Atoms for Peace and the Origins of Nuclear Power in Japan, 1952-1958

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Nuclear Society: Atoms for Peace and the Origins of Nuclear Power in Japan, 1952-1958

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Craig D. Nelson

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2014

Dissertation Committee:

James R. Bartholomew, Adviser

Philip C. Brown

Christopher A. Reed

Craig D. Nelson

2014

Abstract

This project seeks to explain why Japan developed nuclear power despite its negative experiences with nuclear weapons and fallout. It focuses on the period from the end of the American Occupation in 1952, when the Japanese regained full sovereignty, until the signing of the agreement to import a commercial British nuclear reactor in 1958.

The Japanese experience with atomic bombs and radioactive fallout made Japan a seemingly unlikely candidate to develop nuclear power. These fears were renewed following the Lucky Dragon Incident when an American hydrogen bomb test showered a

Japanese fishing vessel with radioactive fallout and contaminated deep water tuna throughout the Pacific. Japan, however, had ample reasons to embrace nuclear power as it: provided a potential solutions to Japan’s energy crisis, while offering Japan a way to secure its place in the international community and a means of defining itself as a nation dedicated to scientific, technological, and economic development. Pro-nuclear advocates identified nuclear power as a key to the advancement of Japan, partaking in what Hiromi

Mizuno termed “scientific nationalism.”

Although Japanese policy makers were interested in the adopting nuclear power before the US offered to extend aid to Japan, the process of doing so was influenced by the American approach to the Cold War and was heavily informed by American efforts to maintain the support of both the government and the general public. While Japanese

ii policy makers moved forward with their investigations of nuclear power, the United

States addressed the Japanese public through a series of exhibitions as part of the Atoms for Peace program to direct the national conversation away from nuclear bomb testing.

As they toured Japan, these exhibitions presented nuclear power as a suite of technologies that would greatly benefit scientific research, medicine, agriculture, industry, and transportation. Seven different national and regional newspapers cosponsored the various legs of these exhibits and presented media campaigns that proselytized for nuclear power far and wide. These exhibitions and the media campaigns that surrounded them helped forge a pro-nuclear consensus in Japan, which would remain durable for decades.

This study combines the political, diplomatic, and social aspects of the adoption of nuclear power. It uses media reports, popular culture, interviews, and polls to gauge the public’s reaction to nuclear power. American efforts to influence nuclear power are examined through the records of the CIA and the United States Information Agency, which was responsible for American public diplomacy efforts. Japanese policy issues are explored using the proceedings of the Diet, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s reports, the Foreign Ministry archives, and trade publications.

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Dedication

For Tom and Anne Nelson, who offered unwavering support

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the people who made this project possible and better than

I could manage on my own. James R. Bartholomew oversaw this dissertation, along with

Philip C. Brown and Christopher A. Reed, all of whom offered constructive comments and valuable advice. David Wittner, who served as my undergraduate adviser, also offered valuable insights and encouragement. This project began its life as a paper written in a diplomatic history seminar run by Robert McMahon. Since my background is in East

Asian history, Professor McMahon and the members of that seminar proved invaluable while I tried to get up to speed on American diplomatic history; particularly, I would like to thank Ryan Dawkins, Mark Rice, and Ryan Irwin for their help. Hiromi Mizuno of the

University of Minnesota offered a great deal of encouragement, very graciously offered advice during the early stages of my dissertation research, and introduced me to other scholars working on nuclear issues in Japan. Since she recommended that I focus on the

Atoms for Peace exhibitions, this would have been a very different document without her assistance.

I would like to thank the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo for hosting me as a Visiting Graduate Fellow, and Nakamura Naofumi and Thomas

Blackwood for serving as my sponsors. This dissertation was written with support from the history department of the Ohio State University, the Fulbright Program, and the D.

Kim Foundation. I would like to thank the Japan-U.S. Education Commission for their help and support, particularly Ito Miyuki. Tomoko Steen at the Library of Congress also gave useful advice and directed me to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, where Eric Vanslander helped me find United States

Information Agency and CIA files that proved vital to my research.

Stephen Shapiro offered advice on military affairs and, along with Anne Sealey, read endless drafts, grant proposals, and presentations. Kjell Erikson, Shi-Lin Loh, and

Lisa Onaga all offered valuable comments on sections of this project, and their assistance was very much appreciated. Beth and Mark Shaffer graciously opened their home to me while I was working in Washington, even though our football loyalties did not always align. I would also like to thank Jim Bach, who helped me negotiate the Ohio State bureaucracy; I do not know how anyone could make it through the Ph.D. process without his cheerful assistance.

Vita

2000...... Proctor Senior High

2004...... B.A. History, Utica College

2009...... M.A. History, The Ohio State University

2005 to present ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department

of History, The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... iv

Acknowledgments...... v

Vita ...... vii

List of Tables ...... xi

List of Figures ...... xii

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: A Nuclear War by Other Means ...... 22

The Post-War Occupation Period and Its Legacy ...... 23

Nuclear Culture in Post-war Japan ...... 41

Atomic Bomb Cinema ...... 44

Atomic Art...... 52

Atoms for Peace ...... 62

Conclusion ...... 90

Chapter 2: Awakening the Monsters of the Deep ...... 92

The Lucky Dragon Incident ...... 94

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Operation Castle ...... 99

Atomic Tuna ...... 105

Atomic Diplomacy ...... 117

The Lucky Dragon in the Headlines ...... 119

The King of the Monsters...... 122

Chronicle of a Living Being ...... 137

Conclusion ...... 146

Chapter 3: Selling the Atom to Japan ...... 149

From Fencing Champion to Editor-in-Chief ...... 151

The Propaganda Master ...... 160

The Hopkins Mission ...... 168

Bringing Atoms for Peace to Japan ...... 177

Promoting the Tokyo Exhibition ...... 189

The Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition ...... 193

Public Response ...... 226

Atomic Politics ...... 230

Conclusion ...... 233

Chapter 4: The Year of Nuclear Power ...... 236

Exhibition Promotion – Kyoto as a representative case ...... 239

Media Promotion ...... 253

The Effectiveness of Atoms for Peace ...... 271

Small Atoms for Peace Exhibitions ...... 288

Protesting a Nuclear Future ...... 294

Conclusion ...... 307

Epilogue – Importing the Future ...... 311

Two warring camps ...... 312

A Plan of Action ...... 326

Conclusion ...... 343

Conclusion ...... 347

Bibliography ...... 350

List of Tables

Table 1. Atoms for Peace exhibition dates, attendance, and sponsors ...... 239

Table 2. Do you feel that atomic energy will prove a boon or a curse on mankind? ..... 278

Table 3. Do you personally expect to derive any benefit from atomic energy in your lifetime? ...... 278

Table 4. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the ability of the big powers to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes? ...... 278

Table 5. Do you feel that the strides made in atomic energy have increased or decreased the chance of war? ...... 280

Table 6. What country do you feel has made the greatest strides in peaceful uses of atomic energy? ...... 282

Table 7. What country do you feel has made the greatest effort to share atomic information with other countries? ...... 282

Table 8. Are you in favor of Japan’s going ahead with atomic research on a broad scale, in a limited way, or not at all?...... 283

List of Figures

Figure 1. Yūrei (Ghosts) by Maruki Iri and Toshi, 1950 ...... 55

Figure 2. The Bravo Shot, March 1, 1954 ...... 102

Figure 3. Each dot on this map indicates a spot where a Japanese fishing vessel caught contaminated fish...... 110

Figure 4. Tuna inspection at Yaizu ...... 115

Figure 5. Comic depicting nuclear fission ...... 257

Figure 6. Comic depicting a chain reaction ...... 258

Figure 7. Comic explaining the function of a moderator in a nuclear reactor ...... 259

Figure 8. Comic depicting two eels discussing electrical power policy ...... 262

Figure 9. Comic showing displays from the Atoms for Peace exhibition ...... 264

Figure 10. Comic showing benefits of atomic research ...... 265

Figure 11. Comic showing more potential uses of atomic research ...... 266

Figure 12. Projections for Japan's nuclear future ...... 316

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Introduction

The Atomic Age was born on August 8, 1945 in the split second between an ordinary Monday morning and a holocaust. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima announced to the world the terrible destructive power of the atom. Tens of thousands were immolated, vaporized, or irradiated in the maelstrom the bomb released, becoming victims to the final days of the deadliest conflict in human history. In the days that followed, Americans celebrated the atomic technology that brought an end to World War

II, while the Japanese were left with the rubble that had once been two great cities. It would be an understatement to say that the Japanese people did not initially share

American euphoria over nuclear technology. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki left an indelible stain on the splitting of the atom, but nuclear weapons were not the only product of the Atomic Age. By the end of the 20th century, Japan would have the third largest civilian nuclear program in the world, a seeming contradiction at the heart of the

Japanese economy.

This project seeks to explain why Japan developed nuclear power despite its negative experiences with nuclear weapons and fallout. Its troubled past with nuclear power led many Japanese people to equate the words “atomic” and “nuclear” with weapons of mass destruction, which is hardly conducive to a large civilian use of nuclear power program. Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons was fierce; it was so great that

1 one in three Japanese signed a petition to end the testing of nuclear weapons in 1954.1

The “peaceful uses of nuclear power,” however, was at the center of the national conversation just a year later, with very little organized opposition to the idea of developing nuclear power. Although 70% of Japanese identified the word “atomic” with

“harmful” in 1956, this number dropped to 30% by 1958.2 This rapid shift in popular opinion is due in large part to the American Atoms for Peace program, which was designed to promote civilian nuclear power throughout the world. The program included a series of touring exhibitions, the largest of which visited eight Japanese cities between

1955 and 1956. These exhibitions thrust nuclear power into the national spotlight while the news media support sold the idea of nuclear power to the Japanese population.

Although American public diplomacy3 was involved in the promotion of Atoms for Peace program, Japan did not adopt nuclear power simply to follow the American lead. Nuclear power was a highly attractive technology for the Japanese for a number of reasons. It provided an opportunity to overcome Japan’s lack of energy resources, remain competitive in a world that would soon be based on nuclear power, be pioneers in an exciting and promising new technology, show the international community that it was a leader in science and technology in the post-war world, and overcome the psychic

1 ishi Matashichi. Bikini Jiken no shinjitsu: inochi no kiro de (T ky Misuzu hob , 003). 2 Cited in Peter Kuznick, “Japan's Nuclear History in Perspective: Eisenhower and Atoms for War and Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 13, 201, accessed June 24, 2014, http://thebulletin.org/japans-nuclear-history-perspective-eisenhower-and-atoms-war-and-peace-0 3 Edumnd Guillon defined public diplomacy as, “The influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.” Cited in United States Information Agency Alumni Association, “What is Public Diplomacy?” Washington, DC, accessed June 4, 014, http://pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org/?page_id=6. 2 scarring caused by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by turning a destructive technology into a constrictive one. Naturally, each of these reasons did not appeal equally to all individuals, but cumulatively they were enough to not only adopt nuclear power, but embrace it as a national project. Atoms for Peace and the media coverage that surrounded it fostered a consensus around the need to develop nuclear power.

Policy makers, however, did not wait for the consensus to materialize before they started laying plans to develop nuclear power. The offer of material aid through Atoms for Peace was enough to set the policy wheels in motion because there was already a group of Japanese bureaucrats, politicians, and academics who were advocating for nuclear power before the announcement of Atoms for Peace. For the most part, this group of proponents focused on policy issues and ignored popular sentiment. They continued to prepare for the implementation of nuclear power even while the country was focused on the radioactive contamination of tuna in the Pacific due to an American nuclear bomb test in 1954, without significant attempts to appeal for public support. The exception was

Shoriki Matsutar , the publisher of the Yomiuri Shimbun and a newly elected member of the House of Representatives, who exerted a great deal of effort to sell the public on the concept of nuclear power. Shoriki used his position as the publisher of the largest newspaper in Japan to promote nuclear power as a way to gain personal power; he parlayed his success at nuclear promotion to become the first chairman of the Atomic

Energy Commission.

Once the exhibitions ended, nuclear issues faded out of the public debate, and policy makers were free to impose their own political agendas on the development of

3 nuclear power. As the Atomic Energy Commission began to develop nuclear power, disputes broke out over how best to develop it. These disputes centered on whether it should be built publicly or privately, whether reactors should be developed domestically or imported from abroad, and whether the reactors should be imported from the United

Kingdom or the United States. In the course the debates, the faction that backed industrial interests defeated the academic faction repeatedly. As a culture of rapid adoption won the day, safety concerns were repeatedly downplayed, setting the stage for future trouble.

This study combines the political, diplomatic, and cultural elements of nuclear power following the end of the American Occupation in 1952 until the signing of the agreement to import a commercial British nuclear reactor in 1958. Each of these aspects is part of the larger story of the adoption of nuclear power in Japan. Although the decision to develop nuclear power was made by government officials, it would have been difficult to enact without the acquiescence of the general populace. Even if postwar Japan did not function as an ideal democracy, politicians still had to stand for election and popular disapproval made some policy options untenable, such as the repeal of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, which forbade Japan from maintaining the potential for war.

Meanwhile, the Americans engaged in a public diplomacy campaign in order to counter the bad press it received from continued nuclear weapons tests. The US aid through

Atoms for Peace to Japan as a direct outcome of the Lucky Dragon Incident, a 1954 accident during which a Japanese fishing vessel was showered with fallout from an

American bomb test and tuna caught throughout the Pacific was subsequently contaminated. The Americans, in effect, tried to sell the Japanese public on a policy that

4 the Japanese government was already pursuing, though the US did so in order to maintain its standing among the Japanese public.

Since the Atoms for Peace exhibitions were organized and held by the United

States Information Agency (USIS), the American records on the exhibition are an invaluable resource. The USIS records held at the National Archive and Records

Administration site in College Park, MD include first hand reports on the exhibitions, explanations of their content, extensive reaction quotes from attendees, surveys of audience reaction, interviews, and summaries of USIS actions to promote the program.

horiki Matsutar ’s CIA name file is also available at the National Archives.4 It details

horiki’s decision to contact the CIA to bring John Jay Hopkins to Japan, his involvement in the Atoms for Peace exhibitions, and his motivation for promoting nuclear power. Naturally, the memos, reports, and telegrams from the USIS and CIA were written by men whose careers were dependent on the impression that they were highly successful at promoting American interests, which raises the question of bias. To the extent possible, these reports have been checked against Japanese sources to verify their accuracy; though they often exaggerate the effectiveness of the USIS and CIA, they are generally accurate, and were more likely to report bad news than the newspapers that covered the events.

Newspapers chronicled the exhibitions extensively in their coverage, which provides an invaluable source to understand the exhibits from a Japanese perspective.

4 It was disclosed as part of the Nazi War Crimes Trial Act of 2005, which declassified the files of people held as war criminals following World War II. This file includes a summary of horiki’s life before and during the war, the war crime charges against him, his efforts to build the first commercial television network in Japan, his unwitting role as a middleman for CIA financial transfers, and as a CIA informant. 5

This study uses ten different newspapers to examine a full range of coverage. These papers include national, regional, and local papers, and they include papers that leaned both to the political left and right. Most of these papers sponsored either one of the main exhibitions or a leg of the smaller exhibition tour. Although the Japanese government approved of and encouraged these exhibitions and pursued a nuclear strategy of its own, it did not formally participate in these events.5 As such, it generated very little in the way oarchival sources that could be used to reconstruct the exhibitions from a Japanese perspective. To examine political issues, this project uses the proceedings of the Japanese

Diet and the records of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, similarly, provide vital information about the Lucky Dragon

Incident and negotiations to import nuclear power to Japan from the US and UK.

Nuclear anxieties extended beyond the news media and often found expression in popular culture. Popular culture provides a valuable lens with which to examine social reactions to contemporary events, but also provokes thought and discussion, thus shaping the national dialogue around critical issues of the day. For example, a film like Gembaku no Ko, which portrays life in Hiroshima several years after the bombing, presents a situation that would have been remote to many Japanese and gives it immediacy through its graphical depiction. Such fictional representations can illuminate or distort reality and bring it to millions of people. This study examines examples of art, film, and comic books to as a means to explore Japanese attitudes toward nuclear issues. In doing so, it

5 The Japanese government was not directly tied to these events, but Shoriki sponsored the Tokyo exhibition. Shoriki was a member of the House of Representatives at the time, but his involvement was as the editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun and as a private citizen. Still, his role as both a public official and private citizen complicate the issue of government involvement. 6 draws on works such as Paul N. Edwards’ The Closed World: Computers and Political

Discourse in Cold War America, in which Edwards uses popular culture to illustrate how the development of digital computers shaped American understanding of the world.

There have been a number of studies regarding the development of nuclear power in various nations, but the Japanese case is unique for a number of reasons. Japan was and remains the only country to suffer a nuclear bombing. The legacies of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki could have provided a serious impediment to the development of a civilian nuclear power, one that was not a factor in other nations. Indeed, the legacy of the bombings amplified outrage over the Lucky Dragon Incident. Rather than hampering nuclear power efforts, Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a catalyst for its development.

As both Yuki Tanaka and Ran Zwigenberg observe, many Japanese, including victims of the bombing of Hiroshima, believed that nuclear power would prove to be so beneficial that it would cancel out some of the harm caused by the atomic bombs.6

Japan also had a unique relationship with the United States, the first country to successfully invade and occupy it. The American occupation lasted for seven years, and afterward Japan was almost entirely dependent on the US for its external security. The

United tates guaranteed Japan’s sovereignty by extending its “nuclear umbrella” over it, which is to say that any country that attacked Japan would be answered by the might of the American nuclear arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, Japan was defended by its

World War II enemy wielding the weapons that its people despised, all while it was

6 Tanaka Toshiyuki, “Genshiryoku heiwa ry to Hiroshima senden k saku no tāgeto ni sareta hibakushatachi,” in Sekai, No. 25 (August 2011); and Ran Zwigenberg, '“The Coming of a econd un” The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power,” The Asia- Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 6, No 1, Feb. 6, 2012. 7 trying to establish itself as a nation that had renounced war. Such contradictions make

Japan a compelling topic of study.

Throughout the 20th century, Japanese policy makers were highly focused on gaining access to energy resources necessary to running a modern economy. Although such preoccupation was not unique among nations in the 20th century, it was extreme and colored Japan’s pursuit of nuclear power to a significant degree. The Japanese decision to attack the United States and invade the Dutch East Indies during World War II was largely based on the desire to secure access to oil deposits in modern-day Indonesia. As

Japan struggled to supply itself with energy throughout the war, it aggressively mined its coal deposits to the point that it undermined the long-term viability of its domestic coal industry. By the time the 1950s rolled around, Japanese policy makers had a heightened sensitivity to energy issues. It had been possible for Japan to import coal from its imperial holdings, but it lost access to its empire after the war. The Chinese Civil War and the

Korean War subsequently led to the establishment of governments that were unwilling to export raw materials to Japan.7 With Japan already suffering from planned blackouts that hampered its production capacity, nuclear promised a new source of energy that the nation sorely needed. If there was a nation that needed a revolution in energy in the

1950s, surely it was Japan.

Finally, the Japanese case is worth study because the geography of the nation is almost uniquely unsuited to nuclear power. et along the “Ring of Fire,” Japan is one of the most seismically active areas in the world and it has a long history of major

7 Laura Hein. Fueling Growth: the Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990), 62-65. 8 earthquake that have caused massive damage. The Great Kant Earthquake of 19 3 is estimated to have killed over 100,000 people, and was still a part of living memory in the

1950s when nuclear policy was being debated. Since nuclear reactors must be located near bodies of water and Japan lacks large rivers, nuclear power plants must be located along the coast, where they are vulnerable to typhoons and tsunamis, as the world learned after the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami of 2011. Despite these vulnerabilities, policy makers in the 1950s expressed surprisingly little concern over the dangers Japan’s geography posed to a nuclear power program.

Atoms for Peace was not a specific program so much as a set of American policies designed to spread nuclear power throughout the world.8 These policies included bilateral agreements for the leasing of fissile materials for nuclear reactors, training programs for engineers, educational exchanges, the establishment of international oversight of nuclear power, and the export of reactor designs. It began as a nuclear disarmament proposal.9 The theory was that the United States and the Soviet Union would create a “bank” of fissile material that could be loaned to countries throughout the world to help with the development of civilian nuclear power programs. Since the supply

8 For more information on the uses of the Atoms for Peace program in the Cold War, see for example: Ira Chernus, Eisenhower'sAtoms for Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); Richard Hewlett and Jack Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Craig D. Nelson, “Nuclear Bonds Atoms for Peace in the Cold War and in the non-Western world,” (MA thesis, Ohio tate University, 009); Kenneth Alan Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006). 9 The origins of Atoms for Peace will be discussed at length in chapter 1. For detailed discussions of the program, see: Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl. Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Martin Medhurst, “Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony the Rhetorical tructure of a Cold War Campaign,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, Nov. 4, Summer 1997: 571-583; Joseph Pilat, Robert Pendley, and Charles Ebinger, eds. Atoms for Peace: an Analysis after Thirty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). 9 of uranium was limited in 1953, the assumption was that as nuclear power programs expanded, the United States and the Soviet Union would have to dismantle their nuclear weapons to keep pace with their commitments.10 The program was intended to foster international cooperation between the Cold War foes and it was timed to take advantage of the thaw in the Cold War following talin’s death in 1953.11 The Soviets balked at the proposal, however, leading to rival programs to support the development of nuclear power, one in the Soviet sphere of influence and the other in the American. After Atoms for Peace failed to build cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the

Americans focused on using the program for propaganda purposes and to help build

American influence throughout the world.12

A number of historians have credited the Atoms for Peace exhibitions as a significant reason for why Japan came to accept the development of nuclear power,13 but there has been very little research on the exhibitions themselves. Ran Zwigenberg and

Yuki Tanaka have both written articles regarding the exhibition at Hiroshima in 1956.

Tanaka rightly points out that many hibakusha (survivors of the atomic bombings) came

10 Lewis Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1962), 358. 11 For information about the American “peace offensive” after talin’s death, see, for example: Vojtech Mastny, “The Elusive Détente talin’s uccesors and the West,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 4. 12 This transition has been discussed at length in Craig D. Nelson, “Nuclear Bonds Atoms for Peace in the Cold War and in the non-Western world,” (MA thesis, Ohio tate University, 009). 13 See for example, Genken sanjūnenshi: henshū Nihon Genshiryoku Kenkyūjo genken 30-nenshi henshū iinkai. (Tokyo Nihon Genshiryoku Kenkyūjo, 1986); Tanaka Toshiyuki, “Genshiryoku heiwa ry to Hiroshima senden k saku no tāgeto ni sareta hibakushatachi,” in Sekai, No. 25 (August 2011); and Yoshioka Hitoshi. Genshiryoku no shakaishi: sono nihon-teki tenka (Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper Publications, 2011). 10 to support nuclear energy as a positive alternative to nuclear weapons,14 and Zwigenberg further argues that “not only did the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fail to prevent

Japanese from embracing nuclear power, on the contrary, it was seen by some contemporaries as a justification for Japan to accept this technology.”15 The Hiroshima exhibition is a natural target of study because of the city’s unique history with the nuclear technology, but it was an exceptional case for that very reason. While Zwigenberg and

Tanaka’s findings hold true for the Hiroshima exhibitions, a broader survey of the nuclear exhibitions shows that the rest of Japan focused far less on the legacy of the atomic bombs and there was virtually no organized resistance outside of Hiroshima, with the exception of halfhearted opposition from the Japanese Communist Party. Tanaka’s narrow focus on Hiroshima leads him to mistakenly state that all of the exhibitions outside of Hiroshima were cosponsored by the Yomiuri Shimbun, under the aegis of the paper’s publisher, horiki Matsutar . In fact, the only newspaper to sponsor more than one of the main eight exhibitions was the Asahi Shimbun, the Yomiuri’s rival.

horiki Matsutar deserves special attention in the history of Japanese nuclear power for a number of reasons. He invited John Jay Hopkins and Ernest Lawrence to

Japan to lecture on nuclear power and invited the United States Information Service to hold the first Atoms for Peace exhibition in Japan (chapter 3), both of which set the stage for future exhibitions and media coverage of nuclear issues. Furthermore, he served as the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and played a key role in shaping

14 Tanaka Toshiyuki, “Genshiryoku heiwa ry to Hiroshima senden k saku no tāgeto ni sareta hibakushatachi,” in Sekai, No. 25 (August 2011), 257. 15Ran Zwigenberg, “‘The Coming of a econd un’ The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 10, Issue 6 No 1, February 6, 2012. 11

Japanese nuclear policy. Shoriki also worked with the CIA to promote nuclear power.

Arima Tetsuo has written multiple books and articles regarding horiki’s involvement with the CIA in which he argues that Shoriki was a key figure in CIA psychological warfare in promoting nuclear power.16 Although Shoriki was unquestionably involved with the CIA and requested materials for use in his media promotions of Atoms for

Peace, he did not promote nuclear power as a cat’s paw for the United tates. horiki benefited personally, professionally, and politically from his pro-nuclear work. As chapter 3 will show, the Yomiuri’s promotion of nuclear power fit into the paper and

horiki’s modus operandi; Shoriki built readership of the Yomiuri since the 1920s through publicity stunts and engaging public interest in science. Shoriki even approached the CIA regarding the possibility of promoting nuclear power, though he did not know that the men he was working with were with the CIA initially.17 The evidence from

horiki’s CIA file shows that the CIA did not orchestrate a massive promotional campaign so much as it served as an intermediary between Japanese groups and the

USIS, the organ of the US government that was designated to carry out public diplomacy.

Shoriki, for his part, proved to be headstrong and the CIA had very little ability to control his actions regarding anything, let alone how to go about promoting nuclear power.

The American effort to spread nuclear power to Japan was just one manifestation of its wider attempt to gain worldwide influence through the use of science and

16 Arima Tetsuo’s work on horiki includes Arima Testuo. C A to sengo Nihon: hoshu g d hopp ry do saigunbi. Tokyo: Shohan, 2010; Arima Testuo. Genpatsu to genbaku: “Ni-bei-ei” kakubus no danmari. Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2012; and Arima Testuo. Nihon-terubi to CIA: hakkutsu-sareta “Shoriki Fuairu.” Tokyo: Shinch sya, 006. 17 “Shoriki Personal Record Questionnaire, 1955,” NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 7-8. 12 technology. The United States and Soviet Union each sought hegemony throughout the world not only through military and alliance systems, but also through the soft power18 of culture. Charles Maier argues that the disparity of power between the United States and its European allies was so great that their relationships greatly resembled those of a formal empire.19 While Maier focused on economic and military alliances, John Krige expanded the comparison to include the scientific relationship between the United States and its European allies. Krige argues that the United States worked to reform the scientific culture of post-war Europe not just to promote American interests, but to create a transatlantic scientific system based on American practices. Despite this gap in resources, however, American power was not absolute, and it engaged in constant negotiations to secure its interests.20 Both the United States and the Soviet Union offered scientific and technical assistance to strengthen the susapport of existing allies and woo potential allies. This support served both as a material aid and as a means of propaganda to demonstrate the superiority of their respective political and economic ideologies.21

18 Soft power is a concept that was developed by Joseph Nye and is the ability of a nation to obtain the support of another without resorting to hard power: military force or monetary persuasion. Giulio Gallarotti explains the distinction between hard and soft power in the following manner “Hard power extracts compliance through reliance on power resources—more direct and often coercive methods (either their symbolic use through threat or actual use), soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations—more indirect and non-coercive methods.” Guilio M. Gallarotti, “ oft Power What is it, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions under which it Can Be Effectively Used,” ( 011) Division II Faculty Publications, Paper 57, accessed June 14, 014, Http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/57. 19 Charles . Maier, “Alliance and Autonomy European Identity and U. . Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years,” in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989), 275. 20 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2006), 11. 21 Joseph Manzione, “ ‘Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military’ The Legacy of cientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963,” Diplomatic History, 24:1 (2000), 49. 13

Japan was a natural target for American hegemony following World War II. It was almost entirely dependent on the United States for its self-defense, which made its relationship with the United States absolutely vital to its security. Under such circumstances, it is easy to imagine that Japan would be obligated to acquiesce to

American desires. John Swenson-Wright, however, argues that the United States did not assume that Japan would do so, and rather negotiated with it frequently and placate its concerns.22 Swenson-Wright points to the Lucky Dragon Incident as an example. The

American government grew concerned over the anti-nuclear weapons testing movement and offered aid under Atoms for Peace as a direct response to the incident.23 This offer of aid included loans of fissile materials, training for Japanese engineers and scientists, and designs of experimental reactors. It also took the form of pro-nuclear propaganda in the form of a series of Atoms for Peace exhibitions to tour Japan.

The Cold War was ideological in nature, with perception of the two sides being one of the chief battle grounds. As such, propaganda played an important role throughout the conflict. The term propaganda is not used here in a pejorative sense, but rather to describe “deliberate and systematic attempt[s] to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”24 Propaganda can either be factually accurate, inaccurate, or a mixture of the two. In his 2006 work, Kenneth Osgood placed propaganda at the heart of the Cold

War, arguing that “Far from being a peripheral aspect of the U.S.-Soviet struggle, the

22 John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?: United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 23 Ibid., 121. 24 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage, 1986). 14 competition for hearts and minds--the cold war of words and deeds--was one of its principal battlegrounds.”25 The Eisenhower administration placed significant emphasis on maintaining and promoting the American image abroad. The use of science and technology played a significant role in these efforts since they demonstrated concrete benefits of allying with the United States. The deployment of Atoms for Peace exhibitions in Japan from 1955 to 1957 are a good example of this trend, especially because they were organized, in part, to defray Japanese concerns about American bomb tests, especially following the Lucky Dragon Incident.

The history of Atoms for Peace in Japan is related to what Odd Arne Westad called the “global Cold War.” Westad argues that the most important elements of the

Cold War were neither centered on Europe nor military affairs, but rather “connected to political and social development in the Third World.”26 Including Japan in global Cold

War is somewhat problematic based on Westad’s definition because Japan was allied with the United tates and as such was part of the “first world” rather than the “third.”

This case is, however, outside of focus on the superpowers, Europe, and military and strategic issues that one finds in traditional scholarship on the Cold War. Atoms for Peace played an important role in the development of nuclear power in Japan, which has caused a host of political, social, and economic issues that continue to resonate decades after the end of the Cold War.

25 Kenneth Osgood. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 11. 26 Odd Arne Westad. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 396. 15

Beyond the Cold War context, this project also fits into national histories of nuclear power. A number of states that developed nuclear power after World War II sought to use the technology as an expression of national identity. In her study of nuclear power in France, Gabrielle Hecht argues that French policy makers sought to develop nuclear power to reinvigorate French national identity in the malaise that developed following a crushing defeat in World War II. In the course of developing reactor designs,

French engineers and policy makers sought to develop a nuclear power program that was uniquely French.27 Lorna Arnold argues that the United Kingdom used their nuclear weapons and reactor programs to demonstrate that it was still a world power following

World War II. According to Arnold, British attempts to keep pace with the United States and Soviet Union in the development of nuclear weapons led them to rush the development of the Windscale nuclear plant. Windscale was designed to produce plutonium for atomic weapons, but the testing of first American and then Soviet hydrogen weapons led the British to retrofit the Windscale plant to produce tritium for hydrogen bombs. This retrofit directly contributed to a reactor fire in 1957.28

Japanese proponents of nuclear power also looked to the symbolic potency of the technology. In 1950, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who would later become Minister of Science and then Prime Minister, proposed the development of nuclear power as a way for Japan to contribute positively to the international community, particularly after the destruction of World War II.29 Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, Asanuma Inejiro, described the

27 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 28 Lorna Arnold, Windscale, 1957: Anatomy of a Disaster (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1992). 29 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Yosan iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Feb. 3, 1950. 16

Atoms for Peace exhibitions by stating, “I foresee a sort of revolution… a second industrial revolution...which will change the world entirely… The world is entering an atomic energy revolution, and Japan must exert every effort to develop atomic energy for peace.”30 These two men, who were on opposite sides of the political spectrum, both saw nuclear power as a way to secure Japan’s place in the world. Nakasone saw nuclear power as a way of rehabilitating Japan in the international community, while Asanuma saw it as being necessary to keep pace with the leading nations. The United States, the

Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were all pouring resources into the development of nuclear technology and it would not do for Japan to fall behind. While the other major nations were developing nuclear power alongside nuclear weapons, Japan would focus solely on the peaceful uses of nuclear power. This focus would further its international reputation as a pacifist nation and as a nation dedicated to science, technology, and economic development. The material benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology would help Japan recover from wartime destruction and, in the words of the Chugoku

Shimbun “make the sacrifice of Hiroshima worthwhile.”31

Using science and technology to promote the nation was not new in the post-war period. As Hiromi Mizuno convincingly demonstrates in Science for Empire, various segments of Japanese society portrayed science and technology as being essential to the success of the empire. Technocrats demonstrated “technological patriotism,” which cast

30 USIS Tokyo to USIA Washington, “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Jan. 1 , 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 2. 31 “Hiroshima genshiryoku 'Heiwa riy haku' ni kitaisuru 2: 'k huku no hi' ni suru kien: Hiroshima no gisei ha muda de nai,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, evening edition, May 15, 1955, 1. 17 science and technology as a way to demonstrate Japan’s superiority to other Asians.32

Marxist intellectuals fought against the concept of the “Japanese spirit,” and sought to replace it with the “scientific spirit,” placing emphasis on Japan’s scientific history.

Meanwhile, popular science writers sought to mobilize the sense of wonder that people experienced while learning about science. Mizuno argues that each of these groups expressed a version of “scientific nationalism,” which she defines as “a kind of nationalism that believes that science and technology are the most urgent and important assets for the integrity, survival, and progress of a nation.”33 Mizuno argues that scientific nationalism persisted in Japan after the war and it is plain to see in the nuclear promotions that surrounded the Atoms for Peace exhibitions, from the mobilization of wonder in the newspapers to politicians’ prognostications that Japan must develop nuclear power or forever fall behind.

This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one explores Japanese attitudes toward nuclear power through 1953, both those held by policy makers and the general public. While a significant number of politicians and bureaucrats viewed the development of nuclear power as essential to the future of the state, the public tended to be more skeptical because many people equated the word “nuclear” with weapons. Although there were pro-nuclear voices in the media and popular culture, discussion and depictions of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proliferated following the end of the

Occupation and its censorship of the Japanese media in 1952. This chapter also examines

32 Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 33 Ibid., 11 18 the origins of the Atoms for Peace program and its initial role as a disarmament program and then as a propaganda tool in the global Cold War. Chapter two discusses the Lucky

Dragon Incident and its effects on Japanese society. The showering of a Japanese fishing vessel with radioactive fallout echoed the atomic bombings and the contamination of tuna throughout the Pacific cut to the heart of Japanese fears of radiation and exposed the vulnerabilities of its food supply. These fears played out both at home and in the media.

Chapter two also looks at two films, Godzilla and Ikimono no Kiroku, to explore Japanese fears of nuclear bomb testing and nuclear war.

Chapter three focuses on the role of Shoriki Matsutar in promotions of the pro- nuclear agenda in 1955, particularly regarding the Atoms for Peace exhibition in Tokyo.

Shoriki viewed nuclear power as a means to gain political power, improve his international standing, and to promote his newspaper. As the publisher of the Yomiuri

Shimbun, Shoriki had decades of experience running publicity campaigns and promoting science and technology and his election to the House of Representatives in February of

1955 left him perfectly placed to promote nuclear power. With assistance from the CIA,

Shoriki brought the Hopkins Mission to Japan and went on to cosponsor the Atoms for

Peace exhibition in Tokyo. A joint effort with the USIS, the Atoms for Peace exhibitions sought to establish the “peaceful uses of nuclear power” as an alternative to the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. They did so by offering a suite of nuclear technologies that would positively benefit humanity, including tools for medicine, scientific research, agriculture, industry, and transportation.

Chapter four explores the Atoms for Peace exhibitions outside of Tokyo and focuses on promotional efforts run by the USIS and its cosponsors. Each exhibition was cosponsored by a national or regional newspaper, which also ran the publicity campaign around the exhibition. The media cosponsors were essential to the success of the Atoms for Peace exhibitions. They lent their legitimacy to the exhibitions by showing that nuclear power was welcomed by local institutions and was not something that was being imposed by a former occupier. The USIS promotions, meanwhile, focused on gaining the support of existing social networks. By approaching schools, social clubs, businesses, unions, and religious organizations, the USIS sought to gain support for the exhibits and then allowed local community members to promote the exhibitions within their organizations and communities.

The final chapter takes the form of an epilogue that shifts the focus from the public facing campaign back to the policy side of nuclear power. The epilogue focuses on the decision making process in the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission as it determined the future of nuclear power in Japan. Although a consensus had formed in policy circles over the need to develop nuclear power, it did not extend to the best way to do so. Two factions developed around nuclear policy. The one led by Shoriki favored rapid, private development of nuclear power through the importation of foreign reactors, while the other was championed by Yukawa Hideki, Nobel laureate in Physics, and urged a slower, public approach that utilized domestic development. horiki’s faction ultimately won the day, and decided to build the Japanese nuclear program around the importation of British reactors, despite concerns over their safety. This policy debate set the tone for Japan’s

20 nuclear future, in which safety concerns were undermined by the demands of industry and the economy.

The question of why the Japanese people decided to support nuclear power in the

1950s despite their experience with the atomic bombs and nuclear fallout is an important one, especially after the 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plan prompted a shift in popular opinion regarding the technology. Following the Fukushima catastrophe, nuclear power critics argued that it was logical for the Japanese to oppose nuclear power because of their experiences with atomic bombings, but this view was not always the dominant one. Nuclear power suited Japan’s needs well in the 1950s and could readily be incorporated as a part of its post-war mission to focus on its economy, science, and technology.

Chapter 1: A Nuclear War by Other Means

This chapter will examine Japanese attitudes toward nuclear issues from the end of World War II through the announcement of the Atoms for Peace policy on December

8, 1953. Policy makers and the general public tended to have very different understandings of nuclear issues. The general public was inclined to associate nuclear power with the destructive capacity of atomic and hydrogen bombs, while policy makers saw it as a solution to Japan’s pressing energy shortage and as a way to reintegrate the country into the international community. This association was reflected in the media, where discussion of atomic weapons far outweighed positive depictions of the civilian uses of nuclear power. Despite the apathy of the masses, a number of bureaucrats, academics, and politicians were already convinced that Japan would adopt nuclear power in a few years before the announcement of Atoms for Peace. Once the policy was announced, the government was positioned to begin the process of preparing for a nuclear power program.

This chapter will also cover the development and announcement of the Atoms for

Peace program. Although Atoms for Peace was originally designed as a disarmament program, it functioned as a propaganda program to counter Soviet allegations that the

United States was focused on the development of nuclear weapons. By publicly sharing peaceful nuclear technology with select countries, the United States could simultaneously combat the negative press surrounding its continued nuclear weapons tests, reward allies, 22 and demonstrate the tangible benefits of allying with the US to countries which were neutral or uncommitted in the Cold War. State Department officials particularly cited

Japan as a key propaganda battleground, and Atoms for Peace seemed to be a potent weapon for combating Japanese antipathy toward nuclear weapons.

Many politicians and the media warmly welcomed news of Atoms for Peace in

Japan, but it did not erase tensions the legacy of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and continued American bomb tests. Nevertheless, Japan had good reasons to develop nuclear power in the 1950s. The nation faced a looming energy crisis that threatened to cripple the recovering Japanese economy, and as a resource poor country, Japan had little hope of supplying its ever growing energy by other means and did not possess an economy capable of supporting sustained imports of coal or oil. Moreover, world opinion had an unbridled optimism for the wonders that nuclear science and technology would offer. Japan would be foolish, therefore, to ignore its potential, especially since it seemed to be the key to a new industrial revolution. By pursuing nuclear power, Japan could engage positively with the rest of the world, prove its modernity, and show that it was still a great power. Although these arguments existed independently of Atoms for Peace, the announcement of the American program proved to be the catalyst that would help vague aspirations plans into action.

The Post-War Occupation Period and Its Legacy

The Japanese people were no strangers to nuclear technology by the 1950s. Not only had Japanese used radioisotopes to produce X-rays for medical imaging for decades,

Japanese scientists, such as Nishina Yoshio, were at the cutting edge of nuclear physics.

Nishina constructed two cyclotrons, one in 1936 and another in 1937, at the Research

Institute for Physics and Chemistry (Riken). As the Pacific War continued, Nishina explained the potential for a nuclear weapon to Lieutenant-General Yasuda Takeo, and in

1941 Nishina became the head of army’s nuclear weapons program. Two years later, the navy began a second, unrelated, effort to develop nuclear weapons, led by Arakatsu

Bunsaku, whose team included Nishina and future Nobel laureate Hideki Yukawa.34

While neither of these programs came close to producing a nuclear weapon,35 Japan was hardly innocent when it came to nuclear weapons research.

Following the war, the United States and the allied powers occupied Japan and banned nuclear research. Initially, SCAP granted Nishina permission to conduct medical and biological research with the cyclotrons at Riken. These orders were countermanded by the ecretary of War’s office, which ordered Riken’s cyclotrons destroyed. The cyclotrons were dismantled and thrown into Tokyo Bay on November 26, 1945, despite protests by Nishina and other scientists that the cyclotrons could be used for peaceful purposes and need not contribute to the capacity for war,36 and Kyoto University’s cyclotron was similarly destroyed. The destruction of the cyclotrons was a significant

34 Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (Philadelphia: Institute of Physics, 1999), 279-285. Also see: Walter E. Grunden, Secret Weapons & World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). 35 There have been a number of claims that Japan succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon, such as Robert nell, “Japan Developed Atomic Bomb; Russia Grabbed cientists,” Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 2, 1946, 1; and Robert K. Wilcox, Japan’s Secret War: Japan’s Race Against Time to Build ts Own Atomic Bomb (New York: Marlowe and Company, 1995). Such claims have been disputed or outright dismissed in responses such as Roger M. Andrews “Review of Japan’s ecret War,” Military History 50, no. 1 (January 1986). 36 Dong-won Kim, Yoshio Nishina: Father of Modern Physics in Japan (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2007), 153-155. 24 blow to the Japanese ability to conduct nuclear physics research, especially because their construction was forbidden. Six years later, when American attitudes toward Japanese atomic research had been largely reversed, the Federation of American Scientists proposed that the United States government either replace the cyclotrons it had destroyed or reimburse the Japanese. The Department of State debated the issue, ultimately decided to ignore the issue. George L. Harris of the State Department argued:

As an informal expression of opinion, I suggest that any favorable reaction to the proposed project in Japan would be more than offset by the propaganda capital which would certainly be made by the communists and other hostile elements in the rest of Asia and in Japan itself. Asians generally are extremely sensitive to the allegation—vigorously promoted by the communists of course—that the United tates is engaged in “atom diplomacy.” …In this climate of propaganda and opinion, it seems obvious that any action by the US at this time which could be interpreted as putting atomic technology into the hands of the Japanese would only improve the communist propaganda opportunity by intensifying Asian fears of both US and Japanese intentions.37

John Patterson followed up Harris’s comments by adding that he did not believe that the

American public would support the U giving technology that could be used for “military purposes.”38 Harris concluded that rather than rebuild the cyclotrons, it would be safer, from a propaganda perspective, for the United States to engage in an educational outreach program to Japan. 39

This discussion highlights the keen consideration that American officials in the

tate Department paid to the propaganda value of “atom diplomacy,” though the weight that the United States would place on the topic would shift in the coming years. Harris

37 George L. Harris, “Proposal of Federation of American cientists to replace cyclotrons destroyed in Japan or reimburse Japanese for their loss,” ep., 7, 1951, NACP, RG 59, Box 51, 1 Japan – General 1947-1952, 1-2. 38 Ibid., 1. Although cyclotrons are primarily useful for basic research, they can be used to enrich materials for a bomb. They are, however, among the least efficient ways of doing so. 39 Ibid., 2. 25 refers to Communist use of information as propaganda while studiously avoiding referring to the American campaign to influence people as such, though he clearly considers the propaganda value of American actions. The issue of propaganda is an essential one because this discussion took place during the Cold War, and every decision

American policy makers made about the sharing of nuclear technology in the 1950s took place within the Cold War framework. As the Cold War deepened and the strategic value of a rearmed Japan became clearer, the Americans shifted their original intention from making Japan into a neutral, disarmed nation to rearming Japan so that it could help in the defense of the “free world.” ince many Asian countries had only recently been attacked and occupied by Japan, the idea of a rearmed Japan was rather alarming to many in Asia, a concern toward which Harris shows some sensitivity. Overall, however, Cold

War considerations often overshadowed considerations of nuclear proliferation, though sometimes they complemented them.

The transition from the American policy of disarming Japan to encouraging it to rearm was not entirely smooth, as discussions surrounding the end of the Occupation make clear. The Occupation of Japan ended with the Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed on September 8, 1951 and came into effect on April 28, 1952. Although this treaty was to return full sovereignty to Japan, during the negotiation of the Treaty, members of the Department of State debated whether to limit Japanese development of both military and civilian nuclear technology. The debate took place within the Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs after the US. Atomic Energy Commission offered to help draw up

26 post-occupation controls on nuclear power development.40 Although the main concern was the development of nuclear weapons, the AEC considered the development of nuclear power as an essential step on the road to developing nuclear weapons, and therefore, based on the policy of disarmament, it was in the United tates’ interest to prevent it. Ultimately, the United States decided not to pursue any limitations on

Japanese military development because, as U.A. Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of

tate, explained, “In fact, we were anxious for Japan to re-arm to the fullest extent practicable, as soon as possible, in order that it may share in the common defense of the

Pacific area.”41 William C. Foster agreed, but made the distinction that the issue should be entirely in Japan’s hands, arguing that, “Measures that Japan undertake[s] in the atomic energy field should be performed voluntarily and on a fully sovereign basis.”42

Instead he advocated that United States negotiate with the Japanese government regarding nuclear technology after the Treaty was in effect.

Following up on the question of conducting an agreement on the development of nuclear technology in Japan, Dr. John C. Bugher, Director of the Division of Biology and

Medicine of the Atomic Energy Commission, went to Japan in 1952, shortly after the

Treaty went into effect. Although many of his assessments were on the prospect of developing commercial nuclear power generation, the development of nuclear power was also of vital interest to medicine and basic scientific research. Nuclear reactors generate

40 R. Gordon Arneson, “Atomic Energy Controls in Japan,” Nov. 9, 1951, NACP, RG 59, Box 51, 1 Japan – General 1947-1952. 41 George piegel, “Atomic Energy Controls in Japan,” Nov. 8, 1951, NACP, RG 59, Box 51, 21 Japan – General 1947-1952. 42 William C. Foster, “Atomic Energy Controls in Japan,” Dec. 31, 1951, NACP, RG 59, Box 51, 21 Japan – General 1947-1952. 27 radioisotopes that are vital for research and medical treatments, and many of these isotopes have a half-life short enough that transporting them from abroad was not a viable option. Medical practitioners, therefore, had as much of an interest in building research reactors as physicists did. More broadly, Bugher also supported the development of commercial nuclear power in Japan, suggesting that the lack of natural resources and the inability to expand hydroelectric power beyond its boundaries made Japan an ideal candidate. The high price of electric power would make developing a nuclear plant in

Japan more cost effective than doing so in the United States, where an abundance of coal made electricity comparatively cheap, an argument that would be echoed in a report commissioned by the National Planning Association43 and by any number of Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, and academics.44

While in Japan, Bugher met with Dr. Kameyama Naoto, President of the Japanese

Science Council, with whom he discussed the potential for nuclear power in Japan.

Bugher reported that, “These conversations had revealed that the Japanese have collected information on atomic energy and desire to move ahead with an atomic energy program.

Although there has been considerable thought given to this matter in scientific and political circles, there has been very little, if any public discussion about it.”45 Bugher’s assessment, based on his conversations with Dr. Kameyama, underplays the public attention that nuclear power had received in Japanese newspapers, which had published

43 Michael Sapir and Sam J Van Hyning, Productive Uses of Nuclear Power: The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan (Washington: National Planning Association, 1956), 4. 44 See for example the comments by Fukui Isamu regarding the cost efficiency of nuclear power versus coal and hydroelectric power at the meeting of the Economic Stabilization Agency of the House of Representatives on Dec. 9, 1952. 45 “Japanese Aspiration on an Atomic Energy Program for Japan,” Dec. 15, 195 , NACP, RG 59, Box 51, Japan General 1947-1952. 28 thousands of pro-nuclear articles throughout the Occupation period.46 While the conversation was further advanced among policy elites than among the general public,

“Dr. Bugher noted that that the ‘knowledgeable’ circles had not given as much thought to the type of reactor or reactors that might be constructed as they had to the question of which agency would be ‘top dog’ in any future atomic energy set-up.”47 The debate over who would be in charge of the overseeing nuclear power was fairly typical of Japanese bureaucracy, and would remain a debate at the center of nuclear research in Japan for some time. It should not be surprising, however, that the Japanese officials had yet to decide on a reactor type in 1952, given that the first commercial reactor would not go online until 1956, and relatively few countries had delved into nuclear reactor development at this point

The fact the Japan was not a world leader in nuclear power in 1952 was a natural outcome of its losing World War II. Dr. Bugher’s visit occurred just after the end of the

Occupation. The Americans had also banned nuclear research in addition to destroying the equipment that would have facilitated research. Even if the Japanese had wanted to pursue nuclear research, it simply was not an option for Japan. In a budget meeting,

Kawashima Kinki questioned Kameyama Naoto on the status of nuclear research in

Japan “The promotion of science and technology is an extremely important matter. It goes without saying that the rise and fall of nation’s civilization is tied to science and technology. Now, as you know, today’s Japan has a number of political and economic

46 Shi-lin Loh, “Printed Traces Nuclear cience in Japan Under Allied Occupation,” Asia-Pacific STS Network Conference, Singapore, July 16, 2013. 47 “Japanese Aspiration on an Atomic Energy Program for Japan,” Dec. 15, 195 , NACP, RG 59, Box 51, Japan General 1947-1952. 29 restrictions, let alone lacking autonomy… For example, the world is now in the Atomic

Age, but in regards to nuclear research what limitations does Japan face —and I do not meant limit it to just that, but what limits do we face?”48 Kameyama demurred that he was not an expert in nuclear issues before explaining that Japan had the scientific talent to do world-class nuclear research, but not the money. He succinctly summarized the problem stating, “However, you cannot simply do nuclear power research with mathematics and thought. It is not so much that Japan has been forbidden to do research that requires equipment, but that we do not have the facilities because we do not have the money.”49 Despite the fact that Diet members recognized, or at least paid lip service, to the importance of nuclear energy, they had yet to allocate funds to support its development. Since Japan was still rebuilding from World War II and faced severe budgetary limitations, such support would not be forthcoming for another two years.

Various legal issues also had to be resolved before Japan could pursue nuclear power: was it even constitutional for Japan to use any nuclear technology? Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution declared “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”50 Although the wording of the article seems fairly straightforward, it raised a number of thorny issues. After all, what is war

48 Kawashima Kinki, Syūin yosan iinkai k ch kai, shugiin gijiroku, Feb. 17, 1951. 49 Kameyama Naoto, Syūin yosan iinkai k ch kai shugiin gijiroku, Feb. 17, 1951. 50 The Constitution of Japan, accessed Feb. 6, 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 30 potential? For example, should civilian manufacture of weapons, even rifles for sport, be considered “war potential” as some legal experts maintained? The wording of Article 9, after all, states that the “Japanese people” renounced war, which some interpreted to mean that civilians had to take responsibility for avoiding building war potential, not just the government. Meanwhile, others argued that “war potential” simply referred to the ability of the nation to conduct a war if hostilities broke out, which would not include industrial or research capacity that could be utilized should this occur.51

Whether the development of nuclear power should be considered as “war potential” was contentious. After all, during the Manhattan Project, the scientists working on the American bomb considered the development of a nuclear reactor capable of going critical a necessary precondition of developing an atomic bomb.52 Furthermore, the infrastructure and fuel developed for a nuclear power program could be repurposed for a nuclear weapons program.53 The interpretation of the clause has changed throughout the years, allowing for the development of a National Police Reserve in 1950, which became the National Safety Force in 1952, then the National Safety Agency, and finally the Japan

Defense Agency in 1954. The Japanese founded the Police Reserve at the behest of the

Americans so that Japan could take part in its own defense. The accepted explanation for why these forces were acceptable is that Japan renounced war, not self-defense. For some, however, self-defense was not limited to conventional forces. Ishizaka Toyokazu

51 Kuriyama Yoshio Tsūsy sangy iinkai k ch kai , kizokuin gijiroku, June 10, 1952. Although MITI had not declared private production of weapons and munitions to be “war potential” and thus unconstitutional, the matter was under some debate. 52 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). 53 Infrastructure in the United States and United Kingdom, for instance, was used for both civilian and military purposes. Such concerns form much of the basis for American objections to the development of a nuclear program in Iran as of the writing of this dissertation. 31 argued that for the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces saying, “What is called ‘military preparedness’ changes with the times… In ancient times, military preparedness took the form of cavalry and armaments, but today war potential includes using the very secrets of the cosmos. By bringing together the best of science, with the commitment of time, intelligence and money, we could build something like a nuclear-powered plane, submarine, or an atomic-powered death ray; we have the equipment. I think it is unfair to conclude that military preparedness only occurs when you provision an army with weapons and personnel. Therefore, I think reserve corps and self-defense forces are inadequate in today’s world, especially given the current international situation, not to mention the domestic state of affairs.”54 Ishizaka argued that the Self-Defense force required modern weaponry, based on the latest science, to be able to conduct modern warfare, which was necessary to defend the nation. In 1959, Prime Minister Kishi would voice a similar opinion, stating that Article 9 did not prevent Japan from developing nuclear weapons to defend itself.55

The debate over Article 9 was in full force in 1952, with Prime Minister Yoshida insisting that developing the peaceful uses of nuclear power did not constitute “war potential,” while constitutional scholars, such as asaki ichi, Fujita Tsugo, and Ashida

Hitoshi, continued to disagree about its legality.56 Yoshida held that the development of civilian nuclear technology did not violate Article 9, though not without some degree of controversy. Yoshida stated his position during the House of Representatives Fiscal Year

54 Ishizaka Toyokazu, Yosan iinkai Sh wa 27-nen yosan to kenp ni kansuru sy iinkai kizokuin gijiroku, March 23, 1952. 55 James E Auer, “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution from Renunciation of Armed Forces ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World,” Law and Contemporary Problems 171, 1990, 53. 56 Yosan iinkai Sh wa 27-nen yosan to kenp ni kansuru sy iinkai kizokuin gijiroku, March 23, 1952. 32

Budget and Constitutional Affairs subcommittee meeting on March 23, 1952. When confronted with the argument that the development of nuclear power would be unconstitutional under Article 9 because it would have latent war potential, he held that it was not and that most legal scholars agreed with him. To defend his position, he argues that the Diet has the power to decide whether developing this technology violated the

Constitution, arguing “Throughout the Constitution, it states that there is no higher organ of the state than the Diet. The preamble states that sovereignty rests with the people, but… the place where this sovereignty of the people is institutional expressed is the Diet.

Therefore this national opinion is integrated through the Diet.”57 Since the Diet was the means by which the people’s will was expressed, according to Yoshida it was the organ of state that could determine the constitutionality of laws. Yoshida’s argument neatly sidestepped Article 81, however, which grants the Supreme Court the power to determine the constitutionality of laws.58 Regardless of Yoshida’s assertions that the development of nuclear power did not constitute “war potential,” the upreme Court ultimately had the authority to affirm or reject Yoshida’s interpretation. The upreme Court did not take up the issue and has never found that the government has violated Article 9.59

By pushing through his interpretation, Yoshida established that nuclear power research was itself constitutional and paved the way for future development of nuclear power, though the Diet would not allocate research funds for another two years. That

57 Yoshida Shigeru, Yosan iinkai Sh wa 27nen yosan to kenp ni kansuru sy iinkai kizokuin gijiroku, March 23, 1952. 58 The Japanese Constitution, accessed Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 59 Carl F. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: a Comparative Analysis (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 156-157. 33

Japan had this debate at all speaks to the post-war difficulties of developing nuclear power. Not only was Japan forbidden to do nuclear research during the occupation, its equipment was destroyed, and it lacked the funds to even restart research. There was significant public and political distrust of nuclear technology. The military limitations that Japan faced also potentially limited its early investment in nuclear technology. Most nuclear research in the US, UK, and USSR was heavily connected to military applications, but the Japanese government could not rally enough political support for developing even if it could get around Article 9. ince Japan’s constitution forbade it from developing offensive military capacity, it did not face the same need to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear submarines, let alone the enrichment, production, or research infrastructure to support military applications.

Despite obstacles, the desire to develop nuclear power in Japan made considerable sense. World War II had damaged Japanese electrical infrastructure greatly, with bombings destroying many thermal power plants while wartime exigencies leading to neglect of transmission infrastructure.60 Although hydroelectric dams survived the war largely intact due to their remoteness, most of the readily accessible rivers had already been dammed making expansion of electric power on the basis of hydroelectricity difficult.61 Besides, the electric power output of hydroelectric dams varies based on season, with dams on rivers without storage ponds producing the most electricity when rivers run fastest during the wet months, but more slowly during dry periods. In years

60 Laura Hein, Fueling Growth. 70. 61 Michael Sapir and Sam J. Van Hyning, The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan (Washington: National Planning Board, 1956). 34 when there was drought, electric output could be greatly diminished during the period when electric demand was the greatest, as occurred periodically throughout the 1950s.62

Government officials considered thermal plants the main alternative to hydroelectric power, though this path was problematic also. Coal had been central to

Japanese electric power production before and during the war, and it remained vital afterward, but coal proved a problematic energy source. Laura Hein points out that coal production was undermined during the course of the war when coal mine owners sought temporarily to increase production by practicing techniques that sacrificed long-term, sustainability.63 The domestic coal industry regularly failed to meet demand, and the loss of Japan’s continental empire meant that coal sources in Korea and China were no longer available to them. In fact, the 1949 Communist Revolution cut off all imports from

China, and the division of Korea during and after the Korean War prevented the importation of coal from North Korea. When the Japanese sought to import high quality coal to use for coking steel, it had to do so at great expense from Pennsylvania and West

Virginia. Although Hein skillfully outlines how coal remained at the heart of Japanese electric production planning throughout the 1950s until oil became a cheap alternative, nuclear power was an alternative to a coal industry that regularly failed to meet its quotas.

62 1951 saw a particularly bad power crisis with regular blackouts and planned power outages throughout the year. Some of these outages were due to infrastructure limitations, while others were there result of strikes at power plants. ee for example, “Takasugiru denryoku riy kin: Shinnendo no wariate ch sei,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Feb. 26, 1950, ; “Kinkyū teiden,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Jan 09, 1951, ; “Ky wa teiden nashi? Denryoku kiki,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Feb. 11,1951, 3; “Daiya yubiwa sanko musumu; teidentyū chūginza no tokeiten de,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Oct. 05, 1951, 3. 63 Hein, 64. 35

Energy security remained a vital topic throughout the electrical generation debates of the 1950s. Since Japan produced very little oil domestically and had problems keeping up with demand for coal, both sources would need to be imported despite efforts to increase domestic coal production. Many Japanese who had live through a war that had started over efforts to secure natural resources, particularly oil, remained sensitive to the issue of importing a substance that was vital to daily life. This problem was especially acute because the Japanese economy remained fragile while rebuilding after the war.

Prospects improved as Japanese companies built material to support the UN intervention in Korea, but policy makers were very conscious of the balance of trade, with MITI regulating currency outflow in order to limit importation throughout the decade. Since

Japan had no uranium mines and limited prospects for locating a source of fissile materials, any nuclear fuel would need to be imported. Proponents argued, however, that uranium or thorium could be stockpiled more effectively and that nuclear plants would require a relatively small amount of fuel compared to the volume of coal or oil needed to produce a similar amount of electricity.

Energy security was vital to politicians and bureaucrats responsible for planning the nation’s future, but also to businessmen. By the 1950s, most economic activity depended on electricity. Without power, factories could not run, offices could not be lit, and production would screech to a halt. Increased consumer demand and sluggish development of new production left many companies reeling in the early 50s. Rationing of power became a high priority, with some factories were reduced to having power only

36 two days a week.64 The ever growing demand provided a crisis and a potential opportunity: without new sources of power, the economy could not grow and might experience a painful reversal, but the demand insured a steady market that would yield years of profit for anyone who could provide a new source of power. Businessmen were free to choose among the alternatives available, but each had its drawbacks. The growing unionization of coal miners left the industry with chronic strikes65 that introduced instability into the supply of coal. However, nuclear power, though unproven, seemed a long-term solution to a problem that did not seem to be going away. While coal remained dominant until the switch to oil in the 1960s, it was apparent that the crisis Japan faced was so great that most former zaibatsu started developing nuclear research and technology after 1955. They did so by developing industrial research groups that brought together the companies that had constituted zaibatsu during the war: Mitsubishi Atomic

Industry Group, Tokyo Atomic Industrial Consortium (composed of Hitachi and Showa

Electric), Sumitomo Atomic Electric Energy Commission, Nippon Atomic Industry

Group (Mitsui and Toshiba), and First Atomic Power Industry Group (Furukawa and

Kawasaki). Although Hitoshi Yoshioka expresses puzzlement why these companies would start a long investment project that would not see profits for almost 20 years,66 this long-term investment in technology that could help resolve a vital issue of national security and economic interest made sense given the issues Japanese business faced at the time.

64 Hein, 70. 65 Hein, 84-92. 66 “Forming a Nuclear Regime and Introducing commercial reactors,” in Nakayama Shigeru and Hitoshi Yoshioka, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Volume 2: Road to Self-reliance, 1952-1959 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2005), 81. 37

And there were other benefits to nuclear power. First, the decision to develop nuclear power was being made in a period when scientists, engineers, bureaucrats, politicians, businesspeople, and laymen throughout the world saw it as the defining technology of the future. The splitting of the atom and the atomic bomb were often cited as the most important events in history, and people’s imaginations ran away with them as they imagined a future free of want and suffering because of the myriad benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom. In the 1950s, the splitting of the atom supposedly meant atomic-powered cars, air planes that could stay in the air for months at a time, new conveniences for housewives, and energy so cheap it was essentially free.

Deeply impressed by the potential of nuclear power, people came to believe that nuclear technology could solve all problems and would lead to a utopian future. This phenomenon has been well studied in the US and Europe,67 but it holds true for the Japan as well. Observers in Japan, much like those throughout the world, thought that nuclear power could produce a new industrial revolution that would fundamentally change every aspect of the world economy.68 Japan could either invest in nuclear technology and reap the rewards or it would fall behind. As House of Representatives member, and future

Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro put it Japan would “forever be a fourth-rate nation”

67 For discussions of global nuclear culture, see for example: Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Mark Langer, “Why the Atom is Our Friend Disney, General Dynamics, and USS Nautilus,” Art History, 18 (1995), 63-96. The British Journal for the History of Science offered a special edition dedicated to nuclear culture in Britain. See The British Journal for the History of Science, Volume 45, Special Issue 4, December 2012, especially articles by Christoph Laucht and Adrian Bingham. 68 ee for example the comments of Hanyū anshichi, Kizokuin Gijiroku, Nov. 06, 1953, No. 5, entry 35. 38 if it did not participate in “the largest discovery of the twentieth century.”69 And

Masazumi, the Minister of Education, similarly declared, “Unlike Western countries,

Japan does not focus on promoting science the way it should. If you compare us to

Western countries, we're perpetually lagging behind… Japan is particularly lagging behind in the Atomic Age. We need to put everything into nuclear research.”70 Just a day before the Atoms for Peace speech, Miki Takeo, who later became Prime Minister, went so far as to ascribe Japan’s unwillingness to pursue nuclear power wholeheartedly to a lack of the “pioneer spirit” that he believed was what made America great.71 Miki believed that for Japan to be a great country, it needed to develop this pioneer spirit by being on the frontier of science and technology. Nuclear power, therefore, became a crucial test for Japan’s future it could either choose to pursue new technologies or become a backwater. This line of argument gained weight given Japan’s recent defeat in a war in which it was outmatched by a technologically superior foe.

Nuclear power, along with other science and technology projects, gave Japan a way of reintegrating into the international community after World War II. Nakasone, in particular, advocated this approach. In a speech, Nakasone stated “According to my understanding of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, the issue of civilization was the entire motivation. T j Hideki was an enemy of civilization and so he received the death penalty. Therefore, a number of things can be done to develop civilization. We can conduct scientific research and we can share the fruits of that research.”72 He specifically

69 Cited in Evan Osnos, “The Fallout,” The New Yorker, 87.32 (Oct. 17, 2011), 46. 70 And Masazumi, in the Diet Proceedings, Monbu iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Dec. 15, 1954. 71 Miki Takeo, Denki tsūshin iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Dec. 7, 1953. 72 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Yosan iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Feb. 3, 1950. 39 cited the development of nuclear medicine and air planes as positive ways that Japan could contribute to world civilization. This desire to contribute to “civilization,” coupled with the desire to avoid falling behind, was tied to securing Japan’s place in the post-war world and charting a new path in international affairs. Japan’s previous plan of developing a colonial empire fell apart at the end of World War II, leaving the nation in need of a new direction. Rather than a military power, Nakasone’s vision was one based on scientific and technological prowess. In the Atomic Age, what could showcase Japan’s modernity better than nuclear technology?

Nuclear power addressed several key issues in Japanese society. Most importantly, it provided a technological fix to a set of economic problems centered on a lack of energy sources in Japan. Nuclear power offered a seemingly endless and miraculous amount of energy that promised to revolutionize industry and every other aspect of human life, and it would certainly solve the looming energy shortages.

Although many of Japan’s energy problems and blackouts centered on strikes that did not pose a long-term risk to energy availability, they brought energy to the forefront of people’s minds and created a mindset that something needed to be done about energy, giving the issue a resonance that any number of charts, graphs, and white papers would not have. But nuclear power was also a potent symbol of national revival and an optimistic, technology-based future, one that would see Japan reintegrate into world society. It would have been a perfect fit, in fact, except for its unsavory associations in the public mind.

Nuclear Culture in Post-war Japan

While the Japanese elite may have recognized that nuclear technology went beyond weapons, the Japanese general public generally connected the word “nuclear” with bombs, making the development of nuclear technology even trickier. Signs that the

Japanese public distrusted the word “nuclear” are apparent throughout the early 1950s.

For example, in a budget committee meeting, Kawashima Kinji argued, “We're not thinking of using nuclear power for military purposes but ordinary people don't understand this [distinction].”73 During the Atoms for Peace exhibitions, which will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4, the Nishi Nippon Shimbun conducted a roundtable interview with people who were connected with the Fukuoka exhibition.

Several of the people at that interview similarly stated that the Japanese associated the term “nuclear” with nuclear weapons

Inoue Shinsaku (director of nuclear research at Kyushu Electric Power Company): Japanese tend to associate nuclear fission with something explosive like atomic bombs, but as far as reactors are concerned, they never explode. You can rest assured that reactors are quite safe.

Kita Yoko (Fukuoka Women’s Club representative) When I left home this morning to see the Exhibit, my relatives warned me to watch out in case the Exhibit should explode.

Arita Hiroshi (a junior high school teacher): Japanese are prone to associate atoms with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.74

A similar sentiment was also expressed in a comic appearing in the Chūnichi Shimbun, in which a figure in white lab coat with an atom for a head introduces itself to a pair of

73 Kawashima Kinji, Syūin yosan iinkai k ch kai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Feb. 17, 1951. 74 “IC Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report, Feb. 25, 1957,” NACP, RG 59, Box 1 , Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1957 Part 1 of 2, 12. 41 children as “nuclear power”; the children imagine that the atom-headed figure will explode and try to run away (see figure XX).75 American observers also suggested this mental connection, with Bugher’s report stating that, “Mr. Hawley agreed that there had been a strong feeling in Japan up to the present time that atomic energy means only the construction of atomic weapons. He would be strongly in favor of undertaking a program that would help dispel these Japanese views and help correct Japan’s precarious economic situation.”76 Although educated Japanese, particularly policy makers and academics, were well aware of the potential of civilian uses of nuclear power in 1952, the general populace was far more likely to connect the word “nuclear” with the weapons that had devastated two of their cities.

Bugher’s trip occurred shortly after the end of the American Occupation, and so it marked the first time since the dropping of the atomic bombs that the press operated without external censorship. During the Occupation, SCAP censors limited the types of information about the bombs that could be published.77 Such censorship played multiple roles: naturally, it kept the Japanese public from gaining a full understanding of the horrors of the atomic bombs, which could have incited significant resentment, but it also blocked the spread of information that could potentially help other nations, such as the

Soviet Union, build their own bombs. With the end of the Occupation, the press was no

75 “Wakariyoi ‘atomu no ky shitsu’: heiwa riy haku de benky ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 5, 1956, 3. 76 “Japanese Aspiration on an Atomic Energy Program for Japan,” Dec. 15, 195 , NACP, Box 51, Japan General 1947-1952. 77 For a discussion of postwar censorship, see: Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American censorship in occupied Japan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991). 42 longer prevented from covering the atomic bombs in full. As a result, 1952 was a landmark year for public discourse on the affects and legacy of the atomic bombs.

On the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima the Asahi Shimbun published an elaborate, multiday spread on Hiroshima, describing the effects of the bomb for one of the first times in Japanese media. There were seven articles related to the bombing of

Hiroshima on August 6th, with two opinion pieces in the morning invoking Hiroshima and the hope for peace and another six in the evening describing the observation of the anniversary. The latter pieces describe the ceremony that took place in Hiroshima, which included the dedication of the register of the dead, public addresses, and the singing of the “Hiroshima Peace ong,” which the Asahi himbun described as “striking one in the chest.” It describes how a speaker told the hundreds of thousands who died to “Please rest peacefully because we will not repeat this mistake,” while others extolled the witnesses to remember what happened so that it would not happen again. 78 The coverage spans almost half a page, which was completely different from the occupation years. In previous years, there were between one and four articles related to the bombing of Hiroshima in the

Asahi during the period between the anniversaries bombing of Hiroshima and Japan’s surrender. Between 1946 and 1951, these articles tended to be buried low on interior pages and were easy to miss. For the most part, they did little but acknowledge that there was an anniversary ceremony and perhaps offer wishes for peace. The coverage on the fifth anniversary was particularly noteworthy: it consisted of one tiny article on the third

78 “Mune utsu ‘Hiroshima no uta’ Hiroshima no genbaku kinenshikiten,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Aug. 6, 1952, 3. 43 page of the morning addition.79 The sometimes emotional coverage stoked the public consciousness of what happened in Hiroshima and sparked public discussion of the events, reinforcing the all too real connection between nuclear weapons and destruction.

The coverage continued with periodic articles for the next week and were eventually folded into a full page of a piece on the anniversary of the end of the war on August 15th.

Atomic Bomb Cinema

Coverage of the events of Hiroshima in the aftermath of the Occupation was not limited to the print media, of course. On August 6, 195 , Kindai Eiga Ky kai Productions released Genbaku no Ko, which means Children of the Atomic Bomb, though it was later released in the United States as Children of Hiroshima. Genbaku no Ko follows Ishikawa

Takako as she returns to Hiroshima six years after the end of the war. Ishikawa was orphaned by the atomic bomb, and has since moved to a nearby island to live with her aunt and uncle. Ishikawa’s trip coincides with the Obon festival, which is a symbolically laden choice. Obon is time when people who live away from their hometown traditionally return home to visit with family and tend their family’s ancestral gravesite. It is also when the spirits of the dead are supposed to return to the world of the living and visit the household shrine kept in their memory. As Ishikawa is leaving her new home, most of the people she meets are excited and happy for her that she is returning to her hometown, with only the ferry captain making a veiled reference to the tragedy that struck the city.

The vast majority of the people seem happy to live without thinking of what happened in

79 “Ky genbaku kinenbi; Hiroshima heiwa matsuri nado moyoosu,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Aug. 6, 1950, 3. 44

Hiroshima, which the film suggests was the wider Japanese attitude toward the city.

Ishikawa’s aunt even goes so far as to say that Ishikawa is always cheerful, adding, “I don’t like to remember the past, but I can’t help it,” to which Ishikawa responds, “I’ve already forgotten.”80

Despite Ishikawa’s cheerful demeanor and insistence that she is past the event, the sights of the city quickly bring her back to the past. The film does not allow either

Ishikawa or the viewer to forget what happened in Hiroshima. Shindo Kaneto, the director, was himself from Hiroshima, though he was away from the city when the bombing happened. He takes great pains to show the wreckage of the city that existed in spite of the years of rebuilding. The opening credits are played over long pans of collapsed walls and ruined buildings, and Ishikawa’s first sight of the city is full of the ramshackle houses along the waterfront. As the camera pans along the sights of the city, a voiceover by Ishikawa breaks the fourth wall and addresses the audience directly, explaining, “Everyone, this is Hiroshima. This city died on August 6, 1945, when the world's first atomic bomb exploded. Her beautiful rivers still flow, just as they did on that day. Today, her beautiful sky is just as big as it was on that day. Those who were children on that day were made to grow up fast. And the homes and buildings that were destroyed have been rebuilt.”81 This scene shows wide swaths of the city, which includes areas that still show signs of destruction and those that have been rebuilt.

80 Arata Osada and hind Kaneto. Genbaku no Ko. DVD. Directed by hind Kaneto. Tokyo Kadokawa Shoten, 2001. 81 Ibid. 45

Ironically, the film immediately cuts to Ishikawa standing before her family’s house, which had not been rebuilt. She clears some of the rubble before placing flowers before a rock that seems to serve as a marker before clapping her hands and announcing to her parents and sister that it is her. As she prays, she relives the morning of the bomb, which was an otherwise ordinary morning. The family jokes and makes plans for the evening while hurrying out the door. From this domestic scene where people talk casually about the cancellation of the morning air raid, the film shows the clock approaching 8:15 am, when the bomb fell. It cuts between scenes of children heading to school and playing on the playground and an infant suckling at its mother’s breast. The detonation of the bomb is not shown directly, but rather a scene where plants are buffeted by heavy winds and begin to shrivel. From this point, there are a series of quick cuts that show a girl badly burned, bare-breasted and bleeding women writhing in pain, survivors blackened beyond recognition trudging through the streets while two naked children clutch each other in the foreground, and a child screaming while poking at its dead mother. The montage continues and builds with a mushroom cloud, a man whose skin has been badly burned and heavily scarred, a funeral at a Buddhist temple, and finally a graveyard. The cuts between the images are rapid and jarring, disorienting the audience as the victims of the bombing would have been. The montage does not contain the worst of the horrors that people faced on that day, though it does show many disturbing images.

Having her act of filial piety, Ishikawa goes to what is today the Hiroshima Peace

Memorial Park and views the A-Bomb Dome. The A-Bomb Dome is a building that was almost directly underneath the initial blast of the atomic bomb, which detonated about

500 feet above the ground. The A-Bomb Dome was one of the few buildings in the immediately blast zone to survive the blast, partially because being directly underneath it shielded it from the concussive force of the bomb and partly because it was one of the few ferroconcrete structures in the city at the time; it has become an enduring symbol of

Hiroshima, in large part because it continues to stand, though thoroughly ruined, in a city that has been completely rebuilt.

Upon leaving the A-Bomb Dome, Ishikawa comes across a man, whom she recognizes as Iwakichi, a former employee of her parents. Iwakichi suffered heavy burns across his face during the bombing and was mostly blinded by the attack; unable to work, he was reduced to begging. The film does not linger on his ruined face, though it does not shy away from showing his scars either. Embarrassed by his circumstances, Iwakichi runs away, but Ishikawa pursues him and he eventually allows her to visit his home. Iwakichi lives alone in a dirty shack because his son died in the war and his daughter-in-law perished in the bombing. With no one to take care of him, save a woman he describes as a rag picker. After some conversation, Ishikawa learns that Iwakichi’s grandson, Taro, survived; since he cannot care for the seven-year-old boy, the child lives in an orphanage.

Ishikawa visits the orphanage, where she meets with the director, who explains that the bomb left more orphans in Hiroshima than in Tokyo or Osaka, even though those cities were larger and had been heavily bombed throughout the war. The orphanage is underfunded and has trouble keeping the children fed, prompting the institution to start growing its own vegetables. Doing so requires the children, some of them as young as six or seven, to work in the summer heat.

After this visit, Ishikawa goes to stay with a friend and fellow teacher, Morikawa

Matsue, who she knew from the time when she taught in Hiroshima. When Mr.

Morikawa returns home, he explains that a friend whose wife is pregnant had agreed to allow the Morikawas to adopt the child because he already had four children. Mr.

Morikawa rather artlessly adds that it is necessary because Mrs. Morikawa has been rendered sterile by the bomb. After Mr. Morikawa leaves, Ishikawa goes to comfort Mrs.

Morikawa, who says that she was initially devastated, though now she is no longer troubled by it. This scene shows that even in a normal, happy household, the specter of the bomb hangs over everyone in Hiroshima. Unlike a conventional bombing campaign, the atomic bomb had lingering effects that left the city damaged, even if that damage was not always visible.

Upon seeing a photo of her old kindergarten class, Ishikawa decides to visit the three students from that class who survived the bomb. The first child, Sanpei, is introduced when he finds out that his father is dying. His father, it seems, has suddenly lost his appetite and started bleeding from his gums, suggesting he had acute radiation sickness, though that would have been extremely unlikely six years after the bombing of

Hiroshima. anpei’s mother has to be summoned from her job, which is helping with the construction of the Hiroshima Peace Museum, another sharp point of irony. When

Ishikawa arrives, she expresses her sympathy, to which anpei’s mother snaps,

“ ympathy is all very well, but it does nothing for the dead!” This comment might have been directed more broadly at the Japanese public which the film suggests did not adequately fund relief efforts in Hiroshima. The second child, Takako, is at a Catholic

48 church, where she has lived since being saved from the bomb by a priest. Ishikawa arrives to discover that Takako has suddenly taken ill and the nuns suspect it is radiation poisoning. Again, radiation poisoning would have been extremely unlike in 1951, though the screenwriter likely used it as shorthand for any number of ailments that continued to afflict victims of the atomic bombs. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was a rash of leukemia cases in Hiroshima, the most famous of which was Sasaki Sadako, the child who tried to fold a thousand origami cranes to cure her cancer. Takako explains that she likes living in the church, “Here I can say prayers for the many people who died from the A-bomb. I pray that God will grant us never ending peace.”82 As Ishikawa is leaving, the camera shows that several of the nuns are badly burned, another indication of the ubiquity of the damage.

Heita, the third former pupil, represents a change of pace as neither he nor his immediate family is dying when Ishikawa arrives. He is an energetic child who is thrilled to see Ishikawa, and he happily takes her home for tea. Heita, like Takako, is an orphan, though he lives with his older brothers and sister. His sister greets them and invites

Ishikawa in for tea. Heita’s sister was injured in the bomb and has a lame leg that had been badly burned; it has left her with a very bad limp. Heita’s older brother later explains that his sister was engaged during the war, but feared that her fiancé, Tanaka, would not marry her after her injury. Upon returning from imprisonment after the war,

Tanaka did agree to marry her. Since his property had been destroyed, leaving him with nothing, however, he asked for five years before the marriage so that he could reestablish

82 Ibid. 49 himself to support a wife. As it happened, the long-awaited wedding was to occur on the very day Ishikawa arrived. Heita’s brother was very moved by Tanaka’s fidelity, and explained that it gave him hope and that it showed that you could still trust people.

Heita’s sister’s fate suggests that even despite the horrors of the bombing, human decency continued and all hope was not dead after all.

In the end, Ishikawa attempts to convince Iwakichi to send Taro to live with her so that he can escape the orphanage. Iwakichi protests, saying that the child was his only reason to live, leading Ishikawa to suggest he come live with her too. Iwakichi agrees, but

Taro refuses to go without his grandfather. Eventually he sends Taro to Ishikawa with a note to take care of the child. Iwakichi then gets drunk and falls asleep, during which time his house catches on fire. He dies shortly thereafter, leaving Taro in Ishikawa’s care.

In the last scene, Morikawa sees Ishikawa and Taro off at the pier. During their farewells, a plane flies overhead. Ishikawa and Morikawa are clearly apprehensive, reflecting their experience with the bomb, and suggesting that a fear of repeating the experience of the bomb lives in every resident of Hiroshima old enough to remember. Taro, however, was an infant at the time, and simply shouts in innocent excitement at the sight of the plane.

As the ferry leaves Hiroshima, the camera lingers on a patch of clouds hanging over the city, repeating the same shot from when Ishikawa arrived in Hiroshima. The cloud looks something like the top of a mushroom cloud, implying that the shadow of the bomb hangs over the city even still.

Genbaku no Ko rather graphically and dramatically shows the suffering of the people of Hiroshima, the visuals of which would have been largely unfamiliar to the

50 public. Signs of the destruction of the city are everywhere, with repeated shots of rubble and the juxtaposition of the rebuilt city with empty lots, construction sites, and rubble. As the title suggests, the focus of the film is on the suffering of the children whose entire lives have been shaped by the bomb, a reality sure to pull at the public’s heartstrings, as the Asahi Shimbun suggests it did. The film also reinforces the idea that the atomic bombings were not like other bombings. Scenes of burning cities and dead bodies would not have been familiar to Japanese who lived in cities, since almost every city in Japan was bombed to some degree or another, but the lingering after-effects distinguished

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On two occasions, the film shows two people who were seemingly healthy but suddenly became ill with signs of radiation sickness years after the bombing. Although this was unlikely to happen in 1951 or 1952, it was an alarmingly common occurrence in the weeks and months after the bombing in 1945. Those who saw the spike in leukemia cases in the years immediately prior to the making of this film can be forgiven for seeing it as a repeat of those early days when radiation sickness could strike down anyone.

Remembrance is a central theme throughout the film. After all, it follows

Ishikawa who cheerfully says she has forgotten the past at the beginning of the film, but late confesses to her friend Morikawa that she refuses to have a shard of glass that was imbedded in her arm during the bombing removed because it is a constant reminder. Her body itself, like the bodies of so many others, was a monument to the atomic bomb, though her wound, like Morikawa’s, was not visible, unlike so many others’. Despite the centrality of remembrance to the film, perhaps its most important legacy was that it

51 brought the reality of what happened and what was happening in Hiroshima to the broader public. It was the first visual depiction of the bombing of Hiroshima that many

Japanese had ever seen, in large part because journalists and artists were forbidden to depict it during the Occupation years. Given the lack of systematic discussion of the bombing during the Occupation, it may have been the first coherent account that some people had heard. Regardless of prior knowledge of the bombing, however, visual representation, particularly in popular culture, has a way of piercing the public consciousness unlike anything else. It is incorrect to say that the Japanese were unaware of the atomic bombs and their effects before depictions such as Genbaku no Ko, but such representations educated the public and likely made some people feel it more keenly than they had before.83

Atomic Art

Artistic representations of the suffering that took place in Hiroshima were not limited to the silver screen, of course. Nearly a year to the day after the release of

Genbaku no Ko, later the first six of the “Genbaku no Zu” [literally Atomic-bomb

cenes, but known in English as the “Hiroshima Panels”] by Maruki Iri and Toshi premiered in Tokyo, on August 9, 1953.84 The Hiroshima Panels are a series of 15

83 In one noteworthy case, elementary students in Nagano who were moved by Genbaku no Ko, sent apples, a regional specialty, to children in Hiroshima. “Hiroshima e ringo; eiga ‘Genbaku no Ko’ ni kangeki Nagano no sy gakusei ” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Dec. 21, 1952, 3.The power of the film on the contemporary public is further discussed in “Genbaku no kora to jigokuzu,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Aug 8, 195 , 3; and “Hakuryoku aru sens zouo no sakebi ‘Genbaku no Ko ’” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Aug. 15, 1952, 4. 84 “‘Hiroshima Genbaku no Zu’ ikinokori no moto guns ga tenran,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Aug. 9, 1953, 8.This exhibit was not the works’ world premiere; the panels received a gold medal from the 52 paintings and charcoal drawings on large folding panels that depict nuclear events in

Japan. Most of them are dedicated to the bombing of Hiroshima, but there are also panels dedicated to the Lucky Dragon Incident, the national anti-nuclear weapons petition of

1954, and the bombing of Nagasaki. Maruki Iri and Toshi were pair of artists who were married and often worked together. Although Iri was originally from Hiroshima, the couple was living in Tokyo at the time of the bombing. They raced to Hiroshima shortly after the bombing to check on Iri’s family. The Marukis described their experiences

Two kilometers from the center of the explosion, the family house was still standing. But the roof and roof tiles were mostly gone, windows had been blown out, and even the pans, dishes, and chopsticks had been blasted out of their places in the kitchen. In what was left of the burned structure, rescued bomb victims were gathered together and lay on the floor from wall to wall until it was full. We carried the injured, cremated the dead, searched for food, and found scorched sheets of tin to patch the roof. With the stench of death and the flies and the maggots all around us, we wandered about in the same manner as those who had experienced the Bomb.

In the beginning [sic] of September, back in Tokyo, we heard for certain that the war had ended. In Hiroshima, we hadn't known. It had never entered our minds-- at that time, we couldn't think beyond what we were seeing and doing.85

Three years after those horrible months in Hiroshima, they began to paint their experiences. Most of the panels, which were completed between 1950 and 1982, depict imaginary scenes from the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima based on their observations.

The first set of panels, entitled Yūrei (Ghosts), is fairly typical of the series. It depicts a large group of victims, whose clothes have burned off and whose bodies have

World Peace Council earlier in year. For further details, see “‘Genbaku no Zu’ ni kin medaru sy ,” The Asahi Shimbun, morning edition, Jan. 29, 1953, 7. 85 Maruki Iri and Toshi, “Message from IRI and TO HI Maruki,” accessed Feb. , 014, http://www.aya.or.jp/~marukimsn/english/message.html, 53 been twisted and destroyed either by fire and radiation. The victims seem to be shambling toward a pile of the dead, presumably to join them. The people are covered by hideous burns or ashes. Rather than depicting these as normal burns, wherever a person’s skin is darkened, that portion of the body is twisted into a monstrous form more reminiscent of a demon than someone in need of medical attention. These burns deformed bodies, robbing them of their humanity. Survivors were stripped of dignity, identity, and will to live.

Each of the panels was accompanied by a poem that shared the name of the

Panel. The one accompanied Yūrei reads:

It was a procession of ghosts in an instant all clothing burned off hands, faces, and breasts swelled.

The purple blisters on their skin were soon burst and peeled off hanging down like pieces of rags.

With hands lifted half up, they were ghosts in procession. Dragging their ragged skin behind them exhausted, they fell down moaning in heaps and died one after another.

At center of explosion, the temperature reached six thousand degrees. A human shadow remained on a stone step nearby. Could a body vaporize? Did it blow away? There is no one to tell what it was like at that moment at the center.

Burned charred faces, no one could tell one from another.

Figure 1. Yūrei (Ghosts) by Maruki Iri and Toshi, 1950

Voices weakened, they told their names but even then were unrecognized.

An infant with innocent face and delicate skin lay asleep Was it saved in its mother's tender breast? Oh, that even this one babe will awake to rise up again86

The poem makes it clear that the burns that the victims sustained were not normal. Faces were “charred” and clothes burned off “in an instant.” Most tellingly, the burns “burst and peeled off hanging down like pieces of rags,” rather evocative imagery. These people were stripped of their humanity and left in a state that gave them nothing to do but fall down to die in heaps. Such imagery was likely to shock even those who survived fire storms caused by incendiary bombings. The poem stresses the extreme nature of the explosion, explaining that the hypocenter reached six thousand degrees, instantly vaporizing people. It argues that atomic bombings were unique, a horror beyond even those experienced by victims of other bombings.

The panel also suggests that the charcoal that coats the people of Hiroshima is something beyond even unnatural burns. In the center of the work, there is a woman whose body is largely untouched by the ashes. She is held by other victims of the bomb, hideous, distorted husks of men and women who had presumably once been her friends and neighbors. A second woman holds her face close to the unburned woman’s and where they almost touch, the otherwise unburned woman’s face turns dark and monstrous. The fact that the woman is largely untouched by the charcoal that covers

86 Maruki Iri and Maruki Toshi, Yūrei, accessed Nov. 7, 2013, http://www.aya.or.jp/~marukimsn/gen/gen1e.html. 56 every other figure except where she comes into contact with other victims suggests that the contamination is somehow contagious. The charcoal, then, could be a physical manifestation of the radiation that bathed Hiroshima, a visible indication of a killer that cannot be seen, smelled, or tasted. Since the woman is being held down by burned people, the panel suggests that even those who may seem to have escaped death could still be contaminated and destroyed by radiation.

The panels show a wide variety of suffering. A panel called Hi [Fire] depicts piles of bodies and survivors burning, while another—Mizu [Water]—shows bodies along a river, victims sought to escape the fire, only to die anyway or drown in a dark irony. The painting shows old men who had dragged themselves to the river, only to sip water over the body of a drowned baby. The accompanying poem couples the experiences of fire and water:

Water, water. All wandering searching for water. Fleeing from the licking flames searching for a last drop of water.

A hurt mother clutching her child running along the river. Falling into the deep part and scrambling back desperately to the shallow. Run! through the fierce flames enveloping the river. Stopping only to cool her face in the water.

Run! Run! Finally to here. Finally she gave breast to babe

and found out it not alive.87

Niji [Rainbow] and Shonen shojo [Boys and Girls] seems to be ironically titled, with the former featuring only dark grays and blues, with only hints of warmer colors. Boys and

Girls features the now familiar shambling survivors and piles of dead, but with a naked pair of children clutching one another in desperation.

Events like the Asahi himbun’s coverage of the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombings and the debut of the Hiroshima panels stoked antinuclear sentiment, particularly because many Japanese associated “nuclear” with bombs, but there were also numerous positive depictions of nuclear power throughout the Occupation period and subsequent years. Shi-lin Loh’s study of newspaper articles about nuclear power in Japan between 1945 and 1949 demonstrated that there were almost 2,000 articles that were not censored by SCAP.88 These articles presented the basics of nuclear physics, introduced nuclear terminology, explored the state of nuclear research, and speculated on the bright future that nuclear power would produce. Although there were also articles that were intended to be factual, Loh found that they had a consistent pro-nuclear bent.89 Loh also examined a play by tsuka K ji, The Land of Atoms, in which two children travel to the eponymous land of atoms to learn about nuclear physics. This play, along with an entire host of children’s books and literature depicted nuclear physics as a positive force for the future.90 These materials were overwhelmingly positive about nuclear science and

87 Maruki Iri and Maruki Toshi, Mizu, accessed Nov. 7, 2013, http://www.aya.or.jp/~marukimsn/gen/gen3e.html. 88 Shi-lin Loh, “Printed Traces Nuclear cience in Japan Under Allied Occupation,” Asia-Pacific STS Network Conference, Singapore, July 16, 2013, 2. 89 Ibid., 8-9. 90 Ibid., 10-16. 58 showed contemporary readers that not all nuclear technology was based on conducting war. They also demonstrate that Japanese opinion in this period was not monolithically opposed to all nuclear technology.

It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of this type of material in creating a positive interpretation of nuclear technology. Newspapers would go on to run remarkably similar articles throughout the Atoms for Peace exhibitions, often with the same premise: the Japanese public did not have an adequate grounding in physics to understand how nuclear power worked or what its significance was. The 2,000 articles that Loh cites are spread across four years and were found in newspapers throughout Japan. Coverage during the Atoms for Peace exhibitions in 1955 and 1956, discussed below, was much more concentrated; the USIS found 20,000 column inches of coverage of in a four month period in Tokyo alone. Occupation era coverage provided interested Japanese a way of understanding nuclear technology and its possible future benefits. It did not succeed, however, in convincing the general populace that nuclear technology was more positive than negative. That shift occurred later, as demonstrated in a poll that showed that 70% of

Japanese identified the word “nuclear” with being harmful, a figure that would drop to

30% by 1958, following the Atoms for Peace campaign.91

Positive depictions of nuclear power were not limited to print journalism in this period. One of the most positive depictions of nuclear power during the 1950s was

Tezuka Osamu’s Tetsuwan Atomu, known in the English speaking world as Astro Boy.

91 These statistic comes from a USIS report by Mark May entitled “Report on U I -Japan,” written in 1959. This report is cited in a newspaper article Hiroki ugita, “U I role revealed in Japan’s tilt toward West,” The Japan Times, Nov. 21, 2007. 59

Tetsuwan Atomu is set in a high-tech future where robots with artificial intelligence live alongside human beings; the technology in this figure is largely based on nuclear power.

Miniature, nuclear-powered computers are at the heart of most of this fictional society’s technological advances, including as the core of robotic electronic brains.92 The world is replete with nuclear powered technology, including cars, computers, and, in one baffling case, a nuclear-powered gun. 93 It is worth noting that in this world where nuclear power is the cornerstone of technology, Japan is depicted as one of the most technologically modern countries in the world. It leads in the production of robots and produces some of the most powerful robots, such as Atom himself. Although the original electronic brain was made by an American scientist, a Japanese scientist name Surumane copies the original and makes improvements that make artificially intelligent robots possible. This leadership is shown time and again as Atom is repeatedly shown to be a world-class robot, who survives trials that triumph over some robots from throughout the world, including the West.94

Not only was nuclear power ubiquitous in the world of Tetsuwan Atomu, Atom along with his brother and sister are conceptually tied to atomic power by their very

92 Tezuka Purodakushon and Atomu o Aisuru Kai, Tetsuwan Atomu: Sono yume to b ken (JTB: Tokyo, 2003), 262-263. The story that this information is discussed in can be found in Osamu Tezuka and Frederik L Schodt (trans.), Astro Boy, Volume 1 (Milwaukie, OR: Dark Horse Comics, 2002), 12-13. 93 The nuclear-powered car is depicted in the serial entitled “His Highness Deadcross,” and can be found in Osamu Tezuka and Frederik L Schodt (trans.), Astro Boy, Volume 2 (Milwaukie, OR: Dark Horse Comics: 2002), 51. Atom was able to recharge his energy from the nuclear-powered car, which also had the ability to change color with the touch of a button and camouflage itself in a forest by sprouting branches and leaves. 94 One series of issues depicts a robot, Pluto, trying to defeat the seven best robots from throughout the world, including one each from the UK, Turkey, German, Greece, and Australia. Atom was one of two Japanese robots, and actually defeats Pluto after Professor Tenma upgrades Atom’s power from 100,000 to one million horsepower. This story was originally serialized in Shonen magazine from June 1964 to January 1965, and can be found in English in Osamu Tezuka and Frederik L Schodt (trans.), Astro Boy, Volume 3 (Milwaukie, OR: Dark Horse Comics: 2002). 60 names. The connection with Atom is obvious, as is his sister Uran, once the reader knows that the word uran is a shortened form of the word uranium that is commonly used in

Japan. Atom’s younger brother Cobalt is a less obvious reference to nuclear power, but this name is likely an allusion to the use of the radioisotope cobalt-60 for medical radiation therapy, particularly for the treatment of cancer; Tezuka’s background as a medical doctor all but assures that he would have been familiar with cobalt therapy when he developed the manga. It is clear that Atom’s world is not a perfect utopia,95 but

Tezuka envisioned a future that positively depicted technology and Japan’s place in that society. In his imagining, the country had fully reintegrated into world society. Atom is proud to be from Japan, and is on occasion depicted as literally waving the Japanese flag96 and leading the Japanese Self-Defense Force outside the borders of Japan to confront and defeat an alien threat to the entire world. Implicit in the comic is the understanding that Japan would have to develop nuclear power if it would ever make this vision a reality.

Throughout the Occupation period and beyond, Japanese depictions of nuclear technology were bifurcated: nuclear weapons were dangerous and terrible, while nuclear power offered the potential for a better future. This bifurcation would only deepen later as more stress was placed on the positive aspects of nuclear power. Prior to 1954, however, the public was largely focused on the negative aspects of nuclear technology, and often equated the word “nuclear” with weapons. This connection was particularly

95 Robots do not have equal rights in this society, and actually require written permission to leave the country according to Article 9 of the Robot Law, as illustrated in Osamu Tezuka and Frederik L Schodt (trans.), Astro Boy, Volume 3 (Milwaukie, OR: Dark Horse Comics: 2002), 146. 96 See the cover of Osamu Tezuka and Frederik L Schodt (trans.), Astro Boy, Volume 2 (Milwaukie, OR: Dark Horse Comics: 2002). 61 prevalent in 1952 when the end of the occupation made depictions and descriptions of the effects of the nuclear bombs possible for the first time. The news media, however, was already showing the positive aspects of civilian nuclear power. Newspaper editors had only to look abroad to see that the “Atomic Age” was one of promise, not just horror.

However, they lacked a reason to feature the technology. After all, Japan was ill-suited and unprepared to develop nuclear power; its economy was just starting to turn around following its collapse in 1945, and nuclear power was a dream for the distant future. All this would soon change.

Atoms for Peace

Atoms for Peace was born on December 8, 1953, when President Dwight D.

Eisenhower made a major speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which he outlined an American initiative to share the peaceful uses of nuclear power with countries throughout the world. That December day was the twelfth anniversary of the

United tates’ declaration of war against Japan. The significance of the day was not lost on the President, who invoked the war in explaining the dangers of atomic warfare:

“Today, the United tates' stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of

World War II.”97 But, “to pause there,” the President continued, “would be to confirm the

97 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” in The World’s Great Speeches, Lewis Copeland and Lawrence W. Lamm, eds. (New York: Dover Publications, 1973), 607-610. 62 hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world.” To resolve the nuclear stalemate,

Eisenhower argued, “It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers.

It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.”

The name “Atoms for Peace,” which came from newspaper coverage of the speech, does not refer to a single initiative, but rather serves as shorthand for a number of programs intended to spread the peaceful uses of the nuclear technology around the world. These initiatives included demonstrating the positive side of nuclear power by demonstrating its application in industry, medicine, agriculture, and energy generation. In addition to setting up experimental reactors in foreign countries, training technicians, and providing nuclear materials for countries without the capacity to produce their own, the

United States sought to promote nuclear power in friendly countries through films, exhibitions, and media campaigns.

In his speech, Eisenhower proposed the idea of an International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), which would function as an atomic “bank” to provide access to fissionable materials for nuclear projects around the world. The theory was that the

United States and the Soviet Union would make matching contributions to the IAEA; at first these would be small in scale, until the two superpowers became confident in the system, and then contributions would increase in size until each side had to dismantle its nuclear weapons in order to continue. In this way, Atoms for Peace was to function as a disarmament program by establishing a forum for peaceful interaction that would

63 eventually promote trust and partnership between two bitter rivals. Eventually the joint project of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear power would provide the means and opportunity of eliminating nuclear stockpiles.

Contemporary observers and scholars have viewed the Atoms for Peace program in several different ways: that it was designed to decrease nuclear stockpiles, that it was an idealistic giveaway program with no practical application,98 or it was a propaganda ploy to counter Soviet arguments that the United States was only interested in the destructive capacity of nuclear technology. In his speech to the UN General Assembly and in his private correspondence, Eisenhower indicated that the program was designed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons in the world by providing an alternative use for uranium and plutonium. This interpretation is at least mentioned in every analysis of

Atoms for Peace, but it is often challenged because the program did not have the desired effects.

The argument that Atoms for Peace was strongly rooted in the need for a propaganda victory against the Soviet Union remains popular. Some scholars, however, have attacked the propaganda approach, calling it a myth.99 But the propaganda argument is solidly rooted in the documentary evidence, and it is strongly advocated by Kenneth

Osgood, Ira Chernus, and Martin Medhurst, all of whom argue that policy makers were

98 For example, Senators John Bricker, William Knowland, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper are on the record as being worried that the program was a “giveaway.” ee Holl, “The Peaceful Atom Lore & Myth,” in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger, eds. Atoms for peace: an analysis after thirty years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 157. 99 Holl, “The Peaceful Atom” in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger, eds. Atoms for Peace: an Analysis after Thirty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 149-151. 64 well aware of the propaganda implications of their actions.100 Considering the frequency with which Eisenhower's advisers discussed propaganda issues, the real debate should be over the degree to which propaganda concerns influenced the President and other important decision-makers relative to other goals, such as arms control.

Atoms for Peace has also been characterized as an idealistic giveaway program.

This point of view was strongly expressed in the contemporary criticism of Joseph

McCarthy, the junior Senator from Wisconsin, whose name was at that same time becoming identified with modern witch-hunts. McCarthy led the Republican charge against Atoms for Peace. He argued that Atoms for Peace would achieve no foreign policy objectives, and was actually dangerous because it would put fissionable material in the hands of foreign entities that could reprocess the spent uranium to produce weapons- grade plutonium. He went so far as to call the program “insane.”101 This line of argument was picked up by scholars who fault Atoms for Peace as a failed policy that contributed to nuclear arms proliferation.

Atoms for Peace served both as a disarmament plan and a vehicle for propaganda, first as the former at its inception and then as the latter during its implementation, as well as a means of obtaining uranium, thorium, and other ores necessary for nuclear technology. As noted above, it is clear from the rhetoric of Eisenhower’s speech to the

General Assembly, and substantiated by evidence from his diary and personal

100 Kenneth Osgood, Total War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Ira Chernus. Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity, (Stanford tanford University Press, 008); Martin Medhurst, “Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony the Rhetorical tructure of a Cold War Campaign,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, Nov. 4, Summer 1997, 571-583. 101 Dana Adams Schmidt. “The Voice of America is Changing its Tune.” New York Times. Aug. 7, 1955, E4; Frank Hughes. “Ike’s Atomic Proposal Hit by M’Carthy.” Chicago Daily Tribune. Feb. 10, 1957, 1. 65 correspondence,102 that the President’s proposal was designed to increase positive interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, and eventually to decrease nuclear arms stockpiles. This intention cannot be ignored, especially when one considers the story of the program’s origin, which is discussed below. However, it did not have the intended effect. In reality, Atoms for Peace led to an increase in Cold War tensions.

Advisers who focused on pragmatic, Cold War concerns managed to shift American policy, both before and during the implementation of the Atoms for Peace program, away from arms control. Rather than being used to promote disarmament, an aim that was officially abandoned in 1955, the program became primarily a propaganda vehicle, a way to build alliances, and to achieve a variety of foreign policy objectives, most concerning positioning and posturing in the Cold War. This focus on Cold War objectives actually served to increase tension by increasing the focus on building alliances and providing a site of contestation for the propaganda war. By delegating the actual implementation of the Atoms for Peace program to subordinates with conflicting interests, the President failed to meet his original objectives: disarmament and decreasing Cold War tensions, and actually made these problems even more intractable.

America’s policies on sharing nuclear technology did not, however, begin with

Atoms for Peace. The first agreements on the sharing of nuclear technology began an entire decade before Eisenhower’s speech, during the econd World War when the

United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada signed the Quebec Agreements on

August 19, 1943. Under these agreements, the British and Canadians agreed to give the

102 Bowie, in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger, eds. Atoms for Peace: an Analysis after Thirty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 23. 66

United States all of their research on nuclear technology and allow their programs for developing nuclear bombs to be subsumed by the American Manhattan Project. In return, the United States agreed to make copies of progress reports made to the President of the

United States available to the British and Canadian governments. In addition, the United

States had the option of sharing whatever technology it saw fit. The nuclear modus vivendi that developed between the British, Canadians and Americans during the war was designed to facilitate the rapid development of a nuclear weapon, and not sustained, joint research for the development of nuclear power during a period of peace. The British became increasingly unhappy with this agreement, especially following the American

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which severely limited the ability of AEC to share information with foreign governments.103

Following the war, the American, Canadian and British governments in the

Agreed Declaration of November 15, 1945 announced their desire to promote scientific advances for the good of all humanity, and asked the UN to set up a commission to regulate nuclear technology and development. According to this proposal, the commission would be responsible for facilitating scientific exchange, the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the elimination of atomic weapons, and the development of safeguards. Following Soviet agreement, the United Nations Atomic

Energy Commission (UNAEC) was established on January 24, 1946. The Acheson-

Lilienthal Report, an American declaration on how the UNAEC should operate,

103 See memo by Gordon Arneson arguing that American reluctance to share information with the British hurt the alliance. “Memorandum by the pecial Assistant to the ecretary of tate for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson),” Dec. 3, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Volume 2, pt. , 1 51. This memo contradicts okolski’s claim that interested partners had already found satisfactory ways of obtaining technology prior to Atoms for Peace. 67 recommended that the Commission own and manage all fissionable materials because the international climate was ill-suited to safeguards and inspections. The US representative to the UNAEC, Bernard Baruch, expanded on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and produced the Baruch Plan, which proposed the creation of an International Atomic

Development Authority that would be responsible for all dangerous projects. The Soviets, unwilling to accept the American proposals, recommended that all atomic bombs should be destroyed, the building of new bombs banned, and all violations be strongly condemned, though they included no provisions for monitoring compliance. Neither side could agree with the other, and in 1948, since no consensus could be reached, the

UNAEC decided to stop meeting until there was good reason to believe that the impasse in negotiations could be overcome. In fact, the UNAEC would never be called to order again.104

Between the failure of the Baruch Plan and the beginnings of Atoms for Peace there were no real attempts at forming another international organization for the development of nuclear power, which is, of course, not to say that the nuclear issue was not a potent one in the interim, especially its use as a weapon. The Department of

Defense actively engaged in developing larger and larger atomic bombs, eventually exploding the world’s first thermonuclear explosive in November 195 . The Atomic

Energy Commission was to aid the DoD and its primary objective was “to make the maximum contribution to common defense and security by continuing to develop and

104 Lawrence Scheinman. The International Atomic Energy Commission and World Nuclear Order (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1987). 68 manufacture atomic weapons.”105 To promote this objective, the AEC was responsible for obtaining the raw materials required for building nuclear weapons, especially uranium.

The US government continued to consider uranium procurement vital, since there was a perceived paucity of the material at the time. The Raw Materials Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in its report in June 1952, made several recommendations to increase procurement. The first was that the AEC should expand its exploration program to find domestic sources of uranium and thorium. This program started in 1948, but was largely unsuccessful; by 1952, only 2% of the uranium mined in the non-Communist world came from the United States. The second recommendation was that the United States seek access to uranium and thorium supplies from multiple foreign sources. The report noted a sense of urgency for both of these objectives, because there was a feeling that a war could cut off foreign sources at any time.106 It is worth noting that prior to 1955 the world supply of uranium and thorium was considered to be very limited, and obtaining a steady supply was a top objective for the AEC, JCAE, and the DoD. tarting in 1955, when the AEC’s domestic exploration project started to yield positive results, uranium would become more and more readily available, leading to

Eisenhower’s assessment in 1957 that the United tates “is saturated with uranium.”107

The uranium situation in the years running up to the beginning of the Atoms for Peace

105 Lewis Strauss. Men and Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1962). 106 “Report of the Raw Materials ubcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,” (Washington United States Government Printing Office, 1952). accessed June 1, 2008, http://sul- derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=00001546&mediaType=application/pdf. 107 “Pre-Press Conference Notes, May , 1957,” Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1969, Robert Lester, Douglas D. Newman, eds. (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), Reel 12, Box 24. 69 program, and the first few years of the program, which were marked with a paucity of materials, was very different from the period that followed.

When Eisenhower was elected President of the United States in 1952, he inherited a complicated nuclear situation. Soviet nuclear weapons programs were quickly catching up to those of the Americans. There was a perception that there was a shortage of fissionable material, which threatened US security. The Soviets had a great propaganda advantage regarding nuclear issues, since they could claim that the United States was the first country to develop nuclear weapons, was the only country to ever use them in war, and that it was thus only interested in the destructive uses of atomic physics.108 Although there were frequent pleas for a nuclear test ban and a ban on atomic bombs altogether, no significant efforts had been made to regulate nuclear arms or energy since the failure of the Baruch Plan and the UNAEC. Nor had there been any significant changes in the international situation that would lead to the reopening of negotiations. Eisenhower would change all of that in his first year in office.

Scholars disagree on the exact origins of the Atoms for Peace program. Since the origins of any program can provide the context for how officials approached a topic and give insight into their motivations, this issue is rather important. Henry Sokolski, placing stress on the arms-control aspect, argues that Atoms for Peace began with the Panel of

Consultants on Disarmament’s finding that the United tates would have trouble preventing a preemptive nuclear strike without international controls, specifically without limitations on nuclear stockpile sizes. This panel was reacting to fears that the Soviets

108 Gordon Arneson raised this issue in a memorandum to Dulles. “Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the ecretary of tate” March 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1127. 70 were close to acquiring the capacity to deliver a “knockout blow” to the United tates.

According to okolski, this finding created the need in the President’s mind to reopen negotiations on arms limitations and safeguards. Eisenhower, realizing the dangers of nuclear war, initiated a project in late March of 1953, codenamed Operation Candor, which the President himself would come to identify as the beginning of the Atoms for

Peace project.109 This operation was designed to gain domestic support for arms limitation through a series of speeches by the President intended to explain to Americans the danger of nuclear weapons and the very real possibility that total nuclear war would break out.110

The timing of this initiative is especially important. The idea for increased openness regarding nuclear issues originated in March of 1953, the same month as the death of Joseph talin, the dictator of the oviet Union. talin’s passing marked a transition in the Soviet Union, when no one was quite sure how or if Soviet foreign policy would change as a result of a change in leadership. tarting on March 15, talin’s initial successor, Georgy Malenkov made a speech where he announced that there was no problem between the United States and the Soviet Union that could not be worked out amicably, and proceeded to initiate a “peace offensive” designed to repair the oviet

Union’s image abroad.111 It seems likely that Operation Candor, with its proximity to

109 “Candor-Wheaties Chronology” in President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Office files, 1953-1961: Part 1, Administrative Series (hereafter, DDE Files), Robert E. Lester, ed. (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1990), Reel 4. 110 Henry okolski, “The Arms Control Connection” in Pilat, Atoms for Peace: an Analysis after Thirty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 37-40. 111 Vojtech Mastny, “The Elusive Détente talin’s uccessors and the West,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 4. 71

talin’s death, was in part influenced by Eisenhower’s desire to change the dialogue that dominated the post-war Stalin years. According to Vojtech Mastny, the United States, lacking plans for talin’s death, mostly worked in an ad hoc manner in response to Soviet initiatives.112 It is likely that this move to change nuclear foreign policy by disclosing more information both domestically and internationally was partly to position the United

States in the new international climate, and offer a less threatening façade.113

As C.D. Jackson and Lewis Strauss attempted to write the speeches for Operation

Candor between April and mid-September, they had great difficulty finding the right balance. They concluded that it would be nearly impossible to convey the necessary information in a way that was not likely to promote panic, and every draft came out

“uniformly dull.” The most successful draft, written in mid-September, included the idea that the Soviets would be able to seriously injure the United States, which would lead to a reprisal. Although this draft was “closer to what was wanted,” it was abandoned because it left readers with the sense that there was no hope.114 It is worth noting that the

President placed stress on letting the public know the dangers of the oviets’ ability to devastate the United States within a speech which had the stated purpose of letting the public know about the dangers of nuclear war. Public knowledge of the dangers of nuclear war would likely promote support for nuclear disarmament and safeguards. It

112 Mastny in Larres and Osgood, 4-5. 113 In their edited volume, Larres and Osgood suggest that Eisenhower was fairly positive about the possibility that the Soviet Union might be moving toward a more amiable foreign policy after Stalin, which might account for Eisenhower’s move toward a more open policy. Ironically, Jackson, who was left to actually write this policy was an adamant Cold Warrior, and argued that the United States should press its advantage in view of a perceived Soviet weakness rather than position diplomatically. See Larres and Osgood, XII. 114 “Candor-Wheaties Chronology,” DDE Files. 72 would have questionable domestic propaganda value because, after all, it was hard to find a way to publicize the dangers of nuclear war without paralyzing the populace with fear.

It is at this point, however, that the President introduced the idea of hope for resolving the dilemma. By proposing hope for the future, such as converting weapons into peaceful ends, as Eisenhower would eventually propose in his speech to the General Assembly, it would be possible to disseminate information about nuclear war without conveying a sense of hopelessness. The introduction of the idea that the speeches needed to avoid a sense of hopelessness represented an important shift in the development of the program.

By September, Jackson and Strauss were still unable to write a suitable speech and the international situation had changed since March. The oviet “peace offensive” became a serious concern for many members of the Eisenhower administration as they came to see it as an effort to disrupt the North Atlantic alliance.115 According to Kenneth

Osgood, the Eisenhower administration initiated a peace “counter-offensive” designed to show the shallowness of the Soviet peace offensive.116 This peace counter-offensive was a propaganda campaign to counter the deleterious effects of what was perceived as Soviet psychological warfare; it was also an attempt to solidify American alliances in the face of a Soviet threat. Mastny suggests that cracks in the North Atlantic alliance appeared during the Bermuda Summit, December 4-7, 1953, immediately prior to Eisenhower’s speech to the General Assembly. Britain and France became especially concerned with

America’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons to replace conventional forces which

115 Larres and Osgood, XIV. 116 Kenneth Osgood, “The Perils of Coexistence Peace and Propaganda in Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy,” in Larres and Osgood, 28. 73 led to an increase of Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons. The French and British would rather have negotiated with the oviets than attempt to maintain a “position of strength,” which translated to nuclear force, as the Americans did.117 At this point, a shift in focus to disarmament would help to mollify Western European fears of nuclear war, and would give America’s European allies something to rally around, serving to help repair Soviet-inflicted damage to North Atlantic unity.

As a result of Jackson’s and trauss’ inability to write a speech appropriate to the

President’s objectives and the changing international situation, Operation Candor was placed on hold and the President opened the issue to suggestions. Lewis Strauss recommended that all the fissionable material in the world be collected, diluted, and stored in a tank at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. If all the fissionable material were at the bottom of the sea, Strauss reasoned, then no one could steal it, and if they did, they could not gather enough of it to obtain a monopoly.118 Although there is no evidence that the President ever seriously entertained this proposal, trauss’ suggestion would have circumvented the issue of alliances and safeguards altogether, and worked as a form of perfect arms control. Since Strauss proposed this to replace Operation Candor and had consistently worked with Jackson and the President regarding Operation Candor, it follows that trauss, at least, thought arms control was Eisenhower’s primary interest.

Rather than force C.D. Jackson to take another pass at a speech for Operation

Candor or adopt trauss’ colorful suggestion, in eptember of 1953, the President came

117 Mastny, 15. 118 In his memoir, trauss describes this idea as “a method [that] suggested itself” to him. trauss, Men and Decisions, 357. 74 up with a third plan, which contained the kernel of the idea that would develop into the

Atoms for Peace program. Eisenhower suggested the formation of an international agency which would allocate fissionable material to various countries for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.119 Although at first this does not sound like an arms-control project, Eisenhower envisioned the United States and the Soviet

Union as making matching contributions to this agency. At first, they would be small, but as trust grew between the two superpowers, they would make larger and larger contributions until finally they would be forced to dismantle their atomic weapons in order to continue. William Golden, trauss’ assistant, suggested that starting the process would be “like getting the first olive out of the jar;”120 that is to say that it would be hard to get the United States and Soviet Union to agree to the first contributions, but it would become easier to encourage larger contributions, until eventually they became so large that atomic weapons would have to be cannibalized in order to keep making donations.

Reactions among Eisenhower’s advisors were mixed, with most of his key advisors initially responding negatively. Upon reading the memo about the President’s plan, trauss responded that although it was “novel and might have value for propaganda purposes,” it ultimately would not work. He argued that since it was impossible to determine the size of Soviet fissionable material stockpiles vis-à-vis those of the United

States, it would be impossible to determine what levels of contributions would lead the

119 “Candor-Wheaties Chronology,” DDE Files. 120 Quoted in Strauss, Men and Decisions, 358. 75

Soviets to dismantle warheads to continue making donations.121 If the United States miscalculated its strength with regard to the Soviet Union, it could fatally weaken its position in an arms race. Furthermore, Strauss argued that he, the Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy (JCAE), and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson all objected to allowing a foreign entity complete control over any amount of uranium or plutonium, arguing that such control would threaten American security.122

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense were similarly concerned with security. They disapproved of the program primarily because it went against

Eisenhower’s own military policy, known as New Look, which was based on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation. The New Look policy was an approach to American defense predicated on the use of a large stockpile of nuclear weapons to act as deterrence, allowing the Defense Department to decrease the size of the standing army while still protecting American interests. The policy was formalized in National Security Council

(NSC) document number 162/2, and approved by Eisenhower on October 30, 1953.123 As

Mark Schaefermeyer observes, the concept of massive retaliation worked as a deterrent, preventing potential Soviet aggression.124 The New Look policy and the Atoms for Peace program seemed completely incompatible, with one aiming to decrease nuclear weapons

121 “ trauss to DDE,” ep. 17, 1953, DDE Files, Pt. 1, Administrative Series. It is worth noting that Strauss dismissed this proposal as only having propaganda value, again suggesting that he thought that propaganda was not the President’s purpose in developing Atoms for Peace. 122 Hewlett and Holl, 231. 123 Bowie in Pilat, Atoms for Peace: After Thirty Years, 20. 124 Mark J. chaefermeyer, “Dulles and Eisenhower on ‘Massive Retaliation’” in Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership, Martin J. Medhurst, ed. (East Lancing: Michigan State University, 1994), 30-34. 76 and the other depending on maintaining those same weapons, both initiated by the same man, President Eisenhower.

The concomitant development of these two diametrically opposed programs, New

Look and Atoms for Peace, is something of a mystery. One could look at this contradiction and argue that Eisenhower was not committed to the arms-control aspect of

Atoms for Peace or that he was only interested in the propaganda aspects, but to argue this would go against the course of the development of the program, the opinions of his key advisors, and the fact that he said the program was for disarmament in his own diary and in personal correspondence. He enumerated the reasons behind Atoms for Peace: it would give the United States a reason to talk to the Soviets, involve more small nations in nuclear concerns, decrease nuclear weapons stockpiles without harming the U ’ strategic position, and would give the United States a method of informing the public about nuclear issues. But, he added, “Underlying all of this, of course, is the clear conviction that as of now the world is racing toward catastrophe—that something must be done to put a brake on this movement.”125

A memorandum from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in the

Soviet Union the day before Eisenhower’s speech further underscores the centrality of the disarmament position. In this memo, Dulles told Charles Bohlen, the ambassador to the

oviet Union, that the “President will… propose a method of allocating from U and

Soviet stockpiles atomic material for peacetime purposes and as means of starting total atomic disarming.” Further, Bohlen should “stress to Molotov [the oviet Foreign

125 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, Robert Ferrell, ed. (New York: WW. Norton & Company, 1981), 260-262. 77

Minister] that purpose of speech is to initiate serious talks, if possible, and not merely to propagandize.”126 Gerard Smith, special assistant to Secretary Dulles for atomic energy matters, wrote a memo on December 9, 1953, the day after Eisenhower’s speech, informing all diplomatic missions that the purpose of Atoms for Peace was “to break the disarmament logjam.”127 At least officially, the stated purpose of the speech was disarmament, to move forward past the problems posed to disarmament since the failure of the Baruch Plan.

If the program was dedicated to the concept of disarmament, how do we explain the contradiction between the goals of New Look and Atoms for Peace? One could use this contradiction to argue that the President was more interested in the propaganda aspects of the program,128 especially if one considers that he would be unlikely to admit that the program was designed for propaganda because that would negate its propaganda value altogether. It is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion on this point. It is possible, however, that the President was aware of this contradiction, but had a longer timeline in mind for the nuclear disarmament portion of Atoms for Peace. After all, if he did not foresee disarmament for another generation, Atoms for Peace would not necessarily have contradicted the New Look policy. This line of argument is supported by

C. D. Jackson’s memo to the Operations Coordinating Board, stating, “It will be

126 “The ecretary of tate to the Embassy in the oviet Union,” Dec. 6, 1953. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1287. 127 “The Acting ecretary of tate to all Diplomatic Posts (Except Moscow),” Dec. 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 1954, Vol. 2, 1293. 128 Ira Chernus, for example, argues for a connection between these two programs, saying that Atoms for Peace was designed specifically to improve relations with allies, particularly in Europe, especially after allies learned of Eisenhower’s plans to cut conventional forces in favor of increased presence of nuclear weapons stationed on the Continent. Ira Chernus. Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 78 particularly important to impress upon world opinion the sincerity with which the United

States seeks international security through the reduction of the arms burden, while at the same time avoiding any premature stimulation of false optimism regarding immediately realizable disarmament, which cannot be fulfilled under present conditions of international tensions [emphasis added].”129 Regardless of whether Eisenhower wanted to use disarmament as a propaganda tool or whether genuine disarmament was his earnest intention, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson thought that Atoms for Peace harmed US security. As we will see below, his opposition had significant ramifications.

Despite these criticisms, Eisenhower pushed his advisors forward, insisting in

September and October of 1953 that they continue to work on the atomic bank that would be the centerpiece of the Atoms for Peace proposal. As they did so, some of

Eisenhower’s advisors were drawn to various elements of the Atoms for Peace program that would allow them to forward American interests that did not always coincide with arms control. Propaganda, development of uranium sources, and alliance-building became key goals of the people working on the program. Each of these goals represents an important aspect of America’s Cold War strategy, even though at various points these goals conflicted with the original aim of Atoms for Peace arms control. As Eisenhower’s advisors worked on the program prior to the President’s speech and immediately after,

129 “Memorandum by the Special assistant to the President (Jackson) to the Operation Coordinating Board,” Dec. 9, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1293. Emphasis added. This quote does pose a potential problem for arguing that the President’s purpose was not propaganda, since it is a memo to a group whose sole purpose is propaganda and its content is regarding the use of the speech as propaganda. It does, however, nicely make the point that Eisenhower, or at least Jackson, realized that immediate disarmament under the international circumstances at the time was impossible. 79 these secondary goals came to dominate the program as the plan for arms control was slowly eviscerated.

Eisenhower administration officials immediately identified the propaganda value of Atoms for Peace, and sought to benefit from it. Although he thought the United States could get further in disarmament talks if such talks were conducted privately rather than publically, Secretary Dulles argued that the United States should be the world leader in nuclear technology, and that Atoms for Peace would show it was just that.130 This attitude was fairly widely held. The British also had a nuclear power program, one that turned to the civilian uses of nuclear power prior to the American program. The British program would result in the world’s first civilian nuclear power generating plant, Calder Hall, which went online nearly a year and half before the first American one.131 If the United

States lost its position as the leader in atomic sciences to the British, or worse, the

Soviets, it would have been a major psychological blow to America.

This concern for propaganda was echoed by C.D. Jackson, one of the chief architects of Atoms for Peace, who wrote a memo to the Operations Coordinating Board

(OCB) stating that Atoms for Peace would effectively break the oviet Union’s monopoly on peace propaganda. That is to say, the United States would finally be able to show that it was not just interested in the destructive applications of atomic physics as the

130 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 11, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1131. 131 There is some debate as to whether Calder Hall can properly be considered a civilian plant, since it also functioned as a site for the enrichment of plutonium for military purposes. Calder Hall did, however, produce electricity used by consumers on the public power grid, and so can be considered a civilian plant, at least in part. The Shippingport Atomic Power Station, in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, opened in 1957, and was the world’s first fully civilian nuclear power plant. 80

Soviets asserted.132 Propaganda provided a major site for Cold War contestation, where the United States battled to win the hearts and minds of the people throughout the world, both those whose nations were already allied with the United States as well as those who were not.133 Atoms for Peace would provide a significant tool toward these ends.

The issue of propaganda, along with the desire to obtain raw materials for nuclear power, was inherently tied to the concept of building alliances, another key interest among US officials. When Gordon Dean, AEC Chairman prior to Strauss, raised the issue of developing peaceful uses of nuclear power in NSC 151,134 R. Gordon Arneson wrote a memorandum to Dulles with the stated purpose of developing a State Department position on NSC 151. He recommended supporting NSC 151 for its propaganda purposes, namely counteracting Soviet claims that the United States was only interested in the destructive uses of atomic energy, so that the US would remain a leader in nuclear energy. More significantly, however, he argued that through the dissemination of the peaceful uses of nuclear power, “it might… be possible to use such a card to bid our allies closer to us and even influence certain countries presently neutral to be more positively cooperative.”135 Although N C 151 predates Eisenhower’s proposal of using an international atomic agency for the purposes of disarmament, NSC 151 was an essential precursor to the Atoms for Peace program in that it first reported the AEC’s

132 “Memorandum by the pecial Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the Operations Coordinating Board,” Dec. 9, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1293. 133 For more on the propaganda uses of Atoms for Peace program, see Kenneth Osgood, Total War and Martin Medhurst, Eisenhower’s War of Words. 134 ee “Report to the National ecurity Council by the Atomic Energy Commission,” March 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1121-1125. 135 “Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the ecretary of tate,” March 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1126. 81 ability to develop peaceful uses for atomic energy. From this memorandum, it is apparent that as early as March 1953, at least one influential player in the State Department was interested in using the peaceful uses of atomic power for building alliances and obtaining uranium prior to the Atoms for Peace proposal, a policy that remained an important part of the Atoms for Peace agenda.

The stress on alliance-building and obtaining uranium through the sharing of nuclear technology is also present in NSC 151/2, dated December 4, 1953, four days before the President’s Atoms for Peace speech. This document includes an outline of the reasons for increasing the disclosure of nuclear research to allied governments in a report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy on Disclosure of Atomic

Information to Allied Countries, a committee chaired by Gordon Arneson. The stated objective of disclosing information to allies was to enable coordination of military planning for defenses, to inspire cooperation, to encourage continued cooperation in US atomic energy programs, especially in regards to uranium procurement, and to increase free world development of nuclear research vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc.136

This statement of American policy locates the focus of sharing nuclear technology on promoting alliances and procuring raw materials, four days prior to Eisenhower’s speech, which based atomic sharing on the principle of nuclear disarmament. These two priorities would seem compatible at first glance, but in reality they generated considerable tension. Eisenhower’s program was based on an assumption that contributions to the proposed nuclear agency would become large enough to require

136 “Report to the National ecurity Council by the Executive ecretary (Lay),” Dec. 4, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 1954, Vol. 2, 1257. 82 dismantling nuclear bombs in order to keep making those donations, but NSC 151/2 states clearly that nuclear transfer could be used to increase the amount of nuclear raw materials available by facilitating ore procurement. These materials could be used to support an expanding civilian program without limiting the size of the nuclear arsenal.

After all, this report was written by a committee chaired by Arneson, who promoted the transfer of nuclear technology in March of 1953 by arguing that “the legislation required to permit industry to participate in the development of useful nuclear power should be so drafted as to enable the United States to deal with certain foreign countries in this area, not only to assure the continuance of the flow of uranium and other raw materials to the

United States from present suppliers, but also to stimulate such a flow from other potential producers.”137 Clearly, uranium procurement was central to Arneson’s conception of a nuclear exchange program, in spite of the problems this would pose for arms reduction. The use of nuclear technology transfer for the purposes of building alliances was also problematic. The purpose of Atoms for Peace was disarmament and, according to Lewis Strauss, to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet

Union.138 If it were used, then, to develop alliances and promote common defense among members of the free world, the Soviet Union would think that the program was being used to unite the free world against it. This result would exacerbate Cold War tensions and negate the purpose of the program.

137 “Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the ecretary of tate,” March 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1126. 138 “ ummary of Meeting with the ecretary of tate on Implementation of the President’s December 8th peech,” Jan. 6, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1326. 83

These conflicting aspirations are understandable if one considers Jack Holl’s argument that the President wrote his Atoms for Peace speech without involving anyone other than his closest advisors. Holl points out that the members of the AEC, aside from

Strauss, were so upset with being left out of the loop on the President’s plan that they nearly resigned en masse.139 Under these circumstances, the notion of the development of a separate basis for policy by staff members who were not privy to the President’s direct thoughts on the subject makes sense. After all, the Ad Hoc Committee that drafted this report contained none of the advisors who aided the President on his Atoms for Peace speech, most of whom were in Bermuda at the time. Since they might not have known that the President’s objective for transferring nuclear technology was disarmament, which is, after all, slightly counter-intuitive, it would be logical that they would develop a policy that was firmly rooted in fighting the Cold War. From the perspective of the Cold War, a policy of building alliances and obtaining uranium would have been reasonable, even if it went against the President’s as-of-yet unstated aims.

At the time of Eisenhower’s speech, there were a number of detractors, both in the administration and elsewhere, who supported the proposal to obtain objectives contrary to the stated purpose of the program. Although the President was vital in pushing Atoms for

Peace forward in spite of significant resistance from his advisors, he was not able to direct the development of policy at all levels. JCAE, AEC, and the Department of tate’s preoccupation with developing uranium supplies ran counter to the President’s goal of depleting supplies to reduce nuclear stockpiles. Most State officials seem to have been

139 Jack M. Holl, “The Peaceful Atom Lore and Myth” in Pilat, Atoms for Peace, 153. 84 more interested in alliance-building and propaganda than in arms control. Meanwhile, the primary interests of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in security, which, at many points, were at odds with Atoms for Peace.

A memorandum by Defense Secretary Wilson on January 27, 1954 to Dulles and

Strauss further attacked the basis of Atoms for Peace. In this memo, Wilson said that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had found, from a military point of view, that several restrictions on the implementation of Atoms for Peace were necessary, most notably, “Implementation of the plan should not result in any appreciable decrease in atomic capability of the

United tates in the military field relative to that of the U R.” This stipulation would be impossible to assure because, as Strauss commented in September of 1953, there was no certain way of knowing the size of the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials.

Wilson, commenting on the AEC’s proposal for the formation of an International

Atomic Energy Agency, further stated that the proposal was acceptable, except for the portion which stated that “the Agency ‘would begin to diminish the… world’s atomic stockpiles,’ which appears to be at variance with the actual facts as I understand them.”140

These two statements taken together indicate that as far as Wilson was concerned, Atoms for Peace was not intended as a disarmament program, a perception which went against both trauss’s understanding and the President’s stated purpose of the program. This disagreement is particularly interesting because both Strauss and Wilson were involved in drafting the original Atoms for Peace speech, though Strauss had been involved in the entire process from its beginning in Operation Candor whereas Wilson had only become

140 “Memorandum by the ecretary of Defense (Wilson) to the ecretary of tate and the Chairman of the United tates Atomic Energy Commission ( trauss),” Jan. 7, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, 1357. 85 involved during the writing of the final speech. Further, it is not as though Strauss was unaware of the security implications of the IAEA and disarmament; he was a former naval intelligence officer and had commented on security throughout the drafting of

Atoms for Peace and its precursors.

As early as January of 1954, we can see the effect of Eisenhower’s advisors driving the implementation of Atoms for Peace. Wilson’s memo resulted in the removal of the mention of nuclear disarmament from the stated goals of the formation of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, marking a considerable shift in policy. The mere absence of disarmament as a policy objective in a planning outline for the proposed

IAEA was not by itself significant, nor was Arneson’s focus on uranium procurement in an NSC memorandum. The real issue is that the shift away from the goal of nuclear disarmament became public during the course of the negotiations over the creation of the

IAEA. Moreover, when the State Department and the AEC began their program of bilateral agreements for cooperation on the civilian uses of nuclear power, uranium production was one of the clear goals. Once the goal of nuclear disarmament was removed entirely from public discourse, the propaganda, alliance building, and ore procurement strategy proposed by the State Department became the driving force behind

Atoms for Peace.

Given its geographic position near two major communist nations, Japan played a paramount role in American Cold War policy and thus was a natural target for Atoms for

Peace promotion. Furthermore, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the only cities to be attacked by atomic bombs, thus both the cities and Japan itself were often at the heart of

86 anti-nuclear weapons discussions and demonstrations. Soviet propaganda frequently attacked the United States for developing and continually testing new nuclear weapons, necessitating an American propaganda response to shift attention away from such arguments. A number of public figures in the United States made direct connections between nuclear power development and the atomic bombings, often explicitly arguing that one could overcome the memory of the other. This argument circulated in

Washington prior to the advent of Atoms for Peace, and was raised by Gordon Arneson as one reason to offer nuclear assistance to Japan in 1952, though this aid would not have been legal under the Atomic Energy Act as it existed at that time.141

Commissioner of the US Atomic Energy Commission’s Thomas E. Murray may have been the first American official to publicly argue that the promotion of nuclear power in Japan could overcome resentment of the use of nuclear weapons. In a fit of hyperbolic rambling that, while approaching psychosis, was typical of the Cold War,

Murray warned of growing oviet influence in nuclear power, saying that, “If the USSR should win the industrial power race, the price tag for nuclear power reactors will be high. So high, indeed, that the purchaser will be forced to relinquish his birthrights and civil liberties for nuclear electric power." In order to counter Soviet progress in nuclear power, he proposed Japan as a suitable place for nuclear development because it was “the first and is still the only land which has been engulfed by the white flame of the atom.”

He went on to argue that, “Now, while the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain so vivid, construction of such a power plant in a country like Japan would be a dramatic and

141 “Japanese Aspiration on an Atomic Energy Program for Japan,” Dec. 15, 195 , NACP, RG 59, Box 51, Japan General 1947-1952. 87

Christian gesture which could lift all of us far above the recollection of the carnage of those cities.”142 Murray, in no uncertain terms, put forward the argument that the development of nuclear power in Japan would actually make people forget about the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a line of reasoning that remained central to

American efforts to promote Atoms for Peace in Japan. The idea was to turn victims of nuclear atrocities into poster boys of the benefits of the peaceful atom. Representative

Sidney Yates (D-Ill) echoed Murray’s statements by calling for a 60 megawatt nuclear plant in Hiroshima. In his speech to the US House, Yates argued it was time to “move forward” and “make the atom an instrument for kilowatts rather than killing.”143 AEC

Commissioner Lewis Strauss and Representative Sterling Cole, future president of the

IAEA, put forward similar statements around this time.144

The possibility that Japan might become neutral was also a central concern to the

United States. American policy toward Japan at the end of World War II provided for something of a Carthaginian peace. As discussed above, Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution, written by the American occupiers under the aegis of the Supreme

Command Allied Powers (SCAP), expressly forbade Japan from ever rebuilding its capacity for war. These policies reflected the initial belief that by dismantling Japan’s capacity for war, Japan would become a neutral country with limited capacity for industrial production. Thus the world would be spared further Japanese aggression. These

142 Levey, tanley, “Nuclear Reactor Urged for Japan T.E. Murray of A.E.C Tells teel Union tep is Vital in Atom Race with Russia,” New York Times, Sep. 22, 1954, 14. 143 “Belgium and Japan eek 1st ‘A-for-Peace’ Power,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, Feb.15, 1955, 5. 144 Ran Zwigenberg, '“The Coming of a econd un” The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 6, No 1, Feb. 6, 2012. 88 attitudes quickly changed as the Cold War took shape, especially with the Chinese

Communist Party victory in the Chinese civil war. Without Japanese bases, it would be hard for the United tates to mount an offensive against the People’s Republic of China or the eastern portion of the Soviet Union. If Japan became neutral, the United States would not only lose a vital strategic position, but the loss of such an important ally would also be a costly propaganda blow. By the beginning of the Eisenhower administration,

American policy was no longer predicated on Japanese neutrality; in fact the possibility that Japan might eschew its alignment with the United States and become neutral was a considerable concern for the State Department.145 It is in this light that one must consider

US-Japanese relations during the 1950s.146

The initial Japanese response to the announcement of Atoms for Peace was overwhelmingly positive. Eisenhower’s speech was front page news in the Japanese media. It dominated the front page of the Yomiuri Shimbun on December 9th, running almost the entire left side of the page. The Yomiuri described Eisenhower’s speech as a

“warning of a crisis that could destroy civilization,”147 faithfully translating the speech’s apocalyptic tone. The article, however, firmly connects the United States with the development and continued testing of nuclear power, citing the increased power of the bombs. Still, the Yomiuri argued that the international control of nuclear power was essential and that Eisenhower’s plan represented one of the “few roads to peace that have

145 ee, for example, “Memorandum from the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration ( tassen) to the Deputy Assistant to the President (Persons),” June 7, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 10, 11. 146 For more information on US-Japanese Cold War relations, see Walter LaFeber, The Clash: a History of US-Japan Relations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 147 “Genshiryoku no ‘ ekai Ginkoan,’” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Dec. 9, 1953, 1. 89 not already been tried.”148 The Mainichi Shimbun reported on the positive sentiment that

Eisenhower’s earned abroad,149 while the Asahi Shimbun covered the international politics Cold War politics of the proposal for nearly a month. The Chūgoku Shimbun, the dominant regional paper in Hiroshima, applauded the United States rhetorical move away from nuclear weapons, calling the proposal “historic”150 and characterizing it as promoting “nuclear power for human beings.”151

Conclusion

Although it did not prompt immediate government action, in 1954 American

Atoms for Peace overtures would prompt Japan to pass its first budget including a line for nuclear power research, albeit on a very small scale aimed at investigating foreign technologies and the feasibility of imports it to Japan. But Atoms for Peace was a catalyst for action, not the sole cause of action. Before Atoms for Peace was even announced,

Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, and academics had spent years contemplating the issue, though with little in the way of preparation for the ultimate decision. Some of the legal groundwork, such as debating the constitutionality of developing nuclear power, and the rationale that prompted the decision were already in place by 1953. As policy makers, the media, and American public relations officers made their pitch for nuclear power over the next several years, they would repeatedly draw on the same arguments established during

148 Ibid. 149 “‘Genshiryoku kanri’ ni k kan,’” The Mainichi Shimbun, Dec. 10, 1953, 1. 150 “Aiku enzetsu no rekishiteki igi,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, Dec. 8, 1953, 1. 151 “Ninzū no tame no genshiryoku,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, Dec. 10, 1953, 1. 90 this period, particularly resource scarcity, its revolutionary potential, the idea that it was modern, and that its development would secure Japan’s role in the world.

The Atoms for Peace program provided a rhetorical method of separating the destructive power of nuclear weapons from the productive capacity of nuclear power, but the announcement did not convert the Japanese populace immediately. They continued to tend to associate nuclear technology with nuclear weapons and it would take a concerted effort to change this mental connection (such efforts will be discussed in chapters 3 and

4). Unfortunately for nuclear power proponents, shortly after the Atoms for Peace announcement, the Japanese people were once again harmed by the ill effects of nuclear weapons and fallout. And, once again, the damage would be dealt by American hands.

Chapter 2: Awakening the Monsters of the Deep

Less than two years after the end of the Occupation, American nuclear weapons once again threatened Japan. On March 1, 1954, the United States conducted its first hydrogen bomb test in a series of six, Operation Castle. The experiment, dubbed the

Bravo shot, took place on Bikini Atoll, in the Marshall Islands. The Atoll had been evacuated prior to the experiments, and the natives were promised that they would someday be able to return. The Bravo Shot was a technical marvel and a great success that proved that hydrogen bombs without cryogenically cooled fusion fuel were feasible.

It was also a disaster, which produced a larger than expected detonation that spread dangerous fallout considerably further than scientists had anticipated. As a result, around

236 Marshallese people on nearby islands and 28 American servicemen were exposed to the fallout and underwent immediate treatment. Unnoticed in the pandemonium, however, was a single Japanese fishing trawler, the Daigo Fukuryū-maru, known in

English as the Lucky Dragon. Following the incident, the Lucky Dragon limped back to port, its crew having been showered by a potentially lethal dose of radioactive fallout.

Although the crew scrubbed the deck as best they could, they remained exposed to high levels of radiation for the two week journey back to Japan. As were the fish in their hold.

When they returned home, the incident ignited a media firestorm that brought fear of radiation to the fore of Japanese society and raised the so-called Japanese “nuclear allergy” to new heights. The crew’s experience became known as Lucky Dragon Incident 92 or the Bikini Incident, but the effects of the incident were not confined to the crew.

Following the Bravo Shot, tuna throughout the Pacific became contaminated with radioactive fallout, requiring hundreds of tons to be destroyed. The public, unsure of the extent of the crisis, began to avoid eating fish, which sent the fishing industry, a major part of the Japanese economy, into a tailspin. Reports of rain with unnaturally high radiation made the Japanese people fear the as of yet unknown effects of such exposure.

This chapter will examine the Lucky Dragon Incident, its effects on Japanese society, and reactions to it. Although the incident is most often identified with the fate of the Lucky Dragon’s crew, it caused serious damage to the Japanese fishing industry.

Hundreds of fishermen were exposed to contaminated tuna and the public temporarily stopped consuming tuna out of fear that it might contain radioactive fallout. Furthermore, it brought memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and fears of nuclear war to the fore of

Japanese society. These fears were particularly visible in some examples of the popular culture of the time, particularly the 1954 hit, Gojira (Godzilla). The incident combined

Japanese nuclear anxiety with resentment over American imperial control over large swaths of the Pacific. It also further the impression that the United States was dedicated to building weapons of mass destruction, which ran contrary to the Japanese post-war shift away from militarism. American officials believed that the propaganda value of the

Lucky Dragon Incident would become a public relations nightmare both in Japan and abroad. In order to shift the conversation away from the damage caused by bomb tests and the idea that the United States was a warmongering nation, the US government decided to offer Atoms for Peace aid to and toward the productive uses of nuclear power.

The Lucky Dragon Incident

The Dai-go Fukuryū-maru was large for a wooden fishing ship, 83 feet long and weighing in at 140 tons, 40 tons over the allowable tonnage of a wooden vessel. It began its life as the Kotoshiro-maru #7 and was used for bonito fishing. Bonito fishing is physically demanding on a fishing boat, requiring it to chase a school of fast moving fish and compete for position with other vessels. After five years as a national leader in the bonito trade, the boat was well past its prime. It had been constructed in the aftermath of

WWII, largely from spare lumber and outfitted with a 250 horsepower engine built in

1943. In 1953, the original owner sold the boat to Nishikawa Kakuichi for ¥12 million

($34,000 at the time). Nishikawa relocated the boat to Yaizu and repurposed it for tuna, which was far less demanding on the boat and very much in demand at the time.152

Nishikawa only had three boats named Lucky Dragon, but he decided to skip numbering his latest the Lucky Dragon #4; one of the words that means “four” in Japanese is a homophone for “death” and is considered unlucky.153

On January 22, 1954, the Lucky Dragon #5 set sail in search of tuna and almost immediately found trouble instead. After diverting to a nearby port to replace a spare engine part that had been overlooked, the ship became stranded on a sandbar. On its second day out to sea, the Lucky Dragon encountered a winter storm that battered the ship with seventy-five foot swells for three days and nights. Upon escaping the storm, the ship’s master changed the original course to Midway Atoll, where other ships reported

152 ishi wrote his own account of his experiences: ishi Matashichi, Bikini jiken no shijistu: Inochi no kiro de (T ky Misuzu hob , 003). Portions of this book have been translated into English, along with some of ishi’s other works. See: ishi Matashichi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, Richard H Minear, trans. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011). 153 Ralph E. Lapp, The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (Harper & Brothers Publishers: New York, 1958), 2. 94 catching bigeye tuna, which were more profitable than the yellow fin tuna that the Lucky

Dragon crew had brought in on their previous voyage. The waters around Midway were known for rough seas, which worried the crew given that the ship’s condition was deteriorating and they were not outfitted for cold weather. The atoll also lives large in

Japanese memories of World War II as the place where the offensive power of their navy was broken, making defeat all but inevitable.

On their second day of fishing near Midway, the crew lost 170 lines of their 330 fishing lines when they got caught on a coral reef. A tuna fishing line was about 1,000 feet long horizontally, with hooks attached to five branch lines that hung down from the main line. The main lines were connected to a series of buoys that held the line into position. The separate lines were connected together to form a long chain; when the

Lucky Dragon cast out all of its lines at the same time, they would extend over 54 miles.

Casting such long series of fishing lines was an arduous task, taking about two hours; pulling them in could take more than four. Although the crew members were able to recover some of their lines and put old ones back into service, the Lucky Dragon was reduced to 200 lines, less than a third of its original capacity. Facing such a disaster on the second day of fishing, the crew members deliberated over what to do. They could not go home because their pay depended on the size of their catch. The decision was between going north of Midway to find more bigeye tuna, or to turn south to fish for yellowfin tuna, which would bring a lower price. To the north, however, were stormy seas that were likely to offer the ship even more trouble, while the south offered calm waters. Perhaps the deciding factor in the matter was the ship’s engine, which had already died eight

95 times on the trip. The ship’s master finally decided they would try their luck near Bikini

Atoll.

Figure 2. Drawing depicting how tuna fishing lines are set.154 At 1 a.m. on March 1, 1954, the Lucky Dragon #5 began to cast lines for the fourteenth time on that trip. After the three and a half hours it took to lay the lines, ishi

Matashichi lay down to take a nap. ishi was twenty years old and had been a fisherman since his father and grandfather had died when he was fourteen. He was roused by a commotion at 6:45 a.m., when a flash made the sea, the ship, and the sky clearly visible despite the fact that the sun had yet to rise above the horizon. More distressingly, the flash was to the west. He scrambled to the deck where an umbrella-shaped yellow cloud was clearly visible. The crew began to wonder aloud what might have happened: was it an asteroid, a military exercise, or perhaps some sort of undersea explosion?155 They excitedly debated whether it might be the sun rising in the west or a pika-don—a word

154 This picture was drawn by ishi Matashichi and taken from ishi Matashichi, Bikini jiken no shijistu: Inochi no kiro de (T ky Misuzu hob , 003), 155 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 19. 96 used to describe an atomic bomb’s blast.156 Unnerved, the ship’s master ordered the crew to start pulling in the lines that they had finished casting less than two hours earlier.

The flash lasted three or four minutes before “The Light turned a bit pale yellow, reddish-yellow, orange, red and purple, slowly faded, and the calm sea went dark again.”157 Part of the crew ate breakfast by turns while the others pulled in the lines.

Masuda anjir described the experience saying, “We saw strange sparkles and flashes of fire, sparks and fire as bright as the sun itself. The sky around us glowed fiery red and yellow. The glow went on for several minutes—perhaps two or three—and then the yellow seemed to fade away. It left a dull red, like a piece of iron cooling in the air. The blast came about five minutes later [with] the sound of many thunders rolled into one.”158

ishi explained, “The rumbling sound engulfed the sea, came up from the ocean floor like an earthquake. Caught by surprise, those of us on deck threw ourselves down… I flung the bowl I was holding into the air, poked my head threw the galley and watched how things would turn out. My knees were quaking. Right after the roar, I heard two dry sounds, “pop, pop,” like distant gunfire. The calmness of the sea contrasted sharply with the light and the sound.”159 The crew continued to haul in the lines at the ship’s master’s insistence. Yamamoto Tadashi, the ship’s engineer, recalled the experience “It called to mind the atomic bomb, and thus death. Moment by moment, it was as if I were being

156 Lapp, 29-30. 157 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 19. 158 “The Ashes of Death,” Time Magazine, March 29, 1954, Vol. 63, no. 13, 19. 159 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 19. 97 chased by some devil. I hated the ship's master's command, ‘Pull in the lines!’ so much I wanted to yell at him.”160

As the sun rose and the sky became visible once more, the crew saw a colossal cloud spreading from where the flash had been, ominously coming toward the Lucky

Dragon even though the ship was upwind. Two hours after the incident, the wind rose, as did the seas, and it began to rain. Mixed in the rain were small white specks, not unlike snow, which continued to fall even after the rain stopped. ishi recalls that

It was just like sleet. As it accumulated on deck, our feet left footprints. This silent white stuff that stole up on us as we worked was the devil incarnate, born of science. The white particles penetrated mercilessly—eyes, nose, ears, mouth; it turned the heads of those wearing headbands white. We had no sense that it was dangerous. It wasn’t hot; it had no odor. I took a lick; it was gritty but had no taste. We had turned into the wind to pull in the lines, so a lot got down our necks into our underwear and into our eyes, and it prickled and stung; rubbing our inflamed eyes, we kept at our tough task. I was the refrigerator man, and wearing rubber coat and pants and hard hat. I put the catch in the tank. Lots of ash went into the tank, too, blowing like snow.161

Others tasted the white grit that fell as well, and debated whether it was salt, sand, or coral. One crewmember even collected some of it in an envelope as a souvenir.162

The snow was radioactive fallout, containing dangerous radioisotopes such as iodine-131, strontium-89, strontium-90, barium-140, cerium, lanthanum, terbium, yttrium, rubidium-103, calcium-45, cesium-137, zinc-65, and cobalt-60.163 After a while,

Kuboyama Aikichi pieced the clues together: the exclusion zone, the bright flash, and the equatorial snow might have meant they had just witnessed the explosion of a nuclear

160 Ibid., 19. 161 Ibid., 20. 162 The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon, 34-35. 163 Jacob Robbins and William H. Adams, “Radiation Effects in the Marshall Islands” in Radiation and the Thyroid: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Japanese Nuclear Medicine Society, S. Nagataki, ed. (Amsterdam: Exerpta Medica, 1989), 14-15. 98 bomb. The crew, fearing that they would be detained or even sunk by US Navy, decided to head back to Japan without alerting anyone. The crew continued to haul in lines and store them, they went to work scrubbing down the deck of the ship and then themselves.

With only a paltry nine tons of now contaminated fish in its hold, the Lucky Dragon headed back to port.

Operation Castle

Bikini Atoll was a part of the Marshall Islands and had been the site of Operations

Crossroads, which consisted of two nuclear bomb tests in 1946. The radio operator,

Kuboyama Aikichi, at least, knew the atomic history of the area. As the crew deliberated going to Bikini, Kuboyama opined that “ ince the war, atomic tests have been conducted there and are still being conducted; I have a hunch we'd better not go close to the restricted area.”164 In addition to knowing about past operations, the ship’s master and captain knew that the US Hydrographic Office had cordoned off the area around

Enewetak Atoll, about 190 miles from Bikini, in advance of Operation Ivy in 1952.165

The Castle series would consist of six tests, and Enewetak was too small to conduct all of them in such a small space because residual radiation after one test made it unsafe for personnel to set up for subsequent tests. Futhermore, Enewetak contained a permanent air strip, thus limiting the sections of the atoll where nuclear tests could be conducted.

Nearby Bikini offered an alternative; four of the Castle tests would take place on Bikini,

164 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 17 165 Ibid., 18. 99 and two on Enewetak.166 On October 10, 1953, the US Hydrographic Office expanded the exclusion zone to run from 10° 15’ to 1 ° 45’ north latitude and 160° 35’ to 166° 16 east longitudes, an area that included Bikini and extended ninety miles past the atoll. The

Japanese Maritime Safety Agency announced this expansion on November 1, 1953, almost two months before the Lucky Dragon #5 left port, but apparently the ship’s crew

167 had not been informed.

On March 1, 1954, Operation Castle began with the Bravo shot, the detonation of a device codenamed “ hrimp.” Castle Bravo consisted of a fission bomb that would produce free neutrons, heat, and compressive forces, which were directed toward the store of lithium deuteride by a uranium tamper. In addition to funneling the fission products to the fusion fuel, the tamper reflected neutrons so that they did not escape and it contained the heat and compressing force blast as long as possible so that the explosion did not diffuse the fuel before it had a chance to fuse. Uranium was used because denser materials are better able to reflect neutrons. American scientists estimated that Castle

Bravo would have a yield between four and eight megatons, but these calculations were based on the lithium-6 deuteride content of the bomb. Scientists did not realize that when lithium-7 was bombarded by a neutron, two neutrons would exit, creating lithium-6, which would produce tritium.168 ince 60 percent of Castle Bravo’s lithium deuteride contained lithium-7, there was more fuel for fusion than expected. The unexpected neutrons released by the lithium-7 produced more free neutrons, which in turn caused the

166 Barton C. Hacker. Elements of Controversy: the Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1994), 131-132. 167 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 18. 168 Richard Rhodes. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 542. 100 uranium tamper to fission, which typically would not occur to any significant degree. The end result was that Castle Bravo detonated with far greater force than expected: fifteen megatons, the strongest nuclear detonation in an American bomb test. The detonation produced a fireball nearly four miles in diameter, with a 6,000 foot crater 240 feet deep.169

Fission in the uranium tamper produced a greater than expected volume of radioactive fallout, making Bravo a very dirty bomb. The United States Atomic Energy

Commission and US Navy, which oversaw the operations, were concerned about the eventuality that the teams overseeing the tests would be exposed to radiation. During

Operation Ivy, the personnel were exposed to 3 roentgens of radiation on average, but

Operation Castle consisted of three times as many tests and was thus likely to lead to much greater exposure. The official limit for exposure during the thirteen week exercise was 3.9 roentgens, though the leadership implemented a policy that would allow them to raise the allowable limits at will.170 As March 1 approached, the task force monitored the weather closely and decided that the weather was unlikely to cause fallout to drift toward populated areas, and the scientific team deemed the bombs in the Castle series unlikely to cause excessive amounts of fallout.171 By midnight on March 1, six hours and forty-five minutes from the scheduled test, the weather forecast degraded to the point at which it was deemed unfavorable, but the Task Force Commander pushed forward with the test regardless, believing that the fallout would not reach inhabited islands until it had

169 Ibid., 542-543. 170 Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 137-138. It is worth noting that Dr. John Bugher, who had appraised the potential for civilian nuclear power in Japan in 1952, was one of the key medical figures working on Operation Castle. 171 Ibid., 138-139. 101 decayed to the point at which it would be harmless. He did, however, order the ships to wait fifty miles from the test site rather than the planned thirty.

Figure 2. The Bravo Shot, March 1, 1954172

The explosion surpassed expectation, as did the fallout. As several ships headed to recover samples and men stationed on land twenty miles from the site, they encountered high levels of radiation. One ship registered radiation at 5 roentgens per hour on its deck, while one spot seven miles from the explosion registered 600 roentgens per hour. The

172 Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organization, “1 March 2014 Marks the 60th Anniversary of the 1954 Castle Bravo Nuclear Test,” accessed May 17, 014, http://newsroom.ctbto.org/2014/02/27/1-march-2014- marks-the-60th-anniversary-of-the-1954-castle-bravo-nuclear-test. 102 ground crew had been relatively safe in their bunker, receiving less than 0.5 roentgens of exposure, though the area immediately outside their location was a hot spot of 800 roentgens per hour.173 Radiation also fell over nearby islands. Men stationed at an air force weather station on Rongerik received between 40 and 98 roentgens before they were evacuated. People on Rongelap, 185 miles from ground zero, received an estimated

110 roentgens before evacuation was ordered on March 3rd. On the island of Utirik, 154 people were evacuated when readings of 0.1 roentgen were discovered.174

Doctors inspected the American servicemen and Marshallese people who had been exposed to radiation and set up long term observation. All told, 28 American service men and 236 residents of the Marshall Islands were exposed to fallout from the bomb test. The severity of their exposure varied depending on the conditions they experienced.

American servicemen were recovered and decontaminated quickly, while many Marshall

Islanders were not evacuated for over 48 hours. The delay in evacuation was largely due to the unexpected outcome of the test, which left the Task Force unprepared to deal with the consequences. The Marshall Islanders were not fully informed of the dangers of the experiment, leaving the inhabitants of Rongelap completely baffled by the fallout, which fell like snow, an new experience for people living just north of the equator. Children were reported to have played in the “snow” and in some cases ate it, worsening their exposure. On the island of Utirik, farther from the experiment, radiation was less intense and completely invisible, giving the inhabitants no warning of the dangers whatsoever.

173 Ibid., 140-141. 174 Ibid., 142-143. 103

The people of Rongelap fared the worst. Although samples were not taken until

17 days after the explosion, best estimates place exposure between 1.75 and 1.9 grays. As

Task Force Commander Percy Clarkson observed, “The Rongelap natives correspond very well with the Japanese who were about 1.5 miles from ground zero at Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. In this group two to three per cent lost some hair, ten per cent had sore mouths, and five per cent experienced hemorrhages under the skin.”175 Two thirds of the

Rongelap patients experienced loss of appetite and nausea, though children under five were hit harder with 85 percent experiencing nausea and 38 percent vomiting; these symptoms subsided after two days. A quarter developed itching and burning sensations in the skin, and after two weeks, 90 percent developed burns. A quarter of the adults lost their hair and nearly all the children did so. Four weeks after the experiment, most patients platelet counts dropped by 30% versus Marshall Islanders who had not been affected, and after six weeks, white blood cell counts were down by half. Fortunately, none of the patients developed bleeding disorders or infections and did not require transfusions.176

Exposure to a host of radioisotopes affected the long-term health of the residents of Rongelap following their exposure to radioactive fallout. Those who were adults at the time of the accident appeared to be unaffected for the first decade after the incident, but later suffered an alarmingly high rate of miscarriages and birth defects. Those who had been under ten at the time fared worst. By 1966, 15 of the 22 affected children developed

175 Quoted in Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 146. 176 Jacob Robbins and William H. Adams, “Radiation Effects in the Marshall Islands” in Radiation and the Thyroid: proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Japanese Nuclear Medicine Society, S. Nagataki, ed. (Amsterdam: Exerpta Medica, 1989), 14-15. 104 thyroid lesions and two young boys’ thyroids atrophied following exposure, preventing them from growing normally. The affected population had high rates of hypothyroidism, thyroid nodules, and thyroid cancers, with five times the incident rate for each disorder as the control group.177 The Marshall Islands was the site of 67 American nuclear bomb tests between 1946 and 1958, with a payload of 108 megatons among them. These events damaged the environment of the archipelago and the health of its inhabitants for decades to come.178

Atomic Tuna

As the Lucky Dragon #5 started back toward Yaizu, the crew started to become ill on the evening of March 1st. They experienced nausea, diarrhea, dizziness, headaches and general pain. After two more days, their skin started to darken beyond the ever tanned skin of professional fishermen, and they broke out in small blisters wherever the ash had settled while they continued to work—wrists, ankles, and waists all broke out. A week after exposure, their hair started falling out.179 The fact that the crew had continued to work for hours before cleaning themselves off made their exposure worse than it might have been otherwise. Out of necessity, they stayed on the ship for two weeks until they finally arrived home. They had scrubbed down the deck and eliminated the visible fallout, but they continued to be exposed to residual and invisible radiation for the rest of

177 Ibid., 16-17. 178 In recognition of the harm it did, the United States agreed to pay $150 million to the Marshall Islands under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association, which went into force in 1983. Nuclear Claims Tribunal, accessed May 21, 2014, http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/ 179 The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 22-23. 105 their voyage. As such, the Lucky Dragon crew was exposed to more radiation than the people of Rongelap.180 The crew would almost certainly have been better off if they had radioed for help immediately, but they decided to avoid alerting the Americans to their position lest they be detained or sunk outright. A ship had gone missing near the Marshall

Islands in 1952, and rumor had it that the US Navy had sunk it; recalling these rumors made the crew fear for their lives.181

At 5:30 a.m. on March 14, the Lucky Dragon #5 returned to Yaizu. The crew members, who had not served together long and were not personally close, decided that they would keep quiet about their experience. Upon arriving home, they told the ship’s owner what happened. Seeing their condition, he sent them to the hospital immediately.

According to ishi, the doctor immediately suspected radiation poisoning. He sent two members of the crew to be treated in Tokyo, but released the rest after testing their white blood cell count and giving them an ointment for their burns.182 At this point, the members of the crew went their separate ways, apparently not fully comprehending their situation. ishi visited with neighbors and gave them the six pounds of tuna he received as part of his compensation, as was his wont. The day after the crew returned home, their catch was sold at market and shipped to locations spanning Honshu, from Niigata to

Okayama, and even as far away as Kagoshima.183

180 Best estimates place the crew’s exposure at between 50-330 roentgens of radiation (2.17 to 2.87 grays); estimates of the average Rongelapese exposure from 1.75 to 1.9 grays. Exposure to 2.9 grays of radiation is typically fatal in 10% of cases, while exposure to 2 grays is rarely ever fatal. 181 The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 20. 182 Ibid., 24. 183 Ibid., 24. 106

Various members of the crew went about their business, visiting public bathhouses, restaurants, and the red light district. Days later, when news of the Lucky

Dragon’s experiences hit the newsstands, those bathhouse and restaurants owners would complain that their regular customers refused to visit because members of the Lucky

Dragon crew had been there. The prostitutes that the crew members slept with, for their part, called the hospital in a panic, demanding to know whether they were in any danger.184 At the end of the day, a several members of the crew returned to the ship and bunked down for the night, staying there until March 16th when news of the Lucky

Dragon’s voyage became public.

The story broke in the Yomiuri Shimbun on March 16, filling nearly half of page seven. The Yomiuri got the scoop because its Yaizu correspondent, Abe Mitsuyasu, happened to live near the owner of the Lucky Dragon #5 and received a tip from a friend in the boarding house where he was staying that something had happened. Abe wrote the story up and sent it to the main office, where a group of staff writers were in the middle of researching a series of articles on the benefits of nuclear power, entitled “We Capture the un at Last.” This group of reporters, therefore, had some background in atomic technology. A Yomiuri reporter then visited a Lucky Dragon deckhand Masuda anjir who, had been transferred to Tokyo University Hospital. The article referred to the 23 member crew as “our fellow countrymen,” forging a connection between the victim and the nation. It describes the fallout, how the crew of the Lucky Dragon was coated in it, and its effects on Masuda and the others. The headlines conjectured whether the incident

184 Ibid., 25. 107 was caused by a hydrogen bomb and described the fallout as “the ashes of death,” a turn of phrase that originated to describe the fallout from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki.185

The Yomiuri coverage sparked a panic in Yaizu and throughout Japan. The experience of the Lucky Dragon crew was a stark reminder of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but radioactive contamination of fish threatened the Japanese way of life itself. Japan’s geography limits the potential for producing food. Although it is slightly smaller than Germany, only 1 % of Japan’s land is arable compared to 33% of

Germany’s, and yet it supports a larger population. In addition to a lack of arable land,

Japan also lacks large tracks of land suitable for grazing, limiting potential protein sources. Japan’s geographic limits combined with its large coastline made fish an important part of the national diet. Anything that threatened fish threatened Japan.

Furthermore, the Japanese had strong memories of starvation during and after World War

II. The fact that radioactive fallout, which was tied to the war through the bombing of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, threatened the fish supply only made the link stronger. Most

Japanese did not understand the exact threat radiation posed, which made their fear even greater: the nebulous nature of the danger allowed people to believe that even slight exposure could be deadly.

Of immediate concern was the Lucky Dragon’s catch, which had been shown to be contaminated and had been shipped to fourteen different prefectures, and two of the tuna had already been consumed before the story broke. Osaka University’s Professor

Nishiwaki Yasushi was called upon to test the in the Osaka Central Market, where his

185 “Houjin gyojin, Bikini genbaku jikenn ni s gū,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Mar. 16, 1954, 7. 108

Geiger counter immediately registered 2,000 counts per minute near fish from Yaizu, with some samples going up to 6,000 counts per minute186 (natural background radiation usually registers at around 20 counts per minute). When he heard the rapid click of the

Geiger counter, an onlooker at the fish market exclaimed, “The fish are crying!”

Following this incident, contaminated fish were called “weeping fish.”187

As a result, the Japanese Fisheries Agency established a demarcation zone running from 2°N to 21°N and 150°E to 175°E. Any ship that went through this region was required to go to one of five ports: Tokyo, Shiogama, Misaki, Shimizu, or Yaizu.

Any fish that registered more than 100 counts per minute from four inches away was to be buried six feet deep. Although the danger zone encompassed a large swath of ocean around Bikini and Enewetak where the Americans conducted most of their tests, the contamination was not confined to this area. Ocean currents carried fallout and contaminated fish westward toward the Philippines, north off the coast of Taiwan, and then toward the east. As a result, nearly 1,000 fishing expeditions, at least one from every prefecture that had a port, brought in contaminated fish, most of which were caught directly south of Japan.188

The Japanese danger zone was a massive rectangle around the American exclusion zone, the area established as a perimeter around Bikini and Entewak. The original American exclusion zone in the Marshall Islands was established on December

1, 1947 and constituted a rectangle around Entewak running from 10° 15’N to 1 ° 45’N

186 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 29 187 The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon, 90. 188 Kawasaki Shoichiro, Daigo Fukuryū-maru: Present-day Meaning of the Bikini Incident (Daigo Fukuryu Maru Foundation, Inc: Tokyo, 2008), 21. 109

Figure 3. Each dot on this map indicates a spot where a Japanese fishing vessel caught contaminated fish.189

and 160° 35’E to 163° 55’E. It was 150 nautical miles north to south and 00 nautical miles east to west. The establishment of such a large exclusion zone went against traditional maritime law, which limited territorial waters to 9 nautical miles from shore.

The United States, however, claimed the authority to do so from its Trustee Agreement

189 The arrows indicate the ocean's current. The rectangle toward the center denotes the American exclusion zone as of March 1, 1954. The semi-circle that extends from it denotes the expanded American exclusion zone following the Lucky Dragon Incident. This map was orignally created by the Fishery Agency of Japan and a copy was provided by the staff of the Daigo Fukuryūmaru Tenjikan (the Daigo Fukuryūmaru Exhibition Hall). 110 that it signed with the UN.190 The US announced its policy publicly and contact Japan about the establishment of this zone, reminding it of the existence of the zone when it caught the Shoichi-maru, a Japanese fishing boat, there on July 2, 1952.191 The US extended the exclusion zone to include Bikini in 1953 in advance of Operation Castle.

Following the Lucky Dragon #5 accident, the Americans expanded their exclusion zone on March 19, 1954. The new exclusion zone took the form of a circle sector of 450 miles centered 12° N 164° E. Most of the exclusion zone was north of

Bikini and Entewak because prevailing wind patterns made it unlikely that much fallout would go southward.192 The new zone created a major problem for the Japanese tuna fishing industry. Although the zone accounted for only one percent of the annual tuna catch, it lay directly in the path of the best fishing grounds in the Solomon Islands, the

Gilbert Islands, and Samoa where 65 percent of the annual Japanese tuna catch took place. Japanese fishing vessels typically went through the exclusion zone to get to these southern fishing waters; the expansion of the exclusion zone added two and a half to three days to the trip. In light of these concerns, the Japanese government requested that:

1.) the US shorten the duration of the exclusion zone, 2.) designate periods when fishing vessels could pass through the zone, 3.) limit the size of the zone, 4.) advise the Japanese government in advance of a test, 5.) issue warnings to ships in the vicinity in advance of

190 Ambassador Araki Eikichi to Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo, Number 957, Nov. 16, 1952, Gensuibaku jikken kankei jiken Beikoku kankei, dai jyūichi kai gaik kiroku k kai Gaimush Gaik Shiry Kan. 191 Ambassador Araki Eikichi to Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo, Number 957, Nov. 16, 1952, Gensuibaku jikken kankei jiken Beikoku kankei Dai jyūichi kai gaik kiroku k kai Gaimush Gaik Shiry Kan. 192 Ambassador Iguchi to Foreign Minister Okazaki, “Eniuetokku ensy hukin ni okeru kiken chitai kakudai no hukoku ni kansuru ken,” Number 59, Mar. 19, 1954, Gensuibaku jikken kankei jiken Beikoku kankei, dai jyūichi kai gaik kiroku k kai Gaimush Gaik Shiry Kan. 111 tests, and 6.) to avoid running tests during the tuna fishing season from November to

March.193

The United States agreed to maintain the exclusion zone only for the duration of tests, though it maintained the right to reestablish the zone. It refused to give specific dates for detonation because all tests were dependent on atmospheric conditions and were given to long, unanticipated delays. Although it promised to warn nearby ships as well as it could, it argued that offering safe passage during the periods when testing took place would be impossible. Most pressingly, the United States refused to accede to Japanese suggestions that it not test nuclear weapons during the fishing season from November to

March. pecifically, it argued that “The importance of nuclear technology to national and world security makes it necessary that tests be conducted at times determined by scientific laboratories. So far as the weather is concerned, for example, the months of

January and February are generally best for test operations.”194 It did, however, suggest that it would continue to study the issue and offered to work together with the Japanese government to obtain and exchange information to help treat the Lucky Dragon crew.

Suggestions that the Japanese government issued were out of sync with the sentiments of its population. The damage to fishermen, manufacturers, brokers, and small businesses in the Tokyo region alone is estimated to have been ¥1 billion (nearly US $2.8 million) by October 1954,195 and they sought direct compensation from the United States.

The United States ultimately paid the Lucky Dragon crew members $2 million for their

193 Ambassador Iguchi Sadao, Aide Memorie, Mar. 31,1954, Gensuibaku jikken kankei jiken Beikoku Kankei, dai jyūichi kai gaik kiroku k kai Gaimush Gaik Shiry Kan. 194 United States Department of State, Aide Memoire, Gensuibaku jikken kankei jiken Beikoku Kankei, dai jyūichi kai gaik kiroku k kai Gaimush Gaik Shiry Kan. 195 “Genshi maguro no higai,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Oct. 4, 1954, 3. 112 suffering, but refused to compensate the Japanese fishing industry in general for its loses.

Traders at the Tsukiji Fish Market in Tokyo held a rally dubbed the “Marketwide Rally against Hydrogen Bombs” on April nd. They resolved that “Fish shops in Tokyo have had to go out of business or close temporarily. If this situation continues, it won’t be possible to eat fish. All loses to death ash should be compensated by the government of the US, and we call on the Japanese government to undertake serious negotiations to that end.”196 Their demands were not met.

The general populace was outraged by American bomb tests. Following the Lucky

Dragon Incident, a group of women in Suginami, Tokyo began a petition to collect signatures on a petition to ban nuclear weapons tests. The grassroots effort spread throughout Japan, with local groups collecting signatures at the village level. Many of these groups were led by women, who played a central role in the anti-nuclear movement.

Although women did not traditionally have a very active role in Japanese political life, these women tended to believe that the peace movement was an extension of their role as mothers, which was their tradition purview. The theory went that ensuring peace kept their children safe; similarly, women would also become important figures in the environmental movement because a clean environment was vital to the health of their children. The petition was a monumental success, eventually gaining 32 million signatures, which amounted to one third of the Japanese population.197

Since the problem of radioactive contamination proved to be national in scope, thirteen additional ports were designated for inspection in May. Inspections continued

196 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 37. 197 ishi Matashichi. Bikini Jiken no shinjitsu: inochi no kiro de (T ky Misuzu hob , 003). 113 through December, with each prefecture along the Pacific reporting at least one vessel coming back with a contaminated catch, and 856 ships had at least some contaminated fish. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, by May 22, 200,000 tons of deep water fish had been brought to the five designated ports and 0.5 percent of that was found to be contaminated; a further 18,000 tons from around Kyūshū, Taiwan, and the Philippines,

0.2 percent of which was contaminated.198 These fish were either disposed of at sea199 or were buried six feet below ground. The Tsukiji Fish Market in Tokyo was the site of some burials.200

Regardless of the exact figures, the effects on the Japanese fishing industry were catastrophic. By the end of March, the price of tuna had dropped between 30 and 50 percent. The price of other fish dropped as well since people were unsure whether they could trust what had been a staple of their diet. The damage was not contained domestically; international tuna packaging companies issued bans on the import of

Japanese tuna for fear that it might be contaminated.201 Fear over contaminated fish was

198 These figures come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minutes of the 12th Consultative Meeting for the Settlement of the Lucky Dragon #5 Incident,” May , 1954, Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo. It was cited in Kawasaki Shoichiro, Daigo Fukuryū-maru: Present-day Meaning of the Bikini Incident (Daigo Fukuryu Maru Foundation, Inc: Tokyo, 2008), 21.Kawasaki Shoichiro reports that 485.7 tons of tuna were destroyed, which suggests that the Ministry’s figures are off by a significant margin. 199 “‘Genshi maguro’ o suis ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Apr. 5, 1954, 7. 200 A memorial to the atomic tuna was erected at the Tsukiji Fish Market. As of the writing of this dissertation, the memorial has been relocated to the Lucky Dragon #5 Museum in Yumenoshima, Tokyo while the Fish Market undergoes renovations. 201 Foreign Minister Okazaki to General Consul H gen in Los Angeles, “Van Camp Corporation’s argument for cancellation of the treaty on importation of canned tuna from Japan,” No. 1 , Mar. 18, 1954 Foreign Ministry Archives, translated and cited in ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 51. 114 so great that Japanese companies began to import tuna from India to assure their customers that the fish was safe.202

Figure 4. Tuna inspection at Yaizu203

On March 28, the US Army transported the remainder of the Lucky Dragon crew to Tokyo for medical treatment. They traveled via military aircraft because officials feared that they might cause a minor panic if the crew were transported by passenger train. The planes began their journey by heading out to sea, and ishi feared that they were being taken to the United States against their wishes. Once in Tokyo, seven members of the crew were taken to Tokyo University Hospital, while the younger and

202 “Sakanaya-san suibaku taikai ‘Kono songai o d shite kureru,’” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Apr. 2, 1954, 3. 203 ishi Matashichi, Bikini jiken no shijistu: Inochi no kiro de (T ky Misuzu hob , 003), 44. 115 unmarried men went to Tokyo National Hospital #1.204 The crew members were under constant supervision with regular blood draws, which revealed that the radiation had lowered their platelet and white blood cell counts. Whereas a normal person has between

100,000 and 400,000 platelets per microliter, these numbers ranged between 10,000 and

20,000; white blood cell counts were between 100 and 1,000 per microliter, while a healthy person has between 3,500 and 10,500.205 This damage left the crew susceptible to internal bleeding and infection, which prompted doctors to prescribe absolute bed rest, large quantities of antibiotics, and regular blood transfusions.

The use of blood transfusion to treat radiation victims was controversial. The crew was suffering from acute panmyelosis, which affected the bone marrow’s ability to generate blood cells, so providing blood was logical. The practice, however, went against the advice of American doctors. “I warned the Japanese that blood transfusion might potentially cause liver damage among patients suffering from radiation sickness. Around

300 Marshallese as well as American victims have not received blood transfusions, and jaundice and other liver disorders have not occurred and all have recovered.”206 The

Japanese victims, on the other hand, did experience liver complications, ultimately leading to the death of radioman Kuboyama Aikichi on eptember 4, 1954. Kuboyama’s death led to a series of accusation and recriminations between Japanese and American doctors, with the former insisting Kuboyama died of acute radiation sickness, while the

204 ishi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, 32. 205 Ibid., 33. 206 Cited in Aya Homei, “The Contentious Death of Mr. Kuboyama: Science as Politics in the 1954 Lucky Dragon Incident,” Japan Forum 25:2, 221. 116 latter insisted that he died of viral hepatitis contracted during a blood transfusion.207

Regardless of the medical controversy, the Yomiuri Shimbun ran a banner headline on the front page proclaiming Kuboyama as the “First Victim of the Hydrogen Bomb.”208

Although the rest of the crew recovered in the short term, many of them were plagued with liver problems for the rest of their lives, eleven of which ended prematurely, either due to the effects of radiation or its treatment.

Atomic Diplomacy

The Lucky Dragon incident proved highly damaging to US-Japanese relations. At first the United States did not comment on the incident at all. The story had legs, however, and threatened to produce anti-American sentiment in Japan, which could threaten the American strategic position in East Asia. As a result, the United States was forced to take a position and offer aid. The offer of aid proved to be problematic, though, since the Army was unwilling to give the Japanese any information that might divulge technical details about the bomb. Information about the nature of the bomb or the fallout that it produced was top secret from the American perspective because this information would aid the Soviet Union in developing its own hydrogen bombs if it should get out.

Rather than provide sensitive intelligence, the United States offered to treat the victims either in American facilities or in the United States. The Yoshida administration found this proposal unacceptable; Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was under considerable

207 For more on questions over the cause of Kuboyama’s death and the controversy it engendered, see Aya Homei, “The Contentious Death of Mr. Kuboyama: Science as Politics in the 1954 Lucky Dragon Incident,” Japan Forum 25:2, 212-232. 208 “Suibaku hisai hatsu no giseisha,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Sep. 24, 1954. 117 public scrutiny at the time, and he feared that if he allowed the United States to take over the operation it would look like a cover-up of the whole incident at a time when he could little afford more negative press. The State Department felt that this incident was more hurtful to US-Japanese relations than the unpopular Security Treaty of 1951, a considerable feat considering that treaty’s unpopularity.209

A solution to this problem came from an unlikely place: the Operations

Coordinating Board (OCB). The OCB was responsible for coordinating Cold War propaganda, hardly the obvious place for foreign policy to originate. It proposed that the

United States offer a bilateral agreement on nuclear power and to build an experimental nuclear reactor in Japan, pointing out that “a vigorous offensive on the non-war uses of atomic energy would appear to be a timely and effective way of countering the expected

Russian [propaganda] effort and minimizing the harm already done in Japan” by the

Lucky Dragon incident.210 This report was written on March 22, 1954, eight days after the Lucky Dragon story first hit the Japanese papers. It indicated that the United States offered participation in the Atoms for Peace program to Japan in order to contain the fallout of an international incident, and to minimize the propaganda damage resulting from it. Undoubtedly the United States would have offered nuclear aid to Japan regardless of international tension; Japan was a close ally in the Cold War, needed for new sources of power, and had the scientific talent to contribute to the development of

209 “The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of tate,” May 0, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, Pt. 2, 1643. 210 “Japan and Atomic Tests,” Mar. , 1954, cited in wenson-Wright, 181-182. 118 nuclear power. The timing of the offer, however, helped substantially to achieve a foreign policy goal: Atoms for Peace in Japan.

The Lucky Dragon in the Headlines

The Lucky Dragon Incident excited fears of radiation and brought it to the fore of public discussion. If it had occurred two years earlier in 1954, the Japanese media would still have been under American censorship, and its coverage of the incident would doubtlessly have been different. The newspapers did not hesitate to make comparisons between the Bikini Incident and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Articles in newspapers called the incident “the third nuclear attack on Japan” or the “third nuclear bomb tragedy,” even before the scale of the fallout was understood.211 An article in the Chūgokū himbun went so far as to argue that the damage to innocent bystanders was the expected effect of nuclear weapons.212 Throughout 1954, newspaper readers would be reminded on an almost daily basis of the threat posed by radiation, whether it was warnings about the health threats posed by “atomic tuna,”213 the spread of radioactive fallout and raie nfall,214 or reports on the condition of Lucky Dragon #5 crew members.215

211 See for example, “Bikini no hai,” The Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 17, 1954, 3; Yasui Kaoru, “Chūgoku rondan: genshi heiki no kinshi o nozomu,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, Mar. 19, 1954, 2; Shiotsuki Masao, “Chūgoku rondan: warera hutatabi genbaku uku,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, Mar. 22, 1954, 2. It is worth noting that the first headline was placed inside a mushroom cloud, while the latter two were written by a men who go on to become an important figure in the anti-nuclear weapons movement. 212 See for example: “Hibaku jiken to suibaku jidai,” The Chugoku Shimbun, Mar. 21, 1954, 2. 213 See for example: “H shan maguro touchaku no kakuchi de zokuzoku kensyutsu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Mar. 18, 1954, 7; “Tsukiji ni houshanou biryou hukumu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 18, 1954, 3; “‘Genbaku maguro” o taberu ato de bikkuri,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, Mar. 19, 1954, 8. 214 See for example: “Tou kara nishi kara genshihai no ky i,” The Chugoku Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 26, 1954, 2; “Niigata-shi ni ‘h shan ’ Niigata daigaku happy ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Apr. 15, 1954, 7; and “Jink teki h shan to kakunin,” The Asahi Shimbun, Apr. 4, 1954, 7. 119

The role of the Yomiuri Shimbun in the Lucky Dragon coverage is of particular interest. Shoriki Matsutar , the editor of the Yomiuri who will be discussed at greater length in chapter 3, was a proponent of the development of civilian nuclear power, and was asked by the CIA to take a consistently pro-American approach in his paper.216

Despite his connections, Shoriki was not averse to criticizing the United States when he thought it was in his best interests. It was the Yomiuri, after all, that broke the story in the first place, prompting the media storm that resulted. It dedicated a substantial amount of its 1954 news coverage to the Lucky Dragon Incident,217 including dedicating the front page of its evening edition to photos of the crew members and their burns.218 The

Yomiuri even criticized US Representative Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy, for his comment that “The Japanese fishermen may have entered the danger zone for a purpose other than fishing and may have spied on the nuclear test.”219 These facts should not be too surprising given the importance of the story that the Lucky Dragon provided. Shoriki was, first and foremost, a businessman, and nothing sells papers quite like a national disaster and panic. The criticism of Cole is also

215 See for example: “Yaizu no senin sy zy susumu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 17, 1954, 4; “Daigo Fukuryū-maru no kanjya Kuboyama-san jyuutai ni ochiru,” The Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 31, 1954, 7. 216 “PODAM/Japanese Public Opinion Regarding Atomic Energy,” July 5, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 217 A search for “Daigo Fukuryū-maru” (Lucky Dragon #5) on the Yomiuri database produced 546 results in 1954, compared to a comparable search of the Asahi Shimbun which produced 888 results. Although the Yomiuri has 40% fewer articles on the Lucky Dragon, this disparity does not mean that the Yomiuri Shimbun covered the incident 40 percent less than the Asahi. The databases divide content by sub-headline, and subsections of articles were often very short, so it does not necessarily reflect the actual amount of content. 218 “Genshiryoku o heiwa ni morumotto ni wa naritakunai,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 21, 1954, 1. 219 ishi Matashichi, The Day the Sun Rose in the West, Richard H Minear, trans. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 27. 120 quite understandable because Shoriki was a nationalist who saw the United States as a means to an end and a bulwark against Communism, not as an ally worth defending at all costs.

The Yomiuri Shimbun did, however, use the Lucky Dragon Incident as a means to further his political goals, which can be seen most clearly in an editorial that uses the

Bikini Incident to advocate for Japanese rearmament. “We, who fear nuclear power, are seeing it once again. The people who have irresponsibly begun to agitate in the direction of war in particular can probably predict how disastrous the next war will be.

Rearmament is the still the greatest matter facing Japan, but seeing nuclear weapons of this strength, in a lot of ways makes rearmament seem necessary. The Lucky Dragon #5 made us inadvertently consider an important lesson. I want to make use of this lesson.”220

The idea of rearming as a reaction to the Lucky Dragon Incident seems out of step with national sentiment, which generally focused on eliminating nuclear weapons all together, not producing conventional weapons as a hedge against a future war. Of greater interest here, however, is the use of the word genshiryoku (nuclear power) in the original. Today, the term refers to electric generation via nuclear power plants, but its meaning was more flexible in the 1950s. As chapter 3 will show, in the 1950s, genshiryoku often referred to a wide range of nuclear technologies, including medical imaging and radiation therapy, radioisotope-based research, and other uses of radiation. The term was generally a positive one, referring the productive aspects of nuclear technology rather than the destructive purposes. The logic of the editorial dictated that nuclear weapons, such as the

220 “Shasatsu: Genshi heiki e no huan,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Mar. 17, 1954, 1. 121

Bravo Shot that contaminated the Lucky Dragon, were something to be feared. The use of this term equates the peaceful and destructive uses of radiation, an odd choice given the

Yomiuri’s support for the development of civilian nuclear power.

The King of the Monsters

Fear of radiation played an important role in Japanese popular culture following the Lucky Dragon incident. As noted above, the most famous work depicting Japanese nuclear anxiety is Gojira (Godzilla in the English speaking world).221 The film develops

Godzilla as a metaphor for the dangers of both nuclear weapons testing and the weapons themselves. Godzilla both reflected existing social anxiety over nuclear war and radiation and also amplified it by providing images that embodied nebulous fears. The commercial success of the film suggests that it resonated with the Japanese population, in part because it tapped into contemporary concerns. The grand spectacle of a 50-meter-tall atomic super-beast destroying Tokyo has an appeal of its own beyond its social commentary, but the audience at the time could not have missed references to the Lucky

Dragon, atomic tuna, and radioactive rain. The film links these real world problems with the destruction of Tokyo, which simulates the effects of a nuclear weapon while also recreating the effects of conventional and atomic bombing of Japanese cities during

World War II.

In 1954, T h tudios had planned to shoot a war movie called In the Shadow of

Glory. T h had already raised the capital for the film and was preparing to shoot the

221 In deference to the popularity and enduring legacy of the film and its franchise, this study will refer to the creature and the film as Godzilla rather than Gojira. 122 film in the jungles of Indonesia when the Indonesian government denied the studio work permits for the cast and crew, effectively killing the project. On a flight back from

Indonesia, Tanaka Tomoyuki, a T h producer, struggled to figure out what to do next.

The producer stared out of the window at the Pacific Ocean and thought about the Lucky

Dragon Incident, which had only recently occurred, when he came up with the idea of “a monster that invades Tokyo the way King Kong attacked New York.”222 Tanaka and

Honda Ishiro, the screenwriter and director, developed the film to aid the anti-nuclear movement, going so far as to say they thought the film would end nuclear weapons testing.223

The film opens with a commercial vessel, the Eiko-maru, at sea, with the crew taking its ease when they see a bright flash. They rush to the railing and see a bright light building underwater when the subsequent explosion blinds and buffets them. The ship catches and sinks with few if any survivors. The bright light that draws the attention of the crew is reminiscent of the flash that the crew of the Lucky Dragon saw following the detonation of the Bravo Shot, though the explosion happened right next to the Eiko-maru and sank the ship, unlike the Bravo Shot, which was 100 miles away from the Lucky

Dragon #5. In the shot of the crew being buffeted by the explosion, there is a life preserver labeled 5 in the background, further alluding to the Lucky Dragon Incident.

Even the name of the ship, the Eiko-maru, has a sinister connotation. During World War

II, the American forces sank over 2,000 Japanese merchant vessels. Many of these ships

222 John Rocco Roberto, “Japan, Godzilla, and the Atomic Bomb a study into the effects of the atomic bomb on Japanese pop culture,” accessed Feb. 1 , 014, http://www.historyvortex.org/JapanGodzillaAtomicBomb.html. 223 Ibid. 123 fell prey to American submarines, including a ship called the Eiko-maru, which was sunk by the USS Seadragon.224 Although it was just one ship among thousands which were sunk and its fate was not common knowledge, this small reference suggests American culpability.

The Eiko-maru manages to send a distress signal to the coast guard, which alerts the ship’s owner, the outh eas alvage Company. The Bingo-maru, owned by the same company, is rerouted to investigate the incident, and is subsequently sunk as well. The three survivors of the attacks are rescued by a nearby fishing vessel, which, quite predictably at this point, sinks. The sole survivor of the attacks washes ashore on Odo

Island, where he is found by his friends and family. Reflecting on the fate of the fishing vessel and the recent lack of a decent catch, an older resident of Odo Island concludes that it must be Godzilla.

Although younger members of the community dismiss his claims, the islanders conduct a ritual, mostly consisting of dancing and building large flames. The old man is asked about Godzilla, and he explains that it is “A giant, terrifying monster. Once it eats all the fish in the sea, it'll come ashore and eat people. In the old days, if the catch was poor for a long time, we'd sacrifice a young girl… send her drifting out into the middle of the ocean. This dance is all that's left of that exorcism ritual.”225 The Godzilla of Odo

Island lore is a vengeful god that must be appeased and driven away by a combination of ritual exorcism and sacrificial blood. The modern Godzilla can be seen as a marauding

224 The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, “Japanese Naval and Merchant hipping Losses during World War II by All Classes,” accessed May 31, 014, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/japaneseshiploss1.htm, accessed May 31, 2014. 225 Gojira. 124 spirit that had been injured by modern technology invading its natural habitat.226 The spiritual element of the film is complicated by the younger residents’ of Odo Island dismissing the myth of Godzilla, one of whom opines, “Godzilla again, pops? There’s no such thing nowadays,”227 when an old man proposes that the creature may be responsible for the poor catch. Although the ritual was meant to exorcize the monster, it was never fully performed because the islanders had abandoned human sacrifice. These scenes hint that Godzilla has a spiritual element, against which modern Japan had lost the ability to defend with the old rituals. The ritual apparently fails to appease Godzilla, and it destroys the village during a large storm the night the survivor returns to Odo Island.

These attacks prompt hearings in the Diet, where the survivors of Odo Island speak. After the survivors testimony, we hear from Professor Yamane Kyohei, a paleontologist. The Diet sends Yamane on a mission to Odo Island, on which is accompanied by his daughter Emiko and her apparent boyfriend Ogata Hideto, who works for the outh eas hipping Company. At Odo Island, Yamane’s team discovers that the village’s well has become irradiated, as are the craters throughout the village, which are determined to be the monster’s footprints. Although the people of Odo Island are already upset about the destruction wrought by Godzilla, the radioactive poisoning of the well seems to be almost equally bad. After being told not to use the well anymore, the women of the village fall into distressed whispers, with someone mumbling, “What are

226 This theme show marked similarity to Miyazaki Hayao’s Mononoke Hime (Princess Mononoke, 1997), in which a forest spirits attempt to take vengeance for a town clear cutting the forest and producing firearms, the iron shot from which corrupts gods and drives them to attack mindlessly, much like Godzilla. 227 Gojira. 125 we supposed to do now?”228 This scene hints at the long-term impact of Godzilla’s attack on the island, which mirrors, in small scale, the effects of an atomic bomb. The initial attack leveled a couple of buildings and killed a few people, but the damage was limited, all things considered, and was something the villagers could recover from. The fact that the island was infested with pockets of radioactivity, including the villagers’ main source of drinking water, however, shows that their hardships will last well past the direct destruction, very much like the effects of an atomic bomb.

After investigating Odo Island and seeing the creature for himself, Yamane returns to Tokyo and reports to the Diet. He identifies the creature as a product of the

Jurassic period, which he incorrectly identifies as being two million years ago. Yamane names the creature after the Odo Island tradition, dubbing it “Godzilla.” According to

Yamane’s analysis, Godzilla was a creature sheltered in a cavity deep in the ocean;

Godzilla’s habitat was disrupted by hydrogen bomb testing in the outh Pacific, most likely leading to the destruction of its food supply. The creature, derived of the fish it survived on, moved into open waters, eventually coming to Japanese territorial waters.

This explanation is bolstered by the presence of strontium-90 in a Jurassic era fossil found in one of Godzilla’s footprints, a byproduct of atomic weapons that does not exist in nature. As a result of its exposure to hydrogen bombs, Godzilla emits “high levels of

H-bomb radiation.” Dr. Yamane’s theory shares some similarities with the story presented about the mythological Godzilla, which went marauding when large numbers

228 Ibid. 126 of fish died, though the idea that Godzilla had come ashore in human memory is not entirely consistent with Yamane’s explanation.

Yamane’s description of Godzilla creates a complex image of the creature. The idea that Godzilla was marauding because its habitat was destroyed by American bomb tests creates a curious shared identity between the Godzilla and the Japanese as common victims of bomb testing. Yamane theorizes that Godzilla survived largely on a diet of fish, much as the Japanese, who feared that their food source would be tainted beyond repair by hydrogen bomb testing, if it had not already. Later in the film, after Godzilla first attacked Tokyo, the government asks Yamane whether Godzilla can be destroyed, to which he responds, “It's impossible. Godzilla was baptized in the fire of the H-bomb and survived. What could kill it now? Right now our priority should be to study its incredible powers of survival.”229 Yamane’s argument furthers the identification of Japan with

Godzilla, since few people in the world outside of Japan had ever survived a nuclear bomb. William Tsutsui goes so far as to argue that Godzilla’s scales resemble the keloid scars borne by victims of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.230

Despite the destruction Godzilla wreaked, Yamane is foremost concerned with studying Godzilla because he is concerned with its ability to survive a nuclear bomb. In an argument with Ogata over the issue, Yamane complains, “All they can think of is killing Godzilla. Why don't they try to study its resistance to radiation? This is a once-in- a-lifetime opportunity… No scientist in the world has ever seen anything like Godzilla.

229 Ibid. 230 William Tsutsui, Godzilla on my Mind (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 33. 127

It's a priceless specimen, found only in Japan.”231 For the most part, Yamane’s focus is on the idea that studying Godzilla could benefit humanity, but he also suggests that

Japanese scientists could offer the world something unique. As Japan sought to reengage the world in a constructive way following World War II, science offered an opportunity to rehabilitate the wartime aggressor.

The shared identity between Godzilla and Japan, however, does not extend to their responses to these stimuli; whereas the Japanese surrendered following the atomic bombings and peacefully, though forcefully, protesting hydrogen bomb tests, Godzilla recreated the conditions of its own suffering. It did so by first simulating the consequences of hydrogen bomb testing, the destruction of fishing. Godzilla’s attacks on shipping and fishing cut to the heart of Japanese vulnerabilities: Japan survived by fishing, exporting goods, and importing food and energy. The loss of ability to do these things would undermine the basis of the country, whether the cause was radioactive fallout contaminating fish or Godzilla attacks. Along such lines Ogata counters, “But

Professor that's no reason to let such a violent monster run loose. Godzilla's no different from the H-bomb still hanging over Japan's head,” thus reinforcing the metaphor of

Godzilla as a nuclear bomb.

Before Godzilla attacks Tokyo, the film depicts the city as being prosperous, alive with electric lights and the hustle and bustle of modern life. After showing the city, the film cuts to a party on a yacht. The people there are dancing, drinking, and celebrating, when Godzilla emerges from the ocean. The creature merely roars and splashes, but

231 Gojira. 128 leaves without doing any damage, except to the revelers’ nerves. These scenes show a happy and prosperous Japan, which is newly recovered from the horrors and destruction of war, but is clearly in the shadow of a looming danger that threatens to undo the past decade’s progress. No matter how comfortable life in Japan has become one, was not safe from fallout, hydrogen bombs, or two-million-year-old radioactive dinosaurs out for vengeance.

As the film progresses, a reporter, Hagiwara, receives a tip from his editor that Dr.

Serizawa might be working on something that could deal with the Godzilla threat.

Hagiwara asks Emiko to introduce him to Serizawa because she is engaged to the scientist. Serizawa is something of an ominous figure, a dour man with an eye patch earned during the war. He refuses to discuss his work with Hagiwara, but he explains it to

Emiko after she swears to secrecy. Serizawa’s invention is called the Oxygen Destroyer.

He explains:

I'd intended to research oxygen thoroughly from every angle. In doing so I discovered an unexpected form of energy. After my first experiment I was filled with horror at the power I'd unleashed. I couldn't eat for days. Just a small ball of this substance could turn all of Tokyo Bay into an aquatic graveyard… If used as a weapon it could lead humanity to extinction, just like the H-bomb. But I'm determined to find a use for the Oxygen Destroyer that will benefit society. Until then, I won't reveal its existence. That's why I told that reporter nothing. Should anyone try to force me to use it before then I'm willing to give up my life and destroy my work rather than let that happen.232

Serizawa has deep reservations about the dangers of revealing the existence of his work to the world, comparing it directly to the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. He feels a moral responsibility to defend the world from its use “If the Oxygen Destroyer is

232 Ibid. 129 used even once, the politicians of the world won't stand idly by. They'll inevitably turn it into a weapon. A-bombs against A-bombs, H-bombs against H-bombs--as a scientist--no, as a human being--adding another terrifying weapon to humanity's arsenal is something that I can't allow.”233 In this Serizawa argues that scientists have a moral responsibility for their inventions, and refuses to deploy an invention that could lead to a new arms race. His stance reflects that of a number of scientists who regretted their role in the development of the atomic bomb after the war.

With no one but Serizawa and Emiko aware of a potential weapon against

Godzilla, the creature is free to enter Tokyo bay. Although the Self-Defense Force fires on it, Godzilla makes it ashore rampages across the city, destroying a train station, a bridge, and other infrastructure. On the surface, this sequence is just about the spectacle of destruction, but Godzilla effectively recreates the war time conditions during the bombing raids. Godzilla is probably best known for knocking down buildings, most of the destruction it causes is due to the fire it starts with its atomic breath, creating a “sea of flames.” This portion of the attack recreates the firebombing of Tokyo late in World War

II. The metaphoric connection between Godzilla and the bombing of Tokyo is cemented when Godzilla is successful chased away by fighter aircraft, which were used to intercept bombers during the war. Whereas at the beginning of the film, Godzilla was a stand-in for hydrogen bomb testing, by this stage in the film it has become a metaphor for a hydrogen bomb destroying a city. A nuclear bomb, much like Godzilla, could recreate the worst of the wartime horrors from which the Japanese were only just recovering.

233 Ibid. 130

This connection is furthered by scenes between Godzilla’s various raids, when the aftermath of the attack is shown. In one scene, the camera pans across scenes of destruction throughout the city and shows the injured in makeshift shelters. The shelters are largely full of women and children, with many of the children crying. Such scenes would have been familiar to the Japanese audience in 1954, whose lives ten years earlier had been composed of similar images. Coupled with such familiar pictures, the film introduces a threat that few had ever faced: radiation. At the infirmary, a doctor uses a

Geiger counter to determine whether a child has been irradiated. When the Geiger counter clicks rapidly, onlookers are clearly distressed. These images conjure thoughts of

Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Lucky Dragon, and the specter of future wars made more deadly by radiological weapons.

Between Godzilla’s first and second attacks, experts from around the world come to Tokyo, and decide that the best tactic is to surround Tokyo Bay with a 100 foot tall barbed, electrified fence. The construction of the fence and the preparations for the next attack leads to mass evacuations of people within 1,600 feet of the fence. This evacuation coupled with the moving of tanks and artillery into the area, along with a fence fortifying the position, simulates the land invasion of the Japanese main islands that never occurred at the end of World War II. The decision to use an electrified fence is a symbolically potent one. The hope behind this move is that electricity can keep away the monster that represents the specter of fallout and nuclear war. This method of doing so is reminiscent of the goals of Atoms for Peace, which offered civilian uses of nuclear technology, including energy generation, as a means to eliminate nuclear weapons. Godzilla easily

131 manages to make it through the electrified fence, and turns around to destroy the transmission towers, first through brute strength before turning to his radioactive breath to melt them to the ground.

Emiko, helping out at one of the shelters, is overcome by what she sees and decides that she must break her promise to Serizawa to not tell anyone about his Oxygen

Destroyer. After she informs Ogata, the two of them attempt to convince Serizawa to allow his research to be used as a weapon against Godzilla. Serizawa refuses until his television mysteriously turns itself on and shows a broadcast of images of the destruction laid over the young girls singing for peace. The images pan through rubble and ruin, scenes of the wounded, and nurses tending to small children before settling on the girls singing in a hall. Serizawa changes his mind, and agrees to deploy the Oxygen Destroyer after first destroying his notes so that they cannot be used to recreate the weapon.

In the final scene, the Coast Guard locates Godzilla resting at the bottom of

Tokyo Bay with a Geiger counter. Serizawa and Ogata dive into the bay to place the weapon near the creature. Before doing so, erizawa yanks on Ogata’s diving cord so that the men on the boat haul him back up while Serizawa unleashes the weapon and cuts his own oxygen cord, thus killing himself so that he can never be coerced into recreating his research. While most of the team rejoices, Dr. Yamane reflects somberly that, “I can't believe that Godzilla was the last of its species. If nuclear testing continues then someday, somewhere in the world another Godzilla may appear.” These final words reinforce the core message of the film that hydrogen bomb testing poses a real threat to the world. The effects are shown throughout the film, first with the destruction of fishing

132 and shipping and then the simulation of a hydrogen bomb attack on Tokyo via a rampaging radioactive beast.

Honda Ishir , who wrote and directed the film, intended it to be a representation of how Japanese society would react to a creature like Godzilla. As a result, portions of the film take on a faux-documentary style to conjecture how various sectors of society would react to the danger posed by Godzilla. This approach gave the filmmakers amble opportunity for social commentary. For example, Yamane’s testimony sparks strong responses in the Diet. There are two sides to the debate, with support split along presumably partisan lines. One side argues that news of Godzilla could spark mass panic, posing a threat to public order. Its leader, Oyama, recommends that the discovery be kept secret. The other side is led by a woman who is not named. The opposition is comprised almost entirely of women and presumably represents the Japanese Socialist Party. The leader of the opposition is combative and interrupts Oyama repeatedly. She argues that the public has a right to know about the threat Godzilla poses, insisting that “The truth must be made public!”234 The exchange quickly degenerates into the beginnings of a riot.

The fact that the opposition, which seems to represent half of the chamber, mostly consists of women is somewhat curious given that only 30 members of the Diet were women in 1954. The prevalence of women in the opposition in part reflects the fact that women were very active in the anti-nuclear movement and took a leadership role in organizing petition drives following the Bikini Incident. Furthermore, women’s groups, such as the Hiroshima Maidens, were very visible symbols of the movement. It is also

234 Ibid. 133 possible that this scene is a reference to the fact that the Diet lapsed into riots on a semi- regular basis, including one in the House of Representatives on June 4, 1954, during which a group of female Socialist Representatives voted in a new government after taking the seats of the sitting government while the ministers attempted to stop a fight that had broken out.235 Regardless, the Diet in the film failed to react effectively to the threat of Godzilla, showing the filmmaker’s distain for politics. ince Godzilla is a metaphor for the threat posed by nuclear bomb tests and nuclear war, the filmmakers are criticizing the real government’s inability or unwillingness to deal with those issues; for example, the Japanese government settled the Lucky Dragon claims and refused to pursue claims from the fishing industry in general.

Print and broadcast media play a very important role in Godzilla, both as a means of exposition and as a way to drive the action of the film forward. The film frequently displays newspapers with headlines that convey information to the audience. In one scene, rather than using a clichéd spinning newspaper, the camera focuses on a paper before zooming out to reveal that it is being held by a man on train. The man holding the

235 ee, for example, “Syūin kūzen no daikonran,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 4, 1954, 1; “Arrests ought after Riot in Japanese Diet,” The Canberra Times, June 5, 1954, 2. Prime Minister Yoshida had been attempting to bring up a bill to reinstitute a national police force, a move the Socialists claimed would make the country a police state. The Socialists had been angling to delay the vote until the session ended, thus blocking it until the next session. When Yoshida attempted to extend the session in order to hold the vote, a fight broke out between the Deputies. During this riot female members of the Socialist Party took the seats belonging to the Chairman of the Diet, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Diet, and all the Cabinet ministers. They held a snap vote, thus forming an all-female Japanese government, albeit one with no power or legitimacy. When the members of the government noticed the interlopers, they attempted to force them out of the seats. According to the Canberra Times, “Resistance collapsed when one woman burst out crying at the men’s rough, unchivalrous handling. Her sobs were infectious and Japan’s first all-women’s ‘government’ dissolved in a flood of tears.” Tsutsumi Yasujiro, the peaker of the House, is said to have battled his way out of the chamber to summon the police, two hundred of which descended on the House of Representatives. In the end, at least 24 police, 30 House Guards, and 50 politicians were injured to some degree or another. 134 paper then discusses the news about Godzilla with another man and a woman. The woman responds, “This is awful! Atomic tuna, radioactive fallout, and now this Godzilla to top it off! … I barely escaped the atomic bomb in Nagasaki and now this!” This woman’s comment alludes to the Bikini Incident by invoking atomic tuna and radioactive fallout, by which she is likely referring to the unusually radioactive rains that plagued

Japan that year. The trio then discusses whether they should evacuate, with one of the men concluding, “Evacuate again? I’ve had enough of it!”236 The woman’s reference to

Nagasaki and the discussion of evacuation directly tie the threat of Godzilla to memories of the war; the attack of an atomic monster, and its radioactive contamination, threatens to return Japan to the horrors from which it had only recently recovered.

Members of the media are often portrayed as heroic. Not only does the reporter

Hagiwara start a chain of events that results in Godzilla’s defeat, the film shows newscasters risking their lives to bring the story to the public. One group of television reporters broadcast from the rooftops of Tokyo, much like Edward R. Murrow during the

London Blitz, and a radio reporter stands on the radio tower itself so he can see the action on which he is to report. He and other reporters bring descriptions and images of the attack to the nation so everyone could bear witness. They also provided advanced warning to the people of Tokyo. One broadcaster observed, “This is absolutely unbelievable, yet it's unfolding before our very eyes. Godzilla's leaving a sea of flames in its wake! Owari-cho, Shinbashi, Tamachi, Shiba, Shibaura—all a sea of flames!

Godzilla's on the move! It appears headed for Sukiyabashi. For those watching at home,

236 Gojira. 135 this is no play or movie. This is real, the story of the century! Will the world be destroyed by a two-million-year old monster?”237 Slightly later, a different reporter is shown with a number of print reporters and photographers standing on a television tower, where he declares, “We're reporting live via shortwave transmitter. Godzilla is heading this way right for our TV tower! There's no time to run. Will we survive? It's getting closer! This looks like the end! It has the tower in its hand. What power! This really is the end.

Farewell, ladies and gentlemen!”238 Unlike the earlier reporter, who simply comments on the destruction and crafts a narrative, the second television reporter actually narrates his own death, remaining dedicated to his job up until the point where he falls off the tower.

During the actual attacks, the media takes on an almost central role in the film.

The choice to use the media as a framing device reflects the central role that the news media play in modern life. Most people experience the world beyond their immediate surroundings through the media, and so the audience experiences Godzilla’s rampages through the fictional media. The centrality of the media in the film reflects their role in the Lucky Dragon Incident, when reporters rushed to relate the effects of the radiation and breathlessly reported the vital statistics of the survivors in the hospital. Whereas politicians are helpless in the face of crisis in the film, the reporters rush to do their jobs and indirectly save the day in the process. During the Lucky Dragon Incident, many

Japanese became frustrated with the government’s unwillingness to press the United

States to end nuclear weapons testing, while many newspapers editorialized that it should do so and excoriated the United States for its role in the affair. Given the importance of

237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 136 the media in the original film and in real life, it is not surprising that the American version included an American reporter who narrates the action.

Godzilla reflects the atomic anxieties of Japan in 1954 and brings fears of radiation into sharp focus. Nuclear weapons testing not only contaminated fish and rain, it threatened the health and way of life of the Japanese people, and presented the specter of a return to war and ruin. Godzilla is a walking hydrogen bomb aimed at a country that in no way provoked it. Rather, Japan was the victim of American actions, just the

Japanese were the unwilling recipients of atomic tuna and radioactive rain. The film offers a bleak future if nuclear testing continued; after all, Yamane suggests that another monster may appear if nuclear testing did not end. With a government unwilling to do anything about it, the filmmakers aimed their appeal to the Japanese people, who made

Godzilla the seventh highest grossing film of 1954.

Chronicle of a Living Being

Kurosawa Akira’s Ikimono no Kiroku (released in the United States as I Live in

Fear) similarly depicts Japanese fears of nuclear weapons and radiation. The film is about Nakajima Kiichi, a foundry owner who goes insane over fear of nuclear war. Prior to the beginning of the film, Nakajima, believing that any radiological threat would come from the south, purchased land in Akita Prefecture in the north, where he began building a bomb shelter. Upon reading a report in a newspaper that fallout would come from the north, he abandoned the Akita property and bomb shelter for a loss of ¥7.4 million. At that point, he became convinced that no place in Japan was safe from fallout, and only by

137 moving his entire family to Brazil could he ensure their safety. His family, seeking to preserve the family’s wealth and prevent him from moving them to outh America, filed a petition to have Nakajima declared mentally incompetent, claiming that Nakajima

“harbored delusional fears about atomic and hydrogen bombs and subsequent radioactivity.”239

At the beginning of the film, the petition has reached family court, where a tribunal is assigned to arbitrate the conflict between Nakajima and his family. The conflict also extends to Nakajima’s two mistresses and three illegitimate children, all of whom rely on Nakajima for financial support. The tribunal consists of Dr. Harada, a dentist who occasionally works with the family court as a mediator, Judge Araki, and Mr.

Hori, a lawyer. All three men are taken aback by the conflict, but Dr. Harada in particular sympathizes with Nakajima and begins to wonder whether fear of nuclear weapons and fallout is truly insane. While Araki and Hori both contend that Nakajima has taken the fear beyond the bounds of reason, Harada is haunted by the question. Upon leaving the tribunal, Harada spends the evening contemplating the question, while his son, Susumu, reads the evening newspaper unaware of his father’s inner anguish. Eventually Harada asks Susumu if he fears nuclear weapons, a question that does not interest Susumu enough to pull him away from the paper. When Harada presses the issue, Susumu responds that he is afraid, to which Harada asks, “Then how can you be so calm?”

Susumu laughs and replies, “Well, because there’s nothing we can do about it, is

239 Hashimoto Shinobu and Hideo Oguni. Ikimono no kiroku. DVD. Directed by Kurosawa Akira. New York:the Criterion Collection, 2008. 138 there?”240 Susumu concludes that if one worries about the issue all the time, it would lead to a nervous breakdown, which prompts Harada to opine that he does not think Nakajima had a nervous breakdown.

Although actor Mifune Toshir , who is given the difficult task of portraying a 65 year old man while only 35 himself, plays Nakajima as a clearly anxious man, given to ticks and outbursts of anger, the film goes out of its way to establish that Nakajima still has his mental acuity. For example, Nakajima negotiates shrewdly and effectively with a man selling coal to his foundry, gaining a steep discount because the ash content was higher than the salesman had stated. When faced with limitations on how much foreign currency he would be allowed to purchase, he manages to identify a farmer in Brazil who wishes to return to Japan and set up a property swap to circumvent the restrictions, which

Mr. Hori the lawyer deems both fully legal and clever.

During their final hearing, the tribunal argues over Nakajima’s competence.

Harada objects, saying “Usually when people are declared incompetent for financial irresponsibility it's for wasting money on women, alcohol and gambling. But taking precautions against A-bombs…” Hori agrees in principle, yet argues, “But his behavior goes far beyond common sense... His psychiatric tests showed no abnormalities, but he's gone too far.”241 The debate is not over his sanity or even whether his fear of nuclear war is reasonable, but whether he is acting in a reasonable way and taking into account his family’s needs. Hori concedes that Nakajima’s concerns are not unwarranted, but rather contends that his actions are outside of social norms of how to react to those fears. By

240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. 139 overreacting, Nakajima threatens not only his family’s well-being directly, but is also a potential threat to the social order; if everyone, or even a sizeable portion of the country, reacted the way Nakajima does, society would collapse.

Harada disagrees with Hori, arguing, “That's my point his only fault is going too far. But his anxiety about the bomb is something we all share… We just don't feel it quite as strongly. We don't build underground shelters or plan to move to Brazil. But can we claim that the feeling is beyond comprehension? The Japanese all share it, to greater or lesser degrees. We can't dispense with it so easily by just saying he went too far—”242

Harada’s advocacy for Nakajima’s core argument is powerful because Harada is a respected member of the medical community, nominated by his peers to be an officer of the court, who is not particularly surprised by Nakajima’s erratic actions. Arguments that are easy to dismiss from a potentially unwell old man, are not so easily ignored from

Harada. Hori, however, manages to win the argument by focusing on the family, “I'm approaching this as a practical problem. The old man feels as he does, but his family doesn't feel like going to Brazil with him. Forcing them to go would violate their rights.

Suppose we leave the situation as it is. He's sure to sell his house and foundry. His family will lose its livelihood and be left on the street… to prevent that, we have to declare him incompetent.”243

Following this speech, Nakajima is declared mentally incompetent, a decision that does not sit well with Harada. In the following scenes, we see Harada trying to come to grips with what has been done to Nakajima. Susumu finds him reading a book entitled

242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 140

Shi no Hai (Ashes of Death), which is about the threat that fallout poses to Japan. When

Susumu jokingly asks his father if he is thinking about moving to Brazil as well, Harada darkly responds, “Read it yourself. If the birds and beasts could read it, they’d all flee

Japan.”244 Harada then goes to the window, where he watches people in the streets and in their apartments, unconcerned about the problem that has overwhelmed Nakajima and troubles Harada. Later, he visits Judge Araki, who says that the case haunts him as well, but ultimately declares that they made the right decision, saying, that Nakajima’s “misery is nobody's fault, really. It simply stems from the fact that the H-bomb exists, and from his rather unusual disposition. His mind has no sense of proper limits. He thinks far too much—about everything.”245 The judge here acknowledges that fear of nuclear war and fallout is not unreasonable, but opines that the real problem is that Nakajima thinks about the problem. Presumably, if Nakajima did not think about the problem, then he would be fine. The converse of this argument is that if everyone really thought about the threat of nuclear war, then they might be inclined to move to Brazil as well. Later, Harada happens to be on the same bus as Nakajima and confronts him. Although Nakajima refuses to speak to him at first, Harada follows and apologizes for the outcome of the arbitration, stating he thought they might have been wrong. After first walking away, Nakajima returns, and upbraids Harada, insisting that he was not afraid of nuclear weapons before, but now that he cannot leave and there is nothing he can do about it, his life has become

“a living hell.” Perhaps Nakajima’s delusion was that he could do anything about a

244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 141 situation completely beyond his control. Without any form of coping mechanism, he gradually begins to lose control of himself.

After Nakajima is declared mentally incompetent and his wife is made his legal guardian, Nakajima meets with the man from Brazil with whom he plans to exchange property. The man from Brazil tells Nakajima that he does not want Nakajima’s foundry and requests that Nakajima buy him some farmland in Japan, which requires an immediate down payment of ¥1.5 million. Nakajima manages to raise ¥1.2 million by approaching vendors for outstanding payments, and attempts to gain the rest by asking his mistresses and illegitimate children for loans, most of whom refuses him. He spends the evening with one of his mistresses, her husband, and child. While the mistress is out,

Nakajima, exhausted after four days without sleep, sits with his sleeping child in his lap, rocking him gently. The mistress’s husband, after an evening of drinking, decides to press the fragile Nakajima in an attempt to get him to leave his family alone. Commenting on the rash of thunderstorms they had been experiencing:

This spooky weather doesn't let up, does it? The newspaper says it's from an H- bomb test. You probably know better than anyone, but they say that even if a bomb is dropped on China, or America or Russia, the fallout will eventually drift over Japan. I don't really understand it. Something to do with atmospheric currents. Japan's a sort of valley that all radioactivity flows into. But what about those of us living in that valley. What will happen to us? First our hair will fall out. In the end our bones will crumble and rot. Not something to look forward to, eh? The other day I saw a report on the bomb damage in Hiroshima. It was really gruesome. I bet you saw it to. You know a child at his age—246

Throughout the speech, the husband continues to drink and laugh tauntingly, but

Nakajima, who is visibly upset and begins to rock the child more intently, is moved

246 Ibid. 142 during this goading to snap at the husband to shut up. In this speech, the mistress’s husband addresses multiple horrors of nuclear bombs. He connects the unnatural weather with the continued testing of nuclear weapons, playing the reports of high levels of radiation in rain and snow that appeared regularly in Japanese papers. Implicit in this comment is the idea that people, particularly Japanese people, will be harmed even without a full-scale nuclear war. He furthers his focus on the threat to Japan by observing that fallout from a bombing of any major power would eventually end up in Japan, as if

Japan had an atomic curse. After listening to the mistress’s husband outline the dangers of radiation sickness, Nakajima loses his composure when he comments on the threat of radiation to small children. Obsessed as he was with issues of radiation, Nakajima would doubtlessly be aware that small children are especially susceptible to damage from radiation, since their cells divide more rapidly than those of adults, offering more opportunities for their chromosomes to be damaged.

The husband continues “I'm terribly sorry. I should've realized it's already weighing on your mind. But even worry has to be done in moderation. You know, you can't do anything without money. Please don't be too stubborn. Make peace with your sons and get as much as you can. You're in a good position. Even if you've been declared incompetent, you could still retire comfortably. Whereas we can't afford to support you here—”247 Driven to the verge of a breaking point, Nakajima storms over to the husband, and snatches the paper from his hands. Before he tears it, he reads the headline, “The

Truth about the H-Bomb, a Weapon to Destroy Mankind,” and declares that the bomb

247 Ibid. 143 never should have been invented, a sentiment that echoes Dr. erizawa’s objections to his

Oxygen Destroyer in Gojira (1954).

In a fit, Nakajima drags his mistress, her husband, and child to his house to confront his family. There, he makes a final impassioned plea “I'm begging you, on my life. Come to Brazil with me. I beg of you. All of you as one family. You say I’m paranoid and maybe I am, but H-bombs really exist and war could break out at any time.

If it does, it'll be too late to get away. We can still make it. Let's flee while we can. I can't let [my illegitimate son] die. I can't let an H-bomb kill him before he's even had a chance to live. I don't care about myself, and I thought I'd have to give you up. I thought at one point if I could at least save this baby--but you're all my flesh and blood. I can't leave you here. Please come with me, I'm begging you.”248 His wife and youngest daughter are moved by his begging and agree to go to Brazil with him, after which he immediately collapses from exhaustion.

While Nakajima is apparently sleeping, the entire family argues over whether the illegitimate children will be included in the will and whether Nakajima’s wife and daughter’s decision to move makes the sale of the foundry inevitable. Nakajima overhears their discussion, and decides to burn down the foundry so that his children will have no reason to stay. The next day, the foundry catches on fire and Nakajima admits to having done it in order to pressure his children to leave. The foundry workers confront

Nakajima and demand to know why he would destroy their livelihood for his family’s sake. Although Nakajima apologizes and promises to take the workers with him, the

248 Ibid. 144 family argues that the workers do not want to go either, and even if they did there is no reason to believe that Brazil would be any safer than Japan. One son goes so far as to yell, “It doesn’t matter where you go! No place on earth is safe from the H-bombs. Just

400 tons can kill all life! There’s more than that now!”249 This final comment snaps what is left of Nakajima’s sanity, leaving him a broken man.

Following his arson, Nakajima is imprisoned pending a psychological evaluation.

He shares a cell with two men who have no sympathy for him. One prisoner tells the other why Nakajima has been imprisoned, to peals of laughter. A prisoner tells Nakajima,

“You are a fool to worry about that stuff. Leave that to the Prime Minister,” while the other says, “If you’re so afraid, why not just move to another planet?”250 After this scene,

Nakajima is imprisoned, and Harada goes to visit him. While going into the institution, he meets Nakajima’s son. He apologizes to the son for the tribunal’s decision, while the son in turn claims it was his family’s fault for drafting the petition to begin with. Before going in to see Nakajima, Harada meets with a psychologist, who admits, "Whenever I see this patient [Nakajima], I become terribly depressed. This is the first time this has happened to me. Of course, the insane are depressing to be around. That said whenever I see him I somehow feel oddly anxious even though I'm the one who's supposed to be sane. Is he crazy? Or are we, who can remain unperturbed in an insane world, the crazy ones?”251 The doctor, having summarized both Harada’s beliefs and the central question

249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 145 of the film, allows Harada in to see Nakajima. Nakajima at first seems to be catatonic, but when he notices Harada, he turns with a clearly disturbed smile on his face, and says:

“You're safe here. Have no fear. By the way, what happened to the Earth? Are there many people left behind there? Are there still many people there? That's not good. Not good at all. They'd better escape soon or they'll be sorry! Why can't they understand?!

They'd better hurry and come to this planet! Is it burning? [he points out of his window at the sun] The earth is burning! It's burning! The earth has finally gone up in flames!”252

Harada, convinced that Nakajima is finally insane, leaves the institution, just as

Nakajima’s mistress and their young child come in.

Conclusion

With fears of radioactive contamination running high in Japan, the United States offered nuclear power to Japan as a propaganda measure to shift the conversation away from the nuclear bomb testing. Atoms for Peace aid would have been forthcoming regardless of whether the Lucky Dragon Incident occurred; indeed, the US offered aid to more or less every country. Still, the offer of aid was an overtly political maneuver.

Although the Japanese government enthusiastically took up the program, the news made little impression on the public, at least not until the following year. Rather, the news and popular culture continued to raise the issue of nuclear bomb testing throughout the year, with very little attention paid to the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Reports of radioactive rain and “atomic tuna” would continue to appear in the papers with

252 Ibid. 146 depressing regularity throughout the year. It would take more than the announcement of an offer of atomic aid for Japan to shift away from its focus on the dangers of nuclear weapons. Such a transition was fully under way during the theatrical release of Ikimono no Kiroku one year later.

One would assume that Ikimono no Kiroku should have been a commercial and critical success when it was released in November of 1955. After all, the director, Akira

Kurosawa, is often considered one of the greatest directors of all time, and he enjoyed immense popularity, both at home and abroad. The previous year, he had released

Shichinin no Samurai (Seven Samurai), which was the highest grossing film of 1954 in

Japan, hailed as a landmark achievement by critics, and won several film festival awards.

In fact, to this day Shichinin no Samurai is regularly regarded as one of the greatest

Japanese films of all time, often without the modifier of Japanese. Moreover , Ikimono’s anti-nuclear tone was in line with that in Godzilla, which was released by the same studio a little more than a year earlier, and it came out less than a year and a half after the Lucky

Dragon Incident, which filled the news with reports of atomic tuna, radioactive rain, and the uncertain health of the crew of the Lucky Dragon.

However, Ikimono did not recreate Kurosawa’s earlier success, or even achieve the lesser success of Gozira. It was in fact a flop at the box office, and was the only one of Kurosawa’s films to lose money upon its release. The United State Information

Service, 253 which oversaw American efforts at public diplomacy to inform and influence

253 The organization was comprised of two parts: the organs that existed inside the United States were known as the United States Information Agency, while the branches that were outside the US were called the United States Information Service. 147 the opinions of foreigners, argued that the film’s failure had to do with the fact that people were no longer as interested in the issue of nuclear war and fallout. One USIS official argued that “It is especially significant that this failure of the film to live up to expectations was apparently due less to artistic shortcomings than to poor timing. To quote one critic, ‘Another unfortunate thing about the film is that the cogent issue of 0 months ago seems to have lost much of its impact. The national hysteria caused by the

Bikini H-Bomb test has died down, making the message taste like last year’s beer.’ U I feels it is entirely justified in claiming for the Atoms for Peace Exhibit and its advanced publicity a share of the responsibility for this poor reception of Kurosawa’s message.”254

This is a remarkable claim. It assumes that Japanese fears and anxieties over radiation and nuclear weapons decreased to the point that, a year and a half after the

Lucky Dragon Incident, fear of nuclear war already passé; furthermore, it argues that the box office failure was due in large part due to the U I ’s actions through Atoms for

Peace. Although the USIS claim is self-serving and perhaps overblown, the introduction of Atoms for Peace exhibitions throughout Japan starting in 1955 helped to change radically the narrative about radiation. The following two chapters will explore how this shift occurred.

254 U I Tokyo to U IA Washington, “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Jan. 1 , 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 6. 148

Chapter 3: Selling the Atom to Japan

Although the civilian nuclear power had been part of the policy discussion for years by 1955, that year marked a turning point for the technology. It was at this point that the “peaceful uses of nuclear power” penetrated deeply into the national consciousness and even came to overshadow fear of nuclear war, if only for a time.

Although coverage of nuclear weapons tests and fallout continued throughout this period, the newspapers began to focus on the peaceful uses of nuclear power not only as a positive force in people’s lives, but as an alternative to the further development of nuclear weapons. This shift was the result of a series of international events: the release of a report from a Japanese mission sent abroad to study the prospects of nuclear power in

May; a high profile visit shortly thereafter by John Jay Hopkins, president of defense contractor General Dynamics, whose visit to Japan along with other prominent promoters of nuclear power, helped convince Japanese scientists and the media that nuclear power was safe; and the Tokyo Atoms for Peace exhibition and the public relations campaign that surrounded it. Two of those events were masterminded by a single man: Shoriki

Matsutar , the editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun and freshman member of the House of

Representatives.

The first half of this chapter will focus on the role of horiki Matsutar in the promotion of nuclear power and his relationship with the United States. Shoriki saw nuclear power as the future of energy technology, and he planned to use it as a means of 149 achieving political power. With a high public profile, Shoriki would emerge as the champion of nuclear power, despite the fact that he was coming to the technology later than many other politicians. His long history of public promotions and control over the largest newspaper in Japan left Shoriki ideally placed to promote nuclear power. With assistance from the CIA, Shoriki was able to invite the Hopkins Mission to Japan, which would in turn put him in a position to cosponsor the first Atoms for Peace exhibition in

Japan. His showmanship and promotional skills created a grand spectacle that demanded public attention and set the standard for the rest of the tour. Despite his relationship with the CIA, however, Shoriki was acting in his own interest and what he saw as the best interest of his country. The CIA and USIS found Shoriki impossible to control or even to corral; his continuous displays of independence caused both agencies a great deal of dismay. Shoriki, for his part, managed to parlay his promotion of nuclear power into becoming the first chairman of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission on January 1,

1956

The second half of this chapter focuses on the Tokyo exhibition itself and provides, as far as possible, an account of the exhibition as people experienced it. This account is based on USIS records of the events and opinion surveys held before and after people entered the exposition. It is also heavily supplemented by the press coverage of the exhibitions. Several newspapers throughout the country ran series of feature articles that explained the various exhibits and attempted to capture the feel of the event on the whole. The description of the event is organized according to the order that a visitor to

150 the Tokyo exhibition would have found them. It was possible to do so because the

Yomiuri Shimbun published a diagram that shows the layout of the exhibits.255

The Atoms for Peace exhibitions were designed to develop support for “the peaceful uses of nuclear power” by showing the public various types of technology based on the use of radioisotopes. They displayed full scale mockups alongside machines designed to treat cancer and improve the durability of industrial goods, radioisotope studies to improve irrigation and fertilization practices, irradiated foodstuffs that would never go bad, particle accelerators, and images of atomic-powered trains, planes, and boats. The exhibitions bundled together a suite of nuclear technologies that showed positive, productive uses of nuclear power to which it would be hard to object. On either side of displays of new technologies, one would find safety equipment that held the implication that the dangers of radiation could be handled with the appropriate precautions. Taken together, the assemblage of nuclear exhibits were designed to convince visitors that nuclear power was the future of technology, and it was convincing to many.

From Fencing Champion to Editor-in-Chief

horiki Matsutar was born in Toyama Prefecture in 1885. His grandfather,

Shoriki Shosuke, was a civil engineer who had been rewarded for his service by being granted the right to carry a sword. Shoriki Matsutar excelled at judo and kendo and was a champion in both sports throughout college; he would go on to earn the highest rank

255 Since the layout was contingent upon the space where the exhibitions were held, exhibitions in other cities differed. 151 possible in judo, the tenth dan, which has only been awarded to 19 people since 1934. He was reportedly a poor student and initially failed the civil service exam after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1911.256 After a brief stint in the census bureau,

Shoriki went on to join the Tokyo Metropolitan police, quickly becoming a member of the riot squad, which he attributed to his skills at kendo and judo.257 The 1919 Hibiya

Rice Riots following the end of World War I offered Shoriki an opportunity to rise to public consciousness; he reportedly faced down multiple protesting groups without resorting to violence, though someone injured him by throwing at rock at his head.258

His rise in stature led to Shoriki being appointed the chief of the Cabinet

Secretariat of the Metropolitan Police. In this post, he served as a liaison between the

Tokyo Metropolitan police and the Diet cabinet, which allowed him to form lasting connections with high-ranking officials. In the police force, he continued to make waves, particularly in regards to his treatment of Communists. In 1923, he ordered the investigation of suspected communist organizers at Waseda University, ultimately raiding the offices of three professors.259 These orders marked a change of policy within the

Metropolitan Police, which had not pursued Communists on university campuses up to this point.260 After a short tenure as chief of police Shoriki was dismissed from the

Metropolitan Police following the Toranomon Incident, during which a man tried to

256 Edward Uhlan and Dana Lee Thomas, Shoriki: The Miracle Man of Japan (New York: Exhibition Press, 1957), 22-30. 257 Matsutar horiki, “Landmarks in my life,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 19. 258 “Mr. Matsutar horiki, Embattled Guardian of Freed of the Press in Japan,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 19-22. 259 Uhlan and Thomas, 63-67. 260 “Memorandum for the Record, ubject Matsutar horiki,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 3. 152 assassinate the Prince Regent. Although Shoriki was not directly in charge of the Prince

Regent’s safety, he was dismissed because the attempt occurred on his watch. horiki would later be granted an imperial amnesty absolving him of responsibility, and was even offered a position as a prefectural governor, which he refused.

Rather than pursuing a career in government, Shoriki instead decided to purchase the Yomiuri Shimbun, despite lacking any experience with journalism or business. When

Shoriki bought the paper in 1924, the Yomiuri Shimbun was a small literary paper with a daily circulation of 50,000. Lacking the funds to buy the paper himself, Shoriki secured funding via a loan from Goto Shimpei, who had become a mentor and patron to Shoriki from his time with the Cabinet Secretariat. Goto reportedly raised the ¥100,000 required to buy the paper by mortgaging his own house.261 Goto’s impact on horiki was so great that upon his death in 1929 horiki is reported to have said, “I will forsake all political ambitions and exert myself to the utmost for the development of the Yomiuri Shimbun in order to repay Count Goto's favor.”262

Shoriki would go on to violate this promise numerous times, but he dedicated most of the next two decades to the Yomiuri. The paper flourished under horiki’s leadership. Circulation grew dramatically, more than doubling every four years from

1924 to 1939, eventually hitting the wartime high of 1,919,000 copies daily in 1944.263

Although some of his critics argued that the Yomiuri himbun’s success was due to

Shoriki pouring money into it, he denied that he did so and questioned whether that

261 Got Kumihiko, “Matsutar Shoriki, A Rising Figure in Japanese Journalism,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 262 “Matsutar Shoriki's Character and Career,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 2. 263 Ibid., 4. 153 strategy would even work since it failed at other papers. Rather, Shoriki credited hard work and dedication. He reportedly believed that superiors should work harder than subordinates with the president working harder than anyone. He is said to have been in his office from 7 or 8 am to 8 pm every day, with occasional all-nighters. Shoriki took a great deal of the credit for the success of the newspaper, saying, “At the Yomiuri

Shimbun, I personally lit the torch of hope and kept it burning before our 2,000 employees. I worked harder and longer than any of them. So did the editors and managers. In addition to the exemplary teamwork, good editorial planning and management strategy [we] hit on a type of newspaper irresistible to a mass readership.

That in a nutshell sums up the whys and hows of our dramatic rise to greatness. Let me add that I played the game all by myself. I kept no brain trust to get me wise on this and that. It took quite a while and plenty of deliberation before I would arrive at an idea. But once my mind was set I saw to it that it was done.”264 Whether this explanation is accurate or not is less important here than the way he chose to describe himself. Shoriki was a self-promoter who denied that anyone but himself was responsible for the success of his paper, going out of his way to dismiss the contributions of others. In describing a traditional Confucian virtue of leadership by example, Shoriki claimed direct credit for his employees’ success, while simultaneously denying that he had anyone to help him make the hard decisions

Shoriki showed a remarkable understanding of how to build newspaper readership by adding features that proved popular. In 1924, the Yomiuri Shimbun added a daily two-

264 “Mr. Matsutar horiki, Embattled Guardian of Freed of the Press in Japan,” 25. 154 page insert dedicated to radio. This insert included a broadcast schedule, pictures of radio stars, and lyrics to popular songs. Since the medium was so new at the time, there was a dearth of material to include in the insert, prompting the idea of including occasional articles discussing the science and technology that made commercial radio possible.

These columns proved popular, especially among teen-age boys.265 By 1924, the Yomiuri had discovered that scientific content could provide the grist for popular news stories.

Shoriki was especially fond of promoting cultural and sporting events to boost readership. In 1923, the Yomiuri had already launched a regular gaming column which focused on go and shogi. To build on the popularity of this column, Shoriki decided to arrange a go match between Honinbo husai and Karigane Jun’ichi.266 Shusai was the top ranked player in the Nihon Ki-in, while Karigane played for the Kiseisha. These two go organizations were rival houses, and their members rarely played one another. Shoriki and the Yomiuri approached both of these players and arranged the match. Once it was arranged, Shusai issued a public challenge to Karigane in the Yomiuri on August 23,

1926, towards which the Yomiuri instructed Karigane to seem reluctant to accept. As

“public pressure” mounted for Karigane to play husai, the Kiseisha announced it was going to hold a vote of its directors to decide if Karigane should play. In reality, of course, all the parties involved had already agreed to the match, but the Yomiuri played the imagined controversy for all it was worth.

265 A fuller discussion of the game between Shusai and Karigane can be found in Uhlan and Thomas, Shoriki, 88-89. 266 Uhlan and Thomas, Shoriki, 90-92. 155

In the weeks running up to the match, the Yomiuri ran daily materials on the match, including commentary from go experts and prominent politicians, such as Toyama

Mitsuru and Hatoyama Ichiro. The match finally began on September 27th and lasted for six days, each of which allowed the Yomiuri to run daily recaps in its papers. It also arranged for public “viewings” of the event in Hibiya and Ueno Parks. The paper set up nine foot tall go boards in the parks, which draw large crowds. Yomiuri employees relayed each move by telephone as it was made, and people at the park would mark the board accordingly. The match ended with Karigane conceding when he ran out of time, though the Yomiuri continued to replay the match for a week afterward. It was an instant classic and is known to this day as “The Famous Killing Game of 19 6.” This match was intended to create a controversy and spectacle, which would draw new readers to the

Yomiuri. The hope was that they would continue reading after the match, perhaps because they were so impressed by the quality of the paper’s go coverage.

Shoriki followed a similar strategy with baseball when the Yomiuri arranged for a team of American all-star baseball players to visit Japan in 1931 and 1934 to capitalize on the growing popularity of the game. horiki’s decision to invite these all-stars to

Japan, twice, is somewhat surprising given that he was not initially a fan of baseball. A friend of his had mentioned that baseball was very popular and that a visit by Babe Ruth would be a worthwhile promotion of his newspaper. Seeing a potential business opportunity, Shoriki hired the baseball coach of Waseda University to head his sports department, with the new hire’s top priority being to bring Babe Ruth to Japan. Although the Yomiuri could not persuade Babe Ruth to come in 1931, the tour was a success,

156 prompting Shoriki to repeat the stunt in 1934. The second tour included such future Hall of Famers as Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Charles Gehringer, and Lefty O’Doul.

The American all-stars played seventeen games in nine cities, the most famous of which was played in Meiji Jingu Stadium. It rained throughout the game, occasionally becoming a torrent. Babe Ruth, a particular favorite in Japan, was asked if they should call the game on account of the rain. Much to the delight of the crowd, he said that as long as the audience was willing to watch them in the rain, they might as well play. At this point, a member of the audience jumped down from the stands and brought an umbrella to Ruth.

Ruth bowed, accepted the umbrella, and then proceeded to play first base while holding the umbrella over his head. The rest of the team, not to be outdone, ran to the stands and accepted umbrellas from the crowd. From that point on, the American team played the rest of the game with umbrellas in hand, except, of course, for the pitcher and catcher.267

Although this game was a crowd pleaser, in February of 1935 Shoriki was assaulted with a katana by Nagasaki Katsuke, a member of the Bushinkai (Warrior God Society); he received a blow to the skull and was hospitalized for 50 days as a result. Sources disagree on the reason for Nagasaki’s assault. ome argue that he objected to the Yomiuri

Shimbun arranging for an American all-star baseball team to play against a Japanese all- star team in the outer garden of the Meiji Shrine, which Nagasaki claimed “desecrated a divine place.”268 Others say he opposed the Yomiuri’s support for the Organ Theory of the Emperor, put forward by Minobe Tatsukichi of Tokyo Imperial University.269

267 Uhlan and Thomas, Shoriki, 109. 268 “Matsutar horiki’s Character and Career,” 16-17 269 “Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Matsutar horiki,” Jan. 7, 1953, NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 157

Regardless of the consequences for horiki’s health, these tours were wildly successful, Every game sold out, and led to the founding of professional baseball in

Japan. During the 1934 visit, Shoriki gathered a team of Japanese all-stars to play against the American team. Earlier such teams had been disbanded after the games they were formed to play, but Shoriki kept them together to form the Great Japan Tokyo Baseball

Club, which in turn became the Yomiuri Giants. In 1935, however, horiki’s team had no one to play in Japan, so while other teams were being formed, the Giants were sent to the

United States, where they won 70 games out of their 110 game schedule. Each of these games was recounted in a play-by-play analysis in the Yomiuri, substantially boosting sales.

Promotions like the Shusai versus Karigane match or the American all-star tours were not necessarily designed to make money in and of themselves, and if fact the

Yomiuri often did not make back its expenses in ticket sales. Rather they were designed to create interest in the paper, which in turn would extensively cover the events to drum up interest in the sports or cultural sections of the paper. Shoriki is reported to have told the manager of the Giants not to sign all the top talent because then there would be no contest, and who would pay to read about a foregone conclusion? They were an entry point to draw people away from their current newspaper, with the hope that new customers would stick around after the special promotion was over. Or, in the case of baseball, create a permanent, self-sustaining story.

Although much of his energy was focused on building a readership and, thus, a profitable enterprise, he saw the role of a newspaper owner as more than as simply being

158 an entrepreneur; he saw the Yomiuri as a way of directing the national discussion and thus policy. This attitude can be seen most clearly in an open letter he wrote to William

Randolph Hearst, famed American newsman, when the Yomiuri Shimbun entered a news sharing agreement with the Hearst Newspapers in 1933. After signing the agreement,

Shoriki wrote an article entitled “Appeal to America through Mr. Hearst,” wherein he addressed William Randolph Hearst directly, saying:

I entertain a great respect for you, Mr. Hearst, who, having great influence over the American press and by making good use of the most complete organization of newspapers, always reports promptly valuable and interesting news and enhances public opinion, and, who, on the other hand, strives all along to show a right course to America and her people by taking a firm and positive stand.270

This quote offers an interesting view of horiki’s motivations. He states that he saw the role of a newspaper owner as one who actively shapes opinion and moves it by showing it “the right course.” horiki’s admiration for Hearst and his ability to shape public opinion is interesting given that Hearst was widely vilified for his role in the development of “yellow journalism,” which dramatized, sensationalized, and sometimes outright fabricated news stories in order to boost circulation.271 Although many historians consider the claim wildly exaggerated, Hearst went so far as to claim credit in a front page, banner headline for starting the Spanish-American War.272 Shoriki went on to write:

270 “Matsutar horiki’s Character and Career,” 13. 271 For discussions of yellow journalism and the role of William Randolph Hearst, see for example: Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2001); Edwin Emory and Michael Emory, The Press and America: an Interpretive History, 5th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984); David Nasaw, The Chief: the Life of William Randolph Hearst (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000). 272 David Nasaw, The Chief: the Life of William Randolph Hearst (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 130. 159

Your papers and my Yomiuri Shimbun are now exchanging news under an agreement, which I concluded with you solely for the purpose of promoting our mutual understanding and preserving friendly relations between our two countries. … I firmly believe that when you and I become to know each other better than ever, join hands to lead public opinion in our respective countries and active to promote mutual understanding, it will contribute not only to the cordial relations between American and Japan, but also to the peace of the world.273

horiki’s grandiose claims that he entered into the agreement “solely for the purpose of promoting our mutual understanding and preserving friendly relations between our two countries” (emphasis added) ignores the financial reality that he could not afford correspondents throughout the world and regularly entered information sharing agreements with other newspapers. The agreement with Hearst also added to the prestige of the Yomiuri, as long as one did not know of the quality of the reporting of Hearst’s papers, and served as a piece of publicity, which he directly enhanced by publishing an open letter to Hearst. Finally, on a personal level, horiki idolized Hearst. horiki’s CIA handlers would later say that he consciously used as a role model.274

The Propaganda Master

Like many newspapers, the Yomiuri’s coverage had a clear political editorial stance, though Shoriki did not personally belong to any political party prior to World War

II, reportedly because he thought doing so might hurt circulation. The Yomiuri stood to the political right, which is not surprising given horiki’s personal distaste for

Communism. The papers supported Japanese nationalism, imperial expansion, and

273 “Matsutar horiki’s Character and Career,” NACP, RG 63, Box 119, 13. 274 “Psych Operational; Specific: PODAM/[Redacted] Progress Report,” Dec. 9, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 160 encouraged the nation to invade China in the 1930s.275 A strident nationalist, Shoriki was made a director of the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) in 1940.

This organization was created by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, a political contact of

horiki’s from his days in the Cabinet ecretariat. Taisei Yokusankai was not a political party, but rather a quasi-fascist umbrella organization aimed at creating a single-party state that sought to remove politics from the decision making process.276 Throughout the course of the war, Shoriki went on to become a leading figure in the Information Bureau, and on May 19, 1944, he was elevated to the House of Peers. horiki’s elevation to the peerage was not unusual for its time as it was fairly typical for influential members of the media to serve in the Peers. Both the owner of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun and Osaka

Mainichi Shimbun had also been Peers. horiki’s nomination was predicated on his years of “render[ing] distinguished service in ‘propagandizing thoughts.’” 277 On September 13, he received a silver cup personally from the emperor “for outstanding service to his country in the war,”278 also tied to his success as a propagandist.

horiki’s involvement in the wartime government and the aggressively pro- imperial stance of his newspaper led to his arrest on December 12, 1945, and incarceration for two years on charges as a Class A war criminal. Socialists and

Communists in particular harshly criticized horiki’s involvement in the war. His critics argue that he was an essential part of the wartime government, helping to form and

275 Simon Partner, Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 76. 276 Richard Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000 (New York: Palgave, 2001). 277 “Shoriki Dossier,” May 9, 1952, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 278 Ibid., 2. 161 implement the government’s media strategy. A memorandum from G- , the Occupancy’s intelligence gathering unit, in 1953 summarized the accusations against Shoriki:

As proprietor of the Yomiuri Shimbun he strongly backed the Axis and urged Japanese adherence to the Tri-Partite Alliance. He is known to have had very close connections with the German Embassy and was known to be one of their chief propaganda outlets in Japan. He made of his newspaper the chief Army organ and through its wide circulation he actively promoted militaristic propaganda in Japan immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. He victimized newspaper men who did not see eye to eye with his pro-Axis policies. He was one of the most important journalists who actively propagated the Axis cause before the war and energetically supported it through the war. With the large circulation which his newspaper enjoyed he ought to be regarded as one of the most evil influences in poisoning the public mind.279

Although these accusations were enough to get him arrested and held for 2 years,

Shoriki was ultimately released without charges. The same memo cited above goes on to examine each of the charges and concludes that they were never proven, particularly connections to the German Embassy. It should be noted, that G-2 did not concern itself with the content of his newspaper coverage, whether it was pro-Axis or served to promote the invasion of China. Regardless of the effect that this coverage might have had, however, supporting militarism and government policy was not a war crime, nor was whipping up the public into a mass murdering frenzy. As G- notes “In liew (sic) of the accusations made against Shoriki, it is pertinent to note that before Pearl Harbor his name is not linked with any of Japan’s political or military leaders, he was not active in political or nationalistic organizations, nor did he hold bureaucratic posts. Shoriki became involved in the Cabinet Board of Information late in the war and was appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council at the tail end during the Koiso Cabinet in July

279 “Memorandum for the Record, ubject Matsutar horiki,” Jan. 27, 1953, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 162

1944 and the peacemaking uzuki Cabinet in April 1945.”280 horiki’s activities in an official capacity definitely fall outside of the planning stages of the war, and there’s little evidence to support the idea that he was heavily involved in directing it either. G-2 concludes:

In summary, accusations against Shoriki appear to be of an ideological and political nature, exaggerated by wartime propaganda and unsubstantiated by any specific evidence other than Shoriki was a prominent newspaper manager who eventually had to fill bureaucratic posts and ‘go along' to stay in business. Unless it is decided as a matter of policy that activity in the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations and/or success in the newspaper business (without consideration of motivating circumstances) are bases for indictment, G-2 recommends release of Shoriki from internment without preference of charges.

horiki’s allies further bolstered claims of his innocence. They argued that he played a relatively minor role in the government, saying that in his role in the Taisei

Yokusankai he “merely allowed his name to be displayed together with those of distinguished men owing to the situation prevailing at that time."281 They further claimed that he tried to minimize his role in the government; for example, they argue that even though Prime Minister T j asked horiki to take the presidency of the Information

Board, he refused, and that he initially did not take a seat in the Koiso cabinet even after it was offered to him. When he served as a cabinet adviser, they claim he made only one recommendation, and that was to disperse the population of the cities more widely in response to air raids.282

In a pamphlet written in support of horiki’s innocence, his friends and supporters argue that Shoriki had an often tense relationship with the army, which they argue

280 Ibid., 5. 281 “Matsutar Shoriki’s Character and Career,” 6. 282 Ibid., 19. 163 attempted to force him out of his position as president of the Yomiuri Shimbun. His supporters claimed “In the battle that developed between the Big Three National

Newspapers, Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri, and the sinister forces, Mr. Shoriki literally staked his life as leader of the triple alliance of the press. The story of how he played his part in the drama deserves a place in the history of Japan’s suicide war.”283 This overwrought prose came from an account of horiki’s involvement with the Japanese government during World War II, written by his friends and colleagues who were trying to save his life by intervening while he was being held as a war crimes suspect. The account details how during the course of the war, the government sought to consolidate the press under its own control to use it most effectively. As the government pressed the regional and national papers, they formed the Japanese Newspaper Publishers

Association (JNPA) in May 1941 to bargain collectively with the government. The JNPA made a number of changes to the newspaper industry in order increase efficiency, such as forcing the disclosure of newspaper circulation, nominally to more efficiently allocate scarce resources during the war, and organizing a nation-wide joint newspaper distribution system. Shoriki advocated for both of these changes, especially the former because he believed he would benefit if the official numbers were widely known.284 The

JNPA was a corporatist collective for making decisions of national import in a single industry. By cooperating with the JNPA, Shoriki was helping to institute facets of fascism in Japan, though he was no more responsible for this shift than any other

283 “Mr. Matsutar horiki, Embattled Guardian of Freed of the Press in Japan,” 1. 284 Ibid., 5. 164 prominent businessman in any field and his support seems to be more about opportunism than ideology.

horiki’s supporters, particularly Mitarai Tatsuo, argue that at the JNPA, however, that Shoriki proved he was not a collaborator, but rather fought for the freedom of the press. In September 1941, the government started making moves to create a national newspaper pool that would incorporate the staff and resources of all existing newspapers in exchange for shares in the new pool. Government employees would run the new corporation and the existing publishers would be responsible for producing the actual product.285 The national papers, Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri, opposed the move along with a number of other, while many of the smaller papers that were struggling supported it, particularly Miki Takeyoshi the president of the Hochi Shimbun.286 According to

Mitarai, at a particularly tense meeting, a representative of the Board of Information said,

“Gentlemen, if you [would] only realize the grave external and internal situation we are now facing, you would not hesitate to do your part in our effort to build up a solid, united front of public opinion. I am here today to see the draft approved by all of you. And let me add that I am here to see it through even at the cost of my position in the government and even my life.” To this declaration, horiki allegedly retorted, “His excellency has my respect for his courage to stake his life on his plan for regimentation of the press. I assure him that I, as a man who has always held journalism dear to his heart, will join his bet by staking my life on the proud cause of the independent and free press.”287 He would go on

285 Ibid., 6-7. 286 It is worth noting that the Yomiuri Shimbun bought out the Hochi Shimbun in 1943, so casting Miki as the villain in this account might be a matter of scapegoating. 287 “Mr. Matsutar horiki, Embattled Guardian of Freed of the Press in Japan,” 9. 165 to add, “Granted it is the collective decision of the army, but I have opposed and will continue to oppose the whole thing. Mind you, my decision does not stem from consideration of dollars and cents. I am standing behind freedom of the press.”288 It is worth noting that Shoriki was given to making bombastic statements of principles that downplay the role of profit, which was a clear factor in almost all of his decisions.

horiki’s imprisonment and subsequent purging after the war were not unusual as a number of industrialists and newspaper editors were also arrested. Shoriki, however, seemed to believe that he was being singled out for ill treatment. His imprisonment came just days after the end of a testy series of negotiations with workers striking from the

Yomuiri, led by editor Suzuki Tomin. The strike, he argued, was a communist plot to take over Japan, saying, “Just as the army gave the free press in Japan a hot chase during the war so did the Japanese communists and fellow-travellers (sic) when peace returned.

For reasons best known to themselves, they picked up from among the newspapers the

Yomiuri Shimbun as their first target of attack. Incited by our managing editor, Tomin

Suzuki, the Red and Pinks under him launched a shock assault on the management early in October, 1945. Behind them towered the Mao-Tse-Tung of Japan, Kyuichi Tokuda, and other top leaders of the Communist Party. From the outset, I had a clear vision of fearsome consequences of any agreement with them through compromise. It was crystal clear to me that my paper in their bag meant communization of the country.”289 horiki’s over-the-top rhetoric, such as equating Kyuichi Tokuda with Mao Zedung and arguing

288 Ibid., 10. 289 Ibid., 22. The issue of why Shoriki thought the Yomiuri was the sole bulwark against Communism was sadly unaddressed. 166 that the Yomiuri being taken over by Communist would lead to the collapse of Japan, was designed to play on American fears that the imprisonment of the wartime leaders

Japan would leave the way open for a Communist revolution. The October Strike, besides being a clear Communist plot against truth and justice, struck Shoriki as a spectacular betrayal, since Shoriki had refused to fire Suzuki during the war when he was asked to by the German ambassador.290 The ambassador disliked Suzuki because he was outspokenly anti-Nazi and anti-Hitler and wrote articles expressing these opinions, though Shoriki said he never published them; Suzuki was married to a German woman who had fled

Nazi Germany, which likely did little to endear him to the ambassador.291 Shoriki stated his belief that this incident directly led to his imprisonment, though his government service and newspaper coverage likely had more of a direct impact.

Overall, 72 Japanese were arrested in connection to Class A war crimes, and the prosecution of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East intended to try these men in three groups. Ultimately, only the first group stood trial as the prosecution declined to bring charges against the remaining 44. Shoriki, who was in the third group, never came particularly close to standing trial, and was released from prison on

September 1, 1947. His time in Sugamo Prison, where alleged war criminals were held proved to be formative, and in the later years of his life, Shoriki would brag that some of the best connections he made in his life he made in prison. Like many men in his cohort,

Shoriki was purged from Japanese political life, banned from hold office or running his

290 Ibid., 11. The actual source says “Ambassador von Otto,” but it is almost certainly referring to Eugene Ott who was Ambassador at the time. 291 Ibid., 11-12. 167 newspaper. He applied to be released from the purge, but on May 22, 1948 his application was declined. Eventually, the growing power of the political left led SCAP to depurge Shoriki and many of his cohort in 1951.

The Hopkins Mission

Following his release from prison, Shoriki slowly returned to public life. From

1947 to 1951, Shoriki focused on baseball, first returning to managing the Yomiuri

Giants, and then becoming chairman of the Japan Baseball League in June 1949. After reentering public life in 1951, he regained his position as owner of the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1952. He expanded his role in media by starting a television network, Nippon TV, which started as an alliance between several leading newspapers. For the next several years, his stated goal was to create a microwave relay system that would broadcast television signals throughout Japan, and eventually expand into Southeast Asia, and even

Pakistan.292 horiki’s involvement in television brought him to the attention of the CIA in

1953 because the agency felt that a television network could prove to be a powerful tool against the Communists, both in Japan and in Free Asia. At first the CIA developed him as a contact with the cryptonym of PODAM around March 15, 1953. The CIA funneled money through horiki’s operations without his knowledge as an “unwitting cut-out for funding purposes,” though it further notes that “subject is known to be reliable, but shrewd. Limited use by CIA as cutout.”293

292 “Shoriki Personal Record Questionnaire, 1955,” NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 7-8. 293 “Shoriki Personal Record Questionnaire, 1953,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 7. 168

After using him to filter money into Japan, the CIA expanded its contact with

Shoriki, though without his knowledge that he was working with the CIA. A CIA report on this meeting notes that “About a year ago [July 1954] [redacted]… met with and developed the owner of one of the largest media complexes[Shoriki], and, over a period of time, convinced him that he should take a strong hand in imposing a consistent anti-

Communist editorial policy upon his media.”294 The CIA’s approach was successful in large part because Shoriki was already actively anti-Communist. Whereas he had been known to employ journalists and editors of various political affiliations for much of his time at the Yomiuri, horiki perhaps felt burned by his “betrayal” by uzuki Tomin in the aftermath of World War II and was more willing to implement a consistent editorial line given the deepening Cold War. It is interesting to note that Shoriki was seemingly still unaware in 1954 that his contact worked for the CIA. He was often told that people he met with had close contacts with the US embassy or were former members of G-2. Rather than acting as a pawn of the US, CIA reports make it clear that he had no great love for the United States and agents thought they could only secure his cooperation if he thought their actions would aid him directly or Japan generally.

Shoriki became interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear power after John

Hopkins, president of General Dynamics, gave a talk before the National Association of

Manufacturers in New York on December 1, 1954. In that speech, Hopkins outlined what he called an “atomic Marshall Plan,” which would help provide power, food, and other necessities to the world’s poorest countries, along with “equality and… all that is implied

294 “PODAM/Japanese Public Opinion Regarding Atomic Energy,” July 5, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 169 in the term ‘American standard of living.”295 Hopkins’s proposal complemented but went beyond what President Eisenhower had laid out a year earlier by introducing the idea that

American industry could take a direct role in the dissemination of nuclear technology. As the president of General Dynamics, the company that had built nuclear reactors for the

American submarines Nautilus and Sea Wolf, Hopkins was in a unique position to make this proposal, and his industry-centric approach was certain to appeal to Shoriki, who was, first and foremost, a businessman.

Following Hopkins’s speech, horiki and his executive deputy, hibata Hidetoshi, attempted to get Hopkins to come to Japan. In order to reach him, they got into contact with William Halstead, president of Unitel, with whom Shibata had previously done business. During December 1954, these conversations came to the attention of the CIA.

Somehow Shibata was put in touch with the CIA, though Shibata apparently did not know the men he was meeting with were CIA officers, but rather believed them to be a

“political analyst in employ [of] G-3.”296 Shoriki, on the other hand, was led to believe that his CIA contacts were men who had close access to the embassy.297 The reports on

hibata’s contact with the CIA offer an interesting insight into why horiki was so interested in developing nuclear power in 1954, saying, “He [ hibata] has admitted quite frankly that his and Shoriki's motives are in large part political. Shoriki ambitious, desires to be power in Democratic Party, dreams of cabinet post. Shibata is presently man behind

295 “An Atomic ‘Marshall Plan,’” New York Times, Dec. 4, 1954, 16. 296 To (priority) [redacted], Dec. 31, 1954, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, and “Classified message to director,” Jan. 27, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 297 “Shoriki Personal Record Questionnaire, 1955,” June 13, 1955, NACP, RG 63, Box 119, 8. 170 powerful financial figure, would like to see his principal rise in importance. Both believe they will gain in prestige through association with important US figure with positive program. Both convinced that atom issue key question in coming elections; if conservative candidates cannot point to constructive peaceful program relating to atomic energy, they will suffer severely at polls.”298

Shoriki saw nuclear power as a positive program that he could champion in order to gain support at the polls. At the time of these initial inquiries, Shoriki was preparing to stand for election for the House of Representatives, an election that was unscheduled upon hibata’s discussions with the CIA but was ultimately held on February 7th, 1955.

horiki’s belief that supporting a program advancing nuclear power at that time was a bold move, since the Japanese public had shown little in the way of support of nuclear technology and did not always clearly distinguish nuclear power from nuclear weapons.

Even if the CIA could have arranged for Hopkins to get to Japan in time for the election,

Shoriki would have had a very brief window to marshal support for the project. The

Hopkins Mission, as it came to be known, did not pan out in time for the 1955 general election, but Shoriki won a seat regardless. This contact with the CIA did not turn out to be a waste, however, because Shoriki would get his visit from Hopkins later that year, and the CIA began to cultivate Shibata as an operative.299

298 To (priority) [redacted], Dec. 31, 1954, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 299 Ibid. It is not clear from the available record whether Shibata became an operative because names are widely redacted, however, this document states that “personal subversion of hibata appears possible,” and a later report explains that “ hibata dependent upon horiki for funds. peculate he may wish separate source income.” This comment makes hibata a likely candidate for a source close to horiki cited in later reports. “Classified message to director, 27 Jan 1955,” NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 171

After his initial contact with the CIA, Shoriki set up an organization to promote nuclear power in Japan. This group, whose name literally translates to “Atoms-for-Peace

Friendly Talking ociety,” was known in English as the “Japan Atoms-for-Peace

Council.” The council was made up of “prominent politicians, businessmen and academicians, headed by PODAM [ horiki],”300 including Ishikawa Ichiro, President of the Showa Denko Company; Fujiyama, Aiichiro, President of the Nitto Chemical

Industry Company; and Moroi Kamichi, President of the Chichibu Cement Company.

The Japan Atoms-for-Peace Council invited John Jay Hopkins, Dr. Lawrence Hafstad, former director of the USAEC reactor development division, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence.

Earl Johnson, vice president of General Dynamics, and Eugene Reed, the former undersecretary of the Army also accompanied the delegation.

The actions of the council had implicit support from the government, with Prime

Minister Ichiro Hatoyama showing his approval “The establishment of the Japan Atoms- for-Peace Council, through which financial leaders and scientists will be able freely to exchange opinions, is a most auspicious event for Japan. I pray that you will be able to contribute greatly to the development of Japan’s economy and culture.”301 Although the

Prime Minister approved and Shoriki was a member of the House of Representatives at the time, the initiative to bring the Hopkins Mission to Japan was led by members of the business community, and Shoriki presented himself as such while organizing the mission.

300 “PODAM/Japanese Public Opinion Regarding Atomic Energy,” July 5, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 301 “Japan Takes First teps to Harness Atom for Peace,” Rome News-Tribune, May 6, 1955, 21. 172

When it became clear that the Hopkins Mission was coming, Shoriki utilized his years of experience backing major public events, and mobilized his media empire to “a full blast favorable treatment of the atom, not neglecting to features himself as the

Prometheus who was bringing this fire to Japan. This was interesting because it was the first time since the war that major Japanese media had done anything but look askance at the atom."302 Although the Yomiuri certainly ran extensive coverage of the Hopkins

Mission, the latter part of this quote from a CIA report on the Mission is factually inaccurate, though it may accurately represent American opinion at the time. Japanese newspapers published over two thousands articles about the peaceful uses of nuclear power between 1945 and 1949 alone, largely glowingly positive, and a number of books for children explaining the wonders of nuclear power were published throughout this same period.303 President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech was well received by most major newspapers,304 including the Chugoku Shimbun, which, being based in

Hiroshima, had as much reason to object as any paper.

Just a week before the Hopkins Mission arrived, in fact, the Asahi Shimbun endorsed the development of nuclear power. This endorsement was based on a report issued by members fifteen member mission, Kaigai Genshiryoku Ch sadan (the

Overseas Nuclear Power Inquiry Commission), led by a University of Tokyo professor and included members of four political parties. The Commission toured 15 countries in

302 “PSYCH/Operational, Specific: Relations with [redacted] and PODAM,” July 5, 1955, 3. 303 Shi-lin Loh, “Printed Traces Nuclear cience in Japan Under Allied Occupation.” 304 Examples of support for Atoms for Peace include “Syasetsu: Beidait ry no shinteian,” The Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 10, 1953, ; “Genshiryoku no ‘Sekai Gink an’; A-dait ry kokuren s kai de enzetsu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, 1; “Syasetsu: Genshiryoku mondai no atarashii michi,” The Mainichi Shimbun, Dec.10, 1953, 1; and “‘Ningen no tame no genshiryoku’: Insy teki datta Aiku enzetsu ” The Chugoku Shimbun, Dec. 10, 1953, 1. 173

Europe and North America over a 3 month period to gauge the potential of nuclear power. Following the release of the report, the Asahi concluded, “We think it is necessary, for the sake of the future, that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry construct two enriched uranium experimental reactors.”305 More accurate was Shoriki’s assessment that the Hopkins Mission “marked a turning point in the controversial issue of atomic energy.”306

Not everyone looked forward to the arrival of foreign experts as much as Shoriki and his staff. Around the same time that the Japan Atoms-for-Peace Council starting to invite the Hopkins mission, the CIA observed that:

Japanese leftists, presumably under the influence of the JCP, began to beat the drums against the whole idea of Japanese participation in anything atomic. The loudest instrument of this reaction was the leftist membership of the Japan Science Council. Playing on the emotions of the misinformed or half-informed members of the Council, the leftists rang the gongs of pollution by atomic waste, the Bikini Incident, and Hiroshima, attempting to exercise the by now well-known Japanese terror of atomic radiation. For the first time in Japan the press debate on atoms was now shifted to a clear division between those powers irrationally against every aspect of nuclear energy and those powers who saw in the many peaceful uses of atomic energy something from which Japan could gain.307

Although the CIA dismissed of the role of pollution, the Bikini/Lucky Dragon Incident, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these concerns were very real and present in the lives of Japanese, who were warned daily that bomb tests could threaten their food supply or their very lives. After all, this controversy occurred only 14 months after the

Lucky Dragon Incident, and Japanese fishermen continued to haul in fish dangerously

305 “Kaigai genshiryoku Ch usah koku happy ; Genshiro wa ichiman kir tto ni ukeireyo Beikoku no n syuku uran,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, May 6,1955. 306 “ horiki Matsutar to President Dwight Eisenhower,” Nov. 17, 1955, NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 307 “PSYCH/Operational, Specific: Relations with [redacted] and PODAM,” July 5, 1955, 4. 174 contaminated by fallout. The division between the reaction of the left and right that the

CIA noted was a relatively new phenomenon at this point. Newspapers of all political stripes covered the Bikini Incident extensively and universally condemned it, just as most newspapers had praised Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace proposal.

The Hopkins Mission arrived in Tokyo on May 9, 1955. During their stay in

Japan, Shoriki feted Hopkins and his entourage "on a scale lavish even by Japanese business standards. PODAM [Shoriki], by these entertainments, succeeded in creating an extremely friendly feeling towards Japan on the part of Hopkins and his group.”308 The nuclear experts, for their part, gave speeches at Hibiya Hall, in downtown Tokyo, on May

13, with thousands in attendance and thousands more watching on television screens outside the auditorium. "The speeches which were given by the scientists of the Hopkins group were of a sort to which Japan had not hitherto been exposed. These men were knowledgable (sic) and expert to the point where they repeatedly reduced their Japanese opponents to nothing. They succeeded in the Japan press in revealing to the Japanese people for the first time that many of the so-called Japanese atomic scientists were hardly indistinguishable from charlatans or at best somewhat misguided."309 This CIA criticism of the Japanese scientists was harsh, but the encounter did undermine the credibility of a number of scientists who criticized nuclear power, at least in the eyes of the newspapers, who dubbed the American experts the clear winners in the exchange.310

308 Ibid. 309 Ibid. 310 ee for example, “Genshiryoku kankei k gy --sudeni gutaiteki kenkyū ni hairu--keizaikai no kanshin takamaru ” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, May 17, 1955. 175

With scientific authority resting on the pro-nuclear side, opposition began to unravel, first in the Japan cience Council and then in the press. “The most profound and lasting effect of these speeches was to surface political disagreements within the Japan

Science Council as purely political disagreements. The Japan Science Council appeared to shake itself out of its political trauma and finally agree with the American scientists that a great deal could indeed be done on a scientific basis for Japan's welfare. Parallel to the debate in the Japan Science Council nearly all Japan major media took up the point of view that atomic science presented a great opportunity for Japan.”311 The support in the press was fairly unanimous from this point, which was a major propaganda coup for pro- nuclear advocates. Typically Japanese newspapers of the time would take contrary views whenever their rivals advocated for a point of policy.

The success of the Hopkins Mission effectively ended the scientific debate over the peaceful uses of nuclear power in Japan, at least for the time being, and brought the

Japanese newspapers together in a rare united support of a policy. Naturally there were dissenters, whom the CIA described saying, “The leftist press was generally reduced to picturing American atoms-for-peace efforts as one more attempt on the part of

Washington and Wall Street to obtain an economic foothold in Japan. This line failed to attract a serious following."312 Other lines of attack on nuclear power remained, but almost all of them focused on the role of the United States and its goals for Atoms for

311 “PSYCH/Operational, Specific: Relations with [redacted] and PODAM,” July 5, 1955, 4. 312 Ibid. 176

Peace, such as the accusing the US of attempting to distract from its commitment to testing nuclear weapons and expanding its stockpile.313

Bringing Atoms for Peace to Japan

Following the success of the Hopkins Mission and the acceptance of nuclear power in the scientific community and media, the next logical step was to plan a full- scale Atoms for Peace exhibition to tour the country. The exhibitions provided an opportunity for the United States, through the United States Information Agency (USIA), to bring demonstrations of nuclear power to the people of friendly nations through displays and instruction meant for popular consumption. Such tours, coupled with the media coverage they produced, had already been successful in Germany, India, and

Pakistan. There had even been an exhibition in Geneva, Switzerland, for the benefit of the United Nations.

Planning for the exhibitions in Japan began at least as early as February 1955, even before the Hopkins Mission, with the recommendation that the Japanese exhibitions be based on the Berlin exposition. 314 The Berlin exhibit was perhaps the single most important Atoms for Peace exhibition because of the unique position of Berlin as the center of the Cold War in the 1950s and a crossroads of Soviet and American influence.

313 This line of criticism can be seen many places, for instance “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Osaka,” July 20, 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956 Part 1, 14; “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” NACP, RG 59, Box 1 , 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956 Part 1, Oct.25, 1956, 1-3; Akahata 314 U IA Washington to U I Tokyo, “Funds in addition present Japan allotment now available for atomic energy exhibit Japan,” Feb. 21, 1955, NACP, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Office of the Secretary, Special Asst. to Sec. of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962 (Atomic Energy Matters), Box 121, 8c Exhibits - General Jan-June 1955 Part 1 of 2, 1. 177

Any American propaganda in Berlin would be aimed as much at the Soviet Union and

East Germany as it would be at the West. As such, the German expositions were much more elaborate than many of the exhibitions the USIA put on. Whereas the UN show was a “mobile panel exhibit,” the German, and later the Japanese, exhibitions featured full scale models of reactors, displays of equipment, and demonstrations in addition to explanations of atomic power that made up the bulk of the UN-type show; the Berlin-type exhibition required 15,000 square feet, while the UN-type exhibit required only 3,500 square feet.315 The Berlin-type show, at $80,000 for a tour of four cities (Berlin, Frankfurt,

Hamburg, and Vienna, which was not in Germany at the time) cost almost twice as much as the UN-type show, which cost $40,000.316

Weighing their options, USIA officials argued that the “UN-type, while good,

[was] not adequate [for] Japan considering sensitivities Japanese on atomic matters, their relatively advanced knowledge of atomic developments, and amounts of publicity already given.”317 One should not assume from this assessment, however, that the UN show was unimpressive, as it featured a working experimental nuclear reactor that dignitaries could operate by inserting and removing control rods to modulate the rate of the chain reaction inside the reactor.318 The Japanese exhibitions, the USIA essentially concluded, were more important than the one presented to the UN. In fact, the Japanese expositions toured more than twice as many cities as the German exhibits and cost 2.5 times more, estimated

315 Ibid. 316 USIA A-558, June 20, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1955 Part 2 of 2, 1 317 “Funds in addition present Japan allotment now available for atomic energy exhibit Japan,” 1. 318 John Krige, Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence, Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 21, Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (2006), 175. 178 at $200,000.319 The decision to use the Berlin-type exhibition, and in fact expanding on it in scale and scope, underscores the importance the United States placed on the Japanese expositions.

Given the important nature of the Japanese exhibits, the USIA decided to acquire co-sponsors. The addition of a local co-sponsor not only helped defrayed the cost, but it also gave access to a network of people on location which could help with scheduling, administration, and acquiring an appropriate space for the function. The participation of local organizations also helped to lessen the impression that the exhibits were purely propaganda put on by outsiders. American concern over this issue is well stated in a memo written by Ambassador John M. Allison to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the occasion of Dr. William Pollard’s visit to Japan in 1955. When Pollard went to

Rikkyo University in Tokyo to determine if it would be well-suited to receive a nuclear reactor, Allison wrote a memo suggesting that “Pollard be warned that university’s science faculty [was] quite leftist and anti-American” and that it was “not advisable to speak to press about reactor gifts because… Japanese sensitivity to having anything atomic forced on them.”320 At least Ambassador Allison, then, was concerned about

Japanese sensitivity to being forced to accept nuclear power. Local sponsorship could be used to diminish the impression that nuclear power was being thrust upon Japan by providing direct evidence that nuclear power was something that business, government,

319 “Funds in addition present Japan allotment now available for atomic energy exhibit Japan,” . 320 Tokyo (Allison) to Secretary of State, Oct. 25, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, 8c Exhibits – General July-December 1955, 1. The warning about the leftist and anti-American nature of Rikkyo’s science faculty came despite the CIA’s claims that opposition to nuclear power had been revealed to be entirely political following the Hopkins mission. It is quite possible that Allison’s concerns were of a more general nature rather than being about nuclear power per say. In this light, the Ambassador would be suggesting that Pollard stick to safe topics of conversation, not necessarily concerned about opposition to nuclear power. 179 and universities were eager to develop by having these segments of society sponsor an exhibition.321

Already in March of 1955, the USIS was examining the prospect of approaching the Yomiuri Shimbun as a co-sponsor.322 The Yomiuri was a reasonable choice given

horiki’s experience with sponsoring publicity events and connections in both the business community and government. Shoriki had spent much of 1955 positioning himself to become the point man on nuclear power and an opportunity to remain in the limelight promoting nuclear power and himself was not something he would easily turn down.

Despite the fact that the Yomiuri sponsored the exhibition, for the most part its national and regional competitors did not attack either the policy of developing nuclear power or the American involvement in the project, though the latter part was more controversial. At the time, a Japanese newspaper attacking a policy prescription put forward by one of its rivals was fairly standard. After all, editorial diversity between the major brands was an established way of selling newspapers, but in the case of the exhibition, the major dailies all pushed the same line and essentially cross promoted each other’s events. This pattern requires an explanation, and there are several possibilities.

Unity on the issue of nuclear power was not new at the outset of the exhibit in Tokyo in

November 1955, having already been established following the Hopkins mission when the papers had no stake in Atoms for Peace exhibitions that had not been planned at the

321 “Funds in addition present Japan allotment now available for atomic energy exhibit Japan,” 3. 322 USIS Tokyo to USIA Washington, Mar. 15, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1955 Part 1 of 2, 1. 180 time. This unity of opinion, then, may have sprung from a common belief among the editors of the papers that nuclear power was the future, and was worth promoting.

This line of reasoning is rather attractive because, after all, in 1955, nuclear power had not yet been developed on a commercial scale. It was projected to cost more than thermal or hydroelectric power, but there was a reasonable expectation that the price would go down as the technology developed. Furthermore, the environmental issues associated with nuclear power today were not yet widely known. Sites that produced plutonium for nuclear weapons, such as the Hanford site in Richland, Washington in the

United States or the Mayak site in Ozersk in the Soviet Union, were highly controlled by the military or the companies that ran them, and accidents could be readily covered up. In fact, Kate Brown’s recent book, Plutopia, demonstrates that the planned, regular release of radioactive material was purposely not studied, and that radiation studies that were conducted were not distributed to policy makers, who were often happy to turn a blind eye.323

Even if Japanese policy makers or journalists wanted to pursue environmental concerns, which likely would not even have occurred to them in the 1950s, or concerns over radiation, the American AEC would not have released any of the necessary reports.

Besides, the official reports that did exist were often so scrubbed of potentially disturbing information that it would not have mattered if they had. There were no public disasters such as Chernobyl or Fukushima to demonstrate the risks, and even Windscale and Three

Mile Island were years and decades away. Meanwhile, the news that was coming out of

323 Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 181 the West was universally positive and atomic physics had already produced advances that only promised more to come. Be belief in progress and the promise of nuclear power was almost palpable at the time, and it is no surprise that this period was known as the Atomic

Age. As such, it should not come as much of a surprise that Japanese newspapers were also caught up in atom mania.

An alternate possibility is that there was a strong financial motive behind cosponsoring the exhibitions. This view, which is a bit more cynical, suggests that the newspapers backed atomic power because they were either paid off by the USIS, stood to make money from sponsoring the exhibition itself, or had long-term financial interests at stake. The idea of pay offs is a bit far-fetched, but worth investigating, particularly because the CIA was involved and such tactics were not beneath them. There is no direct or indirect evidence in horiki Matsutar ’s file or the files of the U I or U IA to indicate that there were any such pay offs. The CIA argued time and again that they believed that Shoriki was using the promotion of nuclear power as a means of promoting his political career.

When Shoriki first approached the CIA about inviting John Jay Hopkins to Japan, a CIA agent reports that horiki’s executive director, hibata Hidetoshi, “admitted quite frankly that his and Shoriki's motives are in large part political. Shoriki [is] ambitious, desires to be power in Democratic Party, dreams of cabinet post.”324 In late 1955, the CIA believed that Shoriki was positioning to have himself made Prime Minister, and in order

324 “Memo, To: (Priority) [redacted]” Dec 31, 1954, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. The Democratic Party merged with the Liberal Party in 1955 to form the Liberal Democratic Party. 182 to put weight behind his push, he sought to gain American backers. To this effect, a CIA report states that, “ horiki is planning campaign to promote himself in eyes of American officials, including letter of thanks to President Eisenhower for Atoms-for-Peace exhibit now in Tokyo, publication in United States of biography of Shoriki, establishment of

Asian atomic energy center in Japan, finally visit to United tates.”325 Shoriki, it would seem, did not need a bribe to support nuclear power. Bribes going to other papers cannot be entirely ruled out, in part because the files relating to the CIA’s involvement with the rest of the Japanese media remain classified,326 but there is no direct evidence and any allegations would remain highly speculative and unsubstantiated.

Suggestions that financial concerns influenced newspaper coverage of Atoms for

Peace in Japan have been around since 1955. Albert Wattenberg, a technical specialist sent to Japan said, “One of [the byproducts of the Atoms for Peace exhibit] is that the newspapers of Japan have stopped printing stories of radioactive poisoning, stories which were unfavorable to the US Instead they are printing stories about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This is partly because in being co-sponsors of the exhibit they have a bill of goods to sell which is fortunately favorable to the US"327 Wattenberg’s assessment connects the decrease in negative stories about nuclear power in the newspapers to a financial interest in promoting the peaceful atom.

325 “Classified Message To Director,” Nov 29, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 326 horiki’s CIA name file was declassified in 005 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. This law mandated that files pertaining to people who were held or tried for war crimes in World War II be declassified. 327 “Report to International Education Exchange Program of the Department of State by Albert Wattenberg, US Specialist to Japan,” NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-Dec. 1955, 2. 183

If Wattenberg was contending that Japanese newspapers stopped reporting on the negative side of nuclear weapons, this contention is easily falsified by citing counter examples.328 The USIS report on the Hiroshima Atoms for Peace exhibition even notes that the Chugoku Shimbun had two anti-American editors and the paper often ran negative stories about the United tates, such as calling the U the “Dr. Jekyll and Mr.

Hyde” of atomic policy for both putting on the Atoms for Peace exhibitions and continuing its weapons tests in the South Pacific, none of which seems to have prompted reprisal.329 If one assumes that Wattenberg was commenting on the decline of stories that discussed negative nuclear issues rather than an absence, then it could be a simple matter of a decrease in the number of fallout incidents. After all, the Bikini test was a year and a half in the past, and panic over contaminated food had cooled.

It seems unlikely, however, that newspapers would avoid negative nuclear stories because of their financial interest in the Atoms for Peace exhibition. After all, newspaper coverage of fallout always centered on the effects of bomb tests, and so there was no real conflict. Articles that discussed fallout or nuclear weapons could just use the danger as way of talking about how desirable the peaceful uses of nuclear power were.330 The

Chūnichi himbun went so far as to argue that it was necessary for the Japanese people to study nuclear power because they had suffered the most from the effects of nuclear

328 ee for example “Bei de ‘shi no hai’ rons ,” The Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 17, 1955, 1; “Genshiryoku sagi arawareru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Nov, 5, 1955, 3; “Genshi haikibutsu,” The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 16, 1955; “‘Bikini suibaku’ yori ky ryoku? My syun no bei suibaku jikken ” The Mainichi Shimbun, Nov. 6, 1955, 1; “'Bikini' ni otorazunu enky : Soren de jikken o kurikaeseba jintei ni kiken: Nihon o o h syan kidan,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Nov. 30, 1955, 7. 329 “U Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” Oct. 5, 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956, Part 2, 5. 330 And they did so. For example, see “Genbaku tanjy no kiroku: seiseishi jyūnen no sono hi: heiwa riy he no tenkan inoru,” The Nishi Nippon Shimbun, July 17, 1955, ; “Genbakusy de shinda shi: jidai no hitobi o mamoritai,” The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 27, 1955, 5. 184 bombs and atomic tuna.331 Furthermore, Atoms for Peace rhetoric centered on the false dichotomy between atoms for war and atoms for peace, with proponents arguing that by developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, it would lead to the end of nuclear power for war.

Wattenberg’s suggestion that the exhibition cosponsors had “a bill of goods to sell” regarding nuclear power implies that sponsoring an Atoms for Peace exhibition would directly profit the paper, whereas the opposite appears to be true. Although it is difficult to estimate how much the Yomiuri spent on the exhibition, their revenue from the event itself is fairly easily determined since all the revenue from tickets and pamphlets went to the non USIS sponsors. The admission fee was ¥50 for adults, ¥20 for students, children and individuals in large groups. The Yomiuri overly optimistically estimated that 370,000 people went through the exhibition in six weeks, at least half of whom paid the ¥20 fare.

Admission, thus, brought in approximately ¥13 million, or, at an exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar, roughly $36,000. They also sold 200,000 pamphlets at ¥30 apiece, which would bring in an additional ¥6 million (about $16,500). All told, the Yomiuri would have brought in about $52,500 from tickets and pamphlet sales. This figure is not to be sneered at, but it would not have offset the cost of building the exhibition hall at

$61,000, let alone the staff of 90 who worked it.332 Although the USIA gave a grant of

331 “Tamago ga nanjikan de dekiru ka; Omoshiroi jikken aisot pu de,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 5, 1956, 3. This argument was a surprisingly serious one to make in an article with a headline about eggs. 332 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Jan. 1 , 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 3. 185

$20,000 to the Atomic Industrial Forum for the exhibition, two thirds of this money went to purchasing the equipment for the exhibit and shipping it to Japan.333

In the end, the Yomiuri almost certainly lost money on the Tokyo exhibition, possibly a quite sizable amount. U I records included the Asahi himbun’s budget for its Kyoto exhibition and it lost money on the deal. Its income was ¥5,697,920, but total expenditures came out to ¥7,309,195, 334 for a loss of ¥1,701,275. The Yomiuri and the

Asahi even had the best scenario for making money since they were the lone sponsor, whereas other shows had multiple sponsors. The exhibition in Hiroshima, for example, was sponsored not only by a newspaper, but also by Hiroshima University, the prefecture, and the city among others, all of whom split the admission fees to recover costs. The

USIS event told the Hiroshima cosponsors up front that they would not recoup their expenses.335

The newspapers did not sponsor the exhibitions, then, to make money on ticket sales, but rather as a form of advertising and brand building. The idea of sponsoring large, international events was a well-established path to building readership in a Japanese paper, as the discussion of horiki’s career should make clear. Most of the cosponsors were regional papers that were running exhibitions in their home cities, whereas the two national papers sponsored exhibitions in the cities where their circulation was the strongest: Yomiuri in Tokyo and Asahi in Kyoto and Osaka. The papers, then, were not really competing since each one was trying to expand its lead in its base region. After all,

333 U IA Washington to U I Tokyo,” ep. 7, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 1 1, 1. 334 “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” April 27, 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956. 335 “U Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” . 186 an exhibition in Osaka was not all that likely to impress readers in Tokyo, which had its own exhibition.

The newspaper cosponsors, then, had some financial interest in the show, but it was largely tied to the prestige of sponsoring a major international event as a way to build their brand. If the newspaper owners and editors did not think nuclear power was a good idea, or, perhaps more pressingly, did not think that it would impress potential readers, then they would be unlikely to support the events. The USIS records clearly indicate that they had their choice of cosponsors. USIS employees shifted through potential cosponsors to identify which sponsor would best help them achieve their goals, and then had their choice of cosponsors. The example of Kyoto is illustrative. To cosponsor the

Kyoto exhibition, the USIS considered the Mainichi Shimbun, the Yomiuri, the Sangyo

Keizai, and Kyoto Shimbun before finally deciding on the Asahi Shimbun. The Sangyo

Keizai and Kyoto Shimbun were ultimately rejected because they were deemed to have insufficient capital “needed to promote the Exhibit and bear the inevitable deficit.”336

Meanwhile, the Yomiuri was rejected because its circulation was too small in Kyoto. The

Mainichi Shimbun, interestingly, was rejected because it had just co-sponsored another event with the USIS, the Symphony of the Air, and the USIS determined that engaging the Mainichi Shimbun for another co-sponsorship would be less helpful than partnering with a different newspaper.337

This reasoning is a bit curious because the USIS ultimately chose the Asahi

Shimbun to sponsor both the Kyoto and Osaka Atoms for Peace exhibitions, which seems

336 “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 2. 337 Ibid., 2. 187 to go against the reasoning that partnering with as many newspapers as possible was the best strategy. It should be noted, however, that the Mainichi Shimbun did not turn the

USIS down. It was particularly keen to sponsor an Atoms for Peace exhibition and petitioned the USIS to extend its tour and add a show in Marugame, Shikoku, which the paper would sponsor.338 Ultimately, the USIS chose not to expand the main exhibition tour to Shikoku, but it did send the small Atoms for Peace exhibit on a tour of Shikoku, which the Mainichi Shimbun sponsored.339 The USIS selected the Asahi Shimbun because it was Japan’s largest and most influential newspaper, had sufficient funds, and was left leaning. The last criterion seems to have played a very large role in the decision- making process. The Kansai region was deemed to be very liberal and potentially hostile to the Atoms for Peace exhibition. By using the Asahi as a co-sponsor, the USIS hoped to avoid criticism from people unwilling to attack a project backed by the paper. For its part, the Asahi Shimbun jumped at the opportunity to cosponsor the exhibitions in Osaka and

Kyoto, but essentially all potential sponsorship candidates were eager to embrace the peaceful atom, and even those who did not sponsor an exhibition covered them with enthusiasm. It is unlikely that every newspaper owner340 in Japan had a direct financial interest in nuclear power.

All told, newspaper owners and editors likely embraced nuclear power for a number of reasons. Some were swayed by arguments about resource limitations, while

338 “Possible extension of Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit,” July 20, 1955 NACP, RG 59, Box 122, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits – General July-December 1955, 1. 339 “Small Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” April 18, 1957, NACP, RG 59, Box 122 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1957 Part 2 of 2. 340 With the exception of Akahata, the Japanese Communist Party news outlet, which panned the Atoms for Peace exhibitions as American propaganda. 188 others worried about the looming energy shortage, or national balance of payments; there were those who wished to see Japan return to the first rank of nations, or even believed that a civilian nuclear power program could be the first step toward developing nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly financial considerations were a factor when a newspaper decided to cosponsor an Atoms for Peace exhibition. One factor that cannot be overlooked, however, is the fact that nuclear power made a great story. This was the Atomic Age, when humanity could split the very foundations of matter to produce theretofore undreamed of amounts of energy, and the future promised a future that defied the imagination. It was a story that brought together the childlike wonder produced by investigating the fundamental forces of nature, the possibility of redemption of a world gone mad as it developed the potential to destroy itself, hope for the future of mankind, and the rebirth of a nation. The Atoms for Peace exhibitions gave newspapers the opportunity to talk about all of these issues, not in dribs and drabs over the months and years, but in a concentrated period of a time when they had the country’s attention.

Newspapers are in the business of telling stories, and the peaceful uses of nuclear power were the story of the century just waiting to be told.

Promoting the Tokyo Exhibition

The Yomiuri, with the extra motivation of their boss’s political career in the balance, embraced the challenge of selling the story of the atom to Tokyo and, with it, all of Japan. Its coverage of the exhibition was extensive, with articles and ads running almost daily for a month before the opening and then continuing with daily coverage of

189 the event once it actually did open on November 1, 1955. The USIS estimated that the

Tokyo press ran over 20,000 column inches of material related to the Atoms for Peace exhibition over this three month period,341 and a search of the Yomiuri newspaper database shows 462 items related to nuclear power during this interval.342Articles were often quite prominently located in the paper and were sometimes quite long. It was not unheard of for the Yomiuri to dedicate an entire page of its newspaper to the Atoms for

Peace exhibition, especially around the time it opened. Since the Yomiuri typically had eight pages in its morning edition, sometimes expanded to ten or twelve, and a four page evening edition, dedicating an entire page to a single topic was a significant investment.

A few days before the exhibition opened, the Yomiuri ran full two page spread describing the various segments of the exhibition with a number of photographs of the displays,343 a significant allocation of resources.

The articles on nuclear power that preceded the opening of the exhibition were a broad mix of materials, including explanations of the basics of nuclear physics,344 profiles of relevant scientists,345 and discussions of the potential for the future of nuclear science.346 Naturally, it also covered legislation that Shoriki was working to pass at the

341 Tokyo to USIA, Dec. 16, 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119, 1. 342 Based on a search for “genshiryoku” from ep. 1, 1955 to Dec. 31, 1955 on the Yomidas Rekishikan. 343 “Semaru heiwa riy tenrankai: kakubunretsusei no jiss shimesu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 26, 1955, 10-11. It should be noted that this edition of the Yomiuri was 12 pages long. 344 “Semaru Genshiryoku: Seimei no shinhi minsu: odoroku beki aisotopu riy ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 26, 1955, 11. 345 “Yukawa Hideki hakase: Jyūnin kaitakusya o kaigeru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 25, 1955, 10 346 ee, for example “Genshiryoku Kenkyūzyo ni tankai: "Taiy shi" o tukuru: kasyūdai debiwuatoron kara” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 1 , 1955, 4; “Nihongakuzyutsukaigi no s kai: Asa kara hiraku: Genshiryoku ya nankyokukansoku” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 1 , 1955, ; “Kagaku no yume no sete: Jikkan yobu Genshiryoku hik ki,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 6, 1955, 11; and “Semaru genshiryoku: Seimei no shinpi minsu: Odoroku beki aisotopu riy : Aze mo kirei ni toru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 26, 1955, 10-11. 190 time,347 as well as a commendation he received for his work on the Tokyo Atoms for

Peace exhibition.348 Perhaps best suiting horiki’s flair for the dramatic in press coverage was the story of a Catholic priest presenting a chalice for Mass to the city of Hiroshima.

The chalice was commissioned by Father Hillsdale of San Francisco and presented by

Pedro Arrupe, a Jesuit from Spain who was living at a seminary on the outskirts of

Hiroshima when the atomic bomb exploded. It was 20 cm high, made out of cobalt and cadmium, and was accompanied by a pedestal made from uranium 238.349

This incident received a prominent place in the evening edition, which Shoriki believed people read more closely than the morning edition, despite the fact that it was not particularly national news and certainly did not have any connection to Tokyo. Rather, it was the exact kind of human interest story that appealed to Shoriki and the Yomiuri, symbolically connecting the devastated past with a promising future. Father Hillsdale’s intentions with the gift are not made apparent in the article, but it was likely intended as a symbol of hope, atonement for sin, and redemption,350 all of which fit in perfectly with the narrative that promoters of nuclear power wished to cultivate. The peaceful uses of nuclear power were not simply necessary and useful, but in some way would make up for the events of the war, particularly the bombing of Hiroshima. This sentiment tracks with

347 “Jigy hani o meikakuka: 'Genshiryoku kihonh ' y k naru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 12, 1955, 1. 348 This report, which focused primarily on Shoriki receiving a commendation from the USIS, seems particularly self-serving “Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku ni keii: Beik h ch ch kan kara Shoriki syasyu ni syukuzi,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 19, 1955, 3. 349 “Hiroshima ni genshi seihai: Ichibeijin shinpo ga okuru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, Oct. 27, 1955, 3. 350 The symbolism of using cobalt is particularly interesting. It was likely intended to evoke the use of cobalt-60 for radiation therapy and other medical uses, but cobalt could also be used to create a “cobalt bomb,” a theoretical nuclear bomb that could be designed to maximize the its fallout. Like much of nuclear culture, the symbolism of this chalice was complicated and perhaps contained unintentional mixed metaphors. 191

Nakasone Yasuhiro’s 1950 claim that the development of nuclear power would allow

Japan to contribute to the world to make up for its role in starting World War II.351 It would later be echoed by the Chugoku Shimbun, which claimed that the peaceful uses of nuclear power would somehow mean that the “sacrifices of Hiroshima were not in vain.”352

Media promotion of the Atoms for Peace exhibition was essential to the success of the show, which would go on to draw between 350,000 and 370,000 people over six weeks.353 All told, nearly 2.5% of the population of the greater metropolitan Tokyo area attended the exhibition. Of those attending, 63% reported hearing about the exhibit from the newspaper and 6% from radio.354 Clearly media coverage was the basis of awareness, which led to attendance. But the role of the media campaign went beyond promoting attendance at the actual exhibit. Although the 19 million people who saw newsreels on television and in the theaters did not necessarily attend the exhibition themselves, they had a virtual experience with the exhibit that included a narrative overview and video of the exhibit. Those who read about it in the newspaper had access to nearly daily stories on the exposition, the basics of nuclear research, and future applications. Radio listeners could hear overviews and first-hand accounts. Those simply exposed to the media coverage did not receive the full instruction on nuclear science and technology and may not have been as impressed by gadgets, but they were exposed to the hype that

351 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Yosan iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku, Feb. 3, 1950. 352 “Hiroshima genshiryoku 'Heiwa riy haku' ni kitaisuru 2: 'k huku no hi' ni suru kien: Hiroshima no gisei ha muda de nai,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, evening edition, May 15, 1955, 1. 353 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 1. 354 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” Jan. 24, 1956 , NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 3. 192 surrounded the exhibit and became part of the pro-nuclear zeitgeist. The variety and sheer volume of the coverage makes it difficult to estimate how many people the campaign reached, but it is easy to imagine that most of Tokyo must have been well aware of the event.

The Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition

On November 1, 1955, after months of preparation, a thousand scientists, educators, legislators, business leaders, and diplomats from home and abroad gathered in

Hibiya Park in the center of Tokyo to be among the first to enter the Atoms for Peace exhibit. Before they could enter, however, they had to sit through the opening ceremony with its numerous addresses by politicians, diplomats, and experts. They included a message from President Eisenhower read by Ambassador Allison; a statement from

Prime Minister Hatoyama read by chief cabinet secretary Ryutaro Nemoto; a speech by

Matsutar Shoriki; a telegram from US Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis

Strauss; and an address by Dr. William Pollard, Executive Director of the Oak Ridge

Institute of Nuclear Studies. The Department of State was quite adamant that a suitably high profile person address the opening, and Dr. Pollard was brought in for this purpose.355 Dr. Pollard, as the director of the Oak Ridge Instituted of Nuclear Studies, was one of the foremost nuclear researches in the United States. By sending him, the US demonstrated that Japan was worthy of receiving such as an important person, thus reasserting the importance of a Japan still recovering from the devastation of war.

355“Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Jan. 1 , 1956, 1. 193

Eisenhower’s speech, as had become his wont, stressed the idea that “The exhibit stands as a symbol of our countries' mutual determination that the great power of the atom shall henceforward be dedicated to the arts of peace.”356

Media coverage of the opening ceremony was extensive. Matsutar horiki’s media empire, in particular, went into overtime to promote it. In addition to the

Yomiuri’s newspaper coverage, which included a two page spread outlining the exhibit,

horiki’s Nippon Television covered the opening ceremony live for 60 minutes. Despite being broadcast during the middle of the day, this coverage was seen by an estimated

50,000 to 100,000 people. The Yomiuri Newsreel Company, meanwhile, put together a newsreel that they distributed to 1,500 theaters throughout the country, which they estimated was seen by 15 million people.357 Not to be outdone, CBS, MGM, and FEN also produced newsreels, some of which were shown on the three major Tokyo television networks on the evening of opening. Between them, the television networks brought the opening of the Atoms for Peace exhibition to an estimated four million viewers in Tokyo alone.358 With this level of saturation coverage, it is hard to see how someone could avoid being unaware of the Atoms for Peace exhibition and, perhaps, getting swept up by the excitement.

Regarding attending the exhibition, Dr. Eiichi Takeda said that “no amount of printed matter could achieve the feeling of reality given by this exhibit, just as an actual

356 USIA Washington USIS Tokyo, Oct. 27, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 1. 357 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 3. 358 Ibid., 3. 194 visit surpasses the travelogue,”359 but since attending is no longer a possibility, a detailed description of the contents of the exhibition and commentary on how visitors received it shall have to suffice. An average of over 8,500 people attended on average days, with

Sundays and weekends bringing in upwards of 15,000.360 Admission cost ¥50 for adults and ¥20 for students, children, and members of a large group. Since a typical visit to the exhibition lasted about two hours, organizers to regulate the rate at which people entered, resulting in long lines. At one point, the double file queue blocked a police box 400 yards from the entrance of the exhibition.361

On another occasion, the long wait times resulted in “scalpers” selling copies of the Atoms for Peace brochure for ¥150, five times the asking price at the exhibition. To remedy the situation, the organizers sent a group of young women out to sell the brochure to the waiting crowd for the normal ¥30 asking price, “But the girls were so mobbed by eager customers that they thereafter refused to venture outside the exhibit premises with copies for sale!”362 All told, 200,000 copies of these brochures were sold. The USIS saw these sales as not only as a sign of how interested attendees were in the peaceful uses of atomic power, but also considered that “this brochure may be regarded as a significant contribution in its own right to promotion of the atoms-for-peace theme, since it is only logical to assume that many who purchased copies at the exhibit later shared them with friends who had been unable to visit the display, thus possibly doubling or even tripling

359 Ibid., 5. 360 Ibid., 1. 361 Ibid. 1. 362 Ibid., 4. 195 the brochure's readership over and above the established 00,000 figure.”363 Although there is no way to determine whether this assessment is true, it is certainly reasonable and played into the U I ’s strategy of relying on word of mouth and tapping into existing social networks to spread information about Atoms for Peace, a subject which will be engaged in more depth in chapter 4.

Upon entering the exhibition, visitors were greeted by a lobby containing portraits of the pioneers of nuclear physics. This display featured a range of scientists, including the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus, Ernest Rutherford, Marie Curie, Otto Hahn,

Neils Bohr, Albert Einstein, and Yukawa Hideki, the last of whom had more local appeal than direct relevance to nuclear power. Visitors were funneled into one of two projection rooms, each capable of holding up to 250 people, where a film explaining the basics of nuclear physics played in a loop. The film, which ran for a little less than fifteen minutes, was entitled A is for Atom. It was a full-color, animated movie produced by Sutherland

Productions and sponsored by General Electric. It was originally intended as a promotional piece for nuclear power in the United States and was commonly dubbed or subtitled for foreign audiences.

The original version of the film begins by describing how the atomic age started with the atomic bomb, though it quickly expresses the hope that mankind would learn to handle nuclear weapons responsibly. All mentions of the atomic bomb were likely deleted from the film when it was shown in Japan, so as not to remind the audience of the

363 Ibid., 4. 196 unfortunate connection between Japan and atomic history.364 The film argues that atomic physics provides humanity with a powerful new tool for research and the improvement of daily life, and suggests that it is a counterpoint to the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. The image of a mushroom cloud transforms into that of a blue giant, which looms over the countryside and seems to be drawn of lines of power. The narrator assured the audience that control over atoms was not only possible but essential, offering that

“Wisdom demands … that we take time to understand this force. Because here, in fact, is the answer to a dream as old as man itself a giant of limitless power at man’s command.”365

Continuing with its anthropomorphization of nature, the film explains much of the inner workings of atomic physics, with a cast led by an “atomic expert,” Dr. Atom. Dr.

Atom has a lithium atom for a head and wears an academic robe and a mortarboard, lending it an air of academic authority.366 Using Dr. Atom’s head as an example, the film misleadingly compares an atom to a solar system before explaining the role of electromagnetism and the strong nuclear force, which it calls “cosmic glue.” The periodic table is depicted as a village full of houses for each of the elements. When possible, these houses are constructed of the element that lives there; tin lives in a tin can, while

364 Memos that circulated within the USIS assumed that any screening of A is for Atom would displayed without mention of atomic weapons, but runtime is listed as 15 minutes, which is about the runtime of the original, so it is unclear whether the USIS edited the film or how extensively it was edited. USIA Washington to U I New Delhi, “New Delhi Atomic Energy Exhibit,” June 14, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1955 Part 1 of 2, 6. 365 A is for Atom, Sutherland Productions. 1953, accessed July 27, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gi-ItrJISQE. 366 It is worth noting that a Japanese cartoonist would later borrow the concept of an anthropomorphized atom wearing an academic robe to explain nuclear physics in the Chūnichi himbun. The artist expands the idea by dressing up his atom-headed protagonist in a business suit when it discusses industrial uses of nuclear power. ee, for example “Wakaruyoi ‘Atomu no ky shitsu,’” The Chūnichi Shimbun, Jan. 5, 1956, 3. 197 aluminum lives in a coffee service. The film introduces the concept of isotopes by explaining that some elements have “families,” and live with other atoms that have the same number of protons but a different number of neutrons. Some atoms are more stable than others; while the dependable atoms are sound asleep, the unstable elements staying up all night, dancing, and emitting radiation. The dancing represents an excited energy state, presumably aided by, but not acquired through, swing music. After a period of emitting various forms of radiation, the film shows a radium atom being ejected through the roof of his house and landing in the home of radon, thus demonstrating natural transmutation. The erstwhile radium subsequently goes through another transmutation, eventually landing in a house made of lead, where its energy is sufficiently depleted so that it could finally get a good night’s sleep.

The narrative moves on to discussing the discovery of artificial transmutation, moving from the transformation of nitrogen to oxygen to the splitting of uranium. After discussing how neutrons liberated from nuclei can perpetuate a chain reaction, the film discusses the energy freed during the splitting of an atom. It demonstrates this principle by explaining that if a baseball-sized ball of uranium underwent fission completely, it would produce an amount of energy equivalent to that produced by filling Yankee

Stadium with dynamite and detonating it. This explosive imagery is followed by discussion of how fissile material for the first nuclear bombs was produced in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee and Hanford, Washington. Since the cut of A is for Atom used in the exhibition itself is not available, it is not clear if this portion of the film was shown.

198

With the basics of nuclear physics out of the way, the film turns to its potential applications. Curiously, it portrays the use of fission for electrical production in a very cursory manner, going out of its way to discuss the limitations and technical difficulties that had not yet been overcome. Equally quickly, it discusses the potential transportation revolution possible through nuclear trains, submarines, ships, and planes. The main focus of the uses of nuclear technology section is the use of radioisotopes as tracers, which the film refers to as “invisible detectives.” At this point, Dr. Atom introduces his friend, a

Geiger counter, and the two of them proceed to change into tweed coats, put on deerstalker hats, puff on pipes, and travel to different research laboratories in a car that labels them “Private ‘I’-sotopes.” Doing their best herlock Holmes impressions, Dr.

Atom and the Geiger counter use radioisotopes to track the absorption of fertilizer in crops, test the thickness of sheet metal in a factory, and check for heart disease, tumors, and thyroid disorders.

In the end, the film returns to the giant featured in the beginning, but splits them into different functions:

Truly the super power which man has released from within the atom’s heart is not one, but many giants. One is the Warrior, the destroyer. Another is the Engineer seeking to provide vast quantities of energy to run the world’s machines. Another is the Farmer, helping to better feed tomorrow’s world. till another is the Healer helping to diagnose and cure the sick. And the last is the Research Worker working in the fields of pure science to reveal more of the mysteries of the universe. But all are within man’s power, subject to his command. On man’s wisdom, on his firmness on the use of that power depends now the future of his children and his children’s children in the new world of the Atomic Age.367

367 A is for Atom. 199

Given the positive portrayal of nuclear power, the giants in A is for Atom are curiously ominous. The Warrior stands stoically with his arms folded across his chest, watching silently while dozens of planes fly over a city, though it is not clear whether these are atomic-powered planes or bear atomic weapons, or whether they are attacking or flying to defense. The Engineer holds a power generation station or substation in one hand and a transmission tower in the other, with the lines from the transmission tower lead to the buildings of the city. The Engineer is steeped in concentration or consumed with concern, but the broad shot of the city shows transmission lines coming from the giant’s hand, not entirely unlike a marionette’s strings. The Farmer stands with arms at his side in the background, looking over a wasteland complete with the bones of an unidentified animal bleaching in the sun. Without the Farmer moving, the wasteland dissolves into a lush farm. The Healer stands at military attention behind a hospital while holding an oval shield depicting the Caduceus, likely due to the American fashion of confusing it with the

Rod of Asclepius. The Research Worker stands ominously with his arms folded before the periodic table, seemingly indifferent.

The decision to portray atomic power as a number of giant energy men is curious, particularly when compared to the irreverent nature of dressing a man with an atom for a head and an anthropomorphized Geiger counter in Sherlock Holmes getups and naming them “invisible detectives.” Given the lack of seriousness of the rest of the short, the posture and symbolism of the Healer, for example, are remarkably martial for a medical professional. It would have made sense to put the Healer in a white lab coat instead of being bare-chested, or to have given him a giant stethoscope composed of energy; the

200

Research Worker could have looked at a test tube instead of staring eyelessly into infinity. Although the film was made for American audiences, one wonders if the decision to show a depiction of nuclear power as a series of world-striding, atomic

Colossi to the Godzilla-fearing people of Japan was a wise choice.

The two rooms for showing A is for Atom emptied into the main exhibit hall, where visitors were initially greeted by a series of displays that further explained the basics of nuclear energy. This section followed up on the basic ideas presented in the film, examining concepts such as fission and chain reactions in more detail. It was dominated by diagrams, illustrations, and explanatory text, all of which were quite stationary when compared to the film the audience had just seen. Volunteer docents encouraged visitors to spend time carefully reading through these introductory panels so that they would be prepared for concepts introduced later in the exhibits, and the docents recounted seeing visitors of all sorts, from professors to housewives, taking extensive notes.368

From the introductory section, visitors came upon one of the main attractions of the exhibition: a mockup of a graphite-moderated reactor with sections cut away so that its inner workings could be viewed. The mockup included a set of control rods that could be inserted or removed from the reactor. When the rods were removed, the interior of the model lit up, and it went dark if the rods were reinserted.369 This design made the model less static and gave a clear graphical representation of the role of the control rods, which

368 For example: USIS Tokyo to USIA Washington, “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” Feb. 25, 1957, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1957 Part 1 of 2, 12. 369 “Semaru heiwa riy tenrankai: kakubunretsusei no jiss shimesu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, 10/26/55, 10. 201 was to stop the chain reaction that was ultimately responsible for producing power.

Although it was a gross oversimplification, the design was an effective teaching aid for a general audience.

The mockup was a full-scale representation of a research reactor and was quite sizeable, taking up nearly as much room as one of the rooms where A is for Atom was displayed, which could hold 250 people at a time in addition to the equipment to display the film. This reactor was one of two full-scale mockups displayed at the Japanese Atoms for Peace exhibit, the other being a replica of the Chicago Pile-5 (CP-5). The actual CP-5 reactor was built by Argonne National Laboratory, and operated from 1954 to 1979 as a research reactor utilizing enriched uranium as fuel and heavy water as a moderator. At the time it was a state of the art facility, and was used by the Argonne Training School to familiarize countless nuclear technicians from the United States and abroad with a working reactor as a part of the Atoms for Peace program. The Tokyo exhibition marked the first time the design was displayed at an Atoms for Peace exhibit.

The two mockups were presented separately, with the graphite-moderated model located toward the beginning of the exhibit and the CP-5 model near the end. Both of these mockups were produced locally in Japan, which apparently led some quarters to complain about the quality. One internal U IA memo grumbled that “The opinion that the Japanese show will be second-rate because of lack of US representation is unfounded”370 and further declared that “While the CP-5 and Graphite Mock-Ups are of local construction certainly the size and opportunity to learn how a reactor operates must

370 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 1. 202 create at least some interest.”371 This concern seems exaggerated, and the mock-ups proved to be one of the highlights of the show. In an exit interview conducted by the

USIS at the Tokyo exhibition, 16 percent of respondents ranked the graphite reactor model as the “part of the exhibit [that] [stood] out most vividly” in their memory and seven percent said the same of the CP-5 mockup.372 The nearby graphite-moderated reactor mockup displayed various types of reactor fuel assemblies, but drew far less interest.

Next was the largest piece of equipment at the exhibition, a massive wall of light bulbs that could be used to depict various types of chain reactions. The wall and its attendant machinery weighted 3 tons, was 27.5 feet tall and 37.5 feet long. The chain reaction model contained both large light bulbs, which represented uranium, and smaller light bulbs that showed the path of neutrons freed by the splitting of uranium atoms.

When a neutron following the path of these smaller light bulbs would strike a uranium atom, the large bulb would flash and send two more neutrons along a divergent path, which would strike yet more uranium atoms, perpetuating the reaction. 373 The model was designed by Dr. Clark Goodman of MIT, who had a connection to Japan in having been a professor at Osaka University.374 The Yomiuri Shimbun variously described the effect of

371 Ibid., 3 372 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” Jan. 4, 1956 , NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 17-18. 373 Descriptions of the model can be found in “Yaa ky wa genshiryoku heiwa riy hakurankai: Dare ni mo hanjiruarigatasa,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 31, 1955, 5; “Bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manga 4: Abaren b no Chūsei,” The Asahi Shimbun, Osaka edition, April 13, 1956, 3; “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 3--Rensahann no nazo,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, Evening, Jan 7, 1956, 1. 374 “Semaru heiwa riy tenrankai:Kkakubunretsusei no jiss shimesu,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 26, 1955, 10. 203 the lights flashing as bizarre and beautiful, and likened it to viewing fireworks.375 Despite size, expense, and laudatory comments from the press, visitors to the exhibition were not particularly impressed with the chain reaction model, with only four percent reporting it as one of the most memorable parts of the exhibit, making it equally as popular the chicken experiments and less popular than the plant experiments, both to be discussed below.376

Immediately past the chain reaction model stood a curious item: a large, illuminated globe with 42 countries. It must have seemed somewhat out of place following so many displays explaining nuclear physics. This globe had a very distinct function, however; it marked the turning point of the exhibition. Basic education had been the focus up to this point, seeking to explain the principles of atomic physics and nuclear power to people. Past this point, the exhibition shifted to the specifics of nuclear power, with an eye to showing how nuclear power might be used for the betterment of mankind. The 42 countries highlighted on the globe identified those which had signed on to participate in the Atoms for Peace program in some capacity. They were accordingly those that stood to benefit from the march of atomic progress. The basic education section was certainly not neutral and actively sought to persuade people that nuclear power was a good thing, whether through its positive tone or by simply granting visitors a tenuous grasp on how nuclear physics worked. But past this point, the displays focused more specifically on how safe nuclear power was and how it would directly benefit

375 Ibid. 376 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. 204 everybody. The designers attempted to cover every possible angle so as to impress as many people as possible.

Immediately past the globe was a room with a wide assortment of equipment and displays. Most of the south side of the room was dedicated to materials designed to handle dangerous radioisotopes, including radiation suits, the US AEC regulation uniforms and hoods, glass bricks, containers, handling tongs, respiration masks, bottles, rubber footwear, and gloves.377 Nearby lay a model laboratory that held a variety of equipment, such as Geiger counters, radiation detection badges, and pocket dosimeters from Tracerlab, El-Tronics, Nuclear-Chicago, and Victoreen. According to the USIS, these samples did not represent the best equipment available, but rather a representative sample from leading companies. Between them, this equipment could “accurately count the three types of radiations and could differentiate between soft and hard beta rays.”378

The quality and breadth of equipment caused one USIA official to remark, "Frankly, many laboratories do not have, for actual work, as good an assortment of equipment as you [USIS Tokyo] will have just for demonstration purposes."379

The “magic hands,” though placed later in the exhibit, was one of the most important pieces of radiation handling equipment. They were part of a machine that translated the movements of the operator’s hands into the movement of mechanical hands. This tool allowed radiation workers to manipulate radioisotopes from behind a

377 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, July 1, 1955, TOUSI 443, June 20, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 1-3. 378 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, 5. Although it is worth noting that this equipment might not have gotten accurate readings since the equipment was designed for 60 cycle input and the local utility ran on 50 cycles. 379 Ibid., 5. 205 protective shield, either a glass screen or through a wall of concrete using television to allow the operator to see. The “hands” at the Japanese Atoms for Peace exhibition were mechanical, though electronic models did exist, and were considered state of the art in

1955.380 The magic hands were surprisingly precise, allowing the operator at the Atoms for Peace exhibitions to write calligraphy through the machine. The operators, usually young women who volunteered to work at the exhibition, proved quite popular with the visitors. In an interview with the Nishi Nippon Shimbun, Ando Shizuko, the magic hands operator at the Fukushima exhibition, explained that the magic hands were extremely popular, “Especially among primary school children. Quite a few children tease me to write their names with magic hand. I just received a letter from the mother of a child who had his name written with the magic hand on a piece of paper, but lost it on his way back to Kurume City, where he lives. His mother asked me to write another one to make the boy happy.”381

Ando went on to explain that even “people in their forties and fifties are especially enthusiastic about the Exhibit. One man kept coming to see the Exhibit for a week in hopes of having a chance of 'operating' the magic hand even for a minute. I wished I could let him run the magic hand, but as it is, no one but authorized personnel could run it. I felt sorry for him but there is nothing I can do about it.”382 The magic hands were so popular that jokes based on them began to appear in cartoons in newspapers, quite notably this nefarious example “Among the more ingenious uses for

380 Ibid., 5. 381 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 15. 382 Ibid., 16. 206 the ‘magic hands’ thought up by one cartoonist, for example, was murder by strangulation, guaranteed to baffle police with the absence of fingerprints.”383 The inclusion of this cartoon in a popular newspaper suggests the popularity of not only the magic hands themselves, but also the exhibit in general, since the gag required the audience to have at least a surface level understanding of what the exhibition contained.

These displays had utility beyond merely presenting some of the many toys of nuclear science. They were items used to detect and manipulate radiation, and to keep people who were exposed to it safe. Protective suits, gloves, and other materials kept radiation workers safe, while radiation badges and dosimeters measured their exposure to radiation, with the goal of limiting contact with it to a safe level. Taken as a whole, this suite of displays implicitly acknowledged the dangers of radiation exposure without explicitly acknowledging it, but at the same time showed it to be a manageable risk. The magic hands were the ultimate expression of how safe manipulating radioisotopes could be: the person manipulating radioisotopes did not even have to be in the same room as the dangerous material.

Although the impression of safety left by this portion of the exhibit was surely important, the assortment of gloves, tongs, and suits failed to impress most visitors, with four percent ranking the handling of isotopes section the most memorable, and only two percent favoring the model laboratory. The magic hands, on the other hand, were a sensation: 30 percent ranked them as the most memorable portion of the exhibition. Their largest number of supporters came from those ages 10 to 19, 56 percent of whom ranked

383 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 7. 207 it the top attraction, but the appeal cut across all age groups, various occupations, and both genders.384 Doubtlessly many were drawn to the 'magic hands' because the exhibition staff used them in manner befitting a carnival attraction and they were generally pretty neat, but others were drawn to their technological sophistication. It is reasonable to believe that at least some of the 44% of skilled and unskilled workers who preferred this exhibit appreciated the important safety implications of such equipment.

On the east side of this room lay displays that showed industrial uses of nuclear power. These displays included a model of an experiment that used radioisotopes to track the patterns of wear on rubber tires. By including a radioisotope in the construction of tires used in the experiment, scientists and engineers could study how tires deteriorate over time.385 Using equipment to detect radiation, the experimenters could determine how and why rubber tires wear out, information essential to the production of safer and more efficient tires. Next to the tire wear experiment was a machine that inspected products to determine whether they had a uniform weight or thickness. With this type of machine, the operator could send a form of radiation from a radioisotope through an item, such as tin foil. Radiation detectors on the other side of the product measured how much of the radiation got through the material, an indication of weight or thickness. Both of these types of machines improved efficiency without exposing the public to radiation. The tire wear experiment would be done in a laboratory and would only affect the design of commercially available tires, whereas the radiation, usually gamma radiation, used to

384 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. 385 Nichols to Tuch, May 13, 1955,” NACP, RG 59, Box 1 1, 8c Exhibits – General Jan-July, Part 2 of 2, 1. 208 determine uniform weight or thickness could pass through the material without any possibility of affecting consumers.

These applications of radiation were meant to be representative and suggestive of the value of nuclear power, possibilities that caused more than one Japanese politician to speculate about a “second industrial revolution.” The world-shaking implications of these applications of radioisotopes, however, did not make for a memorable display. A statistically insignificant one percent of visitors claiming the package monitor was memorable, and only one person interviewed mentioned the tire wear model expressed interest, which amounted to a quarter of a percent of those interviewed.386 Despite the lack of interest in these two displays, when asked whether nuclear power would have the largest effect on industry, agriculture, medicine, or research, 67 percent of respondents said industry.387 This apparent discrepancy is probably a result of respondents considering power generation to be a form of industry, since it certainly would not fall under the heading of medicine, agriculture, or research.

To the north of the industrial uses displays was a series of exhibits that showed the potential medical value of radiation. These uses are perhaps the ones with which most contemporary readers are familiar, aside from nuclear power generation, as medical imaging and radiation therapy for cancer are common. At the beginning of the medical uses display, a projector played a film on using radiation to eradicate mosquitos, which would help prevent the spread of diseases like malaria. Nearby lay a full-sized cobalt

386 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. 387 The 67% corresponds to those who simply replied “industry,” but it was also possible to provide multiple categories. If one counts categories with multiple responses which include industry, industry’s share goes up to 76%. “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” Jan. 4, 1957, 10. 209 therapy machine. Cobalt therapy, developed by Dr. Harold Johns and his team at the

University of Saskatchewan in 1951, uses colbalt-60 to generate gamma radiation and x- rays that can be used to treat cancer. The cobalt therapy was sometimes called the “cobalt bomb” or even the “cancer bomb,” though presumably these appellations went unused in the Atoms for Peace exhibitions.

The machine was more effective than existing treatments using x-rays or other radioactive substances; it could more precisely direct a higher energy beam of radiation from a more compact machine deeper into the body with fewer side effects. Unlike the cumbersome x-ray therapy units that predate it, cobalt therapy machines could be used to treat any part of the body, with the machine extending along an arm and rotating as needed to place the beam of radiation exactly where it needed to be. Using this technology, doctors at the University of Saskatchewan managed to increase the cure rate of cervical cancer to 75%, up from 25% using earlier forms of treatment.388 The display at the exhibition was an actual cobalt therapy machine that could have been fully operational if it had a radiation source. A volunteer, usually a medical student, would explain its function, demonstrate its use, and answer visitors’ questions visitors might have. The machine garnered significant attention, and well it might since it marked a significant advance in the treatment of a notorious set of diseases. While cobalt therapy has been displaced as best practice for radiation therapy, it currently remains in widespread use throughout the world because the units are durable and easily maintained.

388 Janet MacKenzie, “ askatchewan’s Cobalt-60 Beam Therapy Unit Inaugurates a New Era in Cancer Treatment.” accessed April 13, 013, http://wdm.ca/skteacherguide/WDMResearch/Cobalt60_TeacherGuide.pdf. 210

Next to the cobalt therapy machine lay a display of mannequins used to demonstrate techniques for using radiation to eliminate birthmarks, moles, and sometimes acne. The technique involved taking small, hollow tubes made of glass or gold, filling them with radon gas, and inserting them near the blemish. With a half-life of only 3.8 days, the radon “seeds,” as they were called, could remain in the patient’s body with minimal risk of additional radiation exposure after the course of the treatment.389 This technique, which was widely used in the 1950s but was rare by the 1970s, was a big hit among the women who attended the exhibition, with many women indicating in an exit interview that the birthmark removal exhibit was their favorite.

Time and time again women who were interviewed about the exposition brought up the subject of the beauty treatment display unbidden. The wife of Tsuchiya Karoku, the governor of Fukuoka prefecture, did so in her statement, “I know the miserable havoc atomic bombs played during the war; and I have become interested in the peaceful uses of atomic energy all the more since I went through this exhibit. It can be used for beauty treatment, too.”390 For many women, such as Tsuchiya, this display seemed to drive home the idea that nuclear technology could influence every aspect of life. Beauty and cancer treatments were concrete and immediate, which seems to have appealed to women more than the more abstract benefits of nuclear power.

Behind the nuclear beauty treatment display was a model of a reactor used to generate radioisotopes used in medical procedures. The medical reactor was one of six

389 N. Goldstein, “Radon seed implants. Residual radioactivity after 33 years.” Archives of Dermatology, 1975 Jun; 111(6), 757-759. 390 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 1. 211 tabletop models of reactors displayed in the exhibition, though the rest were displayed as a set later on in the exhibit and will be discussed in more detail below. This model was provided by the Lovelace Foundation. It was smaller than the other models and had premiered at the Geneva Convention.391 It is interesting that the USIS decided to display this reactor separately from the others. Most other models were of energy producing reactors, or ones used in basic atomic research. The medical reactor was slightly different because it specialized in producing radioisotopes with relatively short half-lives, which made it difficult to transport them from abroad. This limitation in transportation made it imperative that radioisotope reactors operate in areas throughout the world in order to facilitate research and medical treatment.

To the south of the skin treatment display was another USIA film entitled,

“Atoms for Peace—Medicine.” The full film ran for 0-minutes and examines research into and application of the uses of radiation in four US research facilities: at

Massachusetts General Hospital, it shows the use of radioisotopes to locate and remove a brain tumor; at University of California at Los Angeles, a radioisotope tracer is used to diagram the thyroid in a test subject; at Oak Ridge Cancer Research Hospital, radiation is used to treat cancer; and at University of California at Berkeley, tracers are used to study blood diseases and arteriosclerosis.392 Only the first portion of the film, focusing on removing brain tumors, was shown. The film begins with a man collapsing in the middle of the street. The man is rushed to a hospital, where he is diagnosed with a brain tumor

391 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, 8c Exhibits – General July- December 1955, 3. 392 “Motion Picture Film Library,” United tates Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, accessed July, 19, 2012, http://www.scribd.com/doc/47835009/AEC-Motion-Picture-Film-Library-Late- 1950s. 212 with the help of a scanner using a radioisotope. After the procedure, the segment ends with the man shaking hands with the doctor.393 This film dramatizes the medical uses of radioisotopes that had already been introduced in the exhibition, thus putting a human face on patients who would benefit from their use.

The medical portion of the exhibit was an important part of the rhetorical argument for nuclear technology at the exhibition. Cancer treatments presented with the cobalt therapy machine and in the film provided an effective rebuttal to concerns over radiation. The exhibit presented evidence that not all radiation was harmful, and in fact could provide lifesaving therapies and could provide imaging technology that could be used to treat a host of ailments. The curing of cancer and the advancement of medicine was an unquestionable good that the exhibit associated with other uses of nuclear power by placing them right in the geographic center of the exhibition, sandwiched between the industrial and agricultural uses. Although the use of radon seeds to treat minor skin imperfections may seem ridiculous today, it was medical best practice during the 1950s, with the endorsement of countless doctors whose opinions were often seen as being above reproach. All told, the cancer treatment portion received a significant amount of attention, with 15% saying the cancer treatment segment stood out most in their minds making it the third most memorable part of the exhibit. It is interesting to note that the cancer treatment portion was particularly popular among women, 24% of whom said it stood out, compared to 13% of men. Age had significant bearing on visitors’ opinions;

393 U IA, Washington to U I New Delhi, “New Delhi Atomic Energy Exhibit,” June 14, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1955 Part 1 of 2, 6. 213 the older one was the more likely it was to be memorable, with 23% of those 50 and older remembering it well versus 8% of those 10 to 19.394

The next room was dedicated to the agricultural applications of nuclear technology. Although this terminology might bring to mind farmers sowing their fields with radioactive seeds in order to grow crops with a healthy green glow, the primary agricultural application of nuclear power was in research. Scientists used radioisotope tracers to study how plants absorb water and nutrients from the soil to improve techniques of irrigation and fertilization, maximizing crop yields with existing technologies. Photosynthesis itself was poorly understood before radioisotope studies which utilized biosynthesis chambers, which are structures in which plants are grown with an atmosphere rich in carbon-14.395 Using the carbon-14 in the plants to trace their growth and measuring their output, researchers were able to trace their fundamental processes, leading first to a better understanding of how plants grow and develop and how diseases spread in plants. The results of this type of research promised more productive forms of agriculture and even to improve the taste of produce,396 and thus leading to a better fed, happier population. The exhibition included demonstrated how such research was conducted through a combination of visual displays methods used in

394 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. The difference in opinion between these age groups can likely be attributed to divergent attitudes regarding mortality, which may be better left to the philosopher Peter Townshend and his meditations on the value of dying before one gets old. 395 “Design and Operation of a Carbon-14 Biosynthesis chamber,” Agricultural Research ervice, U Department of Agriculture, issued Nov. 1962, accessed July 19, 2012, goo.gl/znMoV. 396 “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 12: N gy e no riy ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 18, 1956, 1. 214 such experiments and a full-sized portable plastic biosynthesis chamber set up in the assembly hall.

In addition to the plant displays, the exhibition included information on how radioisotope-based research could improve animal husbandry. Much like the plant studies, the animal research focused on how to keep the animals healthy, improve yield, and understand their basic biological processes, which would help with the other two.

The animal research in question was primarily based on feeding animal food that was laced with radioisotopes of phosphorus or carbon in order to trace how the animals processed the food and used it to grow and produce useful products. Studies included determining what kinds of vitamins and minerals cows needed to avoid potentially deadly dietary deficiencies and tracing how silk worms produced cocoons in an effort to improve the quality of their silk.397 Since the animal experiments lacked the equivalent of a biosynthesis chamber from the plant experiments, the exposition designers highlighted the chicken experiments by including a pair of live chickens in the show. The chickens lived in a “chicken coup” on the exhibition floor, which consisted of a large, hemispherical wire cage with a pair of perches for them to stand on and a stand to hold a nest. The chicken experiments, which were, presumably, not conducted on the birds at the exhibition, consisted of feeding chickens feed laced with a calcium radioisotope tracer to study the development of eggs. Researchers hoped that these experiments would

397 Ibid. 215 lead to eggs that did not break so easily, presumably by finding a feed mixture that would strengthen the structure of the eggs.398

Toward the end of the agricultural uses section was a section devoted to the use of radioisotopes on foodstuffs meant for commercial consumption. Food irradiation involves the application of ionizing radiation whether by electrons, gamma radiation, or x-rays, usually generated by cobalt-60. The radiation disrupts any DNA or enzymes it encounters, thus killing pathogens, slowing decomposition, preventing sprouting and ripening, and destroying contaminants, such as insect larvae. Food that has been irradiated can be stored without refrigeration for long periods without spoilage.

Although food irradiation continues to be somewhat controversial, the scientific consensus over the past fifty years has been that the process is safe for consumers and causes no more nutrient loss than other methods of sterilization, such as canning.399 The process has gained world-wide acceptance since the 1950s and is commonly used to irradiate foodstuffs in over fifty countries around the world, including the United States and most of the European Union. Herbs and spices are among the most commonly irradiated foods, but various types of fruits, vegetables, meat, poultry, fish, and baked goods are as well. Although it is currently illegal to import irradiated food to Japan, it has been legal to irradiate potatoes using cobalt-60 since 1972. With over 6,000 tons of potatoes irradiated in 2010 alone, Japan ranks fourth in tonnage of food irradiated in

398 “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 12: N gy e no riy ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 18, 1956, 1. 399 Iowa State University Extension Program, Food Safety, accessed Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.extension.iastate.edu/foodsafety/irradiation/. 216

Asia,400 which may seem counterintuitive for a country that once experienced widespread radioactive contamination of one of its key food sources.

The Atoms for Peace exhibits in Japan displayed samples of foods that were commonly included in exhibitions throughout the world, including irradiated potatoes, bologna, bread, cheese, and corn. Prior to opening of the exhibition, a USIS operative expressed concern that the foods that were to be displayed were not normally eaten in

Japan, and so samples of irradiated rice and smoked salmon were rushed to Japan so that foods more familiar to Japanese audiences would be available.401 The actual samples were accompanied by extensive collections of color photos of irradiated samples alongside the control samples. Although individually the agricultural uses of atomic power did not poll well, taken together they generated a fair amount of interest. The plant experiments received a respectable six percent mention as the most memorable portion of the exhibit, the chicken experiments four percent, and the food preservation display at one percent,402 for a combined total just 4 percentage points shy of curing cancer.

Indeed, the agricultural uses inspired a fair deal of passion among some visitors.

On July 23, 1956, toward the end of the Fukuoka exhibition, the Nishi Nihon Shimbun, a local co-sponsor of the exhibit, conducted a roundtable discussion with students who had volunteered to serve as docents. Nakayama Yunowuka, a lecturer on Atoms for Industry, recounted a story related to food preservation, relating that “One young man came along.

He insisted that some gamma rays may remain in food and create considerable danger,

400 Kume Tamikazu. Ajia ni okeru syokuhin sy sya d k . Center for Applications of Nuclear Technique in Industry, accessed Apr. 24, 2013, https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jrafi/47/1/47_29/_pdf. 401 USIA, Washington to Windchy, USIS, Tokyo, July 21, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1955, 1. 402 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. 217 when I explained that since gamma rays pass through material, gamma-rays-applied food is free from radioactivity. He came to see the Exhibit for two days running. He never went away convinced.”403 Such concerns, grounded in an imperfect understanding of physics as they may be, seem to have been uncommon. Nakayama reported this story as a somewhat baffling anecdote, remarkable for its absurdity. It does suggest, however, that not all visitors were convinced of the benefits of nuclear power, a point that is occasionally suggested by the polling data.

More common were stories about how visitors marveled at the wonders of nuclear technology and the effects it would undoubtedly have on their lives, though they did not always view these as positive. Again, from the July 23, 1956 Nishi Nippon roundtable:

Sasaki Hideto (Lecturer on Atoms for Agriculture): Some noodle maker, who complained about his noodle becoming mouldy [sic] in rainy seasons, asked me if he could keep noodle from becoming mouldy by applying gamma rays. A farmer approached me with a question as to whether or not there is any laboratory where they are doing research using tracers to find out why chickens do not lay eggs in the season which their old feathers fall off and new feathers grow.

Nakamura Shisuki (Lecturer on graphite –moderated reactor): Some refrigerator dealer was shocked to learn that gamma rays are used to keep food from parishing [sic]. He fears that gamma rays would take the bread out of his mouth and all other refrigerator dealer's mouths. He was so serious about it that he questioned me closely about how long it would be before gamma rays are put on the market.

Nishi Nippon: That goes to show how closely the audience feels atomic energy is to their daily life. That's where the significance of this Exhibit lies.

Clearly asaki’s noodle maker and farmer viewed the agricultural uses of nuclear power as a positive, with the noodle maker seeing food irradiation as a solution to a longstanding problem and the farmer believing it might be used to answer a research

403 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 15. 218 question that could ultimately lead to higher yields. Nakamura’s refrigerator maker’s panic is somewhat comical, especially with hindsight showing that he had little to worry about regarding nuclear power encroaching on his field. It does, however, illustrate the

Nishi Nippon’s point that visitors to the exhibition connected to their immediate lives, and with some sense of urgency. The audience saw nuclear technology as the future, one that would shape the rest of their lives, for better or for worse, though almost always for the better. There are few issues that could affect daily life more immediately than food.

After all, a large part of the panic following the Lucky Dragon Incident revolved around the potential contamination of fish, a daily staple of the Japanese diet. At the exhibit, however, this concern was flipped on its head. Instead of the uncontrolled fallout from a nuclear weapon that could poison food, the exhibition presented a way of controlling radiation to actually improve food by making it last longer. Indeed, the exhibition focused on displaying the possibility of better living through radiation.

The last section of the exhibition returned the focus to nuclear equipment.

Immediately upon entering the room one encountered a model of the Tanashi cyclotron installed at Center for Nuclear tudies of the University of Tokyo’s center in Tanashi.

Tanashi was a small city on the outskirts of Tokyo where research on reactor design had begun just over a year earlier in July of 1954. A cyclotron is a type of particle accelerator that guides a charged particle outward through a spiral path. The particles are guided along the spiral using a magnetic field and accelerated by rapidly changing radio frequencies. Once accelerated, the particle can be ejected and forced to collide with various materials, producing reactions that could otherwise not be observed under

219 laboratory conditions. The first cyclotron was invented by Ernest Lawrence in 1932, who had coincidentally visited Japan earlier in 1955 as part of the Hopkins mission. This model, however, only raised a mild amount of interest, with 4% of visitors citing it as especially memorable.404 In the middle of the room lay the popular magic hands exhibit, to the south side was the CP-5 full-scale mockup with attending explanations and photos of the original in Chicago, which were discussed in more detail above.

The penultimate final section was designed to show progress on commercial development of nuclear power. After demonstrating how radioisotopes could be used to improve various fields, the exhibit showed the main event: reactors that would generate the electricity that was increasingly powering all aspects of life. On the east side of the room was a display of pictures of various existing experimental reactors and commercial power plants under construction. The nuclear power plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, the first fully commercial nuclear plant in the world, was prominently featured, along with schematics for the plant under construction at Indian Point, New York. The Indian

Port display included five photos of the site, two different schematics for the plant, and a statement from the president of Consolidated Edison, the company responsible for building the plant.

The pictures and schematics were followed by table top models of various types of reactors, which was the largest collection put together for a USIA show up to that point.405 This collection of reactor models and mockups caused something of a problem: with six different reactors, what was the best way to sort them? Typically, the USIA

404 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 17-18. 405 USIA to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, 1. 220 divided reactor models by their general function rather than their inner workings, so they were described as research, central power station, portable power, and medical research reactors respectively. The alternative was to describe the inner workings of different types of reactors, but this would quickly become complicated because although “the models look different… the actual operation at the core is not apparent and the use of schematic drawings and a lecture or lengthy text would be essential” to describe the differences in how the different models worked. It had been “Washington’s assumption that this highly technical differentiation should be avoided at least in three-dimensional presentations.”406 The USIA sidestepped this issue by dividing the models, assigning each of the four models to one of the typical categories and consciously choosing not to include more, which would once again complicate matters. After all, this exhibit was for a general audience and the point was to familiarize a broad community with nuclear power, which did not require an in-depth understanding of the virtues of various types of moderators and fuel sources. The point was more in line with making laymen understand what a moderator was as a first step to understanding the operation of a nuclear power plant.

The models were, for the most part, general concepts rather than recreations of existing reactors. The research reactor displayed was a model of a swimming pool reactor, built and donated by the Avco Company. Swimming pool reactors are placed in an open pool of water which functions to moderate the neutrons, cool the reactor, and shield the workers from radiation. The entire reactor is open and easily accessible,

406 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, 4. 221 making it ideal for training technicians and conducting research with the neutrons produced by the reactor.

The portable power reactor model was made by the American Locomotive (Alco)

Products Company, is the only model that was based on an actual design rather than a conceptual design. Since this model was based on an active project from Alco in 1955, it was almost certainly based on the 2 megawatt portable reactor that Alco was in the process of developing for the US Army Nuclear Power program, APPR-1. The APPR-1 was designed to be flown to “remote or relatively inaccessible locations” to provide power.407 The APPR-1 design was built as the SM-1 (Stationary, Medium Power, First prototype) plant at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where the US Army used it to train nuclear technicians for all branches of the military. USIA reports offer frustratingly little information on the last two models, including the types of designs they were supposed to be. The central power station model was built by General Dynamics at U I Tokyo’s request, and was exclusive to the Japanese show. Somewhat ironically since they were displayed at an Atoms for Peace exhibition, the portable power reactor model was based on a design for the Army and the central powers station model was built by a defense contractor which, presumably, drew on its experience building reactors while designing the model. The models and mockups were augmented by photographs and plans of existing plants.

407 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, “AEC Research and Development Report Reactors-Special Features of Military Package Power reactors,” Aug. 8, 1956, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.ornl.gov/info/reports/1956/3445603610224.pdf,. 222

The USIS expressed concerns that the smaller power reactor displays would be overshadowed by the graphite-moderated reactor at the beginning of the show and the full-scale CP-5 reactor right next to them. After all, these were static models without sections cut away to show the inner workings, unlike the full-scale mockups, and were table top size. Despite the fact that they cost between $12,000 and $17,000 each to construct, the U I noted that “They have no animation and experience shows they are of little interest to the layman.”408 These concerns seemed to have played out as expected.

Although seven percent of visitors mentioned the portable power station as the most memorable part of the exhibition, the same figure as the CP-5 reactor itself, none of the other table-sized models received so much as a percentage. To be fair, the uranium ore samples and materials on surveying for uranium deposits in Japan that was placed nearby the power reactor models did not garner much interest either, though those were just rocks.

The final materials presented in the exhibition were depictions of atomic powered transportation: nuclear-powered ships, trains, and airplanes. The idea of nuclear-powered transport was perhaps the embodiment of nuclear imagination in the 1950s. Utilizing nuclear power, modes of transportation could go great distances without refueling, a great advantage over existing technology. An island nation heavily dependent on trade and a growing power in ship construction, Japan stood to benefit greatly from a fleet of nuclear-powered commercial ships. Such ships could travel for months without refueling, reducing the need to call on foreign ports to fill up their tanks. Maritime transport, after

408 USIA Washington to USIS Tokyo, Sep. 20, 1955, 7. 223 all, had been one of the first applications of nuclear power, with nuclear submarines driving American, French, British, and Soviet interest in nuclear transport. Japan, constitutionally prohibited from developing the capacity for war, would focus its energies on commerce. Companies like Mitsubishi and Kawasaki thought this singular focus would prove to be a great advantage in developing nuclear ships, and that Japanese shipyards would be rolling out nuclear-powered ships within five years.409 The entire program would eventually prove to be a quagmire, with construction on a nuclear- powered ship delayed until 1967410 and a catastrophic maiden voyage of the first ship,

Mutsu, in 1974 leading to another fifteen years of development before the program was tested again in 1990411 and then finally scrapped in 1995. Although a nuclear-powered train would have cut down on fuel costs, its economic viability, let alone necessity, was never particularly clear. This fact did not stop engineers and businessmen from dreaming, however. These dreams extended to an atomic-powered car, which even some members of the Diet saw as inevitable.412

Perhaps the greatest atomic dream was the nuclear-powered airplane. Such a machine would be able to cross to the other side of the world without landing to refuel, greatly reducing travel times. Although one of the primary proposed uses was for military bombers that could stay airborne for months at a time in order to respond in a moment’s notice to attack orders, Japan would, once again, stick to the commercial applications.

409 Hailey Foster, “Japan Shipyards Work Overtime to Maintain World Leadership: Preassembly methods enable the Kobe Companies to cut building.” The New York Times, June 9, 1957, 185. 410 “Japan Will Build Nuclear Vessel: Sato Gives Final Approval for her First Atomic Ship.” The New York Times, Nov. 22, 1967, 75. 411 “Mutsu Conducts Test at its new port,” Nuke Info Tokyo, No. 4, March/April 1988. 412 ee for example ait Kenz , Denki tsūshin iinkai, Shugiin Gijiroku. 224

The main obstacle to a nuclear-powered plane was the weight of the reactor and the necessary shielding. Proponents of this design believed that the unfailing progress of science would provide materials that would be suited to such a plane, citing, for example, alloys that had shielding properties similar to lead but were much lighter.413 The Atoms for Peace exhibition did not address these limitations, and instead the USIA simply provided an artist’s representation of what a nuclear-powered plane might look like. It is quite fitting this illustration was the last thing visitors would see before leaving the exhibition, with its mixture of belief in progress and unrealized potential.

The design of the exhibition was an integral part of the attempt to persuade visitors of the benefits of nuclear power. The exhibit started with A is for Atom, which explained how nuclear power worked and how it would affect various fields, such as medicine, industry, agriculture, and research. The structure of the film essentially created the template which the exhibition then follows. After the exhibit exposed visitors to the basics of nuclear physics, methods of limiting risk of radiation exposure, and a mockup of a reactor, the audience moved through examples of how nuclear technology would improve the industrial, medical, and agricultural worlds. These areas touched on how the economy would grow, which affected people’s livelihoods, and how health and welfare would improve. They sold the idea of nuclear power not just as another source of electricity, one source of which was as good as another to the end user, but as commonplace, tangible objects that related directly to visitors’ everyday lives. Nuclear- powered transportation, the last key area of daily life to be explored in the exhibit, was

413 “Genshiryoku k kuki jidai tikazuku: Namari yori karui tokusyug kink ,” The Mainichi Shimbun, Nov. 2, 1955, 2. 225 left to the very end with artist renditions of atomic boats and planes right before the exit.

The exhibit consistently alternated between the theoretical, the material culture of nuclear power, and the quotidian to reinforce the central message of the exhibition: nuclear power will improve your life.

Public Response

Reactions to the exhibition show that it was accessible to just about everyone, though what one got out of the exhibit seems to have been largely a matter of how much effort one put into understanding it. The President of Hiroshima University and former

Education Minister Morito Tatsuo, for example, stated, “I have little understanding of such technical matters, but on seeing these working models even we amateurs can imagine how the real equipment functions.”414 Morito commented that amateurs could understand how nuclear power worked, but that it was not necessarily easy. This sense of academic challenge was echoed in an interview by the Nishi Nippon Shimbun conducted during the Fukuoka exhibition. The interview as part of a round table that included

Morita Tamaku, a physics professor at Kyushu University and Yamada Yoshio, a professor of agricultural chemistry at that same institution. Their discussion of the accessibility of the exhibit is excerpted below:

Nishi Nippon: Is the whole thing comprehensible enough for laymen? Morita: The exhibit is very well made. It is made for the public. I think it is impossible to make one more comprehensible that this Exhibit. Yamada: That's what I think.

414 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 3. 226

Morita: I think you should go to see the Exhibit more or less with the idea of "studying" atomic energy, instead of going to see it with the vague idea of seeing something fabulous. Yamada: To get something out of it, you need to take notes Nishi: Seems like people are doing that.415

This discussion also suggests that the subject matter would be quite challenging for laymen, but it was accessible if visitors put forward the proper level of effort. In that same interview, Ms. Kita Yoko, a representative of the Fukuoka Women’s club, commented, “When I saw it the first time, I could not understand how atomic energy works, but I felt the whole thing was more comprehensible the second time. I wish could see it two or three more times.”416 Ms. Kita’s quote raises the question of whether most people attendees actually took away a real understanding of elementary nuclear physics, though some of the most determined surely did.

The question of whether people actually learned anything was likely secondary to the USIS, which was focused on raising awareness of the peaceful uses of nuclear power and winning popular support for it, and for the United States, which generously offered to give away the secrets of the atom to its friends. Regarding its primary goal, the USIS certainly succeeded, winning over people from all walks of life and all political persuasions. Taiko Hirabayashi, a prolific socialist and feminist writer, was impressed by the breadth of atomic technology on display, stating she was “amazed to find that atomic energy has such endless practical uses, as for example in the standardization of dyeing processes through use of radioisotopes.”417 Inejiro Asanuma, the Secretary General of the

415 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 12. 416 Ibid., 12. 417 “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” . 227

Socialist Party, offered perhaps the most interesting response given his previous opposition to nuclear power, reportedly saying, "I foresee a sort of industrial revolution… a second industrial revolution...which will change the world entirely. The things shown here have a very deep significance, as for instance increased food production... the curing of cancer… and extended industrial production through use of atomic energy. The world is entering an atomic energy revolution, and Japan must exert every effort to develop atomic energy for peace.”418 Asanuma was so favorably impressed by the exhibition, in fact, that he went on to advocate publicly for Japan to sign on to international agreements regarding the exchange of nuclear technology and materials, an about face from his earlier position.

These positive responses by some of the luminaries who visited the exhibit were echoed by laudatory coverage in the press. The Mainichi Shimbun called the exhibition

“ pectacular!” and described it as “an attempt to prove that nuclear energy can also be harnessed for human happiness.”419 The English language Nippon Times explained that,

“The models on display give as simple as possible an indication of what is involved in harnessing of nuclear energy to the purposes of everyday life.”420 For the international audience, IN said, “Difficult ideas such as how atom nuclei are split are easily explained with movies and diagrams with flashing lights.”421 A Japan News editorial proclaimed,

“There is no doubt at all that the exhibit did a tremendous job in showing the general public the possibilities inherent in this nuclear age. It replaced the vague and menacing

418 Ibid., 2. 419 Ibid. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid. 228 picture of the ‘atomic mushroom’ with a shining vision of a happier, healthier, more prosperous mankind.”422

Although the exhibition received rave reviews, the U I and CIA’s assessment of working with Shoriki was not quite so rosy. There were obvious benefits to working with

Shoriki, but it quickly became apparent that there was one serious drawback: the USIS staff and Shoriki did not get along. In June 1955, the CIA observed the tension during the co-sponsorship of the Hopkins Mission, remarking that, “PODAM [ horiki] and

QKFLOWAGE [the USIS] did not always hit it off, and it occasionally required vigorous

JABA [CIA] intervention on one side or another to bring the joint sponsorship plan to fruition.”423 Despite the existing tension, the USIS recruited the Yomiuri Shimbun for the

Atoms for Peace exhibitions. The records are not clear when, precisely, the partnership began, but it was clearly in force by July 1955, when Shoriki began to harangue the USIS.

Shoriki demanded publicity material from the USIS five months before the exhibition was to open. He wanted “to print huge quantities of advanced publicity material for the exhibit,” material that he thought should include articles and reviews of the German exposition, including total attendance, average daily attendance, and pictures, plus total value of the Japanese exhibition. horiki’s demands led one U I agent to remark “This is no doubt Shoriki newspaper and magazines will print everything available even if it seems like old news by normal standards.”424

422 Ibid. 423 “PODAM/Japanese Public Opinion Regarding Atomic Energy,” NACP, RG 63, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 424 Tokyo USIS to USIA Washington, June 10, 1955, NACP, RG 59, Box 121, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1955 Part 1 of 2, 1. 229

Atomic Politics

A CIA informant, a US citizen and wife of a lawyer who was connected to the

Atoms for Peace exhibition, further identified Shoriki as a source of the tension, particularly by attempting to take credit for the exhibition for himself “ horiki, in declaring his support of the exhibit, managed to convey the information to several

California papers that he was responsible for the whole thing. Source stated that Shoriki is very high-handed in his methods and source is convinced that he has political aspirations.” The tension extended throughout the organization of the exhibition, notably when Shoriki decided he wanted to buy a nuclear reactor. The same CIA source reported,

“ horiki wanted to buy a 'swimming pool reactor' from the exhibition to set up on his own property. He was told that this would be of no use as a demonstrable source of electric power without the necessary uranium, which of course is not available to anyone in Japan and will not be until international agreements on the polling of fissionable materials have been consummated. Shoriki insisted that he wanted to buy the reactor anyway and was much annoyed when he was refused.”425

For his part, Shoriki made the most of his sponsorship of the Tokyo Atoms for

Peace exhibition. In his letter to John Jay Hopkins following his visit to Japan in 1955,

horiki observed that “a week after your arrival the sudden surge of ardor on the part of our leaders and of the public made it possible for the Hatoyama cabinet formally to accept enriched uranium--previously considered a most difficult decision--and to initiate

425 “Information Report Oct. 1955,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 230 the moves lending to the signing of an agreement with your country.”426 Perhaps building on the precedent, the Hatoyama government moved forward with legislation that would make it possible to develop nuclear power in Japan. On October 1st, the Joint Diet Atomic

Energy Committee was established, with Nakasone Yasuhiro at its head; the committee consisted of three members each of the Liberal, Democratic, Left Socialist, and Right

Socialist parties.

Debate on the Atomic Basic Law, the Establishment of the Atomic Energy

Commission Law, and an amendment that allowed the prime minister to form the Atomic

Energy Bureau started on November 5, during the opening week of the Atoms for Peace exhibitions.427 The vote on the Atomic Basic Law was scheduled for December 13, the day the Atoms for Peace exhibition closed, certainly no coincidence. An accomplished showman like Shoriki would not waste the momentum from the exhibition when it could be combined into a new news cycle about the passage of laws that formed the cornerstone of the Japanese nuclear development, his crowning achievement.

During consideration of this set of laws, the Democratic and Liberal parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party, resulting in a cabinet reshuffle. Shoriki was offered the position of defense minister, but turned it down. According to the CIA,

“he desired ministerial position involving little work or prominence until he can arrange

426 horiki Matsutar to John Jay Hopkins, May 6, 1955, NACP, RG 63, Box 119, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File Part 1, 1. 427 For a more complete discussion of these laws and the organizations that they founded, see Yoshioka, Hitoshi, “Forming a Nuclear Regime and Introducing Commercial Reactors,” in Shigeru Nakayama, Kunio Got , and Hitoshi Yoshioka, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Road to Self-reliance, 1952-1959 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2005), 80-95. 231 for bill assigning control of atomic matters.”428 In all likelihood, Shoriki was already angling to become the first chairman of that Atomic Energy Commission, a goal he would accomplish once the Atomic Energy Commission was established. At the same time, Shoriki was focused on promoting himself to the Americans in advance of an effort to position himself to become Prime Minister with the help of Oasa Tadao,429 a prospect he seemed to believe that his role in atomic affairs would help him achieve.

While the boss was busy with his new day job, the staff of the Yomiuri continued the coverage of the Atoms for Peace exhibition in horiki’s grand tradition of over the top stories. Perhaps the most noteworthy was a piece that ran on December 12th, at the end of the exhibition. That morning’s edition was dominated by atomic news, including coverage of the upcoming vote on the Atomic Energy Basic Law,430 an assessment of the growing need for nuclear power,431 an assurance of the independence of university research,432 and an overview of the 42 day run of the Atoms for Peace exhibition.433

Amid this talk of the closing of “the event of the season” and legislation that would shape the future of Japanese technology, the Yomiuri ran a small story that announced that a

Tokyo couple named their child Nuclear Power. The name itself used the same characters as the Japanese word for nuclear power, genshiryoku, but since Japanese characters have

428 “Classified Message to Director,” Nov. 9, 1955, NACP, RG 63, Box 119, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, horiki Matsutar Name File Part 1, 1. 429 Ibid., 1. His efforts to promote himself to America included a thank you letter for the Atoms for Peace exhibition, working on the establishment of the Asian Atomic Energy Center, and publishing a biography in English. 430 “Genshiryoku kihonh an naru: Asachū ni syūin tsūka e ch d ha de giinripp ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec. 13, 1955, 1. 431 “Genshiryoku hatsuden: Jyūnen inai ni hitsuy ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec. 13, 1955, 7. 432 “Daigaku no jisyusei mitomeru: Genshiryoku kenkyū Shoriki kokumu kotae,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec.13, 1955, 1. 433 “Ohanky o yonda genshiryoku heiwa riy haku: Kaiki 42 hikan o hurikaete,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec.13, 1955, 8. 232 multiple readings, the name itself was read Harakochikara. The child’s parents offered that nuclear power was both powerful and would be of great use to the world.434

Although little is known about this child or why they named their son after a technology, it is perhaps one of the clearest possible signs that the pro-atomic messaging had deeply affected a portion of the Japanese population. These parents saw nuclear power not as something to be feared or connected with the radiation that had made many of their fellow countrymen so sick following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the

Bikini Incident. They did not name this child after nuclear power for financial reason, assuming that proponents of nuclear power did not line their pockets. Rather, nuclear power had become a symbol of the qualities their son should aspire to live up to during his life. It was a symbol of a better future, possibly as something that could even save the world.

Conclusion

The Tokyo Atoms for Peace exhibition were a huge success, drawing over

350,000 people and an estimated 20,000 column inches of newspaper coverage.435 The exhibition, and the coverage that surrounded it, showed that “the peaceful uses of nuclear power” offered benefits that were too great to ignore. These positive benefits offered a sharp division between the destructive power of atomic weapons and the constructive uses on offer at the exhibitions. This division was not lost upon those who attended or

434 “B ya no mei wa Harakochikara: Takumashikusei no yakuni tate to,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Dec.13, 1955, 7. 435 Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit, 1 233 read about the exposition. Regarding the exhibition at Fukuoka, Governor akurai abur of Kumamoto Prefecture stated:

Atomic energy has two sides, good and evil Japanese have experience its evil side in the form of atomic bombs. I don't blame Japanese people in opposing atomic bomb tests. But now it is the time for us to go a step further and try to contribute to the promotion of the welfare of mankind by taking advantage of atomic energy. It is no exaggeration to say that it is the scientific and moral mission imposed upon mankind to turn atomic energy to peaceful use. From this viewpoint, the exhibit will provide an excellent opportunity for us to enlighten ourselves on atomic energy.436

The media, scientific, industrial, and agricultural uses on display at the exhibitions were so great that Sakurai thought that their development was a moral imperative. Examples of positive, even messianic, depictions of nuclear power had floated around for a decade before the Atoms for Peace. The Atoms for Peace exhibitions created a unique opportunity for these representations to become front page news for months at a time.

horiki’s decades of experience with high-profile publicity campaigns made him perfectly suited to champion nuclear power in Japan, which he turned into a source of political power. By inviting the Hopkins Mission and cosponsoring the Tokyo Atoms for

Peace exhibition, Shoriki created a dramatic opportunity to sell the nuclear vision, as well as establish himself as an authority on the technology of the future. Using the rhetoric pioneered in the West and championed by President Eisenhower, Shoriki and other nuclear proponents throughout the media embraced the peaceful uses of nuclear power as a way of overcoming the danger of nuclear weapons and building a technologically

436 “IC Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report, Feb. 25, 1957,” NACP, RG 59, Box 1 , Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits - General July-December 1957 Part 1 of 2, 5. 234 sophisticated Japan that would reemerge as a world power. This media promotions created a wall of endorsements for nuclear power, with few dissenting voices.

Shoriki was so successful in his promotion of nuclear power that he managed to position himself as the first chairman of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission, with his tenure beginning just as the exhibition opened the second leg of its tour. As the

Hatoyama Ichir reformed his government following the formation of the Liberal

Democratic Party in November 1955, he approached Shoriki to become Minister of

Defense. Shoriki turned down this position down to focus on shepherding nuclear legislation through the Diet.437 Shortly thereafter, he was named the first chairman of

Japanese Atomic Commission. Given his high profile support of nuclear power, who better? Shoriki would go on to shape nuclear policy while the source of his rise to power continued to tour the nation.

437 “Classified Message To Director,” Nov. , 1955, NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 1, Box 119. 235

Chapter 4: The Year of Nuclear Power

Following the successful completion of the main Atoms for Peace exhibition’s time in Tokyo, the USIS sent it on a tour of seven major cities throughout Japan. The

Tokyo exhibition, with its political implications and the way it set the stage for future exhibitions, was the most important stop in the tour. The subsequent stops, however, brought the peaceful atom to potentially hostile locations, including the Kansai region, which leaned more to the left than the capital, and Hiroshima, with its past and living connections to nuclear weapons. Despite these potentially hostile crowds, the Atoms for

Peace exhibitions were welcomed by local politicians and prefectural governors, academics, business leaders, artists, other local notables, and, perhaps surprisingly, some anti-nuclear weapons activists and atomic bomb survivors. As the exposition travelled around the country, the peaceful uses of nuclear power were embraced by an ever growing segment of the Japanese population, creating the basis for popular support of the development of nuclear power.

This chapter will explore Atoms for Peace activities outside of Tokyo and efforts to construct a national consensus regarding the need to develop the “peaceful uses of nuclear power.” It will focus on the relationship between the USIS and its media cosponsors, looking at how each promoted the peaceful atom and the challenges they faced. The USIS left most of the media strategy to its cosponsors, which always included a well-placed, well-financed newspaper that could use its medium to spread the word 236 about the exhibition. Meanwhile, the USIS focused on reaching out to politicians, social groups, businessmen, and schools and encouraging them to use their existing social networks to promote the exhibitions. These promotions often included direct appeals to community leaders, but were often connected with the showing of Atoms for Peace films translated for the Japanese public. This strategy not only offered a sneak-peak into the exhibitions, preparing potential visitors for what they would see, but also disseminated information about the benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom to as many people as possible relying on trusted local contacts.

The role of cosponsors went well beyond cost sharing and orchestrating a promotional campaign in the media. These local media promotions were essential because they created a layer between the public and the USIS, so that most of the

Japanese public learned about nuclear power from trusted local media rather than having it imposed on them by the United States. Since multiple newspapers often competed for the role of cosponsor, the USIS was able to choose a newspaper that not only had a large circulation and ready cash, but also one that was able to deflect political criticism, for example choosing the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun to cosponsor in Kyoto and Osaka, which had a significant socialist population that might have been loath to criticize their favorite paper. When appropriate, the USIS might add a local university to the list of cosponsors, and newspapers would often chose to invite local academics to write articles explaining nuclear physics, research, and potential applications.

By involving as much of the community as possible—finding local cosponsors, using local academics to promote the exhibits, and utilizing local leaders’ networks—the

237

USIS avoided the appearance of imposing nuclear power on the public, which, in general, seems to have embraced the technology whole-heartedly, though some groups offered limited objections. Together with its local cosponsors and connections, the USIS sought to tie a major, world-shaping technology to each of the cities and towns it visited. They depicted it as something concrete that could improve everyday life, not just in major cities but throughout the country, making it something accessible and applicable to everyone. While the Tokyo exhibition did the most to move Japanese policy towards the development of nuclear power, having the exhibition tour major cities helped made it a national project, all while improving the United tates’ image throughout Japan. The

USIS went beyond the eight city tour by developing smaller Atoms for Peace exhibits that travelled to smaller cities as well as towns and villages far from any of the main exhibitions. It also held film showings throughout the country, both in areas close to the exhibitions in areas that did not receive a visit from the peaceful atom. This practice brought the lesson even closer to home: this technology was not something for people far away in major cities, but something that would improve everyone’s lives and the United

States would bring it to you. The USIS and its co-sponsors took a global phenomenon and made it local; they took the abstract and made it steel and concrete that came to your city.

238

Dates Attendance Co-sponsors 438 Tokyo Nov. 1 - Dec 12, 1955 350,000 Yomiuri Shimbun Nagoya Jan. 1 - Jan. 23, 1956 Chubu Nippon Shimbun Kyoto Feb 12 – Mar. 4, 1956 155,000 Asahi Shimbun Osaka Mar. 25 - May 6, 1956 180,000 Asahi Shimbun Hiroshima May 27 – Jun. 17, 1956 120,370 Chūgoku Shimbun, University of Hiroshima, Hiroshima prefecture and city Fukuoka Jul. 8 – Jul. 29, 1956 167,000 Nishi Nippon Shimbun, Fukuoka city and prefecture Sapporo Aug.28 – Sep. 17, 1956 Hokkaido Shimbun Sendai Oct. 14 - Nov. 3, 1956 Kahoku Shimp Table 1. Atoms for Peace exhibition dates, attendance, and sponsors

Exhibition Promotion – Kyoto as a representative case

Although each USIS field office ran independently, based on the judgment of the officers running each exhibition in conjunction with the input of their cosponsors, public relations and promotion of the Atoms for Peace exhibitions in each city followed the same general patterns. These publicity campaigns included showing films related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, approaching businesses and schools in order to encourage attendance, sponsoring lectures and atomic power displays throughout the city, finding a newspaper to cosponsor the event, and inviting leaders in the community to get

438 Attendance figures cited here are from the USIS. Estimates from the cosponsors tended to vary somewhat from the USIS figures. The Yomiuri Shimbun, for example, insisted that the attendance figure for Tokyo was 370,000, which the USIS suggested was likely wishful thinking. Official figures for Nagoya, Sapporo, and Sendai are unavailable. See “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 1; “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” cover page; “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Osaka,” 1; “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 1; and “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” cover page. 239 them to promote the exhibit. ince the U I Kyoto field office’s reports focused on more on its promotional efforts and their efforts were fairly typical, the Kyoto exhibition will serve here as a representative case.

One of the most important elements of Atoms for Peace promotion began before the exhibitions ever arrived in Kyoto: the numerous film screenings that the USIS ran in advance of and during the exhibitions. Throughout the 1950s, the USIS would release over 50 pro-nuclear films, which varied widely in content, with some describing basic atomic physics, while others explained how radioisotopes could be used in treating cancer, improving irrigation techniques, or preserving food. Tsuchiya Yuka reports that these films were seen by 4 million Japanese in theaters, with an additional 3 million viewing on television. Tsuchiya argues that they were an essential part of Japan’s embrace of the peaceful uses of nuclear power.439 Showing these films before the exhibition served as a both method of advertising for the exhibition, but also as a way of intellectually softening the ground to make audiences more receptive to the pro-atom message by giving them a preview of what to expect.

In Kyoto, the USIS presented a number of films, the most prominent of which were Atomic Power for Peace, A is for Atoms, and The Yukawa Story. The first two films provided basic information about atomic science and showing the useful advances that had resulted from its study. These showings promoting the exhibition itself by piquing the audience’s interest and whetting its appetite for more, but they also disseminated the

439 Tsuchiya Yuka, “Genshiryoku heiwa riy US S eiga: Kaku aru sekai e no konsensasukeisai,” in Occupying Eyes, Occupying Voices: CIE/USIS Films and VOA Radio in Asia during the Cold War. Tuschiya Yuka and Yoshimi Shunya, eds. (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2012), 47-48. 240 core messages of Atoms for Peace to those that might not attend the exhibition, thus expanding outreach substantially.

The Yukawa Story, despite being shown as part of the Atoms for Peace campaign, has virtually nothing to do with the peaceful uses of nuclear power. It is ostensibly about

Yukawa Hideki’s life and work, but since Yukawa was a theoretical particle physicist, his work was only obliquely connected to nuclear power. Rather than attempt to make any such connection, the film focused on his son, Takaaki, as he was about to graduate from high school in New York, where his father was a professor at Columbia University. The film does not have a traditional narrative structure. Although it has a story, there is almost no dialogue between characters, even when they interact with one another; any scenes where dialogue might occur received a voiceover that left mouths moving silently.

Almost all of the narration is done by Takaaki, with a couple of voice overs by Dr.

Yukawa himself, though in the English version Dr. Yukawa’s voice sounds suspiciously

American, especially when compared to his teenage son.

At the beginning of the film Yukawa Takaaki stands on a bridge in New York and lays out the central conflict addressed in the film. His voice over explains that he has reached a point where he feels like he must make a choice between two ways of life: one exemplified by his mother and the other by his father. His mother’s way of life is that of traditional Japanese culture, which he defines as “Not to think, but to be. Not, it seems to me, to ask questions, but to learn the answers that have long been provided. This is the

241 way of my mother.”440 He argues that this backward looking way of life is comforting and has elements of great beauty, though it is ultimately limiting. His father’s way of life, on the other hand, is that of the West, of science and progress. Takaaki believes that this lifestyle offers a great deal of freedom, but contained an element of inherent loneliness as one searched for answers to questions that might lead to unknown and unknowable places. Ultimately, through observing his parents, Takaaki concludes that they, individually and together, overcome this divide and bridge the gap between tradition and progress. His father, the scientist, for example, composes traditional poetry, while his mother, who lives her life steeped in traditional culture, does not hesitate to embrace the latest modern devices. Takaaki’s conclusions are backed up by a quote from his father, who extends Takaaki’s personal crisis to an issue that the nation of Japan must come to grips with, “We need the freedom of the west to progress and expand. We need the oriental acceptance of tradition to know the responsibility we all share as human beings.

If out of these two civilization a new synthesis can be achieved, there is a chance for growth. If not…”441 This identity crisis was by no means new to Japanese culture, though it perhaps should not be surprising that each generation might rediscover it anew. It dates back at least to akuma houzan’s coining of the phrase t y d toku seiy gakugei

(Eastern ethics, Western science) in the late Edo period. Using this phrase, people like

Sakuma suggested that Japan could retain the core of its identity and tradition while also embracing science and technology from the West.

440 The Yukawa Story, produced by Joseph Krumgold, Washington: United States Information Service, 1954. 441 Ibid. 242

The fact that the USIS decided to show this film as part of its Atoms for Peace campaign is interesting, since it is only tangentially related. A number of journalists, however, seemed to believe that there should be a connection between Yukawa and nuclear power, since he was a particle physicist. In 1952, one interviewer asked Dr.

Yukawa about nuclear power, he replied that he was the wrong type of physicist and that if the interviewer read some books on the subject, he would know as much as him.442 It is likely that the USIS was not just showing the film based on that loose connection alone.

More likely the USIS was interested in playing up the fact that Kyoto was Yukawa’s home town, where he was educated and where he was working as the director of his own lab at the time.

More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the film showed Yukawa, a Japanese scientist, as a highly respected and sought after commodity. The film briefly describes

Yukawa’s life in Kyoto and the world-changing importance of his work that drew him away from Japan, but most of the focus is on Yukawa abroad. To demonstrate how important Yukawa was, the film shows us a group of men at Princeton University, one of whom explains Yukawa’s Nobel Prize winning work on the theory of the meson by drawing diagrams in chalk on the sidewalk. In some of the only lines spoken between actors in the entire movie, the man praises Yukawa highly, calling him “very smart” and

“clever.” The implication is that Yukawa is so important that intellectuals at top universities throughout the world were excitingly discussing his theories, an exciting prospect for a country that had worked for generations to raise the profile of their

442 “Yukawa Hideki hakushi o kakomi genshiryoku no k gy teki riy ,” T y keizai shinh , Oct 18, 1952. 243 scientific capacity. Once Yukawa moves to Princeton to join the Institute for Advanced

Study, the film shows video of Yukawa walking in the woods with Albert Einstein, John

Wheeler, and Homi Bhabha. The voice over explains that physicists at this level have such a specialized language of mathematics that none outside of their circle can truly understand them. This scene depicts Yukawa as a complete equal and presumably a friend of Albert Einstein, the most well-known and respected physicist in the world. The audience, then, can take pride that not only is one of their countrymen so well-respected that he was recruited to work at Princeton and then Columbia University, but he is the equal of one of the most important and influential men of the 20th century.

These images, and others like them, fulfilled one of the Japanese goals of developing science: to emerge as a respected, leading figure in the world. By seeing

Yukawa in a position of authority over a team running the cosmotron in the Brookhaven

National Laboratory, one could feel a sense of pride that seemed impossible a decade earlier with Japan’s defeat in World War II. Developing nuclear power was one way to further this goal. Meanwhile, reinforcing the message that it was possible to develop science and retain the core of Japanese culture provided a sense of reassurance as Japan sought to reenter the world.

The USIS showed The Yukawa Story, along with A is for Atom and Atomic Power for Peace 592 times to an audience of 180,000 in the greater Kyoto region during the six weeks prior to the opening of the exhibit, and displayed them an additional 1,870 times at

244 the exhibition itself.443 Special showings were held for different types of groups with potential interest in nuclear power, including business, educational, and cultural groups.

The USIS, capitalizing on keen interest in the business community, displayed its films for various business groups, such as the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce, the Nara Chamber of

Commerce, a meeting of the directors and officers of chambers of commerce throughout the Kansai region, the Kyoto Center’s regular businessmen’s lunch film series, the

Maizuru Chemical Industrial Research Club, meetings of the Densan and Zentei Unions, and the Kyoto Industrial Guidance Institute. There were also screenings for employees of local businesses, including Toyo Rayon Company and Takashimaya Department Store employees.444

Business leaders had been a consistent promoter of the peaceful uses of atomic power primarily because of the perceived need for a new source of power to keep up with the projected growth of electricity consumption over the coming decades and because many believed that atomic technology would be the basis of a new industrial revolution.

Takeo at , manager of the Kyoto branch of umitomo Bank, visited the American

Cultural Center and told the director that “many of his clients, businessmen in the community, expressed great interest in the Exhibit and mentioned to him that they were anxious to begin a program of education in peaceful uses of atomic energy in their factories.”445 These businessmen thought that atomic energy was central to the future and wanted their employees to learn about it as soon as possible. Interest in the business

443 “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Apr. 27, 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, Atomic Energy Matters, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956 Part 1 of 2, 7. The latter total is largely the result of showing A is for Atom in a loop at the entrance to the exhibition. 444 Ibid., 7-10. 445 Ibid., 4. 245 community went well beyond factory owners looking to secure profits. Upon visiting the exhibition, Eijiro Miyata, who served as the secretary of the Zensen Union, stated, “I estimate the Exhibit very highly and I wish all my union members would take the time to see it. Among leftist inclined, anti-American groups, the impact of the Exhibit is terrific and they cannot deny the importance of the Atoms for Peace program.”446 If even the left- leaning union members embraced the prospects of the peaceful uses of atomic power, it is hard to see where organized resistance might have developed.

The USIS also showed the films widely outside of the business community. The educational nature of Atoms for Peace and the USIS films used to promote it made schools a natural target. The USIS was keenly aware of the importance of the schools, which could bring in large numbers of students to visit the exhibition, and made special effort to invite science teachers from throughout the region to visit on opening day. It placed special emphasis on promoting the films among educational groups, with showings to a meeting of Kyoto high school and middle school principals, the Kyoto

University science department, Kyoto Prefectural Medical College, and the Kyoto

Center. The United Nations Club at Kyoto University took up the task of showing these atomic films to colleges and high schools throughout Kyoto, expanding the U I ’s reach.447 Further showings were presented at symposiums for women held at the Kyoto

Center, the Otsu Cultural Association, the Kyoto United Nations chapter, and the Baku

Society, a cultural and artistic group.448

446 Ibid., 2. 447 Ibid., 7. 448 Ibid. 246

These films were often accompanied by lectures by technical experts. Drs. Kiichi

Kimura and Tsunahiko Shidei, both members of the physics department of Kyoto

University, lectured throughout Kyoto and Shiga Prefectures, often showing atomic power films before their lectures. Dr. Shidei, for example, lectured to seventy members of the Kyoto United Nations Chapter, after which they attended the exhibition, and then had a discussion section led by Dr. Shidei. This session included the directors of

Sokokuji, Kiyomizudera, Tofukuji, and Kenninji temples. Following this meeting, the heads of these temples are reported to have said, "We are living in an atomic age and there is no reason why we Buddhist priests should live apart from it"449 and promised they would encourage their followers to attend the exhibit. The inclusion of Buddhist priests in the promotion of the exposition provided another avenue to penetrate Japanese society. Rather than focus simply on students and businessmen, the two most obvious audiences, the USIS potentially gained an entry to a segment of the population that it otherwise might not have captured. Approaching Buddhist priests was a particularly interesting strategy because some of them clearly saw links between the principles of nuclear power and their own faith. Mumon Yamada, chief priest of Zen sect, and president of Hanazono College, for example, stated “I am surprised to find so much similarity between religious principles and nuclear energy,”450 though unfortunately he did not offer an explanation of such a connection.

Promotions went beyond films and lectures. The director of the American

Cultural Center also reached out to the prefectural and city school superintendents of

449 Ibid., 7. 450 Ibid., 5. 247

Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, and sent letters to the principals of all the schools in those prefectures inviting them to bring their students to the exhibition.451 The Asahi Shimbun also took part in the school outreach program. The paper set up a system of agents to go around to the schools and sign up groups to take tours of the exhibit; the agents were paid

¥300 a day plus a commission of ¥1 per person signed up. Asahi thought these agents were necessary because the exhibition occurred during final exams and preparations for graduation, pushing down attendance figures; these agents ultimately brought in 10,000 students.452 In a curious move, Asahi even distributed swag to science teachers, principals, school superintendents, included 2,000 turkish bath towels, to encourage them to bring their students to the exhibition.453 Between the film showings and direct appeals to the faculty, the school systems were well covered. The connection between the Atoms for Peace exhibition and students was quite natural given the educational nature of the exhibition; after all, the designers of the exhibit went to lengths to make nuclear physics understandable to laymen. Encouraging educators to bring their students to the exposition not only increased attendance, but also had the added benefit, from the U I ’s perspective, of convincing young people that nuclear power was the future. Fostering support among students offered the opportunity to foster lifelong support for nuclear power, a tactic that would continue for decades in the form of a pro-nuclear science curriculum in Japanese schools.

451 Ibid., 9-10. 452 Ibid., 13. 453 Ibid., 13. Unfortunately it is not recorded why the Asahi thought this was a good idea or what the reaction of recipients might have been. 248

The USIS had groups to the exhibition for special tours, both to encourage attendees to spread the word about the exposition to their social networks, but also as a matter of public relations. For example, the USIS sponsored a round-table discussion on connections between atomic science and the arts, which drew twenty-two artists, painters, potters, and screen actors.454 The USIS invited various types of artists to the exhibition, to expand promotion beyond groups that one might expect to attend a science and technology event. These artists, much like the priest cited above, found connections between their disciplines and atomic science, providing another hook to draw in an audience that might otherwise not be inclined to attend. For example, nationally known ceramicist Sanjo Uno gave the Kyoto exhibition a somewhat unusual endorsement when he claimed, “As an artist, a new art arose from the nuclear power field. Although I do not understand the theory of the atom… the artistic aspects of the Exhibit are impressive and inspiring,”455 apparently referring to the industrial design of the reactors and equipment.

Women, who often saw themselves as unlikely to benefit from the exhibition, were another target. With USIS urging, Mikiko Kanzaki, president of the Kyoto Women’s

Association, agreed to schedule a meeting of the female community leaders at the exhibition site. They toured the exhibit and agreed to encourage housewives from their districts to visit the show.456 This type of publicity was particularly useful because it produced peer to peer promotion that targeted an audience that was prone to believe the exhibition would have little to offer them.

454 Ibid., 7. 455 Ibid., 5. 456 Ibid., 7. 249

The director of the Kyoto Center reached out to communities throughout the greater Kyoto area to encourage attendance and pass out promotional materials. He approached the Governors of Kyoto and Nara as well as the mayors to secure cooperation. He also personally went to the Rotary Club, Lions' Club, United Nations

Association, Kyoto Commerce and Industry Club, Chamber of Commerce, Junior

Chamber of Commerce, two different factories of the Toyo Rayon Company, Shimazu

Manufacturing Company, Iino Shipbuilding Company, Kanebo Textile Company,

Marubutsu Department Store, Daimaru Department Store, Nippon Lace Company, Osaka

Gas Company Cooking School, Nippon Electric Company, and Daiichi Kogyo

Company.457 The goal was for each of these organizations to encourage its membership to attend, but also to use their networks in the community to promote the exhibit as well.

Reaching out to existing social networks to promote interest in the exhibition was a remarkably successful strategy and the exhibition received free promotion from a number of businesses and governmental agencies. The Kyoto Banker's Association distributed posters and pamphlets promoting the exhibit, while the Kyoto City

Information Section promoted the exhibit on its weekly public service announcements on

Kyoto Radio and included an article in its bulletin. The city of Kyoto went so far as to run free advertisements on busses and trolleys and announced to passengers when they were approaching stops near the exhibition.458

In addition to advertisements and word of mouth appeals, the Kyoto Center prepared Atoms for Peace displays, which previewed the exhibition by offering

457 Ibid., 9. 458 Ibid., 14. 250 information about atomic energy and its uses in society. Permanent displays were placed in display cases both inside and outside the Kyoto Center and another one at the Kyoto

Prefectural Library. Mobile displays along with atomic energy films were dispatched to the Nara City Social Education Section, Maizuru Cultural Association, and Ayabe Public

Library. These displays, along with the film series, provided a way of simultaneously promoting the exhibition while providing valuable exposure to the ideas behind nuclear power. Whether the people who saw the films or displays attended the exhibition or not, they received some information about the science and its potential impact, thus expanding the effects of the exhibition in the Kyoto region beyond the 180,000 who actually attended the full exhibition.

When the Atoms for Peace exhibition came to town, it would have been virtually impossible to not know it was there. One could even imagine a man who, during the course of his daily life, might have been driven to distraction by Atoms for Peace publicity. If such a man read the Asahi Shimbun, he would have found his morning paper filled with regular, often daily, stories, which were following up on six weeks of coverage preceding the exhibition’s arrival, about the wonders awaiting him. If he chose to turn on a radio or television, he might have found similar stories and advertisements.

On his way to work, the city might have seemed blanketed with the 200,000 leaflets and posters the Asahi Shimbun printed, all of them eager to tell him why he should visit.459

On the street he might have also encountered one of the sound trucks the Asahi Shimbun

459 Ibid., 13. 251 paid to drive through the city and blare advertisements.460 The rest of his commute would not have been a haven from ads, since Asahi had promotional towers built at prominent intersections and placed banners across major thoroughfares.461 The streetcar or bus he took to work might have held an ad or two for the exhibit, and the bus driver or conductor would have alerted him when he approached the exit for the exhibition hall.462 Once he got to work, his employer might have had a surprise for him: a compulsory viewing of a film about Atoms for Peace, sponsored by the USIS, and he even have received the afternoon off—with pay—to go see it for himself. After a long day at work, even leisure might have exposed him to more Atoms for Peace promotion. The regular meeting of his social club could have invited a guest to lecture on the benefits of atomic power. If he had chosen to go to the cinema, a newsreel showing images of the monumental event, an assortment of models, displays, and equipment all waiting to offer an education in the technology of the future would precede his film. Even a trip to a quiet bar or a restaurant might not have spared him because even there he might have found a hostess talking about the Atoms for Peace exhibition.463 When he got home from his long day, the evening paper would have been waiting for him, full of news from the exhibition, along with editorials and opinion pieces from politicians, professors, officials, businessmen, movie directors, cartoonists, or comedians, all in support of the exhibit.

460 Ibid., 13. 461 Ibid., 13. 462 Ibid., 1. 463 Apparently the exhibition was so much the talk of the town in Osaka, the U I report notes “One of the lighter commentaries on the Exhibit was passed on to the RPAO by Asahi Press. According to this story, four mama-sans from first class restaurants in Osaka came to the exhibit, because so many of their businessmen customers talked about it that the mama-sans felt they should be conversant on the topic.” It is not that much of a stretch to imagine something similar happening in Kyoto. “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Osaka,” July 20, 1956, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, 8c Exhibits – General January-June 1956 Part 1, 5. 252

Media Promotion

Since the Atoms for Peace promotion was turning into the event of the decade, naturally the exhibits received extensive promotion in the media, particularly by the various exposition cosponsors. The Kyoto branch of the USIS estimated that the Kyoto exhibition received over 1,300 column inches of newspaper coverage, 800 of which came from the Asahi Shimbun. Although this was a far cry from the estimated 20,000 column inches in Tokyo, Kyoto was a far smaller market, with fewer competing newspapers. The

Kyoto exhibition was also much shorter than the one in Tokyo, running for only three weeks compared to Tokyo’s six.

The Kyoto coverage, just like that in Tokyo, was not simply a matter of translating USIA materials into Japanese; it was crafted by Japanese media professionals who sought to cater to their customers interests, not just to reach the largest audience possible, but also to educate the public in a relatable way. The Asahi, like other Japanese newspapers, responded creatively to the challenge of informing the public about an important technology that most found difficult to understand. It is important to remember that the Atoms for Peace program was an American initiative and the exhibitions were generated and overseen by the USIA and USIS, the vast majority of its promotion was done directly or indirectly by Japanese companies or citizens, and the majority exhibition operations was done by a Japanese staff interacting with a Japanese public.

Although each paper developed its own mix of coverage, balancing serious and more frivolous content to suit its readers’ interest, there were some common elements.

Throughout Japan, papers tended to run multi-part series, often an article a day for up to

253 two weeks. These multi-part features would focus on a specific aspect of nuclear power; examples include coverage of the vocabulary of nuclear power, general concepts of nuclear physics, the history of nuclear science and technology, current and ongoing development of nuclear technology, prominent figures’ reflections on nuclear power, and future possibilities for the peaceful uses of the atom. The articles often were accompanied by pictures or comics that illustrated scientific principles, the uses of the peaceful atom, or sections of the exhibitions themselves.

The Kansai region, which includes the cities of Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe as well as the surrounding areas, experienced a double dose of Atoms for Peace. The Kyoto exhibition ran from February 12 to March 4, 1956, and was followed shortly thereafter by the Osaka exhibition, March 25 to May 6. The Osaka edition of the Asahi Shimbun, which was circulated throughout the Kansai region, ran coverage of Atoms for Peace throughout nearly this entire period. Since the Asahi Shimbun cosponsored both exhibitions, its coverage of the Kyoto and Osaka shows can be considered as a single, long promotion. Like the Yomiuri Shimbun before it, the Asahi Shimbun offered a variety of approaches to the coverage of Atoms for Peace, which was sure to provide something for every type of reader. The Asahi ran a number of serious policy analysis articles, which delved into the not just the state of the art research going on in laboratories, but also the policy choices that were being made abroad. For example, in its Tokyo edition the Asahi Shimbun ran a two-article series on the economics of nuclear power, which explored the economics of nuclear power, including a cost comparison with alternatives, private enterprise’s new interest in developing the technology, and possible effects of

254 shifting away from dependence on coal.464 In a separate five article series, political editor

Tanaka Shinjirou, discussed the development of the atomic energy industry in the United

States and prospects for importing the technology. These articles assess the previous ten years of development nuclear development,465 discuss of the United States’ dedication to developing nuclear power for export,466 and offer an examination of the factors essential to the determining which type of technology to import.467 Although Tanaka’s articles were broadly supportive of the development of nuclear power, they were not entirely complimentary to the United States or its nuclear policy. Tanaka clearly criticizes

American nuclear policy, which he argued was disorderly and contained a number of contradictions,468 and encouraged the Japanese to avoid becoming enmeshed with

American nuclear secrecy.469 Both of these series of article examined the role of nuclear power with a critical eye. Although they were generally positive and supportive, they offered substantial criticism of potential drawbacks of nuclear power. These criticisms

464 “‘Genshiryoku jidai’ no sekai keizai: Mada takai hatsuden genka: Minkan mo y kaku hongoshi,” The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 1, 1956, 6; and “‘Genshiryoku jidai’ no sekai keizai: Sekitan ison kara dakkyaku: Atarashii yunyū sangy t jy ” The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 2, 1956, 4. 465 Tanaka hinjir , “Beikoku no genshi nenry : H syutsu seisaku to sono haikei 2: Sangy y , hayamete zyūnen ato: Hatsuden mejirushi, yon-go hyakuman kirowatto,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, March, 13, 1956, 1. 466 Tanaka hinjir , “Beikoku no genshi nenry : H syutsu seisaku to sono haikei 3: Hatsuden ha "heik keikaku" de: Kaigaishizy o yūsen kakuho,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, March 14, 1956, 1. The American policy of focusing on exporting nuclear power abroad in the 1950s rather than focusing on developing it domestically was based on the relatively low cost of electricity in the United States. The cost of nuclear power per kilowatt was much more competitive with coal or hydroelectric prices in places like Europe and Japan where thermal and hydroelectric power were much more expensive. 467 Tanaka hinjir , “Beikoku no genshi nenry : H syutsu seisaku to sono haikei 4: Hatsudenro syunyū ha shich ni: Gijyutsu dankai mikiwame ga kanjin,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 15, 1956, 1. 468 Tanaka hinjir , “Beikoku no genshi nenry : H syutsu seisaku to sono haikei 1: Ike no naka e nageta "ishi"; Mujyun konran no syori ga mondai,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 12, 1956, 1. 469 Tanaka hinjir , “Beikoku no genshi nenry : H syutsu seisaku to sono haikei 5: Uran wa seisankajy e: Kimitsu tsuki hatsudenro kotoware,” The Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, Mar. 16, 1956, 1. 255 suggest that even though the Asahi Shimbun broadly supported the development of nuclear power in Japan, it was not a lapdog for American interests.

The Asahi’s coverage of nuclear issues was not always quite so serious. From

April 10th to April 19th, the paper ran a series of nine articles that offered a look into the exhibition using comics. While a couple of these manga directly depict various exhibits from the show, more often the artist, Morimoto Masateru, sought to explain atomic physics through absurd metaphors that were illustrated in the comic and explained in the attached article. The second entry in the series, for example, demonstrates the process of splitting an atom by showing a truck striking a sumo dojo; the resulting impact splits the dojo in two, ejecting a sumo wrestler. The truck is labeled “neutron” while the dojo is a nucleus, which ejects energy in the form of the sumo wrestler who strikes a utility pole, thus transferring the energy of the collision into electricity.470 The metaphor strains credulity to the breaking point, and is hardly scientific, but attempts to take a microscopic process and make it understandable by turning it into a macro-level event. It might be hard for someone without a firm science background to understand the splitting of an atom and the energy that is releases, but people have enough real-life experience with the conservation of motion to relate to this example. Of course, the comic is misleading because the energy released from the splitting of a uranium nucleus is not kinetic, but scientific fidelity on this point is sacrificed to further understanding of the basic principle.

470 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 2: Kakubunretsu sy kakumi no syūten: Tobidasu enerugii ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 11, 1956, 3. 256

Figure 5. Comic depicting nuclear fission471

The third entry in this series offers a more workable metaphor as it attempts to explain a nuclear chain reaction. In the comic, an angry wife throws a pot at her husband, who ducks out of the way. The pot crashes through the roof of a dog house, where two dogs were presumably sleeping. One jumps into the air, while a second smashes into a chicken coup, disturbing two chickens. A chick flies harmlessly into the air, while the hen jumps up and strikes a bird’s nest, dislodging two more birds.472 This analogy works better than the last one because, after all, a chain reaction is not unique to atomic physics, and thus can be translated directly from the microscopic universe to the visible one.

471 Ibid. 472 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 3: Tobikau hi no tama: guddoman hakushi: Gojiman no mokeiita ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 12, 1956, 3. 257

Figure 6. Comic depicting a chain reaction473

One of the most strained metaphors, however, occurs when Moriyoshi attempts to compare the role of a moderator in a nuclear reactor to the effects of alcohol on a salary man. When uranium atoms are split, they release fast, high energy neutrons that have the potential to strike other uranium atoms, potentially causing them to split and thus creating a self-perpetuating chain reaction. Uranium atoms are much more likely to split if they are struck by slower, lower energy neutrons than those released by fission. To that end, nuclear reactors employ a moderator, which causes neutrons to slow down when they strike it, thus making fission more likely. In his comic, Moriyoshi depicts two salary men, one who is sober and walks straight down the street, not interacting with anything; the sober salary man, therefore, stands in for a fast neutron. At the same time, a drunk salary

473 Ibid. 258 man meanders down the street, bumping into people, trash cans, and utility poles.474 The drunk salary man, much like the slow neutron, is much more likely to interact with things in his immediate environment and thus provoke a reaction, hopefully one that was not explosive. Despite its outlandishness, this metaphor works surprisingly well to explain a rather complicated process. The function of a moderator is not one that lends itself easily to analogy, but this one works particularly well and fits in well with the Japanese cultural context. Given the extensive role that alcohol plays in Japanese society, particularly among salary men who frequently go out drinking as part of team building, the sight of a salary man stumbling home would have been familiar.

Figure 7. Comic explaining the function of a moderator in a nuclear reactor475

474 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 5: Chūseishi o meshitoru bisyu: 235jy to otanoshima ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 14, 1956, 3. 475 Ibid. 259

These examples show that even though nuclear power was a serious business, learning about it did not have to be. These metaphors were stretched, some to the breaking point if not beyond it, but their appeal allowed readers to relate complicated processes to everyday scales and events. The metaphors employed are by no means perfect and, in fact, require a fair bit of explanation, which is accomplished through the text of the accompanying articles, but ultimately they work. This mixture of humor and irreverence likely brought in readers who might not have attempted more serious attempts to explain nuclear power because they were too complicated. These manga repeat a common theme in the Yomiuri's coverage, which is perhaps best captured by one of its headlines “I could understand the power of the new era.”476 The exhibitions and the press surrounding them consistently stressed that understanding nuclear power did not require a background in science. These articles and exhibitions allowed the public to feel connected with a technology they were told was complicated but the wave of the future, which made them feel smart and a sense that they were actively engaging with the broader world and the future of humanity.

Other articles showed portions of the exhibition, marketing it more directly. A couple of them focus straightforwardly on the displays and experiences of the exhibition, while others have a more playful and interactive component. The first article in the

Moriyoshi series discussed the lobby and its hall of nuclear pioneers, as well as showing a man checking people with a Geiger counter as they entered the exhibit. The article discusses how radiation exists outside of nuclear bombs and reactors. While the article

476 “Rikai dekita seiki no enerugi: Genshiryoku heiwa riy hakurankai no shitami k hy ,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 29, 1955, 7. 260 discusses objects like wristwatches giving off radiation, the comic depicts the attendant checking a bald man’s head.477 The fourth article contains two manga, one of the graphite moderated reactor model and another of a crowd of onlookers. The associated article discusses the operation of the nuclear reactor and compares the uranium fuel to the process of burning firewood.478 These articles attempted to normalize nuclear power. The former did so by arguing that radiation was something that existed naturally and was unavoidable. In doing so, the article neatly avoids the issue of scale and the reasons that fallout from bombs and waste from reactors are dangerous, but, naturally, that was not the point. The latter focused on equating nuclear power to something familiar, the burning of firewood. Attempts to normalize nuclear power were important because the dangers were exotic and not well understood by the general populace, or by scientists for that matter. Normalizing the process made people less likely to fear the new, and largely untested, technology.

The final installment of Moriyoshi’s series offers a particularly interesting manga.

It depicts two electric eels. The larger one is wearing a dunce cap of foam that says

“coal” and represents coal-fired power plants, while the smaller one is labeled nuclear power. Both of the eels are emitting lines of electricity, but despite being smaller, the

477 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 1: Idai na n miso no dend : Kore ha bikkuri, udedokei kara mo h syan ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 10, 1956, 3. 478 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 4: Abaren b no chūseishi: Takigi ha uran no kinzokub ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 13, 1956, 3. Japanese publications throughout this period alternated in their approach to discussing nuclear power, sometimes trying to equate it to ordinary fuel sources, and sometimes trying to purposely make it exotic, such as referring to it as “the third fire.” The term the “third fire” is somewhat vague, but the “first fire” seems to be ordinary fire, such as a campfire, while the “second fire” is chemical explosives, like dynamite, leaving the “third fire” for atomic reactions. For references to nuclear power as “the third fire,” see, for example “‘Genshiryoku haku’ ky kara k kai: Heiwa to musubi ‘taisan no hi’: Santan no koe waku kaikaishiki ” The Chūnichi Shimbun Jan 1, 1956, 7; “Genshiryoku Oosakaten hanayaka ni kaikaishiki: Moeru daisan no hi: Asu kara ippan k kai”, The Asahi Shimbun, Osaka evening edition, Mar. 24, 1956, 3. 261 nuclear eel is giving off significantly more power than the larger coal eel. The nuclear eel is clearly mocking the coal eel, saying, “Coal, you’re already behind the times” by which the coal eel is clearly abashed.479 Mocking the most widely used power source as old- fashioned when its putative replacement was contributing barely any power to any consumer electrical grid was ridiculous on the face of it. The message, however, was clear: nuclear power was the future, while inefficient coal480 was a relic of the past. While coal was inefficient and cumbersome, nuclear power was better in every way. Nuclear power represented progress, with all the promise of the future.

Figure 8. Comic depicting two eels discussing electrical power policy481

479 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 9: Genshiryoku hatsuden: "Shi no hai" sae" shimatsu ga tsukeba ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 19, 1956, 3. 480 If one considers a coal-powered plant and a nuclear plant that produce a comparable number of kilowatt hours, the coal plant would require a significantly greater volume of fuel than the nuclear plant. Despite this inefficiency, however, the coal-powered plant would still produce the electricity more cheaply when plant construction, safety, and operational costs are considered. 481 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 9: Genshiryoku hatsuden: "Shi no hai" sae" shimatsu ga tsukeba ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 19, 1956, 3. 262

The Asahi Shimbun’s coverage was not unique in its mixing of serious and humorous coverage of the Atoms for Peace exhibitions, or its extensive use of manga and photographs. Each paper differed in how it balanced humor and seriousness and its use of images. The Yomiuri, for instance, drew on comics extensively for showing factual representation from the Tokyo exhibition, rather than using the medium’s ability to create fictional scenes as the Asahi Shimbun did. The Chūnichi Shimbun, meanwhile, used manga both to accurately show scenes from the exhibition and to humorous effect to appeal to children. On one occasion, the paper used comics to do both on the same page.

On January 5, 1956, just a few days after the opening of the Nagoya exhibition, the paper ran an entire page of the evening edition comprised of nothing but stories about the peaceful uses of nuclear power; the use of an entire page meant that Atoms for Peace accounted for almost a quarter of the news that evening. On the left side of the page was an article that described the exhibition as something like a carnival, offering up such marvels as bread and cheese that would not go bad for two years, boats with endless power, and an “amusing experiment” that shows how long it takes to make an egg.482

Attached to this article is a comic that depicts the “magic hands,” the graphite moderated reactor mock up, and the chain reaction model, all of which depict the equipment without any frivolous additions, unlike a comic from the Asahi Shimbun that showed the magic hands making sushi.483

482 The entire page contains nuclear related articles, all under the master headline of “Wakariyoi ‘Atomu no ky shitsu’: Heiwa riy haku de benky ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan 5, 1956, 3. 483 Moriyoshi Masateru, “Atom bikkuri gatten genshiryokuten manh 6: Majikku hando: Ninkisya ‘dorei no te’: Ayatsurareru h shan min: Kabe o hedatete jiyūjidai ” The Asahi Shimbun Osaka edition, Apr. 15, 1956, 3. 263

Figure 9. Comic showing displays from the Atoms for Peace exhibition484

Alongside these articles were two separate articles clearly intended for children, each explaining the wonders of nuclear power. One of them featured a man with an atom for a head and wearing a white lab coat, not unlike Dr. Atom from the film A is for Atom.

The figure introduces himself as “nuclear power” to a pair of children, a boy and a girl, who immediately imagine a large explosion and attempt to run away. The atom-headed man grabs them by their shirts and shows them the many uses of nuclear power, ranging

484 Ibid. 264 from powering every day appliances, medical treatments, agricultural research, and atomic powered trains, planes, and boats; it even depicts an atomic powered robot shoveling snow.485

Figure 10. Comic showing benefits of atomic research486

The same day the comic featuring the atomic robot ran, the Chūnichi Shimbun started a daily, fifteen part series called “Endless Energy from the Atoms for Peace exhibition.” Each article contained a large photo either depicting a portion of the exhibition itself or a photo intended to help explain something like the structure of an

485 “Genshiryoku no heiwa e no riy ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, page 3. 486 Ibid. 265

Figure 11. Comic showing more potential uses of atomic research487

atom. Some of these photos, when combined with an explanation, were quite engaging, such as the photograph of workers inserting control rods into the graphite moderated reactor mockup,488 but most of the pictures were quite dull, like a photo of the mannequins used in the display about removing of beauty marks or one of a pair of chickens.489 Most of the articles in the series examine a basic concept of nuclear power or types of technology found in the exhibition. For example, there are articles on the

487 Ibid. 488 “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 3: Rensa hann no nazo,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 7, 1956, 1. 489 Infused with radiation or not, these were, after all, just some mannequins and chickens with no distinguishing features visible in the photos. The mannequins can be seen in “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 11: Aisot pu no y ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 17, 1956, 1; the article with the chickens was “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 12: N gy e no riy ,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 18,1956, 1. 266 discovery of the neutron and its role in nuclear power, the principle of the chain reaction, research applications of radioisotopes, and the functioning of a cyclotron.490 Other sections of the series examined the development of the nuclear industry in Japan, with articles on attempts to develop a domestic experimental reactor, the establishment of the

Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, and the formation of the Japanese Atomic

Energy Commission.491

Although these examples are extraordinary for the richness of their imagery, they are fairly typical of the material put out by cosponsors of the Atoms for Peace exhibition.

The promotional coverage throughout Japan was replete with examples of outlandish rhetoric to appeal to readers. For example, the Kahoku Shimp , the Tohoku regional paper and sponsor of the endai exhibition, ran a six article series entitled “Isotopes

Magicians of Peace,” which focused on how radioisotopes could be used for treating cancer, understanding viruses, improving food through agricultural research and preservation, and regulating the thickness of materials for industrial uses.492 The title of

490 “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 2: Chūseishi no hakken,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 6, 1956, 1; “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 4: Chūseishi no sekisyo,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 1, 1956, 1; “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 3: Rensa hann no nazo,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 7. 1956, 1; “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 10: Rajio aisot pu,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 15, 1956, 1; and “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 14: Saikurotoron,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 20, 1956, 1. 491 “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 7: Waga kuni no genshiro,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 6, 1956, 1; “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 8: Genshiryotku kenkyūjyo no secchi ” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 6, 1956, 1; and “Mugen no enerugii: Genshiryoku heiwa riy haku kara 9: Genshiryoku gy sei,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Jan. 6, 1956, 1. 492 “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 1: Seikatsu k jy ni daikatsuyaku: Katte ha nihon de mo tsukuru,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 6, 1956, 7; “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 2: By kan pitari wakaru: biirusu mo karuku toriko ,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 7, 1956, 7; “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 3: Gan tiry ni hukuin: Akaaza mo kirei ni naoru ,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 8, 1956, 7; “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 4: Yūriy hinsyu o tukuru: Syokury no z san ni mottekoi,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 9, 1956, 7; “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 5: Huhai to osaraba: syokumotsu nan de mo hozon OK,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 10, 267 the Kahoku Shimp ’s series of articles was fairly typical as well, with the Chūnichi

Shimbun running a series called “The Charms of the Atom,”493 in addition to the “Infinite

Energy” series discussed above. The Yomiuri Shimbun offered “The Living un” series.494 While the Chūgoku Shimbun’s major nuclear series was fairly innocuously named “Looking forward to the Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” it offered such installments as “The opportunity provided by the ‘fire of happiness’ Hiroshima’s sacrifice was not in vain,”495 “The culture of the ‘second sun,’”496 and “Nurture the dream of the atomic age.”497 The use of such evocative headlines left little doubt where the newspapers stood on the issue of nuclear power.

Despite the fact that each paper was covering essentially the same exhibits, there seems to have been very little in the way of shared materials. Most papers sought to find local experts to write their copy, which made the exhibitions local affairs. Naturally, the

Yomiuri Shimbun drew on the expertise of scholars at the University of Tokyo, and the

Asahi Shimbun called on experts from the Universities of Kyoto and Osaka, but regional and local papers found their own experts as well. The Chūgoku Shimbun asked professors from the University of Hiroshima to write a series of articles about nuclear power which

1956, 7; “Heiwa no majyutsushi aisot pu 6: Monono atsusa zubari: H seki no iro mo jiyū ni kaeru,” Kahoku Shimp , Nov. 11, 1956, 7. 493 See the first article in the series “Atomu no miryoku: Ootomesyon to shitsugy : Sy hin bumon ni made oyobu: R d jikan no tansyukuron mo okoru,” The Chūnichi Shimbun, evening edition, Dec. 27, 1956, 1. 494 “Seikatsu no "Taiy ": Kore ga genshi da: Ningen no zun miso no atsumari,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Nov. 3, 1955, 7. 495 “Hiroshima genshiryoku ‘heiwa riy haku’ ni kidai suru 2: ‘K huku no hi’ ni suru kien: Hiroshima no gisei ha mud de nai,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, evening edition, May 15, 1956, 1. 496 “Hiroshima genshiryoku ‘Heiwa riy haku’ ni kidai suru 5: ‘Daini no taiy ’ no bunka: Ningen seikatsu o kontei kara kaikau,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, evening edition, May 18, 1956, 1. The Chūgoku Shimbun had a penchant for referring to nuclear power as “the second sun,” which is somewhat misleading since stars generate heat through fusion, while nuclear power plants do so via fission. 497 “Hiroshima genshiryoku ‘Heiwa riy haku’ ni kidai suru 6: Kono kikai o minogasu: Genshiryoku jidai no yume o sodatsu,” The Chūgoku Shimbun, evening edition, May 19, 1956, 1. 268 also featured a section where readers could write in their questions to be answered by experts.498 Even the Shikoku Shimbun, which was not a cosponsor and was not even in a region where the main exhibition visited, sought out its own local expert, Uemura

Fukushichi of Kagawa University in Takamatsu, to explain the uses of radioisotopes and how nuclear power might affect Shikoku.499 Undoubtedly, this trend at least partially arose from geographical convenience, since it would be much easier to ask a local professor to offer an article than to ask someone halfway across the country. Relying on local experts, however, had the added benefit of making nuclear power seem more accessible. It was not something that was isolated and only discussed among a few professors in the preeminent universities, but was something that students in local universities could study with knowledgeable professionals.

Media promotions were not limited to event cosponsors, and even competitors would cover the events. In the case of Kyoto, newspapers other than Asahi ran at least

500 column inches covering or promoting the event. The Mainichi Shimbun, a direct rival of Asahi and failed co-sponsor for the event, dedicated a portion of the front page of its English edition to printing a picture of the exhibit a day for forty days; the Mainichi’s

Osaka editor, however, offered his regrets that he would be unable to do the same in the

Japanese edition, stating that “it just wouldn’t look right,”500 though the Mainichi

Shimbun did include regular coverage of the events at the exhibition. The United Nations

498 Professor Takanaka of Hiroshima University wrote a number of articles for the Chūgoku Shimbun; see “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 7. 499 Uemura Fukushichi, “Genshiryoku jidai 1: Uemura Kadai jy ky jyu ni kiku: H shan d i genso: Hiroi han'i ni riy : k gy no hiy setsuyaku medatsu,” Shikoku Shimbun, Nov. 12, 1956, 2 and Uemura Fukushichi, “Genshiryoku jidai 2: Uemura Kadai jy ky jyu ni kiku: D ry hi ohikisage: Shikoku de mo riy no k ka wa dai ” Shikoku Shimbun, Nov. 12, 1956, 2. 500 “Kyoto howing of U I Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 13. 269

Kyoto Journal and Shi-Kyoto Newspaper both ran spreads publicizing the exhibition, while Camp Otsu ran announcements in its Daily Bulletin, prepared an article for Stars and Stripes, and arranged tours for American servicemen.501 Radio spots ran daily on

NHK and Radio Kyoto ran ten spots prior to the opening of the exhibition, had two special programs on opening day, and then two spots a day during the duration of the event.502 Miyako Press Newsreels shot a minute and a half newsreel on the exhibition and distributed it to theaters throughout the region,503 cinemas which presumably had already shown the nationally distributed newsreels from the exhibition in Tokyo.

The media promotion and coverage of the Atoms for Peace exhibition were essential to the success of the Atoms for Peace campaign. Although the exhibitions were massive, traveled widely, and were reportedly very persuasive, the vast majority of the

Japanese population did not attend one of the eight major expositions, the USIS film showings, or the small Atoms for Peace exhibits that will be discussed below. A relatively small number had the educational background to understand nuclear power, the state of the research, or its potential for the future, and the number who might hear an academic or politician speaking about it was miniscule. The majority of the public encountered nuclear power the same way that it experienced the world beyond its immediate surroundings: through the media. For the most part, newspapers, along with the growing mediums of radio and television, shaped atomic reality for the public. The version of reality they projected was an optimistic one that cast nuclear power as a truly

501 Ibid., 10. 502 Ibid., 9. 503 Ibid., 9. 270 transformative technology that would improve the lives of everyone, or at least those who lived in a country that embraced it.

This was the reality put forward by the USIS and the American government, but it was also the same one adopted by scientists, engineers, politicians, media outlets throughout the world. And why not? The splitting of the atom and releasing the energy stored in atomic bonds was one of the greatest scientific achievements of the twentieth century. The growing understanding of radioisotopes and the ability to generate them in nuclear reactors gave scientists one of the most important research tools humanity has yet developed, and the research conducted by radioisotope tracers has changed our understanding of the world immeasurably. While nuclear power generation has repeatedly fallen into disrepute over decades of accidents both large and small, contemporaries in the 1950s did not have the examples of environmental damage and potential for catastrophe that we have today, and so had far fewer reasons to question its safety. In this light, the Japanese media’s embrace of nuclear power and its extraordinary rhetoric in support of it is not as surprising as it might seem in recent years.

The Effectiveness of Atoms for Peace

The media’s embrace of the Atoms for Peace exhibition was essential because it spread the message of the exhibition wider than the audience of the exhibit and helped translate that message into a cultural context that would most appeal to the Japanese people. But however it was spread, that message first had to appeal to the Japanese general public. It did so in a number of ways, but one of the most important was by

271 attempting to connect the uses of nuclear power and radioisotopes with the lives of the common man and woman. Although scientists and engineers viewed the exhibit, they were a distinct minority. The majority of the people who went to the exhibit were laymen who did not necessarily grasp the technical details behind the science of atomic energy, but it could give them a grasp of the basics and showing them how the new science would improve their lives. Even if the concepts were beyond them, the exhibition made it clear that nuclear power offered exciting things and was the wave of the future. Focusing on applicability and accessibility by showing how atomic science would improve lives in the near term, the exhibition engaged the audience more than any abstract discussion could have.

Visitors and workers repeatedly commented that the depictions of real-life uses of atomic energy were exciting and engaging. In an interview with the Nishi Nippon

Shimbun, Ms. Kita Yoko, a representative of the Women’s Club in Fukuoka, commented that:

Japanese women are not learned in science. When we first heard of the Nishi Nippon Shimbun's plan on the Atoms for Peace Exhibit, we felt as if it meant something far removed from our daily lives. Now that I have just seen the Exhibit, I feel atomic energy is closer to use than I thought it was. I found out that atomic energy can make our lives even more enjoyable, especially in regard to kitchen work, beauty treatment and medical treatment. I went to see the Exhibit twice. When I saw it the first time, I could not understand how atomic energy works, but I felt the whole thing was more comprehensible the second time. I wish could see it two or three more times.504

Kita’s remarks make the connection between accessibility and engagement quite clear.

Ms. Kita’s comments suggest that she was not particularly interested in atomic energy

504 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 12. 272 because it was something abstract and remote, but once she saw that it could affect her life, and quite soon, she grew exceptionally interested to the point that she went to the exhibit twice and wished to go again.

Kita’s comments reflect another common thread in women’s responses to the exhibition: a keen interest in the application of atomic science to medicine and beauty treatments. When asked about who asked the most questions regarding the Atoms for

Medicine portion of the exhibit, student lecturer Matsumoto Akira of Fukuoka, replied,

“Quite a few questions came from women. They took the equipment for cancer treatment for that for beauty treatment, because a beautiful [mannequin] is used as a model for the cancer treatment equipment.”505 Professor Takanaka of Hiroshima University wrote an article for the Chūgoku Shimbun’s series of articles on atomic energy entitled “The

Second Sun— the Atomic Energy story,” in which he described some of the practical uses of radiation in medicine. Following the article’s publication, women started coming to his office at the rate of ten a day asking him to remove their skin blemishes.506 The subject even came up in a statement by the wife of Tsuchiya Karoku, the governor of

Fukuoka “I know the miserable havoc atomic bombs played during the war; and I have become interested in the peaceful uses of atomic energy all the more since I went through this exhibit. It can be used for beauty treatment, too.”507 Mrs. Tsuchiya once again makes the connection between accessible applications of atomic energy and personal interest,

505 Ibid., 15. 506 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 7. 507 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 1. 273 though the transition from atomic bombs to radioactive beauty treatments is somewhat jarring.

A variety of applications of atomic energy similarly captured the interest of visitors to the Atoms for Peace exhibition. In an interview by the Nishi Nippon Shimbun, student lecturers Sasaki Hideto, Nakamura Shisuki, Ando Shizuo, and Nakayama

Yunowuka offered a few ways people connected the exhibit to their daily lives:

Sasaki: Some noodle maker, who complained about his noodle [sic] becoming mouldy [sic] in rainy seasons, asked me if he could keep noodles from becoming mouldy by applying gamma rays. A farmer approached me with a question as to whether or not there is any laboratory where they are doing research using tracers to find out why chickens do not lay eggs in the season which their old feathers fall off and new feathers grow.

Nakamura: Some refrigerator dealer was shocked to learn that gamma rays are used to keep food from parishing [sic]. He fears that gamma rays would take the bread out of his mouth and all other refrigerator dealer's mouths. He was so serious about it that he questioned me closely about how long it would be before gamma rays are put on the market.

Nishi Nippon: That goes to show how closely the audience feels atomic energy is to their daily life. That's where the significance of this Exhibit lies.

Ando: I was amazed by the fact that so many people came back to see the Exhibit again, saying, “I have seen it once, but I could not understand the whole thing the first time.” Those people in their forties and fifties are especially enthusiastic about the Exhibit.

Nishi Nippon: In view of the fact that atomic energy is apt to be associated with atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs by Japanese people in general, the Exhibit is designed to impress on audiences the significance of peaceful uses of atomic energy. How do you think this Exhibit impressed audiences?

Ando: It seems to me that this exhibit has made audiences realize how closely atomic energy is related to their daily lives. For instance, no one has ever dreamed about the possibility of removing birth-marks using radioactivity. I overheard audiences expressing strong interest in these things.

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Nakayama: As for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the field of industry, quite a few people were surprised to find that radioactivity can be utilized for purposes which they never thought of before. This Exhibit is a great success in that it stimulated interest in peaceful uses of atomic energy even among students and housewives.508

Both the story about the noodle maker and the farmer show people making connections between their livelihoods and atomic energy, and both came to the conclusion that the development of atomic technology and research could solve problems in their trades. The story of the man who sold refrigerators is a bit different, but no less telling. The refrigerator dealer saw irradiated foods as a direct threat to his living, one that was immediate enough that he needed to know when the technology would be sufficiently developed to overcome the need for the equipment he was selling. This man saw himself as a potential casualty of the creative destruction caused by technological development.

Regardless of this man’s concern over the change, it was certainly a testament to the exhibition’s ability to make people feel that atomic energy was going to change their lives in the immediate future.

The connections that this interview makes between people and atomic energy go beyond the idea that nuclear power generation would power appliance and aid economic growth. Rather, people made connections to more tangible ideas that resonated with their lives. These connections excited not just wide-eyed youths, but grown men and women who came to see an atomic future that would specifically benefit them, or in the case of the refrigerator salesmen perhaps it is better to say simply affect by them. Ando specifically mentions that the exhibition captured the minds of people in their forties and

508 Ibid., 15. 275 fifties, and housewives who Kita Yoko suggested would not normally be interested in science. By capturing its imagination, these exhibitions and the public relations campaign surrounding it created a public that was eager for the development of nuclear power not just because it was a necessity for energy security and continued growth, but because it offered a future filled with tangible benefits to all segments of society. Furthermore, it was backed by world-wide and domestic scientific communities that assured everyone that the technology was safe. It was in this spirit that the Atoms for Peace campaign swept the country and created the year of atomic energy in a country that had just two years earlier been deeply “allergic” to nuclear power.

Regardless of how colorful these anecdotes are, they do not necessarily represent the wider experience of the Atoms for Peace exhibition audience. Fortunately, the USIS conducted entrance and exit polling at Atoms for Peace exhibitions in Tokyo, Osaka,

Sendai, and Mito to gauge the effectiveness of these shows. The survey in Tokyo was conducted on five days spaced throughout the run of the exposition, with three week days, a Saturday and a Sunday. During the course of these days, researchers interviewed every sixtieth person in line entering and exiting the exhibit, for a total of 100 people each day. The total survey consisted of 250 people doing the entrance interview and the same number at the exit, though there should be no overlap because interviews were done concomitantly at the entrance and exit.509 The USIS asked many of the same questions

509 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 1. The sample size of 500 remained the same for each, though the process for selecting who would participate varied slightly; for example, in Mito every 40th person was selected. 276 upon exit as they asked at entrance, though with the addition of exhibit content based questions.

The results varied by region of the country, but in general they were positive, with the vast majority of attendees having a positive response to both the exhibits and nuclear power in general. It is important, however, to remember that this was a self-selecting sample. The people who were most likely to attend the exhibitions were those who might already have had strong opinions, either for or against nuclear power, which might prove resistant to change. The opinions expressed are representative of those attending the event, but were not necessarily typical of the general populace. The relatively large attendance, around 350,000 in Tokyo alone, does suggest the exhibit’s wide appeal, and shifts in the ratios of responses between entrance and exit can serve as a gauge of the exhibition’s effectiveness to some extent.

The questions the USIS asked visitors covered a number of topics, from participants’ views on nuclear power to which portions of the exhibition most interested them. The questions posed in tables 2-4 focus on whether nuclear power, broadly defined, would have a positive or negative impact on the world and on the individual respondents.

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Table 2. Do you feel that atomic energy will prove a boon or a curse on mankind?510

Tokyo Osaka Before Before Boon on mankind 75% 65% Curse on mankind 9% 15% DK 16% 20%

Table 3. Do you personally expect to derive any benefit from atomic energy in your lifetime?511 Tokyo Osaka Sendai Mito Before After Before After Before After Before After Yes 76% 87% 73% 81% 74% 83% 71% 84% No 10% 4% 11% 9% 8% 4% 7% 4% DK 14% 9% 16% 10% 18% 13% 22% 12%

Table 4. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the ability of the big powers to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes?512 Tokyo Osaka Sendai Mito Before After Before After Before After Before After Optimistic 27% 31% 21% 24% 21% 30% 13% 52% Pessimistic 56% 55% 52% 60% 50% 48% 43% 39% DK 17% 14% 27% 16% 29% 22% 44% 9%

510 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; and “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 4. 511 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of endai Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” Jan. 18, 1957, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1957 Part 1 of 2, 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of Mito Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” Jan. 18, 1957, NACP, RG 59, Box 122, 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1957, Part 2 of 2, 2. 512 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of endai Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of Mito Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” . 278

While the vast majority of respondents thought that nuclear technology would be more beneficial than harmful and expected to benefit from nuclear power directly, they remained pessimistic about whether the major powers would only use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The Japanese text of the question is not available, but it is safe to assume that those responding that they were pessimistic about the ability of major powers to only use nuclear power for peace meant that they feared some form of nuclear war.

The response to this question suggests that attendees did not forget about the threat of nuclear war just because they were at an exhibition showcasing the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Indeed, even after being primed to think positively about nuclear technology by the exhibition, pessimistic responses remained flat in the aggregate.

This question also marks one of the rare times when the respondents in the four cities responded in different ways. Whereas Tokyo’s numbers remained largely unmoved,

Osaka resident became markedly more pessimistic, while people in Sendai became more optimistic by roughly the same margin. Remarkably, the survey in Mito showed a skyrocketing of optimism with an increase of almost 40 percentage points. The USIS

Osaka branch attributed the slight movement in optimism and the larger increase in pessimism to “stubbornness” to admit the effectiveness of the exhibit.513 The U I ’s explanation is not particularly satisfying, though it touches on the fact that the political climate in Osaka was much more left-leaning than in other areas of the country, which could account for some of the differences seen throughout the survey. Mito, on the other hand, had a very large number of people who were undecided before the exhibition, and a

513 “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 1. 279 large number of them were persuaded of the benefits of nuclear power. The exhibition’s success in Mito might very well be tied to the fact that the region had been selected as the home of the new Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, which would make the region the heart of nuclear research and development. The community had a more direct and more immediate stake in nuclear energy than any of the other cities that had hosted exhibitions. Perhaps this investment made the respondents more sanguine about nuclear development. This explanation, however does not account for the high number of undecided respondents upon entrance. After all, the same forces that would account for such a high level of responsiveness would have held true before people arrived at the exhibition; the Ibaraki Shimbun covered nuclear power and the exhibitions extensively, particularly because of the area’s direct interest in its success. It is also interesting that the

Mito results show the lowest support for broad scale development of nuclear power out of the four cities surveyed.

The possibility of nuclear war discussed in the previous question is further explored in the question:

Table 5. Do you feel that the strides made in atomic energy have increased or decreased the chance of war?514 Tokyo Osaka Sendai Mito Before After Before After Before After Before After Increased 22% 25% 25% 28% 26% 23% 25% 26% Decreased 44% 46% 41% 44% 43% 47% 54% 44% DK 34% 29% 34% 28% 31% 30% 21% 30%

514 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of endai Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; and “Audience Reaction urvey of Mito Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3. 280

Interestingly, around a quarter of respondents consistently replied that the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power had increased the probability of war; this response rate remains remarkably stable before and after those surveyed had viewed the exhibition. It is impossible to read the minds of respondents, but this proposition is in no way paradoxical, though it is a bit ironic. Not only did the peaceful uses of nuclear power have military applications, such as nuclear reactors on submarines, but the idea of sharing nuclear power was a contentious issue enmeshed in Cold War politics. The United States and the Soviet Union actively competed to offer technology and fissile material to various countries in order to gain advantage in the Cold War. Although it represented just one more proxy for American and Soviet antagonism, it is possible that the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology increased tension and thus the possibility of a hot war, just as these interviewees believed, though they were decidedly in the minority. It is worth noting that Communist opposition to the expositions, particularly strong in Osaka, was largely based on the Cold War politics of sharing nuclear power.

Along these lines, the USIS asked attendees about which country was in the lead in the race to develop civilian nuclear power:

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Table 6. What country do you feel has made the greatest strides in peaceful uses of atomic energy?515 Tokyo Osaka Sendai Mito Before After Before After Before After Before After USSR 19% 10% 25% 25% 17% 10% 13% 20% US 58% 71% 46% 46% 51% 63% 62% 58% Other 7% 4% 9% 6% 14% 8% 14% 6% DK 16% 14% 20% 23% 18% 19% 11% 16%

Table 7. What country do you feel has made the greatest effort to share atomic information with other countries?516 Tokyo Osaka Before Before USSR 8% 6% US 50% 35% Other 11% 16% DK 31% 43%

These questions spoke directly to a major goal of the Atoms for Peace exhibitions: to further the United tates’ image as the world-wide leader in nuclear power. Officials in various segments of the American government saw the United tates’ reputation in nuclear power as an import aspect of the Cold War. Since both civilian and military applications of nuclear power were to be the defining technologies of the century, a US lead was critical and perhaps even more important was the perception that it was in the lead. The Cold War was largely a matter of assembling and strengthening a coalition of countries around the world to counter the strength of your opponent’s coalition. Any

515 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction Survey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of endai Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of Mito Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3. 516 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3; “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3. 282 perceived benefit to allying with the United States over the Soviet Union could be the difference in the conflict. The polling suggests that the United States major gains in the perception battle among attendees of the Tokyo exhibition, with more moderate improvement in Sendai and Mito, while opinion in Osaka did not budge.

Perhaps the most important question that the USIS asked was whether attendees thought that Japan should develop nuclear power on its own. The other questions discussed thus far attempt to gauge reactions to the Cold War, which were important, but the ultimate goal was to get Japan to adopt nuclear power. When asked:

Table 8. Are you in favor of Japan’s going ahead with atomic research on a broad scale, in a limited way, or not at all?517 Tokyo Osaka Sendai Mito Before After Before After Before After Before After Broad 76% 85% 78% 77% 70% 79% 68% 74% Scale Limited 20% 13% 20% 22% 27% 18% 26% 17% way Not at all 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% DK 3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 6% 8%

Despite implications that a significant percentage who thought that the peaceful uses of nuclear power made war more likely and who questioned whether they would benefit from nuclear power in their lifetimes, respondents almost universally supported the

Japanese development of nuclear power in at least a limited way, and the vast majority wished to see it developed on a broad scale. Remarkably, almost no one entered the

517 “Audience Reaction Survey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 4; “Audience Reaction urvey of Osaka Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 4; “Audience Reaction urvey of endai Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” ; “Audience Reaction urvey of Mito Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 3. 283 exhibition thinking that Japan should not develop nuclear power or without an opinion, so most of the people who switched their responses to “broad scale” did so from “limited way.” This question shows that by the time the exhibitions took place, attendees were already convinced that Japan should be involved in the development of nuclear power.

Given that the development of nuclear power had been controversial in the middle of

1955,518 such near universal support is rather impressive, particularly because attendees came to the exhibition already convinced. In part, this result is at least partially the result of the fact that most of the audience chose to attend the exhibition of its own free will, though a sizeable portion was composed of middle and high school students who were required to attend. The constant promotion of nuclear power by the media, the USIS, the academy, and various levels of Japanese government doubtlessly had a major effect as well.

In addition to giving a view of how attendees viewed nuclear power and the Cold

War, they also provide a valuable look at who attended the exhibitions and how various groups experienced it. Although the reports on polling data from Osaka, Sendai, and Mito are limited to the summary data from just a handful of questions, the report from Tokyo includes breakdowns of the data by gender, age, education, and occupation. The largest single group of attendees was comprised of students, with a mix of middle school, high school, and college students making up 45% of those interviewed. Students were followed by white-collar workers at a third, while skilled and unskilled workers made up

518 horiki Matsutar called it controversial in his letters to John Jay Hopkins and President Eisenhower, as did the CIA in its assessment of the success of the Hopkins Mission. In 1952, the Diet debated whether the development of nuclear power violated Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, which forbids Japan from having the capacity for war. See the testimony of Kuriyama Yoshio before the Ministry of International Trade and Industry committee of the House of Councilors on June 10, 1952. 284 only 6%. By and large, the audience was young and well educated, with 20-29 year olds making up almost half of interviewees. A majority had at least some college education, and most of the rest finished secondary school. Those over 50 years old or with only an elementary school education were virtually unrepresented, with the audience consisting of less than 5% of either group. The audience was predominantly male, with women composing less than 20% of visitors.519

Although there are breakdowns of responses by age, education, occupation, and area of inhabitance, these categories did not show strong patterns in their responses.

Women’s responses, on the other hand, differed from those of men, both consistently and significantly, suggesting that men and women experienced the exhibitions and approached the issue of nuclear power differently. Men tended to be much more optimistic about the future benefits of nuclear technology than women, and were 13% more likely to think that nuclear power would be a boon than women.520 More men expected to benefit from nuclear power in their lifetimes (79% to 65%),521 and tended to support broad scale development of nuclear power more than women (78% to 69%).522

When asked upon entrance, “Do you believe atomic power offers a major solution to

Japan’s economic problems?” women responded yes 4 % of the time, no 19%, and

“Don’t Know” 39%, versus men’s response rate of 73%, 14%, and 13%.523 The response rate of “Don’t Know” is a bit surprising here. Although women tended to respond that

519 Break downs of statistics by category are only available for Tokyo, but they are available for every question asked. “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 5, 7. 520 Ibid., 3. 521 Ibid., 22. 522 Ibid., 24. 523 Ibid., 10. 285 they did not know more often than men in this survey, the gap was generally only a few percentage points higher than the men, and only twice was the gap as much as 10 points.

The gap might be ascribed to the nature of the question, which is particularly complicated; it assumes knowledge of nuclear technology, the basis of Japanese economic problems, and an understanding of how one could relate to the other. However, other questions deal with complicated geopolitical issues and women’s response rate of

“Don’t Know” did not differ from men’s nearly as much, even though economics and geopolitics might both be considered outside the traditional gender roles of women. As such, it is not entirely clear if this divergence was a matter of skepticism or a sincere profession of ignorance.

Once inside the exhibit, women clearly responded to different segments of the exposition. Upon entering, interviewees were asked, “In what way do you think the world stands to benefit the most from atomic energy—industry, agriculture, medicine, or research?” Women responded that the most important area was industry 54% of the time, agriculture 4%, and medicine 23%, while men responded industry 71%, agriculture 4%, and medicine 10%. Before entering the exhibition, women were already more likely than men to think that medicine was the most important application of nuclear technology, but a majority still said the most important issue was industry. Upon exiting, however, a sample was asked the same question with very significantly different results: women responded industry 35%, agriculture 3%, and medicine 43%, while the men’s responses moved much less significantly with 65% saying industry, 6% agriculture, and 19%

286 medicine.524 These results are largely repeated when interviewees were asked, “which of the parts of the exhibit stands out most vividly in your memory?” Women cited the cancer therapy portion by a two to one margin over men (24% to 13%), while men were more interested in the full-sized models of reactors (29% to 5% for women).525

Although women were more interested in treating medical conditions than men, it should be noted that many several women who partook in roundtable discussions or interviews for newspapers pointed out how pleased they were to discover that the exhibit included discussion of how nuclear power could be used cosmetically. For example, many women commented on the benefits of using radiation to remove age spots, which broadly fell under the category of medicine, though not the type of life-saving treatment most would imagine. Lest one think that women took the exhibits less seriously than men, it is worth noting that men and women were both given to frivolity: each group ranked the “magic hands,” a set of mechanical arms that allowed the operator to manipulate dangerous materials from behind protective shielding, as their favorite part of the exhibit by significant margins, despite its lack of significance for the future of humanity.

524 Ibid., 11, 25. These percentages do not add up to 100% because respondents were also allowed to respond that various combinations of industry, agriculture, and medicine would benefit the world equally, as well as respond that they “Don’t Know.” Given the prevalence of the industry response, it is likely that respondents thought of nuclear power generation as an industrial application. This classification makes sense, though it does not correspond with the technology displayed in the industrial uses section of the exhibition. 525Ibid., 18-19. 287

Small Atoms for Peace Exhibitions

In addition to the main Atoms for Peace exhibitions that toured eight major cities, the USIS created a small Atoms for Peace exhibit, three sets of which toured throughout

Japan in late 1956 and 1957 and were viewed by at least two million people.526 A variety of locations hosted the exhibits from large cities like Kobe to towns and small villages.

Like the main exhibitions, the small exhibitions had a cosponsor in each location, though unlike the main exhibitions they tended to have multiple cosponsors, whereas the main expositions generally only had one. Typically, a small exhibition would be cosponsored by the prefectural and municipal governments, a local or regional newspaper, and perhaps the site where the exhibit was placed, often a department store or cultural center. These exhibits were mostly comprised of films, still photographs, explanatory text, and a few small models,527 and were far less involved than the main exhibitions. One USIS officer noted that attendees tended to wander around the exhibit without reading the text or studying the models unless they were given guided tours, though if they were guided, visitors became quite engaged.528 To this end, the USIS sought to find student volunteers to give tours whenever possible, much like at the main exhibitions.

One important target of the small Atoms for Peace shows was Shikoku, the only major Japanese island not to host the main exhibition. Despite the lack of a major exhibition, there was considerable interest in nuclear power in Shikoku. The governor of

526 The USIS noted that 1,572,207 people had visited these small exhibits by April 1957, and a further 400,000 saw the exhibit in Goshogawara, Aomori. See: USIS-Tokyo to USIA Washington, “Small Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” Apr. 18, 1957, NACP, RG 59, Box 122 8c Exhibits - General January-June 1957 Part 2 of 2. 527 Ibid., enclosure 2, 2. Films included A is for Atom and Power for Peace. 528 Ibid., enclosure 2, 2. 288

Kagawa prefecture, for example, became involved with promoting the Kyoto, Osaka, and

Hiroshima exhibitions, going so far as to declare 1956 “Atoms for Peace Year in Kagawa

Prefecture.”529 Although the Mainichi Shimbun attempted to organize visit by the main exhibition to Shikoku, it ultimately failed, prompting the small exhibit to tour Shikoku. A full list of the stops on the tour is not available, but it included cities like Matsuyama,

Takamatsu, and Kochi, as well as small towns such as Misho-cho, Nomura-cho, and

Uwa-cho. The exhibit was shown for two days each in the towns, where it drew an average of nearly 1,500 visitors. In these locations, the exhibits were sponsored by either the Ehime Shimbun or the Kochi Shimbun, in addition to the prefectures and towns where they were located.530

The Takamatsu exhibition was held in two stages: first it was shown from

November 10 to 15, 1956 at the Mitsukoshi Department Store, and then in the Japan

American Cultural Center from November 17 to 23. The exhibit had a host of sponsors, including the Shikoku Electric Company, the Kagawa Prefectural Government, the

Takamatsu City Government, the Shikoku Shimbun, and the Kagawa UN Association, along with further support by Kagawa University and Takamatsu Public Relations

Council. Much like the major exhibitions, the sponsoring newspaper ran publicity, including a series of articles by Professor Fukushichi Uemura of Kagawa University. It was rare for one of the major exhibitions to have so many cosponsors, and even the

Hiroshima exhibition only had four. It seems unlikely that the USIS was following the model set at Hiroshima wherein the USIS pursued many cosponsors in order to blunt

529 “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 14. 530 “ mall Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” enclosure 2, 2. 289 potential criticism or protest. Given that the governor of Kagawa prefecture was quite enamored with atomic energy at the Osaka exhibition and the prefecture’s declaration of

1956 as the year of atomic energy in Kagawa prefecture, it is more likely that the surfeit of cosponsors was a sign of enthusiasm for the venture. Both the act of gaining local cosponsors and using local academics to promote the exhibit continues the USIS strategy of taking a complicated, potentially world-altering technology that many considered too complicated to even approach and showing it as something concrete that applied to everyday life, making it something applicable and accessible to everyone. Nuclear power was not something just found abroad or in major cities like Tokyo or Osaka, but rather something that you could see in your local department store with the endorsement of a fistful of local organizations that people knew and presumably trusted. The USIS and its co-sponsors took a global phenomenon and made it local.

While it was at Mitsukoshi, the small Atoms for Peace exhibit was folded into a larger exhibit by the Shikoku Electric Company on electrical science put on as part of a celebration of its newly completed headquarters. Shikoku Electric is said to have been pleased to have the Atoms for Peace exhibit included in its main exhibition because, according to the U I , “it served to demonstrate the company’s own plans for atomic energy in the future.”531 Shikoku Electric Company, much like the other regional electric power monopolies in Japan, was an enthusiastic supporter of nuclear power, which it saw as vital to the future. Although the Atoms for Peace exhibition could have been held without the Shikoku Electric exposition display, and vice versa, combining them

531 Ibid., enclosure 1, 1. 290 strengthened them both and lent credence to the idea that nuclear power had local support. Shikoku Electric reportedly was going to put on its exhibit regardless of USIS involvement, so it was hardly an example of the US pushing nuclear power on Japan. The exhibition drew 37,000 visitors in six days, and the Atoms for Peace portion proved to be one of the more popular. Continuing a tradition from the main exhibition, school children came to visit the exhibition and proved to be one of the core constituencies. Following its time at Mitsukoshi, the exhibit was relocated to the Japan American Cultural Center in

Takamatsu, where it was placed prominently on the main floor for one week. Attendance at the Center was far less impressive, with 4,800 visitors in a week. The USIS officer responsible for the exhibit commented that the exhibit on its own was worthwhile, but it was far more impressive if incorporated into a larger exhibit, such as the one at

Mitsukoshi.532

At subsequent showings, the USIS tried to have the exhibit tied to a larger exhibition whenever possible, both to compensate for the small exhibit’s shortcomings as well as to draw more visitors. In Kochi City, Kochi Prefecture, the exhibit was incorporated into the Kochi Industrial Fair, which ran from December 8 to 14, 1956 and drew a little over 20,000 visitors. Perhaps the single most impressive display of the small

Atoms for Peace exhibit was in Goshowara, a small city in Aomori prefecture. There the atomic display was shown as part of the American Exhibit at the Tohoku Region

Industrial Fair, which proved popular as it was visited by 402,000 people out of 500,000

532 Ibid., enclosure 1, 2. 291 total visitors to the Fair.533 This total was over a period of fifty days from July 21 to

September 10, 1957, which averages out to around 57,000 visitors a week, which is well in excess of any showing in Shikoku. At 402,000, the exhibit in Goshowara was visited by more people than who went to the Atoms for Peace exhibition in Tokyo, a fairly remarkable feat for a small city in northeastern Japan.

The impact of the small Atoms for Peace exhibition is difficult to measure, particularly because reports from only a handful of locations are available and there were no opinion polls conducted. It is certainly worth noting that some of these shows were requested by government authorities who wanted to take part in the Atoms for Peace phenomenon; for example, the Mayor of Goshowara, Tonosaki Chiyokichi, specifically requested that the Sendai American Cultural Center consider his city for the tour.534 The idea that local government lobbied for involvement certainly suggests that the wider public relations campaign had an effect beyond the major cities, an effect that was certainly multiplied when millions of additional people were able to see a version of the

Atoms for Peace exhibition, even if it was not the full one.

Although the information provided by the small exhibits was largely the same as that in the full exhibitions, the appeal proved slightly different. While urban audiences focused on the industrial and medical applications of atomic energy, the rural audiences were particularly drawn by the agricultural uses of atomic power. Wakado Yoshiyuki, the principal of Nomura High chool, stated, “The exhibit has deepened the understanding of atomic energy among people of our town. Farmers in this area were especially impressed

533 Ibid., 1. 534 Ibid., 1. 292 by the effective uses of the isotope in agriculture.”535 Professor Tomio Segawa of Ehime

University said of the touring exhibit, “The exhibit accomplished much. The majority of the exhibit consisted of pictures. I thought the exhibit would have been more effective if it had been supplemented by more models. Movie showings greatly helped the people to understand the exhibit.”536 The USIS official writing the report out of Takamatsu searched signs of its efficacy, stated, “It is a fairly valid conclusion that since this was the first atomic energy exhibit of any type held in this area it was unquestionably successful in giving a better knowledge about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. To quote

Professor Uemura of Kagawa University, who worked closely with us on the exhibit, ‘It was a good beginning.’”537 Although it is hardly elaborate praise, Professor Uemura and the U I ’s assessment was that the exhibition was worthwhile and its value was as a starting point for getting people engaged in the idea of nuclear power, something that could also be said of the full exhibition.

Beyond being a starting point for gaining support among the populace, these exhibits served as an organizational catalyst in some regions. A report on the exhibits in southwestern Shikoku places the value of the exhibit as a catalyst for organizing a series of Atoms for Peace Study Societies. By April of 1957, such societies had developed in

Ehime and Kagawa prefectures, with ones in Tokushima and Kochi prefectures to follow thereafter. The USIS stated that it expected these organizations to be the prelude to a

Shikoku-wide Atomic Energy Forum composed of industrial concerns and academics.538

535 Ibid., enclosure 2, 2. 536 Ibid., enclosure 2, 2. 537 Ibid., enclosure 1, 3. 538 Ibid., enclosure 2, 1-2. 293

Once formed, these societies would aid the development of atomic energy in Shikoku and would be an important step in moving past the stage of enticing the populace to support atomic power and actually implementing it.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the small exhibits is that they were visited by more than doubled the number of people who went to the major exhibitions, and many of these visitors may not have been exposed to the message otherwise. Support for nuclear power outside of major cities was essential to the project of building a nuclear regime. Not only do small towns and rural areas have influence via their representatives, but nuclear power plants have to be located somewhere and modern power plants generally are not placed inside of cities. Courting the rural population, then, was an essential long-term strategy, whether the USIS was aware of it or not. All told, these exhibitions played an important role in the development of nuclear power in Japan, even if individual shows drew nowhere near the numbers of the main exhibitions.

Protesting a Nuclear Future

Not everyone, however, enthusiastically embraced nuclear power. Although most of the exhibitions were held with little or no organized opposition, the exhibitions in both

Osaka and Hiroshima faced protests. The opposition in Osaka primarily attempted to picket the exhibit during its run, which produced almost no coverage in the media and was largely ignored by the cosponsors. Groups in Hiroshima, on the other hand, leveraged the city’s status as a victim of an atomic bomb attack to orchestrate a public relations campaign that gained national attention prior to the launch of the exhibition,

294 which gained them a seat at the negotiating table. Although the opposition groups in

Hiroshima ultimately received no concessions, their concerns were heard and addressed by event organizers. It is worth noting that neither of these protests were based on opposition to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and in fact various protestors praised the idea of developing the technology.

Opponents of the Atoms for Peace exhibition in Osaka were primarily young activists on the political left who agitated against what they saw as an attempt to distract the Japanese public from the issue of nuclear weapons and weapons tests. This line of criticism echoed that presented by the Soviet Union against Atoms for Peace, and was centered on the idea that if the United States were truly interested in using atomic science for peaceful purposes it would first abandon nuclear weapons. The same arguments can be found in the Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata, and at times was also employed by protestors in Hiroshima.539 The leftist nature of the opposition was highlighted by the fact that they chose May Day for their protest. Although May Day was not a national holiday in Japan, it fell during a week of holidays in Japan called Golden

Week, which included the Emperor’s Birthday on April 9, Constitution Memorial Day on May 3, and Children’s Day on May 5. Typically, employers would give their employees the entire week off, marking one of the rare times of the year when Japanese workers would take an extended period of time off. Since May 1st was an unofficial day off, the Atoms for Peace exhibition was likely to draw a bigger than average crowd for a weekday, giving the protestors at target as well as an audience.

539 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” -3. 295

The protestors attempted to strengthen their demonstration by enlisting students working for the exhibition to join them. On April 30, 1956, the student volunteers at the exhibition found the following sign in their break room:

To those who are working at the atoms for peace exhibit. Tomorrow will be May Day. This festival when laborers and citizens gather together with their hopes and demands. The 27th May Day. How about expressing our hopes and demands at this festival? Tomorrow the demonstration groups will parade in front of our place between 12:30 - 1:30 and we would like to greet them with the following slogans. If you agree with us will you please come out in front of the exhibit with slogans during your rest periods?540

This sign was accompanied by a second one that was covered with anti-atomic and hydrogen bomb slogans, including statements like “It’s May, eason for the H-Bomb,

Please take care of yourself,” “We oppose H-bomb,” and “Don’t be deceived by Peaceful

Usage.”541 Between five and eleven of the student workers did join the protest against the wishes of Asahi, which attempted to stop them with police aid.

These protests were relatively minor, eliciting little or no media coverage, even in the Akahata, and seems to have been limited to May Day itself. The USIS commented that, “the demonstration was extremely weak and more prankish than serious.” In the end,

Asahi took no direct action against the students who took part in the demonstration because they were on a break at the time and “Asahi felt that any action on their part would magnify into unjust proportions a very minor incident.”542 In addition to minimizing the size and impact of the demonstration, the Osaka USIS officer rather cheekily described the protest as a compliment, saying in his official report that, “The

540 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibition in Osaka,” 14. 541 Ibid., 14. 542 Ibid., 14. 296 incident is reported only because it was a direct attempt by leftists to detract from the effectiveness of the exhibit. To have our exhibit ignored by the leftists would not have been much [of] a compliment to its effectiveness.”543

Even if protest occurred on a limited scope, the rhetoric used in Osaka is noteworthy. These protestors did not oppose the peaceful uses of atomic power in and of itself, but rather focused on the connection to atomic weapons, the very connection that the USIS campaign was attempting to sever. The concern was that by focusing on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, people would forget about the dangers of atomic weapons and fallout, which had been at the forefront of Japanese discourse in 1954 but was rapidly discarded in 1955 and 1956. The erosion of criticism of American nuclear weapons testing and development caused by the Atoms for Peace campaign was problematic for two groups: Communists, who viewed events through a Cold War lens and saw it as a propaganda defeat, and antinuclear weapons activists, who saw it as a potential setback for the campaign for nuclear disarmament. The protestors at Osaka seem to represent the former category, while those in Hiroshima drew from the latter.

The Hiroshima protests against the Atoms for Peace exhibition were unique in a couple of ways. First, they were led by atomic bomb survivors’ groups who had considerable local clout and had a national, and in some cases international, profile.

Secondly, rather than taking their opposition to the streets, these protests primarily took place in the pages of the Chūgoku Shimbun, which was one of the cosponsors of the exhibition. Finally, their opposition was more complicated than that in Osaka, since it

543 Ibid., 14. 297 drew not just on concerns that a focus on the peaceful uses of nuclear power would distract from antinuclear weapons projects, but also on the fact that the exhibition would be held at the Hiroshima Peace Museum, which housed relics from those who died during the bombing of Hiroshima.

Understanding that it faced a unique challenge in Hiroshima, the USIS chose to secure multiple sponsors for this exhibition: the Chūgoku Shimbun, University of

Hiroshima, and the municipal and prefectural governments of Hiroshima. The Chūgoku

Shimbun was approached first, despite the fact that the USIS thought that two of the paper’s editors had shown a “somewhat negative attitude towards the United tates,” but the board, including those two editors, unanimously came out in support of becoming a cosponsor.544 Despite this support, the Chūgoku Shimbun itself argued for the need of multiple cosponsors. The USIS report on the Hiroshima exhibition summarizes these arguments, stating:

However, it was felt that the newspaper, despite its large circulation (450,000) in the Chūgoku and Shikoku areas, could not do it alone. One Board member frankly stated that since the exhibition was clearly identified with United States and its foreign policy, sponsorship of the project would, in effect, endorse United States leadership in this field would result in increased prestige for the United States. The Board believed, therefore, that additional sponsors were necessary in order ‘to add more local prestige’ to the exhibition and to minimize possible negative response. The Prefectural Government, the Municipal Office, and Hiroshima University were recommended as co-sponsors.545

The paper believed that its support alone would not be sufficient to overcome the potential hurdles that promoting atomic power might present. The paper and the USIS therefore went out of their way to secure additional partners in order to bolster both the

544 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 1. 545 Ibid., cover page, 1. 298 profile and the acceptability of the exhibition. The focus on local sponsorship is especially important in Hiroshima because it was a community with a unique background, and the support of the pillars of that community lent a credibility that could not be duplicated otherwise.

The sponsors agreed that the Peace Museum and Memorial Exhibit Hall, which depicts the history of, and material culture connected to, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima were displayed, would be the ideal location for the exhibition. The

Museum and Hall were both municipal property, and so would not require rent, and it was already conceptually connected both to atomic issues and peace. After initially assuming that the Museum and Hall, with combined floor space of 46,800 square feet, would be sufficient to host the exhibit as is, it was eventually determined that the construction of an annex would be necessary at the cost of ¥1,500,000. On January 9,

1956, the USIS announced at a meeting of the cosponsors that it would not provide any funds for the construction of the annex and it would not allow Peace Museum pieces to be displayed along with the exhibition, causing some disruption among the cosponsors.

Their dissatisfaction seems to have been primarily based on the belief that they would require US aid in order to pay for the annex, but they were eventually convinced to pick up the costs as the U I officers placed “emphasis on local pride in sharing a big undertaking which is so closely related to Hiroshima's own theme of ‘Peace.’”546

Following this meeting, organizations of atomic bomb victims and anti-atomic weapons groups began to vocally oppose the exhibitions. The Chūgoku, Asahi, Mainichi,

546 Ibid., cover page, 1. 299 and Yomiuri Shimbun all simultaneously ran stories in late January and early February expressing the grievances of the opposition, running with headlines like “Hiroshima A- bomb Victims’ Association oppose A-for Peace Exhibit” and “Banning of Bombs is premise for peaceful uses exhibit.”547 Rhetorically, the primary source of the conflict was not the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in and of itself or holding the event in the Hiroshima Peace Museum, but rather with disrupting the Peace Museum’s display of anti-nuclear weapons material. Fujii Heiichi, the Chairman of the Committee for the Relief of A-Bomb Casualties was quoted in the Chūgoku Shimbun arguing that there was “nothing wrong in campaigning for the peaceful uses of atomic energy,” but added that the “Exhibit should, in principle, make efforts…to ban H and A bombs. Any attempt to move the A-bomb destruction material--the dear memories of our very blood, tears and swear--betrays the fact that the exhibit is designed to lure our attention away from the efforts…to ban bombs under…the label of peaceful uses.”548

As the opposition articles continued, protestors inundated the USIS and City Hall with calls and visits to voice their opposition. The USIS refused to address questions regarding the moving of materials out of the museum, providing the stock response, “We have nothing to do with this since we are responsible only for bringing the exhibition to

Hiroshima. Please see the city officials.”549 The Vice Mayor of Hiroshima along with two other people responsible for organizing the exhibit became ill to the point of hospitalization during the ensuing rush of people, presumably due in part to the stress

547 Ibid., 3. The Chūgoku Shimbun ran critiques from opposition leaders, while the other papers reported more generally that such opposition existed and outlined their complaints. 548 Ibid., 3. 549 Ibid., cover page, 3. 300 involved. The situation became so serious that the cosponsors met without the U I ’s involvement to discuss whether they would move forward with the event; eventually they decided they would do so “even under police protection if necessary.”550

After what was deemed a “cooling off period,” the sponsors held a roundtable discussion on March 9th. It was moderated by the Chūgoku Shimbun and attended by representatives of the cosponsors and delegates from the opposition groups and other interested parties. These representatives were able to air their opposition to the event and ask questions of the sponsors directly. The meeting began with the cosponsors explaining what the exhibition was, why it was being brought to Hiroshima, how the planning was proceeding, and what the exhibitions in Tokyo and Nagoya were like. Following this background information, representatives of the assembled groups were allowed to speak their minds.

Shinzo Hamai, the former mayor of Hiroshima and president of the Anti-A & H- bomb Association said that though he supported the exhibition and wanted it to come to

Hiroshima, he objected that American officials “are constantly referring to our museum as an anti-American monument,” adding that “We think otherwise.”551 This question of anti-Americanism was an important aspect of the debate since American officials, at least those in the USIS, were keen to declare any opposition to the Atoms for Peace exhibition as being tantamount to being against American interests. Protestors, on the other hand, often opposed the exhibitions as the imposition of American interests on Japan, a highly charged topic in the wake of the American Occupation of Japan. The citizens of

550 Ibid., 3. 551 Ibid., 4. 301

Hiroshima had perhaps more cause to question American claims to help than anyone else in Japan. After all, the Americans had not only bombed their city, but then set up the

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), which studied victims of the atomic bomb but offered no medical help. Those who visited the ABCC had to do so during weekdays, meaning they had to miss work and they were not compensated.552 The American doctors reportedly treated their Japanese colleagues as subservient, creating a professional rivalry that came to a head during the Lucky Dragon Incident.553 Given the relationship between the United States and Hiroshima, it is hardly surprising that many in Hiroshima would harbor anti-American sentiment.

Mrs. Yamaguchi, the President of the Child Protection Association and a victim of the atomic bomb herself, argued, “The exhibition is all right, if it will not hinder our anti-A & H Bomb movement… I am afraid the exhibit will make people forget the A- bomb.”554 Mrs. Yamaguchi’s observations were quite astute as combatting her very fear was one of the U I ’s major goals in sponsoring the exhibition. USIS officials cheered any failure of anti-nuclear messages during the run of the exhibitions.555 Tied to this protagonist’s concerns was the issue of moving parts of the museum’s displays to make room for the Atoms for Peace. This opposition took two forms. Protestors like Mrs.

Yamaguchi opposed moving the artifacts of those killed by the atomic bomb because

552 M. Susan Lindee, Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 164-165. 553 Aya Homei, "The Contentious Death of Mr. Kuboyama: Science as Politics in the 1954 Lucky Dragon Incident," Japan Forum 25, no. 2, June 2013, 212-232. 554 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 4. 555 ee, for example, the commentary on the failure of Kurosawa Akira’s Ikimono no Kiroku where the U I report states, “USIS feels it is entirely justified in claiming for the Atoms for Peace Exhibit and its advanced publicity a share of the responsibility for this poor reception of Kurosawa's [anti-nuclear war] message.” “Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 6. 302 doing so diminished the anti-nuclear weapons message when the museum would be experiencing a surge of visitors. Others argued that these items had an almost sacred nature and moving them would be akin to disinterring the dead or enshrined souls.

Professor Fujiwara Takeo, the Dean of the Faculty of Science of Hiroshima University addressed this issue, arguing, “What is this museum? Is it a shrine? The way you people keep referring to it, with such reverence, one may think that it is the Shirakami shrine.

You talk about spirits of the dead…. No one is going to hurt these precious relics or the spirits therein.”556

The effectiveness of Professor Fujiwara’s statement underscores the importance of obtaining local cosponsors. Fujiwara, as a resident of Hiroshima with roots in the community, was able to counter the opposition groups’ arguments effectively by breaking the rhetorical connection between the Museum and a sacred space where souls are interred. Invoking Shirakami shrine is particularly interesting rhetorical device, since

Shirakami Shrine was an old and venerable shrine that was only 500 meters from the hypocenter of the atomic bomb. The reconstruction of the shrine had only been completed in December 1955, three months before the meeting. This kind of culturally rooted emotional appeal that was tied directly to the concerns of the community would have been unlikely to come from an outsider. Furthermore, if such an appeal came from an American, it would seem disingenuous at best. For this very reason, the cosponsors

556 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,” 4. 303 instructed the USIS prefectural public affairs officer who attended the meeting to avoid addressing controversial questions, which should be left to the local cosponsors.557

Although the March 9th meeting did not end all opposition, the USIS notes that it

“ended with a unanimously favorable statement ‘The decision has been made to hold the exhibit in Hiroshima. We will do our best to make it a success, lest people say we prevented it.’”558 The local cosponsors continued to address the concerns of opposition groups both by personally addressing them and addressing the issue in the media, particularly in radio and newspaper editorials. These appeals focused on the educational value of the exhibit, but sponsors also argued that it would provide prestige for the city.

Although doubtless an exaggeration, perhaps even a wildly optimistic one, the USIS ultimately reported that “By April there was unified support from every group and individual in favor of the exhibition.”559

The local cosponsors not only managed to end organized opposition to the exhibition, but they even won former opposition groups over to supporting the exhibition publicly. The sponsors ran a special preview of the exhibit on May 26, to which they invited the press. Members of the press were not only able to go through the exhibit, but they were also encouraged to interview people invited to speak in favor of the exhibition, including several member of anti-nuclear weapons groups that had originally opposed it.560 Having individuals who had opposed the exhibit speak in favor of it not only

557 Ibid., 2-3. 558 Ibid., 4. 559 Ibid., 4. 560 Ibid., 9. 304 produced more coverage, but also raised the profile of the event further and spoke to its persuasiveness among the community most likely to be resistant to its message.

The paucity of opposition to the Atoms for Peace exhibition might be slightly surprising, but there were very few groups that came out against it. Aside from the disruptions in Osaka and Hiroshima, the USIS noted that there were no major protests at the rest of the exhibitions. For example, in Kyoto, the U I officer specifically stated, “It is significant that the Atoms for Peace Exhibit was not marred by incidents inspired by leftist students, such as petitioning for signatures for abolition of A and H bomb nuclear tests. In all past conferences held in Kyoto, such as at the recent Japan Medical Congress which was attended by many American doctors and where the occasion was presented for leftist activity, there have been disturbances.”561

The lack of opposition, however, should not be all that surprising. After all, the major parties favored nuclear power and threw their weight behind efforts to further research, while the academic community was largely unified following the Hopkins

Mission in 1955 and Yukawa’s decision to back the nuclear project. The newspapers, though they would occasionally carry stories critical of the project, were almost all solidly behind the project and many of the national and major regional papers put their prestige behind it. Regional and local government officials routinely backed atomic development, even in areas that did not host a major Atoms for Peace exhibition; for example, governor Kaneko Masanori of Kagawa Prefecture declaring 1956 the year of atomic power despite the fact that Shikoku was the only major Japanese island not to host

561 “Kyoto howing of U I Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 3. 305 a major exhibition. Even governors who opposed the exhibition because of its connections to American foreign policy, such as Ninagawa Torazo of Kyoto Prefecture, did so privately and did nothing to block the exhibition in their prefectures.562 As discussed above, business, union, and even religious leaders supported the development of nuclear power, along with the four leading political parties.

This is not to say that all Japanese were convinced by the public relations campaign, and doubtless a significant number of people objected to the exhibitions and atomic energy. For example, the Hiroshima USIS officer notes that at the opening reception, he was interrupted when an unnamed Korean man, who was apparently intoxicated and had a history of problems with the law, addressed the prefectural public affairs officer and demanded to know, “Why don't you bring the body of Miss

Nakabayashi from the United tates and exhibit it with these things?”563 This gentleman was referring to Nakabayashi Tomoko, one of the Hiroshima maidens, who died right before the opening of the exhibition, thus drawing a connection between the exhibit and the atomic bomb. A student lecturer from the Fukuoka exhibition, Nakayama Yunowuka, commented that, “One young man came along. He insisted that some gamma rays may remain in food and create considerable danger, when I explained that since gamma rays pass through material, gamma-rays-applied food is free from radioactivity. He came to see the Exhibit for two days running. He never went away convinced.”564 Although there were doubtlessly many more people who opposed the peaceful atom, these incidents in

562 “Kyoto Showing of USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit,” 4. 563 “USIS Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima,”11. 564 “Fukuoka ‘Atoms for Peace’ Report,” 16. 306

Hiroshima and Fukuoka were isolated and were rarely reported in the media. With the city of Hiroshima and anti-nuclear groups ultimately advocating for the peaceful atom, the Communists became largely isolated in their opposition. Even the Communists did not oppose the development of nuclear power altogether, rather objecting to its connection to the United States and developing it before the elimination of nuclear weapons. Given the Communists Party’s limited support in Japan, there was no rallying point for opposition to Atoms for Peace.

Conclusion

The Atoms for Peace campaign was a remarkable success. A poll conducted in the beginning of 1956 found that 70% of respondents nationwide associated the word

“nuclear” with the word “harmful,” but when the poll was conducted again in 1958, following the Atoms for Peace campaign, those making such a connection dropped to

30%.565 This shift in opinion was largely the result of the degree to which both the

Japanese media and communities throughout Japan responded to the Atoms for Peace campaign. The USIS and its cosponsors reached deep into communities throughout

Japan, both through mass marketing and more targeted approaches. Newspapers ran extensive coverage about nuclear power, ranging from basic scientific principles and the history of its development to the current state-of-the-art research and projections about its exciting future. This was intended to increase knowledge about the uses of nuclear power and produce interest in its future. The newspapers offered a variety of stories designed to

565 These survey results come from a report by Mark May called “Report on U I Japan” cited in Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006). 307 reach different segments of the population, from children to serious policy watchers.

Although there was some coverage that questioned nuclear power’s place, the rhetoric the papers employed generally ranged from cautiously optimistic to ebullient depending on which audience they were addressing. Headlines that identified isotopes as magical in nature and called nuclear power “the fire of happiness,” made the Japanese media’s support of nuclear power clear.

The media coverage of the Atoms for Peace exhibits and their promotion of nuclear power in general were essential to the success of the campaign. Exit polls from the exhibition show that 62% of those who attended the exhibition heard about it from newspapers, making it the single most important source of advertising, and radio coverage accounted for an additional 6%.566 Of those who attended the exhibition, the overwhelming majority thought that Japan should pursue nuclear power on a broad scale, while most of the rest thought Japan should develop it on a more limited scale. Although attendance was to a large degree was self-selecting and there is no data available from before the promotional campaign, the polling data and anecdotal evidence suggest that the media had already softened the ground for the exhibition significantly, essentially selling the idea of nuclear power before people ever saw the exhibition.

Promotion of nuclear power went beyond the newspapers, however. The USIS and its cosponsors reached out to various communities in the cities where the exhibits were held, inviting their leaders to show support for the peaceful atom. Business leaders, educators, workers, home makers, religious leaders, and artist of various stripes all

566 “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 4. 308 offered their support by pledging to spread the word through their social networks.

Leaders of organizations gave quotes to the media, which could then be used to appeal to people with similar backgrounds or interests. Some would organize official film viewings while still others encouraged members of their community to attend an exhibition or just let friends and family know about the benefits of the peaceful atoms. Such support was important for encouraging attendance,567 but it also served to counter concerns that nuclear power was being pushed on Japan by the United States. By organizing and promoting the exhibition publicly, these groups demonstrated that a broad segment of

Japan wanted nuclear power and was willing to work for it. It was hard to argue that nuclear power was an American plot when your boss, union, and priest were all encouraging you to support it.

The single most symbolically significant endorsement, however, was likely the support of atom bomb survivors in Hiroshima. Although some protestors argued, quite correctly, that Atoms for Peace was a way for the United States to draw attention away from its role in the development and further testing of atomic bombs, most of the arguments centered on the location of the exhibition. These protestors opposed having the

Atoms for Peace exhibition in the Hiroshima Peace Museum since it would displace the artifacts on display there. It is important to note that the protests did not result from opposition to the development of nuclear power itself, which several protestors noted was important and something they did not want to impede.

567 18% of attendees at the Tokyo exhibition heard about the exhibit from a friend, while 14% heard about it from a source other than a newspaper, radio, posters, or a friend. It is impossible to determine what portion of this attendance was the result of USIS community outreach, but it is fair to say that some of it is. “Audience Reaction urvey of Tokyo Atoms for Peace Exhibition,” 4. 309

During the course of the Atoms for Peace exhibition, the Japanese people came to accept nuclear power without the deep ambivalence that marked earlier periods. This acceptance was not limited to the politicians, bureaucrats, and academics that had supported nuclear power development for a decade. It permeated all segments of society.

It was colored by a hope for the future, not for just for all mankind, but specifically for

Japan. Developing nuclear power was a path to reemerge as a world power by taking advantage of the scientific and technological bonanza that nuclear power offered. It was also marked by an urgency caused by the deep anxiety that Japan may already have been too late.

310

Epilogue – Importing the Future

As an epilogue, this study will return to the political aspect of nuclear power and examine the debates policy debates that took place during the early years of the Japanese

Atomic Energy Commission. Although there was a consensus in the Japanese government and in academia on the need to develop nuclear power by the beginning of

1956, there was no agreement about the best way to go about it. Two rival factions debated the course of nuclear power during the early years of the JAEC. These factions were the result of political differences over the best course of action, as well as bureaucratic turf battles to determine which agency would control the development of nuclear power. One faction, which this study will refer to as the “industrial faction,” argued that nuclear power should be put into commercial operation as quickly as possible by importing reactors from abroad. This faction was motivated by Japan’s looming energy shortage and sought to start the nuclear program as quickly as possible so that the crisis could be averted. The other faction, the “academic faction,” believed that nuclear power was still an experimental technology and needed time to mature before an informed decision could be made. It argued that a slower approach and domestic development of reactors would give Japan the time to develop the technical and scientific talent pool that was necessary to run a nuclear power program. A slow approach would

311 also allow more time for the nuclear industry to mature abroad before Japan developed a full-scale program, so that the Japanese program could be modeled on success abroad.

The industrial faction, headed by Shoriki Matsutar , won the day and moved forward an agenda of implementing nuclear power immediately. horiki’s approach placed the interests of industry and the economy as a whole above the issue of safety.

Under his direction, the JAEC decided to import a reactor from the United Kingdom despite a fire at a reactor with a similar design in 1957. Plans were put into place to rebuild Japan’s power infrastructure around the British reactors before engineers and architects could guarantee that they could adequately reinforce that type of reactor to survive an earthquake. The industrial faction’s placing economic interests before safety would become an enduring feature of the Japanese nuclear program for decades to come.

Two warring camps

The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) was established on January 1,

1956. It was founded on the “three fundamental precepts” that nuclear research would be carried out democratically, autonomously, and the results would be made public.568 The commission consisted of a chairman, four commissioners, 15 counsellors, and 30 specialists. horiki Matsutar , in large part due to his work promoting nuclear power throughout 1955, was named the first chairman, with Yukawa Hideki, Ishikawa Ichiro,

Arizawa Hiromi, and Fujioka Yoshio serving as the first commissioners. As a

568 “Activities of Japan Atomic Energy Commission in 1956,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1. No. 1, 5. Atoms in Japan was a bimonthly newsletter printed by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum. It was written in English to reach a foreign audience. The fact that it was primarily intended to inform a foreign audience about the progress of the Japanese nuclear industry is another indication that the Japanese intended to use the program to prove their great power status through science to the rest of the world. 312 compromise at its founding, the Diet agreed that the Commission would have two commissioners to represent the academy (Yukawa and Fujioka), one from industry

(Ishikawa), and one selected by the Japanese Socialist Party (Arisawa). By temperament and politics, Shoriki strongly favored industrial interests, effectively balancing the commission between academic and industrial interests.

Since a political, academic, and economic consensus on the need to develop nuclear power developed after 1955, it was relatively easy to establish the laws and organizations that would make it possible. This consensus, however, did not extend to certain crucial matters. Factions formed around two central issues: first, should Japan import reactors or develop the technology domestically? Secondly, what type of reactor technology should Japan develop? The industrial faction, led by the Shoriki as chairman of the JAEC, advocated the rapid development of nuclear power with a focus on establishing commercial generation of nuclear energy as rapidly as possible. Shoriki was joined by the Liberal Democratic Party, the regional electric power companies, manufacturers , and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The academic faction favored slower domestic development of reactors in order to train a core of nuclear scientists and engineers, and to determine which reactor design would best suit

Japan’s needs. It also tended to favor public development of nuclear technology rather than turning it over to private enterprise. This faction loosely consisted of academics, the

Ministry of Education, the Science and Technology Agency, and the Japan Socialist

Party.

313

The industrial faction believed that the rapid adoption of nuclear power was necessary because Japan already faced an energy crisis that they predicted would worsen rapidly. They cited projections that placed Japan’s power shortfall at 450 megawatts by

1966, 2.8 gigawatts by 1971, 6.42 GW by 1976, and 11.24 GW by 1981. 569 Ipponmatsu

Tanaki, the director of the Kansai Electric power Company, claimed that the shortfall could only be reasonably overcome by the development of atomic energy “In ten years it will become difficult for Japan to develop both hydroelectric and thermal power generation, and generation costs will become higher. As hydroelectric and thermal generation approach their limits, it will become necessary to switch to atomic power generation. Therefore, in order to start commercial operation ten years hence, it is necessary to order a test plant two years hence, complete its construction five years hence and start construction of a commercial plant six years hence. It is impossible to learn techniques unless an atomic reactor is imported and actually handled.”570 According to their projections, the price of nuclear power per kilowatt hour would be competitive with thermal power by the middle of the 1960s, and it would be cheaper than thermal by 1970.

Furthermore, the industrial faction argued that imported reactors could be used to train the scientific and engineering talent that was necessary to build and run a large-scale nuclear program. In its decision announcing that it would import reactor technology, the

JAEC stated that:

In spite of her vigorous efforts, the research and development in the nuclear program of Japan are still considerably lagging behind other foreign countries in

569 Ipponmatsu Tanaki, “Speedy Preparations for Atomic Power Cooperation,” May 14 1956, NACP, RG 263, Box 120, 1. It should be noted that members of the Science Council of Japan disagreed with this assessment. 570 Ibid., 2. 314

particular in respect to the initiation of her program. It is to be expected that it will be a long way before Japan will be in a position to design and construct [a] national power reactor of demonstrated practical value, utilizing her own nuclear technology. It follows therefore that importation of practical power reactors of demonstrated reliability at an early stage is a timely and effective measure for raising the standards of Japan’s nuclear know-how and engineering and at the same time providing additional energy for Japan, thereby contributing to the acceleration of nuclear development program in Japan as a whole.571

Members of the industrial faction strongly believed that Japan had a late start at developing nuclear power and that domestic efforts to develop nuclear power would leave Japan perpetually behind foreign countries. The idea that Japan lagged behind other countries in the development of nuclear power is an interesting one. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom each had a nuclear reactor supplying electricity by 1957, but very few other nations had even experimental reactors at the time, and many owed their research reactors to Atoms for Peace.572 The JAEC’s insistence that it was lagging behind really only applied to three or four countries, but those were the countries with which Japan compared itself. To be a great power, Japan would have to build its own commercial power reactors. In her study of the Windscale nuclear facility,

Lorna argued that British haste to develop a nuclear reactor was tied into their attempts to maintain the status of a great power. Britain rapidly designed and built the Windscale reactors at a time when it did not have the necessary experience, thus making safety a

571 “Jitsuy hatsudenro d nyū ni kansuru genshiryoku iinkai no seimei,” Genshiryoku Iinkai Gepp , Vol. 2 (8), Aug. 1957. Accessed July 20, 2014. http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/ugoki/geppou/V02/N08/195702V02N08.HTML 572 Countries that had experimental reactors in 1957 include Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and Sweden. Canada was a partner in the Manhattan Project, along with the United Kingdom and the United States, and Belgium provided the uranium ore for the Project, using deposits in the Congo. As a result, Canada received technical information on nuclear physics and technology and the Belgians were the first recipients of Atoms for Peace. It is worth noting that the Japanese had an experimental reactor before East or West Germany. 315

Figure 12. Projections for Japan's nuclear future573

573 “Teeing-off program for Japan’s A-Power – Various circles assume critical attitude,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 5, 16. 316 secondary concern to geopolitics.574 By seeking to import a reactor as quickly as possible,

Japan looked to make the same mistake.

uch was horiki’s haste to start developing nuclear power immediately that five days after the establishment of the JAEC, he advocated for an agreement with the US to gain access to power-generating reactors immediately. The four other commissioners immediately responded that such an action would be a violation of the Atomic Basic Law that Shoriki himself had helped shepherd to passage less than a month earlier, and opposed the move.575 Shoriki’s push to import a commercial nuclear reactor immediately, skipping experimental reactors entirely, was in keeping with the narrative that Japan could not wait to develop the technology. But his haste also probably had as much to do with his political ambitions as it did with harsh economic realities. During the formation of the third Hatoyama cabinet at the end of 1955, Shoriki was offered the position of

Minister of Defense, but turned it down in order to become the chairman of the JAEC.

Additionally, he started to appeal to American officials in advance of an attempt to become Prime Minister himself.576 Rapid success at bringing nuclear power, which was quickly becoming popular, to Japan would surely have weighed in his favor as a potential candidate for Prime Minister.

The academic faction favored a slower approach to developing nuclear power. By focusing on experimental reactors and domestic development of reactor designs, they

574 Lorna Arnold, Windscale 1957: Anatomy of a Nuclear Accident (Baskingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 575 Foster Hailey, “Japanese Divided on Atomic Plans Dispute on Role of Private Industry in Development Threatens Nuclear Board,” The New York Times, Jan. 8, 1956, 21. 576 “Classified Message to the Director,” NACP, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, E ZZ-18, Shoriki Matsutar Name File, Volume 2, Box 120. 317 planned to train the engineers and scientists who would be necessary to build and operate a commercial nuclear reactor. They believed that moving too quickly would hurt the

Japanese effort in the long term.577 Once a firm base was established, importation was an option. If they waited until there was a clearer picture of the future of nuclear power, they could examine the operational records of different types of plants before deciding which type of commercial reactor to develop. The academics and their socialist allies preferred public exploration of nuclear power to turning it over to private industry. “If careful watch is not kept, one or two of the large companies will dominate the commercial uses of atomic energy,”578 they argued.

The state of the field at the time was in flux, and it was unclear what type of design would prove to be the most promising. As the debates unfolded in 1956 and 1957, there was only one nuclear reactor providing power to an electrical grid: Calder Hall.

Shoriki and the industrial faction referred to Calder Hall as having an operational record, but it was a short one. Furthermore, the reactor’s primary purpose was producing plutonium for the military, so it was not wholly a commercial nuclear reactor. The academic faction recommended that they at least wait until the American reactor in

Shippingport, Pennsylvania opened later in 1957 before making up their minds, which they did not. Shoriki and the industrial faction had its eyes set on a Calder Hall-type reactor.

577 Foster Hailey, “Japanese Divided on Atomic Plans dispute on role of private industry in development threatens nuclear board,” The New York Times, Jan. 8, 1956, 21. 578 Ibid. 318

Negotiations over the importation of a commercial nuclear reactor began while the Atoms for Peace exhibitions were still under way in Japan. Through the Yomiuri

Shimbun, Shoriki invited Sir Christopher Hinton to Tokyo to discuss the atomic situation in the United Kingdom. Hinton was a nuclear engineer, supervisor of the construction of the Calder Hall reactor, and a member of the British Atomic Energy Authority, as well as a forceful advocate for the expansion of nuclear power. During the course of his two week visit starting on May 16, 1956, Hinton gave four lectures, led roundtable conferences, spoke with experts, addressed concerns of the general public, and most importantly, convinced Shoriki that the British model was a viable alternative to importing American reactors.

ir Christopher’s visit came just five months prior to the opening of Calder Hall.

Calder Hall held a graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactor, built along a similar design as the plant at Windscale, which had been completed six years previously. Both used a graphite- moderated design, which is the most efficient design for producing plutonium.

At first glance, a graphite-moderated reactor used for producing plutonium was a bad fit for Japan, which was constitutionally barred from developing the means of aggressive warfare. Prior to Hinton’s arrival, most Japanese nuclear experts thought that graphite- moderated reactors would not be economical without military purchases of plutonium, and that graphite-moderated reactors only made sense with a military program in place.579

Hinton’s visit, however, overturned this conception. In his lectures and interviews, Sir

Christopher argued that a Calder Hall-type reactor could produce power at one pence (4.2

579 For example, see Sagane Ryokichi “Genshiro sentaku ni kaigan, Hinton-ky no nokoshita mono,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 5, 1956, 2. 319 yen) per kilowatt, a rate nearly competitive with coal power, but also that the price would go down even further if one factored in the intrinsic value of plutonium itself.580 British estimates of a market price of plutonium, were mostly fictitious because no such market existed at the time, Hinton said that Calder Hall could produce electricity for 0.6 pence per kilowatt, which if correct was more or less competitive with coal at the time.581

Even if the price were right, there was still the issue of what was to be done with the plutonium produced by a Calder Hall-type reactor, particularly in a country that was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program of its own. The answer to this question was quite simple: plutonium could be used as fuel for reactors designed to use it. The idea was to start with a series of graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors that would produce plutonium to fuel more efficient reactors that would be designed and built later. The

British planned to experiment with a graphite-moderated, sodium-cooled reactor; light water reactors that would be similar to American designs, only using plutonium rather than enriched uranium; homogeneous reactors, which mixed the fuel source with the moderator, thus creating a core-free design; and a fast breeder reactor.582

The system Hinton described was intended to create a fuel cycle that would produce fuel and electricity at the same time, with the eventual goal of replacing the early plants with fast breeding reactors that would produce their own fuel. This point was very important in both Britain and Japan because both nations were facing shortages of electricity. The alternative to this plan would require either the development of a system

580 Christopher Hinton, “A talk to people in the inner circle of atomic energy in Japan,” NACP, RG 263, Box 120, 3. 581 Ibid., 4. 582 Ibid., 6. 320 for to producing heavy water to act as a moderator for natural uranium reactor or one to enrich uranium for a light water reactor. There were three approaches to producing heavy water on an industrial scale in the 1950s: vacuum distillation of water, distillation of liquid hydrogen, and the Girder sulfide process. The former two were energy intensive and expensive, while the third was based on proprietary technology that had only recently been proven to be feasible for large-scale production.583 Producing enriched uranium was similarly problematic. Natural uranium contains 99.3% uranium-238, 0.7% uranium-235, and trace amounts of uranium-234. Enriching uranium requires increasing the concentration of uranium-235; an enriched uranium reactor requires the fuel to contain 3 to 5% uranium-235. There are numerous approaches to enriching uranium, including the use of centrifuges or gaseous diffusion chambers to separate uranium molecules by weight. Each of these approaches required large-scale industrial infrastructure, and significant amounts of electric power, which neither the Japanese nor British could easily afford.

The American situation was quite different. With an abundance of cheap electric power, the United States could afford to sink large amounts of electricity into enriching uranium for nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the American commitment to nuclear weapons as a tool in the Cold War meant that the US budget for developing a nuclear infrastructure was virtually unlimited. Unlike Japan, the United States did not have to choose between enriching uranium and producing heavy water, but rather did both, along with creating dedicated facilities to produce plutonium. Although it experimented with a

583 J. W. Morris, William P. Bebbington, Robert G. Garvin, Mal C. chroder, and W.C. cotten, “Heavy Water for the avannah River ite.” Accessed July 9, 014. www.c-n-t-a.com/srs50_files/011morris.pdf 321 wide array of reactor designs, the United States ultimately settled on developing light- water reactors that ran on enriched uranium. This decision was largely an issue of path dependency: some of the first non-experimental reactors were designed to operate in submarines, which were well suited to this type of reactor. The companies that made reactors for the navy, such as General Dynamics, then went into the business of producing commercial reactors based on the same technology. Naturally, when the

United States offered nuclear technology abroad, it focused on light-water, enriched uranium designs since that was the technology in which it specialized. Encouraging the export of light-water designs had an added bonus for the United States government: it was one of the few entities that could provide enriched uranium fuel to power them.

Since the atomic energy program was designed to alleviate a pressing coal shortage, the British argued that increasing the electricity demand on the front end by using enriched uranium or heavy water was a poor solution. Instead, they proposed the building of graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors that would avoid both of these initial electricity sinks. Although creating graphite of high enough quality to be useful for reactor work was technically difficult and expensive, it did not require nearly as much electricity as the alternatives. Hinton’s proposal of building 1 graphite-moderated, gas- cooled reactors in Britain by 1965 was “expected to save 5 to 10 million tons of coal.

Furthermore, it will become possible by 1975 to obtain from atomic reactors electric power equivalent to 50 million tons of coal.”584 The British strategy offered short-term savings on traditional fuel while also producing the fuel for the next generation of

584 “Lecture by Sir Christopher Hinton,” at Tokyo, May 19, 1956, May 20, 1956, NACP, RG 263, Box 120, 5. 322 reactors and avoiding the construction of uranium enrichment facilities or heavy water plants.

Fear of coal shortages in the future made many politicians and industrialists more receptive to Hinton’s portrayal of the British strategy. Hinton laid the cold logic out for his Japanese audience:

The driving force behind this plan is the shortage of coal at the present time and the much more serious shortage that is predicted for the future. The problem of future fuel supplies facing us in Britain and you here in Japan are remarkably similar. In both countries we are producing the bulk of our present fuel requirements internally; in both countries the increasing demand for fuel is rising much more rapidly than the production of coal; in both countries the deficiency is being made up primarily by increases in oil imports which are already imposing a heavy strain on our economy and will impose an impossible strain in the future unless an alternative form of power can be developed.585

An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun, picking up on this line of thought argued, "Based on the fact that she is not rich in natural resources while having a comparatively large population, Britain has been vigorously pushing her atomic generation program,” before concluding, “We can safely expect the future of atomic generation to be bright. We therefore think it appropriate for Japan to carry on her basic plans for research and application simultaneously rather than to withhold application until research is complete.”586

This line of argument deeply appealed to Shoriki, whose chief concern appears to have been starting commercial production of nuclear power as soon as possible. Matsui

Sashichiro, who worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported to the CIA that,

585 Ibid. 586 “ aa C Hinton kisyadan ni kataru,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 1956, 1. 323

“ horiki was convinced by Sir Christopher Hinton that atomic power could be developed fairly soon and on an economically competitive basis. Furthermore, Hinton's sales talk on the use of British power reactors fitted in perfectly with Shoriki's person predilections for moving ahead rapidly with the development of atomic power. Shoriki is basically a man of action and impatient with efforts to take a more cautious study approach to the problem.”587 Having spent months battling the academic faction and its slow, cautious approach to the issue, Hinton’s offer to deliver an immediate solution deeply appealed to

Shoriki.

horiki’s impatience and Hinton’s promise of fast results, combined with the other advantages of the British proposal, hurt the American sales pitch, which consisted of selling light water nuclear reactors to Japan and supplying the necessary enriched uranium. Following Hinton’s trip, Dr. Marvin Fox of the Brookhaven National

Laboratories visited Japan, ostensibly to survey the possibility of setting up the Asian

Nuclear Center in Japan, and met with Shoriki. His meeting did not go nearly as well as

Hinton’s. Matsui reports that, “Dr. Fox, who urged a cautious approach publically, made a rather poor impression on Shoriki and convinced him that the US was not anxious to push early development of atomic power.”588 Subsequent memos from the CIA indicated that Dr. Fox told Shoriki that he would have to wait at least five years before Japan could import a reactor from the U. . The CIA report goes on to say, “This reservation

587 “Memorandum of conversation July 5, 1956, Participants: Mr. Sashichiro Matsui, Fourth Section, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” July 3, 1956, NACP, RG 263, Box 120, 1. 588 Ibid. 324 apparently came as a considerable shock to PODAM [Shoriki] and prompted his overtures for the procurement of a reactor from the British.”589

For its part, the CIA thought it had accomplished its task by helping to convince the Japanese to pursue nuclear power. At one point the Japanese field office asked the

tate Department, “Does it matter whether the Japanese purchase U. . or British reactors?” The tate Department replied, somewhat brusquely, that the U government would very much prefer to promote “the business opportunities of American firms” so it would “of course like to see the Japanese purchase their reactors on the United tates market.”590

Although Shoriki and atomic industry insiders like Ipponmatsu were sold on

Hinton’s proposal, the academic faction continued to object to the immediate development of nuclear technology. Yukawa Hideki, taking leadership of the faction, argued that they should study the issue more fully and make the best informed decision possible. Although both British graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors and American light water reactors showed promise, it was not clear in the summer of 1956 which design would prove superior. The argument dragged on until Shoriki announced his decision to import a Calder Hall-type reactor in March, 1957. Yukawa opposed the decision so strongly that he resigned over it, though he was convinced to stay on until the end of the

589 “This reservation apparently came as a considerable shock to PODAM and prompted his overtures for the procurement of a reactor from the British,” 6 July 1956, NACP, RG 63, Box 1 0, 1. 590 “PODAM [redacted] – Policy Re Japan Atomic Energy Program,” July 6, 1956, NACP, RG 63, Box 120, 3. 325 month and officially retired over “ill health.”591 At the end of March, Dr. Yukawa was replaced by Dr. Kaneshige Kankuro. Vexed by the academic faction’s attempts to slow the import of reactors, the industry faction set out to replace Dr. Fujioka Yoshio, a representative of academia, with someone from an industrial background. They approached Okano Yasujiro, a former executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Oya

Atsushi, the vice chair of the JAIF who had previously worked for Sumitomo Chemical

Industries.592 When both of these men declined the position, Dr. Fujioka retained his position, but the academic faction was clearly on the ropes.

A Plan of Action

On October 5, 1957, the JAEC announced its long-term development plan. This plan covered 18 years, from fiscal year 1958 to 1975. The goal was to bring 7 GW of nuclear power online by 1975, most of which was to be based around breeder reactors.

The plan envisioned accomplishing this goal using three generations of reactors. The first generation would be advanced Calder Hall models, the second generation would be thermal breeder reactors, and the third generation would be fast breeder reactors. At the time the plan was written, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute had already constructed a water boiling experimental reactor of American design (JRR-1). It also had plans to build an American CP-5 reactor (JRR-2) and a heavy water reactor of domestic design (JRR-3). The JAEC plan added a second and third domestically designed reactors,

591 Yoshioka, “Forming a Nuclear Regime and Introducing Commercial Reactors,” in A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Volume 2: Road to Self-reliance, 1952-1959 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001), 91. 592 “Two Commissioners for JAEC Reappointed,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no 2, 15-16. 326 the first a thermal breeder reactor and the second a fast breeder reactor. These experimental reactors were intended to study the fuel cycle, gain experience, and refine designs before rolling out full-scale demonstration plants based on the newer technology.593

Breeder reactors produce more fuel than they consume. Thermal breeder reactors take their name from the fact that they use a moderator to reduce the energy of neutrons ejected through fission, while fast breeders do not use a moderator and use the fast neutrons. Both thermal and fast breeder reactors use a fissile core to create and sustain a fission chain reaction. In each of these reactors, the core is surrounded by a mantle of

“fertile” materials, which are non-fissile materials that can be transmuted into fissile materials. Some of the neutrons that are released during the chain reaction escape the core where they encounter a mantle of thorium-232 in a thermal breeder; in a fast breeder, either thorium-232 or uranium-238 could be used. The non-fissile thorium or uranium captures these neutrons and undergoes a process that produces fissile uranium-

233 or plutonium-239, depending on which type of material is used in the mantle.

Breeder reactors eliminate the need to create an enrichment structure and they are far more fuel efficient than conventional reactors, both of which were appealing given

Japan’s limited resources.594

593 “Hatsudeny genshiro kaihatsu no tame no ch ki keikakuan ni tsuite,” Genshiryoku inkai Gennp , Vol. 2 (10), Oct. 1957. Accessed July 20, 2014. http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/ugoki/geppou/V02/N10/195702V02N10.HTML 594 Although the technology seemed promising in the 1950s, it never achieved the success many had envisioned. Breeder reactors have proven more expensive than light water reactors and the falling price of high quality uranium has made the technology less desirable. Japan brought its first experimental fast- breeder reactor, J y , online in 1977 and the Monju Nuclear Power Plant came online in 1994. A year and a half into operation, Monju experienced a sodium coolant leak that resulted in a fire. The Power Reactor 327

Despite its long-term focus, the plan focused on reaching commercial production as soon as possible. This focus was due in large part to the looming energy shortage. The plan assumed that 50 percent of Japan’s energy would be imported from abroad and that the volume of imported oil would be twenty times greater than the 1958 level by 1975.595

The plan was developed in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis of 1956, which raised questions about the stability of Middle Eastern oil exports. It was also immediately before the decade and a half of declining oil prices between 1958 and 1973. Meanwhile, the plan assumed that atomic power would be competitive with conventional thermal plants by the mid-1960s and that developing and constructing nuclear reactors would be cheaper than building thermal plants after 1970.596

Calder Hall-style reactors played a key role in the plan. Atoms in Japan went so far as to state that “The advanced Calder Hall reactors are [being adopted] in Japan solely for the purpose of filling the gap between now and the time when the fast breeder reactors will be put into operation,”597 but they offered other advantages as well. In 1957, when this plan was written, it was not yet clear which technology would emerge as the best and the leader of the Atomic Energy Mission, Ishikawa Ichiro, proposed the Calder Hall-type saying that it was “one of the most promising reactors.”598 It was the only commercially available reactor at the time, making it the only one with operating experience, and it

and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation attempted to cover up the extent of the incident, causing public outrage that delayed the restart of the reactor until 2010. While the Americans, British, and Germans have largely abandoned fast-breeder technology, the Japanese, Indians, French (with some British collaboration), and Russians have continued to work on it, though there are only a handful of plants in operation. 595 “Hatsudeny genshiro kaihatsu no tame no ch ki keikakuan ni tsuite.” 596 Ibid. 597 “Teeing-off Program for Japan's A-Power: Various circles assume critical attitude,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 5, 19. 598 “A-Power Program Not Yet Crystalized,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 1, 2. 328 would fit into the fuel cycle proposed by Hinton. One of the largest selling points, however, was that the JAEC believed that it would be relatively easy to produce parts for the reactor domestically. The first reactor would be built with 60 percent domestic parts, but projections showed that this figure would go up to 85 percent by the early 1960s and

93 percent by the end of the decade.599

Many groups inside and outside of the government criticized the plan. The

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum

(JAIF), the Nuclear Fuel Corporation, and JAERI all argued that it was impossible to project costs, energy deficits, or reactor technology that far in advance, with MITI and the JAIF both pointing out that that the plan did not consider fluctuations in coal and oil prices. The JAIF, JAERI, the Federation of Electric Power Companies, and the Japan

Atomic Power Company, the public-private corporation that was created to operate the first nuclear power plant, all complained bitterly that the plan did not place enough emphasis on the research and development of enriched uranium reactors, rather focusing overmuch on the Calder Hall, natural uranium designs.600 The JAEC program did not entirely eschew enriched reactor designs, but it significantly downplayed their role in the development of Japan’s nuclear power program.

The JAIF and the Asahi Shimbun argued that the JAEC was overestimating domestic capacity to produce components for nuclear reactors, with the Asahi Shimbun arguing that “The Commission proclaims that reactors will be built domestically, but the capacity and technology of the associated industries are problematic. The present state of

599 “Hatsudeny genshiro kaihatsu no tame no ch ki keikakuan ni tsuite.” 600 “JAEC’s Long-term A-Power Program Criticized,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 6, 7-9. 329

Japan is such that the nation will have enough trouble building even a small swimming pool research reactor.”601 The Mainichi Shimbun stated that it was good to have an overarching plan to direct the development of nuclear power, argued that it left out key elements, such as the training of personnel, which would make the quick implementation of nuclear power difficult.602 Meanwhile, the Asahi Shimbun believed that “Mapping out a long-range program is not a bad idea in and of itself. However, the general public would prefer a short-term plan based on definite projects to a long-range program with baseless projections.”603

The Asahi Shimbun was also critical of the choice to import the Calder Hall model because it was more susceptible to being damaged in an earthquake than a water moderated design. The paper ran a report citing the finding of Takeyama Kenzabur , the head of the Building Research Institute; the institute was part of the Ministry of

Construction and was responsible for studying issues relating to building standards and earthquake engineering. Takeyama warned that Calder Hall-type reactors were poorly suited to surviving earthquakes because they used graphite as a moderator.604 The graphite lattice would be comprised of bricks of highly refined graphite that could be crushed during a seismic event, which would damage the reactor and possibly cause a fire.

Even if the bricks were not damaged, any shift in their position could prove disastrous.

Takeyama did not oppose the importation of Calder Hall-type reactor, but rather believed that it was an engineering and architectural challenge that could be overcome. Eleven

601 “Gojyū nendo ni nanahyakugo-man kirowatto,” The Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 5, 1957, 1. 602 “JAEC’s Long-term A-Power Program Criticized,” 7-9. 603 “Gojyū nendo ni nanahyakugo-man kirowatto,” The Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 5, 1957, 1. 604 “‘K rudaa h ru-kata hatsudenro wa jishin ni yowai’ kenchikukenkyūjyo jyūdai na kenkoku,” The Asahi Shimbun, Oct 30, 1957, 1. 330 days later, a second piece ran in the Asahi which featured Takeyama’s enthusiasm for the project, saying, “If a design that brings together English knowledge of reactors and

Japanese understanding of earthquakes can’t do it, then nothing can.”605

Studying the issue of earthquake preparedness was greatly complicated by the fact that the British refused to share any of the specifications before the final deal was signed, including the dimensions of the graphite bricks. Undeterred, the Japanese went forward with preparations during the course of negotiations. Takeyama’s Building Research institute was joined by groups at JAERI, the Earthquake Research Institute of the

University of Tokyo, and the architecture departments of both University of Tokyo and

Waseda University. The JAEC Special Committee for Earthquake-proof Reactors took the designs and data produced by these organizations and send them to the UK to see if they were on the right track, but they did not receive much in the way of confirmation.

Without the necessary specifications, the research was mostly guesswork as

Takeyama conveyed in one of his less reassuring statements “To make graphite blocks for the experiments, what unscientific and humorous ways we tried! For example, we used a magnifying-glass to enlarge a picture in a magazine to better see the graphite part.

Sometimes we asked visiting British nuclear engineers, who were so closed-mouthed, to sit on the vibrating stand and shake them together with the experimental blocks to interpret their reaction.”606 Even with the benefit of shaking what must have been some seriously nonplussed Brits, this research was based on the use of 1/10-scale models, which Takeyama himself admitted were problematic. The use of models was essential to

605 “Takeyama Kenzabur – Jinsunhy ,” The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 9, 1957, 5. 606 Takeyama Kenzabur , “Earthquake-Proof Measure for Graphite Pile,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 6, 2. 331 the process of determining the best way to secure the structures, but their use greatly simplified a complex system that could act in unexpected ways when all the pieces came together.607

Despite the limitations that Japanese researchers faced, the engineers and architects studying this problem tended to believe that Japan was up to the challenge of earthquake-proofing its reactors. Takeyama summarized the Building Research Institute’s findings “It can be said that the reactor design proposed to date is not appropriate in view of earthquakes, although it is understandable that no necessity for earthquake-proof measures exist in England. I also feel certain that an adequate earthquake-proof measure can be taken by reinforcement of the reactor. In fact, there are several measures proposed to the Special Committee for Earthquake-proof Reactors. None of them [are] easy, although [they] should not be impossible.”608 The measures that Takeyama refers to include using a steel cage to reinforce the pile, building to 1.5 times the existing building standards, and making the graphite bricks twelve-sided to avoid slippage.609

The issue of safety and earthquake preparedness became vitally important when a reactor with similar design to that of Calder Hall, Windscale Number 1, caught fire in

Britain. The fire broke out on October 10, 1957, five days after the JAEC released its plan to build Japan’s nuclear industry around British designs. From the start the use of a graphite moderator proved problematic. When graphite is bombarded by free neutrons, its crystalline structure begins to shift, which causes it to build up a significant amount of

607 Ibid., 3. 608 Ibid. 609 Ibid. 332 energy. This energy is named Wigner energy after its discoverer, Eugene Wigner. Left unattended, the Wigner energy can be released in unpredictable bursts, causing the core temperature to spike dangerously. To overcome this problem, the British used an annealing process, which involved heating the graphite up to 250°C and then letting it to cool. This process allows the graphite’s structure to return to normal as it releases its pent up energy in a predictable fashion.

By itself, the problem of Wigner energy did not cause too great of a problem, but it was exacerbated by the repurposing of Windscale to produce tritium. Originally the reactor was designed to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, but the advent of hydrogen bombs, prompted the British to repurpose the Windscale reactors to produce tritium. During the process of retrofitting the reactors, engineers replaced the cooling fans, which changed the heat distribution in the core. Since temperature gauges had been placed to measure the previous pattern, the core could heat up in a way that was undetectable to the reactor’s operators.

After the reactor’s operators started an annealing process on October 7, 1957, they discovered that the Wigner energy was not being released as expected. These readings were likely caused by operators’ inability to accurately measure the temperature of the core. With a false understanding of what was occurring inside the reactor, the operators removed the control rods to allow a second heating of the graphite to insure that the annealing process accomplished its goal. This second heating caused either a fuel rod or a lithium cartridge to burst, eventually leading to a fire. Still lacking the ability to measure

333 the core temperature accurately, engineers continued to allow increased air-flow to cool the reactor, inadvertently feeding the flames.

On October 10th, irregularities led the crew to inspect the gauges visually, confirming that the reactor was on fire. During the height of the crisis, one thermocouple read 1,300°C, close to the melting point of steel. The reactor crew fought the fire over the next two days, starting with liquid carbon dioxide, which had little effect. As concern over the danger of the factory’s concrete collapsing from the heat, which would expose the containment crew to the reactor’s radiation, forced the crew to take a bold risk: dousing the fire with water. Using water could have backfired, since the oxygen from the water could begin to oxidize with the metal, leaving hydrogen gas. Hydrogen gas is extremely combustible and could have caused the entire reactor to explode.610 The gamble paid off and the structure remained intact, while the fire went out.

A large portion of the radioactive debris was contained by air filters, but radioactive isotopes including iodine-131, cesium-134, and plutonium escaped into the atmosphere. The radioactive contamination spread as far as east as Russia, affecting most of Britain, Denmark, the Baltic countries, the southern portions of Sweden and Norway, and northern Poland, as well as portions of Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Although the International Nuclear Event Scale would not be introduced until 1990, the

Windscale fire would have been a five out of seven, the same level as the partial

610 “Thomas Tuohy: Windscale manager who doused the flames of the 1957 fire,” The Independent, Mar. 26, 2008, Accessed: July 18, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/thomas-tuohy- windscale-manager-who-doused-the-flames-of-the-1957-fire-800546.html. 334 meltdown at Three Mile Island.611 Estimates suggest that 740TBq of iodine-131, 22 TBqs of cesium-137, 12 PBqs of xenon-133, and some plutonium were released from

Windscale.612

The release of iodine-131 and cesium-137 were especially troubling because these elements could easily be incorporated into the food chain and ultimately bond with human bodies. Iodine-131 is chemically identical to iodine-127, so if it is digested, it might be incorporated into the thyroid gland where iodine is essential to producing hormones. Cesium-137 chemically bonds in a way that is similar to potassium, which makes it possible for it to be incorporated into human muscle tissue. Both cesium-137 and iodine-131 regularly undergo beta and gamma decay, which can damage cells and cause cancer. Estimates on the deaths and disease caused by the radiation released by the

Windscale fire is still controversial, with different studies suggesting various outcomes.

A study of the people who worked on extinguishing the fire and cleaning up afterward does not show a statistically significant connection between exposure and cancer,613

611 International Atomic Energy Agency, “INE – The International Nuclear and Radiological Event cale,” Accessed July 21, 2014, http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp. There have only been three incidents with a higher INES rating than Windscale: the Kyshtym disaster at Mayak Chemical Combine (6), the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (7), and the Chernobyl disaster (7). 612 John R. Cooper, Keith Randle, Ranjeet S. Sokhi. Radioactive Releases in the Environment: Impact and Assessment (New York: Wiley and Sons, 2003). By way of comparison, 1.8 EBq of iodine-131, 85 PBq of cesium-137, 6 of EBq of xenon-133, 80 PBq of strontium-90, and 6.1 PBq of plutonium were released during the Chernobyl disaster. Nuclear Energy Agency, “Chernobyl Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact,” Accessed July , 014, https://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/c02.html. 613 D. McGeoghegan, . Whaley, K. Binks, M. Gillies, K. Thompson, and DM McElvenny, “Mortality and cancer registration experience of the Sellafield workers known to have been involved in the 1957 Windscale accident: 50 year follow-up,” Journal of Radiological Protection, Sep. 2010, Vol. 30, no. 3, 407-431. 335 while other studies suggest that some 240 people likely died prematurely as a result of exposure to radioactive contamination.614

On October 18th, a little over a week after the Windscale fire, Dr. Yukawa returned to the JAEC to once again state his objection to importing a Calder Hall-type reactor. After he retired from the JAEC he formed the Elementary Particle Research

Group,615 a group whose members believed in a more cautious approach to the importation of a reactor design. The Elementary Particle Research Group was joined by other scientists when it presented its case and tried, once again, to convince the JAEC to wait to sign an agreement with the United Kingdom. They argued that at the time “Any power reactor type is but on an experimental stage and the Calder Hall-type is not [an] exception.” Furthermore, “It is expected that the advanced countries will report on the results of their studies on the more advanced technology in respect to power reactors at the 2nd Geneva conference next September. Under the circumstances, therefore, Japan had better to get in the bilateral negotiations after reviewing such reports.”616 The JAEC ignored the Group’s suggestion.

The JAEC did not, however, ignore the disaster all together. The Japan Atomic

Power Company (JAPC), a public-private corporation that was charged with importing the first reactor, sent a mission to the United Kingdom in January of 1958 to investigate safety concerns that had arisen since the Windscale fire. The British assured JAPC that the same type of incident could not occur in the latest designs. The Windscale reactors

614 Rebecca Morelle, “Windscale Fallout Underestimated,” Oct. 6, 007. Accessed July , 014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7030536.stm 615 The group also included Miyamoto Goro and Tamaki Hidehiko of the University of Tokyo and Taketani Mitsuo and Doke Tadayoshi of Rikkyo University. 616 “Savants Appeal Power Bilaterals,” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 1, no. 5, 27. 336 had been designed for plutonium production and then retrofitted to produce tritium, which caused the unpredicted heat patterns that created the conditions that led to the fire at Windscale. Such problems would not exist in reactors designed for commercial production of electricity. Whereas Windscale accumulated Wigner energy rapidly and required frequent application of the annealing process, “we expect that in the life of the reactor [20 years] the stored energy will be less than the specific heat of the graphite and it is, therefore, not likely that it will be necessary to release this energy during the life of a reactor.”617 The Windscale fire would not be repeated in the Japanese reactor because it would not require periodic releases of Wigner energy.

Furthermore, even if it did require a release of Wigner energy, the Calder Hall- type reactors did not use the same process. As the JAPC mission report explains:

The adiabatic method employed in releasing energy in the Windscale piles is difficult to apply. These difficulties coupled with imperfections of instrumentation were largely responsible for the Windscale Incident. This method would not be adopted in the civil designs. In Calder Hall arrangements have been made to provide a supply of hot air to the cold end of the reactor by re-circulation for the purposes of Wigner energy release. Similar facilities can be incorporated in the civil designs and other methods of combatting the effects of energy storage are already under consideration. The storage of energy in the graphite of the Calder Hall reactors is monitored by placing graphite samples in the reactor. Approximately 2,000 samples have been placed in Calder Hall and these will be examined throughout the life of the reactor.618

The inclusion of removable pieces of graphite to determine the extent to which Wigner energy had built up was certainly an improvement over the method used in the Windscale reactors: guessing based on faulty temperature readings. The British stressed that the each reactor they built taught them more about the design and operation of nuclear reactors,

617 “Visit of Mission from Japanese Atomic Power Company to Industrial Group - 27/28.1.58,” 618 Ibid., 2-3. 337 and that the designs they were selling the Japanese would incorporate what they had learned. "The lessons learned at Windscale,” the British promised, “are being applied to all British reactors. Instrumentation has already been much improved since the time when the Windscale piles were built… The recommendations of the Instrument Working Party set up as part of the Windscale investigations are now being applied to the civil designs.”619

The JAPC’s concerns went beyond the Windscale fire. Regarding the question of earthquake preparedness, the British observed, “In the case of a design intended to withstand earthquakes further calculations must be made taking account of the special conditions which might occur. Although the safety is of paramount importance careful judgment must be exercised to ensure that the reactor design is not spoiled by introducing complications against unduly unlikely occurrences.”620 The Calder Hall-type reactor design was fairly simple for a nuclear reactor, and this simplicity was often seen as a mark of safety; with fewer complicated parts it was less likely to break down in a crisis.

As such, the British warned against changing the design more than was necessary since any change could undermine the safety of the design as a whole. The British design principle was to determine the maximum credible threat and design to accommodate that.

This principle complicated the export of a Calder Hall-type reactor because whereas earthquakes were not a credible threat in Britain, they an inevitability in Japan. The

British considered the design so safe, in fact, that they did not consider a secondary containment structure necessary:

619 Ibid., 3. 620 Ibid., 4. 338

It has not been considered necessary to provide separate containment for the present designs of civil power reactor[s]. The necessity for containment depends very much upon the specific design and in some future designs now under consideration in which temperatures and ratings will be much higher containment is under consideration. In some countries it might be politically desirable to provide [an] additional measure of containment. In such cases the existing reactors buildings might be adapted to give this. The building would require to be re-designed to the proper as[e]ismic code.621

The decision to not include a secondary containment structure on the earliest design of this type of reactor exposed workers and people living near the plants to high levels of neutron and gamma radiation because the coolant vents were located outside the biological shield,622 raising questions about the wisdom of not including a secondary containment building.

Negotiations over the import of a British reactor slowed following the fire, regardless of reassurances that the advanced Calder Hall-type reactors did not share

Windscale’s weaknesses. The Japanese reluctance to continue the negotiations was driven by their opposition to the “hold-harmless” clause in the treaty. The clause indemnified the British government from any damage that resulted the “processing, possession, leasing and utilization” of nuclear fuel provided under the bilateral agreement between Japan and United Kingdom regarding the development of nuclear power. The Japanese argued that they were uncomfortable agreeing to indemnification while importing a new technology, particularly in light of Windscale fire, which suggested that nuclear power was not entirely safe.623 After a great deal of negotiation,

621 Ibid., 4. 622 British Nuclear Group ellafield, Ltd., “Discharges and Monitoring of the Environment in the UK, Annual Report 004,” accessed July 20, 2014, www.sellafieldsites.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/08/BNGSL-2004.pdf. 623 “Anglo-Japanese Bilateral trike a nag?” Atoms in Japan, Vol. 2, no. 1, 5. 339 the final version of this clause read, “The Japanese Government shall indemnify and hold harmless Government of the United Kingdom and the [British Atomic Energy] Authority against any liability to any third party for damage which is attributable to the production or fabrication of such fuel and which occurs after delivery to the Government of Japan or persons authorised by that Government.”624 This wording indemnified the British for any damage caused processing the fuel, but not in its use. Concern over the hold-harmless clause raised further questions about how to assess the potential liabilities that nuclear power presented, and how to insure those liabilities; these questions further delayed the importation of a reactor.

Despite the significance of the Windscale fire and its potential effect on Japanese nuclear policy, the Windscale fire did not garner much attention in the popular press. The

Asahi Shimbun discussed the Windscale fire only twice, a month after the event. The first article simply stated that there had been an “accident” at the Windscale plant, and as a result the British hydrogen bomb tests on Christmas Island had been delayed.625 The second article was more substantial, but still lacking in detail. A large portion of the article focused on the release of radiation. Although the Atomic Energy Authority insisted that very little radiation had escaped from the plan, it halted milk production in nearby areas since iodine-131 had been detected outside of the plant. At the end, the article raises the issue that Japan was planning on importing a reactor with a similar design, and that the question of whether a similar accident could happen in Japan was still

624 “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/ugoki/geppou/V03/N06/195806V03N06.HTML. 625 “ uibaku jikken wa chūzetsu jy tai ni genryoku k ba no jiko de,” The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 16, 1957, 3. 340 under investigation. It concludes with an admonition for Japan to heed the lessons of the

Windscale Incident.626 Surprisingly, the Asahi Shimbun never followed up this article.

The Yomiuri Shimbun ran only one story that mentions Windscale. It appeared four and a half months after the event and consists of the transcript of the budget committee’s hearing on the safety of British reactors in which horiki Matsutar assures the Diet that

Calder Hall-type reactors were safe.627 Meanwhile, the Mainichi Shimbun does not seem to have mentioned it at all.

Given Japan’s experience with radiation, it is somewhat surprising that the

Windscale fire was not more widely covered. The paucity of coverage was likely related to the British government’s attempts to cover up the extent of the incident, and the British press self-censorship regarding the disaster. In the United States, The New York Times ran a story every couple of days through October and November, but these stories were very short, often only a hundred words or so. The little information these stories contained was very similar to the coverage in the Asahi Shimbun. Still, the story featured the dangers of radiation and the technology involved was closely to related to the type of reactor that the

JAEC seemed dedicated to importing in blatant disregard of the scientific community’s recommendations. Unlike the coverage that filled 1954 about the Lucky Dragon, atomic tuna, and radioactive rain, seemingly no one cared about a nuclear disaster. To be sure, the fire occurred half a world away and it did not immediately threaten Japanese citizens, but somehow the Asahi Shimbun could only find space to run a single substantive story on page three, and that was over a month after the fire had already been out for a month.

626 “Genshiro kara moreta h syan ,” The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 18, 1957, 3. 627 “Eiro no anzensei tsuikyū,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, Feb. 22, 1958, 1. 341

Once the Japanese had decided to adopt nuclear power, it would seem, radiation no longer seemed so fearful.

The agreement that paved the way for Japan to import a Calder Hall-type reactor was signed in London on June 16, 1958 and went into effect on December 5th of that year.

This agreement represented a complete victory for the industrial faction in the JAEC. It would be a few more years before construction started on the reactor in March of 1961, and another five years before it went critical in July of 1966. The reactor was dubbed

Tokai Number 1. Tokai Number 1 proved problematic throughout its construction, and a number of years were required before it operated properly.628 By the time its construction was complete, the JAEC was already moving toward American reactor technology using light water reactors. Construction on the first American reactor using American technology started in August of 1967, just a little more than a year after the completion of the Calder Hall-type reactor. By that point, Shoriki was no longer a member of parliament nor a JAEC commissioner. 1967 started a period of rapid reactor construction, with construction on 21 reactors starting in the seven years between 1967 and 1973.

These reactors were built with designs and aid from General Electric and Westinghouse, with the actual construction done by Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba. In the end, the

United States realized its goal of building nuclear reactors in Japan.

628 Yoshioka, “Forming a Nuclear Regime and Introducing Commercial Reactors,” in A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan: Volume 2: Road to Self-reliance, 1952-1959 (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001). 342

Conclusion

The victory of the industrial faction over the academic faction in the JAEC left

Japan with a nuclear program that was more interested in the economics of nuclear power than its safety. Despite the pleas of the physics community to wait for further information, the JAEC came out with a plan to base nuclear development along the British model and would later refuse to pause to consider the implementation of this plan when a British reactor caught fire, raising questions about the design’s safety. Meanwhile, the Japanese public remained largely uninformed about the disaster at Windscale and its broader implications for the Japanese nuclear program. The news media that was so interested in promoting nuclear power suddenly became silent once questions about its safety arose.

The pro-nuclear power consensus that emerged during and after the Atoms for

Peace exhibitions in Japan was based on the belief that nuclear power was safe. This belief emerged in large part because of the assurances offered by national and international experts in science. It was also likely in part because nuclear power was a modern, Western technology, which many Japanese were inclined to trust because it was both modern and Western.629 Once the pro-nuclear consensus was established, it would remain durable for decades. Although “not in my backyard” style protests emerged in the

1960s, large numbers of Japanese would not begin to question the safety and desirability of nuclear power until the 1970s, with larger numbers disapproving after the 1986

629 David Wittner’s study examines the Japanese imports of technology in the 19th century and shows that Japan would import the most “modern” technology based on the symbolic power of its modernity, rather than selecting technology that best suit its needs; the nuclear power case in the 1950s seems to be another example of this phenomenon. David Wittner. Technology and the culture of progress in Meiji Japan (New York: Routledge, 2008). 343

Chernobyl disaster.630 Despite the fact that many nations paused to reconsider their nuclear power programs following the accident at Three Mile Island (1979) and, particularly, Chernobyl, the Japanese nuclear industry simply assured the populace that similar incidents could not occur in Japan. Surprisingly, construction on new nuclear power reactors occurred shortly after each of these incidents; construction began on four new reactors in November 1980 and construction on the Ikata Number 3 reactor in Ehime began four months after the meltdown at Chernobyl, with four more construction starts to follow in 1987.

Multiple accidents in the Japanese nuclear industry in the 1990s, such as the

Monju coolant fire (1995) and the Tokaimura criticality incident (1999), severely damaged the credibility of the industry in Japan. The Great Tohoku Earthquake and the resultant disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant utterly destroyed what is left of the public’s consensus support of nuclear power.631 For decades, officials assured the public of the safety of nuclear power while they ignoring inconvenient safety issues in order to pursue economic objectives, and this tendency is visible from the first years after the founding of the JAEC. Unlike the 1950s and 60s, nuclear reactors have decades of operating experience, and their safety failures are a matter of public record, factors which hamper efforts to convince the Japanese people to continue to pursue nuclear power.

Furthermore, the suite of nuclear technologies on offer in the 1950s are no longer

630 Daniel Aldrich, Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 131-136. 631 As of March 18, 2014, 59% of Japanese opposed restarting the nuclear reactors which had been shut down following the Fukushima disaster. “Genpatsusai kad 'hantai' 59%, Asahi shimbun yoronch sa,” The Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 18, 2014, Accessed July 22, 2014, http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASG3K42CKG3KUZPS001.html 344 bundled in the public consciousness, which allows people to support moving away from nuclear power generation without abandoning the use of radiation in science and medicine. The most revolutionary promises of the atom never materialized and it is still more costly than conventional fuels. Although submarines and air craft carriers are powered by nuclear reactors, this technology never successfully reach the private sector.632

Nuclear power does, however, remain a viable policy. After all, Japan imports 85 percent of its energy, and the price of oil is historically high, causing a drain on Japan’s balance of trade. Thomas Hughes argues that there is such a thing as “technological momentum,” which describes the difficulty of shifting away from established technologies because the infrastructure that makes them work is already in place and replacing it can be prohibitively expensive.633 Nuclear power plants are especially expensive, and the massive amount of investment in existing plants would be wasted if

Japan were to walk away from nuclear power. Furthermore, there is a high cost to not using those plants until a permanent alternative can be arranged. If Japan decided to rely solely on renewable sources of energy, it would still take years before the infrastructure could be built. In the interim, the Japanese would have to import a large volume of oil and liquid natural gas to power fossil fuel plants.

632 The Japanese tried repeatedly to develop a nuclear powered civilian vessel. The project started in the 1950s and did not produce a working prototype until 1974. The prototype, Mutsu, developed a leak in its coolant system on its test voyage, spewing radiation into the ocean. Work continued on the ship until 1991, and its reactor was removed in 1995 having completed a single successful test voyage. 633 Thomas Hughes. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 345

Nuclear power also remains a symbol of Japanese technological prowess, particularly as other nations in Asia turn toward nuclear power as a viable solution to energy problems. The export of Japanese reactors to southeast Asia could provide an economic benefit as well as a boost to Japanese pride. Promoters point to nuclear power as a potential solution to global warming since it does not produce carbon emissions.

Newer generations of reactor technology are purportedly safer than past designs, though it would take political will and, at the least, a lack of public opposition to the installation of new capacity, which seems unlikely when the public seems determined to eliminate existing reactors. It is also unclear whether the government could push forward with nuclear power without the support of the public. The LDP no longer enjoys the monolithic control of the Diet that it once did. As it stands today, it remains to be seen whether Japan will go “back to the future” with nuclear power.

346

Conclusion

The Japanese experience with atomic bombs and radioactive fallout made Japan a seemingly unlikely candidate to develop nuclear power. However, nuclear power provided a potential solutions to Japan’s energy crisis, while offering Japan a way to secure its place in the international community and a means of defining itself as a nation dedicated to scientific, technological, and economic development. A considerable number of the Japanese policy-making apparatus were convinced of the need to develop nuclear power even before the announcement of Atoms for Peace, with some even viewing

Japanese adoption as inevitable.634 They were convinced the nation’s lack of energy resources and the looming energy shortage would cripple the country. Furthermore, they believed that nuclear power was the future of energy and that by engaging in nuclear research Japan could reintegrate into the international community and show that it was still a world leader. Atoms for Peace was the catalyst that converted the “inevitable” into a plan of action.

The Japanese public, however, was not equally convinced. A significant portion of the Japanese people correlated nuclear technology with nuclear weapons and viewed it as harmful, which was a potential threat to the development of nuclear power. The United

States, for its part, offered Atoms for Peace to Japan as a form of propaganda designed to

634 “Japanese Aspiration on an Atomic Energy Program for Japan,” Dec. 15, 195 , NACP, Box 51, Japan General 1947-1952. 347 shift the Japanese public’s focus away from American nuclear weapons testing. The

American Atoms for Peace exhibitions went a long way to severing the rhetorical link between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. By combining all of the non-weapons uses of atomic physics under the banner of the “peaceful uses of nuclear power,” these exhibitions created a suite of technologies that promised boundless potential with no downside. The dichotomy that emerged between the use of atoms for war and for peace allowed the Japanese to embrace the “peaceful atom,” while decrying the continued existence of nuclear weapons. The media campaigns that surrounded the exhibitions amplified the message of Atoms for Peace, while the USIS focused on mobilizing existing social networks to promote the campaign for them. Between the promotion of nuclear power by the USIS, CIA, and Japanese a consensus emerged that nuclear power was safe and offered a bright future.

Pursuit of nuclear power also gave the Japanese a national project that fit in well with the country’s postwar sense of identity; since Japan emerged from the war as a pacifist nation, what better project than to take the agent of its downfall—nuclear technology—and turn it to peaceful uses? A focus on the “peaceful uses of nuclear power” fit nicely with its transformation from a militarist nation to one dedicated to peace. It alone among the major nations would be focused on developing the power of the atom to improving the quality of life and standard of living of its people.

The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s decisions received relatively little public scrutiny as it started down a path that privileged industrial needs against safety concerns. The Windscale Fire received almost no coverage in the major newspapers

348 despite its potential implications for Japan’s plans to import a reactor of the similar design. The consensus that developed around nuclear power would remain durable for decades and would only be challenged as people started to have experience living with the reality of nuclear power plants, and even then the opposition remained relatively local. The vast majority of Japanese people either supported nuclear power or did not express an opinion when questioned into the 1980s.635 Although public opinion turned against nuclear power following the Fukushima disaster of 2011, it remains to be seen whether the Japanese will abandon what was once the energy source of the future.

635 Daniel Aldrich studies Japanese support for nuclear power from the 1960s to the 1980s. His findings can be found in Daniel Aldrich. Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), . 349

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