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Negotiation from Weakness: Achieving National Security Objectives from a Position of Strategic Inferiority

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Negotiation from Weakness: Achieving National Security Objectives from a Position of Strategic Inferiority Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1985 Negotiation from weakness: achieving national security objectives from a position of strategic inferiority. Tangredi, Sam J. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/21464 NAVAL I" IIONTtLPxEY. Li.' i3 DUDLEY KNOX LIBP^ARY MONTERFY. CALIFORNIA 03143 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS: ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES FROM A POSITION OF STRATEGIC INFERIORITY by Sam John Tangredi December 1985 Thesis Advisor : K . Kar tchner Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. TP"fi076I »•-.-. S,^, -0^^ V/ 3 \J UNCLASSIFIED CURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS ) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; ). DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE distribution is unlimited. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) . NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (If applicable) aval Postgraduate School 56 Naval Postgraduate School . ADDRESS {City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (C/ty, State, and ZIP Code) Dnterey, California 939A3-5100 Monterey, California 93943-5100 NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicable) ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT ELEMENT NO. NO NO ACCESSION NO. TITLE (Include Secunty Classification) 'HGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS: ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES FROM ' POSITION OF STRATEGIC INFERIORITY PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) lingredi, Sam J. a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT {Year, Month. Day) 15 PAGE COUNT ister's Thesis FROM TO 1985 December T51 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block numtter) FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP International negotiations, strategic inferiority strategic superiority, arras control, diplomatic deception, negotipition .sfr^^tppv. ABSTRACT {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) he phrase "negotiating from weakness" has been used as an informal :;scription of an adverse or undesirable relative position for a nation r. tempting to interact with other members of the international system. As iich it has represented the antithesis of "negotiating from strength", a ;)ndition considered essential by American foreign policy makers of the . neteen-fifties for successful negotiation with the Soviet Union. This li'-udy develops a distinct concept of "negotiating from weakness" in order to i: amine approaches that can be used by "strategically inferior" nations to i;hieve strategic objectives through negotiations. The primary impetus for Ills study is the erosion of the American strategic position relative to the |)viet Union. Five strategies and twelve corresponding tactics appropriate T negotiating "from weakness" are developed, supporting historical :amples are assessed, and general conclusions on the applicability 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION . DISTRIBUTION /AVAIL-ABILITY OF ABSTRACT H UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT. Q DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (/nc/ude Area Code) srry Kartchner (408) 646-3483 may be used until exhausted. ) FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE All other editions are obsolete. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED StCUHITV CLASSIFICATION Or THIS FAOt fWh«n Dmm Bnff4) # 19 - ABSTRACT - (CONTINUED) for American foreign policy are presented UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of THIS P hGE(Wh»n Dmim Enlmrmd) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Negotiation From Weakness: Achieving National Security Objectives From A Position Of Strategic Inferiority by Sam John Tangredi Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1978 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 1985 ABSTRACT The phrase "negotiating from weakness" has been used as an informal description of an adverse or undesirable relative position for a nation attempting to interact with other members of the international system. As such it has represented the antithesis of "negotiating from strength", a condition considered essential by American foreign policy makers of the nineteen-f if ties for successful negotiation with the Soviet Union. This study develops a distinct concept of "negotiating from weakness" in order to examine various approaches that can be used by "strategically inferior" nations to achieve strategic objectives through negotiations. The primary impetus for this study is the erosion of the American strategic position relative to the Soviet Union. Five strategies and twelve corresponding tactics appropriate for negotiating "from weakness" are developed, supporting historical examples are assessed, and general conclusions on the applicability for American foreign policy are presented. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 8 A. OBJECTIVES 8 B. ASSUMPTIONS 16 C. APPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 20 D. TERMINOLOGY UNIQUE TO THIS STUDY 21 E. STRUCTURE 25 II. DEVELOPING A CONCEPT OF "NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS" 28 A. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY 28 B. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY/INFERIORITY AND AMERICAN POLICY 30 C. NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH 34 D. NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS 41 III. IMPLICATIONS OF INFERIORITY FOR NEGOTIATING PARTIES 46 A. SUPERIORITY IN WAR 47 B. SUPERIORITY IN NEGOTIATION 50 C. "INFERIORITY" IN NEGOTIATION 52 IV. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS 54 A. DEFINING NEGOTIATION 54 B. OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 58 C. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS 61 V. TOWARDS A STUDY OF "DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION" 100 A. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY SURPRISE: FRAMEWORK 102 B. DIPLOMATIC DECEPTION AND MILITARY SURPRISE: TWO CASE STUDIES 116 VI. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 127 APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF MILITARY POWER US/USSR 1985 140 LIST OF REFERENCES 1A2 BIBLIOGRAPHY 146 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 149 LIST OF TABLES 1. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF ICBM/SLBM LAUNCHERS VERSUS ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITY 1961-1985 10 2. EXAMPLE OF NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS "MODEL" 26 3. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS 63 4. EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS 64 5. CUBAN MISSILE "CRISIS" INITIATION NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS "MODEL" 90 6. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 117 7. NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO (SECOND) SOVIET INVASION OF HUNGARY 123 8. CONFORMANCE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR TO NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS MODEL 129 9. SIMPLE COMPARISON OF RELATIVE NUMBERS OF ICBM/SLBM LAUNCHERS VERSUS SOVIET EXPANSIONIST ACTIVITY 1961-1979 133 10. COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF MILITARY POWER US/USSR 1985 140 . I. INTRODUCTION A. OBJECTIVES Negotiation From Weakness is an examination of approaches that can be used by a nation in a position of strategic inferiority to achieve strategic objectives through negotiation. While this examination does not purport to constitute a viable American strategy, the intent of the study is to provide the foundation upon which such a strategy can be built Such a foundation requires the careful development of a novel concept in the study of international relations, the concept of "negotiating from weakness." In the abstract, the concept appears merely the antithesis of "negotiating from strength", an oft-used phrase of recent political history that has been subject to some critical examination. However, acceptance of the concept of "negotiating from weakness" carries implications that may conflict with those identified in studies of the "opposite" condition, and prove to be contrary to assumptions of the international relations field. Some of the direct critical analyses include Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963) and Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength ; Leverage in U.S. -Soviet Arms Control Negotiation . The Washington Papers, 113 (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1985). , . o. t . On the surface, a possible strategy for "negotiation from weakness" would be of little concern to the United States, a superpower. However, the past two decades have seen an erosion of American power relative to its principal opponent, the Soviet Union. Table _1. (following pages) charts the reversal of the American position from superiority inferiority in one category of measurement, the relative numbers of strategic nuclear missile launchers, consisting of both intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "launchers" and submarine launcher ballistic missile (SLBM) "tubes", during developing/continuing strategic arms control negotiations. While this is but one measure of strategic power, its particular importance is its role as the accepted means of counting strategic forces for the purpose of strategic arms control While there are indeed other measures of nuclear capability (numbers of warheads, equivalent megatonnage. Th e mo st po pula rly c i t ed reas on f r th e ini ial accepta nee of la unch ers a s th e uni t of limi ta tion for arms control is its a bili ty to be verif ied b y "n ationa 1 tec hnical means" i . e . , re conn aissa nee satel li tes . B lacker and Duffy [Ref. 1 :p. 235] cont ains a re prese ntati ve e xplana tion of
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