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Chapttr VIII. Mdnttnmcr of Inttrartional Pence and Scrorlty of Grenada As A 274 Chapttr VIII. Mdnttnmcr of inttrartional pence and scrorlty of Grenada as a violation of the principles of the vention and constituted the greatest threat to peace Charter and the rules of international law, in articu- and security yet in the region as it was the first time lar in respect of the non-use of or threat oP use of that warplanes had been used to continue the chain force and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of acts of aggression against Nicaragua. He charged of other States. Jordan could not accept the occupa- that at the present time American and Honduran tion of an independent State, a Member of the troops were carrying out a joint military manoeuvre United Nations, under any pretext whatsoever. The with the objective of making war against Nicaragua. milita activities against Grenada constituted a He also charged that the two countries undermined pave 7anger, for that precedent could be invoked to the peace efforts of the Contadora Group while the justify similar occupation operations in the future.p created the impression that they supported them. Y The representative of the Soviet Union said that The representative of Honduras rejected as com- his delegation would vote in favour of a draft pletely unfounded allegations of its complicity in the resolution calling for a hale to the abrupt and events referred to by Nicaragua and charged that unceremonious high-handedness in international af- Nicaragua had once again tried to involve Honduras fairs, a halt to the military intervention by the United in Nicaragua’s internal problems through false infor- States. mation harmful to neighbouring States and aimed at At the end of the 2491st meeting, on 28 October provokin confrontations to divert attention from 1983, the three-Power draft resolution was put to the those prok lems. Refuting the Nicaraguan charge that vote and was not adopted owin to the negative vote his Government obstructed the efforts of the Conta- of a permanent member of the Eouncil. The result of dora Group, he hoped that Nicaragua would not the voting was as follows: 11 votes in favour, 1 continue to foster a climate of distrust which affected against and 3 abstentions.” the Contadora process. He reiterated his Govem- ment’s full support for that process.* Responding to the Nicaraguan accusations, the representative of the United States said that his N OTES Government had not engaged in aggression against 1 S/I 6067, OR. 38th yr., Suppl. for Ocr-Dec. 1983; !ke also Nicaragua. He added that the United States did S/ 16072, ibid. intend to continue to co-operate with its friends in *For details, see chap. II! of the present Supplemenl. Central America in defence of freedom, self-determi- ‘S/16091, incorporated in the record of the 2491~1 meeting. For nation and democratic pluralism. He charged that it details, see chap. 111 of the present Supplemenf. was the Sandinist rkgime’s betrayal of those princi- * 2487th mlg. ples that had caused substantial numbers of Nicara- ‘General Assembly resolulion 2625 (XXV). guans to take up arms against that rbgime. He further *General Assembly resolution 361103. accused Nicaragua of exporting revolutions and of ’ s/16077, OR. 38th yr., Suppi. for Oct.-Dec. 1983. Zimbabwe destabilizing free and democratic Governments joined subsequently as a sponsor of the draR resolution. throughout Central America and said that so long as ’ 2489th mtg. such a situation persisted, so would tension persist in q 249lst mtg. the region.2 ‘O S/l6077IRev.l, OR. 38th yr.. Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1983. The President of the Council announced that the II For the vote, see 249lst mtg. next meeting of the Council to continue the consider- ation of the item on the agenda would be fixed in consultation with members of the Council.2 28. LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1984 FROM THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES A.1. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NiCAkAGUA TO THE UNITED NA- TIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE N OTES SECURITY COUNCIL 1 S/16306, OR, 39rh yr., Suppi. for Jan.-March 1981. * 2513th mtg. INITIAL PROCEEDINGS By letter1 dated 3 Februa 1984, the representa- tive of Nicaragua requeste7 the President of the 29. LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1984 FROM THE PERMA- Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council NENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE to consider the situation created by a new escalation UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT in acts of a ession by Somozan and mercenary OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL counter-rev0 rutionary forces trained and financed by the United States. INITIAL PROCEEDINGS At its 2513th meeting, on 3 February 1984, the By a letter’ dated 18 March 1984 addressed to the Council included the item in its agenda. Following President of the Council, the representative of the the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the Sudan requested that the Council be convened in representative of Honduras, at his re uest, to partici- order to consider the aggression committed by the pate in the discussion without the ri 9 t to vote.’ The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the Sudan on 16 Council considered this item at the same meeting. March 1984, which constituted a blatant attack At that meeting, the representative of Nicaragua against the sovereignt , security and integrity of the stated that he had come to the Council greatly territory and people or a State Member of the United alarmed by the most serious events over the past two Nations and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the years involving attacks a ainst Nicaragua by Hondu- United Nations, regional charters and the principles ran military planes. T aose events could be the of international law, and posed a serious threat to the precursors of a war between Honduras and Nicara- peace and security of the countries of the region and gua provoked by the United States to justify inter- to international peace and security. Charging that a Put II 275 Libyan bomber had carried out an air raid against the The representative of Egypt said that the whole town of Omdurman, he asked the Council to take all series of acts of aggression carried out against the measures pursuant to its responsibilit for the main- Sudan had but one basis, namely, the uncontrollable tenance of the security of States dembers of the desire to destabilize the Sudan and to interfere in its United Nations and of the security and peace of the internal affairs. He underlined that the Sudanese region and of the world as a whole. Government and people had been subjected to shameful acts of a ression and had the right to At its 2520th meeting, on 27 March 1984, the strengthen their se1 P-defence capacity and to ensure Council included the item in its agenda. Following their security.r the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following, at their request, to participate in the The representative of Zaire stated that the Sudan discussion without the right to vote: the representa- had fallen victim to a barbaric and dastardly act of tives of Benin, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, aggression, which flagrantly violated the Charter and Oman, the Sudan and Zaire; and, at the 252lst the generally accepted principles of international law. meeting, the representatives of Chad and Indonesia.2 The Governments of Africa had the right and the The Council considered the item at its 2520th and duty to unite their forces to guarantee the security of 2521st meetings, on 27 March 1984. the States of the region against the barbarism that would replace the sacred principles of the Organiza- At the 2520th meeting, the Minister for Foreign tion of African Unity (OAU). The speaker said that Affairs of the Sudan reported in detail about an air his country expected the international community to raid alle edly carried out by the Libyan air force on denounce strongly such barbaric acts.’ 16 Marcvi 1984. The raid had resulted in the death of At the 2521st meeting, the representative of France five citizens inside their houses, the wounding of a said that his country could not but condemn the act reat number and the destruction of parts of a public of violence, which could indeed affect peace and % roadcasting station, some private houses and sev- stability in the Sudan. Such use of force, which was eral vehicles. The Sudan viewed the Libyan air raid totally unjustified, could only lead to a very danger- as a fla rant act of a ression against the sovereignty ous deterioration of the situation in an already of the !4 udan and aY einous attack against civilian targets, as well as one more link in an uninterrupted troubled part of the world.4 chain of aggression, sabotage and flagrant interfer- The representative of Upper Volta denounced the ence in the internal affairs of the Sudan. use of force in international relations. The Charter had laid down the procedures to be scrupulously He enumerated the various acts of aggression and followed by all States in settling disputes. For that subversion b the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against reason his country condemned the bombing on 16 his country. kondering about the reasons that had March 1984 of the town of Omdurman as well as the prompted the Libyan regime to persist in its acts of ensuing loss of human life. Yet there remained aggression and intervention against the Sudan, he doubts about the accuracy of these assertions regard- emphasized that his country had no dispute with the ing the sup sed aggressor. There were far too many Libyan Arab Jamahiriya over borders or under- uestions trat remained unanswered.
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