Peace Support Operations: How to Make Them Succeed*

WINRICH KÜHNE Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed*

osovo is the most recent case of the unchecked Almost 1 million people were killed, despite the Kproliferation of socio-ethnic, civil war-like con- presence of roughly two thousand Blue Helmets flict which has become a fundamental threat to (UNAMIR). The Security Council (SC) was not wil- peace and security in the world following the end ling to send additional troops and to change of the Cold War. »Complex emergencies, war-torn UNAMIR’s mandate to prevent this disaster. In fact, societies or failing states«, as these conflicts are most of the Blue Helmets were actually with- appropriately called, may draw entire regions into drawn. chaos and bloodshed. In the Balkans, Europe and Apart from the problem of political will, the North America may have intervened just in time to operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda etc. re- prevent such a gloomy scenario. It is too early to vealed the deep conceptional problems of tradi- make a final judgement. In several parts of sub- tional peace-keeping in dealing with the new type Saharan Africa, however, like the Horn of Africa, of conflict. It was not conceived to operate under Central Africa and to some extent West Africa, this such insecure conditions as continued to exist in nightmare has become a reality. Entire states and these countries even after peace agreements or societies fall apart, millions of people have perished cease-fires had been signed. The use of force be- and even more are either internally displaced or came inevitable, with sometimes disastrous conse- have become refugees. quences like in Mogadishu in October 1993 when Initially, the international community tried to American special forces tried in vain to capture contain and solve these conflicts with an instru- Aideed, a warlord and leader of one of the parties ment developed in the era of the Cold War: »Blue to the conflict, in a surprise attack. Passing the Helmets«, the traditional peace-keeping forces. Mogadishu-line has become a catchword amongst The successful operations in Namibia and Nica- peacekeepers for keeping the proper balance ragua in 1989–1999, as well as the later operations between the use of force, consent and impartiality. in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador crea- The question which follows is what is the pro- ted inflated expectations regarding the future role per use of force in civil war-type conflicts? Tradi- of the UN’s Blue Helmets in conflict management tional peace-keeping doctrine has no answer to and resolution. These expectations were short- this question. Consent and impartiality, like the lived. In Somalia in 1993, UNOSOM II failed to stop non-use of force in traditional peace-keeping, are the country’s descent into total fragmentation and just as difficult to uphold in conflicts where there self-destruction. UNPROFOR in the former Yugo- are no clear geographical front lines and where the slavia more or less shared UNOSOM’s negative fate. warring parties do not divide neatly into two The leading global powers and the international hostile camps. Consent of whom? and impartiality community did not provide the UN with the with regard to which parties? Finally, the issue of capability and means necessary to successfully con- co-ordination and joint management obviously duct such a demanding operation. The inability of becomes much more complicated in operations, a few Blue Helmets to stop the Serb attack on the which not only have to deal with an insecure »safe area« of Srebrenica and the ensuing mass murder of Bosnian civilians was one of the darkest * A shorter version of this article will be published in: hours in the history of UN peace-keeping. In 1994, Peacebuilding: a field perspective (handbook for field diplo- an even greater lack of political will to act swiftly mats), edited by Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, was responsible for the tragic genocide in Rwanda. Lynne Rienner, 2000 (forthcoming).

358 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed IPG 4/99 environment, where there are several parties to the additional change on multi-dimensional peace- conflict, but also one in which the military, police keeping. As was already indicated, the solemn and civilian personnel of the UN, humanitarian signing of peace agreements or cease-fires no agencies and a host of NGOs have to work together longer meant an end to violence. In Somalia, to achieve successful post-conflict peace-building. Liberia and Bosnia dozens of cease-fire agreements This paper will try to present an overview of were broken. The peace-keepers, as well as the development from traditional peace-keeping to humanitarian organizations were confronted with modern peace support operations (PSO) and their all kinds of violence. National, regional and local basic conceptional problems as well as the main leaders, warlords and armed groups are involved – areas of post-conflict peace-building. a difficult mix for the peace-keepers to handle. Establishing and upholding a secure environment for humanitarian aid and socio-economic and poli- From First to Third Generation Peace-keeping tical reconstruction became a primary demand on the soldiers and the police. The old doctrine of The so-called first generation of peace-keeping was non-use of force became untenable. In Somalia, mostly limited to separating warring armies by the SC therefore felt compelled to provide UNO- interposing lightly armed and neutral international SOM II with a so-called robust mandate based on troops and observing or monitoring agreed cease- Chapter VII of the UN-Charter, allowing for the fires, like UNEF in the Sinai in the mid-fifties, limited use of force. UNPROFOR in the former UNFCYP in Cyprus from the mid-sixties onwards Yugoslavia, UNMIH in Haiti, IFOR and SFOR in and UNDOF on the Golan Heights in the mid- Bosnia, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia as well as the seventies. Consent, impartiality, use of force solely French »Operation Turquoise« in Rwanda, MNF in for personal self-defense purposes, free mobility of Haiti and MISAB in the Central African Republic troops as well as a Statute of Force Agreement received similar authorisation. The third genera- (SOFA) with the respective country were the basic tion of peace-keeping, now mostly called multi- pillars of this first generation of peace-keeping, dimensional (robust) peace support operations initiated by Lester G. Pearson, the Canadian For- outside the UN, had come into being. 1 eign Minister at that time, and Dag Hammar- Robust, multi-dimensional PSOs are properly skjöld, Secretary-General of the UN. defined as Chapter VI multi-dimensional peace- In the mid-eighties following the end of the keeping, with consent and impartiality as basic Cold War and the unblocking of the SC a second operational pillars, plus the option of the threat or generation developed which was multi-dimen- use of limited force for defending or implementing sional and dynamic in character. In contrast to the specific elements of the mandate, based on Chap- first generation, the military and their civilian ter VII of the UN Charter. counterparts were no longer limited to the moni- Politicians and the military as well the inter- toring of cease-fires. Finding political and social national public and academia are still struggling solutions to the conflict and removing the need for with this new concept. There is widespread mis- their presence as quickly as possible became giving about the fact that it is blurring the clear equally important tasks. The operations became distinction between traditional, Chapter VI-based much more dynamic and complex in terms of con- peace-keeping and military enforcement based flict resolution. UNTAG in Namibia and UNOVEN in on Chapter VII. This is true and is perhaps unfor- Nicaragua from 1989–1990, UNOSAL in El Salvador tunate. But academics and traditionalists among from 1991–1995, UNTAC in Cambodia from peace-keepers who demand strict adherence to this 1992–1993 and UNOMOZ in Mozambique from distinction forget that the real-life dynamics of 1992–1994, are show cases for this enlarged, new ethnic and similar conflicts have no regard for the type of peace-keeping. Police (CIVPOL) and civilians from various professions became important partners of the military in increasing numbers. 1. See for a first German elaboration of the concept of robust peace-keeping Winrich Kühne: Blauhelme in einer The unabated violence in cases like Somalia, turbulenten Welt (Blue Helmets in a turbulent world), former Yugoslavia, Liberia or Haiti quickly forced Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1993.

IPG 4/99 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed 359 written provisions of the Charter and its theoreti- intervene in a civil war. The operation ended cal distinctions. To put it in the blunt terms of a successfully. The secession of Katanga was preven- Canadian peace-keeper, speaking in context of the ted and the UN left the Congo in 1964. Yet, many conditions in Somalia and Bosnia: »It was evident Blue Helmets lost their life because they that traditional peace-keeping was being made a had not been either withdrawn or sufficiently rein- mockery of. There was almost a total absence of forced in time, but remained in indefensible, ex- the conditions that are essential for peace-keeping posed positions. The Blue Helmets of UNPROFOR, to work.« taken hostages by the Serbs and chained to public Ethnic conflict and civil war blur the lines installations after the switch-over to an offensive between domestic and international, state and use of force by NATO with the Pale bombing come non-state actors, as well as that between Chapter to mind. VI and VII. Conflicts in which hundreds of Unfortunately, none of UNOC’s problems were thousands of people are killed or have to flee their systematically analyzed. Some deadly failures could country are a threat to international peace and have been avoided in Somalia and Bosnia if the security (Article 39 UN Charter) in a highly inter- lessons of the Congo intervention would have dependent world. The Security Council was right been thoroughly learned. Like in Bosnia in 1993, to decide as it did in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia, the UN began the Congo operation with lightly Haiti etc. and to authorise robust operations on armed troops and ended with jet fighters. As two the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Canadian authors point out, deploying a fully equipped combat force, like in Bosnia and the Kosovo, is a better and safer way to do the job. It A Look Back – Third Generation Peace-keeping in is safer and cheaper to start »robust« and then to the Congo 1960–64 reduce personal than to slide into an uncontrolled escalation. There are a number of additional It is little known that UNOC in the Congo with a lessons from the Congo in the field of command, military and civilian staff of more than 20,000 had control and communication, logistics, training etc. been the largest peace-keeping operation under which could have been learned. 2 Unfortuna- the authority of the UN until the operation in tely, it took the General Assembly and the Security Cambodia. UNOC had had all the elements of third Council another thirty years to authorize the generation peace-keeping. Like most operations establishment of a Lessons Learned Unit in the after Somalia it dealt with a conflict, which was Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). 3 internal in origin. It was multidimensional with a considerable number of civil police and other civilians. And, like in the mid-nineties UNPROFOR The Problematic Use of Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it lost about 200 soldiers, when the mission suddenly switched over The proper use of force in PSO still needs a lot of to an offensive use of force to prevent the seces- doctrinal and operational clarification. It has to be sion of the province of Katanga and to quell public explicitly stated that, as a rule, the possible use of resistance. limited force in the context of peace operations is The UN responded by escalating the mandate very different from the massive use of force in war. to a robust one. In a resolution of February 1961, the SC urged the UN »to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for 2. See Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser and James D. cease-fires, the halting of all operations, the pre- Kiras (Ed.): Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in vention of clashes, and the use of force if neces- International Conflict Resolution, The Canadian Peace- sary, in the last resort«. Thirty-one years before keeping Press 1997, p. 35 Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace declared that 3. The author is a member of the informal Interna- tional Advisory Group of this Unit. It has, starting in »national sovereignty was no longer absolute« for 1995, evaluated most of the UN operations since the early the UN, Dag Hammarksjöld was advocating to nineties, starting with UNOSOM in Somalia.

360 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed IPG 4/99 Politicians, journalists and the general public proliferation of small arms in the hands of armed are confused. For most of them using force is gangs and militias on the other; synonymous with going to war and taking sides in protection of humanitarian aid transports and a given conflict. The military still struggle with the the necessary infrastructure (airports, harbours, question of how to use force without getting into bridges, etc.); a dangerous process of escalation and destroying the resettlement of refugees and internally dis- the entire peace process. In Somalia, the confusion placed persons; about the proper use of force amongst the military deterrence of attacks on declared safe-areas and and politicians has led to tragic events and a no-fly zones; rushed withdrawal. It took in particular the disarmament of combatants of the parties to the American military and their leaders a while to conflict and other armed groups. understand, that there is no war to win, there is no Disarmament, which will be dealt with later, and enemy (»conflict is the enemy«, as American doc- the closing of the »public security gap« are trine later correctly stated) and any use of force obviously the most difficult tasks. has to be extremely careful with regard to so- What is the best way to close the »public called collateral damage, i.e. killing civilians and security gap« is still a contentious issue. It ob- thereby loosing the support of the local popula- viously cannot be done by CIVPOL the way it tions. Several hundreds of non-combatant Somalis operates at present. CIVPOL units are normally only were killed in enforcement actions by UNOSOM II mandated to observe and monitor the local police troops. and/or assist in building up and training the A number of lessons have been learned with local police (see for instance IPTF in Bosnia and regard to the proper use of force, as the more Herzegovina). With an exception now in Kosovo, successful actions of MNF and HNMIH in Haiti, they are unarmed and have no direct authority UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia and IFOR and SFOR in with regard to public security. The military, how- Bosnia and KFOR in the Kosovo have shown. Yet, ever, do not consider public security their job, there is still an urgent need to conceptionalize, although they may be forced to fulfill it tempo- differentiate and define the conditions under rarily, like at present in Kosovo, until the inter- which the threat or use of limited force is called for national police arrives and the local one is func- and how to execute it, in order to promote what tioning. IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia in a number of continues to be the ultimate goal of peace- occasions have reacted negatively to appeals by the keeping: the containment of violence and the civil international authorities, i.e. the OHR (Office resolving of conflicts with the co-operation and of the High Representative) to intervene in risky consent of the parties concerned. Doctrine and the cases of public security, for instance to quell violent Rules of Engagements (RoEs), which guide the mass demonstrations. »We are not equipped for everyday work of a peacekeeper, are still weak, as such a job. Our soldiers are not trained to do every practitioner will point out. policing« is the regular reason given for their This doctrine and RoEs have to be based on refusal. what is the ultima ratio for the threat or use of In Bosnia civil authorities in the end had no force in peace support operations (in difference to other choice than to bring in a so-called Third all-out combat action like the bombing of Serbia Force, the MSU (Multinational Special Unit) with a by NATO with the aim of enforcing the agreement personal of more than three hundred, based on the to a peace support operation): creating and main- concept of the Guardia Civil in Spain and the taining a safe environment for the implementation Carabineri in Italy. Similarly, in the Kosovo the of the mandate and its mainly non-military ele- Secretary-General in his report following SC–Res. ments, in particular: 1244 (June 10, 1999) has recommended to deploy a the protection of UN and other international Special Police Unit (SPU) in addition to the CIVPOL personnel and installations; units. In difference to MSU, this special unit will be closing the so-called »public security gap«, due under the command of the civilian component to the non-functioning or one-sided abuse (UNIC) and not, like in Bosnia, form a part of the of local security organs on the one hand, and the military command and control structure.

IPG 4/99 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed 361 One may argue, whether this a wise solution. It Peace-keepers have a hard time deciding which may bring the civil authority into great difficulties, actors’ consent is relevant or not. In Somalia and when the situation is very rough and a close co- Bosnia this became an almost impossible task. Vio- ordination with the military is necessary. The lent groups acquired a great deal of leverage over debate whether it is not better to retrain certain the peace-keepers by denying consent. military units, for instance the military police, for British peace-keeping doctrine was the first to handling the rather violent challenges of public look for a practical solution to this problem. The security in a post-conflict peace-building phase, is concept of »wider peace-keeping« was developed still unresolved. In Haiti in the early nineties and in based on the experience in Northern Ireland Germany after the Second World War, military and then Bosnia. Its innovation was the distinction police took care of public security and it worked well. between »operational/strategic« and »tactical/local« consent. With regard to the first, consent continued to be unchallenged as an absolute rule. If consent Whose Consent? was withdrawn at this level, peace-keepers also had to withdraw. Its existence was considered to be Obviously, more tasks could be added to the above absolutely basic for a continuation of the peace list, in particular, the maintenance of cease-fires process. At a tactical level, however, they could use and the prevention of mass killing and ethnic cle- force or threaten the use of force if consent for the ansing. In the final analysis however, the over-ri- implementation of elements of the mandate, for ding purpose will always be to bring the warring instance delivering humanitarian aid, was denied parties back to the negotiating table and to con- by a local party. tain the destructive, violent dynamics of conflict. As a result of the lessons learned in Bosnia, This can only be done, if consent and impartiality the British military has abandoned this doctrine continue to be guiding principles of PSO. as impractical. Some of its assumptions are As far as traditional peace-keeping was con- flawed. For instance, the distinction between cerned, according to the rule of international law, operational/strategic and tactical/local consent only the consent of the governments of the coun- is questionable. In reality it does not exist in a tries involved in the conflict was actually required. systematic way. An incidence which may look like This rule was then extended to include the one being only local in character, for instance the or two dominant, clearly defined parties to the blockage of a humanitarian transport by women, conflict, like SWAPO in Namibia, RENAMO in old people and children, may quickly turn into one Mozambique or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. of strategic relevance and bring the entire peace It has to be understood, however, that inter- process into deep trouble when blood is spilled national law is only the starting point for the need and some women and children are killed. On the of consent. There are, in addition, two very prac- other hand, crossing the so-called Mogadishu line, tical reasons for taking this principle serious. First, i. e. the line of operational consent, is not neces- it minimizes the danger and eventually the need to sarily irreversible. It may actually be the prelude to use force and therefore protects not only the local reestablish consent and new dialogue, like with the civilians but also the international personal of the Serbs after the Pale bombing. operation. Second, most important, peace-building The relationship between consent and the use and a succesful conclusion of the peace process is of force in complex emergencies therefore remains only feasible, if the local population in its majority a complicated one, in terms of doctrine as well as is behind it or – as is now frequently said – owns clear rules of engagement. Consent is a moving it. Consent is a yardstick as to what extent this target on all relevant levels: the local people, the is the case. parties to the conflict, the national and interna- In socio-ethnic conflicts, particularly if taking tional media. They all tend to have different place in a failing state, this rule has become dif- understandings of consent in specific situations of ficult to apply. As was mentioned before, the lines conflict. It is a minefield for any peace-keeper. of conflict as well as the numbers of parties Many unsolved problems remain. However, a fighting each other are fragmented and in flux. few lessons have been learned: Firstly, there is a

362 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed IPG 4/99 direct relationship between the level of interna- which are not? There is also a widespread assump- tional military power in the field and the solidity tion among politicians, journalists and academics of the consent by the parties to the conflict. As a that the use of force is per se incompatible with rule of thumb one may state that the stronger the impartiality. The moment peace-keepers use force international capability, the better the prospect of beyond the purpose of self-defense, they become consent not being withdrawn. The need to use accused of »taking sides«. force will actually be reduced. This is obviously This is a flawed understanding of impartiality. a forceful argument for going in with oversized Impartiality is not equal to neutrality or passiv- rather than undersized forces at the beginning ity. The UN Charter is not neutral – it demands of a PSO. respect for certain basic values and norms (see, Secondly, consent-promoting or inducing tech- e. g. Articles 1 and 2) –, nor are the mandates given niques become very important so that the use of by the Security Council neutral, in particular if the force remains ultima ratio. These techniques reason, or one of the reasons for international demand much skill from each and every military intervention are humanitarian. Undertaking activi- and civil peace-keeper, particularly at leadership ties towards the implementation of mandates, level. A wide spectrum of »consent-promoting« including the use of force, does not automatically instruments exists, some of which involve behind- equal taking sides, even if the activity happens to the-scenes pressure, sticks and carrots, economic be to one of the parties’ detriment. If, for instance, and other sanctions, psychological operations in the case of an armed bank robbery, the police (PSYOPs), public pressure (use of the media) and were to free the hostages, nobody would accuse the show of force. the police of taking sides; they merely would have fulfilled their public mandate. Actually, the non-use of force may violate impartiality, for Impartiality – a Dynamic Understanding is Needed! instance if the mandate demands the disarmament and demobilization of the combat units of all par- The principle of neutrality obviously made sense in ties to the conflict and one side complies and the conflict between states and conventional armies, other does not. Impartiality is clearly unbalanced with clearly defined lines of separation and deploy- and consent in danger because those parties having ment. It was, however, too simplistic and static disarmed feel treated unfairly. The critical issue when it had to be applied in other kinds of con- therefore is whether the activities undertaken by flict, with less clearly defined actors and lines of the international personal, in the political as well as conflict. The term changed to the need for the in the military field, are in conformity with the peace-keepers to be »impartial«. The 1995 UN– mandate and are undertaken in an even-handed General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations manner. provide a valid definition of this more dynamic Finally, there is a further fundamental problem: concept, which is not identical with neutrality: Mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide »Impartiality must not promote inaction. On have become frequent patterns of socio-ethnic the contrary, peace-keepers must discharge their and similar conflict. They are not accidental but tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour. increasingly part of the military-political strategy of Neither side should gain unfair advantages as a one or the other of the warring factions. This is as result of the activities of a peace-keeping opera- true for the conflicts on the Balkan as well as those tion.... Impartiality should not be interpreted as in Africa. Any action by the peace-keepers and their equidistance between the mandate and the party’s civilian counterparts to prevent such crimes is newly revised position. It is the Security Council bound to pit them against one side or the other. mandate which manifests the legitimate will of the Old concepts of »neutrality« or »static impartiality« international community.« cannot deal with such perpetrations although they In the practice of modern peace-keeping opera- concern the very rationale behind why the inter- tions impartiality faces problems similar to those of national community is sending peace-keepers in. consent: Impartiality with regard to which parties A dynamic, normative definition of impartiality to the conflict? Which parties are relevant and is therefore needed, taking so-called »erga omnes«

IPG 4/99 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed 363 norms of international law (genocide, massive should not be allowed to undermine long-term violations of humans rights etc.) into account. SC goals. Another important lesson learned in past mandates and RoEs need to be formulated accor- missions is that the so-called »emergency-to-relief- dingly! The existence of the two UN War Crimes to-development continuum«, which for a while Courts for former Yugoslavia and the genocide in was very popular in parts of the development and Rwanda as well the agreement on establishing a donor community, is not a useful basis to work on. permanent International Criminal Court most For example, the short-term necessity to prevent probably will reinforce this trend for a more nor- combatants, by whatever means, from taking up mative understanding of impartiality. In addition their arms again, may well clash with long-term the international public and media have to be edu- development objectives demanding their integra- cated to understand this normative, dynamic inter- tion into productive occupations as participants in pretation of impartiality. Peacekeepers who are the national economy. Furthermore, emergency, incorrectly accused by the international media relief and development activities often need to of not being impartial cannot pursue their task take place simultaneously, and should therefore be properly. The judgement by the international approached in an integrated manner. media will be abused by local parties to the conflict It seems natural to think that post-conflict against them. peace-building should start only after a cease-fire has been agreed upon. However, experience in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, Angola, Rwanda, From Peace Operations to Post–conflict Former Yugoslavia and other places, demonstrates Peace-building the importance of an early beginning of post-conflict peace-building in order to limit the damage In modern, multi-dimensional peace operations, caused by violence and to lay the foundations for a post-conflict peace-building has become of stra- more vigorous peace-building effort in the future. tegic importance. The concept, therefore, figured In as much as post-conflict peace-building aims at prominently in UN Secretary-General Boutros- preventing violent conflict from re-emerging, it Ghali’s Agenda for Peace of 1992. It was further may appear as a form of preventive diplomacy and developed in the supplement to an Agenda for to some extent that is so. Still, the point of depar- Peace in 1995 and explicitly welcomed by the ture is different, post-conflict peace-building Security Council and the General Assembly of the applies to situations where the worst has already UN in a number of resolutions. happened, leaving behind traumata to be healed, The purpose of post-conflict peace-building is mine fields to be cleared, former combatants to to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging and be disarmed and refugees to be repatriated and to rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve reintegrated. conflict without fighting. Therefore, the essence of Apart from the ever urgent problem of emerg- post-conflict peace-building is that of a political ency aid and relief activities, it has become clear in undertaking, even if it comprises activities which recent years that there are three fields of strategic transcend the political domain, like development importance for successful peace operations and co-operation, humanitarian assistance, protection peace-building: of human rights and institution building. Post- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration conflict peace-building is different from develop- (DDR) of combatants and other armed groups; ment co-operation in as much as it includes, inter elections and constitution building; alia, emergency assistance, de-mobilisation and justice and reconciliation. reintegration of former combatants, and the Disarmament, demobilization and reintegra- restoration of public order and security. Time tion: With regard to DDR, it is important to note constraints within which it operates are short and that tensions and violence which are at the origin medium-term, as opposed to the long-term per- of a conflict, do not suddenly disappear as soon as spective of co-operation. Indeed, lack of time a peace agreement or cease-fire is signed. Progress is characteristic of post-conflict peace-building. in the field of disarmament, demobilization and Nevertheless, in principle, short-term concerns reintegration, and progress in the peace process

364 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed IPG 4/99 are highly interdependent. DDR is one of the most strategic objective in UN peace missions conducted demanding elements of peace-building. In affluent since the end of the Cold War. Internationally western societies there is a notion that »violence monitored elections have become the conclud- does not pay.« However, in ethnic and similar ing activity in most cases. They are conceived to types of conflict well-considered economic interest be the best mechanism to guarantee an orderly, is more often than not, the dominant reason for peaceful, participatory and transparent succession rampant and continued violence. It is therefore of governments and to make executive power extremely important to understand the economics more accountable to the people. These manifest of violence and economics of war. Warlords repre- advantages may be the reason for the fact that sent a sinister combination of military commander, elections have often been held too soon in con- gang leader, business man and political leader. flict-ridden societies and not terminated the con- Unemployment, particularly among the young, flicts in the way which had been hoped for. Indeed provides a further ground for recruitment. The elections in fragmented societies may result in wide availability of small arms and light weapons in increased fragmentation as, inter alia, the cases of most conflict regions makes it easy and compara- Angola and Sierra Leone demonstrate. Sometimes tively cheap to arm these youngsters. Coercive elections are simply a continuation of war with disarmament in the context of these types of con- other means, particularly in the case of »winner- flict carries considerable risk. Consent-based stra- takes-all« elections. tegies therefore are preferable, but – depending on The right timing of elections therefore is a local conditions – are not always feasible. central issue for elections in peace-building and, Disarmament and demobilization without like other elements of peace-building, they have to rigorous programs of reintegration will inevitably be planned well in advance, ideally two or three fail. Therefore, much attention has to be given years before they take place. Sufficient demobiliza- to the social and economic impact of externally tion and integration of combatants into the new sponsored demobilization programs. Success also army, police force, or civil society and a satisfactory very much depends on the extent to which the restoration of the judicial system and of public former warring parties and individuals believe that administration are necessary preconditions. Credi- their physical and economic security will be bility and integrity of the electoral process help maintained after relinquishing their arms and to prevent disputes over the outcome and forestall abandoning, what for many has become a way of a relapse into violence. International monitoring life and economic survival. should continue throughout the electoral process Weapons buy-back programs may play an and even beyond. This is important because of the important role in disarmament and demobiliza- lasting distrust of the parties to a conflict towards tion, like in El Salvador and Eastern Slavonia. In each other. In extreme cases of fragmentation and sum however, their record is mixed. Particularly if violence it may even be better to go for power- connected to money and offered as compensation, sharing as an interim solution in the general transi- buy-back programs can create streams of weapons tion from war to peace and democracy. Western- flowing from one region to another. It may be style democracy will not work, at least in the short better to spend these funds on improving the run; governments of national unity may be the police and judiciary to improve the security condi- only way to forestall a fall back into fighting. In tions in the country concerned. Weapons destruc- such cases the international community should at tion programs are the most effective way to reduce least try to establish a mechanism to monitor mini- arms flows and to get rid of collected weapons. If mum standards of human rights. Finally, one les- done in public with a ceremony and in the pre- son of past democratization processes, inside and sence of the media, it sends a strong political outside of peace operations is crystal clear: Elec- signal to combatants and to society. The case of tions are only a starting point for democratization, Mali and its public burning of collected weapons not its successful conclusion. Past international was powerful evidence of this. The «flamme de peace-keeping and peace operations by the inter- paix« has become a symbol for a society at peace. national community therefore have been rightly Elections and constitution-building have been a criticised, as having abused elections as a quick exit

IPG 4/99 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed 365 option from difficult peace-processes. This was three attorneys and do not have to fear the death particularly the case in war-torn Liberia. penalty, although they are the main perpetrators, Justice and reconciliation: Finally, there will be puts a severe strain on justice. Those who are dealt no lasting peace and stable democracy in war-torn with by the barely developed judiciary in Rwanda societies without truth, justice and reconciliation. do not enjoy these privileges. Some of them have Mass killing, ethnic cleansing, rape and other already been condemned to death and executed. brutal forms of conducting war in ethnic, religious and similar types of conflict render reconciliation extremely difficult. Although it is a long-term pro- Co-ordination and Integrated Management cess, it has to be started as soon as the peace operation and peace-building are initiated. Dif- In multi-dimensional peace operations and peace- ferent models for reconciliation have emerged. building the co-ordination and management of »Forgive and Forget« has been frequently the multitude of military and non-military instru- practised in Africa, for instance in Zimbabwe, ments and actors is of strategic importance for Namibia etc. It is based on the assumption that their success. An integrated approach is needed civil wars have their own dynamic and that its and has to be planned for from the very beginning. atrocities cannot be judged in normal legal This is easier said than done or, as one popular terms. It is reinforced by the assumption that sentence amongst practitioners goes, »everybody African cultures in particular, have a great capa- wants co-ordination but nobody wants to be city for forgiving. co-ordinated«. During »Operation Provide Com- »Justice and Reconciliation Through Truth« is a fort« in Northern Iraq in the early nineties, more recent model. The South African Truth the allied forces had to cope with about 500 aid and Reconciliation Commission has become organizations, some with more than a hundred well-known for its endeavors to heal the atroci- employees, some with only three. In Somalia, ties of both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle. the number of NGOs was about two hundred. The Truth Commission in Guatemala operates About the same number is know active in Kosovo. in a similar way, where as the Purification Com- Soldiers and NGOs have very different operational mission in Mozambique was based on more tra- cultures. The military are used to following com- ditional concepts of healing and reconciliation. mands without much questioning. Not so in Obviously, the commissions in South Africa and NGOs, in particular those working on a voluntary Guatemala are based on a Christian under- basis. To complicate matters still further, the inter- standing of forgiving by confession. national NGO community itself is extremely In societies in which systematic genocide has heterogeneous. All organizations have their own occurred, justice, truth and reconciliation are of raison d’être, peculiarities and vanities. Never- even greater importance, but even more difficult theless, most of them are valuable for rendering to achieve. Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo are cases humanitarian assistance and peace-building. They in point. In Rwanda more than 100,000 perpetra- can do work which military organizations cannot tors of the genocide in 1994 are still kept in primi- do at all, or at least not as well or cost-effectively, tive conditions of detention by the Kigali govern- in particular with regard to complicated socio- ment. In view of the barely functioning judicial economical and socio-cultural issues. Operation system in Rwanda, one wonders how much justice Provide Comfort, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR and others is needed on the one side and how much can be have shown that soldiers and NGOs can learn to realistically expected to reconcile the Tutsi and work together constructively if certain prejudices Hutu. How much justice and reconciliation the and psychological barriers are overcome. international criminal tribunals, which have been Unity not only of purpose, but also of strategy created by the UN Security Council for Rwanda and action are the sine qua non for success. Joint and Former Yugoslavia, can actually contribute structures for distributing and sharing information remains an open question. The fact that the to all actors, joint analysis and planning, as well accused in Arusha, where the Tribunal for Rwanda as implementation mechanisms have proven their is based, enjoy a tribunal »deluxe« with two or effectiveness, as well as joint pre-mission training

366 Kühne, Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed IPG 4/99 and regular executive meetings to monitor devel- at large must be blamed for rather hindering opments. At all stages the relevant actors (especi- than supporting to improve its institutional set-up ally the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, the and capabilities for doing this job. Important donor community and NGOs) should be closely initiatives, like for instance the Canadian proposal involved in the decision-making process, led by of »Enhancing the UN’s Quick Reaction Capabi- the UN or a regional organization. There may be a lity«, have been torpedoed and come to a stand- need for earmarking a lead-agency to take over still. The fact that multidimensional peace support co-ordination in the early stages. CIMICs, i. e. Civil- operations and peace-building will be one of Military Co-operation structures have been tried the main pillars of peace and security in a highly with some success in Bosnia. Some countries, like interdependent, globalised world, i. e. of global the Australians in Somalia, have established their governance, has apparently not been sufficiently own CMOTs (Civil-Military Operations Teams). understood. And it is of prime importance to enhance and clarify the role and authority of the SRSGs (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) or similar leaders of peace operations and peace-building as the »head of the family and team leader«.