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Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2010 The Royal Navy in the Baltic from 1807-1812 David J. (David John) Raymond Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE BALTIC FROM 1807-1812 By DAVID J. RAYMOND A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2010 The members of the committee approve the dissertation of David J. Raymond defended on April 6th, 2010. ___________________________ Jonathon Grant Professor Directing Dissertation ___________________________ Mark Souva University Representative ___________________________ Rafe Blaufarb Committee Member ___________________________ Michael Creswell Committee Member ___________________________ James P. Jones Committee Member The Graduate School had verified and approved the above-named committee members ii This is dedicated to Edna Lehua Kia Mahalo a Aloha iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the members of the committee for the patience, support and advice they have shown me over the years. For similar reasons, I would also like to thank the History Staff at Florida State University, both past and present. You shall be missed, but not forgotten. An additional vote of thanks is given to Kelly Watson for her translating and formatting skills. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract vi 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. THE DISPUTE OVER TRADE AND THE 1801 BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN 10 3. THE DESCENT ON COPENHAGEN 23 4. ANGLO-SWEDISH RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF GUSTAVUS IV 51 5. THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN 68 6. THE “NEW” ROYAL NAVY AND ITS FOES 94 7. BRITAIN AND SWEDEN 106 8. BRITAIN VS. DENMARK 153 9. THE “HAZARDS OF THE SEA” 196 10. CONCLUSION 213 11. BIBLIOGRAPHY 216 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 231 v ABSTRACT This dissertation presents and analyzes British Naval Operations in the Baltic during the Napoleonic War. In addition, Political and Economic Relations between Britain and the nations bordering the Baltic will be addressed, in particular Denmark, Sweden and Russia. The intent is to present a comprehensive portrayal of a largely overlooked period of Naval and Napoleonic History. vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In most naval histories of the Napoleonic Wars, the narrative of events almost invariably parallels the career of Horatio Nelson. Likewise, the story of the naval war climaxes with the Battle of Trafalgar and the death of Nelson. It is a dramatic story involving one of History’s greatest heroes and commonly concludes with the conformation of Britain as the dominant naval power of the age. However, victory at Trafalgar did not bring to an end Britain’s struggle to control the world’s oceans, nor did it ensure that the trade so vital to the island nation’s economy would continue to flow. Indeed, after 1805 Britain’s Achilles Heel was its dependence on foreign goods, in particular naval stores, that catch-all phrase that includes all the materials necessary to build and maintain ships, both military and civilian. For that Britain had to control not the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, but also control access to that shallow and all but enclosed body of water known as the Baltic Sea. To secure that access, British leaders historically maintained a delicate balance of military force and diplomatic finesse with Denmark, Russia and Sweden, checking any attempt by one of the three to dominate the region, but doing so without alienating them and thus endangering the flow of trade. For the most part, this policy was a successful one for although there was a level of Anglophobic sentiment in each of these countries, Anglo-Baltic relations remained friendly. However, in 1807 a series of decisions made by short-sighted British politicians, coupled with the growing strength of Napoleonic France, led to a series of decisions made on both sides of the Baltic that threatened to accomplish what the combined Franco-Spanish-Dutch fleets failed to do; force Britain to choose between surrender and starvation. Over the ensuring five years, Britain, in the form of its semi-permanent Baltic Fleet, struggled to fulfill a variety of missions; among them protecting Sweden from outside invasion, containing a remarkably resilient and tenacious Denmark as well as a Russian Navy that sought to imperil central Sweden 1 while supporting land operations. All the while the Fleet pursued its traditional role of keeping the trade routes open. More often than not, these missions conflicted and even contradicted one another. For example, Britain’s role as “Sweden’s shield,” continued after the latter nation went from British ally, to cautious neutral, to reluctant adversary, while their conflict with Russia took the form of a “cold war” by which both parties sought to avoid direct confrontation with the other. Only Denmark remained consistent in their opposition to Britain, although their method of fighting the British could best be described as “unconventional,” a combination of commercial warfare, privateering and fragile, but heavily-armed oared galleys that, initially at least, went beyond anything previously experienced by the Royal Navy. Even the seemingly routine business of trade and commerce was, in the Baltic unlike anywhere else. Because the Baltic ports were, thanks to Napoleon’s Continental System, closed to British shipping, trade had to be conducted through neutral nations or by smuggling. In the case of the latter, British officials were actively providing falsified documents such as licenses and certificates of ownership in violation of not only the Continental System, but Britain’s own Navigation Acts which required all British trade be conducted in British ships. It was a haphazard, jury-built system of trade that somehow worked and succeeded in not only keeping open the flow of trade, but also weakened France’s ability to impose her will on northern Europe. It is an intriguing story that plays to one of the primary missions of a navy; to preserve a nation’s rights overseas and influence the hearts and minds of other peoples in a manner favorable to the national interest. Yet, it is a story that, until now, has gone almost unnoticed and unmentioned in either Napoleonic or naval history. Review of Historiography For the most part, histories of the Baltic during the Napoleonic Wars begin and end with 1801 Battle of Copenhagen, largely because of the presence of Horatio Nelson and his legendary “blind-eye” disobedience of his superior officer’s order to disengage. This is perhaps best illustrated by Dudley Pope’s The Great Gamble: Nelson at Copenhagen. Although he addresses the events that eventually led to Denmark’s revocation of her neutrality and subsequent attack by the British, Pope’s central figure is Nelson, in particular his tactical brilliance and his controversial appeal to the Danes to end their hostilities with Britain, bypassing the chain of 2 command but adding to the Nelson myth. And it is this myth that is part of the historical problem as the legend of Nelson has cast a long, obscuring shadow over any and all naval operations that did not directly involve the slightly-built British Admiral. Equally frustrating was the impression that the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen resolved the differences between the British and the Danes when in fact the deeper issue of British blockade versus neutral’s rights remained unresolved and would directly contribute to the Second Battle of Copenhagen six years later. Ironically, the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen has its own obscuring shadow, although this was generated not by a person, but rather by an event. In books such as William James’ Naval History of Great Britain and Arthur J. Marder’s The Anatomy of British Sea Power, the argument is made that the British attack was prompted by the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit and that belief that Denmark was on the verge of placing their navy at Napoleon’s disposal. More recent works such as Thomas Munch-Petersen’s Defying Napoleon has challenged this view by revealing that it would have been impossible for British agents to have forward details of the Treaty to London before the 19th of July, the date that the decision to send an expeditionary force to Denmark with an ultimatum to surrender their fleet to British control or have it taken by force was made. This then raises the question of what did convince British Foreign Minister and de facto head of government George Canning that attacking Denmark would secure British interests in the region and persuade Russia to reject the Tilsit Treaty and return to the anti-French coalition. And while the operation achieved its immediate goal of seizing the Danish Fleet, strategically it was a failure, jeopardizing British relations in the region and setting the stage for the next five years. It is curious that despite the obvious strategic importance of keeping the Baltic open to British trade, so much so as to warrant the deployment of a significant portion of the Royal Navy for five consecutive years, there is little if any mention of that period in most books of naval history. Even more recent histories of British sea power, such as Arthur Herman’s To Rule the Waves, or N.A.M. Rodger’s The Command of the Ocean are silent on the subject, save a brief, almost cursory acknowledgement that said activity had taken place. The reason for that omission was simple, with the exception of single clash between a British and Russian sail-of-the-line, there were no major battles to attract the casual reader. The largest naval power in the region, the Russian Baltic Fleet, appeared to have adopted a policy of avoid conflict with the Royal 3 Navy, focusing instead on defending their coasts and harbors from a sudden British attack.

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