Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism In a wonderful bookHow “ to live”, the author, Sarah Bakewell, writes on Michel de Montaigne and the Hellenistic philosophies. The same philosophies can be useful in investment operations. “About academic philosophers, Montaigne was usually dismissive: he disliked their pedantries and abstractions. But he showed an endless fascination for another tradition in philosophy: that of the great pragmatic schools which explored such questions as how to cope with a friend’s death, how to work up courage, how to act well in morally difficult situations, and how to make the most of life. These were the philosophies he turned to in times of grief or fear, as well as for guidance in dealing with more minor everyday irritations. The three most famous such systems of thought were Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism: the philosophies collectively known as Hellenistic because they had their origins in the era when Greek thought and culture spread to Rome and other Mediterranean regions, from the third century BC onwards. They differed in details, but were so close in essentials as to be hard to distinguish much of the time. Like everyone else, Montaigne mixed and matched them according to his needs. All the schools had the same aim: to achieve a way of living known in the original Greek as eudaimonia, often translated as ‘happiness’, ‘joy’, or ‘human flourishing’. This meant living well in every sense: thriving, relishing life, being a good person. They also agreed that the best path to eudaimonia was ataraxia, which might be rendered as ‘imperturbability’ or ‘freedom from anxiety’. Ataraxia means equilibrium: the art of maintaining an even keel, so that you neither exult when things go well nor plunge into despair when they go awry. To attain it is to have control over your emotions, so that you are not battered and dragged about by them like a bone fought over by a pack of dogs. It was on the question of how to acquire such equanimity that the philosophies began to diverge. Each had a different idea, for example, of how far one should compromise with the real world. The original Epicurean community, founded by Epicurus in the fourth century BC, required followers to leave their families and live like cult members in a private ‘garden’. Sceptics preferred to remain amid the public hurly-burly like everyone else, but with a radically altered mental attitude. Stoics were somewhere in between. The two best-known Stoic writers, Seneca and Epictetus, wrote for an elite Roman readership who were deeply involved in the affairs of their time and had no time for gardens, but who desired oases of tranquillity and self-possession wherever they could find them. Stoics and Epicureans shared a great deal of their theory, too. They thought that the ability to enjoy life is www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 1 Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism thwarted by two big weaknesses: lack of control over emotions, and a tendency to pay too little attention to the present. If one could only get these two things right – controlling and paying attention – most other problems would take care of themselves. The catch is that both are almost impossible to do. So difficult are they that one cannot approach them head-on. It is necessary to sidle in from lateral angles, and trick oneself into achieving them. Accordingly, Stoic and Epicurean thinkers spent much time devising techniques and thought experiments. For example: imagine that today is the last day of your life. Are you ready to face death? Imagine, even, that this very moment – now! – is the last moment of your existence. What are you feeling? Do you have regrets? Are there things you wish you had done differently? Are you really alive at this instant, or are you consumed with panic, denial and remorse? This experiment opens your eyes to what is important to you, and reminds you of how time runs constantly through your fingers. Some Stoics even acted out these ‘last moment’ experiments with props and a supporting cast. Seneca wrote of a wealthy man called Pacuvius, who conducted a full-scale funeral ceremony for himself every day, ending with a feast after which he would have himself carried from the table to his bed on a bier while all the guests and servants intoned, ‘He has lived his life, he has lived his life.’ You could achieve the same effect more simply and cheaply just by holding the idea of your own demise in your mind and paying full attention to it. The Epicurean writer Lucretius suggested picturing yourself at the point of death, and considering two possibilities. Either you have lived well, in which case you can go your way satisfied, like a well-fed guest leaving a party. Or you have not, but then it makes no difference that you are losing your life, since you obviously did not know what to do with it anyway. This may offer scant comfort on your deathbed, but if you think about it in the midst of life it helps you to change your perspective. Such shifts of attitude are the purpose of many of the thought experiments. If you have lost someone or something precious, you can try to value them differently by imagining that you never knew that person, or never owned that object. How can you miss what you never had? A different angle produces a different emotion. Plutarch suggested such a ploy in a letter to his wife, after their two-year-old daughter died: he advised her to think back to before the girl was born, and pretend they were back in those days again. Whether this consoled her is not known, but at least it gave her something to focus on instead of swimming in an ocean of undifferentiated grief. Montaigne and La Boetie both knew this letter well, for La Boetie translated it into French and Montaigne edited his translation for publication. It may have come into Montaigne’s mind each time one of his own children died, as well as when he lost La Boetie. The friendship had been so short that it should not www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 2 Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism have been difficult to remember a time before it and recapture his pre-La Boetie nonchalance. Such tricks of the imagination can be used in mundane situations as well as extreme ones; they are effective even against mild feelings of boredom or depression. If you feel tired of everything you possess, suggests Plutarch, pretend that you have lost all these things and are missing them desperately. Whether the object is a favourite plate, a friend, a mistress, or the good fortune of living in a time of peace and in good health, this exercise magically makes it seem worth having after all. The principle is the same as when brooding on death: faced with the idea of losing something now, you realize its value. The key is to cultivate mindfulness: prosoche, another key Greek term. Mindful attention is the trick that underlines many of the other tricks. It is a call to attend to the inner world – and thus also to the outer world, for uncontrolled emotions blurs reality as tears blur a view. Anyone who clears their vision and lives in full awareness of the world as it is, Seneca says, can never be bored with life. A person who does not sleepwalk through the world, moreover, it freed to respond to situations in the right way, without hesitation – as if they were questions asked all of a sudden, as Epictetus puts it. A violent attack, a quarrel, the loss of a friend: all these are demands barked at you by life, as by a schoolteacher trying to catch you not paying attention in class. Even a moment of boredom is such a question. Whatever happens, however unforeseen it is, you should be able to respond in a precisely suitable way. This is why, for Montaigne, learning to live ‘appropriately’ (a propos) is the ‘great and glorious masterpiece’ of human life. Stoics and Epicureans alike approached this goal mainly through rehearsal and meditation. Like tennis players practicing volleys and smashes for hours, they used rehearsal to carve grooves of habit, down which their minds would run as naturally as water down a river bed. It is a form of self-hypnotism. The great Stoic Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius kept notebooks in which he would go over the changes of perspective he wished to drill into himself: How good it is, when you have roast meat or suchlike foods before you, to impress on your mind that this is the dead body of a fish, this the dead body of a bird or pig; and again, that the Falernian wine is the mere juice of grapes, and your purple-edged robe simply the hair of a sheep soaked in shell-fish blood! And in sexual intercourse that it is no more than the friction of a membrane and a spurt of mucus ejected. www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 3 Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism At other times, he imagined flying up to the heavens so that he could gaze down and see how insignificant all human concerns were from such a distance. Seneca did this too: ‘Place before your mind’s eye the vast spread of time’s abyss, and consider the universe; and then contrast our so-called human life with infinity.’ Another practice of the Stoics was to visualize time circling around on itself, over aeons. Thus Socrates would be born again and would teach in < ?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft- com:office:smarttags" />Athens just as he did the first time; every butterfly would flap its wings in the same way; every cloud would pass overhead at the same speed.
Recommended publications
  • The Little Book of Stoicism
    The Little Book of Stoicism Timeless Wisdom to Gain Resilience, Confidence, and Calmness Jonas Salzgeber Illustrations © 2019 Jonas Salzgeber. All rights reserved. Copyright © 2019 Jonas Salzgeber THE LITTLE BOOK OF STOICISM. All rights reserved. This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of brief quotations in critical articles or reviews. First paperback published 2019. FIRST EDITION. ISBN: 978-1791967284 www.njlifehacks.com Contents Introduction 1 PART 1: WHAT IS STOICISM 9 Chapter 1: The Promise of Stoic Philosophy 11 Practice the Art of Living: Become a Warrior- Philosopher 12 Promise #1: Eudaimonia 14 Promise #2: Emotional Resilience 17 Tame Restricting Emotions (≠ Unemotional) 19 Practice Stoicism and Become more Tranquil as a By-Product 23 Chapter 2: A Quick History Lesson 26 The Most Important Stoic Philosophers 29 Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BCE – 65 CE) 30 Musonius Rufus (c. 30 CE – c. 100 CE) 32 Epictetus (c. 55 CE – c. 135 CE) 33 Marcus Aurelius (121 CE – 180 CE) 34 Chapter 3: The Stoic Happiness Triangle 36 The Stoic Happiness Triangle in A Nutshell 38 1. Live with Areté: Express Your Highest Self in Every Moment 40 The Perfection of Our Natural Potential 43 The Four Cardinal Virtues 47 Character Beats Beauty 51 The Stoic Love of Mankind: Act for the Common Welfare 53 2. Focus on What You Control: Accept Whatever Happens and Make the Best Out of It 56 The Stoic Archer: Focus on the Process 60 Stoic Acceptance: Enjoy the Ride or Get Dragged Along 63 The Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent Things 67 In Poker as in Life, You Can Win with Any Hand 71 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Stoics and the Practical: a Roman Reply to Aristotle
    DePaul University Via Sapientiae College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 8-2013 The Stoics and the practical: a Roman reply to Aristotle Robin Weiss DePaul University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd Recommended Citation Weiss, Robin, "The Stoics and the practical: a Roman reply to Aristotle" (2013). College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 143. https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/143 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE STOICS AND THE PRACTICAL: A ROMAN REPLY TO ARISTOTLE A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August, 2013 BY Robin Weiss Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences DePaul University Chicago, IL - TABLE OF CONTENTS - Introduction……………………..............................................................................................................p.i Chapter One: Practical Knowledge and its Others Technê and Natural Philosophy…………………………….....……..……………………………….....p. 1 Virtue and technical expertise conflated – subsequently distinguished in Plato – ethical knowledge contrasted with that of nature in
    [Show full text]
  • Stoicism and Cosmopolitanism
    Stoicism and Cosmopolitanism Although the term cosmopolitan (κοσμοπολίτης, literally, world-citizen ), was used by Greeks earlier than the Stoic philosophers (who started with Zeno [c. 335-263 BC]), it was these philosophers who took this term and gave it a genuine, “cosmopolitan” meaning, a meaning rather different from its modern usage. Prior to the Stoics Asked where he was from, Diogenes the Cynic (c. 390-323 BC) said, “I am a citizen of the world (in the Greek, kosmopolites ).” The atomist philosopher Democritus said, “To a wise man every land is accessible; for the entire world ( kosmos ) is a good soul’s native land.” Many Greek Sophists held cosmopolitan views. The Sophist Antiphon (d. 411 BC) wrote that “by nature we are all constituted alike in all things, both barbarians and Greeks. This can be seen by consideration of those things which are essential by nature to all men… In these things no barbarian is set apart from us, nor any Greek. For we all breathe into the air through mouth and nostrils…” Stoic Cosmopolitanism Zeno’s earliest and most famous work, Republic , was summarized by Plutarch: Moreover, the much-admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field.
    [Show full text]
  • ABSTRACT the Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine's
    ABSTRACT The Conversion and Therapy of Desire in Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues Mark J. Boone, Ph.D. Directors: Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., and Michael P. Foley, Ph.D. The philosophical schools of late antiquity commonly diagnosed human unhappiness as rooted in some fundamental disorder in our desires, and offered various therapies or prescriptions for the healing of desire. Among these only the neo-Platonic treatment for desire requires redirecting desire towards an immaterial world. Although Augustine agrees with the neo-Platonists on the need to redirect our desires to an immaterial world, he does not adopt their therapy for desire. Instead he adopts a thoroughly Christian approach to the healing of desire. The conversion of desire results from the Trinitarian God’s gracious actions taken to heal our desires. Augustine does not recommend fleeing from the influence of the body, as neo-Platonism encourages, but fleeing to Christ, immersing ourselves in the life of the Church, and practicing the theological virtues. In this dissertation I examine Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), Augustine argues that we must vigorously desire wisdom in order to attain it; that we must have hope in the possibility of attaining wisdom; and that our desire for wisdom must be bound in faith to Christ. In De beata vita (On the Happy Life), Augustine argues that the Trinitarian God is the only perennially satisfying object of desire and shows that the pursuit of God is the activity of a prayerful community of believers who are practicing faith, hope, and charity. In De ordine (On Order), Augustine recommends that the reordering of our desires be pursued through a liberal arts education and through Christian morals.
    [Show full text]
  • The Polemical Practice in Ancient Epicureanism* M
    UDK 101.1;141.5 Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 3 The polemical practice in ancient Epicureanism* M. M. Shakhnovich St. Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation For citation: Shakhnovich M. M. The polemical practice in ancient Epicureanism. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies, 2019, vol. 35, issue 3, pp. 461–471. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2019.306 The article explores the presentation methods of a philosophical doctrine in Greek and Ro- man Epicureanism; it is shown that for the ancient, middle, and Roman Epicureans a con- troversy with representatives of other philosophical schools was a typical way of present- ing their own views. The polemical practice, in which the basic principles of Epicureanism were expounded through the criticism of other philosophical systems, first of all, Academics and Stoics, was considered not only as the preferred way of presenting the own doctrine, but also as the most convenient rhetorical device, which had, among other things, didac- tic significance. The founder of the school, Epicurus, often included in his texts the terms used in other philosophical schools, giving them a different, often opposite, content. While presenting his teaching in the treatise “On Nature” or in letters to his followers, Epicurus pushed off the opinions of Democritus, Plato, and the Stoics, but resorted mainly to implicit criticism of his opponents, often without naming them by name. His closest students and later followers — Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Colotes, Philodemus, Lucretius, Diogenes of Oenoanda — continuing the controversy with the Academics and the Stoics, more frank- ly expressed their indignation about the “falsely understood Epicureanism” or erroneous opinions.
    [Show full text]
  • A Philosophical Treatise of Universal Induction
    Entropy 2011, 13, 1076-1136; doi:10.3390/e13061076 OPEN ACCESS entropy ISSN 1099-4300 www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy Article A Philosophical Treatise of Universal Induction Samuel Rathmanner and Marcus Hutter ? Research School of Computer Science, Australian National University, Corner of North and Daley Road, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia ? Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: [email protected]. Received: 20 April 2011; in revised form: 24 May 2011 / Accepted: 27 May 2011 / Published: 3 June 2011 Abstract: Understanding inductive reasoning is a problem that has engaged mankind for thousands of years. This problem is relevant to a wide range of fields and is integral to the philosophy of science. It has been tackled by many great minds ranging from philosophers to scientists to mathematicians, and more recently computer scientists. In this article we argue the case for Solomonoff Induction, a formal inductive framework which combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework. Although it achieves excellent theoretical results and is based on solid philosophical foundations, the requisite technical knowledge necessary for understanding this framework has caused it to remain largely unknown and unappreciated in the wider scientific community. The main contribution of this article is to convey Solomonoff induction and its related concepts in a generally accessible form with the aim of bridging this current technical gap. In the process we examine the major historical contributions that have led to the formulation of Solomonoff Induction as well as criticisms of Solomonoff and induction in general. In particular we examine how Solomonoff induction addresses many issues that have plagued other inductive systems, such as the black ravens paradox and the confirmation problem, and compare this approach with other recent approaches.
    [Show full text]
  • The Influence of Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism on Human Life in the Early Church
    Theological Research ■ volume 3 (2015) number 1 ■ p. 25–42 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/thr.1680 Arkadiusz Baron The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow, Poland The Influence of Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism on Human Life in the Early Church Abstract: This article deals with the issue of ancient Greek models of life proposed by Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics. The author tries to describe how and which of these models were assimilated by Christian society during the first centu- ries and which were rejected. The purpose of this article is to show how im- portant Aristotle’s, the Stoics and Epicurus’ philosophy was for Christians in the advancement of the Christian lifestyle among the Greek societies. Un- derstanding the development of theology in the early Greek Church requires knowledge of the ideals and values that shaped the thinking and behavior of people before they heard about the Gospel of Jesus. Keywords Aristotle, Stoics, Epicurus, Plato, ancient Greek and Christian models of hu- man life 26 Arkadiusz Baron Introduction In the article Greek Models of Life up to Plato’s Philosophy and its Influ- ence on the Christian Life in the Early Church I presented a brief account of the ancient Greek models of life up to the time of Plato’s philoso- phy as well as their importance for the lifestyle of the first Christian generations. In the present article, I will search Aristotle’s, Epicurus’ and the Stoic’s writings to find the ideals they contained regarding the human person and I will attempt to show their influence on Christian writings in the firsts centuries.
    [Show full text]
  • AUGUSTINE on SUFFERING and ORDER: PUNISHMENT in CONTEXT by SAMANTHA ELIZABETH THOMPSON a Thesis Submitted in Conformity With
    AUGUSTINE ON SUFFERING AND ORDER: PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT BY SAMANTHA ELIZABETH THOMPSON A Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Samantha Elizabeth Thompson 2010 Augustine on Suffering and Order: Punishment in Context Samantha Elizabeth Thompson Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2010 Abstract Augustine of Hippo argues that all suffering is the result of the punishment of sin. Misinterpretations of his meaning are common since isolated statements taken from his works do give misleading and contradictory impressions. This dissertation assembles a comprehensive account of Augustine’s understanding of the causes of suffering to show that these views are substantive and internally consistent. The argument of the dissertation proceeds by confronting and resolving the apparent problems with Augustine’s views on sin and punishment from within the broader framework of his anthropology and metaphysics. The chief difficulty is that Augustine gives two apparently irreconcilable accounts of suffering as punishment. In the first, suffering is viewed as self-inflicted because sin is inherently self-damaging. In the second, God inflicts suffering in response to sin. This dissertation argues that these views are united by Augustine’s concern with the theme of ‘order.’ The first account, it argues, is actually an expression of Augustine’s doctrine that evil is the privation of good; since good is for Augustine synonymous with order, we can then see why he views all affliction as the concrete experience of disorder brought about by sin. This context in turn allows us to see that, by invoking the ii notion of divinely inflicted punishment in both its retributive and remedial forms, Augustine wants to show that disorder itself is embraced by order, either because disorder itself must obey laws, or because what is disordered can be reordered.
    [Show full text]
  • Augustine's Ethics
    15 BONNIE KENT Augustine’s ethics Augustine regards ethics as an enquiry into the Summum Bonum: the supreme good, which provides the happiness all human beings seek. In this respect his moral thought comes closer to the eudaimonistic virtue ethics of the classical Western tradition than to the ethics of duty and law associated with Christianity in the modern period. But even though Augustine addresses many of the same problems that pagan philosophers do, he often defends very different answers. For him, happiness consists in the enjoyment of God, a reward granted in the afterlife for virtue in this life. Virtue itself is a gift of God, and founded on love, not on the wisdom prized by philosophers. The art of living In Book 8 of De civitate Dei Augustine describes “moral philosophy” (a Latin expression), or “ethics” (the Greek equivalent), as an enquiry into the supreme good and how we can attain it. The supreme good is that which we seek for its own sake, not as a means to some other end, and which makes us happy. Augustine adds, as if this were an uncontroversial point, that happiness is the aim of philosophy in general.1 Book 19 opens with a similar discussion. In his summary of Varro’s treatise De philosophia, Augustine reports that no school of philosophy deserves to be considered a distinct school unless it differs from others on the supreme good. For the supreme good is that which makes us happy, and the only purpose of philosophizing is the attainment of happiness.2 Both of these discussions cast philosophy as a fundamentally practical discipline, so that ethics appears to overshadow logic, metaphysics, and other comparatively abstract areas as a philosopher’s chief concern.
    [Show full text]
  • Freud and Epicurean Philosophy: Revisiting Drive Theory
    Contemporary Psychoanalysis,2014,Vol.50,No.3:395–417. C William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis & Psychology and ⃝ the William Alanson White Psychoanalytic Society ISSN: 0010-7530 print / 2330-9091 online DOI: 10.1080/00107530.2014.922859 JONATHAN YAHALOM, M.A. FREUD AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY: REVISITING DRIVE THEORY Abstract. This article reviews Epicurean philosophy to expose Freud’s drive theory as overly quantitative and lacking a qualitative dimension. Epicurean philosophy is congruent with fundamental premises in psychoanalysis, and contributes a qualitative and quantitative theory of pleasure. Moreover, Epicurean philosophy is compatible with fundamental tenets within relational psychoanalysis, indicat- ing that drive theory is relevant—and possibly constitutive—to the relational perspective. After reviewing Epicurean philosophy, the article returns to Freud’s conceptualization of drive. Arguments are made against Freud’s hypothesis of a death drive, insofar as Freud believed that organisms are motivated by the pur- suit of pleasure in an isolated individualistic manner. The article maintains that a critical exploration of Epicureanism challenges our tendency to equate classical drive theory with material reductionism. This carries significant implications for contemporary psychoanalysis and its interpretation of the drives. Keywords: Epicurean philosophy, drive theory, pleasure principle, relational psychoanalysis Introduction Relational theorists have critiqued Freud’s drive theory, arguing that in- terpersonal factors—not intrapsychic drives—define mental life. For ex- ample, Greenberg (1991) calls for the “radical rejection of drive [theory]” because “all motivation unfolds from our personal experience of ex- change with others” (p. vii). Motivation theory certainly benefits from this Address correspondence to Jonathan Yahalom, M.A., Duquesne University, Psychol- ogy Department, 600 Forbes Avenue, 544 College Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15282.
    [Show full text]
  • Stoicism a School of Thought That Flourished in Greek and Roman
    Stoicism A school of thought that flourished in Greek and Roman antiquity. It was one of the loftiest and most sublime philosophies in the record of Western civilization. In urging participation in the affairs of man, Stoics have always believed that the goal of all inquiry is to provide man with a mode of conduct characterized by tranquillity of mind and certainty of moral worth. Nature and scope of Stoicism For the early Stoic philosopher, as for all the post-Aristotelian schools, knowledge and its pursuit are no longer held to be ends in themselves. The Hellenistic Age was a time of transition, and the Stoic philosopher was perhaps its most influential spokesman. A new culture was in the making. The heritage of an earlier period, with Athens as its intellectual leader, was to continue, but to undergo many changes. If, as with Socrates, to know is to know oneself, rationality as the sole means by which something outside of the self might be achieved may be said to be the hallmark of Stoic belief. As a Hellenistic philosophy, Stoicism presented an ars vitae, a way of accommodation for people to whom the human condition no longer appeared as the mirror of a universal, calm, and ordered existence. Reason alone could reveal the constancy of cosmic order and the originative source of unyielding value; thus, reason became the true model for human existence. To the Stoic, virtue is an inherent feature of the world, no less inexorable in relation to man than are the laws of nature. The Stoics believed that perception is the basis of true knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • Hellenistic Philosophy
    Hellenistic Philosophy drishtiias.com/printpdf/hellenistic-philosophy Introduction The Greek philosophy began as speculation into the nature of the cosmos or universe (Meta Physics). The early philosophers, in the Pre-Socratic era, like Sophists, Democritus, Pythagoras and others made bold speculations about the origins and nature of the universe. With the advent of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the focus of philosophy also shifted towards morality, virtues and ethics. However, due to the sudden death of Alexander the Great (in 323 BC), the whole of Greece fell into a state of uncertainty & local wars and later it became a province of Rome. The empires that succeeded him, known as the Hellenistic empires, lasted for hundreds of years and spread Greek culture over huge territories. As the life of the average citizen was changing, the prevalent philosophical thought also underwent a change. Political, social and moral environment no longer sustained the creative impulses in philosophical thought and this gave rise to Hellenistic Age or post-Aristotelian philosophy. A common element of the philosophers in Hellenistic age was that the focus of Philosophy was shifting from general understanding of the universe to individual life and its perception as an “art of life”. Philosophy ends up being a driver of life and a source of relief, a healing art, a way to cope with a hostile world. This period saw the emergence of the three great schools of moral philosophy viz. Epicureanism, Stoicism and Skepticism. Epicureanism This school derives its name from its founder Epicurus, who founded his school on the outskirts of Athens and famously called it as the Garden (307 BC).
    [Show full text]