The Genocide in Rwanda an Interpretative Case Study of the UN Decision-Making Process

The Genocide in Rwanda An Interpretative Case Study of the UN Decision-Making Process

Sandra Krüger

Peace and Conflict Studies Bachelor 12 ECTS Spring/Summer 2021 Supervisor: John H.S. Åberg Word count: 13113

Abstract

This thesis uses an interpretative case study of the Rwandan genocide to explore and analyze factors in the decision-making process of the United Nations. Using defensive structural realism and its concepts and theories explained by Stephen Walt, a level-by-level analyses is conducted going over the internal and external power relationships of Rwanda, the (perceived) intentions of both involved sides and some possible alternative actions based on the Offence-Defense Balance. Conducting the research from a realist point of view states are treated as rational actors whose greatest interest is self-preservation and security. Taking this as the baseline the thesis concludes that in the framework of Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory the United Nations did not intervene because of a perceived threat, but because of a misperception of intentions of the Rwandan government. While already involved the Hutu army manages to use force and manipulation to land critical strikes on the moral of the intervening countries. Overall, it can be concluded that the Balance of Threat Theory is useful to explain political decision-making to a degree, yet it misses several other important aspects such as international news coverage.

Keywords: Genocide, Realism, United Nations, Uncertainty, Rwanda, Decision- Making

Glossary

Akazu – Kinyarwanda: „small house“; the presidential guard

DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DFS – Department of Field Support

HRS – Humanitarian Relief Sector

Interahamwe – Kinyarwanda: „Those who stand together”; Hutu paramilitary organization

MRND – Mouvement Revoloutionaire Nationale pour le Development

PDD-25 - Presidential Decision Directive 25, a directive limiting American involvement in UN peacekeeping missions

ROE – Rule of Engagement

RPF - Rwandese Patriotic Front

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNITAF – United Task Force

UN(O) – United Nations (Organization)

UNOMUR – United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM I – United Nations Operation in Somalia I

Zaire – now Congo

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Research Problem ...... 1 1.2 Aim and Research Question ...... 3 1.3 Relevance to Peace and Conflict Studies ...... 4 1.4 Delimitations ...... 4 1.5 Thesis Outline ...... 5

2 Background and Previous Research ...... 6

2.1 Rwanda before the Genocide ...... 6 2.2 The Rwandan Genocide ...... 8 2.2.2 The Mogadishu Line ...... 10 2.2.3 Responsibility to Protect ...... 10

3 Analytical and Theoretical Framework ...... 12

3.1 Defensive Structural Realism and the Balance of Threat Theory...... 12 3.2 Power ...... 13 3.2.1 Force ...... 14 3.3 Uncertainty and the Security Dilemma ...... 15 3.4 Offense-Defense Balance...... 16 3.5 Humanitarian Interventions and the United Nations ...... 16 3.5.1 Humanitarian Intervention ...... 16 3.5.2 The United Nations and its Peace Missions...... 17

4 Methodology ...... 19

4.1 Case Study Approach ...... 19 4.2 Research Design ...... 20 4.3 Data Selection ...... 22 4.4 Source Criticism ...... 22 4.5 Ethical Considerations and Positionality ...... 23

5 Analysis ...... 24

5.1 How was Rwanda’s internal and relative Power compared to the involved UN member states? ...... 24 5.2 What were the (perceived) intentions behind the conflict in Rwanda and how did they change over time? ...... 27 5.3 Which ways of engagement stood open to the UN Security Council and member states and how were they balanced and considered? ...... 30

6 Concluding Discussion ...... 35

7 References ...... 38

1 Introduction

‘Rwanda was simply too remote . . . too poor, too little, and probably too black to be worthwhile.’ e(Alison Des Forges. In: Jones 2013: 255)

1.1 Research Problem

Over the years the world has become more and more globalized, and countries have developed an understanding of international responsibility as well as a new sense of threat and security. With the creation of the United Nations (UN) many countries came together in an effort to, on the one hand, secure international peace and on one side to have a greater national security as they had the other member states behind them if they were to be attacked. Every country that joined the UN had at least some selfish reasons for doing so. And with very varying national strengths, the member states were never on the same level in terms of capabilities to support of the UN, nor their rights within. An example for this would be the veto rights of the five permanent members of the Security Council: “The Republic of China, France, the Union of Socialist Republics [Russia], the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America” (UN-Charter, Chapter V art 23.1). Yet, the Security Council also acts as a preventive measure to minimalize the abuse of power that comes with being a part of the United Nations by ruling over the necessity and therefore legality of an unrequested intervention into another country. On April 7th, 1994, the Rwandan Genocide began which lasted until July 15th the same year. In these roughly 100 days, an estimate of about 800.000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus are said to have lost their lives by the hand of Hutus. The slaughtering started when the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down over Kigali Airport, killing everyone inside, in the evening of April 6th. At this point, the United Nations already had their Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the country for six months in a peace keeping effort to help seeing the Arusha

Peace Agreement through, which was meant to end the Civil War raging at this point. Yet, when the peace keeping mission became a humanitarian intervention, most of the personal already stationed in the country was ordered back, causing a delay in the help which could be provided. When it comes to the Rwandan Genocide there are two very prominent standpoints. One states that the severity, if not the entire genocide, was possible due to a lack of political will of the member states (Melvern, 2015: 482) which therefor means that the failure was not one of the United Nations Organization (UNO), but rather of its member states. They were the ones who had not been willing to offer the needed supplies, troops and support due to national interests (Dellaire, 2008: 582). The second standpoint is more diverse and argues that the situation had been more complex than that. Here, the point is made that the decisions were based on various intertwined but sometimes also completely independent reasons which clearly goes beyond a simple reasoning of what is right and wrong and declaring one party as the guilty one. But how can we determine who was at fault, or if there was a wrongdoing in the first place? This paper will look upon the data collected by of independent observations, laws and mandates as well as subjective interpretations of involved parties from a realistic point of view, therefore focusing on the motives of the UN member states as well as the Security Council and the UN as such to gain a better understanding of each. Rwanda is chosen as a research object because of the long-lasting debates which followed the genocide as well as its suitability to show what impact actions and outcomes of previous interventions can have on the next. Even though the politics surrounding UN interventions have partly changed over the past three decades, many uncertainties are still present, which makes it even more important to look at prior mistakes and to evaluate an analyze past failures.

1.2 Aim and Research Question

The aim of the thesis is to give a possible explanation for the decisions made by the United Nations and its member states shortly before and during the Rwandan genocide using the help of the chosen theory. The research will be based on Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory and correlating concepts and be conducted from a defensive structural realist standpoint. Since the United Nations is a union of states, there are many facets and standpoints for each topic discussed. In order to stay in the boundaries of this paper, the thesis will only look at the member states which were mainly involved in the decision-making process concerning the intervention in Rwanda 1994, namely: The United States, Belgium and France, as well as the United Nations as an organization reacting to the events. The research question to guide this thesis will therefore be as follows:

How can the (in)actions of the United Nations before and during the Rwandan Genocide 1994 be explained by a structural realist approach?

The thesis will follow Stephen Walt’s (2002) theoretical criteria on the motivation behind international interventions as brought forward in his Balance of Threat Theory, namely (1) relative power, (2) proximity, (3) intentions and (4) offence-defense balance (ibid.: 200-201), which will be explained in more detail later on. It will follow the operational questions based on this theory:

- How was Rwanda’s internal and relative Power compared to the involved UN member states? - What were the (perceived) intentions behind the conflict in Rwanda and how did they change over time? - Which ways of engagement stood open to the UN Security Council and member states and how were they balanced and considered?

These questions aim to enable a better understanding of the reasons behind the decision- making of the United Nations and its member states.

1.3 Relevance to Peace and Conflict Studies

Focusing on the problematic of the decision-making processes of the United Nations Organization this research aims at gaining a greater understanding of international policy making and the motives behind interventions. Rwanda was not the first failure of a humanitarian intervention nor the first genocide that took place, but the case had a large impact on how the United Nations and its missions were looked upon. Many people were involved in the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) as well as UNAMIR and UNAMIR II and many have given statements in one way or another about their experiences and actions. This makes Rwanda an important case to study as it has impacted many people’s lives directly as well as indirectly for a long time. With the United Nations being of great importance and influence in international politics, it is important to understand its structure and processes. Even though the case of Rwanda lies over twenty years in the past and many regulations have changed during this time, the failure in Rwanda left its mark not only on the country and its people themselves, but also on the United Nation up to this day.

1.4 Delimitations

Due to the choice of focusing on a single case study with a pre-defined theoretical framework, this paper limits itself to only the facts which are important in order to answer the research question. Other aspects will not be taken into account which does not reduce their importance as such, but for the research interest of this thesis. Such aspects include, but are not limited to racism, enemy images or the origin of the conflict itself. The aim is to present a thorough and clear analysis of the reasoning behind the decision-making process that led to the actions of the UN and its member states from a defensive structural realist perspective in the context of the Rwandan genocide. This does not mean that research conducted from another point of departure cannot lead to a different conclusion. In addition, the research uses interviews and statements as an important part of its data and is therefore subject of the personal interpretations of events discussed in such. This thesis aims to provide a general analysis of the motivations behind the decision-making process and actions of the United States and its member states shortly before

and during the genocide in Rwanda. It will therefore not look at each decision and mandate in detail but at the situation and actions as a whole.

1.5 Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of six chapters including this introduction in which the research problem as well as its aim and guiding questions were elaborated, the relevance for the field of Peace and Conflict Studies discussed and delimitations explained. The second chapter provides the necessary background and a discussion of previous research in order to build a basis for the analysis. After this, the third chapter will provide the analytical and theoretical framework, discussing and explaining the theories and concepts used in this thesis, focusing on Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory. The fourth chapter will explain the choice of method as well as details to source selection and criticism. In chapter five, the analysis is divided by three operational questions in order to answer the research question in the sixth chapter.

2 Background and Previous Research

This chapter will provide background knowledge about the Rwandan genocide as can be established from previous research. This will offer a firm base on which the analysis of the motivations behind the decision-making processes during the Rwandan genocide will fall back on.

2.1 Rwanda before the Genocide

By looking upon the history of Rwanda as a colony as well as independent state and the difficulties and conflicts which were experienced, it becomes clear what information the UN had access to in order to understand the country in which they were conducting first a peace mission and later an intervention. By knowing this, it is possible to analyze in terms of ignored knowledge during the decision-making process. The genocide in Rwanda was governed by the differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi. Yet, when looking back into the history of Rwanda these groups were only fully established around 1899 when Rwanda became a German colony and the Germans started to place weight on these terms, seeing Tutsi as superior to the Hutu and implemented this classification in their indirect government (Heeger 1998: 23). Before that ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were only terms used to refer to farmers and cattle breeders. There was a lot of mobility and interchange between these two (Harding 1998: 3). They were no groups but just descriptive terms. This changed in 1919 when Belgium took over the Rwanda-Urundi area following the treaty of Versailles and included the classification of Hutu and Tutsi into the Identification Cards of the Rwandese (Heeger 1998: 29). This implementation will become the death sentence to many Tutsi in the Genocide at the end of the century (Totten and Ubaldo, 2011: 4). But already around the 1950s ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ became ethnical identifications and with it the center of many social conflicts (Rink and Schreiber 1998: 37) escalating in a revolution from 1959 until 1962 in which the Hutus succeeded and took overpower, leading to a rapid increase of emigration of Tutsi and a spiral of violence fueled by the identification of both sides to be the victim (Mamdani 2017: 469). With the invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), an army formed by exiled and fugitive Tutsi, into northern Rwanda, a new wave of violence erupted in October 1990. The RPF soldiers were well equipped and experienced in fighting in contrast to the Rwandese army,

yet they could not overcome them as the Rwandan army was supported by intervention groups from France, Belgium and Zaire (Kuperman 2001: 9) in exchange for the implementation of democratic reforms and the introduction of a multi-party system. With the north of Rwanda still being occupied by the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the UN passes Resolution 846 which leads the way for the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in the following year which aims at controlling the border between Rwanda and Uganda in order to minimize military assistance (Security Council S/RES/846 1993: Art. 3). Even though the mission was underfunded and understaffed (Melvern 2015: 463) it helped setting the pre-conditions for a peace agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government which was finally signed on August 4th, 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania. This agreement stated for the armies to be merged as well as it implemented a transit-government formed out of MRND, RPF and moderate parties until a democratic election could be held (Jones 2001: 122ff). Shortly after, the RPF and the acting government requested a peace mission to oversee the situation until the Arusha Agreement was fully implemented which was granted, but not to the extend as Roméo Dellaire, the commander of the UNOMUR and conductor of the previous assessment to the case, asked (Security Council S/RES/872 1993: Art. 3). The new mission United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the already existing UNOMUR were combined in October 1993 in order to de-weaponize the capital Kigali, observe the demilitarized zone between RPF and government areas as well as enforce disciplinary actions against violations against the Arusha Agreement. In the same month, a civil war broke out in Burundi after the first democratically elected president Melchor Ndadaye, a Hutu, was assassinated by four Tutsi hard-line soldiers (Totten and Ubaldo, 2011: 8). Following this, many Tutsi fled to Rwanda in hopes of avoiding the discrimination and in fear of retaliation. With the situation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda being similarly bad, the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTMLC), one of the most popular and extreme radio stations in Rwanda, used this opportunity to spread further mistrust against the Tutsi (Dellaire 2008: 155). Finally, on April 6th, 1994 the plane carrying the Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down when he was returning from a meeting about the Arusha Agreement, marking the beginning of the Genocide. Immediately after the plane was shot down the Akazu, the presidential guard, started to put up roadblocks and systematically kill Tutsis (Totten and Ubaldo, 2011: 8).

2.2 The Rwandan Genocide

Many scholars have chosen to research and analyze the Genocide in Rwanda from different angles and perspectives. From looking into the history between Hutus and Tutsis over analyzing the Radio broadcasts and the included enemy images to the failure of international community and especially the United Nations. Often, great emphasis is laid upon the soldiers who were stationed on the ground and their efforts to help the civilians without being allowed to used guns while being confronted with unimaginable scenes of horror and brutality. Documentaries are said to fall short in portraying the dimension of the genocide and the impact it had (Dellaire 2008: 15). The research on the genocide in Rwanda is so extensive, that there is barely an angle left that has not been researched, yet it seems that new research finds a way to bring more and more details to light. Studies in Rwanda seem to be of more interest than the research on the international interventions and the steps behind them.

Rwanda is also seen as an important event in the further development and definition of international and humanitarian interventions. In the Responsibility to Protect Act, the United Nations accumulated much of their experiences from successes and failures from the past. Research has shown that the difficulties experienced in Rwanda had an impact in these developments and even though the R2P Act still lacks clarifications in many incidences, it can be seen as an improvement when it comes to deciding when to intervene.

2.2.1 Genocide or (Civil) War?

When talking about the actions and inactions of the international community and the United Nations in specific during the Rwandan Genocide, it is important to speak about the differentiation between (Civil) War and Genocide. In the context of Rwanda in specific, there was a clear restrained from defining the events happening as genocide. It took until June 8th, 1994 and Resolution 925 to incorporate the term “genocide” in an official document (Security Council S/RES/925 1994: Preamble).

In the research about this topic, it is important to define whether or not the events in Rwanda 1994 were a genocide from the beginning and if they could also have been identified

as such, since many of the early actions of the United Nations were based on the assumption that they were dealing with a renewed and even more brutal Civil War with massive crimes against humanity (Power 2002: 350) between regime and rebels. This false belief led to the Resolution 912 which cut down UNAMIR and tasked the few people left with ceasefire talks between the conflict parties (Security Council S/RES/912 1994: Art. 6f). Even human rights activists, local NGOs and UNAMIR only started to talk about geocide from the second week on (Kuperman 2001: 24), which was still earlier than the Security Council.

In the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), genocide is defined as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

(Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948: Art. II)

The difference between (civil) war and genocide therefore lies in the targeted enemy group. In a genocide, the enemy is a civilian population instead of a military force (Shaw 2014: 148). This does, however, not exclude genocide from appearing during a war.

2.2.2 The Mogadishu Line

The expression ”Mogadishu line” was, as well as this can be traced back, coined by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) (Clarke and Herbst 1996: 70). It is used to describe the “need to maintain neutrality in the face of all provocation for fear of becoming an unwilling participant in a civil war” (Clarke and Herbst 1996: 70). This need stems back from the US intervention from 1992 until 1993 in the Somalia Civil War and its dramatic failure not only to bring peace and stability to the city of Mogadishu but also to protect their own soldiers. During the efforts to arrest general Mohamed Farah Aidid, the leader of the strongest party in the Civil War, for an attack on Pakistani peace workers, eighteen American soldiers were killed and pictures of their bodies being dragged through the streets under applause were published all around the world (Barnett 2002: 37). This incident caused the trust of the member states in the UN to weaken dramatically, and they became less likely to agree to potentially risky interventions (PBS Frontline (21.01.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali [online]). Even though this sentiment affected most of the UN member states, the United States also had to focus on the internal repercussions this incident caused as the soldiers killed and publicly humiliated weir theirs. Following Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, the US public became very risk-adverse towards interventions in Africa and started to focus more on US national self-interest “and race and ethnic considerations that place Africa as a low priority” (Hughes, 2010: 1038). Rwanda was far away, small, and landlocked, without a representative population in the United States, which, in light of the recent experiences in Somalia, made a highly unfavorable target to intervene in the public eye, putting pressure on the government and representatives (Hughes, 2010: 1044).

2.2.3 Responsibility to Protect

Historical events are not only important in order to understand what happened at that time, but also to look on how it influenced the norms and regulations in the future. Having the experiences from Somalia as well as Rwanda, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the framework for

the Responsibility to Protect in 2001 in order to change the discussion from the “right of states to intervene to the normative principle of shared responsibility to protect all people from the worst forms of human rights violations” (Moravcová 2014: 66), making sovereignty a responsibility and not only a right of the governing representatives (Moravcová 2014: 76-77). Moravcová (2016) identifies three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect. For one, its purpose is to prevent man-made crisis which would pose a risk to local residents. Second, to respond to emergency situations appropriately and proportional by using means such as sanctions, international prosecution, or even military interventions. Lastly, to rebuild post-war states, especially after military interventions Fisseha (2016), as well as Hunt and Orchard (2020) identify Rwanda as one of the biggest arguments that the Responsibility to Protect was founded, even if not the first intervention being questioned. Since it gives a good insight into the reasons on why states would intervene or not and the undefined space that occurred between the willingness to intervene and the obligation to do so. The Responsibility to Protect is thought of to make it easier for the international community to identify clearer and sooner if there is a need to intervene, yet it still leaves many unresolved questions and undefined problems for the UN and its member states to work through.

3 Analytical and Theoretical Framework

This chapter explains the theories and concepts used in this thesis in order to answer the research question. The focus here lies with Stephen Walt’s (2002) Balance of Threat Theory and the concepts and ideas it is based upon. Together, they will offer the framework which will guide the analysis.

3.1 Defensive Structural Realism and the Balance of Threat Theory

This section will explain how defensive structural realism is widely understood and used for this research as described by Stephen Walt (2002). It will, however, focus mainly on the aspects which are important for this paper and not its entirety.

Being developed from neorealism, defensive structural realism shares the idea of states being motivated mainly by the objective to ensure their own survival before anything else (Walt 2002, Glaser 2003). To ensure their survival, states focus on defensive measures to protect themselves from other states as they pose the greatest threat to their own well-being (ibid.). These defensive measures are primarily focused on supporting a favorable status quo. Yet, following John Herz (1950), states are often incapable of differentiating between a defensive and an offensive action by another state (ibid:187) which may very well lead to a downward spiral of mutual aggression due to misconception. The idea of an Offence-Defense Balance which favors defense becomes more achievable when a country prevails technologically as well as in the geographical sector which often do rather favor a defensive stance (van Evera 1999: 10). This can also play a role in the attempt to retain a status quo. States are considered rational actors and will therefor do what is best for themselves without upsetting their environment to a greater extend. Living in a world in which it is difficult to achieve long lasting conquest, not much balancing may be needed to

counteract revisionist behaviors of other countries (Elman 2007: 21). Therefore, this theory is stronger in explaining the chosen responses to conflicts rather than the conflicts origin. With this paper focusing on the response of the UN to the genocide in Rwanda instead of trying to explain why it came about, this theory offers good guidelines on how to look at the situation and actions (not) taken. Stephen Walt’s (2002) Balance of Threat Theory aims to explain how states perceive threats rather than the objective threat and uses it to make assumptions about their motives. One of the major arguments points out that states will form alliances in order to protect themselves. This can be considered as a defensive and preventive measure rather than an opposing and threatening one. States, being rational actors, will not start a war they would certainly lose, which makes it viable to have allies who will fight on your side in the event of an attack. These alliances have the ability of posing an offensive threat, but are not intended for such thing, following Walt’s argumentation. In order to understand how a state perceives a threat posed by another country, Walt offers four elements as the key factors: (1) the relative power of the other country compared to the own; (2) the proximity of the other country; (3) their intentions, which is often difficult to determine as described above; and (4) the offence- defense balance in place (Walt 2002: 200-201). This approach clearly follows the realist belief that “state’s interest dominates all other interests” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008: 67). Which also means that a state becomes less likely to spend its money to maximize military security if the own core survival is not threatened.

3.2 Power

When talking about power, one can distinguish between absolute and relative power. Absolute power describes the relationship itself, while relative power puts it into relation with another power holder. For this thesis, the focus lies in the relative power of Rwanda to the UN as well as its member states in order to be able to follow Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory. Even so, to be able to understand the potential in relative power, one also has to have a look at the relative power relations and changes therein (Wrong, 1995, p 21-34). In the context of this thesis, relative power can be estimated by the country’s military as well as influence in social

and political dimensions. In addition to this, the thesis works with three out of the four common sub-categories of power: Force, Knowledge and Legitimacy, the fourth being Manipulation. To understand the perceived intentions behind the events in Rwanda, this thesis will use Knowledge and Legitimacy incorporated in the use of the concepts of the security dilemma and offence-defense balance as in Stephen Walt’s theory. The power relations in Rwanda on the other hand are subject to Force which will be discussed as an addition to the theory.

3.2.1 Force

Force is often seen as a result of a prior failure of power, yet has a distinct position in many power relations in violent as well as non-violent forms. The ends can vary from gaining new power to securing already established power relationships. Often, the belief that force as a form of punishment can succeed in re-establishing pre-existing power relations is reason enough to incorporate it into these relationships (Wrong, 1995, p 21-34). Violent forms include, but are not limited to, the use of physical and/or biological force, bodily pain or injury including death or not meeting basic biological needs and the restriction of other’s freedom through physical obstacles, this last point works towards the prevention of unwanted behavior rather that the implementation of wanted behavior. Non-violent force can take shape when using one’s own body to prevent others from their actions rather than acting directly on other bodies or declining appearance at work. One of the most common uses of force in international relations is the threat of force. This can be seen in the threat of sanctions or military interventions. In these cases, it is to differentiate whether the action taken was coercion or force. If the subject choses to obey following the threat, it is coercion. But if the subject still refuses to obey but is compelled to a decision it can be called force (ibid.).

3.3 Uncertainty and the Security Dilemma

The concept of uncertainty and its Security Dilemma play a central role when it comes to analyzing the behavior of states in international politics from a realist perspective. With uncertainty and insecurity being closely related, yet separate from each other, it is possible to attain a certain degree of security insight of uncertainty. Uncertainty does not necessarily have to be negative, yet it does keep this possibility open at any time. While insecurity can be defined as negative, as for example the insecurity of a state of war (Hoffman 1965), the uncertainty of a stable peace is a current positive situation even though it holds the possibility of conflict (Boulding 1979). Living in a state of uncertainty makes decision-makers wary of other countries as uncertainty is part of every individuals and groups existence and therefore builds the core of the Security Dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 134 In: Williams 2009). The dilemma is split into two levels, the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. The dilemma of interpretation explains the difficulty states encounter when interpreting actions of other states as offensive or defensive (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4-5). This correlates to the ambiguous symbolism which defines the same predicament when it comes to weapons and it follows the same train of thoughts. It is nearly impossible for an outsider to be capable of fully differentiating between a defensive and an offensive weapon (Herz 1951; Butterfield 1951). Even if subjective categories are established and something is categorized as defensive, it does not mean that it is not a support for an offensive weapon, making the offensive capabilities even stronger. Therefore, states “must assume the worst because the worst is possible” (Posen 1993: 28). When the decision-making bodies come to a conclusion whether to interpret the actions of another party as offensive or defensive, the dilemma of response takes effect. They now have to decide if they should send deterrent or reassuring signals to respond to the state’s actions (Jervis 1976: 58-113). This decision is highly based on the result of the interpretation, yet also seen with a grain of salt as no one is fully capable of understanding all the motives of their counter parts in other countries (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 136 In: Williams 2009) due to cultural differences and gaps in knowledge (ibid.). The misinterpretation of the situation can lead to a disproportionate response which in return can cause in the unnecessary loss of money, lives and prestige on both sides resulting in mutual hostility (Jervis 1976: 58-113). The so- called security paradox.

3.4 Offense-Defense Balance

Over the time there has been a large variety on the definitions of the concept of offense-defense balance. For this thesis one of the more flexible conceptions is adopted, which describes the concept as relative to a “particular objective, form of conflict, and set of actors” (Garfinkel and Dafoe 2019, p. 3). It is seen as a way to determine, on the one hand the threat of a conflict to start or crisis stability, and on the other hand the likelihood for an arms race or the establishment of a peacetime stability. Hereby, a tendency towards offense might cause a worsening of the security dilemma described above by making the actors even more uncertain and wary about the other nation’s decisions, always having to expect an offensive action (referring to: Garfinkel and Dafoe 2019, p. 3-5). In a situation where offense becomes the best defense decision making bodies see each other as growing threats.

3.5 Humanitarian Interventions and the United Nations

This research centers around the decision-making process of the UN in regard to humanitarian interventions. Therefore, one first has to understand the difference between a humanitarian intervention and a UN peace mission, as well as the structure in which the UN operates in order to be able to follow and analyze their actions and inactions.

3.5.1 Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian Interventions (HI) can most commonly be seen as the combination of a moral imperative and military means (Moravcová 2014: 66). It is conducted by a single state, a group of states or international organizations and is often conducted without the consent of the state in question (Moravcová 2014: 66 referring to Tesón, 1988). The definitions of what a humanitarian intervention includes in detail are only roughly shaped and have not only changed over time, but also by perspective. Therefore, one state or organization can understand

something different under the term than another. Yet, there are four humanitarian principles which guide all interpretations: (1) humanity; (2) neutrality; (3) impartiality; and (4) independence. These four principles strive to guide the interpretation of what a Humanitarian Intervention is, yet also make a perfect realization very unlikely (Barnett 2011: 2). Countries do not often act out of pure empathy. Most of the time they are motivated through some sort of gain (Barnett 2011: 14-18). Humanitarian Interventions are no exception. Some of the countries which are highly represented are also the ones producing and selling the weapons that are used in the conflict they try to end. Therefore, they gain money through the sale and prestige through their humanitarian work which makes these interventions a strategical and military tool. This also means that an intervention lead by a country or a group of countries can hardly be seen as truly neutral and independent. In addition, there is a common misunderstanding of humanitarian work and work for human rights (Barnett 2011: 16). Humanitarian work aims on satisfying the immediate needs of the people. Nothing less, but also nothing more. But many people these days understand humanitarian interventions as a mean to establish or secure human rights. To do so would implement a long-term strategy involving national politics. As soon as this is the case, neutrality can no longer be upheld, and the intervention loses its humanitarian character (Barnett 2011: 16-17). Yet, if an intervening country does only focus on immediate relief, it is scrutinized for only addressing the symptoms, not the problem itself. Meeting all four principles can therefore be quite difficult regardless of the means by which it is tried to be achieved. And even if they are achieved, there is no guaranty for them to be accepted by the public.

3.5.2 The United Nations and its Peace Missions

The United Nations as a collective of 193 sovereign states has strict rules when it comes to interventions in another country. Therefore, the UN-Charter offers several guidelines on when and how to act. Chapter VI of the UN-Charter explains that member states should seek peaceful means to settle their dispute before any other action is taken (UN-Charter, Chapter VI art. 33.1). In case of such dispute the Security Council possesses the decision-making power to determine whether or not the blue beret should be sent to help establishing peace or not (United Nations Peacekeeping: Role of the Security Council). To do so there are several criteria to fulfill including (1) a ceasefire agreement; (2) the willingness of the involved parties to a peace process and a political solution; (3) a clear aim for the peace mission; (4) the possibility to

formulate a mandate; and (5) the security of the UN personal in the country has to be believably guaranteed by the involved parties (ibid.). Even so, the primary responsibility to resolve a dispute lies with the involved parties and the Security Council should rather be seen as a passive observer which can investigate and give advice, but no direct orders (UN-Charter, Chapter VI art. 34-38). If the Security Council should at one point decide that the involved parties are unable or unwilling to settle their dispute with peaceful means and the conflict endangers international security, it has the authority to enforce measures including sanctions as well as military actions (UN-Charter, Chapter VII art. 39). This has to be decided unanimously. If all criteria are fulfilled a technical mission is send to the conflict zone to gather information so the secretary general can formulate a report for the Security Council to advice for the upcoming mission including, but not limited to, size, equipment, and funds (United Nations Peacekeeping: Forming a new operation). If a mission is authorized a resolution has to be formulated and passed including a clear mandate. From there on, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) take over the planning (United Nations Peacekeeping: Forming a new operation). This is a lot of work and it can take weeks until a passed mandate can be brought into action. Similar to the four general principles of humanitarian interventions stated above, the UN has three pillars on which its peacekeeping missions are built upon: (1) Consent of the conflict parties; (2) neutrality of the peacekeepers; and (3) no use of force except for self- defense reasons (Dwan 2014: 248). These pillars are meant to distance the UN from the conflict in order to remain an outside guiding force and no active conflict party themselves.

4 Methodology

This chapter will elaborate on the methodology, research design and choice of data for this research in order to successfully answer the research question:

How can the (in)actions of the United Nations before and during the Rwandan Genocide 1994 be explained by a structural realist approach?

4.1 Case Study Approach

This thesis conducts a qualitative analysis of the decision-making process of the United Nations and its member states before and during the Rwandan Genocide 1994. A qualitative approach has been chosen since it focuses on the how and why of a given topic (Lakshman, et al., 2007), which makes it very suitable for studies of interventions and their background. In addition, a qualitative research is open for primary, secondary, and tertiary materials related (Fisseha 2016: 29), which opens up the door for many more sources to which to compare the official announcements and resolutions used in this study.

In this research an interpretative case study is undertaken as a method to uncover the reasoning behind the United Nations decision-making process during the genocide in Rwanda 1994 with respect to concepts of defensive structural realism. It was decided to focus on the Rwandan genocide as the sole case in order to be able to thoroughly research the case in the limited terms of this thesis. In addition, the Rwandan genocide presents unique circumstances when looking at the pre-conditions as well as the events which took place. Even though the genocide itself cannot be generalized, this research aims to explain the reasoning behind a small part of decision-making in international politics. For this purpose, the case offers an already well researched background offering a great variety of information from different angles which makes it possible to deeply analyze the circumstances and reasoning, therefore making assumptions about international decision-making on a broader scale, lose from a specific case.

Choosing an interpretative case study, the great variety of accessible information in this case can be researched and analyzed with greater freedom which in return offers a greater variety of applications of the information found (de Vaus 2001:18). The case was chosen because of the attention it gained internationally as well as the weight it carries to this day, still. This approach was chosen after reviewing the most relevant literature in order to have a first, unrestricted look upon the data. This study tries to approach the case from several angles to identify as many motivators as possible. By reviewing some of the literature before choosing the theory, it is aiming at a variety of viewpoints as well as subtle notes in literature which might not primarily deal with the theory. The literature can be analyzed freely without a prejudice through the categorization of a certain aspect of the research.

4.2 Research Design

The research conducted for this thesis follows the approach of a single case study and is therefore non-generalizable in its findings (Stake 1995: 7). To guide the research, the analysis follows three operational questions which are based on the theoretical framework of Stephen Walt’s (2002) Balance of Threat Theory and its concepts of relative power, proximity, intentions, and Offense-Defense-Balance in order to answer the research question of “How can the (in)actions of the United Nations before and during the Rwandan Genocide 1994 be explained by a structural realist approach?”. Having established that this research follows a realist approach, states are seen as rational actors whose core interest is self-preservation and security (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008: 67). Therefore, the first operational question of: “How was Rwanda’s internal and relative Power compared to the involved member states?” attempts to establish the power relationship between Rwanda and the involved UN member states, and the internal power relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. The first part is important in order to lay a baseline on Rwanda’s capabilities at this point and the threat it posed to the involved UN member states. Given that self-preservation is of high priority, the greater the threat, the greater the motivation to do something against it. This part also includes Stephen Walt’s parameter of “proximity” in order to better evaluate the threat posed to the UN member states. The second part of the

question gives insight into the situation which could be witnessed by the UN and its member states. With the United Nations being an association bearing international responsibility, a clear superiority of one side, even when dealing with a Civil War, could cause concern and a need to intervene in one way or another.

Building on the knowledge gained in the first operational question, the second operational question: “What were the (perceived) intentions behind the conflict in Rwanda and how did they change over time?” is focused on the intentions of the Rwandan parties as perceived by the United Nations and its member states, which includes intentions on an internal as well as an external level, going back to the first question about the threat posed to the UN member states. In addition to this, this chapter also deals with the security dilemma on how to interpret and how to act according to the witnessed events. The aim is to understand what the UN and its member states thought the strived for goal was and the ability of the parties to achieve such goals and by what means, therefore clearly influencing their decisions on how to act in response.

With the third operational question: “Which ways of engagement stood open to the UN Security Council and member states and how were they balanced and considered?”, the last parameter of Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory, the Offence-Defense Balance is analyzed. Building up on the findings of the first two operational questions, this chapter aims to incorporate the concepts of uncertainty and the Security Dilemma in order to analyze possible alternatives to the options chosen. These alternatives change depending on the interpretation of the situation. The aim is to establish the capabilities of the United Nations in 1994 in order to be able to judge the actions that were and were not taken. By using the concepts of uncertainty and genocide it enables the research to go more in- depth with the information presented in order to come to a more founded conclusion. Given the qualitative nature of this case study, the findings are not generalizable (Stake 1995: 7), but they can help to establish a broader picture and with that a better understanding of the motivations behind UN peacekeeping missions as well as interventions.

4.3 Data Selection

The literature chosen for this research is of both primary and secondary nature. On the one hand this study includes the mandates and official reports which were accessible to, or released by, the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda as well as international law as presented in the UN Charter, explicitly dealing with international interventions as well as genocide as a specific case. These sources function as the knowledge of the United States and its member states as they present the assumptions under which the decisions were made as well as the goal they were implemented to achieve. International law is especially important when it comes to the question of possible alternative actions. On the other hand, Roméo Dellaire’s book Shake Hands with the Devil (2008) in which he describes his experiences as commander of the UNAMIR as well as the interviews conducted during the production of the PBS-Documentary Ghosts of Rwanda (2004) play an important role alongside the previous research conducted on this topic over the years. This variety of different angles on the topic offers great insight into the situation in Rwanda before and during the Genocide through eyewitnesses reports and research. These information are important to understand if there is a difference between what was experienced on the ground and what was assumed by the Security Council of the United Nations, but also to be able to analyze certain critiques on the actions of the United Nations by soldiers like Roméo Dellaire or NGO’s which were on the ground.

4.4 Source Criticism

This thesis is greatly based on interviews and personal recollections of the events next to official documents as well as the corresponding law. Due to this, subjectivity cannot be fully nullified. However, the selected sources and the information given in such are critically viewed upon and compared to be in accordance with other sources in order to estimate and assure their reliability. It is not feasible to expect all of the recollections of the events to be completely accurate, especially as many interviews were hold years after the genocide, yet by keeping a critical stance and using the framework as guidance, this research aims at using the information that did show accuracy to elaborate on the field of interest. The mandates and other documents by the United States and its Security Council cannot fully represent the discussion which lead to

the final decision, but they can point to the topics which were higher prioritized and are therefore an adequate addition to the literature. It was decided not to include press releases and news coverage as these outlets are mainly used to either inform purely about the decisions made, but not about the prosses to get there, or to appeal to the population. Therefore, this data would be of little interest in the frame of this study. Roméo Dellaire’s “Shake Hands with the Devil” was published in 2008, and even though it is thought of as a reliable source and Dellaire worked together with other soldiers who were on the ground in order to make it as accurate as possible, the fact still remains that it was written many years and mental problems after the event. In addition, members of the UN Security Council are writing Resolutions in the knowledge that they are publicly accessible. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for them to include detailed argumentation and elaboration on the reasoning of all involved member states for their actions. Yet, they are a reasonable source in order to gain clear information about the actions taken and the reasons they felt comfortable sharing, which will be included in the “perceived” part of power, threat and intention later on in the analysis.

4.5 Ethical Considerations and Positionality

This thesis is aware that the primary guilt of the genocide in Rwanda lies with the people who engaged in the planning, endowment and killing. It is not the intention of this research to rationalize or minimize these acts in any way, shape or form and strongly opposes any of these actions. However, this thesis is focused on analyzing the international reactions to the events happening rather than the events themselves. Due to this, the crimes committed play a secondary role, building the basis on which this research stands upon.

5 Analysis

In this chapter the collected data will be analyzed with the help of the framework and theories explained above. The three operational questions will guide this analysis, building up on each other to, in the end, be able to answer the research question of this thesis.

5.1 How was Rwanda’s internal and relative Power compared to the involved UN member states?

Since this thesis is not only concerned about the conflict between and actions of two countries, but a number of sovereign states in the UN as well, which has an international obligation to act and protect civilians, this section will not only focus on the relative power between Rwanda and the involved UN member-states, but also at the internal power relations between Hutus and Tutsi. This will help to get a better overview of the situation the UN Security Council was faced with and therefore build the basis to be able to analyze its actions. Stephen Walt’s aspect of Proximity will also be analyzed in this chapter as it has a direct influence on the threat Rwanda presented as well as its abilities to utilize its Power relatively as well as internally. The first part of this chapter will focus on the internal power relations between Hutus and Tutsi. After this, the relative power between Rwanda and the involved member states will be looked upon.

Looking at the internal power relationships it is also important to look at how it developed over time. In order to stay in the boundaries of this thesis, only a few key dates and events will be dealt with in order to show the sentiment and history of the embedded relationship. There is however, more to the history between Hutu and Tutsi, but for the aim of this chapter this will be sufficient.

After the Hutus won the Rwandan Revolution, which was ongoing from 1959 until 1962, and became independent, a clear increase in organized violence against Tutsi could be observed which led 100.000s of Tutsi to flee into neighboring countries. Some of these exiles came together in small armed groups launching repeated attacks on Rwanda from the neighboring countries. These attacks by the so called Invenzi or also “Cockroaches” by the Hutu government, led to the repression against the Tutsi which still remained in Rwanda by putting them into relation (Wütherich 1998: 67). This escalated into the massacre and even further exile of Tutsi in and from Rwanda, bringing their population from 17% down to 9% (Kuperman 2001: 7). Meanwhile, the government under Juvenál Habyarimana grew more authoritarian, and the intra-Hutu common political front frayed, leading to a shift of military and economic power to the president's narrow northern ruling elites (Khadiagala, 2004: 67). To fight against this weakening of economic and political power, Tutsi exiles in Uganda came togetther and formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) which started to invade Rwandan in October 1990. These Tuts exiles were mostly trained and served in the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) during the Ugandan Civil War and tried with their invasion to enable exiles to return to Rwanda and regain citizenship, introduce a power-change and change the dictatorial system into a democracy (Khadiagala, 2004: 68 and Wischert 1998: 111). Even though the RPF was at this point not only better equipped, but also better trained than the Rwandan army, the Habryarimana government secured help from French Intervention-Groups as well as Belgium and Zaire (Kuperman 2001: 9) under the condition to implement democratic reforms with a multi-party system. Yet, the Hutu party MRND would still be dominant and in April 1992 Hutu Agathe Uwilingiyimana became Prime minister in the provisional government (Jones 2001: 63). Looking at this, to the time of the genocide, there was a repeated history of clashes in which the Hutu came out mostly victorious. They also held the political and economic power. In terms of military strength and capabilities, the RPF might have been ahead of the Rwandan army, but the international community had shown that they were most likely to stand with the Rwandan Army. Keeping these factors in mind and adding that the Tutsi living in Rwanda made out only about 10% of the population, one can clearly see the one-sided internal power relations.

Having established the internal power relationship between Hutu and Tutsi, the focus will now lie upon the relative power of Rwanda compared t the involved UN member states, France, Belgium and the United States.

One of the first factors that comes to mind is the proximity. With the three member states being located in North America and Europe, Rwanda as an African country was quite far away. This is important when looking at the threat posed by Rwanda towards the US, France and Belgium. It takes an extensive amount of resources and founds to be able to threaten a country half-way around the globe. With a worsening economy, and a steadily increasing overpopulation, Rwanda had to fight resource scarcity in addition to their internal conflicts (Khadiagala, 2004: 67). This makes it highly unlikely that they posed any threat to countries which were not their direct neighbors. But proximity is also important when focusing on the other side. Countries that want to deploy troops internationally also have to deal with the critique of their civil population. And even though this is mostly possible to explain if it is a humanitarian intervention commissioned by the UN Security Council, it has to be kept in mind that the United States just finished their intervention in Somalia with massive public outcry. Therefore, the US public was very risk-adverse on the topic of interventions in Africa. Rothchild and Emmanuel explain this by the “strategic considerations about US national self-interest and race and ethnic considerations that place Africa as a low priority” (Hughes, 2010: 1038). Rwanda as a small landlocked country was, in the words of Alison des Forges: “too remote . . . too poor, too little, and probably too black to be worthwhile” (Alison Des Forges. In: Jones 2013: 255). As established, power does entail way more than just the military strength of a country, even though this aspect plays a great role when it comes to risk assessment. Even though the UN member states were clearly superior when it came to the force, legitimacy, and knowledge generally speaking, the Hutu regime was capable to use the little information they had about their international foes to their advantage, while the intervening troops were hindered by the strict line of legitimacy. A good example for this is the murder of 10 Belgian peacekeepers by the Hutu military in the early days of the genocide. Even though the Belgian troops clearly outmatched the Hutu army in manpower, funds and equipment, they were forced to retreat due to the feared media outlash for getting Belgian soldiers killed in a war in a faraway country which would not offer any profit to Belgium even if successful. The Hutus were aware of this sentiment and were able to land a harsh blow with minimal risk to themselves.

5.2 What were the (perceived) intentions behind the conflict in Rwanda and how did they change over time?

The first question brought forward that there has been a very one-sided power relationship between the Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda, even before the genocide started and that the Hutu government previously received assistance from French Intervention-Groups as well as Belgium and Zaire, making it even more uneven. This chapter will now focus on how the United Nations and its member states the United States, France and Belgium perceived the intentions behind the conflict Rwanda shortly before and during the genocide. This question does not only apply to the discussion whether or not the Security Council was aware that the event was indeed a genocide and not a civil war, but also about the extent of the threat each party posed on the other and the UN.

Besides the clear history of violence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, the situation in 1993 was interpreted as relatively stable by the UN, especially after the Arusha agreement was signed. It made the impression as if both sides were interested in working together towards peace. Alison des Forges explains in her interview with PBS Frontline, that the international community was too optimistic and was wishing for a success story after the failure in Somalia. They ignored warning signs such as the threats of the Hutu-power movement and the uneasiness in the RPF (PBS Frontline (01.10.2003): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Alison des Forges). Even though this optimism and ignorance can be detrimental, it, nevertheless, ensured the cooperation of the US in the intervention. With their position in the UN and their veto rights, they could have caused great problems in the installment of UNOMUR and UNAMIR in 1993 if they did not see a way for improvement in this situation. By engaging in a seemingly easy and safe peace mission they hoped for a success not only for the UN but also for themselves by gaining back some political prestige they lost through the failure in Somalia (PBS Frontline (30.09.2003): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Prudence Bushnell). On April 5th, 1994, just one day before President Habyarimana’s plane was struck down, Resolution 909 was put in place by the UN Security Council. This resolution announced the extension of the UNAMIR, but also clearly states in its preamble that the council was aware of several problems such as the stagnation of the peace process already established in spring 1994 as well as the obstruction of an interim government which included RPF participation as well as the continuous rise of violence inside the country, especially against Tutsi (Security

Council S/RES/909 1994: Preamble). This shows that not only the involved member states, but also the Security Council itself was paying no greater attention to the problematic but continued with a concept of the UNAMIR which was clearly not working as well as intended, still holding on to the belief that all the involved local parties wanted peace. On April 20th, 1994 Boutros-Ghali, the secretary general of the United Nations, speaks in his update report to the Security Council about the situation in Rwanda about a newly erupted civil war and offers three options on how to proceed with the UNAMIR: 1. The extensive strengthening of the mission by sending in several thousand additional soldiers to enforce a ceasefire as described in Chapter VII of the UN- Charter (Security Council S/1994/470 1994: Art. 13). 2. Reducing the mission down to 270 people. 3. A complete retreat of the UNAMIR – this was explicitly advised against. (Security Council S/1994/470 1994: Art. 19)

On the following day, the Resolution 912 was passed, deciding that the mission would be brought down to a mere symbolic presence in the country, leaving those few left in charge of negotiating a ceasefire between regime and RPF, offering humanitarian help and being a sanctuary for all the civilians that came for help (Security Council S/RES/912 1994: Art. 9).

While these are some of the most important interpretations by the Security Council and the involved member states that can be clearly shown by the resulting documents, it is impossible to speak about how the UN Security Council could have perceived the intentions of the Hutu army without talking about Roméo Dellaire’s so called “Genocide-Fax” sent to Maurice Baril in the DPKO as early as January 11th, 1994. This fax was the result of information given to the UNAMIR by an informant and is often used to argue that the council was well aware of what was going to happen and stood by. To be able to interpret if this accusation is true, it is important to have a look at the exact information this fax presented to the DPKO and Security Council. First, the fax points out that the Interahamwe, a Hutu paramilitary organization, was trying to provoke the RPF during a demonstration in Kigali in order to reignite the Civil War. Further, the systematical killing of Belgian soldiers was planned by an alliance of Interahamwe, the gendarmerie and several government parties (Dellaire 1994: Art. 2f). Continuing, that there were at least 1700 members of the Interahamwe which were trained by the Rwandan military and organized themselves in 40 cells all over Kigali (Dellaire 1994: Art. 5). And lastly, the fax

states that the Interahamwe was apparently registering all the Tutsi in Kigali since the beginning of the UNAMIR with the aim of systematically killing them at a later point in time. They were supposed to possess the resources to kill about 1000 Tutsi in a matter of only 20 minutes thanks to their cells spread across the city. All of this, according to the informant, happened without the knowledge of president Habyarimana as he lost control over his troops (Dellaire 1994: Art. 6f). Given these accusations, there are several points which oppose the assumption that this fax was a clear and yet ignored warning of an upcoming genocide. For the first part, the word ‘genocide’ is not mentioned in this fax. This is important as the United Nations has clear rules on how to act not only in an ongoing genocide, but also during the planning of such. Not mentioning this or at least the possibility gives the impression that the forces on the ground did not make this interpretation with their knowledge of the situation and the given information by the informant. Seeing that the DPKO and Security Council miss the aspect of first-hand experience in the case of Rwanda, they have to rely on their forces to offer these thoughts, if they think that there might be even the slightest chance of an upcoming genocide. This does not exempt the council from looking at the information themselves and interpret them on their own, but it provides insight on how the situation was understood by the forces in Rwanda. Second, the report mentions 1700 Interahamwe members which were gathered in Kigali. This gives no inclination for the nation-wide killing spree, which was about to happen, but rather an inner-city dispute. Even though it is now known that not 1700 but several ten-thousand members of the Interahamwe across the country were trained and mobilized, this, knowledge however, was non which was accessible to the Security Council at that point in time. If they had access to such information, it would paint a vastly different picture of the threat and the actions needed to be taken (Kuperman 2001: 103). Next, all the threats described in the fax were purely focused on Kigali and did not mention any actions outside of the city. Even though these actions alone would have been enough to destroy the Arusha agreement they did not call for an immediate military intervention. Instead, Kofi Annan ordered Dellaire to confront the president with their newly found knowledge and the information that they will be watching the situation very closely in order to find a diplomatic solution which would allow the UNAMIR to stay mostly outside the conflict and maintain a neutral position as much as possible (PBS Frontline (17.02.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Kofi Annan) Lastly, it was not uncommon for the UNAMIR troops, or peace missions in general, to get information about apparent assassinations and planned attacks. Due to a great amount of

them being false or greatly exaggerated, little attention was paid to them. This informant fell into the same category which made his information, even though not necessarily wrong, less valuable to the DPKO and Security Council. Information like these were not uncommon, so at that time there was not much attention paid to it (PBS Frontline (21.01.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali). Even though the informant came highly recommended as can be read in the fax and apparently was a top-level trainer in the cadre of Interahamwe-armed militia of MRND, Dellaire did point out the possibility of a trap and to have “certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the informant to come clean with this information” (Dellaire, 1994).

Looking at all the gathered information together it can be said that the UN Security Council as well as the involved member states could have been more critical about the seeming truce and peace in Rwanda. As can be seen in the analysis above, the Security Council was aware of the instable peace agreement as early as 1993, followed by Dellaire’s fax in January 1994, there would have been many reasons to be wary of the ongoing situation and not hold on to the peace agreement by all means possible.

5.3 Which ways of engagement stood open to the UN Security Council and member states and how were they balanced and considered?

“For us, genocide was the gas chamber - what happened in Germany. We were not able to realize that with the machete you can create a genocide” (PBS Frontline (21.01.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali)

After the previous two questions determined the one-sidedness of the conflict as well as the uphold hope and disbelief of the UN Security Council towards the genocide happening in front of their eyes, this chapter will focus on some of the alternative paths of action that stood open to the UN Security Council as well as the UN member states. This is

important as this research aims to explain why certain decisions were made. Why others were not taken is therefore a factor which should also be included. It is important to keep in mind that there is no possible way of reenacting exactly who got which information and how much was understood or taken seriously. In addition, with the knowledge of nearly three decades of research on this topic and no immediate time pressure it is easier to focus on the facts now known to be correct and important in order to argue for a different course of action. Yet, this analysis tries to stay as realistic as possible while suggesting different actions at certain points in time based on the information that was established to have reached and been acknowledged by the UN Security Council and the involved member states.

To be able to analyze what has and has not been done in Rwanda, the general state of operation of the United Nations has to be taken into consideration as well. In the beginning of the 1990s, the UN overwhelmed itself with work by starting too many missions and operations around the same time, not having the bureaucratic nor administrative capabilities to handle such workload (Barnett 2002: 30). The newly founded Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which was, besides many other missions, in charge of the UNAMIR, had to divide its attention between them, with especially the Balkan states taking a higher priority than Rwanda (Dellaire 2008: 117). The department was so understaffed and underfunded, that Roméo Dellaire even remembers the staff sitting on their printers because there was not enough space in their small office (PBS Frontline (2003): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview General Romeo Dallaire). Lewis McKenzie, commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), described the situation very accurately when he said: “If you are a commander of a UN mission, don’t get in trouble after five P.M. or on the weekend. There is no one in the UN to answer the phone!” (cited In: Barnett 2002: 31). This quote was highly criticized, yet provides a good insight in the lack of confidence even UN commanders had in their team at home. This is less a criticism on the staff itself rather than the way the UN was handling the situation. In such an overwhelming environment, it is easy to believe secretary generals statement that information could have gotten lost more than once and it never reached the decision-making bodies such as the Security Council or the secretary general (PBS Frontline (21.01.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali).

By taking on too many tasks at once, the United Nations limited their capabilities on how to act upon every one of them. Due to the lack of personnel and equipment, the UN was not able to analyze and manage the situation in Rwanda to the best of its potential. Another large point of criticism on the UN is, that they did not act upon the first signs of a genocide taking place. To be able to argue whether or not the United Nations could have used the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) earlier in the case of Rwanda, it is important to understand the definition of genocide that applies and the differences to a Civil War. When trying to apply this convention to the case of Rwanda it becomes visible that the situation was quite unclear from an international point of view. After the evacuation of nearly all internationals in the beginning of the genocide, there were only a few people left to gather information to present to the decision-making bodies. The few information’s that did come through, painted the picture of a renewed Civil War, rather than a genocide, with the interpretation that the Tutsi, or rather the RPF, were winning, for which the Hutu were first seen as the victims. The bad information followed the grave underestimation of the victim count as well as the affected area. Expecting far less victims than what was true, and the situation to only effect Kigali, the United Nations did not have reasons to expect a genocide going on in the beginning. Yet, after two weeks many of the human rights activists, local NGOs and UNAMIR staff stopped believing that what they were witnessing was a very brutal civil war with massive crimes against humanity (Power 2002: 350), and started to define the situation as a genocide (Kuperman 2001: 24), whilst the UN still believed in a war between regime and rebels. Due to this assumption, the Resolution 912 cut down the extend of the UNAMIR drastically, asking the remaining few members to engage in ceasefire talks with the conflict parties (Security Council S/RES/912 1994: Art. 6f). The Security Council, at this point in time, was well aware of the devastating violence in Rwanda with thousands of civilian victims and a large part of the population fleeing the country (Security Council S/RES/912 1994: Preamble), but saw a return to the Arusha agreement as the only viable way towards peace (Security Council S/RES/912 1994: Art. 12).

While it is true that civilian victims are expected during a civil war, the Security Council must have been aware of the one-sidedness of the matter in the case of Rwanda. By listening to the people on the ground, it would have been clear that the Tutsi were systematically killed from an early point on. With this realization, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide could have been enacted from at least the second week into the genocide. Yet, Boutros-Ghali tried to explain the blindness the UN experienced with

the disbelieve that the Rwandan people were capable of such a deed. “For us, genocide was the gas chamber - what happened in Germany. We were not able to realize that with the machete you can create a genocide” (PBS Frontline (21.01.2004): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Boutros Boutros-Ghali).

But even if the UN would not see a genocide to begin with, it would have had the ability to extend the UNAMIR due to the massive increase in violence. As well as sending more staff, the Code of Conduct could have been updated to allow the soldiers more rights to defend themselves and others by any means necessary as the directive to this point still stood, that weapon use was only allowed if they were specifically shot at (Dallaire 2008: 271). This was announced to try to avoid becoming an active part of the conflict but left the UN soldiers to stand practically unarmed against the violent masses in Rwanda (Barnett 2002: 98).

It still stands to consider that, while these actions might have been formally possible, the United Nations are still an organization which relies on the funds and support from its members. Being aware that few were interested in a long lasting, expensive conflict, costs were tried to be hold low. UN member states would, by themselves, refrain from using the word genocide in order to avoid responsibility under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Power 2002: 350). It took until May 4th 1994 for the secretary general to publicly call it a genocide for the first time, which was met by applause of several member states. In the following Resolution 918 on May 17th, the declaration as genocide was yet again missing which was only added in the next Resolution on June 8th (Security Council S/RES/925 1994: Preamble). By not calling it a genocide in the Resolution 918, the UN made it possible to engage in a very loose planning when it came to the actual implementation. There was no time schedule, no finance plan, no binding agreements about which member states would even contribute their troops for the intervention (Dallaire 2008: 429). UNAMIR II, while talking about punishable actions, was no intervention on a genocide. Due to this, the priority was not as high as it should have been, having most of the help arrive after the genocide was already over.

genocide in order to avoid responsibility under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Power 2002: 350).

6 Concluding Discussion

This thesis aimed at establishing a clearer picture of the motivation behind the decision-making process of the United States and its member states shortly before and during the Rwandan Genocide 1994 from a structural realist approach. To do so, Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory was used and his criteria of 1) Relative Power; 2) Proximity; 3) Intentions; and 4) Offence-Defense Balance were the guiding principles of the operational questions. In this research it became clear that there are countless factors which influence the decision-making process. These factors can range from economic or state-interest all the way to repolishing the international standing and perception of a state. In the case of the intervention in Rwanda it is important to keep in mind that the failed intervention in Somalia was only a few months prior and many of the UN member states, especially the US, but also the United Nations as an organization stood in critique for their actions, trying to find a way to redeem themselves (PBS Frontline (30.09.2003): Ghosts of Rwanda. Interview Prudence Bushnell). The US, in light of the failure in Somalia, started acting according to a three-tiered approach, which weighted national security interests most important, then economic interests and only in third place humanitarian interests would “only be considered to be emphasized as a result of political influence by ethnic lobbying if the lobby has been active on the issue and the US has taken action where there are not evident tier-one and tier-two interests at stake” (Hughes 2010: 1040/1). Following the chosen theory, the starting conditions for the intervention in Rwanda were quite bad. Since the involved member states, and especially the United States, were mainly focused on their self-interest, they were not planning in signing up for a long- lasting humanitarian intervention but a quick peace mission to redeem some of the damage caused by the intervention in Somalia. This already tense situation caused the involved member states to be very careful and not take too great a risk. This can explain why Belgium pulled all its troops out after 10 of their soldiers where killed. The same might be said about the United States and their Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) from May 1994, in which they safeguard themselves in case the situation would get even worse. With this directive in place, they had an argument to limit their support to the UNAMIR an therefore at least secure the lives of their soldiers and some of their money.

Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory in the light of structural realism can be well used to gain greater insights into the How? And Why? Of political decision-making. Yet it misses to identify real guidelines on how to find and proof intentions and how they were perceived by another party. Since this thesis only focusses on the single case of the Rwandan genocide, it is not feasible to state that the aspects which were most present in this case are also the most important ones in other decision-making processes of the UN. The Rwandan genocide was a unique event in which many mistakes were made, but these, how ever devastating the consequences might have been, give us the opportunity to learn and try to avoid making the same mistakes. Each new case has to be looked upon from scratch, but Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory and other versions of it can help with a guideline for this. However, it must be said that the theory leaves out at least one important aspect for analyzing influences on decision-making processes in our globalized world, which is the international news coverage which can cause real time pressure on the decision-making bodies. It was decided not to add this aspect to this thesis in order to stay in its limits and focus in detail on the chosen theory as is.

Following the findings of this thesis, it could be interesting to analyze the genocide in Rwanda in a broader context of international and humanitarian interventions and the development of such. The Rwandan experiences had their impact on how future missions were conducted, as did Somalia on Rwanda, and will stay an important event in the history of international interventions. In addition to this, Rwanda rose the problematic of political speak and the power behind the words chosen by politicians. By refraining from the use of the word “genocide”, the UN member states were able to avoid having to take action for a long time. By now it is commonly known that words, especially those spoken by people in important positions, bear great power themselves and ought to be chosen carefully. With the problematics risen in this thesis, a greater in-depth analysis of the exact wordings used during the conferences and public announcements to the events would be enriching and could provide even greater insights. Keeping the focus on Rwanda, there is still much to understand when it comes to how the extreme tendencies and actions of the Hutus were able to spread as fast as it did, reaching nearly everyone in the country. It is known that the radio station Radio-Télévision

Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) broadcasted hateful messages about Tutsi and urged Hutu to kill Tutsi during the period of the genocide (Totten, 2011, p. 25), but other media channels are often left unnoticed. It would therefore be enriching to have a look at other media outlets and their broadcasts before and during the genocide.

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