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The Dilemmas of Peacekeeping

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The Dilemmas of Peacekeeping The Dilemmas of Peacekeeping Yasushi Akashi Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations An Interview by Spyros Spyros Demetriou Demetriou New York, February 7, 1996 Yasushi Akashi, a career UN diplomat andformer special representative of the secretary-general for the peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia (UNPROFOR and UNTAC respectively), deserves special respect. Both missions departed radically from the model of "traditional peacekeeping" in the sense that they were multidimensional, exercising a diverse mixture of humanitarian, military, and civil relations functions. As a special representa tive, Mr. Akashi was responsible for coordinating and commanding the various components of each mission, and ensuring that they worked towards the goal of peacebuilding. Given the drastically expanded peacekeeping mandates autho rized by the Security Council in the recent years and the little time the Depart ment of Peacekeeping Operations has had at its disposal to develop an appropri ate infrastructure, one must be cautious in apportioning blame to the UN when such missions are not resounding successes. The criticism that has been levelled against Mr. Akashi in the past is not fair, given the scope of his responsibilities and the fine line he has had to tread in the midst of civil war. Too many people appear to forget that the United Nations and its officials operate at the juncture of conflicts, with the principle of impartiality their only strength. If all UN officials were to succumb to the pressures of the mass media and outspoken gov ernments, the UN would surely not last much longer. In this interview, Mr. Winter/Spring 1996 - Volume III, Issue 1 77 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:32:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Yasushi Akashi Akashi outlines some of the major problems facing the UN in the area of con flict prevention and management and suggests how they can ultimately be re solved. Joumah The secretary-general said in a recent interview that "we are be ginning a new period, the post-cold war, without an awareness of this new period." What challenge does this new era pose to the United Nations? Akashi: The secretary-general is right in saying that we are entering into a new era which is full of uncertainty. We have to cope increasingly with types of conflicts we never faced before. The UN dealt for the first forty years of its existence mostly with international, intergovernmental conflicts. Now we are faced with basically internal, domestic conflicts with far-reach ing ethnic, religious, tribal and other implications. These conflicts are more messy than clear-cut conflicts of an international character. The boundary between international and internal conflicts is becoming more and more blurred. With the full cooperation of the member governments, the coop eration of regional or other organizations and the collaboration of trans national entities—non-governmental organizations—we have to devise new methods of dealing with new crises. The solution has to be comprehensive. In the majority of conflicts there is no simple or easy military solution. Joumah Is there a constructive role for UN-sponsored peacemaking ef forts in conflicts whose eventual resolution remains uncertain? Akashi: In principle, the UN should not involve itself in open-ended con flicts whose outcome is uncertain, unclear or ambiguous. I think we have learned a lesson to involve ourselves only in a situation where we can con trol events. In other words, when we go in, we should have some kind of an exit strategy and a clear-cut timetable. Having said that, I must admit that there are emergencies and conflicts in which we cannot control the devel opments of these events and where we may nevertheless have to involve ourselves because of humanitarian or human imperatives. But I think we should know why we are heading into a situation, what kind of resources are needed, and what we can expect out of it and when. Joumah Does preventive diplomacy have a useful role, and is it a viable instrument for conflict management in the long-run? Akashi: There is no question in my mind that preventive diplomacy is the 78 The Brown Journal of World Affairs This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:32:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Dilemmas of Peacekeeping most effective and most cost-effective way of dealing with conflicts. Take the former Yugoslavia. There are people who say that the UN experience there was a failure. I do not subscribe to that at all and if you turn your attention to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where the UN has a preventive deployment, it is a resounding success. Through its preventive deployment the UN has been able to make sure that the interethnic con flict which prevailed elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia did not permeate into Macedonia, and although it is suffering from serious economic dislo cation and unemployment, Macedonia has been able to maintain its politi cal independence and ethnic stability, thanks partly to the wise leadership of President Gligorov. But I think—and I had many occasions to speak to President Gligorov—I think the primary factor for stability in Macedonia is the UN preventive deployment where Nordic and U.S. troops are there in the framework of the UN. This is one example in which preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment have been successful. There are many other conflicts in which the UN secretary-general plays a very quiet, a very discreet role to bring parties together to talk things over out of the lime light. I was with the secretary-general a few weeks ago in London when we brought together the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugual to have a full discussion on their conflict over East Timor. And as preventive medecine is better than administering treatment after the illness has occured, certainly if the international community has enough foresight and wisdom it should resort as much as possible to preventive diplomacy and preventive action. Joumak Preventive diplomacy then is another manifestation of the power of initiative restored to the UN following the end of the Cold War. Akashi: More and more attention is given in the UN to preventive diplo macy. We have been also seriously thinking of an early warning system regarding impending disasters, conflicts and tragedies. For instance, a con crete application of preventive diplomacy is the repeated warnings given by the UN secretary-general on the alarming situation which has developed over Burundi. The Security Council has considered that matter on the ba sis of the secretary-general's appeal. At the moment, the former president of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere, is conducting preventive diplomacy in full consul tation with the UN, which is also keeping the OAU fully in the picture; in addition, options for rapid deployment are being considered. Since the situ ation is developing in an alarming manner we may have to exert all diplo matic, political and peacekeeping resources at our disposal. Winter/Spring 1996 - Volume III, Issue 1 79 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 22:32:20 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Yasushi Akashi Journal. In light of recent events, how do you view the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping operations? Akashi: The important issue here, I believe, is whether the Security Coun cil members are fully cognizant of the challenges faced by peacekeepers on the ground and are always ready and willing to provide the kind of man dates and resources which are needed to cope effectively with the situation. The example of the former Yugoslavia indicates that the Security Council is not always able to do so. I do not think it is a shortcoming of peacekeeping doctrines or principles which are at fault. I think that the fault has been in the Council's partial understanding of the actual situation and the lack of a unified approach among the members of the Council—particularly among some of the more influential members—on how to deal with the Yugoslav situation. I think that the Council's approach, no matter how well-mean ing it might have been, has been an instinctive, ad-hoc reaction to events rather than the consequence of a longterm, well thought out peace strategy. Journal Could this situation perhaps have as its cause a lack of adequate communications between the different components of a peacekeeping op eration? Akashi: I think it is partly a communication problem, which can be allevi ated. But it is also due to basic attitudes and preconceptions which were not identical among major countries. Let me cite the example of our succesful peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. We had, in Phnom Pen, the capital of Cambodia, a group of ambassadors from the most active countries in volved in this conflict—a core group of ten countries—who sat down with me once, and sometimes twice, a week. I kept them fully informed of our challenges and problems, they offered information and ideas, and we dis cussed everything together. These ambassadors kept their capitals, and through their capitals their UN ambassadors, fully in the picture. In that way we were able to avoid any discrepancy that might have arisen between peacekeepers on the ground and their governments who are represented on the Security Council. Unfortunately in the former Yugoslavia we did not have such a possibility due to the paucity of resident ambassadors in Sarajevo. There were many more diplomats in Zagreb, but these diplomats were ac credited to Croatia rather than to Bosnia.
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