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Uprising in East Germany 1953 UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY 1953 THE COLD WAR, THE GERMAN QUESTION, AND THE FIRST MAJOR UPHEAVAL BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN Compiled, edited and introduced by CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN Editorial coordination by MALCOLM BYRNE • CEU PRESS * i > CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY PRESS CONTENTS Preface by Charles S. Maier, Harvard University xv Introduction and Acknowledgements xix Acronyms and Abbreviations xxvii Chronology of Events xxxi PART ONE THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS Introduction 1 Document No. 1: Soviet and East German Minutes of Conversations between Josef Stalin and SED Leaders in the GDR, 1 April and 7 April 1952 22 Document No. 2: CPSU CC Resolution Approving the Deployment of Border Guards along the Eastern Border of the GDR, 2 January 1953 43 Document No. 3: Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, 11 March 1953 44 Document No. 4: Draft Instructions for General Vasilii Chuikov and Vladimir Semyonov Regarding GDR Control of Borders, 18 March 1953 50 Document No. 5: Memorandum by Ivan Tugarinov, "On the Western Powers' Policy Regarding the German Question," 18 April 1953 52 Document No. 6: Memorandum on the German Question, from Georgii Pushkin and Mikhail Gribanov to Vyacheslav Molotov, 18 April 1953 67 Document No. 7: Soviet Foreign Ministiy Memorandum, "Regarding Further Measures of the Soviet Government on the German Question," 28 April 1953 71 Document No. 8: Cable from N. Spencer Barnes to U.S. Department of State Reviewing Developments in the GDR since Stalin's Death, 30 April 1953 74 Document No. 9: Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov to Vyacheslav Molotov Evaluating the Prospects for a Successful Resolution of the German Question, 2 May 1953 82 Document No. 10: Report on 4 May Disturbances at the Tobacco Depot in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, 7 May 1953 86 VI1 Document No. 11: USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum, "On Further Soviet Government Measures Pertaining to the German Question," 8 May 1953 90 Document No. 12: Memorandum from the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs to Vladimir Semyonov, "On the Question of Preventing the Defection of Inhabitants from the GDR to West Germany," 15 May 1953 97 Document No. 13: Memorandum from General Vasilii Chuikov, Pavel Yudin, and Ivan Il'ichev to Georgii Malenkov Critically Assessing the Situation in the GDR, 18 May 1953 100 Document No. 14: CIA Report Evaluating Vladimir Semyonov's Appointment as Soviet High Commissioner for Germany, 29 May, 1953 110 Document No. 15: Cable from Ambassador Charles Bohlen to John Foster Dulles regarding the Transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany to Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Semyonov, 29 May 1953 111 Document No. 16: Materials for a Meeting of the Organizational Secretariat of the CPCz CC, with Attached Report on Party Activities in Plzefi in Connection with the Events of 1 June 1953, 31 July 1953 113 Document No. 17: Radio Free Europe Report on the Strikes in Plzen during Early June 1953, 8 September 1953 128 Document No. 18: USSR Council of Ministers Order "On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR," 2 June 1953 133 Document No. 19: Otto Grotewohl's Notes of Meetings between East German and Soviet Leaders in Moscow, 2—4 June 1953 137 Document No. 20: SED CC Politburo Minutes Discussing Moscow's Directives for the New Course, 6 June 1953 139 Document No. 21: Cable from Samuel Reber to U.S. Department of State Outlining U.S. Perspectives on Four-Power Talks, 13 June 1953 142 Document No. 22: Transcript of Conversations between the Soviet Leadership and a Hungarian Workers' Party Delegation in Moscow, 13 and 16 June 1953 144 Document No. 23: Letter from Lavrentii Beria to Georgii Malenkov Reflecting on the Events of Spring 1953, 1 July 1953 155 Document No. 24: Transcript of the CPSU CC Plenum Meetings Regarding Beria's Views on the German Question in Spring 1953, 2-3 July 1953 (Excerpts) 158 via PART TWO THE UPRISING Introduction 163 Document No. 25: Situation Report from Vladimir Semyonov and Andrei Grechko to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, 7:26 a.m. Moscow Time (5:26 a.m. CET) 181 Document No. 26: Situation Report from Vladimir Semyonov and Andrei Grechko to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 195 3, 11:15 a.m. CET 183 Document No. 27: Cable from the Czechoslovak Mission in Berlin to Foreign Minister Vaclav David, 17 June 1953, received 1:45 p.m. CET 185 Document No. 28: Radio Telegram from Vladimir Semyonov Providing Situation Report to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 2:00 p.m. CET 186 Document No. 29: Situation Report from the Czechoslovak Mission in Berlin' to Foreign Minister Vaclav David, 17 June 1953 188 Document No. 30: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, received 6:30 p.m. Moscow Time (4:30 p.m. CET) 190 Document No. 31: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 5:30 p.m. CET 192 Document No. 32: Cable from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department of State Relaying Minutes of the First Meeting of the Western Military Commandants in Berlin, 17 June 1953, 6:00 p.m. CET 194 Document No. 33: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 11:00 p.m. Moscow Time (9:00 p.m. CET) 196 Document No. 34: Cable from Cecil Lyon to the State Department Reporting on Afternoon Meeting of the Western Commandants, 17 June 1953, 9:00 p.m. CET 198 Document No. 35: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 17 June 1953, as of 11:00 p.m. CET 200 Document No. 36: Pravda Correspondent P. Naumov to Dimitrii Shepilov, "Report on the Events in Berlin on 16 and 17 June 1953," 22 June 1953 202 Document No. 37: Situation Report from Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii and Marshal Leonid Govorov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, 2:05 a.m. Moscow Time (12:05 a.m. CET) 208 Document No. 38: Psychological Strategy Board Memorandum from John M. Anspacher to George A. Morgan, 17 June 1953 210 IX Document No. 39: Cable from John Foster Dulles to HICOG Bonn on the Propaganda Value of the East Berlin Demonstrations, 17 June 1953, 7:02 p.m. EST (18 June 1953, 1:02 a.m. CET) 213 Document No. 40: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of 8:00 a.m. Moscow Time (6:00 a.m. CET) . 214 Document No. 41: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of 1:00 p.m. Moscow Time (11:00 a.m. CET) 216 Document No. 42: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 18 June 1953, as of 2:00 p.m. CET 217 Document No. 43: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 18 June 1953, as of 6:00 p.m. Moscow Time (4:00 p.m. CET) 219 Document No. 44: Telegram from Cecil Lyon to U.S. Department of State Reporting on Developments in Berlin, 18 June 1953, 7:00 p.m. CET 220 Document No. 45: CIA Current Intelligence Review Analyzing the "Communist 'New Look'" and "Recent Unrest in Eastern Europe," 18 June 1953 222 • Document No. 46: Minutes of Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security Council on 18 June 1953, 19 June 1953 225 Document No. 47: Report from KGB Resident in Berlin Col. Ivan Fadeikin to Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, 19 June 1953 232 Document No. 48: Telephonogram from Vladimir Semyonov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin Reporting on the Situation in East Berlin, 19 June 1953, 3:35 p.m. CET 236 Document No. 49: CPCz Information Bulletin on Czechoslovak Reaction to the Events in East Germany, 19 June 1953 237 Document No. 50: Order from the Polish Minister of State Security, to Regional Branches Outlining Steps to be Taken to Limit Spillover of Events in East Germany, 19 June 1953 241 Document No. 51: CIA Current Intelligence Digest, "Comment on Berlin Rioting," 19 June 1953 243 Document No. 52: Situation Report from Andrei Grechko and A. Tarasov to Nikolai Bulganin, 20 June 1953, as of 10:00 a.m. Moscow Time (8:00 a.m. CET) 244 Document No. 53: Special Report No. 2 of the WUBP in Wroclaw (Poland), Regarding Spillover from Events in Berlin, 20 June 1953 245 Document No. 54: Memorandum from Karl Schirdewan to First Secretaries of the District Leaderships of the SED, 21 June 1953 247 Document No. 55: Diary Entry from U.S. HICOG James B. Conant on the Effects of East Zone Troubles on Soviet Policy, 21 June 1953 248 Document No. 56: CIA Current Intelligence Bulletin on Comments by Charles Bohlen and the Deployment of Soviet Troops, 21 June 1953 249 Document No. 57: CPSU CC Memorandum to the SED CC, Enclosure to Minutes No. 40 from the SED Politburo Session of 21 June 1953, 23 June 1953 251 Document No. 58: Minute from Selwyn Lloyd to Winston Churchill, Reflecting British Perspectives on the Berlin Uprising, 22 June 1953 252 Document No. 59: Special Report No. 4 of the WUBP in Wroclaw (Poland), Noting the Spread of Rumors about East Germany, 23 June 1953 255 Document No. 60: Report from Vasilii Sokolovskii, Vladimir Semyonov, and Pavel Yudin "On the Events of 17-19 June 1953 in Berlin and the GDR and Certain Conclusions from These Events," 24 June 1953 257 Document No.
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