The Dilemmas of

Yasushi Akashi

Special Advisor to the -General of the

An Interview by Spyros Spyros Demetriou Demetriou New York, February 7, 1996

Yasushi Akashi, a career UN diplomat andformer special representative of the secretary-general for the peacekeeping missions in the former and (UNPROFOR and UNTAC respectively), deserves special respect. Both missions departed radically from the model of "traditional peacekeeping" in the sense that they were multidimensional, exercising a diverse mixture of humanitarian, military, and civil relations functions. As a special representa tive, Mr. Akashi was responsible for coordinating and commanding the various components of each mission, and ensuring that they worked towards the goal of peacebuilding. Given the drastically expanded peacekeeping mandates autho rized by the Security Council in the recent years and the little time the Depart ment of Peacekeeping Operations has had at its disposal to develop an appropri ate infrastructure, one must be cautious in apportioning blame to the UN when such missions are not resounding successes. The criticism that has been levelled against Mr. Akashi in the past is not fair, given the scope of his responsibilities and the fine line he has had to tread in the midst of civil . Too many people appear to forget that the United Nations and its officials operate at the juncture of conflicts, with the principle of impartiality their only strength. If all UN officials were to succumb to the pressures of the mass media and outspoken gov ernments, the UN would surely not last much longer. In this interview, Mr.

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Akashi outlines some of the major problems facing the UN in the area of con flict prevention and management and suggests how they can ultimately be re solved.

Joumah The secretary-general said in a recent interview that "we are be ginning a new period, the post-, without an awareness of this new period." What challenge does this new era pose to the United Nations?

Akashi: The secretary-general is right in saying that we are entering into a new era which is full of uncertainty. We have to cope increasingly with types of conflicts we never faced before. The UN dealt for the first forty years of its existence mostly with international, intergovernmental conflicts. Now we are faced with basically internal, domestic conflicts with far-reach ing ethnic, religious, tribal and other implications. These conflicts are more messy than clear-cut conflicts of an international character. The boundary between international and internal conflicts is becoming more and more blurred. With the full cooperation of the member governments, the coop eration of regional or other organizations and the collaboration of trans national entities—non-governmental organizations—we have to devise new methods of dealing with new crises. The solution has to be comprehensive. In the majority of conflicts there is no simple or easy military solution.

Joumah Is there a constructive role for UN-sponsored peacemaking ef forts in conflicts whose eventual resolution remains uncertain?

Akashi: In principle, the UN should not involve itself in open-ended con flicts whose outcome is uncertain, unclear or ambiguous. I think we have learned a lesson to involve ourselves only in a situation where we can con trol events. In other words, when we go in, we should have some kind of an exit strategy and a clear-cut timetable. Having said that, I must admit that there are emergencies and conflicts in which we cannot control the devel opments of these events and where we may nevertheless have to involve ourselves because of humanitarian or human imperatives. But I think we should know why we are heading into a situation, what kind of resources are needed, and what we can expect out of it and when.

Joumah Does preventive diplomacy have a useful role, and is it a viable instrument for conflict management in the long-run?

Akashi: There is no question in my mind that preventive diplomacy is the

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:32:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Dilemmas of Peacekeeping most effective and most cost-effective way of dealing with conflicts. Take the former Yugoslavia. There are people who say that the UN experience there was a failure. I do not subscribe to that at all and if you turn your attention to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where the UN has a preventive deployment, it is a resounding success. Through its preventive deployment the UN has been able to make sure that the interethnic con flict which prevailed elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia did not permeate into Macedonia, and although it is suffering from serious economic dislo cation and unemployment, Macedonia has been able to maintain its politi cal independence and ethnic stability, thanks partly to the wise leadership of President Gligorov. But I think—and I had many occasions to speak to President Gligorov—I think the primary factor for stability in Macedonia is the UN preventive deployment where Nordic and U.S. troops are there in the framework of the UN. This is one example in which preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment have been successful. There are many other conflicts in which the UN secretary-general plays a very quiet, a very discreet role to bring parties together to talk things over out of the lime light. I was with the secretary-general a few weeks ago in London when we brought together the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugual to have a full discussion on their conflict over East Timor. And as preventive medecine is better than administering treatment after the illness has occured, certainly if the international community has enough foresight and wisdom it should resort as much as possible to preventive diplomacy and preventive action.

Joumak Preventive diplomacy then is another manifestation of the power of initiative restored to the UN following the end of the Cold War.

Akashi: More and more attention is given in the UN to preventive diplo macy. We have been also seriously thinking of an early warning system regarding impending disasters, conflicts and tragedies. For instance, a con crete application of preventive diplomacy is the repeated warnings given by the UN secretary-general on the alarming situation which has developed over Burundi. The Security Council has considered that matter on the ba sis of the secretary-general's appeal. At the moment, the former president of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere, is conducting preventive diplomacy in full consul tation with the UN, which is also keeping the OAU fully in the picture; in addition, options for rapid deployment are being considered. Since the situ ation is developing in an alarming manner we may have to exert all diplo matic, political and peacekeeping resources at our disposal.

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Journal. In light of recent events, how do you view the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping operations?

Akashi: The important issue here, I believe, is whether the Security Coun cil members are fully cognizant of the challenges faced by peacekeepers on the ground and are always ready and willing to provide the kind of man dates and resources which are needed to cope effectively with the situation. The example of the former Yugoslavia indicates that the Security Council is not always able to do so. I do not think it is a shortcoming of peacekeeping doctrines or principles which are at fault. I think that the fault has been in the Council's partial understanding of the actual situation and the lack of a unified approach among the members of the Council—particularly among some of the more influential members—on how to deal with the Yugoslav situation. I think that the Council's approach, no matter how well-mean ing it might have been, has been an instinctive, ad-hoc reaction to events rather than the consequence of a longterm, well thought out peace strategy.

Journal Could this situation perhaps have as its cause a lack of adequate communications between the different components of a peacekeeping op eration?

Akashi: I think it is partly a communication problem, which can be allevi ated. But it is also due to basic attitudes and preconceptions which were not identical among major countries. Let me cite the example of our succesful peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. We had, in Phnom Pen, the capital of Cambodia, a group of ambassadors from the most active countries in volved in this conflict—a core group of ten countries—who sat down with me once, and sometimes twice, a week. I kept them fully informed of our challenges and problems, they offered information and ideas, and we dis cussed everything together. These ambassadors kept their capitals, and through their capitals their UN ambassadors, fully in the picture. In that way we were able to avoid any discrepancy that might have arisen between peacekeepers on the ground and their governments who are represented on the Security Council. Unfortunately in the former Yugoslavia we did not have such a possibility due to the paucity of resident ambassadors in Sarajevo. There were many more diplomats in Zagreb, but these diplomats were ac credited to Croatia rather than to Bosnia. I wanted to constitute something like the Core Group in the former Yugoslavia as well, but I was not given that possibility.

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Joumak One criticisim that has also been levelled against the Security Coun cil is that it has become less representative of the international community of nations.

Akashi: The Security Council was perhaps not 100 percent reflective of all major countries involved in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, four of the five members of the Contact Group were represented, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation. Missing from the Council until this year was Germany. Other countries, like the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Spain also sent troops. Countries like Italy, Austria, and Greece were also vitally interested. To that extent the Security Council did not have all the players on its membership. But this is a matter which we may partially resolve through the present exercise to review the composition of the Security Council and its structure.

Journah Why, when and how should the so-called "Mogadishu line" be tween peacekeeping and peace enforcement be drawn in future operations?

Akashi: That is a very complex quesiton to which there is no simple an swer. When the peacekeeping mission for the former Yugoslavia was sent to the area, it was under Chapter VI. It was to be a classical peacekeeping operation. As you know, three basic principles of such operations are the use of force only in self-defense, the consent of the parties to accept such operations, and the principle of impartiality on the part of the UN and the peacekeepers. We did our best to maintain these principles as long as pos sible, but when the brutality and the inhuman acts of the warring parties, particularly of the Bosnian Serbs, became widely known, there was a call for more robust action, including the use of NATO air-power. We used the threat of NATO airpower to our great advantage. I utilized the threat of NATO airpower in my negotiations to gain the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons from Sarajevo in February 1994, and from Gorazde in April 1994. But the Bosnian Government and some other member governments of the UN which wanted the use of NATO airpower against the Serbs were ex tremely unhappy with me. I believe, however, that the great majority of the other members supported our approach—the secretary-general certainly did. The intensity of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia was such that the Rapid Reaction Force was introduced into the theater in July 1995. After the dramatic air-strikes—twice in late May in 1995—there was an active internal debate wether we were still in the mode of classical peace keeping or wether we had crossed the Mogadishu line. There is a profound

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:32:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Yasushi Akashi reason why we are attached to the classical mode of peacekeeping: we are effective only to the extent to which our impartiality is recognized by the parties. You have to always remember that the party you bomb today may be the party with whom you negotiate tomorrow for the safe passage of humanitarian convoys. You have to remember that you may be able to forcefully open one checkpoint, but our convoys had to go through ten to twenty other checkpoints. We were operating throughout a country in which 70 percent of the territory was under Serb control. These are the real prob lems which peacekeepers on the ground have to face every day. It is easy to criticize our passivity or our seeming timidity, but when you are actually responsible for the lives of the people and for the continuation of the op eration, your choices are very limited.

Journal. What future leassons for UN diplomacy can be drawn from the experience of crisis management in the former Yugoslavia?

Akashi: There are many lessons to be drawn from the former Yugoslavia. Let me just cite a few. As we discussed, if we deploy, it is much more effec tive to do so when the conflict is still in an incipient stage rather than after it has broken out into a full-scale conflict. Secondly, to the extent possible you should combine peacemaking with peacekeeping. Peacekeeping in iso lation from attempts for mediation and diplomatic settlement can only have a limited impact. We can hold the situation for a limited period through negotiating temporary cease-fires or truces. I negotiated a four-month agree ment on the cessation of hostilities on December 31, 1994, but after a few months the parties became impatient and they resumed fighting. As soon as we had the signatures of the parties on the December 311 asked the Contact Group to accelerate its work and try to identify a more permanent framework for peace. Peacekeepers can hold the volatile situation only for a while. Another lesson is that after the framework for peace and for the settlement of the conflict is arrived at, peacekeepers can best be sent to implement that agreement. But we, the UN peacekeeping forces had to operate without such an agreement. We were there before Dayton and not after. Perhaps NATO should have been there when we were there, and we, not NATO, should have been sent after Dayton. That is one of the great ironies of the Yugoslav conflict.

Journal What do you make of the current arrangements in the former Yugoslavia, where NATO has joined the UN as a peacekeeping and peacebuilding agent. Has this set a precedent?

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Akashi: In the future there will be many circumstances in which the UN cannot cope with the situation alone. The UN Charter provides for coop eration between the UN and regional organizations and arrangements. NATO is not a regional body—it is a coalition of interested states origi nally created to fight the Cold War but now being very instrumental in waging peace in Eastern Europe, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. NATO has been helpful in policing the arms embargo around the former Yugoslavia. It has been instrumental also in policing the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia. It is now deployed in Bosnia as the IFOR—International Imple mentation Force. But I think there has to be a constructive, creative divi sion of labor between the UN and organizations such as NATO. In Bosnia NATO is responsible for the military aspect of peace implementation. The UN is responsible for human rights, for civilian police and for the repatria tion of refuguees, while the OSCE—which is a regional body—is in charge of organizing democratic elections. The rehabilitation and reconstruction work will be a joint effort by the World Bank, IMF, UNDP and other UN bodies and regional organizations in Europe. So, there will be more and more cooperation among the interested organizations in constructing peace in the future.

Journak Finally, I'd like to touch briefly on the financial aspect of peace keeping. How can the UN maintain the current level of peacekeeping mis sions and embark on others when the Department of Peacekeeping Opera tions is effectively bankrupt?

Akashi: I deplore this financial crisis of the United Nations—it is not just DPKO, but the entire UN is on the verge of complete financial collapse. The main cause is the schizophrenic attitude of UN member nations who pay lip service to the cause of international peace and solidarity but are often negligent in paying even basic membership—or peacekeeping fees to the UN. As you know, the entire UN budget is less than the budget of the sanitation department of the city of New York. What the international com munity is paying to the work of the UN, including peacekeeping, is really a pittance. What led to the demise of the was also the financial reticence of its membership. I hope very much that the UN will not have to go through the same sad fate. ©

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