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Notes and References Introduction 1. For the reasons behind the development of the strategy of flexible response and the way in which American and European consensus on the new strategy was achieved see David N. Schwartz, NA TO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1983) 136-92. 2. NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989) 139. 3. Details about the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the USA, UK and France are taken from William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1985) 37-63; and Catherine Kelleher, 'NATO Nuclear Operations' in Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner and Charles Zracket (eds) Managing Nuclear Opera­ tions (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987) 448. 4. Thomas Cochran, William Arkin and Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol 1: US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1984) 42-54. 5. Ibid., 136-7, 306-7. 6. See Greg Todd 'Q Catharsis', Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 3 (September 1988) 203. 7. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) 1. 8. William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse 'Nuclear Weapon Command, Control and Communications' in SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1984) pp. 455-7. 9. Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985) 1. 10. This definition is derived from that of Paul Bracken in The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983) 3. The definition has been expanded to make explicit the function of decision-making and both national command authorities and military commanders have been specified to make clear the involvement of both political and military decision-makers in nuclear command and control. 11. Herbert D. Bennington, 'Command and Control for Selective Re­ sponse', in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds) Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger, 1962) 119. 12. William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, op. cit., 456. 13. Bruce Blair, op. cit., 4. 14. Herbert D. Bennington, op. cit., 119. 15. J. M. Legge, Theatre Nuclear Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, April 1983) R-2964-FF, 40-1. 201 202 Notes and References 16. Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner and Charles Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987) 7. 17. The best is Milton Leitenberg's chapter entitled 'Background Materials on Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Primarily in the European Context)', in Frank Barnaby (ed.) Tactical Nuclear Weapons European Persectives, SIPRI, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978) 3-136. Although not a specific study of command and control the piece contains a great deal of interesting material. 18. Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War be Controlled? (IISS, 1981) (London: Adelphi Paper 169). 19. Bruce Blair, op. cit. 20. Paul Bracken, op. cit. 21. John Steinbruner, 'National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 22, 3 (1978) 411-28; and John Steinbruner, 'Nuclear Decapitation', Foreign Policy (Winter 1981- 2) 16-28. 22. M. Blumenson and J. L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). 23. Robert Coulam and Gregory Fischer, 'Problems of Command and Control in a Major European War', in Robert Coulam and Richard Small (eds) Advances in Information Processing in Organisations Vol 2 (New York: JAI Press Inc, 1985) 211-73. 24. John Cushman, Command and Control of Theatre Forces: Adequacy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983). 25. Paul Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1991). 26. C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control and the Common Defense (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990). 27. Daniel Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1985). 28. Catherine Kelleher, op. cit., 445-69. 29. Desmond Ball, Controlling Theatre Nuclear War (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1987) (Working Paper 127). 30. Paul Bracken, op. cit., 130. 31. Ibid. 32. Daniel Charles, op. cit., 151-2. 33. Ibid., 6. 34. Catherine Kelleher, op. cit., 468. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Desmond Ball (1987), op. cit., 3. 38. Ibid., 36. 39. Ibid., 14. 40. Crisis in the context of this book refers to an adversarial international security crisis defined as a period of change or decision in the relationship between adversarial nations or alliances which threatens to tranform the nature of that relationship from peace to war. See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) 6-9. Notes and References 203 41. Ash ton Carter, John Steinbruner and Charles Zracket (eds), op. cit., 9. 42. Amongst many others see Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Mass.: Little^Brown, 1971); Michael Brecher, 'Towards a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, 1 (1977) 39-74; Ole Holsti, Theories of Crisis Decision-Making', in Paul Lauren (ed.) Diplomacy (Free Press, 1979) 99-136; and, Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 43. Desmond Ball (1981 and 1987), Bruce Blair (1985), and Paul Bracken (1983), for example, all use this approach. 44. Paul Bracken, 'The Political Command and Control of Nuclear Forces', Defense Analysis, vol. 2, 1 (1986) 11. 45. Robert Coulam and Gregory Fischer, op. cit., 213-4. 46. G. D. Foster, 'Contemporary Command and Control Theory and Research: The Failed Quest for a Philosophy of Command', Defense Analysis, vol. 4, 3 (September 1988) 201-28. 47. Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner and Charles Zracket (eds), op. cit., 3. 48. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1985; and, Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982) especially 153-254. 49. For an explanation of force coupling see Paul Bracken (1983), op. cit., 54-9. 1 Political Control of Nuclear Weapons In NATO 1. Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, House of Representatives, Subcommit­ tee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, 1 December 1975) 1. 2. Theatre Nuclear Forces. Throughout the book the term theatre nuclear forces or the acronym TNF is used to include tactical and theatre nuclear forces, unless otherwide explicitly stated. 3. The Atlantic Alliance (Washington DC: Hearings, The Committee on Government Operations, US Senate, 89th Congress, Part 2, May 1966) 69-86. 4. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982) 69. 5. Ibid., 68. 6. Milton Leitenberg, 'Background information on tactical nuclear weapons', in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives, SIPRI, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978) 12. 7. The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., 69. 8. Because of the lack of strategic range delivery systems at the time strategic nuclear weapons had been forward based in some European countries, notably the UK, since 1948. See Robert Jackson, Strike Force: The USAF in Britain Since 1948 (Bury St Edmonds, Suffolk: Robson Books, 1986). 204 Notes and References 9. William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol /(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1984); and Leitenberg (1982), op. cit., 109-16. 10. David Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC: Brook­ ings Institution, 1983) 263. 11. Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press, 1962) 109. 12. J. M. Legge, op. cit., (April 1983) 6. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 7. 15. Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the UK (London: Macmillan Press, 1987) 31-40. 16. Carl H. Amme, NATO Without France (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1967) 153-72. See also Guy De Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France 1944-68 (Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press, 1970) 283-92. 17. NATO Final Communiques 1949-74 (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975) 113. 18. Milton Leitenberg, op. cit., 15. 19. Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons (Boston, Mass.: University Press of America, 1987) CSIA Occasional Paper Series, 27. 20. Irving Heymont, The NATO Bilateral Forces', Orbis, vol. 9, 4 (1966) 1031-3. 21. Milton Leitenberg, op. cit., 15. 22. Irving Heymont, op. cit., 1033. 23. Robert E. Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO (Washington DC: Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1962) 21. 24. These concerns have been explored more fully in Klaus Knorr, 'Nuclear Weapons: "Haves" and "Have-Nots"', Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, 1 (April 1957) 167-78 and Albert Wohlstetter, 'Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+ 1 Country', Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, 3 (April 1961) 355-87. 25. Milton Leitenberg, op. cit., 15. 26. P.M. Gallois, 'New Teeth for NATO', Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, 4 (October 1960) 67-80. 27. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, op. cit., 284. 28. To follow this up see ibid., 284-5. 29. Ben Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); see also Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961) 174-92. 30. This idea is explored in Alistair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1960) see also Snyder, op. cit., 174-92. 31. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, op. cit., 295. 32. See ibid., 295-307 for a more detailed discussion. See also Alistair Buchan, The Reform of NATO', Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, 2 (January 1962). 33. David Schwartz, op. cit., 82. Also whole chapter, 82-135; Wilfried Wohl, 'Nuclear Strategy in NATO and the MLF', Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXXX, 1 (March 1965) 89-109; John Slessor, The Case for a Notes and References 205 Multinational Nuclear Strike Force', in K. H. Cerny and H. W. Briefs (eds) NATO in Quest of Cohesion (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1965) 239-56. 34. Francis Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NA TO (Cincinatti: Ohio State University Press, 1969) 67-72.
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