Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding US Decisions of Armed Humanitarian Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War
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STORIES AND PAST LESSONS: UNDERSTANDING U.S. DECISIONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Shannon Peterson, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Associate Professor Donald A. Sylvan, Adviser Approved by Professor Emeritus Chadwick F. Alger ________________________ Adviser Assistant Professor Ted G. Hopf Political Science Department ABSTRACT What factors appear influential to U.S. decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention? Utilizing the “story model” mode of problem representation first utilized by psychologists Pennington and Hastie (1986; 1988) and adapted to the domain of foreign policy by Sylvan and Charlick-Paley (2000), this research seeks to answer this question by exploring how top decision makers within the Bush and Clinton administrations collectively represented problems in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the early to mid-nineteen nineties. In particular, it explores whether decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention appear linked to: (1) the invocation of historical analogies, (2) perceptions of threats and or opportunities to vital national interests, (3) perceived moral/legal imperatives, (4) pressure and interests related to domestic actors, such as the Congress, the public and the media, (5) institutional pressures and interests pertaining to U.S. membership in international organizations or alliances, such as NATO and or the United Nations, (6) the perceived relative ease and utility of intervention, and (7) vested military interests. An analysis of the collective elite discourse and evolving representations (or “stories”) of each crisis reveals, among other things, that decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and ii nonintervention appear strongly linked to perceived pressure and interests pertaining to U.S. membership in international institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO and to perceptions of the relative ease and utility of such intervention. In addition, although analogies appear to influence and constrain elite representations of problems, they were invoked in the discourse in a piecemeal as opposed to a holistic fashion. Meanwhile analogies of past foreign policy “failures” and “successes” did not appear to correlate with decisions of armed humanitarian intervention and nonintervention as originally posited, although a correlation did exist when stories were classified according to a less stringent “activist” or “nonactivist” classification. Finally, the research also supports the importance of perceived domestic pressure – notably public opinion – to intervention decisions; the importance of “multilateralism” as a norm constraining elite decision making; and the tendency on behalf of decision makers to “demonize” one actor or groups of actors in extended conflict situations. iii For Michael, Camryn and Catherine iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge and thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Donald Sylvan. If it were not for his continual guidance and inspiration, encouragement in time of doubt, and patience throughout the many stops and starts along the way, this research would not have been completed. I would also like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Chadwick Alger, for his thoughtful support and encouragement over the years, and Dr. Ted Hopf, for his insightful comments and analysis. To the staff and faculty in the Political Science Department at Utah State University, thank you for the use of the department’s resources and facilities, as well as the support, advice, encouragement and friendship that helped sustain me throughout the dissertation process. Finally, I must acknowledge my many friends and family members who never lost faith in me and whose love and support made this dissertation possible. A special thanks to my mother, whose unflagging optimism, infinite patience and endless hours of child care made possible the time necessary for researching and writing; and to my father, for his intellectual curiosity, interest and sympathy to the trials and tribulations of an aspiring academic and working parent. Above all I want to thank my husband Mike and my two daughters, Camryn and Catherine, who have provided me with the v encouragement, love, laughter and inspiration to follow and complete my goals while also putting such work in greater perspective. vi VITA December 7, 1966……………………… Born – Murray, Utah 1990 ……………………………………. B.A. Liberal Arts and Political Science, Utah State University. 1992 ……………………………………. M.A. Political Science, Utah State University 1992 -1996 ………………………………Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University 1996 -1997 ………………………………Editor and Analyst, Samsung Securities International Business Department, Seoul South Korea 1997…………………………………….. Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University 1998 – present ………………………….. Instructor, Utah State University PUBLICATIONS Research Publication 1. “American Public Opinion and the Use of Force: Change or Continuity in the Post- Cold War World?” with Richard K. Herrmann in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds. 1997. U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. vii FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…………………………………………………………………………. ii Dedication ……………………………………………………………………… iv Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………… v Vita ……………………………………………………………………………… vii List of Tables ……………………………………………………………………. x List of Figures ……………………………………………………………………. xi Chapters: 1. Introduction: Understanding Intervention Decisions………………… 1 2. The Somalia Intervention …………………..……………………… 37 3. The Nonintervention in Rwanda ……………………………………… 133 4. A Tale in Two Parts: Inaction in Bosnia (1992-1993) ……………… 196 5. Bosnia II: The Road to Intervention (1993-1995) …………………… 271 6. Concluding Observations …………………………………………… 369 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… 411 ix LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2.1 Hypothesized factors favoring military intervention as reflected in key junctures of the evolving Somalia story ………………………………… 105 3.1 Hypothesized factors favoring military intervention as reflected in key junctures of the evolving the Rwandan story…………………………… 176 4.1 Hypothesized factors favoring military intervention as reflected in key junctures of the evolving Bosnia story………………………………….. 247 4.2 Comparison of the most “activist” stories across the four Bosnian cases. 258 5.1 Hypothesized factors favoring military intervention as reflected in key junctures of the Clinton administration’s representation of the Bosnian conflict (July 1993-November 1995)……………………… 338 6.1 Factors favoring military intervention as reflected in the stories of armed humanitarian intervention in the Somalia and Bosnia cases…………… 370 6.2 Factors favoring military intervention as reflected in the most “activist” story junctures (excluding those defined as “armed humanitarian intervention” in Table 6.1) of the Somali, Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts…………………………………………………… 379 6.3 Factors favoring military intervention as reflected in the least “activist” story junctures during the Somali, Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts……………………………………………………….. 380 6.4 Analogies invoked in the key story junctures across the four cases……. 390 6.5 Analogies invoked in the most “activist” stories across the four cases… 394 6.6 Analogies invoked in the least “activist” stories across the four cases… 395 x LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page 1.1 The Original Story Model ………………………………………… 5 1.2 The Adapted Story Model ………………………………………… 7 2.1 The story leading to the U.S. military airlift “Operation Provide Relief” (July-August 1992) ……………………………… 44 2.2 The story leading to the UNITAF intervention “Operation Provide Hope” (November-December 1992) …………………….. 53 2.3 The story leading to the UNOSOM II transition under the Clinton administration (December 1992-March 1993) ………….. 74 2.4 The “Get Aidid” story following the massacre of Pakistani peacekeepers (June-July 1993)..………………………………….. 84 2.5 “Withdrawal” story following the deaths of U.S. forces (August-October 1993)…………………………………………… 92 3.1 The Clinton administration’s “No interests, No involvement story” (April-July 1993)…………………………………………. 137 3.2 The story surrounding “Operation Provide Support” (July- August 1994)……………………………………………………… 165 4.1 The Bush administration’s story of “Aid and Avoid” (Spring-December 1992)…………………………………………. 201 4.2 The Clinton administration’s story of “Peace through Diplomacy” (January-April 1993)……………………………….. 215 4.3 The “Lift and Strike” story (April-May 1993)…………………... 226 4.4 “Containment” (May – July 1993)……………………………… 236 5.1 “Peace through Threats” (July 1993-January 1994)…………… 275 xi 5.2 “Coercive Diplomacy” (January 1994-November 1994)…… 287 5.3 “Muddling Through” (November 1994-July 1995)……………… 306 5.4 “The Endgame” (July-November 1995)……………………… 323 xii CHAPTER 1 UNDERSTANDING INTERVENTION DECISIONS When and why does a state intervene militarily into the affairs of another state? Since the end of the cold war and more recently since the events of 9/11, the question of military intervention has garnered new salience. America’s global war against terrorism and conflict with Iraq has added a new chapter to the debate over military intervention, a debate that began prior to the new millennium. In the wake of the cold war, civil and ethnic conflicts