COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 61 “This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”1 The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives Introduced and annotated by Christian F. Ostermann I. ince the opening of the former Communist bloc East German relations as Ulbricht seemed to have used the archives it has become evident that the crisis in East uprising to turn weakness into strength. On the height of S Germany in the spring and summer of 1953 was one the crisis in East Berlin, for reasons that are not yet of the key moments in the history of the Cold War. The entirely clear, the Soviet leadership committed itself to the East German Communist regime was much closer to the political survival of Ulbricht and his East German state. brink of collapse, the popular revolt much more wide- Unlike his fellow Stalinist leader, Hungary’s Matyas spread and prolonged, the resentment of SED leader Rakosi, who was quickly demoted when he embraced the Walter Ulbricht by the East German population much more New Course less enthusiastically than expected, Ulbricht, intense than many in the West had come to believe.2 The equally unenthusiastic and stubborn — and with one foot uprising also had profound, long-term effects on the over the brink —somehow managed to regain support in internal and international development of the GDR. By Moscow. The commitment to his survival would in due renouncing the industrial norm increase that had sparked course become costly for the Soviets who were faced with the demonstrations and riots, regime and labor had found Ulbricht’s ever increasing, ever more aggressive demands an uneasy, implicit compromise that production could rise for economic and political support. only as long as norms remained low and wages high — a Curiously, the 1953 East German uprising also turned compromise that posed a severe restraint for Ulbricht out to be crucially significant for Western, in particular when, in the early 1960s, he sought to reform the GDR American, policy. The uprising did not only undermine economy through his “New Economic System.”3 More- British premier Winston Churchill’s grand scheme for a over, instead of allowing for greater political liberalization, East-West deal on Germany and help West German as the Soviet-decreed New Course had envisioned at least chancellor Konrad Adenauer win a sweeping victory at the to a certain degree, the eventual triumph of the hardliners federal elections later that fall.7 The uprising also jolted headed by Ulbricht resulted in a dramatic expansion of the the U.S. administration, first into believing that the dawn apparatus of repression and in the encrustation of an of “liberation” had arrived, and then, after a US-sponsored essentially Stalinist system in the ensuing months.4 food-aid-program evoked much more of a response among Even more surprising, important and controversial are East Berliners and East Germans than the Americans had the international repercussions of the crisis. How did it expected, into reassessing the feasibility of a “rollback” intersect with the power struggle that was taking place in strategy.8 the Kremlin in the weeks following Stalin’s death on 5 Perhaps the most fascinating meaning of 1953 lies in March 1953? Recently, this question has received impetus the impact of these events on the mindset of the SED and by the publication of new materials on the activities of Soviet leaders. Much like the discourse among dissidents KGB chief and Minister of the Interior, Lavrentii Beriia. A and the population at large, in which 1953 became an number of formerly secret internal party documents and almost mythological, though ambiguous, point of refer- memoirs seem to suggest that Beriia was ready to abandon ence, the crisis became deeply embedded in the collective socialism in the GDR, in fact to give up the very existence memory of a generation of East German leaders and a of the East German regime, which had been set up with powerful symbol within the “discourse” among East bloc Soviet support in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany leaders. 1953 came to stand for a hardline repressive in October 1949.5 Did Beriia’s alleged plan — the resolution of internal unrest and the ultima ratio of Soviet reunification of Germany as a democratic and neutral military intervention, and as such was central Ulbricht’s country — represent a missed opportunity for an early end (and later Erich Honecker’s) hardline approach to crises in to Germany’s division and perhaps the Cold War? Some Eastern Europe in 1956, 1968 and 1980/81. “This is our historians have questioned the new evidence and the experience from the year 1953,” Honecker reminded existence of a serious policy alternative, arguing that the Polish party chief Stanislaw Kania and his colleagues disagreement on German policy among the Soviet leader- during the December 1980 East bloc summit at the height ship was “not as serious as it looked.”6 of the Polish crisis, urging a crackdown on the opposi- 1953 also looms large as a defining moment in Soviet- tional “Solidarity” movement and holding out the possibil- 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 ity of Warsaw Pact intervention.9 thing without clamor but persistently” — and announced that the “pacifist period” was over. He also sanctioned the Given the importance of the 1953 East German crisis, socialization of GDR agriculture and industry, again it is little surprising that Soviet policy towards Germany “without much clamor.”17 That summer, at its Second and the East German uprising in the spring and summer of Party Conference (July 9-12), the SED announced the 1953 have come under intense scholarly scrutiny since the policy of “the forced construction of socialism,” following opening of the Russian and East German archives in 1990- final approval by Moscow on July 8. The crash socializa- 1992.10 Yet key aspects of this episode of the Cold War tion and collectivization course quickly aggravated remain controversial. Historians, in particular Germans, economic dislocations and popular discontent. Extraordi- still fiercely debate the essential character of the crisis: narily harsh regimentation and persecution, massive arrests was it basically labor unrest against industrial norm and trials accompanying the new policy added to the increases or a failed popular rebellion?11 Even more strains on the social and economic fabric of the GDR. By controversial are the international ramifications of the East early 1953, East Germans were fleeing their homeland by German crisis in the spring and summer of 1953. What the thousands. were the intentions of Stalin’s successors with regard to The mounting crisis in the GDR coincided with a Germany? Did Beria favor “a grand bargain that would change of leadership in Moscow: Stalin died on 5 March reunify Germany as a capitalist, neutral government?”12 1953. Even as the dictator was still dying at his dacha in What role did the German question play in the post-Stalin the Moscow suburb of Kuntsevo, Beriia and Georgii succession struggle. What effect did the East German Malenkov plotted to seize the reins of power. The two uprising have on the policy-making process in Moscow? quickly coopted Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary of the The documents edited below, obtained in preparation CPSU Central Committee, into the leading “troika,” and or as a result of the November 1996 conference on “The secured the state and party apparatus under their control. Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” co- Lacking both stature and legitimacy, they put Viacheslav sponsored by the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Studien Molotov in charge of foreign affairs, leaving the defense (Potsdam), the National Security Archive (Washington), ministry to Nikolai Bulganin. Breaking with the hard-line and the Cold War International History Project, shed new and paranoid policies that had put Soviet policy on the light on these questions and contribute in important ways defensive worldwide, the new leadership immediately to our understanding of the 1953 crisis.13 The following moved to put Soviet foreign policy on a more calm and essay will briefly introduce the documents, highlighting flexible track. Shortly after Stalin’s death, Malenkov the significance of the new evidence. announced a “peace initiative,” arguing that there were “no Soviet policy toward Germany after 1945 has been a contested issues in U.S.-Soviet relations that could not be hotly contested field of research. Recent studies on the resolved by peaceful means.” Within weeks, the Soviet Soviet occupation zone in Germany have revealed that leadership indicated its desire to end the Korean War, and Stalin’s policy was deeply conflicted and inherently deal with lingering disputes such as those over Austria, contradictory. Soviet policy options in postwar Germany Iran, and Turkey. While terrified to let any internal — the Sovietization of the Eastern occupation zone, the dissension leak out to the West, Malenkov and Beriia soon creation of a unified, socialist Germany, or the establish- began to press the more conservative “Stalinist” Molotov ment of a demilitarized “neutral” Germany — remained to reconsider Soviet policy on these critical issues. Slowly essentially unresolved during the early years of the Cold but persistently, Malenkov and Beriia sought to limit War.14 Even after the establishment of the German Molotov’s prerogative over foreign affairs. Democratic Republic, run by the Socialist Unity Party Germany loomed large in the minds of the Soviet (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands = SED), leaders in those days. In March, the Deutsche Bundestag, Stalin’s policy remained, by all indications, torn between the West German parliament, had sanctioned the Bonn the full satellization of the new state and all-German Treaty (General Treaty) which provided the Federal aspirations.