lines for individual or unit activities, A second draft of the 'UN Military 4 Unpublished internal paper of the DPKO, 30 which will be produced as required. Observer Course' has been completed. June 1994. 5 Unpublished internal paper of the DPKO, 30 It provides guidelines for training June 1994. IIL Personnel courses for actual or prospective 6 The following remarks are based on an unpub- The Training Unit has currently 5 military observers. lished internal paper of the Training Unit, 3rd officers on loan from different niem- draft, 9 February 1994. ber states. They serve the UN from 6 The aim of the 'UN Civilian Police months up to 3 years. Most of them Course' is to provide contributing have long experience in various UN governments with guidelines for peacekeeping missions. The Head of training civilian police to be used in the Training Unit is a retired military the preparation of personnel for as- officer and employee of the UN. He signment to UN peacekeeping opera- UNPROFOR - Mission im- has the lead responsibility and reports tions. to the Assistant Secretary-General possible Planning and Support through the The Training Unit is working on 'UN Director of the Planning Division. Guidelines for Peacekeeping' and a It is the Bosnian Serbs' questionable Each of the three components of the 'UN Code of Conduct' for the DPKO. merit, by having detained hundreds of Training Unit has its Officer-in- The Unit prepares material for infan- UN peacekeepers in retaliation for Charge (OIC). The OIC is responsible try, medical, engineer, signal and NATO bombardments, to have for the planning, performance and the logistic units and guidelines for stress brought the ongoing tragedy in Bos- output of the component. He reports management. nia and Herzegovina out of the dark- ness and back to the international to the head of the unit. The OIC of the agenda, and to have caused a feverish Research and Coordination Compo- 5. Summary and confusing discussion of how to Despite being only three years old, the nent is the Deputy Head of Training react to the latest escalation in the Unit,. The Training Unit can host UN Training Unit of the DPKO is quite Bosnian war. Interns for an three-month internship. efficient in publishing a number of material for standardization of train- The background IV. Output of the Training Unit ing for peacekeeping missions. The The agreement of 31 December 1994 The DPKO and its Training Unit have DPKO itself established very high on the cessation of hostilities virtually developed training material that cov- goals for its Training Unit. It is per- collapsed in March 1995. Fighting ers a range of subjects, from standard haps too early to judge, whether its spread from the Bihac area to central operating procedures to training elec- output has met these goals. So far, it Bosnia and Tuzla and then to Sara- tion monitors. In the following para- is even too early to determine whether jevo. Bosnian Serb forces increased graphs, some of the publications are the United Nations are closer to a pressure on the city of Sarajevo as described. The Training Unit has substantial change in the training or well as on UNPROFOR, while published a 'UN Peacekeeping Train- the preparation for missions or if it Bosnian government forces were also ing Manual' It provides guidelines has truly begun to create a new type of responsible for a number of incidents. for actual or prospective troop-contri- peacekeeper 'with comparable skills, buting governments in the preparation knowledge, discipline and code of With the expiration of the cessation- and training of their personnel before conduct, able to work together effec- of-hostilities agreement on I May deployment to missions. tively at short notice'. 1995, the renewal of which could not be achieved, fighting around Sarajevo further intensified and, on 8 May The 'UN Peacekeeping Handbook for Capt. Torsten Sevecke* 1995, reached a level comparable to Junior Ranks' describes the require- that of February 1994. Following Notes ment for those junior ranks assigned internatioual pressure - especially by to UN peacekeeping operations. * The author is junior barrister (Rechtsreferendar) the US - to use air power against the in Hamburg (Germany) and reserve officer in the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR on 24 An 'English Language Course for UN German armed forces. He was with the Training May 1995 issued a warning that an Civilian Police' has been developed to Unit of the United Nations Department of Peace- attack from the air was to be expected ensure that members of the UN civil- keeping Operations, Office of Planning and if all heavy weapons did not cease ian police possess adequate language Support in New York from 1 September 1994 to 20 February 1995 as an Intern. firing by 1200 hours the next day. In skills in relevant subjects. addition, it was demanded that four 1 See: United Nations. Background note: January heavy weapons that had previously The 'Peacekeeping Bibliography' pro- 1995. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. been removed from weapons collec- vides information on written materials United Nations, New York, NY. tion points by the Serbs were to be re- useful as background information on 2 Unpublished internal paper of the DPKO, 30 turned by the same time. A second June 1994. the preparation of troops for UN 3 Report of the Seaetary-General, 24 August deadline, 24 hours later, was set for peacekeeping operations. 1994, A/49/336/page 18/Rev. 61; 14 March the removal out of range, or the 1994 S/ 26450-A/48/403/page 11/rev. 38. placement in weapons collection points, of all heavy weapons that had found and rescued by US forces after responsible for the dilemma in Bosnia been introduced into the area by both 6 days of hiding near Bihac. and was widely reproached for being the Bosnian government and the too cautious, too passive and for not Bosnian Serb side. According to a Both incidents, most of all the pic- adopting a tougher stance towards the very detailed report of the UN Secre- tures of humiliated UNPROFOR force Bosnian Serbs, his intention to defend tary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, members, taken hostage by a 'terrorist UNPROFOR becomes evident from on the events of the end of May 1995 organization' and abused as human the report. (the most relevant parts of which are shields, handcuffed on potential bom- reproduced below; S/1995/444 of 30 bardment sites, raised international The Secretary-General's review May 1995, paras. 6-15), UNPROFOR anger and provoked hectic activities Starting point of the Secretary-Gen- issued the warning conscious that and reproaches. The public discussion eral's analysis is a thorough exami- non-compliance would require a in most Western countries focused nation of the development of the UN strong response, which was likely to mostly on military questions, with operation in the former Yugoslavia cause a significant risk to exposed positions extending from demanding and of the mandated tasks of UNPROFOR personnel. Nevertheless, a explicit military intervention UNPROFOR as well as its ability to UNPROFOR had no alternative but to through NATO to a 'robust peace- implement them. continue its mandated tasks because keeping option' that is concentrating of the overriding requirement to on the strengthening and empowering It should be remembered that it was maintain its observation tasks. More- of UNPROFOR. Finally, a 'with- not 'the UN' who initiated the over, it would have made little sense drawal option' seems to be prevailing peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and to demand the return of heavy in the US public opinion and may be Herzegovina, but the UN Security weapons if there was no one at the summarized as 'Let's get out of there, Council under pressure by the major- weapons collection points to monitor let's lift the arms embargo against the ity of its permanent members. The their return. Bosnian government, and let them UN Department of Peacekeeping fight it out'. Operations as well as the Secretary- As the Bosnian Serbs did not respect General initially opposed the idea of the deadline for the weapons' return, A lot of metaphors have been used to establishing the operation. The Secre- the first air strike took place on 25 describe the situation and perspectives tary-General in a report of 12 May May 1995. It was limited to target two of UNPROFOR and the emerging risk 1992 concluded that the 'conflict was bunkers within an ammunition dump that it may turn from a peacekeeping not susceptible to the UN peacekeep- near Pale. Afterwards, realizing to a combat mission: 'mission creep', ing treatment' because of a lack of UNPROFOR's fears, Bosnia Serb 'quagmire', 'Vietnam or Munich', agreement between the parties and forces surrounded a number of weap- 'Mogadishu line', 'Somalia Syn- added that the disrespect for UN ons collection points and shelled five drome'. The description chosen by peacekeepers manifested by the war- of six safe areas, resulting in particu- UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali ring factions was already at such a larly heavy casualties in Tuzla, where in his latest report on the events in level that 'these are not conditions some 70 civilians were killed. A sec- Bosnia (S/1995/444 of 30 May 1995) which permit a UN peacekeeping ond attack on the six remaining bun- is 'mission impossible' and stands for operation to make an effective contri- kers in the Pale ammunition dump a quite different approach to the cri- bution' (see report of 30 May 1995, was conducted the following day. sis. In his report, he concludes that S/1995/444 para. 17). The Council, Additional weapons collection points UNPROFOR due to a contradictory however, by resolution 761 (1992) then were surrounded by Bosnian mandate given to the force and the authorized the deployment of Serb forces, taking UN military ob- particular situation in Bosnian, is UNPROFOR at Sarajevo airport. servers into custody and using a num- hardly able to fulfil its mandate and to ber of them as human shields to deter meet the public expectations raised by The second point to be made is that further air attacks on potential targets. it. In other words: the Bosnia Serbs' UNPROFOR is not a peace-enforce- The number of UN personnel taken failure to cooperate with UNPROFOR ment operation. This becomes appar- hostage or confined in their positions has led to 'the gradual addition to its ent by analysing the tasks entrusted to in the end exceeded 400. The Bosnian mandate of tasks that are incompati- UNPROFOR by the Council and by Serbian forces demanded NATO ble with its peacekeeping and hu- literally reading the relevant resolu- guarantees not to launch further air manitarian roles' (S/1995/444 of 30 tions, particularly as regards refer- strikes in return for their release. The May 1995 para. 77). In consequence, ences to Chapter VII of the UN Char- last 26 peacekeepers taken hostage the more enforcement elements were ter and the use of force. The force were released on 18 June 1995. The included in the mandate, the less the originally was entrusted with a pure use of air power has not been consid- UN force would have the ability to peacekeeping mandate based on the ered since. implement it. This conclusion corre- will of the parties and their consent sponds with recent experiences, that and cooperation, which indisputably On 2 June 1995, Bosnia Serb forces military means are of little help in is required to perform such a man- shot down an American F-16 fighter performing a peacekeeping operation; date. But the unwillingness of the on a routine NATO monitoring mis- they may, in contrast, even prevent parties - not only, but more evidently sion over northern Bosnia with a positive outcomes. Since the UN pub- the Bosnian Serbs - to abide by and surface-to-air missile. The pilot was licly has been charged to be primarily fulfil existing agreements and com-