UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY

Al R reviewU N I VE R S IT Y T H E PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

CONGRESS AND NATIONAL S E C U R IT Y ...... * The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Member United States House of Representatives T he Dec isio n to Respond: W hat Forces Do We Need in a Crisis? .... 16 Lewis A. Frank COUNTERFORCE IN AN E r .A OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE...... 27 Capt. D. J. Alberts, USAF N ew Waves in the South Atlantic: A S trategy Needed?...... 38 Dr. Richard E. Bissell Acquisition: A Dynamic Process...... 45 Lt. Col. David N. Burt. USAF Air Force Review T he New USAF F ighter Lead-In Program A Fir st Year’s Progress Report...... 55 Lawrence R. Benson In My Opinion Program Management and Major Mo d if ic a t io n s ...... 67 Lt. Col. George R. Hennigan, USAF C risis around the Air po r t ...... 75 Capt. John G. Terino, USAF Books and Ideas T he Metrics Are Coming! ...... 82 Dr. James A. Fraser A n American Dilemma: E mpire or Containment? ...... 87 D r . G e o r g e VV. C o l l i n s T he Contributors...... 95

Addrc» rrunutcnpu to Editor. Air Umversity Rrvrvr Dtvsion Bldg 121!. Maxwell AFB. AL lhe covcr 36112. Princcd by Government Pnnting Office. Addirw «ubvnption» to Superintendem of Dncu- Article I of the Constitution provides for the mrm». GPU. Washington DC 20402. yearly $1 I 60 Icgislative powers of lhe Congress of the United domeicn:. $14.50 foreign. single copy $2.00. States, and Scction 8 thereof em powers the Con­ gress to “provide for the comrnon Defence and general Welfare of the United States/* Con- grcssrnan William L. Dickinson of Alabarna. in Vol XXVI No 3 M arch-A prii. 1975 '‘Congress and National Security," focuscs on how this broad Constituiional mandatc is put into effec t by the Congress of th is latter day. Our covcr reflects both the U.S. Constitution and lhe scal of the U.S. House of Representatives. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

T he Honorable William L. Dickinson Member, U.S. House of Representatives

S I see it, national security covers lows it to effectively administer and si two broacl areas: the internai and pervise its part in the overall responsibi A the externai. The externai threat ity for national security. to our national security is the one with The beginning of wisdom for a mil which most of you are better accjuainted tary officer attempting to understan because you are a part of the military how Congress works on national securit force charged with the responsibility to would be, I suspect, to recognize th; keep that threat in check. The Congress efficiency is not the first priority. I ofte is deeply involved in both the internai find that military officers look with bt and the externai dimensions, and I vvant mused tolerance on the way Congreí to spend a few minutes discussing each. conducts its business. (We have had Dt But first I vvant to explain the internai fense Secretaries who viewed us wit organization of the Congress, which al- unbemused tolerance.) This is not sui

On a visit to Headquarters Military Airlift Commarul on 2 November 1973, Congressman William L. Dickinson and members of the Airlift Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee confer with the Commander, General Paul K. Carlton. Mr. Dickinson is seated third on the GeneraTs right. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECUR/TY 5 rising because, in a sense, the first proach has a virtue that the Presidential urpose of our institution is the antithe- decision-making lacks. In this regard, let s of vours. The military’s first priority is me quote something from a delightful ways to be orgartized and trained in little book by George Reedy called The uch a way as to perform efficiently in Twilight of the Presidency (1970). Mr. I Reedy makes a point worth remember- he most violent and chaotic situation, hat is, in war. The purpose of the ing about how' even astute Presidents can Congress is to provide a fórum where blunder into bad political decisions. deas are fullv tested in debate and No man is so wise as to play his own vhere all points of view are considered. “devil’s advocate," and workable wisdom is The contribution of the legislative the distillation of many different view- íjranch is the democratization of the points which have clashed heatedly and bovernmental process. Whenever you in- directly in an exchange of opinion. To fuse democracy into decision-making, maintain the necessary balance between you pay a price in lost efficiency; a assurances of securitv and assurances that bommittee is not as efficient as a dictator. enough factors have been taken into con- sideration is perhaps the most pressing This is not to say that Congress cannot problem of statecraft. The atmosphere of íecome more efficient in the way it the VVhite House, in which the president is conducts its business. In fact, it is now in treated constantly as an infallible and (the throes of a reorganization to do just reverential object, is not the best in which that—particularly to ensure better con- to resolve this problem. Itrol of the federal budget. But remem- In retrospect, it seems little short of ber, as you view the Congress, it is not amazing that Presidem Kennedv would designed to be a streamlined decision- ever have embarked upon the ill-fated Bay making organization, and attempts to of Pigs venture. It was poorly conceived, reorganize it run the risk of limiting its poorly planned, poorly executed, and un- capacitv to represem the people s voice dertaken vvith grossly inadequate knowl- in the process of government. edge. But anyone who has ever sat in on a White House council can easily deduce I make this point at the beginning what happened without knowing any facts because I am going to say later on that I other than those which appeared in the think Congress is going to have an public press. VVhite House councils are not increasing voice in national securitv pol- debating matches in which ideas emerge icy-making in the future. If this happens, from the heated exchanges of participants. I hope you vvon t judge the wisdom of The council centers around the president the Congressional decisions by the seem- himself, to vvhom everyone addresses his ingly raucous and zigzag way we some- observations. times go about making them. But this isn t just a result of Congressmen and Senators’ not knowing what they are Air University Revieu< takes pleasure in pre- talking about; it is a necessary concomi- senting to its readers lhe substance of an address given at the Air Command and tant of the basic nature of the institution. Staff Cofiege on 20 Septetnber 1974 by VV inston Churchill said, “Democracy is The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Rep- the worst form of government ever de- resentative from the Second District of vised—except for all the others.” Alabama in the Congress of the United V\e may even be coming to an appreci- States. The Editor ation of the fact the Congressional ap- 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW The First strong observations to attract the place where policy would be made the favor of the president become subcon- Congress was given the power to collec sciously the thoughts of everyone in the taxes and duties, to “provide for th< room. The focus of attention Shifts from a testing of all concepts to a groping for common defense and the general wel means of overcoming the difficulties. A fare,” to “regulate commerce with for thesis which could not survive án under- eign nations,” to “declare war,” to “raisi graduate seminar in a liberal-arts college and support armies,” to “provide anc becomes accepted doctrine, and the only maintain a navy,” to “provide for orga question is not whether it should be done nizing, arming, and disciplining the mili but how it should be done. A forceful tia.” public airing of the Bay of Pigs plan In giving “executive power” to the would have endangered the vvhole project, President, the framers nowhere stated of course. But it rnight have prevented what that is. But he was given specifit disaster. powers in conducting externai affairs l he men who wrote the Constitution He was macle Commander in Chief ol were not all that much concerned with the Army and Navy and was given the efficiency in conducting the people’s power to make treades and to appoint business. They didn’t think there would ambassadors and other officials with the be all that much business to conduct. If concurrence of the Senate. there is one idea to which they uniformly Congress retains to this day more au­ subscribed, it was: the less government, thority in domestic than in foreign af­ the better. Thev were imbued with Mon- fairs. A President can get us into war tesquieu’s ideas of the nature of man, without prior aetion by Congress, but he and they believed that no one man could caiTt build a highway or raise Social be trusted with an undue concentration Security until Congress first gives the of power. In the field of national security okay. they envisioned that the President would The founders, in other words, envi­ be, in effect, chief executive officer re- sioned legislative government, and for sponsible for carrying out the policy fash- much of the nineteenth century that is ionecl by Congress. what we had. But what the founders clid As we know, it hasn't quite workecl out not foresee is the ability of an active that way. President to make commitments that the The founders gave the Chief Execu­ legislature could not abrogate. lhe tive the traditional powers given to an power of the President expancled, not by executive but circumscribed his authority Constitutional amendment or acts of in areas that had been abused by kings Congress but by Presidents’ getting away and governors in the past: the authority with what they could. Often the Con­ to make treaties and appoint ministers gress was left with no choice but to was shared with the Senate; the power of legitimize what the Commander in Chief veto was limited to legislation as a whole had already done. (the veto was really thought of as a In the twentieth century a series of Presidential defense against an aggressive reforms designed to improve budgetary legislature); and the power to make war control contributed to a shift of power to was given to Congress. the Executive Branch. l he most notable It is clear that the writers of the was the Budget and Accounting Act of Constitution considered the legislature as 1921, which set up the Budget Bureau CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 7

Congressman Dickinson meeis wiih young Air Force officers in a Commitlee hearing room.

(now the Office of Management and In these sectors [military policy and Budget) and provided the President a foreign policy] Congress generally ac- central agency for clearing all legislative quiesces in Presidential dominance. Its proposals. That act has resulted in the mode of behavior, by necessity or choice, President’s becoming the chief legislative has become primarily that of monitoring officer of the government and Congress’s the executive branch. . . . The increasing largelv forfeiting its role as originator of tendency to monitor, to establish political legislation. perimeters of tolerance and expectation, Coupled with this has been a great rather than to use power to intervene shift in power to the Presidency, particu- deeply in the shaping of the substance of larly since the Franklin D. Roosevelt policies, is perhaps the most striking devel- administration. Congress, it must be said, opment in Congressional behavior. acquiesced in the abrogation of much of I bring all this up for two reasons: one its policy-making power. is that it is helpful background in talking In an essay entitled “Congress and about the Congress’s role in national National Security Policy," political scien- security policy-making. But more impor­ tist Holbert N. Carroíl, writing in the tam, I think we are entering a most early 1960s, summed it up this way: exciting time in the life of the legislature. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Recent events have reminded us of what security affairs Congress has taken too rnany of our citizens have forgotten: back seat, and it is here that the mos that the Congress is the branch that significant changes are likely to occut provides the democratization of govern- Some of us have a tendency to think o ment and that assures protection of peo- national security in terms of strictly mili ple’s rights and freedoms. I think what tary policy—the matters that are th* scared people most about Watergate— province of the Armed Services and Ap and rightly so—is the thought that it propriations Committees. I want to b< could happen here, that the Constitution clear, however, that I am thinking o could be subverted bv willful men. And national security in the broad sense recent events should also remind us that which involves many committees, as well if the genius of our system, the checks as the whole range of our foreign policy and balances of power, is to work, the which involves the Foreign Affairs anc Congress must play its full role. I think Foreign Relations Committees. this realization will lead to the people’s I do want to say some things abouj demanding more of the Congress. how Congress is approaching militar) There is a concomitant of this which policies and which ones are likely to gel also will surely contribute to Congress’s added attention in the future. But First playing a larger part in national security there is one aspect of our internationai policy-making in the future. It is that trade policy with a profound impact or events have taken the mystique out of our national security which I want to the Presidency. The entry into and con- discuss in some detail both because it is duct of the Vietnam war, Watergate, often neglected in talks such as this and credibility gaps of one kind or another— because it is an area where I feel Con­ all have done much to dispell the idea gress is ready to take the initiative to that Presidents and their advisers are prevent the Executive Branch from possessed of vast additional knowledge gravely weakening our security withouti and special wisdom. Presidents of both realizing what it is doing. parties have botched the job enough that The issue is just how far we are to go members of Congress have lost their in assisting the Soviet Union and its inferiority complex about opposing Presi- Communist satellites to develop their dential policies. military and industrial capability. I think, therefore, that the Congress is Since the May. 1972 summit confer- facing its most interesting but most diffi- ence in Moscow. at which the abm Treaty cult challenge: the challenge to take back and the ínterim Agreement for the Lim- and exercise its share of the power it has itation of Strategic Offensive Arms were surrendered over the past forty years. signed, we have seen an alarming in- Whether it is willing to do that, and crease in the exportation to the Soviets whether it can do so wisely, remains to of some of America’s most advanced be seen; but to do so will require much technological know-how. For instance, in work and more political fortitude on the October 1973, Control Data Corporation part of those of us in the legislature. announced the signing of a ten-year As I mentioned earlier, Congress has agreement with the U.S.S.R. Council of always playecl a more prominent part in Ministers for Science and Technology to domestic policy, where it has been on provide for technical “cooperation” in more familiar terrain. But in national developing and manufacturing the most CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 9 ijdvanced Computer equipment. The puters. As you know, the Soviets have rord “cooperation" meant that they just recently developed the capability to rould supply us with some of their mir v their long-range ballistic missiles. dvanced capabilities and we would sup- We expect to see mirv warheads de- »]y them with some of ours. The truth ployed by the Soviets in 1975. f the matter is, our technology in this With the advancement of détente with rea is roughly five years ahead of theirs. the Soviet Union, we have witnessed a 'here is little that the Soviets know that steady dismantling of our export Con­ vould be of any value to the American trols. 1 believe that this trade constitutes :omputer industry. Consequently. any a threat to American labor and industry, jenefit derived from such an agreement as well as to our security, in the long vould accrue to the Soviet side and run. vould onlv serve to help dose that five- But let us examine another question •ear gap. American sources in Moscow for just a moment: Does, indeed, a true ?stablished the agreement’s ultimate détente exist between the United States worth to the Soviets at about $500 mil- and the Soviet Union? I don’t believe so! iion. The Soviets outspend us militarily, and The Sperry Rand Corporation entered have since 1970. They encouraged the into a similar agreement with the Soviets Arabs to prolong the recent oil embargo in May of 1974 and is now discussing against the West, as they encourage them with the Soviets the possible construction to make war in the Middle East. We have of a large Computer manufacturing com- lavished them with the American tech­ plex in Moscow. Just recently a univac nology which they so desperately need 1106 Computer, the most advanced ever and must have if they are ever to transferred to a Communist countrv, was outstrip us militarily. But they have con- delivered to Poland. tinued to go out of their vvay to prove Obviouslv, such agreements could ben- that the Cold War is alive and well in efit the Soviets in a military wav. And Moscow. Détente must be a two-way since the Soviet military machine is de- Street, but, so far as I can see, almost all signed with the destruction of the United of the benefits have been realized by the States in mind, I do not believe that such other side. agreements are in our best interest. Now don’t misunderstand me. I think (1 believe the issue of national security détente is a good idea. It’s a sensible is more important to the American peo- alternative to perpetuai tension between ple than the several million dollars that the two most powerful nations the world U.S. industry vvill derive from the sale of has ever known. But we've done our our best technology.) part, and it’s now time for us to slow VVithout computers, modern weapon down and question what the Soviets are systems could not be built. integrated, going to contribute to the cause of tested, deploved, kept combat-readv, or détente. operated. In fact, computers form an Using American technology, the Sovi­ integral part of the armament systems of ets have been able to increase their missiles, aircraft, tanks. and submarines. productivity to the point where they are Avionics are intrinsically computer- now producing more of some products linked. So is missile accuracy. MIRVing than their own economy requires. One missile heads is impossible witbout com­ example is tractors, which have been 10 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW introducecl into the American market, and vocal group of members who are it selling for 20 to 50 percent less than favor of giving the Soviets practicall’ comparable U.S.-made tractors. VVe can- everything we have. not expect American industry and vvell- For the most part, trade with Com paid, organized American vvorkers to munist countries is regulated by th< compete with Soviet state-owned enter- Export Administration Act, passed by prise married to nonfree Soviet labor. Congress in 1969. That act gives tht And this is why 1 say that vve must President broad powers to control trade exercise strong export Controls or else vve The authority for administration of tht threaten the very existence of American act has been delegated to the Secretary labor and industry as vve knovv it. We still of Commerce. Under the provisions ol live in an economic world, and vve must the act, a private company that desires to begin to vievv economics in the long run sell its products in foreign nations is rather than in terms of immediate “Wall required to apply to the Department of Street type” parameters. Commerce for a separate license to ex­ There is no doubt in mv mind that port each product. The Secretary of American technology in the Computer Commerce then notifies the Secretaries field has advanced the Soviet military of State and Defense of the request for effort by several years. There is no doubt licensure and asks each to advise him as that American machinery to be used for to whether or not the license should be the manufacture of trucks at the Kama granted. If, for example, the Secretary of River Truck Plant can also be used to Defense objects to the licensure of the produce trucks to transport troops and product on grounds that it vvill be of ammunition from behind the Iron Cur- military significance to the recipient, the tain in an attack on our allies in Western Secretarv of Commerce vvill consider the Europe. There is no doubt that a ioan objection and vvill make the final deci- made by the Export-Import Bank to sion. He can, and occasionallv has, over- assist the Soviets in purchasing American ruled the Secretary of Defense. Gener- goods has the ultimate effect of strength- ally, vvhen he does overrule the Secretary ening their economy, and 100 percent of of Defense, his justification is that the the bank financing is provided by Ameri­ product in question is “readily available can banks vvhile none is provided bv the elsewhere.” In some cases it makes good Soviets. There is no doubt that if Boeing sense that if the Soviets can get a particu­ or Lockheed proceeds to build a vvide- lar product from England, France, Ja- bodied aircraft factory in the Soviet Un­ pan, or any one of several other nations, ion, those wide-bodied aircraft could be vve may as well sell it to them, even if it used for the transport of troops or for benefits them in a military vvay. At least the mid-air refueling of Soviet bombers. if vve sell it to them, vve knovv what they I could go on and on, but I think the have. But the Soviets themselves have idea is clear. said that it is American technology in Your question at this point vvould prob- vvhich they are interested. So it is not ably be, “What is the Congress doing about alvvays as easy to control the exportation it?” of technology as it might at First aDpear. Many members of Congress are avvare But there are many members of Con­ of and vitally concerned with problems gress, in both the House and Senate, in this area. But there is another strong who were not satisfied that the provisions CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 11 j>f the Export Administration Act were Secretary of Defense should have this idequate. Senator Henry Jackson of power to stop the exportation to Com- Washington succeeded in getting an munist countries of goods or technology miendment to the fiscal year 1975 Mili- that would aid their military effort arv Procurement Bill passed in June of against our country. But I was not one his vear. His amendment would allow of the conferees, so I had to make my he Secretarv of Defense to “recommend position on this subject known. 1 wanted o the President that he disapprove any the House conferees to adopt this -equest for the export of any goods or amendment, which was already in the echnologv to any controlled country if Senate version of the bill. I wrote a letter le determines that the export of such to the Chairman of our Armed Services Toods or technology will significantly Committee, Congressman Hebert, indi- increase the militarv capability of such cating just that and suggesting that Al- country. . . bania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, the People’s And farther down in the amendment, Republic of China, North Korea, and it savs that “the term “controlled country’ North Vietnam be added to the list of means the Soviet Union, Poland, Ro- controlled countries. mania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslo- What the conference dicl was even vakia, and the German Democratic Re- better than 1 had hoped for. They public [East Germanv].” Another section acceptecl the amendment and took my of the Jackson Amendment provides that recommendation into consideration. But whenever the Presidem exercises his au- instead of listing the countries I had thority under subsection (H) hereof to suggested, they added the phrase, “and modify or overrule a recommendation such other countries as may be desig- made by the Secretarv of Defense pur- nated by the Secretary of Defense.” The suant to this section, the Presidem shall bill passed both houses with little opposi- submit to the Congress a statement indi- tion. cating his decision. Either House of the Here is an example of a law passed by Congress shall have a period of thirty (30) Congress, with its implicadon clearly ex- calendar days of continuous session after tending to national security, and the the date on which the statement is trans- Congresss becoming dissatisfied with the mitted to the Congress to disapprove by way it was being administered and pass- majority vote the action of the President. ing legislation to provide for Congres- This means that either house of the sional participation in implementing the Congress can reverse the President’s de­ law. This is an excellent recent instance cision and thereby assure that the judg- of how Congress was able to influence ment of the Secretarv of Defense does national security. Congress, in effect, prevail. took a veto power on Presidential deci- A conference committee of Senators sions in the interest of national security. and Congressmen was formed to iron Now on the subject of military policy, out the differences betvveen the military a number of things need to be said in procurement bilis passed by each house, some important areas where Congress so that an identical bill could be pre- has taken the initiative and where it has sented in both houses for final passage. not done too badly. Notable examples I strongly believed that the Jackson are the nuclear submarine program, the Amendment was sound and that the improvement of military pay, and the As the ivatchdog oj national securtty, the Home Armed Services Commiltee concems ilself wilh such Air Force milestones as lhe rollout of the XB-70 at North American Avia- tion, Palmdale, Califórnia, on 11 May 1964. Later designated as reconnaissance- strike RS-70, luto prololypes were buill, hui the plane never went into production. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECUR/TY 13 veronautics and Space Act of 1958. 11 it Congressional action—to take back the ere not for the Joint Atomic Energy war-making power. As much as any- Committee, the nuclear submarine would thing, it is a product of the Vietnam war. iot have been developed nearly as early Whether Congress, in a crisis, could s it was—and Admirai Rickover would avoid giving its imprimatur to a Presi- íave been forced into retirement as a dent’s action. thus mitigating the effect japtain. And if it had not been for the of the law, remains a question. 1 suspect \rmed Services Committee, nuclear that the Vietnam experience itself, rather >ower for surface ships would have than any law, will restrain future presi- noved at an even slower pace than it has. dents. But the act does represent an In the matter of military pay, it was important attempt by Congress to get he Congress—largelv through our Com- back its prerogatives. nittee on Armed Services—which in- The Administration requested the all- Teased pav significandv bevond what the volunteer armed forces and an end to Lxecutive Branch proposed in the mid- the draft, but these accomplishments 960s. We doubled the size of the 1965 were really in response to Congressional jav bill and tied the military to the initiative, which in turn was in response :omparable automatic pay increases of to public opinion. If there is any bill that he civil service in 1967. It was the can be said to be a product of popular Congress which provided the dramatic mandate, it is the elimination of compul- ncreases in pav and allowances in 1971, sory military service. It remains to be as a concomitant of the final extension of seen whether the volunteer army will the draft, providing in one year the rate work—and if it does, whether we can of increase the administration had pro- afford it. posed to take effect over a period of In areas where Congress tried to force teveral vears. Thus the fact that military acceptance of spetific programs, the rec- pav today is generally competitive with ord is mixed—but often because support private industrv. for the first time in our in Congress was not unified. Congress history, is attributable more to the initia- has been verv successful in forcing a tive of the Congress than of the Execu- minimum strength for the Reserve tive Branch. forces, for example; less successful in In 1958, following the launch of Sput- trving to force production of specific nik, the Congress, on the initiative of the weapon systems. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, The classic example is the continuing launched space committees in each house confrontation over the manned bomber. and forced legislation creating the Na­ In 1963 our committee started out to tional Aeronautics and Space Adminis­ direct the construction of the RS-70 and tration. moved on a collision course with Presi­ In some areas where Congress took dent Kennedy. He didn t want to be the initiative. the jury is still out, most directed to build anything, but he didn’t notably the VVar Powers Bill and the want a clash with Congress, either. In the abolition of the draft. end Chairman Vinson and President The War Powers Bill. a product of the Kennedy took their famous “walk in the Foreign Affairs Committee. is an attempt Rose Garden,” the word “directed” was bv Congress to prevent the President changed to “authorized,” Secretary Mc- from getting us into war without prior Namara wrote a letter promising a new 14 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW study, and everyone achieved a sort of procurement, and so on. peace with honor. In the House at the These authorization and appropriatioi time there was much talk of a moral cycles mean a double review of th victory. At times, I suppose, there is a defense program, which often looks con fine line betvveen vvinning a moral victory fusing and duplicative to military person and being seduced. The plane was never nel; but it allows the Congress to ge built, as our committee hoped, but it was deeper into programs and is consisten not killed either, as the Defense Secre- with what I said in the beginning abou tary desired; and today, ten years later, the inherent ineffíciency of a democratii the battle over it still goes on, except that body. the opposiüon is now in Congress. A few' statistics from Congresses ter Another important point to be recog- years apart will show that Congress i* nizecl is that Congress is getting more spending much more time on defense and more into the details of the defense matters, is no longer taking the words ol business. It is attempting to play a larger the military on faith, and is challenging role, not just in broad policy but in the its cognizant committees in floor consicl- selection of weapon systems and the eration. determination of force leveis. The Defense Department keeps statis­ Congressional decisions on force leveis, tics on the hours its officials, military and numbers and tvpes of strategic and tacti- civilian, spend before Congressional com­ cal weapons, overseas deployments, mittees in hearings and briefings. For spending leveis, and so on, are expressed 1963 (Ist session, 88th Congress) the through the annual defense authoriza- total was 836 hours. For 1973 (lst ses­ tion and defense appropriation bilis. sion, 93d Congress) the total was 2284 They are the principal measures through hours. which the Congress expresses itself on To look at another example of levei of military policy. The authorization legisla- effort, in 1963 our committee held 19 tion, limited ten years ago to missiles, days of hearings on the authorization airplanes, and ships, has gradually been bill, had 835 pages of printed hearings, expanded to include authorization for and issued a 32-page report. For 1973, active and reserve strength, all research the Committee had 42 meetings, 2917 and development, tracked combat vehi- pages of printed hearings, and a 115- cles, torpedoes and other weapons, and page report. defense civilian manpower. This gradual In 1963 the authorization bill faced expansion of the role played by the one floor amendment in the House and legislative committee is in itself evidence none in the Senate and passed unani- of the greater effort by Congress to deal mously in both houses. In 1973 there with the defense business. And the ex­ were 15 amendments offered in the pansion of the authorization requirement House, 12 offered in the Senate (with has generallv been in response to prob- eight adoptecl), and 59 votes against the lems found in the Defense establishment bill on final passage in the House and 5 that had not been adequately dealt in the Senate. with—the M-16 scandal bringing about In 1963 debate on the authorization the regular review' of “other weapons” bill in the Senate took 19 pages in the procurement, the M-48 torpedo fiasco Congressional Record. In 1973, it took 303 leading to the annual review of torpedo pages. CONGRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15 I could quote numerous other statisti- it is too late. And when they do, it will Ical examples, but the point is clear that trigger strong pressure for the Services to the Services can no longer merely wave reduce personnel and to reduce long- the flag and get Congressional approval range personnel costs. At that time, 1 will for their requests. Congress is now very be concerned about possible atteinpts to much in the act, and the Services might reduce the strength of our armed forces as well learn to live with us. VVe are h e r e below what I believe to be the minimum to stav. safety levei. In short, the overall responsibility for national security, both internai and exter­ VVithout going into detail, let me men- nai, is shared by the Congress with the tion a few areas where I think the Executive Branch. The Congress author- Congress is going to be particularly con- izes and funds those programs it consid- cerned in the next few years. ers necessary for the nation’s defense, I mentioned the volunteer army as still and the Executive Branch, through the subject to question. It would be more military Services, has the responsibility correct to emphasize the high cost of for implementing our national security personnel as the problem, because doing policies. The internai and externai as- away with the volunteer army would not pects of national security are inseparable. automatically lower personnel costs. In Both Congress and the Executive Branch Congress we are very conscious of the must realize this important fact and fact that we spend 56 percent of our willingly share the inherent responsibili- defense budget for personnel costs while ties if our nation is to remain strong. the Soviets spend only about 30 percent Two other items of special concern on for personnel. It doesn’t take a mathe- the personnel front are retirement costs matician to see where that could lead us and the number of sênior officers. Re­ after a number of years in the compara- tirement costs are rising at a rate that tive amounts left to spend on research frightens members of Congress. There is and development and on new weapons. also an enduring feeling in Congress that The question of whether or not the we have too many generais and colonels, Soviets have overtaken us militarily particularly since we have as many or seems to be a continuing debate these more than we had during World War II. days. Some say they have and some say I would be quite surprised if some they havent. The fact is, in Fiscal year reductions are not made in the next few 1975 we are spending less than $10 years. billion for military research and develop­ Finally, I believe that in the years ment while the Soviets are spending ahead Congress is going to have to roughly three times that amount for the review extensively our worlclwide com- same purpose. If we continue to let the mitments, for as of now they far outstrip Soviets outspend us by three to one in our military capacity, if we support them military research and development, it will seriously. Some of them have become certainly be just a matter of time before inoperative, and, of course, we want they overtake us, if they have not already everything pertaining to U.S. policy to be done so. I he spending Figures spell the soundly based and respected in lhe eyes inevitable. But I am conFident the Con­ of the world. gress will come to this realization before Washington, D.C. THE DECISION TO RESPOND

What Forces Do We Need in a Cri si s?

Leu is A. Frank

fíUl

___ N a politically fragmented but econom- vehicles while at the saine time leaving icallv interdependent world, the abil- room for basing and payload flexibility as ity of the United States to use military new' strategic systems phase in. The salt trength is closely tied to the suitability of effect on the nuclear balance only serves to ts forces to support high-priority dip- heighten the importance of maintaining omatic objectives in a crisis.1 Today credibility in our armed forces to carry out nanv diplomadc and political factors are U.S. foreign policy in a suddenly shifting nvolved in shaping the world role of the period of international relations. It might J.S. and setüng the tempo of its foreign even be illusory to hope for further under- -elations. standings of the salt type widiout forces The future momentum of policy and adequate to strengthen diplomacy and 'orce planning is alreadv being influ- prevent misunderstandings at the eleventh ?nced bv a wide set of considerations. hour. rhere are systems procurement or devel- Any force can conceivably be used to jpment decisions that create “multiplier” increase or decrease the risks of war; the ;ffects throughout the economy. Ad­ question is about how and when such use vanced technology itself makes a signifi- is justified and, equally importam, how' a :ant impact on the requirements for decision-maker should assign values to ikilled personnel to man an all-volunteer the use of force in a crisis. The decision militarv force. Such considerations and to respond is a judgment that may have the capabilities they lead to in later years to be made in the absence of many reflect some essential judgments about needed facts. A distinguished economist possible adversary intentions and our and president of the American Economic objectives concerning deterrence. Association, Kenneth Arrow, recently We h ave experienced a decade of said that “our lack of economic knowl- necessarv public concern about U.S. de- edge is, in good part, our difficulty in fense, and today anv discussion of the modelling the ignorance of the economic directions it could take cannot exclude agent.”3 In a similar vein, it may be said the impact of the Strategic Arms Limita- that while military forces are designed to tion Talks (salt) negotiations, not only operate under uncertain conditions, di­ on forces but on diplomacv as well. At plomacy feeds on certainty. Since payoffs the time of this writing, the publicly are based on vvidely differing environ- reported U.S. position at salt II favored ments, any trade-offs between military achieving mutual “equivalence” in the and diplomatic requirements could be nuclear capabilities available to each side subject to a considerable margin of error. by means of overall ceilings on the l he crisis decision-maker needs har- number of strategic missiles and bomb- mony between military and diplomatic ers, including limits on missile-borne operations. He wants to reduce the possi- multiple independently targetable re-en- bility of miscalculation. Thus, the means try vehicles (mirv’s ) and on the pavload by which military forces can contribute to or “throw-weight” capabilities of íand- crisis settlement deserve further attention based missiles.2 because military options by themselves The Vladivostock salt II accord, if con- do not resolve crises. firmed by the U.S. Senate, reflects the de- While it is still too early to speculate on sire for equivalence in delivery systems and the effects of the Strategic Arms Limita- 17 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW tion Talks on U.S.-Soviet crisis behavior, At least for now, salt is not a peaceij salt’s current purposes appear to have keeping institution. Agreements or trea ; important potential for the management ties to the contrary, political pressure of future crises in two ways. First, by can still emerge that move the U.S. ant, providing a set of agreed-upon leveis of the Soviet governments into high-risk strategic force capability, salt influences taking positions in a crisis, as in th« the vvay each side might deploy its forces Middle East during 1973.7 in a crisis, including those not subject to In a world of imperfect knowledg» SALT-negotiated ceilings. Seconcl, salt there is an increasing prospect of crisis could institutionalize into another “hot connected misunderstandings that coulc line” for communicating some intentions repeatedly involve military and diplo as well as capabilities to the other side. matic resources of the U.S. in many area: Former President Nixon admitted using and in many forums. Accordingly, thert a “salt channel” in 1971 or 1972 to are likely to be new problems and new persuade the Soviets to include ceilings tests of fine-tuning the art of diplomacy on submarine-launched ballistic missile to the military art. It may be true, as (slbm) launchers in the salt I ínterim Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesin- Agreement accompanving the 1972 Anti- ger has said, that the world is becoming ballistic Missile (abm) Treaty.4 “a single strategic theater,” but there is Besides salt channels, there are salt- yet some distance to go before that related channels that could contribute to becomes a perceived reality. crisis management. The 1973 U.S.-Soviet VVhile there is some prospect for even­ agreement on the prevention of nuclear tual negotiated force reductions in Cen­ war has explicitly endorsed “urgent con- tral Europe betvveen nato and the War- sultations” betvveen the parties to avoid savv Pact through the Mutual Balanced confrontation or escalation.5 Such agree- Force Reduction (mbfr) discussions, the ments, of course, are not self-executing rest of the world is experiencing a prolif- and are only as good as the reactions of eration of military force and “theaters” the parties to a crisis. Viewed in their for conflict. It takes little imagination, best light, “hot line”-type treaties and unfortunately, to write realistic-sounding agreements could play a major long-term scenarios for U.S., Soviet, or Chinese role in reducing the risk of miscalcula- confrontation along a global crisis path tion and contributing to vvhat Secretary which, when traced, passes through the of State Kissinger calls “strategic stabil- Middle East, northern and Southern Áf­ ity”—a condition in vvhich both sides rica, Latin America, the Indian subconti- understand that neither can “gain a nent, and back into the Persian Gulf. In substantial aggregate advantage” over the addition, the risks of a Soviet-Chinese other.6 dispute escalating from their border con­ There is, of course, a certain amount flict into a wider war gives pause for of wishful thinking that tends to assign concerned thought. to institutions roles which they vvere not Crises that erupted into both World intended to have and for which they lack Wars and many limited wars began suitable resources and power. salt is a either because one of the parties could negotiating forum, a weathervane shovv- not (or would not) construct a timely, ing the rest of the world which vvay the credible military-diplomatic position wind is blowing in U.S.-Soviet relations. against the other or because one side THE DEC1SION TO RESPOND 19 simplv .failed to perceive the danger escalation in the existing povvder-keg x>sed bv the other side. As a result of areas of lhe world. As a defense analyst his initial imbalance or blindness, mod- wrote some years ago: ‘rn wars have had an almost uniform The concept of deterrence is aimed . . . endency to escalate to a scale of violence not only against the use of nuclear w'eap- and involvement) where the ultimate ons but also against the use of the threat of outcome was highlv disproportionate to nuclear weapons in vital circuinstances.1" the issues involved. Of course, there are (Emphasis added.) Eoccasional indications that increased In addition, credibility in “vital circum- l.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese diplomacy stances” means having nonnuclear “safety can shed new light on ways in which catches,” as vvell as nuclear ones, by superpowers and third parties alike can means of which a U.S. decision-maker manage conflicting interests if not resolve can positively control and alert forces, them.8 Successful crisis manageinent by deplov them to create a presente in the the involved parties depends on a com- crisis or threat areas, use them to engage plicated process of identifying those dip- in threshold bargaining, and expedi- lomatic and military aspects of a situa- tiously withdraw, commit, or reinforce tion that can be reliablv controlled with them, as appropriate. available resources and then using these Forces designed to be managed in this resources in ways that maximize the wav must also support a parallel track of incentives for a peaceful settlement of diplomatic actions aimed at restoring, the crisis. These are demanding require- creating, or maintaining Communications ments, in a conceptual as vvell as a with the parties involved—all in the hope practical sense. Yet, at a time when the of achieving peace. Although we may not U.S. and the Soviet Union together could knovv vvhat stability is, we are in a hurl over 10,000 nuclear weapons at century replete with the national and each other (in a purely two-sided, two- human toll of war and instabilitv. nation exchange), an uncontrolled crisis Should the United States (and the involving the superpowers could lead to Soviet Union) be disposecl toward crisis disaster.5' management? This is a question of ut- most importance because it is becoming customary for smaller powers to empha- I nsurance against war by mis- size nationalistic aims while seeking super- calculation is not the least of the many power assistance or mediation in a crisis. things that an S82-billion defense budget Moreover, this paradox is likely to recur has to buy and maintain. Even if contin- because the reach of small powers for mod- gencies do not arise from the somewhat ern armed forces is exceeding their grasp in frantic scrambling about for more arms utilizing them. and prestige, the high risks and costs of Modern wars are very expensive to the 1973 Middle East experience and the light—economically, politically, and so- ensuing U.S. worldwide nuclear alert cially. Even an advanced small power can have impressed even critics of increased quickly exhaust its abilities on the battle- defense spending that the country re- íield if it has to be burdened with quires a more crcdible nonnuclear maintenance, repair, or replacement of “ready force" option from which to sophisticated weapon systems, radars, choose, to reduce the risk of nuclear and fire-control apparatus while provid- 20 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW ing adequate food, fuel, and other logis- and irrelevant if one is “losing.” Other tic support for its forces.11 The loss of a forms of U.N. crisis intervention can highly trained pilot or missile specialist only be triggered by a recognized attack may not be easily compensated for, so it on a U.N. member State. is litde wonder that many States, includ- Since the U.N. leaves much to be ing the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great desired in a crisis, the U.S. is no doubt Britain, France, Iran, Pakistan, índia, resigned to choices other than paralysis North Korea, and Cuba, have under- or Armageddon in searching for defina- taken what may best be called manage- ble and credible “ready” forces that can ment contracts to operate and man ad- checkmate a crisis, hoping for but not vanced air strike, air defense, or armored counting on Soviet, Chinese, or even assault components for various clients, allied cooperation. principally in the Middle East and Military forces that are to play a major Southeast Asia.12 part in creating the atmosphere for crisis While some future wars could quickly settlement must add credibility to the expire through technological exhaustion, settlement process. They can do this in others occurring under different condi- two basic ways: through (a) selective tions might be easily extendecl through response and (b) controllable effect. This either contracting out or stepping aside is no more and no less than being able to for new or existing sponsors to take create a match between diplomatic and charge. Either way could result in dan- military moves in a crisis. For example, gerous escalation if a satisfactory diplo- the reliable Communications at H-hour matic solution is not reached by the time must also be sufficient at the eleventh one or both parties need more military hour to flexibly apply or withhold force. capabilitv. In such circumstances the The implications of crisis capabilities U.S., Soviet Union, and China could must ultimatelv be understood by all have increasingly significant opportuni- parties to the crisis. After all, having ties for both diplomatic and military crisis “credibility” is having a means of participation in future regional conflicts assuring all concerned that the use of and crises. force is not inconceivable if a settlement is The superpovvers have the means to not arrived at. Put another way, the U.S. “quarantine” a crisis to see that it does requires both military and diplomatic not erupt into a nuclear holocaust, but means of maximizing the incentives to there is nothing automatic in this that settle the matter peaceably, whether assures restraint. By way of contrast, through tacit or negotiated understand- international organizations such as the ings. United Nations may be conferred legal The “safety-catch” capabilities that a but ineffectual powers to become in- given force may require for crisis-control volved in a crisis. U.N. peace-keeping purposes will in turn affect the way this forces can provide a presence to police a force is brought into the arena and its cease-Fire, but they can do little to put abilitv to react to situations encountered out the fire unless there is also a force while there. For selective response, three contribution by a major power. Article initial operational capabilities appear to 51 of the U.N. charter permits national be required by a decision-maker: acts of self-defense, making appeals to Positive Control: The force must be able to the U.N. unnecessarv if one is “winning” have secure contact with national authori- THE DECISION TO RESPOND 21 ties—ihe “word” must get through at all Force Application or Wühdrawal: If the crisis times. becomes a war in which lhe United States, Quick Reaction: Specific procedures are despite all other efforts, is involved, the required to facilitate the conversion or deployed force must be ready to defend acdvarion of the force to achieve its mis- itself and/or attack targets on a selective, sion. sustained basis. If the crisis is resolved, the Presence: Range, speed, and the ability to force should be capable of timely disen- penetrate into or near the crisis area are gagement and redeployment to home obviously desirable, especially in a contin- bases. gency where the United States has no forces stationed in the area. There should YVithout going into a detailed crisis also be a capability to “signal” the other scenario, \ve can illustrate these capabili- parties that such presence exists. ties schematically as a package of de- Being present in the area—and assum- mands varying in intensity as the crisis ing that diplomatic measures have not proceeds. (Figure 1) abated tensions as yet—the deployed Ideally, the decision-maker ranks his force requires further operational capa- requirements for each major capability bilities: according to vvhat his information tells Maintaining Threshold: Depending on the hitn is most important to have at a given intensity of the crisis, a threshold dividing point in a crisis.13 As Figure 1 indicates, tension and war may be at hand for times his demand for receiving and acquiring ranging from hours to weeks after the information (e.g., positive control) is uni- inicial alert. This means that forces may formly high (in economic terms, infi- have to be rotated or reinforced. nitely elastic) at all times. This is not as

Figure 1. Decision-maker dernands for force capability in a crisis.

crisis duration 22 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW true regarding other capabilities, al- (a) The crisis occurs without prior warning though, as reflected by the ultimate con- some 3000 to 5000 miles from the shores vergence of the curves, they all become of continental U.S. (ConUS). crucially important at the eleventh hour. (b) No U.S. forces are within 400 miles of As the crisis extends, action priorities the crisis area. (c) No allied forces are available, and in can, and should, change. The impor- fact the U.S. has been denied permission tance of sound but flexible judgment was to operate out of certain allied-owned chronicled by Robert Kennedy during airbases and seaports (à la the 1973 Mid- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis delibera- dle East crisis), which further complicates tions: the assembly of air, naval, and ground It is no reflection on them [the 17 mem- units. bers of the “Excomm,” the specially created Executive Committee of the Na­ If diplomatic activity increases but the tional Security Council] that none was use of force is not ruled out, what kinds consistent in his opinion from the very of response do we have left? If the beginning to the very end. That kind of decision-maker considers (in our case) a open, unfettered mind was essential. For nonnuclear response, he is compelled, some there were only small changes, per- for all practical purposes, to alert and haps varieties of a single idea. For others cleploy ConUS or sea-based forces to the there were continuous changes of opinion scene of the crisis, whether it be for a each day; some, because of the pressure of friendly government endangered by ex­ events, even appeared to lose their judg­ ternai threats or to a troublecl region ment and stabiíity.14 beset by warring governments. The decision-maker is likely to prize In adclition to aspirin, let us afford the quick reaction above all other capabilities U.S. decision-maker four readv forces to (except positive control) at the beginning choose from, given a crisis during the of the crisis. Later on, he may want the mid to late 1970s: forces to maneuver in such a way as to • one bomber squadron vvith signal otir intentions to the other party aerial tanker support (ConUS-based)* (or parties) involved. At another subse- • one airmobile Army brigade quent point, the forces will have to be consisting of 3 to 5 airborne, armored, applied, disengaged, or reinforced— mechanized, or ranger battalions hence the U shape of the quick-reaction (Con US-based )* demand curve. • one amphibious task force (sta- tioned in the Pacific, Mediterranean, or A ssuming the illustrative Caribbean area)** crisis demand pattern shown in Figure 1, • one all-nuclear-povver carrier vve can carrv the analysis a step further task group (stationed in the Pacific, Med- by asking: “How available are certain forces to meet the requirements of a •As cxpcrienced in the 1973 Middle East crisis. there is a possibilitv of crisis?” The answer is that some forces last-minutc foreign-government restrictions on movemcnt ol prepositioned are not as available as the public usually U.S. forces and equipmenr in NATO Europe or the Far East. Thereforc, forces based or home-ported in thosc arcas are not considered available to believes. To understand vvhy, let us add the decision-maker in the situaiion discusscd. some shadows and tones to the crisis ••Gcnerally consists of one or two marinc regiments in amphibious ship- picture: ping plus some armed Naval escorts. force utlllty

high Figure 2. Surge rales of / *N four alterruitive forces.

médium

____ Bomber squadron ____ Airmobile brigade ...... Amphibious task group low ...... Carrier task group

to

iterranean, or Indian Ocean area).*** response that can be reasonably expected of a given force, involving highly coordi- In considering these alternatives, one nated operations with the requisite mo- might construct a general measure of the bility and firepovver to sustain combat or utility generated bv a given military force withdraw as appropriate. Just as opera- by estimating its surge rate—the increase tional capabilities desired by the decision- in utilization (usually in hours per day) maker at a certain point in time define of which a force is capable for wartime his demand for them, the respective as compared with peacetime purposes. surge rates of the forces constitute For example, increases in crew-to-ship or streams of military capabilities which the crew-to-aircraft ratios, maintenance per- decision-maker can call upon at any sonnel, and war reserve materiel are all given point in the crisis. (Figure 2) major indicators of increased surge Bombers are likely to have the highest rates.13 initial utility because their initial peace­ The surge rate indicates the overall time utilization is relatively high. Signifi­ •••AvaÜabiity dcpcnding on overhaul cyclc—general ly two carriers re- quüred to support onc on staiion. Consista of onc nuclear-powcrcd aircraft cam numbers of alert aircraft and crews camer (CVAN) and associated air wing. (two intcrccptor squadrons with are based in the U.S. that could be air-co-air mnstles. two clear-weathcr attack squadrons. two all-weather at- tack and electronic warfare squadrons) with four nuelear-powercd frigates quickly used, and their post H-hour (DLCN) in antisubmarinc warfare (ASW) and antiaircraft surfacc-to-air mtssiie (SAM) roles. (At present. the U.S. has only suffkient nuclear transit time into a crisis area is likely to frigates 11 ovcr $260 milfion each—to outfit onc carricr task group. Two be much less than that required by the usk groups of th» kmd could noi bc formcd prior to 1978. assuming a rcasonablr pcriod for sca trials aftcr dclivcry of ncw DLGNs to lhe flcct.) other forces considered. Even while air-

lorce utflity/ desired capability Figure 3. Crisis response of jour altemaliveforces.

crisis duration basicallv depend on what point the deci- of harbors and other vital approaches sion-maker believes the crisis is approach- has been a secondary task of the U.S. ing. In the real world we do not usually Strategic Air Command (sac) bomber know until it is over and we can look force. In addition, the emergence of new back on it. Uncertainty, however, does technologies for surveillance could en- not preclude choice. Other things being hance the utility of the bomber for crisis equal, our short exercise indicates that operations: technologies including air- the potential use of bombers in a con- launched, remote-control pilotless drone temporary crisis affords a high-confi- aircraft; precision strike weapons guided dence option for satisfying likely crisis ob- by tv, laser, infrared, and radar; elec- jectives throughout the crisis. tronic defense jamming devices; and en- larged-capacity tanker aircraft. T his conclusion might surprise those The important point to be under- who do not fully understand the diffi- scored is that crisis response should lead culty of assembling forces where foreign away from war by providing a measured bases could be politically clenied, or those deterrent force. The dynamics of a crisis who regard the bomber as capable only situation—the decisions involved and the of more Hiroshimas or Hanois. Al- operational capabilities required—may go though it is not generally known by the against conventional wisdom and lead us public, bombers have been utilized in to support our diplomacy by utilizing other ways appropriate to crisis manage- long-range forces that are independent ment. For several years now, minelaying of foreign basing. Washington, D.C. 26 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW No (ca usefulness to world peace of the "improvement that has begun in Soviet] 1. "Crisis" has bccn well defined bv onc observer as a series of events American relations". see Praida and hvestia dispatches of 31 January] where lhe panies involved realize rhai "an importam turning poini in 1974 as translatcd in Current Digest oj the Soviet Press, Vol. 26, No. 5. 27 hisiory is imminent and thai rhere is an increased danger of war."— February 1974, p. 4. Hannes Adomeii, “Soviei Risk-Taking and CrisLs Bchavior." USS Adelphi 8. From contacts with Moscow and Peking during 1971 and 1972. the Paper 101 (London: Internaiional Institute for Strategic Sludies. 1973), p. United States was apparcntly able to ascertain certain limits on the naturc 3. I would add ihat governmcnts can bc highly seleetive in attaching a of Soviei and Chinese support for North Victnam Such maneuvering "crisis" labei lo events—especialiy where another party is inerely sus- may have been a sine qua non for the United States to harness military pcctcd of being involved—c.g.. (he Dominican crisis of 1965 and the force and diploinatic activity (via lhe May 1972 Haiphong mining SovieiAVarsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. operations and the December 1972 LINEBACKER saturation bombing 2. Departmcnl of Defense, Anmuil Defense Department Refmrt FY 1975, 4 raids) in achieving the Vietnatn cease-fire of January 1973. Laurericr March 1974. pp. 29, 44; also see ariiclcs by L.eslic H. Gelb in \'ew York Martin, Arms and Strategy (New York: David McKay Co.. 1973). pp. 207-9. Times, 24 March 1974. p. E3. and 31 March 1974. p. 2. If the public 9. Total weapons counl (force loadings) in terms of strategic offensh* statements are accurate. the U.S. position appears to be an internai (ICBM/SLBM or bomber-launched) weapons available to the U.S. and comproiime between the tcchnology-limiting viewpoint of the State Soviet Union estimated as of rnid-1974 to bc 7940 and 2600. respectively, Department and the Arins Control and Disarmament Agencv (ACDA)— cxcluding some 7000 U.S.-conlrollcd nuclear weapons in NATO Europe; as reflected in Senate Resolution 281 of 8 February 1974 (introduced by see table provkled by Secrctary ol Defense Schlesinger to the Senate Senator Mathias. R . Md.>— and the Department of Defense'» prcfcrencc Arrned Services Committee in earlv 1974. U.S., Congress, Senate, for equali/ing throw-weight which Senator Jacksons (D.. Wash.) SALT Committee on Arrned Services, Hearings on Fiscal Year 1975 A uthoriiatian proposal of 4 December 1973 reflects; see Congressional Record—Senate, for V/ilitary Procurement. Research and Developmenl, and Actne Duty, Selecletl Vol. I 19. No. 189, 4 December 1973. and Vol. 119. No. 230, 8 February Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 93d Congress. 2d session (Wash­ 1974. In his news confercnce of 2 December 1974. Presidem Ford ington: GPO. 5 February 1974). Part 1. p. 290. acknowledged that the Vladivostok agreemenl allows the U.S. and 10. Amoretta Hoeber, "Strategic Stability," An University Review, July- U S.S R. each a ceiling of 2400 missile and boinber delivcry svstems August 1968, p. 67. T (forward-based U.S. systerns and probabl> the Soviet Backfire bomber 11. According lo Information released by Mr. Pinhas Sapir, Israel’! excluded) with a constraint ol 1320 missiles permitted to be equipped Finance Ministcr. the 18-day 1973 war cost Israel $396 million per day t< with multiple independentlv targeted warheads (MIRVs). Washington Star- fight. Washington Post, 5 March 1974. p. A24. This total was nearly four Xeu>s. 3 December 1974, p. A-7. times lsraels daily war expenditures in the 1967 war. U.S.. Congress 3 Kenneth Arrow. "Limited Knowledge and Econoinic Analysis," House Committee on Arrned Services. Report of the Special Subcommitlee on the address delivered to the American Ec.onomic Assoe ia tion conventiori, 29 Xtiddle East. 93d Congress. lst Session (Washington: GPO. 13 December December 1973. published in American Economtc Revieu>. March 1974, p. I. 1973). p. 13. 4. U.S.. United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shapmg a Durable 12. When merger talks failed between Egypt and Libya, Pakistani Ati Peace—The PresidenTs Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973, in Weekly Force pilots replaced Egyptians in the cockpits of French-made Mirage Compilatiun of Presidenlial Doeuments, Vol. 9. No. 19, 14 May 1973, p. 625. interceptors of the Libyan Air Force. Washington Post, 18 February 1974. Tcxt of the "ínterim Agreemenl between the USA and the USSR on p. Al. According to Israefs Defense Ministcr. Moshe Dayan. North Certain Mcasures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Korean pilots tnanned a squadron of Egyptian MIGs in the 1973 Middle Arins” of 26 May 1972 in L.S., Congress, House Committce on Foreign East war, and at least a brigade of Cuban "volunteers” have been helping Alfairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Legis/ation on Foreign operale Syrias Soviet-supplied forces in the Golan engagements with Relations: Joint Committee Prmt. 93d Congress. 2d Session (Washington: Israel in 1974. Washington Post, I April 1974. p. A14. In April 1974, a GPO. March 1974), pp. 1180-82. Hereafter cited as Legislation on Foreign Beirut magazine reporled that Iranian pilots would replace British Relations. contract pilots operating Omans small air force in strike operations 5. See text ol "Agreemenl Between the USA and the USSR on the against rebel strongholds. Iranian tank and artillery personnel are also Prevention of Nuclear War" of 23 June 1973 in Legislation on Foreign operating in Oman under a cooperation agreement with that State to Relations, pp. 1196-97. Especialiy relevant for crisis behavior is Article IV: secure the Persian Gulf entrance. Washington Post, 5 April 1974, p. A27. “I f at any time relations between the Parties or between either Partv and 13. In the "real world," things can bc much dilferent. In the USS other countries appear to involve the rixk of a nuclear conflict, or if Pueblo crisis of 1968. there was an apparent lack of information vis-à-vis a relations between countries not parties to this Agreemenl apftrar to possiblv trotiblesomc situation, although previous North Korean attacks involve the ruk of nuclear war between the [U.S.A.) and lhe (U.S.S.RJ or against South Korean vessels were known. The U.S. had detected some between either Party and other countries, the [U.S.J and lhe [U.S.S.R I acting North Korean threats against the Pueblo scveral weeks prior to the ships in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. shall immediately sei/ure. but such information was not properly routed into National enter into urgent consultations with each other and make evefy effort to Command Authority Channels. U.S., Congress. House Committee on aiert this nsk." (Emphasis added.) Arrned Services. fnquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-I21 Plane íncidents: 6 U.S.. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on Hearings bejore the Special Subcommitlee on the USS Pueblo; 9lst Congress, lhe Nàmination of Henry A. Kissinger, 93d Congress, lst session (Washing­ 2d Session (Washington: GPO. 1969), pp. 683-85. 704, 728. 896. ton: GPO. 1973), Part I ol II. p. 127. Hereafter cited as Hearings. 14. Robert F. Kcnnedy, Thnteen Days: A Memon of the Cuban Missile 7. Expressing conccrn about U.S.-Soviet relations alter the Middlc F.ast Crisis (New York: Signet Edition. 1969). p. 31. crisis and possibly over the threat lo Soviet inlluence in Latin America 15. Statement of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in U.S.. Congress, after the fali ol the friendlv Allende regime in Chile. CPSU Chairman Senate. Committee on Arrned Services, Hearmgs, Part 1. p. 121. Brezhncv paid a State visit lo Cuba and told (or warncd) a Cuban 16. See Addendum II lo statement ot the Chief of Naval Operations in revolution-day rallv in earlv 1974 "We are not pacifists, we are bv no U.S.. Congress, House, Arrned Services Committee. Hearings on Cost means for Iree/ing ol lhe social anil political processes that are taking Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts and Military Posture aiul H.R. place inside particular countries." On the other hand. he lauded the 6722, Part 1.93d Congress, lst Session (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 937. COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF ESSENTIAL

C aptain D.J. A lberts

HILE vvatching the national news on the evening of January 10, 1974, 1 was a bit startled to hear of a "nevv option, a “new targeting strategy” that the United States was implementing. The new option is “counter- force.” I thought there must be some mistake. A misquote perhaps? But no, there in the next day’s New York Times was a short article entitled, “U.S. Says It Is Retargeting Some Missiles Under a New Sua* tegic Concept."1 This was followed on January 15 by an editorial in the same publication calling for ‘a great national debate' on the topic.2 And then, lo and behold, /ime on Februarv 11 devoted its cover story to this issue and other matters relating to the defense policy of the United States. I was beginning to íeel a little like Rip Van \V inkle must have felt when he awoke from his nap. Was 1 the only person alive who was either too young to forget or too old to remember that there once was a great debate on this very topicr' Was there not a young man called forth from the 27 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW capitalistic dungeons of sweat-shop De- There are two general areas thai troit who slew the mighty dragons of should be examined in the Great Debate \ missile gap and massive retaliation, who counterforce itself and the provision oll pursued the Holy Grail of flexible re­ options. Strictly defined, counterforce ií sponse, who provided to his king many a targeting strategv wherein the principa: and varied options, and who, while giv- targets in a nuclear attack are those thaii ing guidance to young scholars at Ann have direct military significance. In par -, Arbor in 1962, first confounded and ticular, those targets are the opponentY then tried to convince the mighty Red offensive nuclear capability, consisting ol knight of Moscovy that a new, more his missile complexes and fields, his rational strategv existed, one that woulcl bomber force and supporting bases, and save us all from disaster if one of us his submarines and supporting facilities. somehow “pressed to test”? This better This targeting strategy may be contrasted option was labelecl “counterforce.” VVhat vvith the targeting strategy of counter- happened to the millions of words, the value, which is the striking of targets thousands of dollars of speakers’ fees, because of their value to the opponent. the gallons of ink, the wrinkled brows, These values are normally conceived of the testimonies before Congress, the in terms of population (cities), industry, panic workloads in the Pentagon, and and other types of culturally, politically, the heated conversations at cocktail par- or economically significant objects. (To ties that made up the resulting Great Hitler and the Soviets, Stalingrad had Debate over counterforce? Have we hacl “value" in the countervalue sense not a book burning, a return to the Dark only by virtue of its population, geo- Ages where the works of such strategic graphical position, and industrial poten- thinkers as Schelling, Snyder, Brodie, tial but also because of its name.) Part of Halperin, and Kaufmann have been rele- the confusion marking the sixties’ debate gated to the depths of some monastery as well as today’s stems from equating, to be watched over by the Order of John counterforce to a credible first strike or, Birch? Or is it simply a case of the media in Defense Secretary Schlesingers terms, forgetting that we did this once before? a “disarming first strike.” The two may be Are we about to reinvent the wheel? tied together, but there is nothing in the Having been in the position of teach- logic of either concept that requires them ing some of these concepts to future to be tied together. The logic behind a officers, I wondered whether, if a Great truly credible first-strike capability implic- Debate is indeed needed, I might offer itv assumes either near totally effective for consideradon some of the arguments counterforce application of offensive put forth during round one, so that, at weapons or a nearlv invulnerable defen- the very least, readers of this journal sive capability (one that protects all types would not have to waste precious time of targets, value, and force). relearning and rethinking old argu­ In discussing counterforce and coun­ ments. Furthermore, since the basic stra­ tervalue strategies, an immediate practi- tegic environment of the world has cal problem surfaces. What is the divid- changed considerably since 1962, it ing line between the two? For example, is might prove worthwhile to consicler the Offutt Air Force Base a counterforce or basic arguments relating to counterforce countervalue target? The intention rep- in context of strategic balance today. resented in striking Offutt would be COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF EQII1VALENCE 29 ounterforce, but much of the resultam the dilemma created by the difference lamage done to Omaha would provide a between deterrence and defense. (The ountervalue spin-off. (Herman Kahn classic explanation of this dilemma was k-ould characterize an attack on Olfutt as provided by Glenn Snyder.3) Options are n example of “counterforce with bonus only important if deterrence fails. The trategy.) exercising of an option is to engage in | The provision of options is a some- actually fighting a war. In other words, if vhat different matter. In the era of the the deterrent threat has failed to deter, I960s, the United States was shaking off what can we then do to (1) win, or (2) i he effects of the Eisenhower/Dulles doc- stop the nuclear exchange, or (3) avoid rine of massive retaliation. Under mas- being destroved? Unfortunatelv for both iive retaliation, the United States had theoretical and practical exercises, one’s ÍIíffectivelv only two options should de- consideration of various strategies and errence fail (in the form of a Soviet options to be usecl if deterrence fails also ittack on Western Europe or the conti­ affects the credibility of one’s deterrent nental United States): either do nothing threat. That is, deterrence is maximized 3r attempt to destrov the Soviet Union in if one’s threatened response contains no retaliation. Eisenhower began to retreat option other than immediate automatic "rom pure massive retaliation after 1955. massive response. Likewise, the percep- Despite modern-day revisionism concern- tion of the threat to be deterred, as well ing the actual application of massive as the opponent’s “risk calculus,” is af- retaliation as a deterrent strategy, the fected. Once the options are present, at importance of the strategy to this brief least in the form of the physical ability to listorical synopsis is that skeptics and exercise them, the deterrent environ- :ritics of the strategy saw only this ment increases in complexity. Such rumi- :hoice. Therefore, the credibility of the nations as Schelling’s negotiation of risk- strategy as a deterrent to any action taking4 and Kahn’s escalation ladclers short of a full-scale nuclear attack on the and tension scenarios5 become vitally U.S. became suspect. important, if for no other reason than The McNamara strategv of flexible that they have been enunciated and might response was an attempt to change this be operating in the calculations of one or jasic strategic choice. At the nonnuclear both sides in a given tension situation. evel, flexible response was intended to The overall name given the nuclear Drovide a conventional defensive capabil- portion of the McNamara strategy was tv in those areas of threat to our security “controlled response.” Counterforce and where deterrence by use of nuclear the various and sundry mutations of a weapons was clearly irrational. On the basic counterforce targeting strategy are strategic levei, flexible response was also some of these options provided under designed to provide, in anv situation controlled response. The debate, then as where deterrence failed, an alternaiive now, can therefore still be looked at in other than doing nothing or attempting two wrays: First, the rationality and effec- to destrov the Soviet Union in retaliation. tiveness of counterforce itself as an op­ Thus, the original enunciation of coun- tion; and, second, the worth of pursuing terforce was an option within flexible options. response. Perhaps the most concise formulation I he concern for options arises from of round one of the great counterforce/ 30 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW option debate is found in Morton Hal- The objection that counterforce per se perin’s Cantem pura ry Military Strategy,s is a first-strike strategy is somewhat more Quoting Halperin: difficult to answer. This is tied into the The Strategy of Controlled Response, fourth objection, that opponent fear of a with its goals of limiting maximum dam- first strike makes inadvertent nuclear age in a general nuclear war, while giving war more likely. Regarding the first-i first priority to deterring such a war, strike objection, Halperin claims that the might seem unobjectionabie. In fact, how- critics miss the point: that the use of ever, the enunciation of the doctrine by such strategy is really designed to in- Mr. McNamara evoked a storm of criti- crease leverage in the effort to negotiate cism in the United States and elsewhere, an end to the nuclear exchange. The which has continued. The objections which vvill be considered here are: the attractiveness of first-strike motives’ influ- Soviets will not adopt the strategy given encing decision-makers can only be re- their inferiority; the strategy is of no value cluced by the development of well-pro- if both sides have well-protected strategic tected strategic forces on both sides.!l forces; it is only valuable in a first strike; Therefore, the two objections are illogi- the strategy increases the danger of an callv linked in the first place. inadvertent nuclear war; and finally, it Lastly, the criticism that controlled re- leads to an accelerated ar ms race.7 sponse/counterforce would lead to an arms race is dismissed because the criti­ Halperin’s counter arguments to the ob­ cism confuses war control with a commit- jections can also be vievved as summaries ment to strategic dominance. Critics of of the other side of the debate. First, counterforce assume that counterforce . . . even if the Soviets reject the strategy publicly, it is clearlv in their interest to requires either complete superiority or seek to limit damage, if war occurs. Such high payloads and superaccuracy. This is limitation concerns both sides; but it is not necessarilv so. Various quality mixes even more in the interest of the weaker, can confer a counterforce capabilitv. In rather than the stronger, power. Once w-ar the extreme, one missile capable of de- begins, the Soviet Union can do much less stroying one other missile can be targeted damage to the United States, even if it counterforce. What is actually being ar- attacks American cities, than the United gued is credible first strike. The require- States can do to the Soviet Union, despite ments for a credible first strike are the greater concentration of American substantially different. population. Moreover, the greatest Soviet What really happened in this round of objective—particularly as long as the So­ the debate? Which side was right? It is viet Union is weaker than the United difficult to find sure answers because we States—is to avoid general nuclear war.8 have not fought a nuclear war (thereby The seconcl objection, that if nuclear “proving” the critics wrong); we have forces are protected the strategy has no had a kincl of arms race (thereby “prov­ value. is ansvvered by the charge that not ing” the critics right), and the issues all nuclear forces are protected. Eliminat- involved in the debate were never really ing reserve forces that can be destroyec! resolved. The policy emphasis shifted in retaliation obviously increases negotiat- from controlled response to assured de- ing power in that we vvould still have a struction somewhere in the later Mc­ usable reserve while the opponent’s re­ Namara years, and the issues of counter­ serve would be lessened. force faded awav into some nether re- COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF EQU1VALENCE 31 ion to re-emerge in 1974. This would January died down in the summer of içnd to indicate that any Great Debate 1974 for rather obvious reasons, i.e., oday would have similar results—that is, Watergate and the constitutional ques- ,o results. In fact, it is difficult to tions surrounding impeachment. Now nderstand, in my mind, why the issue is that these two issues are largely history, uddenly again so sensitive. There is no one might expect renewed interest in the ublic evidence, as I recall, that we ever strategic question. l he debate has con- tft counterforce strategy between 1962 tinued to exist, however, low key and nd 1974, with the exception of the back burner but there nonetheless.11 nnouncement that we were returning to There is some evidence, and the claim . (Logic compels the assumption that if has been made, that the original state- e are returning to it, we must have left ment of counterforce had unfavorable , even without public announcement.) results and did in fact lead to something )ne may argue that enunciation of as- of an arms race. However, even if true, ured destruction meant leaving counter- this would not invalidate Halperin’s claim arce out of our strategy, but this is not that such a race was a result of strategic kecessarily true. Assured destruction es- dominance rather than the having of a jentially says to an opponent, “Regardless strategy of counterforce. The construc- ff what vou do to us in a first strike, we tion put on the events of 1962 can vary; an guarantee to you destruction that we simply do not have enough informa- ou cannot accept and still survive.” The tion. One construction runs something rgeting of the second strike may or like this. With all our late 1950s concern ay not be counterforce, or pure coun- over Soviet ic:bm’s, Sputnik, and missile ;rvalue. In all probability, it would be a gap, the Soviets saw that we perceived a lixed strategy depending on many vari- Soviet capability (an aclded first-strike bles (enemy offensive forces in reserve, potential aimed at the continental U.S.) bility to retarget rapidly, desire for that did not exist. (Soviet missile strength Í[evenge, etc.). Assured destruction, if it was quite pronounced in ir bm’s—a threat fails to deter, may not be so “assured” to Europe—but very weak in icbm’s.) As tecause it might not even be used. In long as we so perceived the situation, it ny case, the strategy of counterforce is only seemed to blow up the Soviets’ lefinitely not new. It may be emphasized strength to encourage this belief through n a different manner, but it simply is missile-raltling. Why would the United lot something new to the scene of States want to give the Soviets an appar- trategic thought.1" ent capability they did not possess and Now, why did the first debate over then be afraicl of that apparition? How­ ounterforce abate? The answer is rela- ever, when Mr. McNamara announced ively simple. The debate was overcome counterforce, rather than telling the So­ >y other issues, both in the strategic field viets that we wanted to control a nuclear ind in other areas; namely, assured war, whether it be inadvertent or calcu- iestruction leacling to realistic deterrence lated, we were actually telling them that n the former, Vietnam (among other we had reali/.ed our error in regard to hings) in the latter. Other events lheir capabilities. More than that, it is rowded the minds and works of those conceivable that we were telling the Sovi­ .vho were the likely debaters. Likewise, ets that we had a credible first-strike he debate so fervently called for in capability and were willing to use it as 32 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW part of our deterrent and/or confronta- of striking an opponent’s force doe tion posture. In other words, regardless imply, however, for maximum utüity an i of the content of Mr. McNamara’s signal, benefit, a first strike. But this fact doei the Soviets were hearing, “Look, we now not detract from the capability of a less know that you really don’t have many than-maximally beneficiai controlled sec icbm’s. We further know that we, the ond strike. There will be missiles lei United States, possess a vast superiority (reliability being what it is). Not all of th in nuclear weapons. We know where bombers would have made it off th your retaliatory forces are located, and ground (maintenance aborts), and som we can destroy them, if we so desire.” reserves would logically be left to insur The Soviet response was threefold: a destruction of key targets that wer massive shift of emphasis from ir bm’s to somehow missed in the first shot. I icbm’s, a quick-fix attempt to redress the would be to our advantage, if we wer balance bv the Cuban episode, and, in to retaliate at all, to destroy these target time, the somewhat shaky decision (from so as to limit or eliminate further dam a technical standpoint) to pour money age to ourselves in any follow-on at into the development and deployment of tack.12 Further, anybody can alway, the Golash abm system around Moscow strike first—it is a possibility. But thi and its icbm field. The Soviet icbm panic may be a far cry from a credible strike then served as the trigger that led to the Counterforce only equates to a credibl assured destruction concept and the first strike in an environment where it i arms racing of the later McNamara coupled either with overwhelming supe years. riority, so as to guarantee a disarming o Now, this is not to say that it actually nearly disarming strike, or with a defen happened. It is but one of the construe- sive posture that guarantees or nearl tions that can be built upon the known guarantees invulnerability to retaliation facts. Other constructions have been The New York Times article calling fo| placed on the same events. It should be the great debate put forth many of thi noted that counterforce enunciation only same arguments that first appeared ii indirectly led to the arms race. The 1962. perceptions of superiority and what such Such a debate is vital because of th* superiority meant in political terms can immediate impact of the new strategy or be seen as the direct cause of the late Soviet military planning, on the strategn 1960s race. arms limitation talks (sal t II) and on th* The last point that should be looked opportunity that still exists to halt a nev into before moving to consideration of arms race in mir v multiple warhead mis today’s strategic environment is whether siles. . . . or not counterforce is in fact a first-strike Mr. Schlesinger insists that the retarget ing Minuteman and projected deploymen strategy. It is on this point that logic and later of more accurate missiles would no morality, not to say national objectives, constitute a true “First strike” capabilit; become confused and create paradoxes. since the United States would only be abl* Counterforce by itself does not imply to destroy some, not all, of Russia's icbm s either a first-strike or second-strike capa- But Soviet analysts, using traditional mili bility. l he United States has repeatedly tary “worst-possible-case” estimates, ma; gone on record as ruling out a U.S. pre- see the American capability differenth emptive strike on any grounds. The logic and press for a matching Soviet “firs COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF EQUIEALENCE 33 strike” force. The advantages of shooting looking at our own forces, we tend to First in a crisis would be so great that both assume that one leg of the triad must sides might become trigger happy. . . . deter all of the Soviet threat. In this The trouble with this approach is not particular case, a missile counterforce only that it requires enormous numbers of new, highly accurate warheads. making a capability would only equaie to a credible new round in the strategic arms race First strike if it were near totally disarm­ probable and dooming sal t II. but it ing—if our MIRVed missile force pos- would increase rather than decrease the sessed the accuracy, warhead quantity, likelihood of strategic nuclear war. If the and megatonnage necessary to destroy consequence of using nuclear weapons is a nearly every Soviet launcher, be it lo- limited enemv counterattack against inili- cated in a submarine, in a silo, or on an tan installaüons—on the dubious assump- airfield. Even prior to salt I, this was tion on both sides that rapid escalation not the case, and the limitations imposed into all-out nuclear exchange could be by salt 1 indicate that this is a physical avoided—the inhibition against the use of impossibility for our icbm force. Simply nuclear weapons would be much re- put, the numbers do not allow it. duced.13 However, this view of the triad is )ne is very much tempted to throw up incorrect. Our purpose in the triad has >ne's hands and either sob or laugh been thus deFined: lysterically. There is no particular evi- not to provide an independem assured ience that the Soviets in their planning destruction capability in each element of lave ever paid much attention to what the strategic forces, as some people have ve do. We alreadv have the “enormous presuined. Rather, it is to achieve a suffi- íumbers of . . . highly accurate war- cient degree of diversification in our leads”—but so do the Soviets (bigger, forces to hedge against both foreseeable )ut less accurate). And, although it is a and unforeseeable risks, and to enable us veak argument, since we first instituted to continue to make available to the Presi­ rounterforce in 1962 and no war has dem a reasonable range of strategic op- resulted, can one assert that the inhibi- tions. . . .14 ion against use of nuclear weapons has We must therefore look at the total aeen reduced? Additionallv, there are strategic force and the total capabilities :he U.S. and U.S.S.R. triads (icbm's, and limitations, not solely at icbm versus slbm’s , and manned bombers); so a “lim­ icbm. It likewise follovvs that if our icbm ited disarming strike” is not a credible force is counterforce targetecl, this does first strike. not equate to a first-strike capability in Confusion arises here for several rea- and of itself. There is much more that sons. Whereas both the United States must be accounted for in this determina- and the Soviet Union possess a triad of tion. strategic forces, the view vve ascribe to The New York Times has erred once each respective triad differs. Each ele- again in confusing deterrence with de- ment of the U.S. triad is viewed bv many fense. As Glenn Snyder tried to point to be a deterrent across the strategic out in 1961, “the central theoretical spectrum in its own right. At the same problem in the field of national security time, we tencl to concentrate on the policy is to clarify and distinguish be- Soviet missile force (sometimes including tween the two central concepts of deter­ slbm s) as their sole deterrent. And, in rence and defense." 15 l h e New York Times. 34 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW among others, has not paid attention or outcome of the strategic arms limitatioi has forgotten. Things that contribute to negotiation.” deterrence may be useless in defense, Our defense policy in this age of sal' and vice versa. With the increasing com- is now termed “essential equivalence.’ plexity of the defensive posture of both Unlike our previous “strategic suffi sides, complete reliance on deterrence ciency,” the posture is now taking or may leave us totally unprepared for some sort of definable shape. Tht defense, if deterrence fails. United States has given up the desire oq Unlike 1962, the United States no aim of clear-cut strategic superiority] longer enjoys a massive strategic nuclear This is not to say that by doing so we are superiority. Like it or not, for the fore- willing to accept strategic inferiority seeable future we are in an era of Rather, we will maintain some sort oi mutually assured r/estruction (mad—origi- rough parity or, if you will, equivalence nally Donald Brennan’s term). This situa- with the Soviet Union. If they attempt tc tion exists primarily because of the hated gain superiority, we will resist. “overkiH” capabilities of both sides and Much of this whole thing is involved in the agreed-upon Antiballistic Missile what has already been done in salt I (abm) Treaty leaving retaliatory forces and the abm Treaty and is hopefully to relativelv undefended against missile at- be continued in salt II. While I do not tack. It is difficult to see how any care to indulge in a résumé of the amount of MIRVing, accuracy increase, alleged pros and cons surrounding salt or any other qualitative offensive improve- I, it is imperative to make a few points in ment could alter this basic fact, barring a the context of superiority. completely unforeseen technological The Soviets possess an agreed-upon breakthrough of the scope of the inven- guaranteed quantitative superiority in tion of the airplane or the discovery of launchers, approximately 40 percent. Tire. salt I and the abm Treaty help This numerical superiority also confers freeze us into mad, and mad insures a superiority in throw-weight and thus in high, mutually existing deterrent. (An in- maximum megatonnage. This superiority vulnerable defense and/or an unstoppa- is offset by U.S. mir v technology and ble totally effective offense would be deployment, U.S. accuracy, and number needed to break the mad deadlock—i.e., of warheads (particularly the result of give somebody a credible first mir v). The U.S. also possesses a vast, but strike.) lfi aging, superiority in manned bombers. A more serious objection is the possi- The sea-launched systems can likewise be bility of an arms race, which is, in fact, considered roughlv equal—more launch­ being discussed. However, I would main- ers on the Soviet side, better accuracy tain, much as Halpeiin did in 1967, that and MIRVing on the U.S. side. (The if an arms race results, it does so because abm Treaty really means that neither of a desire to maintain superiority, or to side will defend its forces in a way gain superiority, not because of pre- involving an imperative to increase num- emption fears generated by a counter- bers of missiles to offset the defense.) force strategy. As Secretary of Defense Essentially, the static position of mid- Schlesinger stated, “The decision to pro- 1974 is a Soviet missile numerical superi­ duce and deploy these Systems will de- ority balanced by an American qualitative pend, among other things, upon the superiority—or essential equivalence. COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF EQUIVALENCE 35 Manv analysts would perhaps disagree clear war is considered to be more ith this formulation. Hovvever, by irrational and less probable. If China was ^reeing on these measures, both sides not deterred from supplying the Viet ave accepted them and would appear to Minh by the possibility of massive retalia- e satisfied with the paritv presently tion, can we expect that the Soviet Union xisting. The future is another matter. If will be deterred from contemplating, íe Soviets move to mir v deployment, and threatening, or even using, in a limited lere is as vet no indication that they are manner, nuclear weapons in a confronta- oing so, then the balance could start tion with the United States or a nato lifting to Soviet superiority. In August member over some strategic area? The 973 the Soviet Union tested a mirv. options are to give us the ability to 0 the technological knowledge is there. threaten less than maximal response and )eployment is another matter. If the therefore increase the credibility of our ioviets mir v, the agreed-upon existing deterrent threat. The linkage to thq evel of U.S. qualitative superiority could sizing question lies in the nature of the vell disappear, and the already existing strategic balance, or more precisely, the íumerical and megatonnage superiority question of parity or superiority. An )f the Soviets would be relatively option represents two things in this con- trengthened. Secretarv Schlesinger has text: first, it is a rung on the escalation isked for r&d funding to continue to ladder that must logically be topped by ievelop U.S. qualitative options. An arms superiority (whose ladder goes higher in ace, if it develops, will come only if thinking out the unthinkable); and sec- ioviet deplovments occur to erase the ond, it represents the physical capability J.S. qualitative margin and we deploy in numbers of launchers, warheads, and/ lew systems to keep it. Secretarv Schles- or megatonnage set aside for that option nger has made it clear that we are while still meeting the physical require- .villing to accept asymmetries in compari- ments of other options, including full- ion of triad legs. This is a far cry, scale second-strike response. lowever, from accepting a major asym- Détente notwithstanding, Americans metry in the overall strategic balance, or must ask themselves if this is an accepta- 1 series of asymmetries that “all point in ble position to be in: a world with Soviet ane direction." 17 strategic superiority across the board. Secretarv Schlesinger has separated the This is properly the central question to sizing issue from the counterforce or be answered. What price superiority, or targeting issue. This in itself has caused more accurately, what price prevention some mental confusion because there are of inferiority? While a discussion of su­ linkages between the two issues.IH The periority is beyond the scope of this targeting, or option issue, relates to pos- article, some observations are in order. sible gaps in our deterrent threat, as well I would agree with Colin Gray1!' that as the defensive abilitv (in Glenn Sny- there is a lot of confusion in American der’s concept) to fight a nuclear war and strategic thinking today. Old arguments provide intrawar deterrence should de- continue to be heard, still unsubstan- terrence fail to deter. The view is ex- tiated by events or meaningful data. This pressed that deterrence based on assured holds true for the small but growing destruction/countervalue is becoming less debate on the meaning of strategic supe­ credible in a world where full-scale nu­ riority. Many of the arguments used to 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW refute the view that superiority is mean- with us as a concept/policy for over 12 ingful beg the question by using examples full calendar years now.) The meaning of vvhere U.S. superiority never enterecl the superiority is a burning issue, as is Mu­ equation (specifically, the example of tual Force Reduction (mfr ),23 the desira- Hungary, 1956).20 Huntington has made bility of mad and what to do about it if the point that the political implication of we dont like it, and salt II.24 I would superiority essentiallv lies in the eyes of also add the warning(?) that the superi­ the beholder.21 If vve are confused as to ority question should be considered vvhat superiority means and if the Soviets across the board, including esealation gain strategic superiority, are \ve as a scenarios, intervention capabilities, and nation not automatically at a political conventional situations. It is inconceiva- disadvantage? Would not our deterrent ble to me that any individual, group, or posture immediately suffer from a lack “players in positions” would contemplate of credibility simply because we could disarming the opponent’s icbm force not agree on the meaning of superiority when he/it/they would be deluged with that is now hostile? 22 bombers and slbm’s in retaliation. If we The central point is that there are are going to indulge in a great debate, many questions of great importance that let us at least indulge in a meaningful need investigation by strategic thinkers, one that can clarify significam issues and this investigation is neecled now. today and in a manner that does not rely Counterforce is not, in my opinion, one on emotional fears. of these burning issues. (If for no other reason than that counterforce has been United States Air Force Academy

Notes 1 John W. Finncy. “t’.S. Says It Is Rciargeting Some Missiles Under a Chalmers M. Roberts. "Expandiug U.S. Opnons," Washington Fost, April 10. New Strategic Corxcept," Sew York Times. )anuarv 11. 1974. 1974; and. for balance, Julius Duscha. "Mditary Spending: TheJuggernaut 2 John W Finncy. Nixons Nuclear Doctrine," \'ew York Times. Rolls On." Progresswe Magazme. April 1974. Particular attention should bc January 15. 1974. paid to those articles highlighting Senator Mclntyrc’s position during tes- 3. Glenn H Snyder, Deterrence and Dejense (Princcton: Princcton timony on the issues. If testimony is not readily availablc. a good set of Univcrsitv Press, 1961), pp. 5-40. articles can bc found in the Wall Street Journal of June 12 and 13. 1974. 4 Thomas C. Schclling, Arms and Influrncr (New Haven*. Vale Univer- entitled. "A Choice on Deterrence" and “Power Strugglc: Crilics C.ondemn sity Press, 1966). Congress for Defensc Budget." 5. Herman Kahn's own triad, On Thermanuclear War (1960); On 12. In the era of SALT I. and assuming the ínterim Agrecment holds. Esealation: Metaphurs and Semanas (1965); and Thmking About the Unthmka- the "opcn-hole" alleged illogic takes on new meaning perhaps. (The opcn hle (1962). holes are the “launchcrs" into which new missiles must go in order to be 6. Morton H Halpcrin, Contemporarj Military Strategy (Boston: Littlc. launched in 2d, 3d. . . . nih wave attacks.) Brown and Company. 1967). 13. Sew York Times, editorial. January 15, 1974. 7. Ibid.. p. 84 14. James R. Schlesinger. Annual Defense Department Report: FY 797? 8. Ibid.. p. 85. (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Govt Printing Office. 1974). p. 49. 9. Ibid.. p. 86. 15. Snyder, p. 3. 10. There does seem to bc agreement in rnost learned circles that wc 16. For a rather short discussion of SALT I/MAD implication, see did indeed Icave counterforce bchind after about 1964. not so much Dnnald J. Brcnnan, "VVhên the SALT Hit the Fan." Xational Revteiv, \ ol. from choice as From the phvsical necessity to provide warheads and XXIV (June 23. 1972). pp. 685-92. vehicles to meet our critcria of what constituted a levei of assured 17. Schlesinger. p. 43. destruetion. Secretary Schlesinger indicatcs. howevcr. that wc still main- 18. Laurerue Martin, in “Changes in American Strategic Doctrine." tained some element of counterforce targeting in our ovcrall counter- Survwal. Vol. XVI. No. 4 (July-August 1974). pp. 158-64. provides an value assured destruetion deterrent threat. interesting look at the debate from a European point of view. Part of the 11. The editoriais and short articlcs buricd in back pages of ncwspa- articles value lies in proving once again that vastlv diflerctu. vet objective pers throughout the country are too numerous to mention. Howevcr. and reasonable. conclusions can be drawn from the satnc pnntcd word. attention should he drawn to: Herbert Schovillc. Jr.. “The Balance of 19. Colin S. Cray. "Defensc and Negotiation." Air Force. Januan 1974. Arms,'* The Xew Repuhhc. March 30. 1974; U.S Representaiive Robert pp. 32-36. Howevcr. I would dísagree with some of Crav s conclusions as Prirc*s letter to the Op-Ed editor. “Of Counterforce and the Prospects of to the importance of strategic questions. A "limited but substaniial War." Nrw York Times. March 22, 1974; editorial. “New Strategic Nuclear counterforce capabilitv." in my mind. has been possessed by both sides Policy,” Avtafton Week. March 18. 1974: Herbert York. "Deterrence by for scveral vears. What is in question and unknowablc to the publishing Means of Mass Destruetion." Butletm of the Atomir Srientúb. March 1974: analvst is the degree of certaintv or probabilitv of kill. thus credibility of COUNTERFORCE IN AN ERA OF EQUIVALENCE 37 lhe capabilitv Ne could strikc a number of Soviet »ilm loday und destro» A frank. "Soviet Power aftcr Salt I A SlratrgK -Cocrtive Capabilityr" iheir mixsilc». So what? Can m assurcdly gel lliem allr The Soviet» could Strateg* Rrvtrw, Spring 1974. likewue expend theír SS-9» over sevcral ol our missilc firlds in a litnttcd 23. The derignaiioii of MFR i» rcccnt. Previnuily the icrm wa» MBFR. bui subsijniul counlerforce uríke" Agam. so what'—we could laumli or Mutual anil Balaticed Force Reduction. The Soviet» had »lrenuou»ly thc rr»t in retaliai um—we are not disarmed objccted to "Balancctl " Oure again. the U.S. and N A FO cornpromued 20. See. for examplc. Brnfamm S Lainbcth. "Delerreiicc in lhe MIRV on the iinaltcred Soviet povilioit era. comained in Ki> hard C. Head and Ervin J R..Ue, editor». Imtrran 24. Not bcmg able to resht a parnrhul «df-inuitulioiial plug. I reler Drjrmt /'n/irt. Sd editbn (Baltimore: John» Hopkiiu Univrreity PreiS, lhe reader» to an extrlleni volume, alrearlv ctled. Head and Rnkkr. in the 1973). pp. 117-20. lield of nattonal sccuril) policv See also lhe newlv publishcd boolv by 21 Samuel P Huntington. "Alter Containmenc: l"hr Funilion» of lhe Frank B Horton III. Anthonv C: Rogerson. and Fdward 1.. Warner III. Militar» E»tabii»hincnl. Th* Annali, March 1973. p. 10. editor». C.omftatnlnr Dtjemt Polir) (Baltimore: John» Hupkiu» Univrrsity 22 For an intcrcsting picce and a ncu terin for lhe jargon. see Letvn Prcx». 1974)

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A Strategy Needed?

Dr . Richa r d E. Bissel l

I I N w h a t u s e d to be an ignored corner some long-range thinking about the fu­ of the globe, changes are occurring. ture of that region. This article. of The South Atlantic is the scene of course, can only outline some of the both long-term and immediate changes alternative scenarios, but anyone inter- in strategic formulas. The United States, ested in defense policy will want to in addition to the countries of that explore at greater lengtli the implications region, is looking at military and foreign of American policy in the South Atlantic. policy questions concerning that area With that in mind, let us consider Ameri­ with great care. The problems to be can policy in the past, the challenge of faced ha ve implications for coming dec- present developments, and the possible ades, and answers will have to include future. NEW WAVES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC 39 from moralistic African leaders caused he past the British to lower their military visibil- ^Yior to 1960 the South Atlantic caused ity in South África. The national govern- ew anxieties. The countries of Latin ments of South África then took on America had more than enough prob- more defense activities of their own. The ems to handle. África was an apparently new African States pushed for the re- quiet continent, ruled bv colonial powers moval of all European powers from the hat were members of the North Adantic African continent, the Indian Ocean, and iVreaty Organization (nato). The area the South Adantic. The Liberation Com- was untouched by the cold war, and mittee of the Organization of African 3reat Britain kept the maritime peace Unity has continually given material and rom bases in Gibraltar, South África moral support to liberation movements. Simonstown), and its island colonies. A few of the newly independem States The air did not need to be ruled, since also invited nontraditional powers into jthe South Adantic was on the path to the area. In a sense, the United States nowhere. The most advanced aircraft in made its First important impact on the die region were reconditioned C-47s of area after 1960, but so did the U.S.S.R. World War II vintage. Thus, for obvious and China. In Nigéria the Russians easons, the American government and helped supply and finance the federal he U.S. Air Force had few interests in government during the Nigerian civil the area. war and have remained to occupy key There were some important aspects to positions in the burgeoning oil industry tSouth Atlantic defense, nonetheless, re- and budding Steel mill complex. Their lating mosdy to the sea-lanes around the military ties remained close enough for Cape of Good Hope. Vet nobody had the Nigerians to send a military delega- reason to be concerned for their safety, tion to Moscow in October 1973 to check since all the powers in the area had an out possible arms purchases. Soviet influ- interest in keeping the sea-lanes free and ence was strongly felt at various times in open to tankers of all nations. Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania, but two This situadon lost its routine character, areas merit special menüon. In Somalia, however, with certain long-term changes the U.S.S.R. has clearly been establishing in África and Latin America and in non- a position—port facilities and a Commu­ Western strategic thinking. In addition, nications base in the north bought with these changes were compressed into the IL-28s, MIG-l7s, and SAM-2s—that last fifteen years, a time when American would match the efforts of the U.S. in defense thinking was concentrating on the Red Sea-Indian Ocean area. The problems in Europe, Southeast Asia, and U.S.S.R. appears to have little interest for the Middle East. the moment, however, in escalating that African States began obtaining inde- strategic race, being satisfied with occa- pendence in large numbers about 1960, sional port courtesv calls, the latest being with significam changes occurring almost the three-ship convoy en route from immediately thereafter. Most continued Suez Canal work to the Black Sea. When to follow the lead of their former mother observed during a ca 11 at Mauritius and countries in foreign policy, but it took while transiting the Cape of Good Hope, only one or two independent-minded the convoy consisted of the helicopter leaders to change the situation. Pressure cruiser Leningrad, a destroyer of the 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW Kachin class, and a support replenish- Such were the long-term changes that ment tanker. Such conventional forms of began to stimulate a few Americans to the Soviet presence must be balanced, of new thinking about the Southern hemis- course, against small arms shipments and phere, including the South Atlantic. It training given to the liberation move- was a process of reaction: to the grad- ments of Southern África. The quantities ually increasing Soviet naval presence in of those gifts can hardly be measured, the Indian Ocean, to the withdrawal of being transferred frequently from the Western Europeans from África, and to arsenais of Eastern European and third the fact of vveakening United States in- world friends. fluence in South America. The Chinese have tended to establish Short-term changes have been equally themselves on land, extending an offer important, particularly in the last year. that was accepred to build a railway from The dramatic change, certainly, has been Dar es Salaam in Tanzania inland to the that of the government in Portugal and Zambian copper belt. The American subsequent indications that the Portu- presence has taken nonmilitary forms, guese African colonies would obtain in­ with prominence given to the Peace dependence. Such a change is now ac- Corps, bilateral aid programs, covert op- cepted as inevitable by all sides. More- erations (as in the former Belgian over, the new- governments of Guinea- Congo), nasa tracking stations, and the Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola would normal operations of U.S. corporations. clearlv be led by men vvho succeeded in The Latin American side of the trian- their tjuest for povver by means of gle was changing as vvell. Increasinglv Chinese and Russian arms. The United nationalistic and willing to thumb their States shipped school books to the rebels noses at the norteamericanos, some Latin of Mozambique, through the efforts of Americans found it profitable to establish Janet and Eduardo Mondlane, vvhile the relations with, first, Western European Russiatis shipped carbines and the countries and later with Communist Chinese provided instructors in guerrilla States. Such international trade and arms vvarfare. Mondlane, formerly the leader purchases became more common in the of frelimo (the Mozambique component late 1960s, as Peru, Chile, Brazil, and of the Conference of Nationalist Parties Argentina expressed their self-confidence of the Portuguese Colonies), is now dead, bv breaking the Yankee monopoly. Thus having been assassinated in 1969, and in Argentina today the Air Force is the leadership is in the hands of those mostly British-equipped; the Brazilian vvho appreciated guns more than books. Air Force has 16 Mirage III-EBRs on Such a dramatic change in povver clearly order; Chile bought a cruiser for its alarms the remaining vvhite governments, Navy from Sweden in 1972; Venezuela is Rhodesia and South África, as vvell as the buying its fighters from Canada and United States, vvhose assumptions about France. Even Ecuador turned to Britain the povver distribution in the South At­ to buy its armed trainers (BAC-167) in lantic are being destroyed. By 1975 the late 1971. There were, of course, parallei stakes are not simply tramp freighters developments in the economic and politi- limping around the Cape. Western Eu- cal fields, as the Latin Americans at- rope obtains nearly 60 percent of its tempted to declare their independence petroleum supplies via the Cape route, from outside assistance. and petroleum supertankers vvill con- NEW WAVES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC 41 linue to use that route even after the majority by L.abour in the British parlia- 5uez Canal is reopened. Admittedly the mentary elections cannot be predicted. pnited States gets few vital supplies via The South Africans, though, have seen i he Cape of Good Hope, but if Western possibilities across lhe Atlantic also. defense interests include a stable supply Trade between South America and ! energv to Western Europe, American South África has generally been minimal, iitrategic interests in the Southern hemis- with a steamship of the Nedlloyd Line Dhere are at stake. making the trip every week or two. More svmbolically, the Cape-to-Rio yacht race is held every three years in January, the bresent developments latest in 1974. Such a nautical tie trans- With the most to lose. the South Africans lated into military relationships would jiave been the first to react. South África please the South Africans greatly, but by nas not tradiuonallv searched out foreign all indicators the ties had been fairly ^lliances. Externai affairs were to be weak until 1974. Events were to take a rpursued onlv when necessary, which different tack, as Brazil became inter- meant that South África had ties with ested in the South African connection. neighbors—Britain, Australia, and re- Brazil had long had ambiguous feel- cendy the United States—but few other ings about África. In 1972 the Brazilian countries. The year 1973 caused changes Foreign Minister made a well-publicized in South African calculations. At the time trip to eight black African States. The of the Yom kippur war, South África junket, however, had few strategic impli- received the honor of being placed on cations, since the Foreign Minister was ithe oil bovcott list. Iran did not honor more interested in mustering support for that list and continued to supplv at least higher coffee prices under the to-be- 40 percent of South Africa’s petroleum negotiated International Coffee Agree- needs. Needless to sav, South África has ment. At the same time Brazil had been cultivating even closer ties with certain natural bonds with the Portu- Iran. In recent months, for instance, the guese territories through shared lan- South African presidem visited Iran. In guage and culture. But Brazil in 1974 late January 1974 the South Africans saw itself as joining a fancier club of carried out joint maneuvers with ships nations. It was booming economically, from Great Britain’s Royal Navv. In that urging a higher birth rate to populate exercise the British supplied the naval the inland frontier, talking of developing component, and the South Africans sup­ nuclear weapons, and seeing itself as the plied the air force to hunt phantom paramount power in Latin America. As submarines off the Cape of Good Hope. Professor Robert Pfaltzgraff notecl in a Contacts between the British and South recent issue of this journal, “The grow- Africans had been at a low levei in recent ing strength of Brazil will give that rising years, limited largely to the supplying of power a role of unprecedented impor- the British frigates lying off Beira that tance in Latin America.”1 South África were trying to keep oil out of Rhodesian wanted to link up with that power. The fuel tanks. Thus the joint maneuvers inauguradon of General Ernesto Geisel were an important indicator of South as Presidem of Brazil in March 1974 was African and British relations. Whether attended by South African Foreign Min­ such ties will survive the attainment of a ister Muller and the Chief of the South 42 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW African Navy, Vice-Admiral Johnson. desire for closer ties is clearly present I Such a mission at that levei, especially the problem is for each side to determin» when sent by the South Africans, has the basic strategic needs and the política more than simply courtesy implications. price that can be paid to obtain them | Relations were clearly warming, as indi- The same problem will be present ir cated in the announcement of June 1974 U.S.-Brazilian relations. that their respective diplomatic legations The principal cost to the United State: vvould be raised to embassy status. The of closer ties in the South Atlantic lies ir improvement in relations can be ex- the nature of the domestic politics oi pected to continue. both Brazil and South África. Both pro- Relations between South Al rica and fess to be democratic, and yet both arc Paraguay were the focus of President under attack from many parts of the Stroessners five-day visit to South África world for allegedly repressive policies in April 1974. Such a trip was also toward domestic opposition. South África unprecedented in terms of those two has been under particularly strong at­ countries’ relations. The immediate im­ tack, both at the United Nations and plications of that visit were clearly more from official quarters of several Ameri­ economic than military, as South África can allies in Europe, for apartheid, a contracted to help Paraguay undertake policy of racial segregation that the exploration for minerais. But the gesture United States has voted to condemn at on South Africa’s part indicated a real the United Nations. The degree to which urgency in its efforts to find common Americans are committed to opposition ground with the South American coun­ to South African domestic policies will tries. It seems clear that South África was affect the ability of the American govern- rebuffed by Argentina because of the ment to coordinate defense planning latter’s internai instability. with the South Africans. The American The most important leg of the stra- government is under a great deal of tegic triangle, however, lies in the role of pressure from many groups of domestic the United States in the South Atlantic. interests opposed to any dealings with If American interests in that area are South África at all. The formation of ties security and stability, a means of dealing with Brazil and South África will thus with the major powers, Brazil and South involve the cost of alienating the segment África, wiU have to be found. of American opinion strongly opposed to South África has made several ap- the two governments. proaches to the United States since the Present developments thus push the Portuguese coup. In January 1974 the American government in two directions, South African Minister of Information, and like a man trying to stancl in two Cornelius Mulder, paid visits on then boats at once, the government’s policies Vice President Ford and Vice Admirai may fali into the sea. Pressure for a Ray Peet, in charge of overseas military decision on strategic policies is building, sales. In May more discussions were held with the Navy asking for a go-ahead on in Washington by Admirai Hugo Bier- constructing the Diego Garcia base in the mann, South African Chief of Staff, with Indian Ocean, which vvould have implica­ Admirai Thomas Moorer, Chairman of tions for the South Atlantic. Political the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Navy pressures for a clear policy toward the Secretary J. William Middendorf II. The newly independent Portuguese colonies NEW WAV ES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC 43 nd Southern África are stronger. going South Atlantic could be viewed as rivais. i both directions. Delaying a decision is Any accretion of military power in the self a. policy, since that merely gives the hands of the South Africans, for in- íitiative to other countries. A purely stance, would mean greater problems if efensive policx would satisfv none of at another time they were hostile to le American goals in the area. American interests. Thus any strategic ties formed in the area would be with le future weak, small States that could be easily tmerican policv in the South Atlantic manipulated and would demand little for rill need to be defined in response to all themselves in return for the American íese long-term and short-term changes. presence. Potential friends of that type mt it will also need to reflect the might be Libéria, Zaire, or independem American attitude toward new middle- Falkland Islands. evel powers such as Brazil and South A major element in “nationalist" think- SÁfrica. How does one deal with a coun- ing is cost, and that means cost in both rv that is onlv slightly important on a political and financial terms. Ties would jlobal scale and vet verv important in a be made with small States because the Darticular region? The United States has political costs would be minimal. The aced this dilemma before and has never degree of military accommodation would 'ound a consistem solution. The South be small, in contrast to the elaborate \tlantic will be another test case. The security needs of South África and Bra­ wo major Solutions that can be foreseen zil. The political cost of developing Diego will be labeled “nationalist” and “interna- Garcia Island as a base in the Indian tionalist." Each term can be explained in Ocean, for instance, is nothing in terms :ontext. of the host government, as the island is The “nationalist" approach to the owned bv Britain; and the financial cost £>roblem of the South Atlantic would is also small. More important allies de­ involve two basic goals: preservation of mand large aid packages as the price of American interests in and through the bases. Portugal and Spain have been area (thus including the oil shipping receiving large pavments every year for lanes) and maintenance of those interests decades so that the United States can at the least possible cost, preferablv using have strategic bases in those two coun­ American military forces to achieve it. tries and in the Azores. Such an American “nationalist” approach Indeed, a good “nationalist” analysis has many historical precedents and would compute the cost/benefit ratio of should be explained. the American presence in the South This vievv is based on the notion that Atlantic. The cost to date has been small. the United States is the strongest povver It is increasing rapidly and may already in the world and therebv has the right have surpassed the benefits. Some “na- (and perhaps the obligation) to defend tionalists” would urge either a more its own interests. Reliance on allies is economical method of maintaining discouraged, especially when dealing American interests or simple withdrawal. with relatively unstable States such as But there we can see that some would Brazil or South África; their stability, hesitate. Many factors elude precise pric- after all. is hardly assured. In a way, too, ing, particularly the potential benefits of the major States in a region such as the the region. 44 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW An “internationalist” vvould take a case of South África, for instance, mul­ broader view of the issues. Departing tinational corporations have been used as from a narrowly military viewpoint, the a form of pressure for changing the person with "internationalist” views oper- apartheid laws. ,In Brazil, on the other ates on several assumptions. The First is hand, American aid ties have been criti- that world politics is multipolar. Not only cized for accommodating to local police has the nuclear club expanded and thus practices rather than trying to change changed international politics but those them. Such ties obviously do cut both countries with the immediate potential of ways, but each country has its own developing nuclear weapons need to be environment, and the ties vvill vary ac- accorded due respect as vvell. A second cordingly. assuntption is that one can better pre­ The overall goals of an “international­ serve the peace through cooperation ist,” hovvever, vvould be to create a stable than through competition and confronta- framevvork of governments in the South tion. One can thus imagine what conclu- Atlantic and then allovv a process of sions such an analysis vvould provicle for orderly change that vvould not threaten the South Atlantic. American interests directly or indirecüy. The policy vvould first concentrate But in contrast to the “nationalist” view, upon the existing important powers in control over change vvould be vested in the area. Brazil and South África vvould the local governments, as supported by be the targets for obtaining cooperative the U.S., and not in the U.S. direcdy. agreements. Few other countries in cen­ Direct involvement of the U.S. vvould be tral and Southern África vvould be vvor- discouraged as leading inevitably to costly thy of much attention, although a few of imposition of American force in an area the other States in South America vvould difficult to supply. be catered to, particularly if Argentina The “nationalists” and “international- can stabilize its politics. Cooperation with ists” are both vvell represented in the the two major regional powers vvould American military and among the con- embrace all spheres of governmental cerned public. The clash betvveen their activity, not merely the military. From points of view is inevitable, but as to the “internationalist” point of view, after vvhether or not it is resolved at this time all, all areas of activity are related. If cannot be predicted. The South Atlantic agreement can be founcl in political, is clearly important enough to deserve social, and economic matters, military ties more attention, and vvhen the issues are will naturallv follow. Or they vvill be properly confronted vve can expect one unnecessary, since the South African and of these two points of view to prevail. Brazilian militaries vvould be able to After all, the South Africans and Brazili- carry out American goals. ans are not inhabitants of mere banana There vvould be a notable expansion republics. They are now powertul of other forms of American influence. enough that American policy vvill either such as increased investment by U.S. have to adjust to them or go around them. multinational companies, more trade, Princeton, Meu< Jersey and large aid programs (economic assist- ance and arms purchases). Such ties can Note be important in mitigating some of the I Dr Rohcrt L. Plalt/graff. |r.. • National Sccurity in a Orcmde of political costs othervvise incurred. In the I ransition," -hr L 'nnrrsity Rrvirw. July-August p. 7 ACQUISITION A Dynamic Process

Lieu t en a n t Colonel David N. Buri

URING the past fifteen years many innovative techniques have been instituted to improve the devel- Dopment, procurement, and support of defense systems. These improvements have been initiated in response to outside pressure—Congressional and taxpayer concern with how \ve acquire systems—and as the product of dedicated individ­ uais within the acquisition process whose efforts focus on the purchase of more defense per dollar. In the 1950s and most of the 196üs we made decisions con- cerning the future of billion- dollar programs based on ana- lytical (paper work) analyses. When we progressed to pro- duction, we frequently encoun- tered monumental problems, resulting in cost overruns and slipped schedules. lhe fly-be- fore-you-buv approach is a re- action to the problems asso- ciated with the total reliance on such analyses. In effect, we 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW novv test the hardware under considerado» (compedtive bidding). Prior to the 1960s for purchase before committing ourselves many supplies and Services could not be to a productíon contract. (Obviously, this procured by use of formal advertising approach is not applicable when one or a procedures, since we clid not have speci- fevv copies of an item are being bought.) fícations describing our requirements ad- Although development costs increase vvith equate to use with this method of pur­ inclusion of the hardware to be tested, we chase. In the early sixdes, we developed believe this additional cost will be more a procedure called Two Step Formal than offset by savings during production. Advertising to allow the benefits of for­ Further, subsequent support costs will be mal advertising even when we did not reduced, since only one or a limited have adequate specificadons. number of confignrations of a system will Under this procedure, we provide a be produced. brief description of our requirement and invite interested potential suppliers to submit technical proposals indicating how they vvould satisfy our requirement PIECOST if they received a contract. The technical proposal does not give any indication of Overhead typically represents two-thirds the cost involved for the approach being of the in-plant expenses incurred by submitted. The technical proposals are defense contractors. piecost , an acronym reviewed and accepted or rejected based for ”/>robability of /ncurring cstimated on predetermined criteria. After two or cost,” is a statistical technique designed to more technical proposals have been enable us to determine a measure of found acceptable, we proceed to step two acceptable overhead cost. in the process. In this step we invite the With piecost we identify the variables that influence or drive overhead costs at potential suppliers whose technical pro­ each contractors plant. Thus we are able posals have been accepted to submit to negotiate more realistic overhead rates formal bids on their respective technical on our large development and produc­ proposals. In this manner we are able to tion contracts. Of equal importance, we get the benefits of formal advertising. are able to monitor the contractors in- currence of overhead costs. If we note recognition of contractor capital employed that the contractors costs are running Since the time of the Revolutionarv War, high, we can inform him that he is we have related profit under negotiated spending at an excessive rate and direct procurements to the cost of the goods or that he correct the situadon. Services being purchased. Until verv re- cently, we tencled to ignore the role of invesred capital as a factor in developing profit objectives. We have recently devel­ Two Step Formal Advertising oped a procedure designed to encourage With the exception of World Wars I and defense contractors to invest in more II and the Korean conflict, we have efficient equipment and facilities. attempted to purchase most of our sup- Historicallv, there has been a high plies and Services to meet defense re- correlation between a contractors costs quirements through formal advertising under a negotiated contract and the ACQUISITION 47 rofits he achieved. This relationship ing position. This goal is accomplished laces the incentive (as seen from the by conducting an in-depth in-plant anal­ ontractors point of view) on the side of ysis and by challenging inefficiencies in íefficiency, for the greater the cost, the the contractofs operation. lhe actual reater (in absolute terms) will be the methodology consists of a five-phase pro- irofit. gram: planning, data aequisidon, anal­ Diametrically opposed to this approach ysis, report, and negotiation. > the European concept of basing profit The planning phase begins with the olely on the atnount of capital invested. idendficadon of a candidate for a review. This approach guarantees a profit on a The general criteria for selection are ontractors investment regardless of the found in the following quesdons: (1) Is “fficiency with which he uses those re- the program a major, ongoing one of ources. This is not our objective. We high dollar value—$25 million or more? desire to reduce the inequities in the (2) Does the contractor have substantial profit opportunity available and motivate amounts of negotiated government sales? the contractor to employ his resources (3) Has the contractor been operating in ífficiendy. Under certain large dollar- a sole-source atmosphere or another en- /alue contracts we will determine our vironment that does not require effecdve profit objective by giving equal emphasis cost control? (4) Has there been substan­ to the contractors use of his capital tial cost growth associated with the item resources and his likely costs. being procured? (5) Will there be a Bv increasing the emphasis placed on significam number of follow-on produe­ the amount of contractor capital em- tion contracts? (6) Does the planned ploved on a contract, we hope to reverse award date allow aclequate time for the the historie incentive for contractors to review? And finally, does the project increase cost. We are not going to the manager have a reasonable expectation extreme of guaranteeing a profit based of a payoff from the type of effort that solelv on the amount of capital invested. goes into a major Should Cost analysis? We are balancing between these two Selecting the team members is the next extremes. In the process, we hope to step in the planning phase. The size of induce our suppliers to increase their the team will vary with the magnitude of efficiency and reduce their costs and the effort. Generally, the team will have ours. ten to thirty people, half of whom will be engineers. Team members must be highly capable, and great care must be “Should Cost” taken during selection to insure that the Shoulcl Cost is a procedure used to proper balance of talent is obtained. l he determine what a system ought to cost, skills required generally include those of assuming reasonable economy and effi­ industrial engineers, designing engineers, ciency in the contractofs operations. It produetion specialists, statisticians, ac- represents a coordinated analysis of a countants, cost analysts, management an- contractor s management, cost estimating, alysts, and any additional specialists re­ and produetion engineering procedures. quired to analyze the company’s produet The ultimate objective of the Should line (e.g., nuclear engineers, aerospace Cost approach is to provide the govern- engineers, Computer specialists). The ment with a more supportable negotiat- planning phase concludes after the work 48 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW has been apportioned to the team mem- costs proposed for these elements. Indi­ bers and a master schedule has been vidual team members contribute to these established. negotiations by providing expertise in Phase two, the data acquisition phase, the area they have evaluated. takes from one to four months. This is The benefits of Should Cost are two- the actual on-site investigation of the folcl: the short-term benefit of better contractor's operation. Before the investi­ pricing on the current requirement and gation begins, however, the contractor the long-term benefit of more efficient must be briefed on the goals of the contractor performance on future re- analysis team, to insure cooperation in quirements. gaining access to required information. VVhile Should Cost is not a panacea, it Then everv aspect of the contractor's has proven its effectiveness in analvzing operation is reviewed by the appropriate high-dollar, major programs. As the team members. The areas evaluated in- method is further refined, its effective­ clude plant lavout, machine capacity and ness should increase. The use of Should utilization, production scheduling and Cost principies to strengthen traditional control, labor standards, make or buy analysis, coupled with the Should Cost policy, industrial engineering standards, review of selected major programs, will quality control, general and administra- make detailed analysis more effective. tive expenses, cost estimating, tooling, labor, production engineering, design Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria engineering, engineering overhead, man- ufacturing overhead, and any other areas During the 1950s we found ourselves vital to efficient operations. These eval- plaving catch-up with the Soviet Union. uations must be completely coordinated Our concern was to develop high-per- to assure that all pertinent facts are formance systems—and quickly. Our gathered without duplication of effort. management information systems pro- Analysis, the third phase, overlaps vided cost information—after the fact. both the preceding and following phases. This information usually put us on no- During this period the team members tice that we were in a cost overrun discuss and integrate their findings. situation after it was too late to take any The report phase is the realization of corrective action. The net result of our the teairfs efforts. The report will be the 1950s approach to acquisition was high basis for the government’s position dur­ performance, slight program slippages, ing negotiations. The report format is and huge cost overruns. Studies of ac­ clesigned to make the report an efficient quisition during this period indicate the negotiating tool. The report contains costs typically were 300 percent of those suggested primary and alternative nego- budgeted. tiation positions, findings, and recom- During the earlv 1960s we imposed mendations. new management information svstem re- The negotiation phase is the finale of quirements on our contractors. In most the effort. The government is concerned instances, the contractors found it expe- vvith areas such as more efficient plant dient to resort to a sort of double layout, better inspection and sampling bookkeeping—one information svstem techniques, and improved material pur- for their information and control and chasing practices, as well as the actual another svstem to satisfv government ACQVIS1TION 49 equirements. Cost control in the earlv actual costs exceed or fali short of the ixties was somewhat better than during budgeted cost, a cost variance is detected le 1950s, but still not good. vvhich points out a cost overrun or Now we have developed a concept that underrun for an individual work pack- Hows the contractor to satisfy both his age or for the contract as a whole. nd our cost and schedule information Another comparison is drawn accord- equirements with one system. I his ap- ing to the time span originally estab- >roach is known as Cost/Scheduie Con- lished for the work packages in the rol System Criteria (c/scsc). planning and budgeting stage. If the A prospective contractor must describe items scheduled to be completed at a n detail how his management system certain time have not been accomplished, vorks and the steps required, if anv, to an unfavorable schedule variance is >ring the svstem into compliance uith d noted. Quite possibly other items that ícsc. This approach requires that the were not scheduled to be completed are vstem to be developed and produced be actually finished. This balancing factor >roken into a pyramid of units down to mav eventually erase the effects of sched­ ?nd components. It then relates the ule variance in future accounting pe- dements of work required to each other riods. If anv variance, whether in cost or md to the end product. The contractor schedule. is noted through the c/scsc ístablishes completion schedules and tar- analysis process. the contractor is re­ 2jet costs for each subunit and lower tier quired to trace the cause of the variance. tem. c/scsc recognizes that the contrac- He must determine and explain its origin :or will have to reschedule and rear- and the steps he is taking to correct any range certain activities as the contract deficiency. progresses and gives lhe contractor the Our experience in the 1950s and early Sreedom to make adjustments under cer- 1960s demonstrated the need for an |tain constraints. integrated system of inspection and eval­ c/scsc requires the contractor to have uation of engineering requirements. cost, onlv one set of books for both his and schedule performance that could internai planning and control and for provide greater visibility for the program the required government reports. The manager. c/scsc has been designed to contractor has to develop a program for provide a means of comparing actual work performance that the government schedules and costs with budgeted sched­ can use to monitor the contractor s per­ ules and costs. Thus we now have the formance. In this context estimated and capability to analvze problem areas in actual cost, schedule. and technical per- time to take effective management ac- jformances must be reported in summary tion. c/scsc serves to flag problem areas iterms to Department of Defense man- that do not fali within the parameters of lagers. acceptable variance. Through the princi­ c/scsc requires the contractor to as- pie of management by exception, it fo- isemble, review. and analvze the totais of cuses only on those items that cause a Iseveral different categories of costs variance in cost or schedule which may monthly. I he resulLs are then forwarded result in a revision to desired product to the government for evaluation. A performance. Because of the timely re- comparison is then drawn between the porting of information, clanger areas are budgetcd costs and actual costs. YVhen now detected early enough to afford a 50 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW direct resolution before the errors com- awarded to the supplier (contractor) on a pound. The contractor is required to periodic basis. The amount of this fee take the initiative to solve these problems pool that the supplier can earn is depen­ and, at the same time, report the prob­ dem on his performance—as determined lems and their selected Solutions to the unilaterally and qualitatively by us, the government for íurther analysis. buyer—over and above the minimum The complexity of today’s defense Sys­ requirements set down by the contract. It tems and the desire to be ahead of other is possible for the contractor to earn nations in technological achievement fre- from zero to 100 percent of the award quently require a contractor to research fee, dependent, of course, on his per­ deeply and develop processes that were formance. beyond the State of the art when the The award fee has a periodic aspect in contract was awarded. The nature of this that its entire dollar amount available for work lies in uncertainty, which breeds the life of the contract may be broken variances from time schedules and down for disbursement at specific evalua- planned costs. Thus c/scsc is not ex- tion periods. Formal performance eval- pected to eliminate cost growth. But uations are made periodically over the life management now has an effective tool to of the contract, and a fractional award project the results of schedule and cost fee determination and payment is made variance on the desired system and pro- at the end of each evaluation period. For vide a sound basis for the decisions example, if a contract were awarded for necessary to limit cost growth. a one-year period with a total award fee of $1,000,000 and quarterly formal eval­ uation and fee disbursements, the sup­ the award fee plier might typicallv be offered $250,000 The award fee concept is a relatively new during each of the evaluation periods as innovation. It is an extremely flexible the maximum amount he could earn. approach to contracting that improves Formal evaluation and payment would Communications within the buying and be made at the end of each quarterly the selling organizations and between period. buyer and seller. l he award fee provi- The periodic nature of the award fee sion is the major element, in terms of concept allows us to make a thorough contractor motivation, in the Cost Plus evaluation of progress, make necessary Award Fee (cpaf) contract and a signifi­ changes in areas where conditions have cam factor when the award fee is used in changed or performance is not as ex- conjunction with other tvpes of contracts. pected, and provide useful feedback to It is specifically designed to provide an the contractor on how he is progressing. incentive to the supplier for superior The flexibilitv in the award fee provi- contract performance. The philosophy sion stems essentially from four factors: behind the award fee is to give the (1) the subjective nature of the perform­ supplier a monetary incentive and to give ance evaluation and fee determination the government a flexible management process, (2) our right to change or mod- tool with which to influence perform­ ify areas to be considered for perform­ ance. The award fee itself is simply a ance evaluation from one period to an- “fee pool” (a specific dollar amount) other, (3) the versatilitv with which the established by the buyer (dod) and amount of the award fee can be distrib- ACQUISITION 5 1 »ted over the life of the contract. and (4) pared with the expected cost of produc- he fact that no absolute requirement tion. The program proceeds to the next xists to have specific evaluation and fee stage of development if projected pro- letermination periods set for all con- duction costs and net revenue are satis- iracts. This inherent flexibility represents factory. If they are unsatisfactory, alter- f major advantage of cpaf contracting natives are examined for cost correction iver other types of arrangements (e.g., or the project is terminated. irm-fixed price. fixed-price incentive, With the presently established procure- ost-plus-incentive fee. cost-plus-fixed fee, inent policies, dod follows a similar proc­ knd various multiple incentive contracts). ess for system development and acquisi­ Increasing use of the award fee con- tion. A proposed major system is sub- ept is being made in dod acquisitions. jected to several stringent reviews by the (íuch research and development work is military clepartment, the Defense Sys­ arocured bv use of this technique. The tems Acquisition Revievv Council (dsarc), >peration and maintenance of the Air the Office of Management and Budget rorce Arnold Engineering Development (omb), and Congress before each funding (^enter are in the process of being ac- milestone. The decision for continued complished under an award fee contract. development requires satisfactory find­ The award fee concept has been used ings as to expected system performance with excellent results in conjunction with and projected system costs. Conse- Dther pricing techniques in the acquisi- quently, the total costs of a program tion of the F-15 aircraft. must be commensurate with perform­ ance and must fali within budgetary design-to-cost constraints. This may require trade-offs One of the more recent developments in in system performance and schedule. the acquisition field is called "design-to- The strategy requires that viable alterna- cost." Although this concept has been tives be maintained umil such time as the used bv industrv for vears, its application system selected for development has to the acquisition of defense systems is clemonstrated the recjuired performance relativelv new. and supportability within cost constraints. The incrementai acquisition strategy This concept of procuring systems that dod has adopted can be comparecí within a cost constraint has been given to the product development process used various titles, including design-to-cost, in private industry. Generally, when a design-to-price, cost-to-produce, and de- private firm initiates a new product, it sign-to-cost-to-produce. For simplicity, we First assigns that product to a sniall team refer to the concept as design-to-cost. of personnel from engineering, manufac- (Jse of the concejDt requires the estab- turing. and marketing. The team devel- lishment of a unit production cost we can ops estimates of recjuired technology, afford to pay for the quantities needed. market impact, and manufacturing re- The unit production cost is a primary quirements as well as their associated design parameter equal in importance to costs. Executive management reviews the system performance parameters. The project teams Findings at specified inter- concept requires that cost be emphasized vals during the development process. At continuously in trade-off decisions and each of these review points, anticipated that the contractor clemonstrate his abil- price and return on investment are com- ity to achieve the cost target before 52 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVI EU award of the production contract. Use of of production method to be used. In the concept requires attention to four acldition to system design, the number of key elements: (1) system cost targets, (2) units required plays a major role in system performance goals, (3) production determining the production process and, plans, and (4) feedback mechanisms. consequently, the unit production cost. Establishment of the cost target is Design and the quantity required specifi- probably the most crucial aspect of de­ cally affect direct labor, direct material, sign-to-cost. In the first or conceptual and factory overhead. For example, de- phase of a system acquisition, the total signs requiring special tooling or “clean estimated future cost of a program de- room” facilities will increase a manufac- pends on the technology required, the turer’s overhead. Usually specialized number of units required, monetary in- equipment is more economical for large flation, delays, changes in system per­ production runs, and general-purpose formance characteristics, and numerous tooling is ordinarily more cost-effecdve other cost factors. Since some of these for smaller runs. The variable and fixed factors can be estimated only imprecisely, costs associated with labor, material, and cost estimation techniques are extremely overhead will vary depending upon the important in the establishment of the processes specified during system design. initial target cost. When the Secretary of Defense ap- The establishment of system and sub- proves the request to enter full-scale system performance goals is another im­ development, the unit production cost is portant factor in the use of the design- established and becomes a firm require- to-cost concept. Unlike some acquisition ment of the development contract. Dur­ policies, however. performance is not the ing development, it is essential to track dominating characteristic for program the designs of those items comprising the evaluation. Though clesired performance significant cost elements of the system. characteristics may be specified, the con­ Though these items are only a small part cept requires an ability to trade perform­ of the total system, they comprise the ance factors for greater cost savings major portion of total system cost. His- consistent with some minimum leveis of torically, 20 percent of a systems compo- performance. It should be noted, how­ nents constitute approximately 80 per­ ever, that failure to meet the cost target cent of its cost. or the minimum performance leveis By monitoring design progress of the would require that the program be ex- major cost components and evaluating amined for possible alternatives or termi- the effect of designs on production costs, nation. Consequently, design-to-cost re­ one can determine the need for redesign quires rigorous use of cost-benefit anal- action to meet the design-to-cost goal. ysis. Increments in cost must bejustified Figure 1 depicts an example of a system s by the benefits derived in performance projected production costs based on an from proposed system or subsystem cle- analysis of designs produced. l he top signs, materiais, or production methods. portion of the figure illustrates progress These cost increments must be consistent toward the unit production cost goal with the overall cost target. through successive design iterations and System design not only influences per­ shows hovv the impact of early system formance characteristics, reliability, and designs can be extrapolated to reveal maintainability; it also influences the type potential production cost overruns. The ACQUISITION 53 prevent sunk costs from consuming a major portion of the development budget. Further, the early review of designs is important since system design will ultimately influence not only cost but also performance, reliability, and main- tainability. As has already been noted, design-to- cost is part of the overall dod incremen­ tai acquisition strategy. In an effort to provide system programs with exercisa- ble, viable alternatives, the strategy calls for the Defense Systems Acquisition Re­ view Council (dsarc) and Service reviews throughout the life of the development program. Coupled with these reviews is the requirement for separate contracts for development and production. During the dsarc and Service reviews, cost is given major consideration for program continuation and is the basis of the ultimate decision to enter a production contract. Though system performance goals are specified, design-to-cost re- quires trade-offs in performance and schedule to meet the cost objective con­ sistem with these statecl performance requirements. Our experience with design-to-cost is very limited. There is a belief on the part of several practitioners that the design- Figurt 1. Projtdion oj production costs and cffeds nj nde- sigrt adiam in rrlation Ia developmml funds txpendcd. to-cost approach is most applicable at the i Adaptrd /ram R L. Biducll and R. D. Gilbert.) subsystem and even component levei. As an observer of the evolving acquisition lower portion shows the expenditure of process, I have little doubt that proper the development budget as design itera- application of design-to-cost will result in tions and time progress. If the possibility significam savings of dod acquisition and of an overrun exists, alternate designs operating dollars. should be developed. These design itera- tions of the major cost items should occur earlv in the development phase of integrated logistics support the system program. Otherwise lhere Perhaps the most significam improve- may be insufFicient development funds ment in the acquisition process is the remaining to correct designs, which introductíon of the Integrated Logistics could cause excessive production costs. Support (il s) concept. During much of rhus, earlv design review will usually the 1950s and 1960s our approach to 54 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW system acquisition was predicated on the the system. Unfortunately, under our principie of concurrency—concurrent concurrency concept of acquisition, too system development, test, production, little attention was paid to the support and even operation. The objective was to implications of the chosen system design. achieve an operational capability at the During the past few years the il s earliest possible time. Engineering and concept has been developed and imple- design changes vvere made on equipment mented. Under this approach, we now in production and even after deploy- provide visibility of the support require- ment, to correct deficiencies revealed ments essential to perform system trade- during testing of the system. The con- off analyses. I hus we can reduce the currency concept created severe prob- total cost of ownership of a system, lems for those personnel subsequently including the cost of both acquisition and supporting and maintaining the system. support during operation. Under il s, we Spare parts, test equipment, and techni- have assigned highlv qualified logisticians cal data ordered during previous months to the project offices responsible for were not alwavs compatible with the end acquiring new defense systems. These items being producecí during the current logisticians cause us to analvze support month. Under this concept performance implications of each approach under and early operational capability were em- consideration. il s should significantly re­ phasized, frequently at the expense of duce the total cost of owning a system. future support costs. The reliability and maintainability of subsystems and compo- nents were not given the same attention In his recent book Arming America,* J. as was system performance. Yet, as indi- Ronald Fox found much wrong with the cators of how long an item would per- acquisition process. I concur that there is form satisfactorily under stated condi- a need to tnake many changes, but I also tions and how quickly an item coulcl be believe, as reflected in this article, that repaired when it failed, reliability and those in the defense acquisition business maintainability have tremendous implica- have not been idle. Much has been done, tions when considering how much a and we are actively working on the much system would cost to own. Frequently we more remaining to be done. found that an extra dollar invested dur­ School oj Systems and Logistics, AFIT ing development or production would * I his book was rcvicwed by Coloncl Buri in the Januarv-Februarv 1975 save us ten dollars during operation of issuc of An Unhfffsity flrviru'. Air Force Review

THE NEW USAF FIGHTER LEAD-IN PROGRAM A First Year's Progress Report

Lawrence R. Benson HE history of aerial warfare has re- T peatedly clemonstrated that a supe­ rior Fighter pilot can usually prevail in combat against a less capable pilot in a somewhat better-performing aircraft.1 Consequently the United States Air Force historically has invested a signifi­ cam portion of its resources in training its “fighter jocks.” The Air Force has collected dividends on this investment vvhenever callecl to action in a combat situation. The accelerating complexity of vveapon systems and tactics makes the training of fighter aircrews more impor- tant today than ever, and also more expensive. This article explores a new step in the process of training men to fly Fighter aircraft, a change that might be both better and less expensive than the traditional way. present combat creu) training Under the customary practice, the future Air Force fighter pilot or weapon Sys­ tems officer (wso) begins earning his vvings with undergraduate pilot or navi- gator training (upt/unt) after a system- atic selection process. Here he learns basic flying skills in the T-41, T-37, and T-38 at an Air Training Command base. He then goes on to combat crew training (cct) in first-line fighter aircraft with a Tactical Air Command unit. This move from undergraduate to combat training has meant a significant and sometimes 56 AIR FORCE REV1EW 57 ;ifficult transition period for the devel- tais of combat flying. Today the concept íping fighter pilot. is being put to the test by the 465th Upon his arrival at cct the potential Tactical Fighter Training Squadron jmbat crewman faces two major chal- (tfts) at Holloman afb, New México.3 mges. First he must take transition Briefly outlined, the major advantages aining to a new aircraft and learn the that planners anticipated might ensue andamentals of flying a real fighter from employing the fighter lead-in con­ lane. Then he must learn how to use it cept were as follows: nd its sophisücated systems aggressively (1) tac could reduce the high cost of i the highly demanding combat envi- training an F-4 or A-7 pilot. Average jnment. After several familiarization total cost per flying hour was recently mies, he is still “getting the feel" of his computed at $319 for the T-38 versus amplex new aircraft while at the same $1215 in an F-4 and $947 in an A-7.4 me mastering the close teamwork and With the current conFiguration of the T- iscipline of tactical formation flying— 38, it is estimated that the lead-in pro- scissors,” “barrei rolls,” and other basic gram saves 10.1 F-4 and 9.4 A-7 training ghter maneuvers (bfm)—and the pre- and indirect support flying hours per ise delivery techniques of ground attack student. Even if total costs are not cut, sa). Performance is closelv watched by the much lower fuel consumption of the íe instructor pilot (ip). If the new man T-38 (about 1/5 that of an F-4) has ontinues to make the grade in progres- already become a significant factor in ively more difficult tasks, he can expect conserving JP-4.5 3 be a full-fledged Phase II Fighter jock (2) A better pilot might be produced i about six months, after approximately using Fighter lead-in training. He would 00 hours of flying in the F-4 or 85 learn bfm, selected ground attack and ours in an A-7.2 If making the grade tactical formations in a familiar, easier-to- iroved to be too hard at the expected fly aircraft, theoretically advancing faster >ace, the new man had to be given more than if starting these courses in a new istruction, more practice, more time. and more difFicult machine. The lead-in 'his happened often enough to call for training would be Consolidated in a close look at the scheduled progression highly controlled environment provided hrough training. by a specialized training unit, a setting that a larger and many-faceted replace- ment training unit (rtu) cannot dupli- he fighter lead-in concept cate. n recent years Tactical Air Co mm and (3) With fewer first-line Fighter aircraft ifficials began developing the concept of devoted to training missions, tac’s com­ 1 more gradual transition or “lead-in” bat posture would be strengthened. rom upt/unt to combat crew training. A In June 1972 tac obtained concur- 969 Curriculum Review Conference at rence from Headquarters usaf on the -uke afb, Arizona, explored the idea in concept of T-38 lead-in training and onsiderable detail. The Fighter lead-in through September briefed the Air Staff oncept envisioned several advantages to Board Structure on details of the plan. >e gained by utilizing the Northrop T- tac was required to use its own existing 18A Talon in a concentrated tactical resources to fund the program and did raining course to teach basic fundamen­ so by trading off 27 T/AT-33s and Contmurd on fnigt 60 a

d 9 The F-4D Phantom (a) is being replaced by lhe T-38 Talon in the LrSAF's Fighter Lead-ln Program, one reason being lhe lower cost of operation of the T-38. . .. Student pilots in lhe 465lh Tactiail Fighter Training Squadrons ftghler lead-in course pracliee fortna- tion landmgs in lhe T-38 (b). ... A mockup of an F-4 bearing headmg distance indicator serves in teaehing navigatwn instrument proeedures (c). . . . An inslructor pilot demotislrales lhe Ingh-speed tactual maneuver "yo-yo" to student pilots in preparation for performance in lhe T-38 (dl. ... The 58 sorties averaged per day by lhe 465th TFTS accounl for a busy squadron operalions desh (e). 60 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW slightly under 500 manpower spaces. In 4Ds. Th is required additional personnel, March 1973 the Chief of Staff approved training, equipment, and supplies. Even the transfer of' T-38s to tac, and the part of the Holloman boq was vacated command was authorized to start a lim- and refurbished for the future students. ited program during fy 74 as these The base used local resources as much as aircraft became available.8 possible to accommodate its new squad­ ron and training mission.9 Air Training Command (atc), and to implementation of the program a lesser extern Air Force Systems Com­ To carry out the Fighter Lead-In Pro­ mand, furnished the 465th with its most gram, Headquarters tac chose the 465th important item of unit equipment— Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, then Northrop T-38 A Talon supersonic train- an AT-33 unit stationed at Cannon afb, ers.10 These aircraft were transferred to on the plains of eastern New México. On the Tactical Air Command after thor- 1 August 1973 the 465th transferred ough preparation and inspection. The “without personnel or equipment” to a 465th tfts gradually received its 40 new home at neighboring Holloman afb, assigned and 4 not operationallv author­ in the south-central part of the State.7 At ized (noa) aircraft in a delivery schedule Holloman the 465th joined the 49th that lasted from August 1973 to July Tactical Fighter Wing (tfw), the Air 1974." Many of the Talons required Force’s onlv dual-based NATO-committed wing changes prior to their assignment Fighter unit. The 465th was integrated to the more rigorous flying maneuvers of into the 49th tfw organizational struc- a tactical Fighter environment. Almost all ture and became its fifth flying squad­ of the 465th's T-38s were built in 1960 ron. On 28 August the 465th flew its and 1961. The 465th is currendy working first T-38 sortie. with the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, After the 49th tfw’s official notifica- Kelly afb, in a detailed stress analysis study tion in May 1973 that it would be to collect data for determining the actual responsible for the Fighter Lead-In Pro­ wing Life of T-38s in the lead-in program. gram, wing offlcials planned the numer- The 465th’s T-38s are now scheduled for ous actions required to bed down the wing changes after 1000 hours of lead-in 49th’s newest unit. Adequate facilities flying.12 were, of course, a priority. To provide The San Antonio Air Logistics Center hangar, classroom, and administrative (saalc) is also presently involved in a space, the Holloman Facilities Board, in project to modify tac’s lead-in T-38s bv accordance with instructions from higher adding a practice ordnance capability. headquarters, approved use of a large The new equipment consists of a modi- hangar across the airfield from the main Fied A-37 gunsight (CA 513), a KB-26A base and required several base organiza- sight camera, an armament control panei, tions to move from adjacent builclings.8 an A-37B-tvpe aircraft pylon, and a B-37K These facilities then underwent modifica- bomb rack. The saalc will strengthen the tion for the new mission. The 49th also T-38s' center-line fuselage structure and had to add an entirely new logistics also install MXU-553 recording systems on capability for the T-38 and the J-85 ten of the aircraft to obtain fatigue analysis engine to its existing commitment to data. The 465th expects to achieve weapons maintain the combat readiness of 96 F- delivery capability in spring of 1975, and AIR FORCE REVIEW 61 he project is scheduled for completíon bv tionally ready—supply) rate.17 farly 1976. At a programmed cost some- A key to lhe future success of the Ehat over $2,000,000, the “Class 5 Mod” Fighter Lead-In Program was the forma- Lriil perniit further expansion of the 465th's tion of a competem and highly motivated round attack training missions with a cor- faculty of instructor pilots. The original esponding reduction of A-7 and F-4 sorties cadre of ip’s for the new 465th carne uring cct. 13 from three main sources: the old 465th In addirion to the 65 officers and 18 tfts at Cannon, atc T-38 units, and nlisted personnel who are presently au- various tac combat support groups. In íorized in the 465th tfts itself, the 49th addition, the squadron obtained the Serv­ actical Fighter Wing was given 300 nevv ices of two former pow ’s as instructor lanpower spaces in support of its new pilots.18 lission.14 Most of these positions were As newly arrived members signed into or T-38 maintenance. They have been the 465th, they found a tremendous job irgely Filled by using assigned 49TFW ahead of them before the first student >ersonnel as well as by diverting pipeline class even arrived. Since the 49th’s civil esources, intracommand reassignments, engineers could not provide all the re- nd special assistance from the Air Force sources needed to accomplish the unpro­ dilitarv Personnel Center.15 grammed workload suddenly required The wing’s logistics complex had to by the new mission, the 465th relied stablish the necessary maintenance and heavilv upon “self-help" projects. Its offi­ upply support for the new aircraft. This cers and airmen took up hammers, saws, nvolved evervthing from training per- and paint brushes to remodel their facili- onnel in T-38 aircraft svstems to obtain- ties into a professional learning and ng numerous bench stock items. The operating environment in which to con- t9th Organizational Maintenance Squad- duct the usaf Fighter Lead-In Pro­ on set up a new flight-line section gram. I!l devoted to the T-38s. The Field Mainte- íance Squadron encountered the most developing the neu< curricula ;erious T-38 problem area in seeking to >btain a functional J-85 engine test cell. Even more importam, the methods of 'ortunately the 78th Flying Training instruction and course contem for the A'ing at VVebb afb, Texas, was able to new program had to be developed and íelp the 49th by providing use of its refined. Headquarters tac prepared the Queen Bee” jet engine intermediate syllabi for T-38 Qualification (Course naintenance facility pending the estab- T3800Q) and ip Upgrade (T3800I) as ishment of this capability at Hollo- well as the overall Fighter Lead-In Tian.lh Despite some J-85 maintenance Course (T3800A). T he 465th tfts itself lifficulties and shortages of certain T-38 prepared the detailed phase manuais for oarts and equipment, the 49th has been the lead-in course as well as academic [ible to generate up to 1100 sorties per course; outlines. The academic instructors Imonth to successfullv meet the 465th’s constructed the actual course contem by Lraining requirements to date. The size referring to Tactical Fighter Weapons pf the squadron’s future student load School publications and lexts in use by epends largely on increased manning A-7 and F-4 training units.20 Pnd a reduction in the nors (not opera- The usaf Fighter Lead-In Course fi‘2 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW consists of five phases of’ training for weeks. Student progress follows an or- pilots, four of vvhich vvso’s will also derlv flow schedule, which charts all complete. The amount of flight training required tasks, coordinated in a chrono- in each phase is listecl in Table l.21 After logical sequence. rtu’s have shown con- modification of the T-38s for practice siderable interest in their academic pro- weapons delivery, the ground attack gram interface with the 465th tfts. For phase will increase by three sorties and example, in April 1974 an Instructional three hours for both pilots and wso’s. Systems Development (isd ) Team from Simulator usage and the academic train­ the 355th tfw of Davis-Monthan afb, ing load are also listecl in the table. Arizona, visited Holloman to review at first hand the 465th’s capabilities and its lead-in curricula. As a result of this Table 1 review, the 355th deleted eight hours of bf m academics as well as a tactical naviga- Fighter Lead-ln Training tion course from its cct for lead-in Pilot WSO Pilot WSO graduates. Glose coordination in the fu­ Flying Phases Hours Sorties ture between the 465th and the combat Transition 1.3 1 Formation 8.4 2.4 7 2 training units it serves will be highly Basic Fighter Maneuvers 7.2 3.6 8 4 productive.22 Low-Level Navigation 1.2 1.2 1 1 Ground Attack Orientation 2.0 1.0 21 Total 20.1 8.2 19 8 preparing the IPs Simulation Training Flying T-38s, however, remained the F-4 Simulator 6.0 number one priority in the new squad- T-38 Simulator 3.0 3.0 ron’s order of business. The officers Egress Trainer 2.0 2.0 assigned to the 465th had a wide variety Total 5.0 11.0 of flying experience and included com­ Academic Training bat veterans of Southeast Asia. Others Specialized Training 7 6 had more limited backgrounds. For ad- Life Support 33 ministrative purposes, the original con- Aircraft Systems 44 tingent of pilots was divided into the Flight Characteristics 4 Formation 44 following six groups, based on the range Basic Instruments 10 and currency of their previous experi­ Basic Fighter Maneuvers 17 17 ence and training: (1) six former atc T- Mission Planning 33 Weapons Delivery 4 4 38 ips with fighter experience, (2) six Radar 10 tac T-33 ip s qualified in ground attack Inertial Navigation 6 (ga) Air Attack 4 as well as T-38 Air Combat and Academic Preparation (.5 Basic Fighter Maneuvers (acm/bfm), (3) hour per hour of nine tac T-33 ip's qualified in c.a with instruction) 21 27 fighter experience but without T-38 Total 63 102 time, (4) four T-38 proficiency pilots with fighter experience, (5) three tac F-4 pilots current in ga and acm/bfm, (6) Each fighter Iead-in class goes through eighteen T-33 proficiency pilots with T- 25 flying days and 3 ground training 38 student time but without fighter or ip days, with a scheduled duration of six experience.23 AIR FORCE REVIEW 63 Based on the needs of each of these Pilots from the other groups also soon roups, the squadron implemented a began receiving the training they re­ jmprehensive upgrade program to ob- quired.26 iin a fullv qualified faculty of ip’s in a Despite not yet having as many of its linimum number of sorties and in time aircraft on hand as it could have usefully >r the student load to come. The ip’s in employed, the 465th had fully qualified -roup 1 needed only local orientation 22 T-38 ip’s by the end of 1973 and 46 íissions, which also served to qualify of 47 assigned pilots by 31 March 1974, íose in the second group as transition just a month after the arrival of its first istructors. Full mission qualification in student class and slightly ahead of the iimpliance with the tac T-38 ip Up- revised program schedule. rade Course was achieved when the ^uadron could generate multisortie mis- starting the new course ons. The ip Course consists of T-38 ransition, Formation, bfm, and ga Due to restricted areas over the vast chieved in 17 sorties (about 18 flying White Sands Missile Range and the high ours) and 30 hours of academics. A volume of F-4 traffic in the 49th’s exist- aluable added experience for many of ing airspace, the 465th tfts needed its le 465th’s ip’s has been the opportunity own airspace to safely perform its heavy ) fly bfm occasionally with the expert load of student training missions. (It ir-to-air T-38 pilots of the 64th Fighter calculated a T-38 sortie generation of 60 ^eapons Squadron from Nellis afb, Né- per day.) Therefore, the Federal Avia- ada.24 tion Administration established a special This nucleus of a dozen instructors operating area southeast of Roswell, New len began the task of upgrading the México, as requested by the squadron.27 emaining pilots. The officers in the The 465th tfts actually began per- ther four groups required training as forming its T-38 training mission in ollows: Groups 3 and 5—the T-38 Air- February 1974. The first pilots to receive raft Qualification Course (T3800Q) and instruction from the new squadron were fie T-38 ip Upgrade Course (T3800I); somewhat more experienced than its ex- iroup 4—Course T3800I; and Group pected typical student. These pilots were i—Courses T3800Q and T3800I as well the usaf Thunderbirds, who cross- s the new usaf T-38 Fighter Lead-In trained to the T-38 in two groups of Course itself (T3800A). The T-38 Quali- three each and one individual pilot be- ication course consists of both transition tween 4 February and 17 April 1974.28 lying and instruments. It requires 10 This accomplishment by the squadron orties of about 14 flying hours and 24 helps indicate the three-pronged training lours in the classroom.25 mission of the 465th, which includes T- Squadron officials selected both more 38 qualification-jet recurrency and ip xperienced pilots (from Group 3) and upgrading as well as the Fighter Lead-In he least experienced (Group 6 ) to begin Course. The Lead-In Course itself is also raining First. This allowed the 465th to clesigned as initial fighter training for ncrease its core of ip’s quickly while at experienced flyers (e.g., 0-2 and OV-IO he same time gaining practical experi- pilots) as well as students fresh from upt :nce in its rapidly approaching mission and unt. |>f teaching the Fighter Lead-In Course. fhe raison dJetre of the 465th Tactical 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Fighter Training Squadron remained to Here the instructors realize that stu- begin molding the products of under- dents are the output, not grade folders. graduate pilot and navigator training into “Fighter jocks.” The 465th vvas soon Very professional outfit.30 involved in a busy schedule of turning The real proof of the 465th’s perform­ out Fighter lead-in graduates. By 1 Au- ance and the validity of the whole Fighter gust 1974, its First anniversary at Hollo- lead-in concept vvill come during combat man, the 465th had completed training crew training. That is where the 465th’s 121 pilots in 8 classes, and 2 more classes graduates themselves vvill demonstrate were somewhere in the process of com- how well they have learned. And that is pleting the 6 -\veek course. Classes ranged where the Fighter Lead-In Program is in size from 13 to 35 individuais. The novv being evaluatecl. average class is programmed to consist of Acting upon the interest expressed by 25 upt and 15 unt graduates. VVith a 3- tac Commander, General Robert J. vveek overlap period between classes, the Dixon, Headquarters tac developed a total student load for the 465th vvill comprehensive “Plan for Evaluating the eventually be about 80 individuais at a T-38 Fighter Lead-In Training Pro­ time. The graduation of all classes on gram.” 31 It monitors a number of classes schedule has proved the wisdom of locat- entering rtu’s for whom lead-in training ing the program in the Southwest, as was not available. The performance of very few flying days have been lost to these pilots serves as a control sample weather.29 when comparecí with data from several other classes whose members have been appraising the lead-in course through the course at Holloman. After each training sortie, the ip vvill quantify Student reaction to the overali Fighter his studenfs performance on a speciFied Lead-In Course thus far has been highly grade sheet, using a gracling scale of one favorable. Some typical comments upon to ten. (One connotes “Unable to per- their completion of training at Holloman form task,” five is average, and ten have been: indicates a perfect performance.)32 The course is an excellent program for The Tactical Air Command Directo- upt grads. . . . rate of Studies and Analysis vvill collect In talking to friends who have com­ all these scores and process the data into pleted rtu. this course seems almost inval- learning curves to determine such pa- uable. . . . rameters as (1) the time required to reach I expect FU be a better and safer A-7 various proficiency leveis; (2 ) the poten- pilot in rtu because of it. . . . tials of lead-in training for increasing I feel I learned a good bit in a relatively painless process, which is what training is proficiency leveis; (3) the transferabilitv all about. I feel much better prepared to of lead-in training in areas covered. e.g.. go on to the F-4. . . . formations, bf m, ground attack; (4) fall- The learning here in six weeks was out beneFits in other phases of training, tremendous. . . . e.g., transition, instruments, air attack; The bfm phase of the program was (5) potendal for decreasing the amount outstanding. . . . of training in first-line aircraft; and (6 ) It s great to be able to learn these additional areas where lead-in training techniques in a familiar airplane. . . . might be einployed. AIR FORCE REVIEW 65

At the completion of each cct phase, I he 465th Tactical Fighter ie ip’s will complete additional evalua- Training Squadron has in one year ans on the students, including task grown from a handful of officers with íalvsis questionnaires. Project oífícers in two T-38s into a highly active and ich participating wing will fonvard professional training arena for produc- jmbing, strafing, and rocket scores for ing apprentice fighter pilots. Its early ich student, as well as interview ip ’s for íedback and comments on lead-in grad- graduates are already being further ates. The same methods will be used to trainecl in combat tactics, flying A-7s and lonitor wso progress. The 49th tfw F-4s. The verdict on the new progranVs roject Officer is also maintaining similar effectiveness is not yet in, but prelimi- ata and instructor feedback on the nary indications point toward a favorable udents during their lead-in training, judgment. If the existing program is icluding the instructors’ predictions on found to be beneficiai, further expansion ow their students will perform during of lead-in training is possible. Perhaps in ct.33 The tac Comptroller has been the near future all would-be fighter crew isked to compute total cost figures for members will be funneled through the oth lead-in training and traditional Lead-In Course before moving on to aining with first-line aircraft, which the combat training. The implementation of irectorate of Studies and Analysis can the Fighter Lead-In Program again dem- se to determine the cost effectiveness of onstrates the willingness of the United le new program. Headquarters Tactical States Air Force to finei a better way of ãr Command expects the first authorita- doing things. ve report on this systematic evaluation Holloman Air Force Base, New México 3 be in by 1 June 1975.

4. Cost ligures were computed lor the author by Major Dunvood chnowledgments Lcwis. 49TFW Budget OHicer. using I April 1974 figures in Table 24. AFM 173-10. USAF Cuil mui Plannitig Farton, for dcpot maintenancc, The author would like to thank Colonel William L.. material, labor, replenishinent and sparcs. and lhe latest availablc ligures irk. Commander of the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing. (as of 14 August 1974) lor jet luel costs. >r suggesting and encouraging the writing of this 5. Comparison of luel consumption as made in Talon Srrvur News. Summer 1974. p. 3. rticle. It was accomplished only with the assistance of 6. Background of the program is outlincd in Atcli I to Llr, TAC/XP to umerous officers of the 465th TFTS and the staff of 49TFVV rl a!., subj: T-38 Lead-In Training. 29 Apr 1974 íe 49th TFW. The contribudons of Captain Edward 7. Hq TAC Movcment Order No. 5. 22 Jun 1973. . Cole. who prepared the squadron histories during 8. TAC Programniiug Plan 13-73, T-38 Lead-ln Training. 25 Mas 1973 (nrigmally i lassified SECRET, latcr declassified and titlc rhanged to íe period of this study, were especially valuable. "T-38 Fighter Fainiliari/aiion"). Annex R 9. 49TFW Programming Plan 1-73, Implementation ol 465TFTS l'nii Bcddown. 10. \lsg TAC/LGM to ATC/LGM. subj: T-38 Acft lor TAC Fighter otn Familiari/.ttion Program. 211545/ Scp 1973. TAC Program 3T-273. 1. In a recem artide bv Jack N Mcml and Pterre M. Sprey, "Qualítv. Dclivery schcdulcs and related message tralfic are in 49TFW History uanriiv or Training." L'SAF Fighter H'eapun.% Rrvieu*. Summer 1974, pp Ollicc files. -15. n has been stated: “Seriou» and detailrd historical evidence of I I In accordance with Ltr. SAAMA/MMC to TAC/LGMK, subj: 1-38 idividual air and ground action* almost invariably point» 10 lhe Aircraft Usage Program Implementation, 26 Apr 1974 inclusion thai sound training. well considcred lactics. and individual 12 Msg, TAC/LGMF to I2AF/LGMD. subj: T-38 Wing Life Time in tmpetence overwhelm mo»l olher aspects of che balde " TAC Environment. 172115/ Aug 1973. 2. TAC Briefing Guide. Course II1507B. USAF Operatumal Training 13. Hq USAF Program Management Directive for Class V Modification 9une F-4. Aug 1975; AFM 50-51. USAF Formal Schooh Catalng, Jun 1974. of T-38A Aircraft. 6 Fcb 1974, PMD No. R-Q 2507; Msg. CSAF/RPD to hange 5. 8-11—12. AFLC and TAC. subj: T-38 Aircraft for Lead-ln-Figltter (LIF) Modilica- 3. Alihough rhe Fighter Lcad-ln Program i$ designed lor boih pilots non. 141308/ Jun 1974. »d nasigator» (weapon sv»tem» officers), iht» articlr primarilv addrrssel 14 49TFW Unit Detail Listíngs; Ltr. MMFD-29 to 49TFW/DO/DP/LG, íot training The 465th TFTS began navigator training in August 1974. subj: Mtssion Support Manning for 465TFTS. 13 Jun 1973 66 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

15 TAC PPlan 13-73. Anncx B 25. Historical Report. 465TFTS. Ocl-Dec 1973. 16. Msg. TAC/LGMS to I2AF/LGM. subj: J-85 JEIM Capability, 26. IM. 221706Z Aug 1973; USAF Host-Tenant Support Agrccment. 78TFW 27. Letter of Agreemcnt. Albuquerque ARTC Center, 49th Tactical and 49TFVV. 21 Mar 1974. Fightcr Wing and I877th CoinmunK anons Squadron. subj: Air TrafTtc 17. Msg. 49TFW/CC to I2AF7LG/DO/DP. subj: T-38 Flving Capabililies Control Service to 49th Tactical Fighter Wing Aircraft, 4 Mar 1974 112230/ Apr 1974; Msg. I2AF/DO/LG to TAC/DO/LG/DP. subj: T-38 28. TAC Programming Plan 6-74. Thunderbird Convertion. 14 Feb Fightcr Lcad-ln Capability. 232I41Z May 1974. 1 he advanccd age of tbe 1974. Holloinan T-38s has contributcd to lhe MORS rate by making parts tnorc 29. Training data were extracted from records mamtained by the difFicult to obtain 465TFTS School Secrctary 18. 465TFTS Historical Rcports. 30. Exccrpts frotn students' End of Coursc Critiques collccted by 19. Ibul I65TFTS School Secrctary. The most criticized aspect of lhe course itself 20. To allotv more data bits for lhe AFMPC Computer, the rourse was the lack of rcalistic ground attack due to the absence of practice numbering svstein was recently cbanged to a ten-digit number. Syllabi are ordnance and a sight reticlc. The students also made some specific noiv referred to by the First six of these charactcrs. Of the courses suggeslions on streamlining course conlent and improving visual aids. discussed in this article. T3800A replaced 1II502FL. T3800I rcplaced 31. Telcphonc interview. author with Maj. J. D Koehler, Lead-ln 111502FI. and T3800Q replaced 111502FQ as syllabi designations. Project Officer, TAC Directorate of Fighter Operations—Fighter Train­ 21 Based on TAC Syllabus Course 11I502FL, USAF Fighter Lead-in ing Division, 15 Aug 1974. Coursc T-38, )an 1974, 1-2. 32. Msg, 49TFW/DOV to 12AF/DO. subj: Evaluation of T-38 Fighter 22. Ltr. 355TFW/DOTS to DOT. DO. CC. in turn. subj: A-7 1SD Team Lead-ln Training Program. 051710Z Feb 1974; Ltr. 49TFW/DOT to 12 Report of Visit, I May 1974. AF/DOO, subj: Trip Report of Lcad-ln Training Study, 13 May 1974 23. Ltr. 465TFTS/DO to 49TFW/DO, subj: IP Upgrade Training. 26 The complete plan. which the author summarizes in the following Scp 1973. The s<)uadron's First two instruetor tveapon svstenis officers paragraphs. is attached to Ltr. TAC/XP to 49TFW/CC el ai, subj: T-38 \vere assigned in ]une 1974. Lead-ln Training, 29 Apr 1974. 24 Msg. 12AF to TAC/DOO. subj: Dissimilar ACM. 042201Z Sep 33 Ltr. 49TFW/DOT to 465TFTS. subj: Data Collection of T-38 1973 Evaluation Program. 23 May 1974. with sample grade sheets attached. In My Opinion

Lieut ena nt Colonel George R. H ennigan

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND MAJOR MODIFICATIONS

67 HE past two decades ha ve produced In 1964 the Air Force developed a T an abundance of literature reflecting series of Air Force Systems Command the changing nature of management the- (afsc) Manuais known as the 375 series. orv and practice. The two major changes These manuais were designed to set up a in traditional management thought have program of guidance for management been the introduction of the Systems logic and control over acquisition of all concept and the professional system pro- future weapon systems. This original gram manager. In the early 1960s, nevv guidance has been replaced with the approaches to managing weapon systems current 800 series of Air Force regula- acquisition were being implemented tions and related directives for system, within the Department of Defense. Con- subsystem, and equipment programs. current with these management revolu- General in nature, these regulatorv docu- tions in government were similar changes ments are all geared to the management in business and inclustry. of major weapon systems acquisition. It is, in short, quite possible that the only VVhile billions of dollars are expended on trulv effective methods for preventing, or new acquisitions, many other programs coping with, problems of coordination and that do not share the acquisition spot- communication in our changing technol- light are equallv important to overall ogv will be found in new arrangements of force structure and national securitv. people and tasks, in arrangements which They are programs designed to improve sharply break with the bureaucratic tradi- the safety or extend the capability of tion. In either case, bv changing people or existing weapon systems. These major changing organizations, a reappraisal of weapon system modification programs our traditional methods of achieving orga- are managed by the Air Force Logistics nizational goals is urgently in order.1 Command (aflc). At this time the total The primary purpose of this article is price of in-being or approved major to examine the applicability of program modification programs exceeds $2 bil- management concepts to management of lion. This sum is accounted for in only major modifications to existing weapon nine programs. Obviously, major modifi­ systems. The vehicle of implementation cations are indeecl high-density dollar cliscussed, akin to a system program programs, and only the soundest of office (spo), is the so-called Mini-SPO, management practices should be applied comprised of a small number of func- in the execution of those programs. tional specialists collocated with a Mini- spo director or modifications (mocl) man­ acquisition-modification analogies ager and charged with overall manage­ ment of a major weapon system modifi- Many aflc. major modification programs cation. A major modification is defined bear a striking resemblance to afsc sys­ as a program in excess of $100 million. tem acquisition programs managed un-' A second purpose is to iclentify some der the system program office concept. of the problems facecl by a Mini-spo/ They share similar development risks, mod-manager in trying to implement and it is not uncommon for the aflc program management concepts in a bu­ program to be of a more immediate reaucratic environment and, finally, to national urgency. Most modification pro­ offer some suggestions on how to cope grams have direct parallels to afsc ac­ with these problems. quisition life-cycle phases—conceptual. 68 IN MY ÜPINKJN 69 Iidation, development, production, and eye and a difficult one to make accu- perational. They meet “major program rately. The essence of the decision re­ iteria as established bv Air Force Regu- volves aroünd the fact that there are rion and are governed by an otficial always many programs competing for ;af Program Management Directive. the scarce manpower resource. Making le objectives of acquisition program the determination that a program office anagers and modification managers are or Mini-SPO is warranted is only part of te same: to bring their program to the problem. Since establishment of a uition on time, below cost, and within Mini-spo is always at the expense of lhe írformance parameters. This is particu- functional organization, timing becomes rly true in the case of a modification criticai. The question involves when, how ísigned to increase the capability of a much, and how long. At what point in eapon svstem. as there are often high time should the Mini-spo be formed, “velopment risks involved. In sum, how much manpower should be allotted anv major modification programs are to it, and how long should they remain igh-risk. high-cost efforts deserving of dedicated to Mini-SPO business? Consid- rogram management with centralized erations include magnitude of the effon, >ntrol over all the technical and busi- unfamiliarity of tasks, degree of interde- ?ss aspects of the modification. Report- pendence existing between tasks, phase g to the Presidem in 1970 on major of the program, and corresponding eapon svstems acquisition, the Blue workload. ibbon Defense Panei made the follow- The Mini-spo must be formed before ig recommendation: the task grows to the point that there is risk of fragmented effort among func­ The matrix approach organizationally tional managers, with each working his and in qualitv, not numbers, of personnel share of the program commensurate should be strengthened. Caliber, rank, with his own priorities. On lhe other and experience of personnel should be hand, the Mini-SPO formed prematurely determined by the requirements of the will result in insufficient workload and program.2 attendant slack time. This not only uti­ he matrix organization referred to is lizes resources poorly but establishes an le system program office. The majority unfavorable reputation for the Mini-SPO, F the major modification programs are vvhich in all likelihood is already under lilor-made for spo management tech- severe criticism from the hard-line func­ íques but on a smaller or Mini-spo tional manager. :ale. l he answer to how many personnel to devote to a Mini-spo is directly related to the magnitude and unfamiliarity of the hen, how much, and how long task. A sizable effort of a first-time asic to successful program management nature involving high risk and high cost recognizing when or even if a program would require manning to a higher de­ ffice is needed; in other words, when to gree than a lesser program. irm a matrix organization, as opposed More important than quantity is the > using the regular functional organiza- quality of personnel selected. The con- on to do the job.3 This is a decision of cept of program management evolved íuch more importance than meets the because the ordinary way of doing things 70 AIR UNIVERSITY RF.V1EW was not adequate for the task at hand. It structure must be dynamic enough to is imperative that only highly competem meet the needs of a continually changing personnel be assigned to perform in the program environment.4 Contrary to the “out of the ordinary” environment of the bureaucratic form of pyramidal structure Mini-spo. and its “crisis-centered" environment, the Regarding the question of how long to Mini-SPO must be a “knowledge-cen- keep a Mini-SPO in operadon, no clearlv tered" organization. In the knowledge- defined solution can be found. Phase-out centered organization, closely coordi- or slowdown of Mini-spo activity cannot nated, integrated teams circumvent be tied to an event; it must be driven by chains of command and depend upon a program demands. Depending upon the high degree of reciprocity between the natnre of the program, a Mini-spo might participants. In this type of organization, begin phasing out as production goes the traditional functional theorv has into full swing, at the time of modifica- some applicaüon; but if carried too far, it tion kit proof, vvhen first article configu- will result in an authoritative environ­ ration is established, or at any other time ment that can offend and stifle the when it is determined that the program Creative bent of the members.5 is going smoothly and will continue to There are many alternatives from progress in a routine fashion through which to choose an organizational struc­ completion. This is the time to start ture. These range from pure functional phasing dovvn the Mini-spo and return- to pure project or to any combination of ing personnel to their functional jobs. the two. In reality, hovvever, initial selec- At the start of a program the entire tion of organizational structure is rela- levei of effort is centered in the func­ tivelv unimportant because as the pro­ tional activity. After the Mini-SPO is gram progresses organizational structure formed and begins to assume program will evolve to meet the need. Much more responsibilities, the functional levei of important is the selection of system pro­ effort starts to decrease. It never drops gram office personnel. completely out, hovvever, because the The caliber of the program manager is Mini-spo will require support from the all-important. The successful program functional organization on an exception manager has been characterized as “a basis throughout the life of the program. person who usually found a way to work As the program reaches maturity and around the regulations by carefully utiliz- day-to-day business approaches a routine ing the source of authority from which status, Mini-spo activity will begin to slow the program draws its sponsorship." fi down. As routine is established, func­ Equally important is the selection of tional responsibilities will once more in- competent, eager, and dedicated person­ crease until the formal phase-out of the nel to man the Mini-spo. These should Mini-spo. be personnel specialized in budget. audit, contract surveillance, technical advice. programming, procurement, engineer- organization ing, and other disciplines as determined The essence of Mini-sPO organization is by needs of the program.7 These people versatility: the organization can be built should be detailed to the Mini-SPO for around the task; as the task changes, so the duration of the program. In addi- must the scope of the organization. The tion, a memorandum of agreement, with IN MY OPINION 71 scope of individual personnel tasks and controlling a modification program, with mitatíons, should be drawn up between the objective of satisfying cost, schedule, íe parent functional organization and and performance requirements. le Mini-spo. After identification of the Mini-SPO special sources of trouble ;am, collocation of members under one oof is an absolutelv essential step. This Mod-managers face some unusual prob- tep must be taken to guard against lems in trying to direct and harmonize ivided loyalty of functional personnel the diverse forces at work in the Mini- ssigned, late or inadequate staffing, and spo environment. Their main difficulties, utright loss of personnel to other observation suggests, arise from three ligher-priority programs. In addition, sources: organizational uncertainties, un­ ollocation fosters an esprit de corps, a usual decision pressures, and vulnerabil- ense of belonging, and a common goal, ity to top-management mistakes. Lhich will reduce conflicts with func­ Many newly appointed Mini-spo direc- ional duties. tors will find that their working relation- ships with functional branch, division, or directorate chiefs have not been clearly he Mini-SPO director’s role defined. Many decisions vitally concern iecentlv a panei of military prograni the mod-manager, but he must often nanagers, examining their role. likened interact with externai forces in dealing t to that of the general manager of a with them. Unless he does so skillfully, mall companv. The comparison is espe- the questions are apt to be resolved in :ially apt. It would be impossible to write the interest of individual departments at i meaningful position description for the expense of the program as a whole. hat job. It is equally impossible to write The mod-manager must handle these >ne for the mod-manager’s job. YVhat delicate situations single-handed, with lit- he general manager does is whatever is tle or none of the experienced top- leeded to move the affairs of the busi- management guidance that the line man­ tess. A general manager is not a “doer” ager enjoys. >f any job. but he sees to it that what he Severe penalties of delay in both cost vants is done; and what he wants is a and operational capability often coinpel íarmony of things done so that his the mod-manager to base decisions and >bjectives are met. This implies control- recommendations on relatively few data, ing and coordinating the work so that no analyzed in haste. Decisions to sacrifice >ne aspect dominates others to the detri- time for cost, cost for qualily, or quality ment of the harmonv of the whole. for time are common in most programs, This touches upon what is likely to be and the mod-manager must be able to he most important function of the mod- make them without panicking. Clearly, manager: getting people to communicate then, he has a special need for total and with each other to achieve a common intelligent support from higher manage- understanding of the needs of the pro­ ment. sam and their place in the harmony of Though top management can seldom the total program.8 Stated more conven- give the mod-manager as much guidance tionally, the mod-manager is responsible and support as his functional counter- pbr planning, organizing, directing, and part enjoys, they can easily jeopardize 72 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW program success by lack of awareness or proach to getting the job done and the ill-advised intervention.9 This is particu- manner in vvhich he performs it. The larly true in the initial phases of a environment of program management program when a mod-manager may be therefore places an extraordinarv pre- constrained by a lag in contract negotia- mium on talent for leadership as distin- tion or some minor legal tie-up between guished from command, on persuasion the government and the contractor. Too as distinguished from direction. often these minor lags are elevated to the One student of program management general-officer levei without the mod- has described this authority as derived in manager s concurrence or at times with- part from the program managers “per- out his knowledge. The resultant high- suasive ability, his rapport with extra- level guidance is not alwavs in the best organizational units, and his reputation interest of the overall program and in resolving opposing viewpoints within sometimes creates more prohlems than it the parent unit and between the externai sol ves. In addition, this often casts the organizations.”12 mod-manager in a bad light at the upper leveis of management when in reality he some pitfalls and suggestions on has been too busy getting the job done to how to avoid them protect himself or practice “image man­ agement.” The remainder of this article will discuss some of the common everyday problems that the mod-manager might encounter authority and will offer some suggestions on how Given the responsibility for a program, to cope with them. the Mini-SPO director must estahlish his Universal Support. Nevvlv appointed authoritv to carrv out the task. Authority Mini-SPO directors may be dismayed to is necessary if one is to get a modifica- discover that there is less than complete tion completed on time and within cost and enthusiastic support from all con- and performance requirements. How- cerned agencies, including his own head- ever, a degree of personal freedom is quarters, and within the Air Staff. Every required in the Mini-SPO environment, program competes with all others, and particularlv for the specialists. Balancing competition is especiallv fierce in periods these two conditions of freedom and of tight budgets. authority is one of the more challenging To gain total program support, the prohlems facing the Mini-SPO director.10 mod-manager must sell his program. Authoritv derives from many sources. The program managers main job is to As a result of his position, the Mini-SPO make the program look good. I don't director has official authority delegated mean to fake it. I mean to be on top of from upper-level management. More im- the program, to anticipate what the boss portant in the program management expects, what the budget people expect, what os d expects, and even what Congress environment is vvhat Henri Fayol called expects. The image of an energetic, capa- personal authority, “compounded of in- ble program is a great asset in recruiting telligence, experience, moral worth, abil- the people you want in the program ity to lead, past Services, so forth . . . .”n office. and in obtaining the right kind of A significant measure of the mod-man- support from functional organizations. ager’s authority springs from his ap- The morale and success of the program IN MY OPINION 73 office staff are largelv a reflection ot that The expert, in fact, simply by reasons oí image. A good image results in coopera- his immersion in a routine, tends to lack tion and a bad image results in struggling ílexibility of mind once be approaches the all the time to get what you need.13 margins of bis special theme. 15 aken in the context and scale of the One of the most difficult concepts to lini-spo environment, th is quote suc- put across to functional specialists is that nctly defines the approach a mod- the mod-manager is responsible for de- tanager must pursue in achieving uni- termining what will be done. The func­ ersal support for his program. tional specialist is responsible for how it The Xlagic Wand Syndrome. One of the is done. There is no clear-cut method for uickest and easiest ways to dravv unwel- solving this problem. One program tnan- ame attention to a program is to miss a ager said that he often overcame the rtuch touted and publicized milestone. opposition of functional specialists by ometimes the milestone will be missed “working harder than they dicl.” This •et ause of uncontrollable circumstances. program manager found that he could -íore often, failure to meet milestones so overwhelm a specialist with facts, ,’ill be the result of the “magic wand figures, and analyses that it became too yndrome,” a feeling deriving from over- much of a chore for the specialist to ptimism that all the detailed tasks asso- refute the program managers position.16 iated with a major undertaking will The Low-Pass Fi/ter. Nothing dampens utomatically be accomplished—perhaps spirit faster than a system where every- >y someone waving a magic wand. thing stops at the mod-managefs desk If program continuity is to be main- waiting for his return from somewhere. ained, the mod-manager must adminis- If he is not careful, the boss can become er an antidote. That antidote is skepti- the chief clerk and proofreader in the ism. Skepticism is the second requisite office, the one who checks everything to >f program management. Planning is the make sure it is right. This is poor irst. Planning will disclose what has to utilization of what little time the mod- >e done. Skepticism will probe the esti- manager will have left after trying to nate of how simple it will be to do it. satisfy insatiable demands for briefings The searching questions are: Have de- and information updates. ailed tasks been delineated? Has suffi- l he best way to go is to select the best ient time been allotted for administra- people you can get, give them a reasona- ive processing? Have adequate provi- bly free rein, and rely on being able to iions for contingencies been made? 14 fix their mistakes without too much dam- Functional Specialists. The mocl-man- age being done. Weekly staff meetings tger may fmd himself facecl with func­ will provide a backstop to catch the really ional specialists who see their discipline significam mistakes. If weekly meetings ts the central core of a successful pro- are not an adequate backstop, the prob­ çram. Their commitment to their spe- lem is not organization but ineffective áalty leads them to try to dictate to the subordinates. The solution then is not orogram what will or must be done, as centralization of decision-making but re- distinguished from advising what should placement of personnel.17 3e done. Further. there is no lack of regulations with which they can bolster In conclusion, billions of defense dollars their claim. are being spent on operational weapon 74 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW system major modification programs. management techniques to management Management requirements for these pro­ of modification programs—the Mini-SPO grams closely parallel those of major for mods—on a scale governed by the acquisition programs. This suggests the scope of the modification. advisability of applying system program Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma

Notes 1. William H Read, "The Decline ol Hierarchy in Industrial Organiza- 8. Jntroduction tu Military Program Management, prepared by the Logistics tion,*' Business Horizons. Fali 1965, p. 47. Management Institute. Department of Defense Document LM1 Task 61- 2. "Stall Report un Major VVeapons Systems Acquisition Process," 28, Washington. D.C., March 1971, p. 4. Herealter cited as Jntroduction to Refmrt to the President and the Secretary oj Dejense on the Department of Military Program Management. Defense, by the Blue Ribbon De Pense Panei, Appendix E, July 1970, p. 41. 9. Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management, p. 296. Hcreafler cited as Report to the President 10. Systems Analysis and Project Management, p. 227. 3. David 1. Gleland and William R King, Systems Analysis and Project 1 I . H e n r i F a y o l , General and hulustrial Management (London: Sir Isaac Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 154 Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1949), p. 21. Hereaftcr cited as Systems Analysis and Project Management. 12. Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management, p. 285. 4. Jbúl., p. 171. 13. Peter F. Drucker, The Ejfective Executix*e (New York: Harper and 5. thid.. p 147 Row, 1966). pp. 23-24. 6. Report to the President. p. 30. 14. Introductlon to Military Program Management, p. 55. 7. David I. Gleland and William R King, Systems, Organizations, Analysis, 15. George A. Steiner atid William G. Ryan. huiustnai Project Management Management: A Book oj Readings (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Companv. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 29. 1969), p. 289. Hcreafter cited as Systems, Organizations. Analysis, Manage­ 16 Ibid ment. 17 Introductlon to Military Program Management, p. 10. CRISIS AROUND THE AIRPORT

Captain J ohn G. I erino

» Twenty-two children and adults die ! Forty-nine homeowners living near Los I when a privately owned, Koreati War- 1 Angeles International Airport are vintage F-86 Sabrcjet fails in an attempt awarded $365,700 by a jury to compen- to tate off from a Sacramento, Califór­ sate them for devaluation of tneir nia, airport and crashes into an ice property caused by airplane noise.3 cream parlor direcdy off the end of the runwav. The store had been built as part of a shopping center despite oppo- sition from the State.1 f An F-4 Phantom jet fighter taking off . from Davis-Montnan Air Force Base, t A fully loaded Air Force KC-135 Arizona, plunges to the ground one . tanker takes off from McConnell Air mile from the base. Four civilians die in Force Base, kansas. Moments later it the accident, which a local newspaper crashes into a residential area in VVich- calls a “fiery crash of an Air Force jet ita; 23 civilians and the seven crew into a supermarket and residential members perish.2 area.” 4

| A United Airlines Boeing 737 on Final • approach crashes into a heavily popu- lated neighborhood less than two miles from Chicago’s Midway Airport. Fortv- three aboard and two on the ground are killed. It is speculated that more passengers might nave survived if part of the plane was not inside a house.

AKEN individually or collectively, Since December 1903, when the T these incidents are tragedies. But Wright brothers made powered, con- bevond the loss of life and material trollecl ílight a reality, aviation has pro- value, these and many similar events in gressed from heing a curiosity to its recent years have real significance as present State as an important part of the manifestations, indicators, symbols of the daily life of virtually everyone in the crisis around the airport—a crisis that is United States. Food, newspapers, flow- facing the Air Force and the other ers, components of everything—from a military Services, as well as civil and transistor radio to the rockets used to commercial aviation to an even greater hurl our astronauts into space—are car- extern in some wavs. ried routinely across the nation and 75 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW around the world by air. In 1973, almost Services to meet the demands of oti 185,000,000 passengers were carried by business and leisure economy, the size < airlines within the United States.*5 Busi­ airports and the ancillary industries ass< ness and government executives no lon- ciated with them have turned the are;i ger depend on time-consuming ex- around major air terminais into indu changes of correspondente to solve prob- trial complexes. Simultaneously, bus lems involving widely scattered firms and nesses that rely on air transportatio departments. They solve them imme- have gravitated to the vicinity of th diately in face-to-face meetings and con- airport to reduce costs in transportatio ferences, often in six or seven different of goods, as well as the time required t cities in a three- or four-day period. get goods to distributors and consumei They are able to do this because of the With the airport now an industri; reliability and accessibility provided by center employing directly or indirectlv i aviation. some instances tens of thousands c Major cities, even States, depend on people, it is only natural that thos the airlines for their economic livelihood. people employed in the industries at o Hawaii had over 2,245,000 tourists in near the airport should purchase or rer 1972. Tourism tops pineapples and homes as close to their place of work a sugar as the major industry of Hawaii. possible. This creates a need for shop Tourists spent over $755 million there in ping centers, schools, recreation facil 1972. The only bigger industry, and that ties, churches, and all the other necess: by a very slight margin, is defense spend- ties of a residential community, which ii ing.7 turn increase the population dwellin; Las Vegas, a city with a population of near the airport as the people wht only 310,000 people, draws annually provide these Services move into the are. over 17,400,000 tourists, who spend and to be near their place of business. Th gamble over $1 billion.8 New York, Services and facilities, new housing devei Reno, Niagara Falis, Miami Beach, Chi­ opments, and modern highways anc cago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, San other means of transportation linking th* Francisco, San Diego—name a major city airport to the metropolitan center in in the United States, and the tourism, crease the property values of lanei nea conventions, and businesses that are ma­ the modern airport complex. This in jor economic factors in sustaining its creases its desirability as a residentia prosperitv are nurtured by a steady flow area for people who have no connectioi of nonresidents in and out. The heart with the airport. Thus the airport, once ; that pumps this economic lifeblood of remote facility beyond the edge of town people and money is aviation. becomes an integral part of the city itself Yet the very technological growth that When all these factors are combined— has enabled aviation to produce faster, the technological growth of aviation tha bigger, and more efficient aircraft capa- has produced bigger and bigger aircraf ble of moving up to 400 passengers from that 11) more and more frequently witf New York to Miami Beach in less than larger and noisier engines that emis three hours has also spawned the crisis untold pollutants into the air, and the around the airport. encroachment of cities up to and in some As the aircraft industry has grovvn cases past the airport—the crisis arouncí more complex and expanded its size and the airport occurs. Accidents, noise com IN MY OPINION 77 (laints, environmental questions, suits rnoving into a home directly under the }nd court tests then become common. flight pattern of the usaf's largest fighter Fhat point has been reached around the base to comprehend that they are part of irports of the United States today. a national problem that extends well John F. Kennedy International Airport beyond the aviation industry. But they i New York City is a classic example of and literally millions of other Americans bis. Created some fifteen vears ago from are intimately and inexorably part of the he muck and marshes of Jamaica Bay in problem. f sparsely populated area that lacked Nevertheless, according to Gary D. lasv accessibility bv road or any other Vest, of the Environment Planning Divi- neans, today Kennedy Airport is sur- sion, Directorate of Civil Engineering, lounded by housing on virtually every Headquarters usaf, “Airports and their iece of land within twenty miles in any impacts are real. They are here to stay. irection. Dulles Internationa! Airport, However, there exist serious conflicts khich serves Washington, D.C., is start- between many airports and the land ng to see the same thing happen. To a areas in their environs.”5’ ^reater or lesser degree, encroachment is That confliet extends in many direc- itaking place at almost every commercial. tions. The Environmental Protection rçeneral, or military aviation facility in the Agency ( epa considers the problem of Jnited States. noise from airport operations to be quite As encroachment grows around an serious and growing more so every day. lirport, dissatisfaction with the airport It estimates that there are 16 million irises. Complaints about noise, pollution, people in America living or working in ind crash potential are received bv the and near airports who are affected by iirport, communitv, State, and federal aircraft noise. In ten years the epa pre- bfficials. In most cases the airport was dicts the figure will grow to 24 million íhere first, but that justification makes people.10 little impression on most people who Harrv Nelson, a medicai writer for the yiew the airport’s activities as an invasion Los Angeles Times, States: “There is good !l)f their privacy. They don’t want flying reason to believe that hundreds of thou- lo stop; they just want it to stop in their sands, perhaps millions, of Americans heighborhood. are slowly becoming partially deaf—pain- lessly and usuallv without an awareness of what is happening to them.” 11 This Is this a real problem or is it loss he attributes to the rising noise levei only something that seems to be a prob- of the American environment, a noise ilem? For many Americans the idea of an levei vvhich he says for people in and lairport crisis is unreal. near airports is largely attributable to the It is hard for the traveler sitting in the noise from jet aircraft. jcocktail lounge of a Boeing 747, sipping Citing studies in Europe and at the a martini, or an Air f orce pilot willing to University of Southern Califórnia and give his life in defense of our nation, to Califórnia medicai schools, Nelson points realize that they are involved in and to physical and mental effects from ex- Icontributing to the crisis around the posure to high noise leveis, such as the airport. Similarly, it is difficult for a 100 decibels generated by a jet transport recent retiree and his wife who are at 1000 feet. These studies showed that 78 AlR UNIVERSITY REVIEW elevated cliastolic blood pressure occurs county approval, to approach the Air in men exposed to noise near 100 deci- Force to determine what dangers existed, bels, and if the exposure is sustained the what the noise leveis were. Then we blood pressure does not return to nor­ would either seek compensatory damages mal, even with the aid of drugs, when from the Air Force, or ask them to buy the individual is removed from the noise the land.” 13 environment.12 Couple this with the emis- With no county or State statutes ade- sions from jet engines adding pollutants quately covering the matter of land-use to the air and the physical effects of planning around airports, this suit may aviation on the well-being of millions of succeed, not because the board of super­ Americans become evident. visors is doing something wrong but But there is more to the crisis around because it lacks legal authority to protect the airport than the physical and psycho- the people as well as the airport. logical effects on people. There is a How much money was involved? As decided economic effect too. Land farmland, the property was worth $18,- around airports is valuable. The people 000; subdivided, the price tag was $3.6 who own it expect big returns on their million. money. In most instances they wish to At one point Los Angeles Interna­ subdivide the land for residential use. tional Airport was the defendant in noise A recent lawsuit filed bv a landowner datnage suits totaling $5 billion.14 Prior against the county board of supervisors to the trial, which cost the airport $365,- in Maricopa County (Arizona) Superior 700, the citv bought 34 other homes for Court highlights the problem of regulat- $ 1.8 million.15 ing land use around airports. In this case One cannot shrug off figures like the supervisors, following the reco m men- these, as well as multiples many times dation of the county planning and zon- greater that could come to pass in the ing commission, refused the property future, by simply saying “The property owners request to subdivide his land into owners deserve it; the government residential lots because it vvas less than should pav or build the airports some- two miles from the runways of Luke afb, place else.” It takes only a moments the usaf's main F-4 Phantom jet fighter reflection to realize that we are running training facilitv. l he supervisors felt that out of the wide-open spaces.around our the development would expose residents cities, that it costs too many billions of to danger from possible crashes and the dollars to construct first-rate airports noise of the aircraft, whose flight pattern when we already have them, and we woulcl pass near or over the homes in cannot afford to keep threatening the the proposed development. According to health of people and then paying them newspaper reports, the lawyer for the damages. Aviation is not going to fold its landowner saw the action as denying his tent and leave the transportation scene as client a chance for a fair return on his did the sedan chair and the horse and investment: “If we meet all legal require- buggy. Along with the automobile, avia­ ments, we have a right to legally subdi­ tion is the basis for our mobile American vide in accordance with regulations.” societv. Even more interesting is what was planned if the zoning had been ap- hat, then, are the alterna- proved: “We intended, after receiving tives? Althoughw the crisis at the airport is IN MY OPINION 79 complex issue involving many more to introduce vertical and short takeoff hings than have been enumerated here, and landing (v/stol) aircraft that incor- md anv soluuon would be almost equally porate the quieter and cleaner engines, «omplex, there are some basic courses of and to alter flight patterns so as to íction to consider. minimize the harmful effects of noise. í First, there is the laissez-faire, or no The quieter and cleaner engines are jction, approach. While many may con- coming. The Federal Aviation Adminis- ?nd this has worked until the present, tration (faa) already is requiring quieter le reverse is true. as exemplified at Los engines on new commercial aircraft, and mgeles Internaüonal Airport and Luke it has let contracts for design tnodifica- dr Force Base. Ultimately the money tions to retrofit older aircraft. To re- aid out of the public coffers would have equip one Boeing 707, however, has 3 come from the people, thus adding to been talked of as costing up to $750,- ie tax burden or depriving our society 000.17 Where that money would come f some benefit. from is a serious question for an industry As communiues have grown, the eco- already beset by Financial woes caused by lomic importance of the military to them new equipment purchases and the rising ias diminished. Pressures to end flying costs of operation, some of which re- md close the field follow. Bolling, sulted from increased fuel costs. mwry, Oxnard, Chanute, Mitchel, and vstol aircraft could prove to be a ianscom Air Force Bases and Floyd partial solution to the noise and crash iennett Naval Air Station are among the hazards of the crisis around the airport. nilitary airports that have either stopped What type of vstol aircraft is right lying or closed entirely. While there is presents a problem. According to ittle argument that many military instal- Charles W. Harper and Albert J. Evans ations were justifiablv closed for sound of nasa s Office of Advanced Research lational defense, economic, or other rea- and Technology, “If it is to be, initially, a íons, there is little logic in allowing a suburban-area-to-central-airport system, aase such as Luke to suffer a similar fate one kind of aircraft is called for. If it is [>ecause of urban encroachmem. Re- to be suburban-or-outlying-airport-to- placement of Luke, which has perfect downtown, another type would be cho- Kear-round flving weather, dual runways, sen. If many downtown stops are envi- modern support facilities, and accessibil- sioned, still another type might be cho- ty to an ideal gunnery range, would run sen. u 18I w :lose to SI billion.,H Anyone looking at To be effective, the vstol aircraft recent defense appropriations can see must provide a means of giving more :hat requests for majo’* construction of Services to more people and of reducing new installations would stand little noise, pollution, and crash hazards. Har­ :hance of acceptance by Congress. per and Evans put this very succinctly: Yet letting things go on as they are is “It will take a well coordinated and simply unacceptable. both economically decisive effort by city planners, aircraft and in terms of the health of the Ameri­ designers, airway Systems designers and can people. operators . . . to succeed.” A second approach to the problem Flight pattern alteration is another way would be to use our technology to de- to reduce the effects of noise. While this velop quieter and less-polluting aircraft, can be extremely effective, it can also 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW present problems, particularly for mili- given that legislation is on the book tary aviation, vvhich trains large nurabers allowing zoning around an airport, , of pilots in high-performance aircraft. planning and zoning commission o Safety is the prime consideration. While county board of supervisors can mak> take-off power may be curtailed, a steep- appropriate decisions that will allow th. er glide path used, or a segmented airport to operate and provide the land approach tried, these are all compro- ovvner a fair return on his land when thi mises in terms of the ideal operating health, welfare, and safety of the entir» mode of the aircraft, and a compromise populace are considered. could produce fatal results in case of an None of these three approaches i: emergency.20 truly going to solve the crisis around th« Nevertheless, all possibilities should be airport. Realistically, a total solution tc considered. The faa is currently working the situation that vvould keep everyont: on a tvvo-segment approach that vvould happy is probably impossible. Yet some keep aircraft higher longer as they pre­ things can be done to reduce the prob pare to land. The faa has also been lem considerably. Perhaps a program i: studying lovver wing flap and reduced needed that incorporates some aspects ol engine thrust combinations. Similar tests the second and third approaches. r have been and are continuing to be As Vest says, “the solution of thci conducted by the airlines.21 airport . . . problem must begin withii A third alternative is to adopt planning the recognition that there is, in fact, a, and zoning legislation that will prevent problem and that if it is not resolved the encroachment upon airports. This, how- results will be unacceptable.” 22 Gaining ever, is a very sensitive subject. Great recognition of the problem around mili­ pressures can be brought to bear on city, tary airfields is more difficult because in county, State, and federal government by many instances they do not represent a business, industry, and landowners vvhen major factor in the community. The somebody starts telling them what they problem will become even greater as the can or cannot do with their land and economic impact of these airfields on the expansion plans. local communities continues to decline Despite this, there is still hope. lh e and because the military members are Air Force has devised a tool that can be really transients in the communities and used by communities in planning land unable to wield the political power of use around airports, whether military or permanent residents. civilian. The tool is callecl the Air Instal- If the hearing and psychic damage lation Compatible Use Zone (aicuz). ai- faced by 16 million Americans today, the cuz blends information such as flight billions of dollars in lawsuits alreadv patterns and accident patterns of aircraft settled or pending, and the costs of operating from an airport and noise building new airports, whether military generated by the aircraft with possible or civilian, do not represent a recogniza- land uses around the airport. It also ble problem, then there is a communica- provides degrees of noise attenuation tion and comprehension gap. achievable in relation to the aircraft noise The first thing that must be done is to through different structural design and educate people in all echelons of govern­ the choice of construction materiais. ment, industrv, and the American public With the data furnished bv aicuz, and about the problem. The Departments of IN MY OP/N/ON 81 í)efense. Interior, Transportation, of new airports while providing conven- íealth, Education and YVelfare. the faa, ient facilities for air travei within the citv. íe icc, and any other agency involved At the same time, every technological i aviation at the national levei should option, including vstol aircraft, should ombine and intensifv efforts to obtain be explored. Similarly, Hight patterns ational legislation that vvill require States and procedures need to be carefully 0 provide laws of their own enabling examined to see what, within the limits iroper land-use planning around air- of safe operation, can be done to reduce »orts or requiring that in the absence of noise. uch laws they follow a minimum federal Research efforts to produce quieter tatute. Similar action should be under- and deaner-burning engines should be aken at State, county, and city levei.23 In further underwritten, either directly or ddition, at the local levei building codes through tax advantages. At the same hould be sought that require appro- time, as quieter and more efficient en­ >riate and adequate noise attenuation, gines are developed, the government vhether the source of noise is an airport should back low interest loans or other >r a toy factory. Here the catalvst should means of subsidizing the costs of retrofit- )e the aviation and business communi- ting existing aircraft. ies, the people who own, operate, and The solution, or even a marked easing, ase aviation on a daily basis. of the crisis around the airport requires YVhere inappropriate zoning has been a multifaceted, multilevel approach in- nade, government should subsidize noise volving the total commitment of many ittenuation, redevelopment, or even out- government agencies and the entire avia­ ight purchase of the structures, as was tion community working together. It is ione in Los Angeles.24 AJthough iniüally not a problem that vvill go away or be Jiis might be cosdy, in the long run it brought under control without hard :ould be considerably cheaper than the work and much conciliation. How hard :ost of lives and subsequent lavvsuits that the leaders of government agencies and follow accidents. This program could the aviation industry work will determine >ave many airports that are now re- how quickly the crisis around the airport stricted in their operations or may face is diminished. rlosing, thus saving the construction costs Hq Tactical Air Command

Vote* 13. Neil Mazurck. "Zone Limits Near Airfields Challcnged." Arizona 1 Garv D Vest. AtCUZ Information BiãUtm Two, Headquarters Lnited Repuhlu, Junc 14. 1974. States Air Force AF/PREE. March 1973. p 1-2 14 Marvin Milcs, "Miraclc Cure Needed—But None in Sight," Los 2. Wichita Btacon. januarv 16. 1968. p I Angrles Times, November 12. 1972. 3. VIvTna Olíver. "49 Famiiies Io Oet $365.700 in Jel Noise Suit." Lai 15. Oliver, op. eil. Angeles Tones, Januarv 11. 1973. 16 Department of the An Force Environmental Slatement on F-15 fíeddouin at 4 Tueton Daily Cittun, December 19. 1967. p I. Luke AFB. Aniona, July 1974 5 “National Transportation Safetv Board Details Findings in Midway 17 Mouat, op. nt. Cralh." /fvuOiin Wtrk anã Spacr Teehnology. December 17. 1973, p. 53, and 18. Charles W. Harper and Albert J. Evans. "The Drawing Board januarv 7. 1974. p 63; also Vest.op eil Dilemma.” in Masterplannmg the Aviation Envnonment, edited by Ângelo J. 6 Aiuttkin Wrek anã Spaet Techiuilogi. March 25, 1974. p 38. Cerchione, Victor E. Rothc. and James Vercellíno (University of Arizona 7 The 197-4 World Almanar and Book of Fato (New York Newtpapcr Press. 1970), p. 31. Enterprise Association. Inc ), pp 649 and 712 19 Ihid 8 Ibut. p 653 20. Vest. p. 1-6. 9. Vest. p ii 21. Mouat. op. ciL 10 l.ucia .Mouat. 'Jet No»e Problem Continues," Hampton Hoaãi Daily 22. Vest. p. 1-1 iPrrn. Februarv I, 1974 23. William R. Sims and Ângelo J. Cerchione. “In Search of an 11 Hairv Nelson. "Milbons Going Deaf—But Dont Know It." Lo> Aviation Environment Master Plan," An University Revtnu, September- Angrta Tmuy November 12. 1972. October 1969, pp. 64-72. 12 Ikã 24. Oliver. op. cit THE METRICS HERE is an old saying to the effect T that you don’t know much about a ARE subject until you can answer the ques- COMING! tions “How much?” or “How many?” In short, qualitative information is useful, but far from complete. To be complete, Dr . J ames A. Fraser the information must be quantified. When a motorist drives up to a filling station and asks for gasoline, the reply is usually, “Fill her up?” or “How much?” or some other form of a request for quantitative information. The same idea holds in the much more exciting business of space travei. To understand anything about space, one must think in terms of velocity or speed. And it is not sufficient to say “very fast” or “very slow” or “quick as a wink” or any other qualitative de- scription of speed. One must use units of Books and Ideas measurement. BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 Recendv a master of çeremonies was a gallon, but it takes 32 of another kind jresiding at a meeting where space scien- of quarts to make a bushel. A child must ists were reporting on their research. learn that there are two different ounces: 3 ne after another the scientists read there are 16 of one kind of ounce to a their papers, and one after another they pound but 32 of the other kind of ounce spoke of speed in different units of to a quart. In fact, the situation is so jrteasurement. The first spoke about feet confusing that the author of a delightful Der second. The next, miles per hour. little book, Let's Gu Metric, mixes things \.fter that carne speakers using knots, up when he says on page 66: “He must eet per minute, meters per second, know that there are 16 of one kind of :entimeters per minute, kilometers per ounces to a quart but 32 of the other íour. etc. The units that may be used kind of ounces to the pound.”t When ire almost without limit. The master of the system confuses an expert, pity the ;eremonies, before introducing the next poor school children. speaker, remarked on this diversitv oí In Let's Go Metric Mr. Frank Donovan measurenient units. He said, “1 recognize says: ;he impossibility of standardizing upon a By 1971 all but fifteen countries in the single unit for use in the whole world, world were using the metric system or iut surely we could select a unit to be were in the process of converting to it or jsed in this one room for one day. were studying how they would convert to dowever, I know better than to ask vou it. The only non-metric countries were ^entlemen to select the unit. If I did, we Barbados, Burma, Gambia, Ghana, Ja­ would be right back where we are now. maica, Libéria, Muscat, Oman, Naura, One would want feet per second and Sierra Leone, Southern Yemen, Tonga, Trinidad, and of course, the United another meters per hour, and voting States. All of the non-metric partners of would bring no agreement. So I won’t the United States in an otherwise all ask vou, 111 tell you! From now on 1 metric world are small islands or backward want everyone to use furlongs per fort- or emerging countries. More than 95 night! ” percent of the people of the world meas- The story illustrates nicely the current ure by the metric system or are learning foolishness regarding systems and units how to. Most of those who do not are in for weights and measurements. In the the United States.1 (pp. 31-32) United States a gallon is 231 cubic inches. In other English-speaking coun- In response to this statement I made a tries a gallon is 277.3 cubic inches. Thus survey of the larder in my wife’s kitchen a gallon of gasoline in Canada is bigger and found that packaged food was al­ than a gallon of gasoline in the United most universally labeled only in pounds, States. A quart of milk in Canada con- ounces, gallons, pints, fluid ounces, etc. tains more milk than a quart of milk in There were two exceptions. A box of the United States. Even without leaving com muffin mix was labeled, “Net Wt. 8 V2 oz.” in large print and “241 grams” the United States, we have plenty of in small print. A box of breakfast cereal iconfusion. One must remember that it callecl Total was labeled “Net wt. 12 oz.” takes four of one kind of quarts to make in large print and “net wt. 340 gms" in t Frank Donovan, Let's Go Metric (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1974, $5.95), 154 pages. 84 AIR UNIVERSJTY REVIEW small print. This is, of course, a start and some telling reasons why we mus indicates the route of change. Household change to the metric system. He note products and common articles of com- that the important reasons have little t< merce will be labeled in familiar units do with whether the housewife measure and in metric units. This dual system will flour by the cup or by 250 milliliters be required for perhaps a generation— Rather the important and principal ad until education and time make the metric vantages for changing are in the areas o system of units familiar. government, economics, industry anc The impact of the change to the commerce, international trade, and inter metric system is probably less striking on national relations. He notes that th» household products than on national United States will go fully metric in an- defense and industry. The August 7, international cooperative space program 1974, edition of Air Force Times includes that measurements are just as importan an article entitíed, “Panei Plans Metric as prices in determining the amount o Move,” which States: machinery sold by the United States tc . . . under the direction of Dr. Joseph major foreign countries. He also note; Ryerson of the Rome Air Development that the Department of Defense issued í Center, N.Y., a defense panei has been metric study listing numerous advantage? formed to plan for the pending conver- of the metric system. These included sion of the nation’s present measurement decrease in training time for engineers system to the metric system known around mechanics, and maintenance personnel the world as si—the system international reduction in errors, and easier and d’unites. quicker repair. The U.S. is the only major industrial nadou that’s non-metric. However, some Chapter five poses the question American manufacturers use both the “What’s wrong with the system we have?’ metric and U.S. weights and measures and develops in detail the general answei Systems. that it is “much harder to learn the manj Several bilis have been introduced in unrelated units of the Customarv systerr Congress for converting the nation to the and even more difficult to learn the metric system over a period of years. fractional arithmetic that this system re- Some defense industries have already be- quires. And when it is necessary tc gun the conversion process. calculate measurements . . . the decimah VVhile it is true that Air Force medicai, ized metric system is so far superior that scientific, and technical personnel have there is no comparison.” Specific exam- been using the metric system for a long ples of calculations are provided to docu- time, the coming change to a widespread ment the argument. and general use of the metric system in The effect of the change on people in the United States makes Leís Go Metric a various tvpes of jobs is next considered particularlv appropriate book for mem- (chapter six), and it is noted that the bers of the Air Force. effect will vary markedly with the kind of After three chapters dealing with the work. A man who sweeps floors will not history of attempts to measure effec- be affected at all. A secretary will be only tively, the creation of the metric system slightly affected in that she will have to and its spread, and the debate in the learn the spelling of some new words, United States as to whether it should be The effect on a factory worker will be adopted or not, Frank Donovan presents slight. On the other hand the conversion BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 vill cause great changes in the construc- existing yardsticks, measuring tapes, ion industrv. AJmost the entire pharma- scales, kitchen measuring cups, and other ;eutical industry and the entire medicai measuring devices will have to be jrofession are now on the metric system, scrapped. All cookbooks will have to be o that there will be little change in these rewritten. All quart bottles, gallon cans, srofessions. Probably the greatest cost bushel baskets, and one-pound weights md impact of change will be in indus- would have to be replaced. All gasoline ries that manufacture machinery, ma- pumps and water meters would have to :hine tools, agricultural equipment, mo- be junked. All road signs would have to ors, and automobiles. There may be a be changed. ew industries where the impact will be He counters this argument by saying ío severe that they will not convert for that the change will be slow and gradual, nanv years, if ever. Railroading is a over a period of years. Originally there jrobabie example. The chapter is replete will be some inconvenience because of vith specific examples of the probable the need for thinking in two systems. íffect on many occupations. It should be Conversion from one to the other may loted, however, that the actual effect will be necessary in some circumstances. He lot be fully known until the system is then provides a most interesting specula- xied, and it will not be fully anticipated tion regarding the specific effect upon a jntil experts in each occupation and long list of daily living activities. In many ndustry seriously consider and plan for cases he supplies rule-of-thumb methods he conversion. This is already happen- for quick conversion of units when nec­ ng in many industries, and the current essary. Deriodical literature is increasinglv re- I think that there probably is an easier porting the results. In Automotive Engi- way out of the difficulty. In spite of fieering for August 1974 is an article inflation, which is making almost every- entitled “The Optimum Metric Fastener thing more expensive, small portable (System.” Fasteners are nuts, bolts. screws, calculators are getting cheaper every washers, clips, rivets, and similar devices year. Soon they will be vvithin reach of used to join components into assemblies. everyone. Even today Rockwell Interna­ (The article concludes that “the optimum tional has a portable calculator that will metric fastener system can be the basis make all the conversions from the Cus- for direct and administrative savings tomary system to the metric system and |worth millions of dollars annually to a vice versa. With it in hand, the conver­ company like Ford" and “the long range sions will be quick, easy, and almost free cost saving available to North America from error. It may take a whole genera- will be several hundreds of millions of tion, however, before conversions be- dollars, not just one time, but repeated come unnecessary. ieach and every year.” The author provides an interesting In chapter seven the author addresses speculation about the game of football himself to the problems of daily living (pages 121- 22). that will be posed by the change to One sport that may defy conversion is metric. He starts by pointing out that football, because the yard is so much a those who oppose the system claim that part of the game. Of course, the field the change will cause complete chãos in could be changed from 100 yards to 100 our daily lives. They maintain that all meters, with 10-meter end zones instead 86 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW of 10-yard end zones. But this changc is not even a scholarly book. But it does would make quite a difference in the do vvhat it set out to do. It provides a game. It would be necessary to move the short, clear, basic introduction to the bali about 10 percent farther to retain possession, and this would result in fewer coming system of measurement in the first downs. Because of this, and because United States. It also provides interesting American football is not played anywhere speculation regarding the effects of the else in the world, it is possible that the new system. As such it is stimulating and yard will remain as the standard of meas- could easily form the basis for a discus- ure.2 sion. Manv readers will disagree in part with some of the predictions. But after The book concludes with the explana- all, no one can see clearly into the tion that while the coming system has future, and intelligent efforts to foresee been referrecl to as the metric system, change make us better able to cope when that is not its official name. Since 1960 change is thrust upon us. the official name is Le Systeme Interna­ tional d'Unites or the International System of Montgomery, Alabama Units. In both French and English it is called “The si System.” A brief descrip- tion of the si System and a set of Notes 1. The quotation is verbatim. hui lhe countries cited total only conversion tables are providecl. fourteen. The book is not a profound treatise. It 2. Football is played in Canad3 also. AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

Empire or Containment? Dr . G eorge VV. C ollins

HAT have been the aims of Amer­ meaning and results of American foreign ican diplomacy since the Second policy since 1945, attacking the subject World War? Were they achieved, and,from íf two points. In the first he deals Wso, were the results meritorious, or do chronologically with some of the funda­ they justify accusations of incompetence mental diplomatic issues, such as the or imperialism? Did the United States origin and outcome of the cold war, the use its economic superiority in the cause reconstruction of Europe, and the con­ of global order and security, or was it tainment of Communism in Europe and used to promote the expansion of capi- Asia. In the second part he surveys the talism? Despite Vietnam and Watergate, role of the United States in world eco- is the United States still vvilling to accept nomics. Aron makes no pretense of the responsibilities incumbent upon a having written a diplomatic history of the great power? These are among the many period examining every twist and turn of important questions Raymond Aron policy; instead he has focused on the raises in a criticai essay on the foreign larger issues in Europe and Asia, with policy of the United States.! lesser attention to the nature and impact Professor Aron, of the College of of U.S. policy regarding the Third France, a longtime political affairs analyst World. A quick summary of his assess- and author of many books, is vvell known ments of American policy inight be: in to American students of contemporary Europe, success; with the Third World, affairs. In this work he examines the indecisive; in Asia, failure.

tRaymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973, translated by Frank Jellinek (En- glewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974, $10.00), 339 pages.

87 88 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW Professor Aron divides American dip- parallel, the new China policy of 195( lomatic history into three periods. The the withdrawal from the Aswan Dat first began vvith the Peace of Paris in project, and the intervention in Vietnan 1793 and extended through the Spanish- Nevertheless, Aron’s overall assessment. American War of 1898. It resulted in the complimentary, attributing the genen geopolitical continental hegemony of the international economic well-being of th United States; i.e., continental suprem- last twenty-five years to the success c acy, yet insulated by oceans, interests, capitalism, and he observes that, a and traditions from the larger theater of though the United States was the leadin interstate affairs. The second period, he world power for most of that period, States, ended either in 1941, when the did not aspire to rule. United States entered World War II, or In approaching the issues immediatel in 1947, a year he accepts as the begin- associated with the Second World Wa ning of the cold war. Aron characterizes and the beginning of the cold war, Aror this period as one of indecisiveness in unlike many other analysts, sees no pui American foreign policy, a period of pose in searching for culprits. In faci inconsistency when, against its will, the throughout the book his treatment of a^ nation participated in world affairs yet individuais is moderate. Even Stalin, Oi failecl to accept “the role imposed upon whom no commendable quality is men it by destinv.” (Shades of John L. tioned, is not personally vilified. As fo 0 ’Sullivan! How interesting to see a mid- the origins of the cold war, Aron reject twentieth-century scholar, and a Euro- the “revisionist” thesis that holds Americ pean at that, extolling America’s manifest responsible, as he rejects all revisionis destinv!) arguments. He concludes that the divi For the chronological and policy pa- sion of Europe was inevitable and tha rameters of the third period, the central both Stalin and the Western leader aspect of his essay, Aron argues that the acted consistem with their own valuesi criticai elements are the Marshall Plan of He cites Staliifs remark, “Everyone im| 1947 at one end and, at the other, the poses his own system as far as his arm i devaluation of the dollar in 1971 to- can reach,” (nevertheless, the Unitet, gether with President NixorVs visits to States rejected that contention, and Tru, Peking and Moscow the following year. man ignored ChurchiH's advice and with Within this time span he considers drew American forces from their for American policy to have been very con­ ward positions in Europe at the end o sistem, featuring the containment of the war). ! Communism by economic, political, and While Aron finds no fault with Roose military means. It was a policy ideologi- velt s desire for postwar cooperatiot cally negative and marked, although with among the Big Three, a position hn importam exceptions, by moderation to- credits to the President s universalis ward its chiei rival. He does maintain ideais of interstate relations. he doei that American judgment was faulty in criticize the emphasis placed on mihtari several instances during these years, in- victory instead of an attempt to reach . cluding President Roosevelfs lack of in- political settlement with Stalin. One won terest in political settlement during ders if that was possible. As Aron himsel World War II, the decision to carry the notes, after signing the Yalta agreement Korean War north of the thirty-eighth Stalin almost immediately violated it it BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 aland and Rumania. VVhat kind of eter until it had insured that the Repub- p-eement would he have accepted ihat lic of Korea had sufficient military ould have been more equitable for strength to resist aggression. One might ther East or West Europe? To have suggest that that is easier said than done. aced anv leverage on Stalin, the United Defense spending was under heavy fire ates, at a minimum, would have had to in America, and the nation lacked the •tain sizable forces in Europe. and troops to garrison South Korea; and to rons comment that, had Truman have given President Syngman Rhee ished to do so he would have found greater military strength for himself mie way, does not appear realistic. It might have encouraged an attack on ould have been contrarv to American North Korea. Even during the korean adition and to the thrust of wartime War, when Rhee was more dependent ropaganda which had created a favora- upon American support, he proved to be e public image of “Uncle Joe" and a difficult ally. aviet requirements. Moreover. as Aron More signiflcant is Aron’s declaration idicates in another context, American that the Korean War “set in motion a d I íc v consistentlv rejected direct con- chain of events in Asia and Europe ontation with the Soviets. which is still running out its course today and has cletermined some of the main characteristics of the period 1950-1972.” I he major events which es- He States that it was Korea that escalated iblished the nature of the postwar inter- the cold war to military and global ate relations were, Aron believes, the dimensions. Not only did American pol­ jíarshall Plan for Europe and the ko- icy dramatically shift with the establish- ?an War in an even larger context. Wkh ment of a large, standing peacetime talin s refusal to participate in the Mar- army and the rearming of Europe; now íiall Plan, bipolarity was fullv estab- two military blocs stood face to face. shed. For the American policv that Nevertheless, Aron maintains that those nifted from advocacv of a universalist military measures were necessary for orld communitv to acceptance of a American credibility and to provide a alance of power and for America’s climate of security and confidence in cceptance of the role as the West’s Europe. íader, Aron has high praise, toasting For America, Korea was its first experi- lat policv revision as "the ‘finest hour ence with limited war and peace without i American diplomacy in Europe.” victory, and, most significantly, says What other policy,” he asks, "save con- Aron. “it was in Asia far more than in iinment was open after cooperation Europe that the American republic as- ith Stalin had proved impossible?” sumed the imperial burden.” From the In regard to korea, Aron criticizes Korean involvement he sees direct policy -merica’s political abandonment of the links to American intervention in Viet- eninsula, citing Secretary Dean Ache­ nam. Despite his reservations about i s January 1950 speech as an error, American policy toward Korea prior to rofessor Aron believes that the United the war, Aron agrees that President tates should have maintained a more Truman was correct in intervening mili- >rceful policy and should not have elim- tarilv once the South was attacked. How- lated Korea from its defensive perim- ever, once it was engaged, Aron charges 90 AIR VNIVERSITY REV1EW America vvith grievous policy errors. The in the summer of 1947, including tf decision to carry the war north of the creation of the Cominform, the treati» thirty-eighth parallel not only preventecl concluded betvveen the Western povve: a Iimited victorv in 1950 but led to a new and Soviet satellites signifying de fac China policy that vvas disastrous—a “time recognition of the sovietization of Ea bomb,” says Aron, which ultimately ex- Europe, the French decision to join Bri ploded into the American intervention in ain and America in the unification t Southeast Asia. Prior to that time, he their zones in Germany, and Stalin notes, the United States had avoided rejection of the Marshall Plan. Otht taking sides in the Chinese civil war; now scholars differ. Robert H. Ferrell suj it vvould elevate its hostility to Mao’s gested about ten years ago that th regime into an anti-Communist tirade. Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan t< What vvas the point, he asks, if China gether signifiecl the change in policy was merely a Soviet satellite? He declares More recently, John Levvis Gaddis, lif that it vvould have been a more rational Aron, dismissed the Truman Doctrine ; policy to seek an accommodation in Asia more rhetoric than policy. Gaddis di similar to American policy in Europe. credit it as being a “real revolution,” bi Instead, the United States compounded only in the sense that it vvas accompanie the error and plunged into the war in by a “sense of exhilaration” in demoi Indochina. It had been providing modest strating that “for the first time in recer assistance to the French there before the memory the State Department had a>i Korean War began, but now massive aid tually clone something, quickly, efficient vvould be provided, and the nature of and decisively.” But, unlike Aron, Gadd the war in Indochina vvas transformed. does not offer the Marshall Plan as tf France had been resisting the independ- turning point for Europe; instead h ence movement and fought to protect its argues that the Korean War vvas tl empire; but vvith the entrance of the decisive event. After that, American po United States, the war became another icy no longer differentiated betvvee aspect of the global effort to contain Communism and Communist countrú Communism. (except for Yugoslavia) but treated it as Some comment is in order regarding monolith to be contained everyvvhere the definitive date when this third period Inasmuch as Gaddis’s conclusions coi of American foreign policy began, the cerning the significance of the Korea period in which, says Aron, the United War are substantially the same as Aron' States achieved global hegemony. He one vvonders if the Professor has n< vvrites rather loosely about this. In the selected the Marshall Plan largely to giv prologue he States that the period began symmetry to his argument; that is, i either vvith Pearl Harbor or the Truman more sharply delineate a distinction i Doctrine in 1947. Later. he argues that American policy betvveen Europe an Truman continued Roosevelfs universal- Asia than vvas really there. Perhaps it ist policy, and he dismisses the Truman indicative of a native European s bias. Doctrine as being of slight significance, declaring that for Europe “the major turning point vvas in fact the Marshall H aving already failed t Plan." He supports that contention by take advantage of the overtures tovvard citing a number of events that occurred thaw in the relationship vvith the Sovi< BOOKS AND IDEAS 91 nion that followed Stalins death in and butter” during the Vietnam war was }53. Professor Aron believes that the the beginning of American economic nited States erred again the following woes today. One may suggest that, in- »ar when it refused to accept a draw stead of questioning the economic policy id a demarcadon in Vietnam similar to towarcl Europe, Aron might have seen le one it accepted in Korea. He dis- the value of a similar grant rather than a edits the “domino theory," arguing that loan policy with the Third World. Cer- hile Southeast Asia mav have suc- tainlv to have attempted to contribute to ímbed to Communism as far west as the reconstruction of Europe after World hailand, there was no likelihood of its War II through loans would have raised jccess bevond that point. And the loss again, and legitimately, the cry of “Uncle > the United States, he believes, would Shylock.” It is clifficult to believe that a ot have been significam, pointing out strong Atlantic alliance could have been tat the expenditures to defend Korea erected on such a policy. Furthermore, nd V ietnam have far exceeded the economic conditions in the Third World ;tums. also justified the provision for grants YVhv did containment succeed in Eu- there. spe but not in Asia? Aron offers two On the question of imperialism, Aron xplanations: First, that once Europe was exonerates the United States of the revi- rotected against the threat of externai sionist charge that it has used its eco­ çgression, it proved capable of coping nomic strength to further the nation’s ith internai Communism; but that was capitalist expansion. l he evidence shows, ot true of Asia, where nationalism was he believes, that what motivated the ss developed. Second, in the matter of United States was the threat of Com­ conomic assistance. he finds no common munism, and while America may have enominator providing guidance—other been mistaken in the way in which it tan that such aid has been beneficiai for extended the scope of its counter-Com- íe reconstruction of war-ravaged devel- munism crusade, its economic strength ped nations but far less successful in was used for that purpose rather than to [imulating the economic growth and expand capital is m. Defining an imperial :abilitv of underdeveloped countries. State as one that uses its strength “to >ne factor that he might have elaborated defend its proteges rather than to en- pon is the question of grants versus slave its clients or dictate its will to the jans. l he reconstruction of Europe, he weak," he observes that “as the para- bserves, was greatlv assisted bv U.S. mount State, the United States has not conomic grants, but the Third World ruled.” Aron wonders why, when it is lore often has been extended only generally accepted that neither a colonial >ans. In terms of the best interest for policy nor military domination is neces- unerica, Aron suggests that the United sary for growth and prosperitv: “If this is tales might have been better off had it true for the vanquished or the secondary lerely provided loans for Europe, for powers, why should it be false for the hen its own economic situation would be dominam State . . . ?” He dismisses tronger today. However, that is ques- charges that the United States created a ionable; although the recovery of Eu- new economic imperialism through mul- ope and Japan has provided competi- tinational corporations, excessive con- ion for this countrv, the policv of “guns sumption of foreign raw materiais, or 92 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW exorbitam profits realized from overseas blocs. That was evident in the Hungar I investments. Instead he argues that nei- and Suez crises of 1956 and in the Sino ther foreign trade nor profits from for- American conflict over Quemoy anel eign investments were that significant to Matsu in 1958. In their actions durinp the American economy. Moreover, the those events it was apparent that thct existing lag in the economic growth of Soviets and the Americans had reachecü the underdeveloped countries, Latin an accommodation so that neither uní America in particular, Aron attributes to duly exacerbated situations unfavorabli internai problems of their own doing to the other. Moreover, the actions of th<| rather than to U.S. policy. In support of lesser allies of both great powers re that argument one may read vvith proTit vealed their independent-mindednes: Karl M. Schmitt’s analysis of the cíiffer- and were indicative of emerging dissen ing development of México and the sion vvithin the rival alliance systems. United States in the decades after 1821. Professor Aron believes that undei Comparable in size of population and Kennedy the United States reached the territorial domain and both possessing height of its hegemony as the worlc appreciable natural resources, political power. Nevertheless, he does not accep turmoil and social inequities have had Robert Osgood’s assessment of America! more to do vvith the retarded growth of cold war policy as “a striking success,’ the Mexican economy than did the inter- noting that vvithin a few years the condi ference of its northern neighbor.3 Aron tions were dramatically altered as the States that the United States has been Soviet Union also achieved global povvei generallv indifferent to the Third World status. It was the Kennedy administra and for the past decade has been invest- tion's “propensity to a dvnamic policy’ ing more heavily in the developed coun- that led it to test its counterinsurgencv tries. Surely America’s policy in regard to capability, for which, declares Aron, i the Middle East, he notes, has not been must share “the responsibility for the condutive to easy access to oil. And only misfortunes of Gulliver in the quagmire in the Caribbean and Central America of the rice paddies of Vietnam.” Having does he believe that the U.S. has fol- refused to accept the nationalism issut lowed an “imperialist” policy, continuing vvracking Vietnam and having failed tc to intervene in accordance vvith its his­ discover a leader there similar to Rhee ir torie interpretation of a legitimate, pre- korea who was both nationalist and anti eminent role there. It would seem, how- Communist, the United States was seri ever, from the recent disclosures as to ously handicapped for the achievemeni the expenditures made to undermine of a political victory. Allende's government in Chile, Professor Aron is extremely criticai of American Aron has underestimated the Nixon ad­ military policy in both the bombing oi ministra tion’s determination to iníluence North Vietnam and the “search and the affairs of South America. In regard destroy” operations in the South. Neithei to that continent, William P. Bundy’s had a chance of success, he argues, and proposal that the United States vvithdravv the “only rational” policy should havei from the security aspects of the Organi- been a levei of intervention sufticient “tc zation of American States (oas) has merit.4 gain time enough to consolidate a gov- In the 1950s Aron sees importam ernment capable of maintaining order ir changes occurring vvithin the rival power South Vietnam and of resisting both thel BOÜKS AND IDEAS 93 jsurgencv and any attack by North engendered by Vietnam forced the ietnam.” Instead the destructiveness of change in financial policy. And while ie American military operations not that decision was to the disadvantage of hlv was unsuccessíul in crushing the America's Asian and European allies, he jiemy but also led to revulsion in Amer- insists that it was realistic. But dollar a and abroad and ultimately discredited devaluation also symbolized the changed e anu-Communist crusade. relationship between the United States For the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy he and its allies. Now they compete as is high praise and writes of its “brilliant economic rivais, thus bringing into ques- rokes” in reversing policy toward the tion other aspects of their alliance. To- >viet Union and China. He says the gether these revised policies toward ene- ?w policy “aimed at creating a lasting mies and allies alike signify the end of sace and freedom by means of a strategy Aron’s third period of American foreign ' national security contingent on a realistic policy. terrence and a diplomacy of active negotia- While the subject of Raymond Aron’s m [Aron’s italics].” The highlights of essay is American foreign policy and his le new policy were the President’s trips discussion necessarily centers there, he » Peking and Moscow, vvhich heralded has no hesitation about stating his convic- étente. the withdrawal without defeat tions on other matters; for example, om Vietnam, and the 1972 Strategic charging Stalin with the real responsibil- rms Limitation Talks (salt) agreement. itv for the Korean VV7ar, or Castro for the he ultimate issue in Vietnam, he main- Cuban missile crisis. There are some tins, was whether or not the Thieu minor, nevertheless annoying, discrepan- Dvernment would be abandoned by the cies in this book. Whenever there is a nited States. But the accord of January reference to the American ground forces 373 signified, Aron believes, at least the engaged in Korea, they are mistakenly mporary abandonment of Hanois in- referred to as the Seventh Army instead stence on unification of North and of the Eighth. In his chapter entitled 3Uth Vietnam under a coalition (Com- “Disciples of Metternich,” which discusses lunist) regime. However, the continued the important Nixon policy shift to de- vel ot warfare in South Vietnam belies tente and withdrawal from Vietnam, the le professor’s contention. Hanoi has not very First sentence States that the Presi- mporarily abandoned its objective of dent visited Peking and Moscow in nification according to its terms; instead 1971—it was 1972. Later in the chapter is playing for time and the internai the Peking visit is clated as March 1972— Dllapse of the South. As for the First it was February. And the important vlt agreement, there he believes the North Vietnam offensive that continued nited States fully expressed its interest while Nixon visited Moscow is First re­ i détente by accepting Soviet nuclear ferred to as commencing in April 1971, jperiority. and then as in April 1972—it was March Aron also defends America’s dollar 30, 1972. evaluation of 1971, which he argues Stanley Hoffmann has characterized as overdue and did not represent an Aron’s convictions regarding the inter- ^merican attempt to exercise economic state systerrfs inherent competitive nature nperialism. The economic recovery of and division into contesting units as urope and Japan and the inflation today’s “best expression of this gloomy or 94 AIR UXIVERSITY REV1EW sceptical philosophv.”5 Although in this States away from its commitment. With book Aron declares that the modem drawal from its responsibilities as a grea complexitv of International affairs re- power is impossible for the Unitec quires relationships at leveis further than States, he argues, and he insists that tht merely a balance of power, the general nation must continue some middle impression given is that contemporary ground policy between isolationism anc affairs still require a viable balance be- global domination. But he is worried tween the Soviets and the West. That and realistically so, that the backlash tc impression is confirmed by Aron in a Watergate may lead to undesirable re more recent interview in which he stated strictions upon Presidential direction ol that “if the United States was to vvith- foreign policy. Citing numerous instance; dravv completelv from Western Europe, of what he considers unwarrantec there is a clanger that the Communists Congressional action since World War I vvoulcl take power in Italy and maybe in Aron confides that “it is to the presi- France.”K It is the security of the West- dency rather than the Senate that Euro- ern alliance that causes Aron to question peans look for an equitable policy.” the reaction to Watergate, which he sees as affecting the temper of the times and which, he fears, may lead the United Wichita State Universih

Notes •I. William P. Bundv. "International Securitv Today," Foreign Affatr, 1 Rnlx-Tt H. Fcrrell, Roosevelt and Iruman Policy: Continuitv or Octobcr 1974, pp. 34-35. Change?” a paper read at the Organization of American Historians in 5. Stanley Hotfmann. "Tlie Acteptabilily oí Militarv Force." in "Foro Cincinnati in Modem Societies: Its Place in International Politics," Adrlpht Papen 2 John Lewis Gaddis. "Reconsklerations: Was the I ruman Doctrint* a No 102 (London: International Institute for Stratcgic Studies, 1973). p Real Turning Point?" Foretgn Affairs, Januarv 1974. pp. 386-402. 3. Karl VI Schmift. Mrxico and the United States, 1821-1973: Conflict and ti ”A Frenc h Vicw of Rising U.S. Power," V.S. Xrm tá World Report Coexislenee (New Vork: John Wiley & Sons, lnc., 1974). pp. 44—50. April 29, 1974. pp. 5(^51. he ontri tors

Ca hia in Donalo J. Alberts (USAFA. Ví .A . Ccorgetown University; VI.S., Um* T he Honorable Wil u a m L Dickinson versitv of Southern Califórnia) is Assistam (LL.B.. University of Alabama) was elected Professor of Political Science, U.S. Air Lie i tenam Colonei. D a vi o N B ir t to thc United States Congress in 1964 and Force Academy, where he spcciali/es in (Ph.D., Stanford University) is DOD Dircc- represents lhe Second Congressional Dis- insurgency studies and American dclcnsc tor, Foreign Viilitarv Sales, for Australia. at irict of Alabama. He is thc fourth ranking policy. He has ser\ed two tours in South- Canberra. He recentIv completed four Republican on the House Cotnmittee on east Asia. flying the F-4, and a tour in years with the Air Force Institute of Tech­ Armed Services. Afler graduarion from law Europe as a Wild Weasel pilot and wing nology as an asso* iate professor in logistics school in 1950, he practiced law and fillcd stalf officer. Captain Alberts is a cocditor rnanagement. He was also Direttor of the a nurnbcr of judgeships. He has received and contributor to Political Vialencc and Procuretrtenl Vlanagement ProgTarn, origi- the Distinguished Service Award from the Insurgency: A Comparaiwe Approach (1974). nator ot thc DOD Procurement Symposia Americans for Constitutional Action every series, and of the Air Force Business year he has been in Congress. Two of his Vlethods Research Management Center. outstanding activities are in support ol Colonei Burts articles on procurement and prisoners of war and a strong nacional systems aequisition liave been published in defensc. Rcprescntaiive Dickinson is a professional journals. Navy vetcran of World War 11and a major in thc USAF Reserve

Lewis A. Frank (VI.A., University of Cali­ fórnia at Los Angeles) is an cconomist and consultam on strategic studies with Ana- lytic Services Inc., Falis Church, Virginia. I)r Rkhard E. Bissel l (Ph.D.. Fletcher Lawrence R Benson (VI A . University of His writings on wcapon systems dcvelop- School of Law and Diplomatv. Tufts Uni­ Vlarvland) is Hístorian, Air Force Viilitarv ment and politico-military analvses have versity) is a rescarch assoeiate at the For- Training Center, Lackland AFB, Texas. At appearcd widely, thc most recent. “Soviet eign Policv Research Institute, Philadel- the time he wrote the articlc on the Fighter Power after SALT I." in Stralcgic Rtvwv phia. and a visiting research fellow at the Lead-In Program he was historian of the (1974). Mr. Frank is author of Tlu Arms Center for International Studies, Princeton 49th Tactical Fighter Wing, Holloman Trade in Intematunuil Relatiom (1969) and is University. Currcntly working on long- AFB. New Víexico. He served with the U.S. currcntly writing a book on strategy He is range planning for the U.S. government in Army in Vietnam and taught high school a graduate of the Industrial Collcgc of the África south ot the Sahara. Dr. Bissell will in Ari/.ona before becoming an Air Force Armed Forces and is listed in American Víen publish his previous research on South civilian ernployee at Davis-Vlonthan AFB. and Women o) Scieruc—F.conumics 1975. African forcign policy in Iate 1975. Arizona, in 1971.

95 ground instruetor for pilois in the RCAF. Dr. Fraser has served as lecturer in thc George Washington University Center and Auburn University Center at Maxwell AFB. He is currently teaching statisties for Troy State University, Montgoincry. He is retired as a colonel, USAF Reserve.

Cartain John G. T erino (B.S., Fordham University) is Chief, Press Media Branch. Directorate of Information. Hq Tactical Lieu t en a n t Colonel George R. Henni- Air Command. While serving at Lukc can (M.S., Air Force Instiiute of Technol­ AFB, Arizona, vvhere his office received ogy) is Chief, B-52D Structural Modifica- the TAC Information Achievement Award, lion Program Office. B-52 and Missiles hc handled the problems of urban en- Systems Management Division, Oklahoma croachment and the initial iinplementation City ALC. Commissioned from pilot train- of Air Installation Compatible Use Zone ing in 1956, he has served in ATC, (AICUZ). Hc has served as an information USAFE. TAC. PACAF. and ADC flown officer also at AF1T. Hq PACAF, Bien thc F-86D. F-102. F-106, and 100 missions Hoa AB. Vietnam. and Air Force Cam- over North Vietnam in the F-105; and held bridge Research Laboratories. special assignments with Special Air War- fare Center and Air Defense Weapons Center Colonel Hennigan is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

Dr . G eorge W. Coluns (Ph.D., University of Colorado) is Assoe iate Professor of His- torv. Wkhita State University. He served as a bomber navigator during World War II Ou. J ames A. Fraser (Ph D., Columbia and Korea and later in Strategic Air Com­ University) is Professor Etneritus, Air Uni­ mand. He then taught navigation and versity. having served as Director of Cur- historv at the United States Air Force riculum. Air University lnstitute for Academy until his retiremenl in 1968. Dr Piofessional Developinent. In World War Collins has published articles on historv II he was a navigation instruetor and and navigation in professional journals.

V The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “They Were Good Ol’ Boys! An Infantryman Remembers An Loc and the Air Force” by Major John D. Howard, USA, as the outstanding article in the January-February 1975 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel. E ldon W. D owns, USAI' Editor J ack H. M ooney Managing Editor M ajor Ric h a r d B. C omyns, USAF Associate Editor J ohn A. W estcott, J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Midosi May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. De P aola Art Editor and Illustrator R udolph W. Morgan Financial and Administrative Manager ADVISERS Colonel James F. Sunderman Hq Aerospace Defense Command Colonel Gerald J. Hickman Hq Air Force Logística Command Dr . Harold M. H elfman Hq Air Force Systems Command Colonel H. J. Dalton, Jr . Hq An Training Command Colonel H. A. Davis, Jr . Hq Müitary Airlift Command Francis W. Jennings SAF Office of Information Colonel John W. Walton Hq Strategic Air Command Colonel Richard D. Moore Hq Tactical Air Command Colonel Melville A. Madsen Hq United States Air Force Academy

ATTENTION Air University Rcciew is published to stimulate pro- fessíonal thonght concerning aerospace doetrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the irivestiga- tions and conclusioas of its editors and are not to be coastrúed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW