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Contemporary Archives Otto , (C? JCJr -f=- Keesing's STANFORD UNIVERSITY Contemporary LIBRARIES Archives FEB 2 3 1983 Record of World Events Edited by Robert Fraser Volume XXIX (1983) 52nd Year of Publication Record of national and international current affairs with continually updated indexes. Keesing's factual reports are based on information abstracted from press, broadcast­ ing, official and other sources. UK ISSN 0022-9679 Longman K! 32591 KEESING'S VOLUME XXIX December 19! In the context of a motion on Liberal Party strategy approved on Sept. As regards internal party matters, the Liberal assembly 22 the assembly had also declared that the priority was now "to allow approved on Sept. 20 a constitutional amendent stating that t the relationship [between the Liberal Party and the SDP] to evolve party's standing committee should have the responsibility for t according to local wishes through joint campaigning", with the agreement final draft of the party's general election manifesto, subject on arrangements for the 1984 European elections being seen as "a major the final agreement of the leader of the party; (ii) approved, al step in that direction". The motion continued: "We therefore oppose any further allocation of seats or any attempt to create obstacles to the on Sept. 20, a motion that "in future Liberal Party politic development of closer relations between the two parties. We strongly broadcasts shall be the joint responsibility of the standing comm believe in the democratic principle that members of the two parties should tee and the campaign and elections committee, together with tl not be expected to support and campaign for those candidates in whose leader and the parliamentary party"; and (iii) on Sept. 22 reject selection they have not played a full part. Therefore, decisions over the a proposal that a deputy leader should be elected.—(Times method of selecting candidates should be taken at local level by the Guardian - Financial Times - Labour, Liberal and Social Dem members of both parties, and we recommend joint open selection as the cratic Parties) (Prev. rep. Labour Party 32526 A; SDP pa most effective way of choosing the best person, of whichever party, to 32285; Liberal Party/SDP Alliance 30980 A, 31176 A, 31699. win each seat." 31771 A, page 3221 MIDDLE EAST — ARAB WORLD i A. CHAlj) — Civil war in north - Libyan, French talks were reportedly also concerned with Libyan occupation i and Zairean involvement the uranium-rich "Aouzou strip" on the border between the tw countries, which had been annexed by Libya in 1973 [see 281361 31677 A; 32104 A]. These talks having proved inconclusiv Border clashes with Nigerian forces (April to May reports of fighting in northern Chad (where rebel forces capture 1983). Ounianga-Kebir) were followed by Chadian complaints again Capture of Faya-Largeau by northern-based rebel forces Libya at the United Nations. of Mr Goukouni Oueddei (June 24). The Government of Chad complained on March 17 of Libya French and Zairean aid to Chadian Government "aggression and occupation" and demanded an urgent meeting of tl (June). UN Security Council; the Libyan Government, however, rejected the! Government counter-offensive and recapture of Faya- accusations and claimed that President Habre was attempting to dive attention from "fighting between rebel forces controlling the capital an Largeau (July). the forces of the legitimate Government led by Mr Goukouni Oueddei Fall of Faya-Largeau after Libyan air strikes (Aug. The Security Council on April 6 called on the two sides to reconcile the 10). differences "without delay and by peaceful means" on the basis of th charters of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Aft; Formation of French defensive line (August). more fighting in mid-April, the Chadian representative at the UN accuse 10th Franco-African summit conference (Oct. 3-4). Libya of "violating the spirit and the letter" of this declaration. The situation in Chad was also discussed at a meeting in Paris on Apr Renewed fighting broke out in northern Chad in mid-1983 11 between Mr Abdullah Obeidi, the Libyan Foreign Secretary, an between government troops of the Forces armies nationales French government officials. tchadiennes (FANT) and Libyan-backed rebel forces loyal to Mr United States State Department officials reported "an upsurg Goukouni Oueddei, the former President until June 1982 [see of Libyan military activity in northern Chad" during May, an 31677 A] and leader since October 1982 of a rival "National on May 17 the Chadian Government claimed to have defeate Peace Government" set up in the northern town of Bardai [see a rebel assault on Faya-Largeau. A government spokesma: 32104 A]. announced on June 22 that rebel columns "with the active logisti A series of rebel successes in June and July took Mr Oueddei's support of the Libyan Army" were advancing on Faya-Largeau forces as far south as the town of Abeche [see map on page and after two days of conflicting claims the Government admittei 31677], but President Hissene Habre's government forces then on June 25 that the town had fallen to the rebels the previou launched a successful counter-attack, driving the rebels north day, and that FANT units were making a "tactical withdrawal' towards the Libyan border. In early August, however, the rebels south-east towards Abeche. (with Libyan air support) recaptured the town of Faya-Largeau While rebel spokesmen admitted receiving arms and supplies from thi and again advanced southwards. The fighting subsided in August Libyans, they repeatedly denied allegations that Libyan personnel wen after French troops, who had moved into Chad at President involved in the fighting. Mr Soumalia Mahamat, the Chadian Informatioi Habre's request, assisted government forces to establish a series Minister, nevertheless insisted on June 24 that government units wen of strongpoints across the country, in a line running from Mao being engaged directly by Libyan soldiers. On the same day M. Claudi in the west to Abeche in the east. Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister, warned that France would no remain indifferent to Libyan involvement in Chad (which was a Frencf Diplomatic efforts to resolve crisis - Outbreak of colony until 1960—see 17569 A; 17612 A). fighting - Reports of Libyan involvement The question of Libya's continuing support for Mr Oueddei Border clashes with Nigerian troops was discussed when a Libyan delegation visited Ndjamena, the A dispute over the ownership of a number of islands in Lake capital of Chad, at the beginning of March. The discussions, the Chad led to a series of clashes between Chadian and Nigeriar first contact between the two Governments since President Habre troops during April and May. assumed power in 1982, continued later in the month when a Over 70 soldiers were killed in fighting in the islands in late April, and Chadian delegation flew to Tripoli, the Libyan capital; the Tripoli on May 16 the New Nigeria newspaper claimed that over 300 Chadian December 1983 KEESING'S VOLUME XXIX 32592 troops had been killed in a Nigerian counter-attack. Although an agree­ FANT units rapidly consolidated their victory at Abeche by ment to end the hostilities was signed by representatives of both Govern­ pursuing the rebel forces northwards, recapturing Oum Chalouba ments in Lagos (the Nigerian capital) on May 17, the fighting continued and Biltine on July 14, Fada on July 21, and Faya-Largeau on and on May 19 the Nigerian press reported that Chadian soldiers, suppor­ July 31. A government spokesman claimed that over 800 rebels ted by French mercenaries, had launched a major offensive, while Chadian had been killed in the FANT advance and 26 Libyan personnel sources later the same month claimed that Nigerian MiG fighter aircraft taken prisoner—10 men identified by the Government as Libyan were bombing Chadian lakeside villages. soldiers were paraded through Ndjamena on July 31. At a meeting in Ndjamena between President Habre and Presi­ dent Shehu Shagari of Nigeria on July 11, the two sides agreed Libyan air strikes on Faya-Largeau - Increased US to end the fighting and to reopen the border, which had been military aid - Rebels recapture Faya-Largeau closed for several months. In the first week of August, Libyan aircraft carried out a number French and Zairean aid to Habre Government - FANT of air strikes against FANT positions in the vicinity of Faya- counter-offensive Largeau, Oum Chalouba and Kalait. The raids were condemned by the US State Department as "open aggression" and "overt The fall of Faya-Largeau led to decisions by the French and intervention which is dangerous to the stability of the region". Zairean Governments to provide military aid to the Habre regime. The Chadian Government made a formal complaint about the President Mitterrand of France accused Libya on June 28 of raids to the Security Council on Aug. 9. directly supporting the rebel forces, and stated that France would According to US intelligence and eyewitness reports from European supply military aid to Chad under the terms of the 1976 co­ residents of Faya-Largeau, the raids, which were carried out by Sukhoi-22 operation agreement [see 27744 A]. The French Air Force began bombers using napalm as well as phosphorous and fragmentation bombs, airlifting supplies, including anti-tank guns and rockets, to resulted in several hundred casualties, including a large number of Ndjamena on June 27, and 250 Zairean soldiers also arrived on civilians, many of whom were left to die without treatment as the FANT July 3 together with three Macchi MB-326 K counter-insurgency forces retreated. The Libyan news agency JANA denied that Libyan aircraft of the Zairean Air Force. aircraft had carried out any bombing; however, a man identified by the Chadian Government as a Libyan Air Force major, who was said to have The Libyan Government continued to deny that it was involved in the been captured after his aircraft was shot down, stated in Ndjamena on fighting.
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