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Air University Review: March-April 1975, Volume XXVI, No. 3

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Air University Review: March-April 1975, Volume XXVI, No. 3 UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY Al R reviewU N I VE R S IT Y T H E PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CONGRESS AND NATIONAL S E C U R IT Y ...................................................................................................................... * The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Member United States House of Representatives T he Dec isio n to Respond: W hat Forces Do We Need in a Crisis? .... 16 Lewis A. Frank COUNTERFORCE IN AN E r .A OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE......................................................... 27 Capt. D. J. Alberts, USAF N ew Waves in the South Atlantic: A S trategy Needed?............................................. 38 Dr. Richard E. Bissell Acquisition: A Dynamic Process...................................................................................................... 45 Lt. Col. David N. Burt. USAF Air Force Review T he New USAF F ighter Lead-In Program A Fir st Year’s Progress Report......................................................................................... 55 Lawrence R. Benson In My Opinion Program Management and Major Mo d if ic a t io n s ...................................................67 Lt. Col. George R. Hennigan, USAF C risis around the Air po r t ...................................................................................................... 75 Capt. John G. Terino, USAF Books and Ideas T he Metrics Are Coming! ............................................................................................................ 82 Dr. James A. Fraser A n American Dilemma: E mpire or Containment? ................................................... 87 D r . G e o r g e VV. C o l l i n s T he Contributors..................................................................................................................... 95 Addrc» rrunutcnpu to Editor. Air Umversity Rrvrvr Dtvsion Bldg 121!. Maxwell AFB. AL lhe covcr 36112. Princcd by Government Pnnting Office. Addirw «ubvnption» to Superintendem of Dncu- Article I of the Constitution provides for the mrm». GPU. Washington DC 20402. yearly $1 I 60 Icgislative powers of lhe Congress of the United domeicn:. $14.50 foreign. single copy $2.00. States, and Scction 8 thereof em powers the Con­ gress to “provide for the comrnon Defence and general Welfare of the United States/* Con- grcssrnan William L. Dickinson of Alabarna. in Vol XXVI No 3 M arch-A prii. 1975 '‘Congress and National Security," focuscs on how this broad Constituiional mandatc is put into effec t by the Congress of th is latter day. Our covcr reflects both the U.S. Constitution and lhe scal of the U.S. House of Representatives. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY T he Honorable William L. Dickinson Member, U.S. House of Representatives S I see it, national security covers lows it to effectively administer and si two broacl areas: the internai and pervise its part in the overall responsibi A the externai. The externai threat ity for national security. to our national security is the one with The beginning of wisdom for a mil which most of you are better accjuainted tary officer attempting to understan because you are a part of the military how Congress works on national securit force charged with the responsibility to would be, I suspect, to recognize th; keep that threat in check. The Congress efficiency is not the first priority. I ofte is deeply involved in both the internai find that military officers look with bt and the externai dimensions, and I vvant mused tolerance on the way Congreí to spend a few minutes discussing each. conducts its business. (We have had Dt But first I vvant to explain the internai fense Secretaries who viewed us wit organization of the Congress, which al- unbemused tolerance.) This is not sui On a visit to Headquarters Military Airlift Commarul on 2 November 1973, Congressman William L. Dickinson and members of the Airlift Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee confer with the Commander, General Paul K. Carlton. Mr. Dickinson is seated third on the GeneraTs right. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECUR/TY 5 rising because, in a sense, the first proach has a virtue that the Presidential urpose of our institution is the antithe- decision-making lacks. In this regard, let s of vours. The military’s first priority is me quote something from a delightful ways to be orgartized and trained in little book by George Reedy called The uch a way as to perform efficiently in Twilight of the Presidency (1970). Mr. I Reedy makes a point worth remember- he most violent and chaotic situation, hat is, in war. The purpose of the ing about how' even astute Presidents can Congress is to provide a fórum where blunder into bad political decisions. deas are fullv tested in debate and No man is so wise as to play his own vhere all points of view are considered. “devil’s advocate," and workable wisdom is The contribution of the legislative the distillation of many different view- íjranch is the democratization of the points which have clashed heatedly and bovernmental process. Whenever you in- directly in an exchange of opinion. To fuse democracy into decision-making, maintain the necessary balance between you pay a price in lost efficiency; a assurances of securitv and assurances that bommittee is not as efficient as a dictator. enough factors have been taken into con- sideration is perhaps the most pressing This is not to say that Congress cannot problem of statecraft. The atmosphere of íecome more efficient in the way it the VVhite House, in which the president is conducts its business. In fact, it is now in treated constantly as an infallible and (the throes of a reorganization to do just reverential object, is not the best in which that—particularly to ensure better con- to resolve this problem. Itrol of the federal budget. But remem- In retrospect, it seems little short of ber, as you view the Congress, it is not amazing that Presidem Kennedv would designed to be a streamlined decision- ever have embarked upon the ill-fated Bay making organization, and attempts to of Pigs venture. It was poorly conceived, reorganize it run the risk of limiting its poorly planned, poorly executed, and un- capacitv to represem the people s voice dertaken vvith grossly inadequate knowl- in the process of government. edge. But anyone who has ever sat in on a White House council can easily deduce I make this point at the beginning what happened without knowing any facts because I am going to say later on that I other than those which appeared in the think Congress is going to have an public press. VVhite House councils are not increasing voice in national securitv pol- debating matches in which ideas emerge icy-making in the future. If this happens, from the heated exchanges of participants. I hope you vvon t judge the wisdom of The council centers around the president the Congressional decisions by the seem- himself, to vvhom everyone addresses his ingly raucous and zigzag way we some- observations. times go about making them. But this isn t just a result of Congressmen and Senators’ not knowing what they are Air University Revieu< takes pleasure in pre- talking about; it is a necessary concomi- senting to its readers lhe substance of an address given at the Air Command and tant of the basic nature of the institution. Staff Cofiege on 20 Septetnber 1974 by VV inston Churchill said, “Democracy is The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Rep- the worst form of government ever de- resentative from the Second District of vised—except for all the others.” Alabama in the Congress of the United V\e may even be coming to an appreci- States. The Editor ation of the fact the Congressional ap- 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW The First strong observations to attract the place where policy would be made the favor of the president become subcon- Congress was given the power to collec sciously the thoughts of everyone in the taxes and duties, to “provide for th< room. The focus of attention Shifts from a testing of all concepts to a groping for common defense and the general wel means of overcoming the difficulties. A fare,” to “regulate commerce with for thesis which could not survive án under- eign nations,” to “declare war,” to “raisi graduate seminar in a liberal-arts college and support armies,” to “provide anc becomes accepted doctrine, and the only maintain a navy,” to “provide for orga question is not whether it should be done nizing, arming, and disciplining the mili but how it should be done. A forceful tia.” public airing of the Bay of Pigs plan In giving “executive power” to the would have endangered the vvhole project, President, the framers nowhere stated of course. But it rnight have prevented what that is. But he was given specifit disaster. powers in conducting externai affairs l he men who wrote the Constitution He was macle Commander in Chief ol were not all that much concerned with the Army and Navy and was given the efficiency in conducting the people’s power to make treades and to appoint business. They didn’t think there would ambassadors and other officials with the be all that much business to conduct. If concurrence of the Senate. there is one idea to which they uniformly Congress retains to this day more au­ subscribed, it was: the less government, thority in domestic than in foreign af­ the better. Thev were imbued with Mon- fairs. A President can get us into war tesquieu’s ideas of the nature of man, without prior aetion by Congress, but he and they believed that no one man could caiTt build a highway or raise Social be trusted with an undue concentration Security until Congress first gives the of power. In the field of national security okay. they envisioned that the President would The founders, in other words, envi­ be, in effect, chief executive officer re- sioned legislative government, and for sponsible for carrying out the policy fash- much of the nineteenth century that is ionecl by Congress.
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