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The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR JONATHAN DEAN Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: July 8, 1997 Copyright 2 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born in Ne York City; raised in Darien, Connecticut Harvard College and Columbia University Canadian and U.S. Army, )orld )ar II Limburg, ,ermany - .reis Resident Officer 1121-1131 U.S. Land Commission ,erman democrati4ation Duties Environment Death threat Neo-Na4is Bonn, ,ermany - Political Officer 1132-1137 Environment Attitude of ,ermans 8ohn Paton Davies Liaison House Escort duties Bundestag ,ehlen organi4ation ,erman rearmament East Berlin uprising - 1133 ,ermany and NATO London and Paris Treaties Adenauer Political parties French policies ,erman-French relations Russia factor Cohn and Shine McCarthy atmosphere CIA system ,erman refugees East ,ermany recognition issue A neutral ,ermany issue State Department - East ,erman Desk Officer 1137-1170 Sue4 and Hungary issues Po ers U-2 aircraft issue Open skies proposal )arsa Pact system Soviet military intervention Eleanor Dulles Chief 8ustice Earl )arren —Live Oak“ contingency plans Soviet-East ,ermany peace threat East ,erman-Soviet relations Hallstein Doctrine Berlin )all CIA Congressional interests Foreign Service Institute - C4ech Language Training 1170-1171 Prague, C4echoslovakia - Political and Economic Officer 1171-1172 Police state Environment Relations ith government Embassy invaded Ambassador Ravndal Travel Surveillance )alk-ins PN, insurance Lumumba riots Reporting Local employees America House Eli4abethville/.atanga, Zaire - Consul 1172-1172 U.S. policy UN forces conflicts Tshombe .atanga secession .atanga forces confine UN forces Belgium@s role Ralph Bunch visit ,odfried Munongo Italian consul general Natali abduction UN role Central government UN ,endarmerie forces conflict Consulate attacked Mercenaries Reunification of Congo Simba uprising Missionaries Mobutu Belgian ithdra al National )ar College 1172-1173 Aietnam issue State Department - United Nations Affairs (IOC 1173-1177 Robert Bo ie 8oseph Sisco .ashmir Issues Personnel State Department - Assistant to Counselor Robert Bo ie 1177-1178 Duties Aietnam Secretary of State Rusk Bonn, ,ermany - Political Counselor 1178-11E2 C4echoslovakia invaded Soviet nuclear eapons in Eastern Europe ,erman-American relationship ,erman unification issue The Bonn ,roup )illy Brandt Ostpolitik .issinger )arsa Pact reaction to C4ech invasion Helmut Sonnenfeldt@s predictions )orld reactions to Soviet C4ech invasion ,erman contacts ith .,B Changes in ,ermany Bader Meinhof terrorism Press media activity NiFon visit Imperial presidency Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador .enneth Rush Berlin issue ,erman-Russian relationship ,erman reunification State Department - Mutual Balance of Force Reduction (MBFRC 11E2 Preparations for negotiations of NATO Pact talks NATO-)arsa Pact Aienna talks Hungary status —Flank“ participants .issinger-Bre4hnev agreement on Hungary .issinger and Foreign Service ,oal of MBFR Shevardnad4e ,romyko Helsinki Accords Soviet objectives Bureaucracy role .issinger modus operandi Berlin Negotiations 1178-11E2 .issinger@s modus operandi Brussels meeting Soviet intentions ,erman unification issue Controlling ,ermany Brandt@s Ostpolitik U.S. vie s of Soviet competence U.S. objectives concerning USSR NATO agrees on Berlin talks Bonn ,roup meetings French skepticism France@s status ,erman sensibilities Ambassador .enneth Rush .issinger@s —back channel“ operations Personalities in negotiations . it4inski (SovietC Negotiations Soviet objectives SiF po er system (BerlinC Alois Mertes NiFon support Berlin )all CSCE East ,ermany recognition issue U.S. objectives in CSCE Translation problems Berlin Agreement provisions Disagreements ,erman reactions to agreement East-)est ,erman treaty )est ,erman-Soviet treaty .issinger and Soviet po er State Department vie s on negotiations Eastern European treaties Mutual Balance of Force Reduction (MBFRC Negotiations - )ashington, DC and Aienna, Austria 11E2-1181 NATO options (threeC Hungary status Aenue for negotiations Turkey and Italy ant to participate French position —Permanent ad hoc group“ Romanian participation .issinger@s arms Soviet intelligence tactics Retirementr 1182 Carnegie Endo ment Union of Concerned Scientists ,orbachev Reagan policy Non-governmental organi4ations (N,OsC ,lobal Action to Prevent )ar Nuclear eapons abolition INTERVIEW $: Today is the 8th of July, 1997. This is an interview with Jonathan Dean. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I would li)e to begin at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family. DEAN: I as born 8une 13, 1122 in Ne York City. My father as a stockbroker and e moved fairly soon to the outskirts. My grandfather had a big family compound in Stamford, Connecticut here he built a house for each of his siF children. )e lived there for a time and then my father built a house of his o n in Darien, Connecticut. That@s here I gre up until the early death of my mother. )e then moved to Ne York and I ent to a school in Yonkers called Riverdale Country School and then to Harvard College. I ent from there to the Canadian army shortly after the United States entered )orld )ar II. I as under age for the U.S. armed forces at 1E. $: I want to move bac) a bit. Everybody tries to get modest and they don+t want to tal) about their early days. I do li)e to catch a little more of the person because I thin) it is interesting for future historians to understand who are these people who are involved in foreign affairs rather than sort of springing up. In your early schooling what sort of boo)s did you read and what interested you particularly, DEAN: There is a clue there, definitely. My father as a great fan of ,eorge Alfred Henty, ,.A. Henty, a British riter of the nineteenth century ho rote historical novels for boys. $: Oh, yes, .A Dash for Khartoum./ DEAN: Yes, among 100 other titles. I still have about 30 of them. $: .0ith Clive in India./ DEAN: 0ith Clive in India, The Cat of Bubastes (that as one of the Egyptian onesC, 1aric the Briton and True to the Old Flag; it had to do ith the American Revolution. $: 3ou might e4plain who Henty was and why the interest in him. DEAN: ,eorge Alfred (,.A. is the only ay he@s kno n.C Henty as a British riter of boys books in the 1880s and 1810s ho used a standard plot in myriad historical circumstances. His history as Huite good and Huite detailed. For eFample in one, Through Russian Snows, I believe it as called, he sho s you the campaign of Napoleon as he advanced into Russia and gives you a good deal of detail. Other books ould actually have military diagrams of battles ith the position of the troops and so on. He made history interesting to kids, mostly British kids at that time, but also American ones. My father read them as a boy and he read them to me. Of course the plots ere rather sort of a British Horatio Alger; usually, some disadvantaged youth ould meet the beautiful daughter of some very distinguished person and end up marrying her after bravely carrying out an assignment for the distinguished person, a military commander usually. $: 3ou are not the first. Obviously I was touched by Henty. There were others I+ve interviewed that Henty had a real influence on. It was a good way to cram history down... DEAN: Yes, very palatable and I think his books that I@ve looked at as an adult seem to me to be Huite accurate. Ho ever, here they dealt ith aspects of British history, they ere rather .iplingesHue, justifying empire. He did get in an enormous amount of detail for that time. $: 3ou had this interest in history, did this continue, DEAN: I had an eFcellent American history teacher in Riverdale School. His name as —Mickey“ Murray and he as superior. He aroused interest in all of the kids and I got a history pri4e a couple of times from his class or from the school. I also had an eFtremely fine Latin instructor, Mr. Lubey, ho filled us ith ancient history on Caesar and so forth. $: 3ou were going to school in about the early 78 s, DEAN: Yes. $: As you were going through did foreign affairs intrude much into your thought process or field of vision, DEAN: Scarcely at all I felt. Not until I got into college did I develop much interest in it. Our family as having a hard enough time because of the Depression. My mother died early on and going to school as kind of rough. As a day student it took me t o hours each ay, and then as a boarding student it as not too happy a time. $: I thin) for many people, the schools where you went away particularly, did cause some distress and all that. I went away to Kent and it was difficult but you sure got a hell of a good education. DEAN: I think the net result as certainly good. It as a better education. I also ent to several public schools and I remember the very patriotic public school that as on 23rd Street in Manhattan here Miss 8ulia )agner as my teacher. At that time you had to say allegiance to the flag, sing a patriotic song or t o and so forth, and then e ere drilled in hand riting and so forth. She as very nice. $: 0hen you went to Harvard was this just following a family tradition or did you have any thought in mind of why you were going there, DEAN: Yes, it as follo ing in the family tradition. I didn@t have much intellectual maturity. I as just sort of casting around for some kind of interest and I ended up ith ethnology, hich as hat I as orking on.
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