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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2010 The Royal in the Baltic from 1807-1812 David J. (David John) Raymond

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE IN THE BALTIC FROM 1807-1812

By

DAVID J. RAYMOND

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2010

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of David J. Raymond defended on April 6th, 2010.

______Jonathon Grant Professor Directing Dissertation

______Mark Souva University Representative

______Rafe Blaufarb Committee Member

______Michael Creswell Committee Member

______James P. Jones Committee Member

The Graduate School had verified and approved the above-named committee members

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This is dedicated to Edna Lehua Kia Mahalo a Aloha

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the members of the committee for the patience, support and advice they have shown me over the years. For similar reasons, I would also like to thank the History Staff at Florida State University, both past and present. You shall be missed, but not forgotten.

An additional vote of thanks is given to Kelly Watson for her translating and formatting skills.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract vi

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THE DISPUTE OVER TRADE AND THE 1801 BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN 10

3. THE DESCENT ON COPENHAGEN 23

4. ANGLO-SWEDISH RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF GUSTAVUS IV 51

5. THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN 68

6. THE “NEW” ROYAL NAVY AND ITS FOES 94

7. BRITAIN AND 106

8. BRITAIN VS. DENMARK 153

9. THE “HAZARDS OF THE SEA” 196

10. CONCLUSION 213

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY 216

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 231

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents and analyzes British Naval Operations in the Baltic during the Napoleonic War. In addition, Political and Economic Relations between Britain and the nations bordering the Baltic will be addressed, in particular Denmark, Sweden and Russia. The intent is to present a comprehensive portrayal of a largely overlooked period of Naval and Napoleonic History.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In most naval histories of the Napoleonic Wars, the narrative of events almost invariably parallels the career of Horatio Nelson. Likewise, the story of the naval war climaxes with the Battle of Trafalgar and the death of Nelson. It is a dramatic story involving one of History’s greatest heroes and commonly concludes with the conformation of Britain as the dominant naval power of the age. However, victory at Trafalgar did not bring to an end Britain’s struggle to control the world’s oceans, nor did it ensure that the trade so vital to the island nation’s economy would continue to flow. Indeed, after 1805 Britain’s Achilles Heel was its dependence on foreign goods, in particular naval stores, that catch-all phrase that includes all the materials necessary to build and maintain ships, both military and civilian. For that Britain had to control not the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, but also control access to that shallow and all but enclosed body of water known as the . To secure that access, British leaders historically maintained a delicate balance of military force and diplomatic finesse with Denmark, Russia and Sweden, checking any attempt by one of the three to dominate the region, but doing so without alienating them and thus endangering the flow of trade. For the most part, this policy was a successful one for although there was a level of Anglophobic sentiment in each of these countries, Anglo-Baltic relations remained friendly. However, in 1807 a series of decisions made by short-sighted British politicians, coupled with the growing strength of Napoleonic France, led to a series of decisions made on both sides of the Baltic that threatened to accomplish what the combined Franco-Spanish-Dutch fleets failed to do; force Britain to choose between surrender and starvation. Over the ensuring five years, Britain, in the form of its semi-permanent Baltic Fleet, struggled to fulfill a variety of missions; among them protecting Sweden from outside invasion, containing a remarkably resilient and tenacious Denmark as well as a that sought to imperil central Sweden

1 while supporting land operations. All the while the Fleet pursued its traditional role of keeping the trade routes open. More often than not, these missions conflicted and even contradicted one another. For example, Britain’s role as “Sweden’s shield,” continued after the latter nation went from British ally, to cautious neutral, to reluctant adversary, while their conflict with Russia took the form of a “cold war” by which both parties sought to avoid direct confrontation with the other. Only Denmark remained consistent in their opposition to Britain, although their method of fighting the British could best be described as “unconventional,” a combination of commercial warfare, privateering and fragile, but heavily-armed oared galleys that, initially at least, went beyond anything previously experienced by the Royal Navy. Even the seemingly routine business of trade and commerce was, in the Baltic unlike anywhere else. Because the Baltic ports were, thanks to Napoleon’s Continental System, closed to British shipping, trade had to be conducted through neutral nations or by smuggling. In the case of the latter, British officials were actively providing falsified documents such as licenses and certificates of ownership in violation of not only the Continental System, but Britain’s own Navigation Acts which required all British trade be conducted in British ships. It was a haphazard, jury-built system of trade that somehow worked and succeeded in not only keeping open the flow of trade, but also weakened France’s ability to impose her will on northern Europe. It is an intriguing story that plays to one of the primary missions of a navy; to preserve a nation’s rights overseas and influence the hearts and minds of other peoples in a manner favorable to the national interest. Yet, it is a story that, until now, has gone almost unnoticed and unmentioned in either Napoleonic or naval history.

Review of Historiography For the most part, histories of the Baltic during the Napoleonic Wars begin and end with 1801 Battle of Copenhagen, largely because of the presence of Horatio Nelson and his legendary “blind-eye” disobedience of his superior officer’s order to disengage. This is perhaps best illustrated by Dudley Pope’s The Great Gamble: Nelson at Copenhagen. Although he addresses the events that eventually led to Denmark’s revocation of her neutrality and subsequent attack by the British, Pope’s central figure is Nelson, in particular his tactical brilliance and his controversial appeal to the Danes to end their hostilities with Britain, bypassing the chain of

2 command but adding to the Nelson myth. And it is this myth that is part of the historical problem as the legend of Nelson has cast a long, obscuring shadow over any and all naval operations that did not directly involve the slightly-built British . Equally frustrating was the impression that the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen resolved the differences between the British and the Danes when in fact the deeper issue of British blockade versus neutral’s rights remained unresolved and would directly contribute to the Second Battle of Copenhagen six years later. Ironically, the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen has its own obscuring shadow, although this was generated not by a person, but rather by an event. In books such as William James’ Naval History of Great Britain and Arthur J. Marder’s The Anatomy of British Sea Power, the argument is made that the British attack was prompted by the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit and that belief that Denmark was on the verge of placing their navy at Napoleon’s disposal. More recent works such as Thomas Munch-Petersen’s Defying Napoleon has challenged this view by revealing that it would have been impossible for British agents to have forward details of the Treaty to London before the 19th of July, the date that the decision to send an expeditionary force to Denmark with an ultimatum to surrender their fleet to British control or have it taken by force was made. This then raises the question of what did convince British Foreign Minister and de facto head of government George Canning that attacking Denmark would secure British interests in the region and persuade Russia to reject the Tilsit Treaty and return to the anti-French coalition. And while the operation achieved its immediate goal of seizing the Danish Fleet, strategically it was a failure, jeopardizing British relations in the region and setting the stage for the next five years. It is curious that despite the obvious strategic importance of keeping the Baltic open to British trade, so much so as to warrant the deployment of a significant portion of the Royal Navy for five consecutive years, there is little if any mention of that period in most books of naval history. Even more recent histories of British sea power, such as Arthur Herman’s To Rule the Waves, or N.A.M. Rodger’s The Command of the Ocean are silent on the subject, save a brief, almost cursory acknowledgement that said activity had taken place. The reason for that omission was simple, with the exception of single clash between a British and Russian sail-of-the-line, there were no battles to attract the casual reader. The largest naval power in the region, the Russian Baltic Fleet, appeared to have adopted a policy of avoid conflict with the Royal

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Navy, focusing instead on defending their coasts and harbors from a sudden British attack. Thus, one can conclude that Britain enjoyed naval superiority and that said deployment was routine. However, this assumption ignores the efforts of the vengeance-minded Danes to make their territorial waters inhospitable to British shipping, thereby denying them access to the Baltic. Also ignored were the extraordinary policies adapted by the British during their time in the Baltic: the sanctioning and protection of smuggling efforts by both British and non-British ships, the protection of Swedish sovereignty from foreign invasion even after the toppling of the pro- British King Gustavus IV and the establishment of a Anglo-phobic government that actively sought an alliance with Napoleonic France. In a time of great political and economic upheaval it was the British Baltic Fleet that provided stability and security and in the process, reestablished Britain as a trustworthy and honorable force in the region, so much so that the Crown Prince of Sweden, the former French Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte praised the British as “Sweden’s Shield.” This would indicate that a great deal of historically significant activity was taken place at this time, in this place, all worthy of investigation. To be certain, there have been historians who have examined the Baltic campaigns and provided some insight. In his Naval Wars in the Baltic 1522-1830, for example, Roger Charles Anderson chronicles several single-ship actions involving British warships in these waters, as does William James. Unlike James however, Anderson does not limit his scope to actions involving the British, but rather local such as the Swedes and Russians. What is lacking though is a strategic overview, a context through which individual battles can be assessed and their contribution to overall history evaluated. Of far greater historical value are the efforts of Anthony N. Ryan who in a series of articles addresses British activities in the Baltic, starting with the 1807 attack on Copenhagen and continuing with the Baltic Fleet’s defense of Sweden, the debate over British trade policies in the region and culminating with the Navy’s greatest maritime disaster, an event that, in terms of both ships and men, proved more costly than all of Nelson’s battles combined. Sadly though, Ryan too is missing an overriding framework upon which these events could be placed, a story that would have completed the history of the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. There are, of course, other perspectives to consider. The Danish historian Ole Feldbaek for example argues that the 1801 attack on Copenhagen had been instigated by the British who view Denmark’s assertion of neutrality as an opportunity to increase their profitable trade with

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France in spite of British blockade policies In his Denmark and the Armed Neutrality 1800-1801: Small power policy in a World War, Feldbaek makes the claim that it was this, couple with the fantastic ambitions of the “mad” Tsar Paul I that placed Denmark within the British crosshairs, only to be abandoned at the last moment by their rival/ally Sweden. Munch-Petersen makes a similar argument with regard to the 1807 attack, although he does acknowledge that Denmark’s abandonment of Holstein and the pro-French sympathies of high-ranking members of the Danish Court may have contributed to British suspicions regarding Danish neutrality. Yet, Feldbaek’s argument that the Danes were but innocent victim of Great Power politics is one-sided, and does not take into account the fact that by arming their ships and organizing convoys the Danes had violated their own long-standing policy of asserting their neutrality until pressed, than concede the point and continue on. As for Munch-Petersen, since his work ends with the seizure of the Danish Fleet, there is no mention of Denmark’s alliance with France and their dogged, if ultimately futile maritime guerrilla war against Britain. As for Sweden, there are some sources regarding the Swedish military, such as Jan Glete’s Navies and Nations or Daniel Harris’ F. H. Chapman: The First Naval Architect and His Work. Unfortunately, these are primarily survey works that do little more than confirm that the Swedish military was in a state of decline during the Napoleonic Wars, without explaining why. A much more useful work is Christer Jorgensen’s The Anglo-Swedish Alliance Against Napoleonic France, which focuses on the complicated, even contentious relationship between these countries. Particularly useful was Jorgensen’s insight to the personalities involved, in particular the dynamic, mercurial, perhaps even “mad” King Gustavus IV and his crusader-like commitment to Napoleon’s downfall. However, while Jorgensen acknowledges the presence of the Baltic Fleet and the positive contribution of its commander James Saumarez, he does not do into detail, nor does he address Anglo-Swedish relations after the King’s removal from power. In all, while each of these sources is significant and useful in their own way, they are but parts of an incomplete picture. What is missing is the overall perceptive that can connect the individual sources and provide a context through which the full impact of the British presence in the Baltic can be properly assessed, not just from the British perspective, but from the Danish and Swedish points of view as well.

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On Canning’s “Secret Intelligence” One curious aspect about examining the secondary sources concerned the justification behind the 1807 attack on Copenhagen. The standard view offered by history was that the attack was a type of preemptive strike intended to forestall the French gaining possession of the Danish Fleet as well as closing the Baltic to Britain. Presenting this reasoning was the British Foreign Minister, Lord Canning, who claimed to have received so-called “secret intelligence” of a secret accord within the Tilsit Treaty requiring Denmark to join the Russo-French alliance and declare war on Britain. So persuasive was this argument that it has become canonical, despite the fact that the source of this “intelligence” remains unknown. To be certain, attempts have been made to uncover that source. In 1906, J. Holland Rose addressed this subject in an article for the Royal Historical Society titled “Canning and the Secret Intelligence from Tilsit,” in which Rose suggests that Canning’s source was a mysterious individual known only as “Mackenzie.” In her biography of Lord Canning, Wendy Hinde appeared satisfied that it was Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, British Ambassador to the Russian Court and Canning confidant that was the source. The critical flaw in both these analyses however, was that no British representative was allowed access to the Tilsit negotiations. Thus, the British were forced to rely upon secondhand observations, rumors and Court gossip. In any event, the first scraps of information concerning Tilsit did not reach London until the 16th of July, a mere day before the British Cabinet formally set into motion the events that that culminated in the un-premeditated attack against neutral Denmark. It seems unlikely that a seasoned politician such as Canning would have authorized such action based on such sketchy information and leads one to question if it was indeed the Tilsit Conference that led to the assault on Copenhagen.

Primary Source Material The mystery as to the identity of Canning’s source of intelligence only deepened as the relevant primary source documentation was examined. Indeed, in all the correspondence between Canning and Leveson-Gower, both official and private, not one mention of a secret agent is ever mentioned. Even more curious was the fact that throughout the summer and fall of 1809, Canning frequently writes to his Ambassador demanding the public release of all secret portions of the Tilsit Treaty, presumably as proof that Russia had agreed to pressure Denmark

6 into allying with France and to place their fleet as the disposal of the French. Yet, no such document has ever been revealed and it was during the Parliament debates the following year that the first mention of the existence of “secret intelligence” occurs. And despite the best efforts of minority-party politicians to the Foreign Minister down, the identity of Canning’s secret agent remained unknown. Had this episode occurred in the post-modern era, rumors of conspiracy and cover-up might have generated a scandal that could have toppled the Canning Ministry. However, a wider search through the Foreign Office correspondence revealed another possible motive for the attack on Copenhagen. It was in a letter from Edward Thornton, British Ambassador to the Hanse Towns to Canning that an attack on Copenhagen might reverse the tide of anti-British sentiment, possibly even persuade Russia to reject the Tilsit Accords and return to the anti-French coalition. Intriguingly, this letter was received in London in early July ten days before the decision to attack was made. If correct, this suggests that the Copenhagen expedition was indeed a preemptive action and not a response to a rumored Russo-French accord. Rather, the attack was intended to persuade the Russians of British power and resolve while keeping the Baltic and its resources accessible to British trade.

Introducing James Saumarez There are two primary sources concerning the commander of the Baltic Fleet from 1808- 12. The first was Sir James Ross’ Memoirs and correspondence of Admiral Lord De Saumarez. Published in 1838, it is an understandably sympathetic, if occasionally biased account of the Admiral’s command, not surprising considering that Ross served as Saumarez’s flag lieutenant, liaison to the Swedish government and quite possibly, chief of intelligence. Ross also attempted to provide insight into the workings of Saumarez’s mind, his careful weighing of naval operations with some insight into his dealings with the Swedish government, although the latter was largely confined to praise for Saumarez’s actions in protecting their nation. Ross is also useful in providing a portrait of Saumarez outside of the shadow of Horatio Nelson, despite the former’s serving under Nelson during the 1798 Nile Campaign, thus including him as one of Nelson’s “Band of Brothers.” In fact, far from being a Nelson protégé, Saumarez saw himself as a contemporary who achieved worthy accomplishments based on his own merit, but was doomed to languish in the shadow of the Nelson legend.

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More recently, Anthony Ryan published another source of Saumarez correspondence, The Saumarez papers : selections from the Baltic correspondence of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez 1808-1812. Unlike Ross, Ryan restrains from commentary and interpretation and appears content to let the documents speak for themselves. In addition, there is a curiously minimal amount of overlap between the two sources, thus providing a more complete picture of the activities taking place during that period. Like Ross, Ryan includes in his collection, documents relating to political and commercial matters, in particular his defense of convoy operations and his attempts to have all shipping vacate the Baltic before the onset of winter, decisions that often put him at odds with profit-seeking British merchants. Also of interest was Saumarez’s efforts to keep himself at arm’s length from the Swedish Court. While possibly complicating his mission of defending Sweden from invasion, this allowed Saumarez to avoid the contentious world of Swedish politics while minimizing the opportunities of the Anglophobic opposition party to use his presence to further their agenda. In particular, Saumarez was able to avoid coming into contact with the mercurial, demanding Swedish monarch Gustavus IV, who’s despotic, self-centered demands frustrated nearly every British official who attempted direct negotiations. One last source that proved useful in this analysis were the Court-Martial records conducted every time a Royal Navy warship was lost. Through these records it was possible to gain an appreciation of the difficulties encountered by the British in their operations in the Baltic and that, despite the absence of a traditional naval threat such as the French fleet, these waters were still fraught with danger and peril. Some, such as the threat posed by the remaining warships of the Danish Navy, could be anticipated and largely controlled through vigilant patrolling. Others, such as the Danish oared galleys, proved far more challenging and difficult to contain. Even after measures such as stronger patrols, including the stationing of sail-of-the- line as floating fortresses and forbidding the running of convoys through waters such as the Danish Sound, the Danish galley remained a real threat ready to pounce whenever the opportunity presented itself. The Court-Martial records also proved useful in underscoring the real meaning of the clichéd term, “Perils of the Sea.” The fact of the matter was that storms and accidents claimed more vessels, and certainly more British lives than all the major fleet battles of the age combined. This was particularly true in 1811 when a major storm struck the last convoy

8 departing the Baltic. In addition to the approximately three dozen merchant ships wrecked in both the Baltic and North Seas, that storm and its aftermath claimed no less than five Royal navy warships, including two Third Rates and the Second Rate 98-gun St. George, which ironically served as Nelson’s flagship until just prior to the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen. Over two thousand lives were lost in proved to be one of the greatest maritime disasters ever in British naval history. In the final analysis, this work has a three-fold purpose. First, to bring to light a period of naval history that, up until now, has been little more than a historical footnote, and provide a framework by which previously published articles and treatises can be set against. The second reason is to advance British naval history away from the shadow of Nelson and that to prove as important and fascinating a figure that he was, Nelson was not the sum total of the Royal Navy. Finally, this work intends to illustrate that there was more to naval operations than engaging and destroying the enemy. Rather, that the purpose of a navy is to both preserve and project national interests around the world and that while perhaps lacking in romantic heroism, is no less crucial to Britain’s survival and therefore worthy of examination.

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CHAPTER 2

THE DISPUTE OVER TRADE AND THE 1801 BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN

As a result of the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, Britain’s claim to mastery of the world’s oceans had been confirmed. However, the same could not be said for her strategic situation. In fact, by 1807 it had deteriorated considerably in the two years since Trafalgar. French victories over Austria in 1805 and Prussia the following year had weakened the coalition of nations built by English diplomacy and secured with English subsides. Adding to this were the decisions made by the Tory-led government known as the “Ministry of All the Talents.” By giving priority to expanding Britain’s commercial interests overseas at the expense of their obligations to her allies, Britain was in a position of achieving Napoleon’s goal of isolating Britain from the Continent. This situation was most keenly felt in the Baltic, which was not only one of the few places in Europe still open to British commerce, but was also the primary source of that most critical of strategic resources, naval stores; a term applied collectively to those materials essential in ship construction and maintenance: lumber, masts, hemp, flax, resin and tar, materials that were in short supply in Britain, but without which the exercise of naval power was impossible. By 1807, the Royal Navy had been compelled to reassess its force structure, building smaller and more numerous warships using non-traditional materials and armed with non-traditional ordinance. The first of these mass-produced vessels would make their appearance in the Baltic, where they would be confronted with challenges but unique and traditional in the theater that was both non-traditional but very familiar to the Royal Navy.

Britain and the Baltic: Denmark Arguably the Baltic nation that caused the greatest concern for British leaders was Denmark. Traditionally neutral, the nation’s strategic position across the entrance to the Baltic, its small but impressive navy and its extensive (and potentially competitive) trade network

10 ensure that Denmark would enjoy a prominence out of proportion to its size. At the same time though, the Danish Court’s apparent susceptibility to French influence and its persistent assertion of a neutral’s “right” to trade with ports under British blockade placed both nations on a collision course not once, but twice. As mentioned previously, Denmark’s strategic importance stemmed from its geographic position astride the entrance to the Baltic, in much the same manner as a door to a house. Accordingly, it was very much in the British interest to ensure that Denmark remained if not friendly to Britain, then not under the control of a power hostile to Britain. Of secondary interest was Denmark’s rise as a shipping power, a growth that ironically, was encouraged by the British themselves. As a neutral, Danish ships were immune from interception by belligerent warships and could conduct trade with nations at war, so long as they did not carry goods considered “contraband.” Among the nations benefiting from this was Great Britain, who used neutral Danish vessels to transport British trade goods, but to the frustration of French privateers.1 Indeed, Britain encouraged Denmark to expand their trade network into the lucrative East Indian market, despite protests from the powerful East India Company, which long enjoyed a monopoly on Asian trade. As a result, the Danish merchant expanded exponentially, numbering some 3344 vessels operating around the world, replacing the Dutch as the world’s second largest merchant fleet.2 Thus, far from being inconvenienced by the dictates of war, Denmark flourished, taking advantage of their neutral status to generate both profit and influence in the world community. Likewise, Denmark possessed a navy that was out of proportion to their size and neutral status. Unlike other Baltic navies, who relied primarily on coastal vessels as galleys for defence, the Danish Navy boasted a deep-ocean force structure of sail-of-the-line ships, along with a number of , sloops and similar vessels. In addition, Danish naval architects made it a point to collect the latest innovations in ship design and technology, incorporating them into their vessels. As a result, Danish warships were surprisingly state-of-the-art, although the shallowness of their waters limited them to ships with a maximum draught of twenty-two feet, equivalent to a

Third-Rate sail-of-the-line.3

1 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality 20. 2 Ibid. 16. 3 Robert Gardiner, Warships of the Napoleonic Era, (London) Chatham Pub. 1999. Pg. 155. 11

The reason for such a force structure was two-fold. First and foremost was as a deterrent or check on the expansionist ambitions of their northern neighbor Sweden. Accordingly, the number of sail-of-the-line kept either in commission or in ready reserve was deliberately set to be slightly greater than those possessed by the Swedish Navy. As for their frigates and sloops, Danish naval policy was to use them for commerce protection and in that capacity they often were deployed overseas and were often found escorting Danish convoys in regions of high risk, such as the Mediterranean, where the Barbary Pirates preyed on sails of all nations. The second reason was as an appeal to the patronage and support of the largest of the Baltic Powers, Imperial Russia. Despite being defeated by Sweden in the 1788-90 War, Russia still remained a force to be reckoned with in the north and a Russo-Danish alliance served to present the Swedes with the unhealthy prospect of facing a war on two fronts. 4 In addition, by maintaining a powerful naval presence at the entrance of the Baltic, Denmark could argue that they served Russia as a shield, protecting that nation’s Baltic flank from potential enemies such as the Royal Navy. However, such a policy had its risks as well, as it tended to relegate Denmark to the role of Russian client state and on occasion, forced them to choose between serving their interests, or Russia’s. Such was the case in 1780 when the Russian Empress Catherine the Great called for a League of Armed Neutrality in protest of British blockade policy. In this Denmark was at best a reluctant participant, fearing that a more active role might invite British retaliation against their overseas commercial interests. Fortunately, Britain’s refusal to recognize the League as hostile allowed the Danes to get by with a token gesture while still maintaining Russian goodwill.

Denmark during the Wars of the French Revolution: 1793-1801 By its very nature, the British blockade violated the right of neutral shipping to conduct free trade and commerce, merely because the nation they wished to trade with was at war with Britain. At the heart of the dispute were two questions: What constituted contraband goods and who had the right if it was being carried by a particular ship? From the British perspective, the definition of contraband was any good that conceivably be used for military purposes. This would include not only the obvious; munitions and the like,

4 Feldbaek, Ole “Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars: A Foreign Policy Survey” (Lund) Scandinavian Journal of History Vol. 26, 2001, Pg. 90. 12 but also goods that had both military and civilian uses, in particular, Baltic goods such as timber, masts and other naval stores. In addition, British naval policy asserted that they had the right to demand physical inspection of any ship suspected of carrying contraband goods and to seize such ships and cargoes as prizes. There was an application beyond the purely military. By denying the French access to the Baltic market, they ensured that British merchants would enjoy greater access and lower prices to naval stores, increasing profits and securing their strategic advantage. There were monetary benefits for the Royal Navy as well, in the form of prize money for ships captured and cargoes confiscated. For several reasons then, it was in the British interest to keep the definition of contraband as broad and subjective as possible. For the Danes though, it was just the opposite. Immediately after the opening of hostilities between France and Great Britain, it was announced that Danish merchant ships would not engage in illegal trade. That is, the carrying of goods belonging to belligerent powers or the transporting of contraband goods such as war materials into blockaded ports. Beyond that though, the widest possible latitude had to be accorded to neutrals to engage in trade without fear of harassment. That meant that British warships had to regard ships flying the neutral flag as an extension of the nation itself and that a declaration that a ship was not carrying contraband goods had to be taken at face value and the ship allowed to sail on unmolested. This was consistent with Denmark’s long-standing policy of “Free Ships make Free Goods.” Here again, ulterior motives can be seen. By limiting the definition of contraband to strictly military goods, Danish merchants could maximize their opportunities for trade and increasing national revenue. Moreover, by presenting themselves as “honest brokers” willing to trade with all nations with equality, the Danes could argue that their remaining neutral was not only in their best interests, but in the interests of belligerents as well. Overseeing Danish interests was their veteran Foreign Minister Andreas Bernstorff who, given the mental instability of his sovereign, King Christian VII, oversaw both foreign and domestic affairs.5 Bernstorff’s approach with regards to Britain was a policy called “defensive neutrality,” in which Denmark would assert their right as a neutral to trade freely and openly with any belligerent power but when confronted by a belligerent, concede the point and wait for

5 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality Pg. 25. 13 the dispute to fade away. It was a passive, but practical policy that allowed the Danes to walk the fine line of remaining aloof from hostilities but still profit by it. There is some evidence suggesting that this policy was effective. For example, when Holland came under French occupation and saw its merchant vessels targeted by British warships, it was the Danes who filled in the void, extending their trade network to both the West and East Indies as Danish-flagged ships were now stopping in Batavia and Canton.6 There were merchants and ship owners who were caught trying to carry contraband goods past the British blockade. Bernstorff tended to turn a deaf ear to their complaints, reasoning that the occasional seizure by the Royal Navy was a small price to pay for the overall prosperity being experienced by the nation. Another point of contention came in the form of defining what exactly was blockaded and what was not. The British contended that the declaration of blockade applied not to any one port, or a number of ports, but to an entire coastline and that neutral ships would be subject to increased scrutiny to ensure that they were not engaged in illicit trade with the enemy. In part this was due to the success the French had in prosecuting the war and that “in no former war had the blockading system been pushed to this extent.”7 In addition, the very success of the Danes in expanding their trade and commercial advantages at a time when British merchants could only operate under the protection of convoys, providing security but at the expense of profit. However, it was understood by both governments that all Danish merchants had to abide by such principles. Invariably, there were attempts by neutral ships to move contraband or goods belonging to belligerent powers in defiance of the British blockade. Such goods were, by economic necessity, enjoyed a high profit potential, provided one was willing to the risks of interception and capture. If discovered, Danish ships would be routinely escorted into the nearest British port and be subjected to inspection and judgment by a Prize court. Depending on the court’s judgment, ship and cargo could either be released to continue its journey, or be confiscated, in which the contents would be sold by the Prize Court and restitution be made to the ship’s owners. In such cases, Danish complaints were usually confined to the amount of time it took for a determination to be made.8 Even here, Denmark did appear to have benefited from a

6 Ibid. Pg. 21. 7 Qtd. In Chitty, Treatise, Pg. 133. 8 FO 22/24 Scott to Grenville 2/9/95 14 certain flexibility applied by the British to their own regulations regarding non-military goods such as grain intended for French markets.9 A possible explanation for such largesse on the part of the British was their recognition that Danish neutrality meant that the gateway to the Baltic, the Kattegat, would remain open, thereby ensuring access to naval stores. In 1800 alone, some 3139 British merchant ships passed in and out of the Baltic, often in convoys of 100 to 200 vessels.10 All but forgotten by the British was their experience in the past war. Then British policy was to demand that all nations had to submit to their interpretation of blockade policies and submit to British search and seizure rules. While this was directed at strangling traditional rivals France and Holland, it also alienated neutrals like Denmark, creating far more harm to British interests than was gained. Nevertheless, this differing of views between Denmark and Britain, and the lengths both sides were willing to go in defence of those views would prove to at the heart of both the first and second Anglo-Danish Wars.

Escalation At the time of Britain’s entry into the wars of the French Revolution, Denmark was enjoying a period of political, economic and social growth that stood in contrast with the turmoil surrounding her.11 Throughout the last years of the eighteenth century, the Danish government initiated a series of reforms, including the abolition of serfdom, the extension of civil rights to Jews and establishment of freedom of the press.12 Norway, while part of Denmark, was given considerable autonomy in conducting local affairs. Offsetting this were the increasing number of Danish merchant ships being stopped and seized by the British for violating their rules of blockade. To be fair, French privateers were preying on Danish merchantmen as well, seizing those vessels discovered to have been carrying British cargoes. Yet, while losses to French privateers could be rationalized as the risks of war, the rigidity with which the British were enforcing their blockade posed a real threat to the national economy and thus, had to be resisted with all their power.

9 FO 22/24 Grenville to Crauford 31/10/95 10FO 22/41 Drummond to Grenville 19/1/01 11 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality, Pg. 14. 12 Bain, R. Nisbet Scandinavia: A political history of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1513 to 1900. (Cambridge, MA) Cambridge Historical Series, 1905. Pg. 388. 15

The British too had cause to question Danish policy. An increasing number of French and Dutch privateers had discovered that Norway, with its long, rugged coastline and innumerable bays and fjords made ideal bases from which they could prey on British shipping. As a result of British protests, Denmark began stationing warships off the Norwegian coast, establishing patrols intended to expel all intruders from their national waters and “maintain the neutrality of the coast.13” However, this proved an impossible task for the and as the number of ships lost increased, both British and Russia warships began patrols of their own, with similar results. 14 Similar strains began to appear along the diplomatic front as well. Conservative leaders within the British government began to suspect that the Danish Court was vulnerable to French influence, and viewed recent liberal reforms, such as the granting of Freedom of the Press, as proof of such influence. As British Ambassador William Crauford observed, “Certain it is that the spirit of Democracy and the illusory ideas of Equality is wide-spread” in Denmark.15 Another seeming conformation came in 1796 when a representative of the French Republic had presented his credentials to the Danish Court, at least a tacit recognition of the Directory as the legitimate government of France.16 Opponents of this view pointed to Denmark’s long-standing policy to maintain friendly relations with Russia, one that would hardly be served by establishing relations with Revolutionary France. Indeed, in response to Russian pressure, Denmark joined the anti-French coalition in July of 1799, albeit with some reluctance and with no real change on policy concerning free trade. In any event, Denmark’s status as a belligerent proved short-lived as Russia’s sudden withdrawal from the Second Coalition later that same year removed what little incentive there was and Denmark quickly slid back into neutrality. . Although official Danish policy was not to challenge the British blockade, complaints from Danish merchants over rising ship losses succeeded in prompting the government to action, but in an unexpected manner. In 1794, Denmark overcame their natural suspicions and reached out to Sweden, who had experienced similar problems with the Royal Navy. In 1794 the two nations signed a Neutrality Convention, pledging to cooperate in defense matters and conduct

13FO 22/24 Crauford to Greenville 20/9/95 14 R.C. Anderson Naval Wars in the Baltic (London) Francis Edwards Pub. Pg. 297 15 Ibid. 20/2/95. 16 Ibid. 12/3/96 16 joint naval maneuvers over the next two years. However, it was difficult for either nation to completely set aside their historic rivalry and the “joint” naval operations were limited to largely symbolic cruises of their sail-of-the-line within the Baltic itself.17 Even that gesture was not without controversy as Danish officials complained of the poor quality of the Swedish fleet and the lack of resolution of their commanding officers.18 Perhaps equally frustrated were the Swedes whose requests for joint security of the Kattegat were denied by the Danes. Another, more concrete example of Denmark’s refusal to submit to the British will was to provide protection for their merchant ships in the form of convoys. Convoys were already in operation in the Mediterranean, where Danish frigates provided some measure of security from the North African corsairs. However, such a move would place a severe strain on the Royal Danish Navy, which had a limited number of frigates and sloops at their disposal. More might be built, but only at the expense of diverting resources from their sail-of-the-line, which was the key of their deterrence strategy. Another factor that had to be considered was that sailing escorted convoys through waters regarded by the British as theirs might exacerbate, rather than lessen tensions between the two nations. . For these reasons, Andreas Bernstorff refused to allow an expansion of convoy operations, trusting instead that time and defensive neutrality best served Danish interests in the long run. Bernstorff’s untimely death in June 1797 brought that policy to an end as well as a turning point in Anglo-Danish relations. Thanks to the growing mental instability of the Danish King Christian VII, day-to-day rule had been placed in the hands of Crown Prince Frederick who since 1784 had been serving as Regent. Unlike Bernstorff, Frederick saw British harassment of Danish shipping an affront to national pride and honor but out of respect to the veteran politician he kept silent.19 With the Foreign Minister’s death however, Frederick was free to pursue a more active, even confrontational policy, ordering the running of convoys into waters frequented by British warships. As for the captains of the escorting warships, they were ordered not to allow British warships to seize or even inspect ships under their protection. Charged with “selling” this new policy to the international community and in particular Great Britain was the new Danish Foreign Minister, Christian Bernstroff, son of his predecessor. Initially supportive of his late father’s policies, Bernstroff tried to rationalize the establishment of

17 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality Pg. 27. 18 FO 22/24 Crauford to Grenville 31/10/95 and 20/2/96. 19 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality Pg. 25. 17

Danish convoys as a help to the British blockade, rather than a hindrance by reducing the number of ships, the British had to inspect. Danish naval captains, he reasoned, would themselves inspect the ships under their charge to ensure that only legitimate cargoes were being carried.20 The British though were not persuaded, believing that far from being deterred from carrying contraband, merchant ship captains sailing under convoy would be more encouraged to do so, knowing that the Danish Navy would be on hand to protect their illicit trade. Thus, rather than reducing Anglo-Danish tensions, the decision to operate convoys only heightened them.

First Shots Initially, both the British and the Danes exercised considerable restraint, not wanting to be held accountable for the outbreak of hostilities. In the first year and a half after the establishment of convoys, there had been eight encounters between Danish and British warships. On three of these occasions, the senior British commander simply accepted his Danish counterpart’s assertion that none of the ships in his charge were carrying contraband goods and allowed them to pass unmolested. In four other cases, the British demand to heave-to and submit to inspection was politely but firmly refused by the escorting Danish warship. As for the last, a Danish convoy was searched by a British , only to have her commander swiftly rebuked by no less a figure than the commander of the Channel Fleet, the Earl St. Vincent.21 From the Danish perspective, it appeared that as in 1780, a demonstration of their willingness to use force to defend a neutral’s right to trade proved a successful deterrent. In fact, the British view was quite the opposite, insisting that the presence of a Danish warship did not in and of itself guarantee that the ship’s sailing under its protection were not engaged in illegal trade, nor did it remove the obligation of British warships to subject them to inspection. In the end, the question became which was the higher principle, a belligerent’s right to fight a war, or a neutral’s right to profit by it. It was on Christmas Eve, 1799 that the Anglo-Danish dispute escalated. While sailing in the Mediterranean a four-ship convoy under the protection of the 46-gun frigate Havfruen, was intercepted by three British frigates. When called on to heave-to and submit to inspection the Havfruen’s captain not only denied the request, but also fired upon boats that were approaching

20 FO 22/40 Bernstorff to Grenville 31/12/1800. 21 Feldbaek, Armed Neutrality Pg. 33. 18 the convoy. Despite having superior numbers, the senior British captain chose not to push the issue and withdrew. Unwilling to set a precedent in which British blockade policies could be flouted at will, the Admiralty issued new instructions authorizing their captains to search neutral convoys and in the event of resistance, both merchant ships and their attending escorts were to be seized and brought into port. A more serious incident occurred in the summer of 1800 off the English coast when a convoy of six merchant ships escorted by the 38-gun frigate Freja were intercepted by a squadron of three English frigates headed by the appropriately-named Nemesis. Again the Danes were ordered to heave-to and submit to inspection, which the Freja’s captain refused to accept and like the Havfruen, fired at longboats attempting to close with the convoy. At this point the British warships engaged Freja and after a half-hour fight, forced the Danish warship to strike her colors and surrender. In accordance with the new Admiralty regulations, both warship and convoy were brought back to Britain. Although both sides were quick to accuse the other of firing the first shots, neither Britain nor Denmark were particularly interested in engaging in prolonged hostilities. On the 4th of August, the prominent diplomat Lord Whitworth was dispatched to Copenhagen to resolve the situation and persuade the Danes to discontinue their convoys and agree to Royal Navy inspections. A squadron of twelve sail-of-the-line accompanied Whitworth to this conference, to intimidate the Danes into accepting the British proposals and also as a deterrent in the event that Russia or Sweden might intervene on Denmark’s side. In response, the Danish navy was placed on a war footing. Six sail-of-the-line were readied for immediate action, all merchant sailors within reach were mobilized for military service and all buoys marking dangerous shoals were taken up. However, while Crown Prince Frederick took a defiant tone, the newly-appointed Foreign Minister, Christian Bernstorff was of a different mind. Taking a page from his father’s “defensive neutrality,” Bernstorff agreed to suspend convoy operations pending further negotiations provided that the British release the Freja and her charges and allow them to return to Denmark forthwith. In the short-run, this defused the threat of war while allowing both parties to claim that they had adhered to their respective principles. While the immediate crisis had passed, another, more dangerous situation was beginning to develop. As part of Denmark’s preparations for war, an appeal was sent to St. Petersberg 19 calling for the creation of a new League of Armed Neutrality and that the Russian and Swedish Navies were to be mobilized to aid in the defense of Copenhagen. While not an entirely unreasonable action to take, given the circumstances, this had the effect of placing Danish national interests in the hands of an outsider; the mercurial, volatile and erratic Tsar of Russia, Paul I.

Tsar Paul and the Second League of the Armed Neutrality When he initially ascended the Russian throne in 1796, Tsar Paul opposed the French Revolution on the ground that it threatened the Divine Right of Kings. By 1800 Paul had become an open admirer of Napoleon Bonaparte and simultaneously suspicious of Britain. Shrewdly, the former was able to exploit this by arranging that Paul be named Grand Master of the island of Malta, which had just been occupied by British troops, a gesture that the Tsar greeted with, “childish joy.”22. When Britain refused to recognize Paul’s claim to the island, he responded by not only severing diplomatic relations with the British, but also by ordering the arrest of all British subjects on Russian soil. Likewise, Paul welcomed the Danish appeal for the formation of the old League of the Armed Neutrality, not to protect Denmark and preserve the right of neutrals to trade, but the instrument by which he would assert himself on the European stage and “punish” Britain for offending him. Unlike the 1780 League, Denmark was expected to play an active, military role by closing the entrance of the Baltic to British shipping and keeping it closed until the ships of the Russian fleet had freed themselves from their ice-blocked harbors and were able to join them. In short the 1801 version of the League of Armed Neutrality was fundamentally contrary to Danish neutrality while placing them on the front line to receive the inevitable British backlash. Even worse, despite being a member of the League, Denmark would find themselves bearing that blow alone.

22 FO 25/40 Grenville to Whitworth 17 Oct. 1800. 20

The First Battle of Copenhagen By 1801 the Danes had prepared eight sail-of-the-line and two frigates for immediate deployment with a further ten in various stages of reserve.23 However, this force was earmarked to be Denmark’s contribution to the proposed League fleet of Russian, Swedish and Danish warships and by itself would be no match for British fleet that even then was being assembled in the waters off Great Yarmouth. Therefore it was decided that in the event of a British attack, the Danish warships would remained within Copenhagen’s inner harbor, called the King’s Deep and would be protected by a formidable, if somewhat ramshackle network of shore batteries, floating barges and elderly warships stripped of their masts and rigging. Manning these defenses was a similar hodgepodge of personnel, including sailors of the Royal Danish Navy, merchant seamen pressed into duty, drafts of soldiers from the city’s garrison and volunteers from the civilian population. It would not be until late March that their British opponents, consisting of twenty sail-of- the-line, five frigates, four sloops or brigs and seven bomb vessels, arrived. The overall commander, Sir Hyde Parker, was an elderly, cautious officer whose ambiguous orders seemed to reinforce his reluctance to attack. His deputy, the already legendary Lord Nelson was of an entirely different mind-set and unlike his superior, understood that the real danger was not Denmark, but Russia and that the Danes had to be defeated before the Russian fleet was freed from the ice. Nelson launched his attack on the 2nd of April, approaching the Danish defenses not from the north, but from the south. This allowed him to bypass the powerful Trekoner Fortress and instead concentrate on the anchored warships and floating batteries to the south. Despite their inexperience and largely antiquated guns, the Danish defenders fought with desperate zeal and courage and afterwards Nelson would remark that the engagement was as intense as any other he ever fought. By 1:30 in the afternoon, the tide of battle had swung in Nelson’s favor the fleet commander’s panicked recall order notwithstanding.24 Nevertheless, fighting continued for more than an hour until Nelson threatened to set all captured ships to the torch without making

23 Ole Feldbaek The Battle of Copenhagen: Nelson and the Danes (Copenhagen) Pgs 74-75. 24 Thereby prompting Nelson’s feigned ignorance of the order using the famous “blind eye” gesture. 21 provision for the evacuation of their crews.25 Thus, the Battle of Copenhagen, one of the bloodiest naval engagements of the age, came to an end.

Aftermath As a result of the Battle of Copenhagen, the Danish fleet had been effectively neutralized and as a result of Nelson’s polite but forceful negotiations, the British gained temporary control of the entrance to the Baltic. As news that Tsar Paul had been assassinated spread all enthusiasm for the League of the Armed Neutrality vanished. In the final peace agreement signed in October of 1801, Denmark retained possession of its warships that were not directly been involved in the fighting, thereby maintaining its ability to defend itself. However, this was at the expense of their submitting to Britain’s interpretation of blockade rules, in particular their right to inspect Danish merchant ships on demand. In addition, all convoys were to be suspended and Danish warships required to cooperate with Royal Navy warships in all matters. Denmark had played a heavy price in their ultimately futile attempt to uphold the principle of neutral’s rights. Unfortunately, it would not be the last one.

25 Afterwards both Danish and British officers would term the letter a ruse de guerre written to preserve what was arguably a tenuous advantage, whereas Nelson would claim that his sole motive in sending the letter was to prevent further loss of life. 22

CHAPTER 3

THE DESCENT ON COPENHAGEN

In the years following the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen, Denmark returned to its policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In addition, the nation added to its deep-water navy, building new sail-of-the-line to replace those expended in the 1801 war. Above all, Denmark resisted attempts by outsiders, in particular Russia, to take an active role in the wars against Napoleon. To anyone that cared to listen, Danish leaders reiterated their desire to remain above the fray as well as their commitment to defend that neutrality from all directions.26 And for the first few years of the nineteenth century, the British were more than willing to take such promises at face value. However, with the collapse of the Peace of Amiens in May of 1803 and the subsequent occupation of Hanover by French troops placed Denmark closer to the war than ever before. This helped to place Danish policy and policy-makers under a closer scrutiny from a British government increasingly wondering if the Danes were capable of resisting French influence…or indeed, if they wanted to.

The Holstein Question In September of 1805, while British attention was focused on the threat of the Franco- Spanish armada sheltering in the port of Cadiz, some 20,000 troops of the Royal Danish Army, under the personal command of the Crown Prince, marched into the German province of Holstein. The reason offered by the Danish government was their desire to keep the expansionist French as far away from Danish soil as possible. Thus, Holstein would serve as a buffer preventing a possible French coup de main, thus preserving Danish autonomy and neutrality. Interestingly, Crown Prince Frederick, the de facto Head of State, chose to remain in Holstein, taking up residence in Kiel, effectively making that city the unofficial capitol of the Danish state. Accompanying Frederick was his Foreign Minister Christian Bernstorff, but not

26 F/O 22/49 Lison to Fox 16 July 1803. 23 the rest of the court nor the various foreign representatives and ambassadors, who remained in Copenhagen. Serving as liaison between the two was Deputy Minister Joachim Bernstorff. Brother of the Foreign Minister, Joachim was capable after a fashion but prone to make intemperate remarks that did more harm than good.27 Approving this unusually assertive move on the part of the Danes was Britain, in part because it seemed to support their determination to resist French incursion into their borders and also because as a neutral, Holstein could serve as a conduit of British trade goods into French-occupied central Europe. 28 Unfortunately, that policy began to unwind in the fall of 1806 when war broke out between Prussia and France. Now in the eyes of the British, Denmark’s continued occupation of Holstein took on an added importance; that is keeping Napoleon out of reach of their commercial trade network in the Baltic. Therefore, it came as a shock when on the 19th of November the Crown Prince ordered his troops to vacate Holstein and retire across the border. The British were stunned that after years of receiving assurances that the Danes would not allow themselves to submit to French brow-beating they would, “retire from it under every circumstance of increasing danger.” 29 In addition, with Holstein soon to fall into French hands, Britain’s trade and communications conduit with the rest of the continent became more difficult. In response to the urgent inquiries made by British Ambassador Benjamin Garlike, Bernstorff explained that the rapidity of the French advance had left the Holstein garrison vulnerable and in danger of being cut off from the rest of the country. This argument was supported by the fact that the security of the Danish frontier was dependent not on their occupation of Holstein, but rather on their larger neighbor to the south, Prussia. The unexpected destruction of the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstadt and that nation’s subsequent collapse fatally compromised Danish defense strategy. Even worse, the presence of the Danish corps in Holstein represented a potential threat to the French flank and all but invited a response. 30 So, from the Danish perspective, returning to Jutland was the best option in their quest to remain neutral and uninvolved.

27 Thomas Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807. (Gloucestershire) 2007. Pg. 44. 28 Henning Soby Andersen “Denmark between the Wars with Britain 1801-7,” Scandinavian Journal of History 235. 29 FO 24/49 Garlike to Howick 26 December 1806. 30 A.N. Ryan “The Causes of the British Attack on Copenhagen 1807” The English Historical Review Vol. 68 Jan. 1953 Pg. 39. 24

In London though, government ministers took a much dimmer view. There had long been rumors that the Danish Court was susceptible to French influence and in March of 1806 Garlike reported that the French were about to demand that Denmark close its ports to Allied shipping or face retaliation. At the time Danish assurances that no such request had been made were taken at face value. But in light of more recent events, British leaders found themselves compelled to reevaluate the sincerity of Danish neutrality. Indeed, a month after Denmark’s abandonment of their Holstein “buffer,” Ambassador Garlike was instructed to, “Transmit the earliest intelligence of any preparation which may seem to be made with a view to resist the power of England rather than that of France.”31 Of particular concern to the British was the Danish Navy, which as in 1801, was seen to pose a grave potential threat to British security and survival.

The Dilemma of the Danish Navy Because of their decision not to commit their first-line warships to combat Nelson at the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen, the Danish Navy remained largely intact and a viable instrument of war. Although its mission to provide convoy escort and protect its merchant ships from British harassment no longer applied, its primary purpose of deterring Swedish ambitions remained intact. Accordingly, the Navy was still based around its sail-of-the-line, which continued to increase in quality as well as quantity. In accordance long-standing policy, only a certain number of their front-line warships were kept in active service, while the remainder was kept in a state of reserve, hull maintained and armament installed, but with masts and rigging removed. In order to quickly make the transition from reserve to active status, large stockpiles of materials: masts, sails, rigging and so forth, were constantly kept on hand within their Great Arsenal at Copenhagen and in the event of emergency, the full strength of the Danish Navy could be readied in a relatively short time. As mentioned previously, Denmark traditionally emphasized deep-water warships for its national defense. In September of 1806 though, that began to change as Frederick, on the advice of the army, authorized the construction of large numbers of oared-powered galleys. Similar in design to vessels already in service in the Russian and Swedish navies, these galleys would boast a pair of 24-pound cannon mounted in the bows and powered by 35-40 pairs of oars. Although

31 FO 22/49 Howick to Garlike 30 December 1806. 25 limited to coastal waters individually fragile, these vessels could be built in most small harbors and in large numbers. The plan was that by 1814, there would be no less than 300 of these vessels, while the number of sail-of-the-line would be reduced by a third. This too would draw on the stockpiles in the Arsenal as well as lead to increased activity within the shipyard. Curiously, while the end product might serve to lessen British concerns regarding the Danish Navy, the initial gathering of materials and short-term increase of building activity only added to British concerns. It also led to several surreptitious “fact-finding” missions investigating the capabilities and intentions of the Danish Navy. The results of these missions, although largely contradicting one another, only heightened Anglo-Danish tensions as the latter were often called upon to defend positions that they themselves were only vaguely aware of.

The Dunbar Mission The first of these missions was conducted by Royal Navy Captain James Dunbar. In December of 1806, Dunbar brought his ship, the 32-gun frigate Astrea into Copenhagen for repairs. Almost immediately Dunbar was contacted by the British representative in Copenhagen, Benjamin Garlike who instructed him to examine the condition of the Danish docks and ships and report his observations. In retrospect, Dunbar may not have been the best choice. Although capable of making a professional and detailed assessment of naval affairs, Dunbar’s observations suggest an anti- Danish bias. For example, Dunbar mentions that his hosts had mentioned that the recent increase in new construction was due to a build-up of the Swedish galley flotillas across the Sound. However, he seemed not to have placed much credibility in this explanation, writing that, “This attempt at disguise could not escape me.”32 Dunbar also pointed out the haste with which the Danes apparently expedited repairs to his ship, noting that, “they worked by torchlight all night for five nights and even during mealtimes when fresh hands were employed.”33 Although this could be attributed to the understandable desire of the Danes to see a foreign warship safely on its way, Dunbar suggested that the real motivation was to keep prying eyes away from their ship- building program, in particular his.

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 26

Another part of Dunbar’s report that London found alarming was his claim that the Danes had no less than twenty sail-of-the-lien, twelve frigates and numerous smaller vessels, all of which, “could be ready in less than a month. They were obviously much more ready for commission than ours are when reported to receive men.” Only the lack of crews, he claimed, kept these ships from reaching full operational status.34 Such an assessment seemed to support the theory that the Danes were preparing for hostilities against Britain and, by extension, allying themselves with France. Indeed, over the coming months those who advocated an attack on Denmark would make much of Dunbar’s professional assessment. However, Dunbar’s observations did not take into account the recent decision by the Danish government to construct galleys and that gathering of materials were in support of that program. Dunbar also failed to mention that the majority of the Danish warships lacked not only crews, but also masts and rigging, indicating that their state of readiness was not as advanced as Dunbar claimed.35 To be certain, Dunbar never claimed that the Danes were preparing for war. Nevertheless, that is exactly the interpretation made by Foreign Minister Viscount Howick. Once a firm supporter of Danish neutrality, Howick now viewed the Danish Navy in an “extraordinary state of preparation” and a potential threat to British trade and strategic interests.36 Accordingly on the 10th of January 1807, the Admiralty issued orders recalling Sir John Duckworth from the Mediterranean with the idea of naming him to command an expedition to the Baltic should the need arise. It was believed that a force of twelve sail of the line might suffice for a Baltic deployment although the earliest such a force could sail was in the spring.37 This gave Howick the opportunity to reevaluate the available information and conclude that Danish naval preparations were consistent with a nation defending its neutrality, rather than threatening Britain. By the end of January though Howick was willing to accept Danish claims that their preparations for defense were directed at Sweden, not Britain and plans for a Baltic fleet were shelved.

34 Ibid. 20 December 1806. 35 Thomas Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon Pg. 53. 36 GRE B15/11/13. 37 DUC 13-18 Thomas Grenville to Duckworth 18 January 1807 National Maritime Museum. 27

Denmark protests the Orders in Council and Britain reacts On the 7th of January 1807, the British government issued its response to Napoleon’s Continental System, its Orders in Council. Essentially the orders stated that any ship sailing between two ports closed to British shipping was subject to seizure. The orders did not apply to trade between neutral and closed ports, which in British eyes, more than adequately addressed the issue of neutral’s rights. At least this seemed to be the view taken by the new Danish Ambassador to Great Britain, Jacob Rist.38 Unfortunately, this was not the view prevailing in Copenhagen, where Garlike reported that Foreign Minister Joachim Bernstroff was so angered as to be beyond speech.39 Further conveying Danish displeasure was Rist who, in contrast to his earlier indifference, was now insisting that the new policies would have severe effects on Danish trade and commerce.40 It can be argued that this latest protest was the logical extension of Denmark’s long- standing resistance to the British blockade and its violation of a neutral’s right to trade. Also fueling Danish ire was the belief that British warships were singling out Danish merchantmen for harassment and seizure, not for violating the blockade, but in the search for prize money. Both of these issues had been raised in the previous Anglo-Danish conflict in 1801 and while the latter had eventually agreed to accept the British position, it seemed to have gained new life in 1807. In February the Danes went beyond mere diplomatic protests, closing the port of Husum to packet-boats of the Royal Mail Service. This placed a potentially severe handicap on British strategic planning diplomatic messages and correspondence now had to be transported around the Jutland peninsula rather than across it, adding days, if not weeks to the decision-making cycle of British strategic policy in the Baltic. As events would prove, this last event would have fateful consequences and play a key role in propelling England and Denmark towards war. Meanwhile in London, this latest round of Danish protests was viewed with cynicism if not suspicion. In his response Howick pointed out the Danish Court made no similar protests to Napoleon’s Berlin Decrees, the first step in the Continental System, the previous year and that to now claim offense to British policies undermined Danish claims to neutrality.41 Also brought up was the withdrawal of Danish troops from Holstein the previous fall along with the suggestion

38 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon 55. 39 FO 22/51 Garlike to Hovick 30 January 1807. 40 GRE 15/11/20 Garlike to Hovik 30 January 1807. 41 Parliamentary Debates Vol. 10 Howick to Rist 17 March 1807. 28 that this move had not been driven by military conditions after all. In his report to Copenhagen Danish Ambassador Rist remarked that Howick’s comments had, “developed a marked irritation towards us,” and that he was struck by the “the harsh or rather bitter tone” of the British.42 This combined with the decision to close Husum seemed to reinforce the idea that Denmark was preparing for the day when its policy of neutrality would no longer be tenable and that the decision whether to side with France or Britain might already have been made. Reporting this apparent change in British attitude was the Swedish Ambassador who wrote to his King that, “in the system of moderation hitherto pursued by the British government towards the Danish court seems to be at an end.”43 Although a compromise of sorts was reached, with the British agreeing to allow trade to continue to a couple of small Danish ports on the Elbe estuary. However, the previous amiability of Howick towards Denmark appeared to have vanished as he later observed that, “the general dispositions of Denmark were hostile to us.44 More immediately, plans to send a squadron to the Baltic were revived as the Admiralty to prepare sixteen warships and hold them ready at Yarmouth, the home base of the North Sea Fleet.45 As that happened however, a change of governments proved the next step on the descent to Copenhagen.

The Rise of George Canning Following the February 1806 death of William Pitt the Younger, national policy in Britain was determined by a coalition government known as the “Ministry of All the Talents.” Headed by William Wyndham, 1st Baron Grenville, the government included members of nearly all political parties in Britain and as such, served a plethora of interests. Under this government, every opportunity to expand British trade and strategic interests was exploited while Britain’s obligations to their allies in the anti-Napoleon coalition were allowed to languish. The collapse of this government led to the creation of a new, more aggressive coalition of political leaders determined to undo the mistakes of their predecessors. One of the more dynamic of these politicians was George Canning, who replaced Lord Howick as Foreign Minister in April of 1807. As energetic as he was ambitious, Canning’s arrival at first appeared to be a pleasant change from the contentious Howick, impressing Danish

42 DRA. DUA/ 1988, desp. 24 Rist to C. Bernstorff 20 March 1807. 43 SRA. Anglica/490, desp 18. Rehausen to Gustavus. 17, March 1807. 44 GRE B21/2/98 Grenville to Grey 29 December 1807. 45 ADM 3/160 Admiralty to Keats 1 April 1807. 29

Ambassador Rist with his, “experience, enlightened spirit and obliging manners.”46 Reinforcing this view was Canning’s decision to continue the exemptions allowing trade to continue in and out of the Danish ports on the Elbe as well as postponing the dispatch of a squadron to the Baltic, although the warships comprising that squadron remained at the ready. Upon assuming his new office, Canning appeared determined to demonstrate British commitment to their continental allies by raising subsidy payments to 2.6 million pounds sterling and proposing to send 30,000 troops to the Baltic to support allied operations in the region.47 When it came to Denmark though, it became evident that Canning had many of the same opinions of the Danes as his predecessor had at the end of his tenure. He believed that Danish neutrality was merely a self-serving pretense masking the pro-French sympathies lurking within the Danish Court. To his friend and confident Granville Gower, Canning described the neutrality of Denmark as “specious” while the rancorous protests over the Orders in Council revealed the true hostility of Denmark and its “strongest prejudices against the cause of the allies.”48 Canning also held little trust in Garlike’s ability to provide a clear assessment of Denmark’s intentions although Munch-Petersen suggests that this stemmed from Canning’s fundamental belief in Danish hostility, a position that the Ambassador did not share.49 In any event, Rist’s faith in Canning’s affability was shattered after their meeting in May of 1807. The subject of this discussion was one very familiar to both sides, the seizure of Danish merchantmen by British warships. Canning took the standard British position on the subject, that as a belligerent power they had the right to enforce their blockade and seize ships discovered carrying contraband cargo. Similarly, Rist presented the long-standing complaint that Danish ships were being singled out by British naval captains desiring prize money. This was hardly a new dispute in Anglo-Danish relations. Indeed, it was the capturing of Danish merchant ships by the Royal Navy that was the trigger of the 1801 attack on Copenhagen. Based on his initial impression of the new Foreign Minister, Rist believed that there was an opportunity to revisit this particular subject and reach an accommodation more favorable to Denmark. Unfortunately, Rist underestimated Canning’s irritation over the

46 DUA/1988 Rist to C Bernstorff, 28 March 1807. 47 FO 65/68 Canning to Gower 16 May 1807. 48 FO 65/69 Canning to Gower 16 May 1807. 49 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon 73. 30

Ambassador’s “frequent and frivolous” complaints over British offenses50 while failing to take similar issue when it came to France’s Continental System.51 Either out of frustration or in an attempt to force the Danes to reveal their true intentions, Canning instructed Garlike to lodge a complaint over Rist’s objectionable tone and language and for engaging in “a correspondence which has for the most part consisted in a succession of claims on one side and concessions on the other.”52 While stopping short of officially demanding the ambassador’s recall Canning believed that if the Danish Court disavowed or recalled Rist this would be seen as a sign that Copenhagen still harbored goodwill towards London. Conversely, supporting Rist would expose Danish claims to neutrality as a sham and their hostility towards Britain become apparent in which case, as Canning wrote, “I must look forward for a tedious controversy here to be terminated by nothing but a peace or a fleet in the Baltic.”53 For his part Rist seemed aware that his actions, while appropriate in the service of his country’s interests, nonetheless might have contributed to a raising rather than lessening of tensions between their nations. On the 9th of June Rist wrote to his Foreign Ministry requesting more precise instructions for future proceedings or the appointment of a new Ambassador, “endowed with a character which will give the British a little more pause before they administer a reprimand in the extraordinary manner adopted by M. Canning.”54 Curiously, almost four weeks passed before the Danish Foreign Ministry chose to respond to either Canning’s complaint or Rist’s request for instructions. In a letter between the Danish Foreign Minister Christian Bernstorff and his brother (and deputy) Joachim, it was decided to retain Rist as Ambassador while conceding that if such tensions continued and relations worsened, a reassignment of representatives would be considered.55 Such was the tone related to Garlike, although by then other events had rendered this dispute insignificant. Nevertheless, the absence of a speedy Danish reply coupled with the receipt of additional reports concerning Danish naval preparations had made an impression on Canning that Danish neutrality was but a duplicitous sham.

50 Ibid. Canning to Rist 5 June 1807. 51 FO 22/52 Canning to Garlike 26 May, 1807. 52 Ibid. Canning to Garlike 5 June 1807. 53 FO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 6 June 1807. 54 DUA/1179 desp. 54. Rist to Ministry 9 June 1807. 55 DUA C. Bernstorff to J. Bernstorff 28 July 1807. 31

Conflicting views of Danish naval preparations The first report concerning the state of the Danish Navy came in May around the time of Denmark’s protests over the Orders in Council. The observer, Lieutenant Francis Hanchett of the Royal Navy, reported seeing seventeen sail-of-the-line, eleven frigates, nine sloops, three floating batteries and twelve fitted with oars. With regards to their readiness for action, Hanchett observed that the ships did have their ballast in, but had yet to have their rigging installed. Equally important was Hanchett’s failure to report any signs that the Danish government had issued any orders to mobilize their maritime population and organize crews for their ships. 56 Far more alarmist was the letter sent to Canning by Lord Pembroke, the newly appointed British Ambassador to Austria who had stopped in Copenhagen in late May en route to Vienna. In his report Pembroke wrote that in touring Copenhagen, “it was impossible not to perceive that every exertion was making to prepare against any possible attack.” The northern fortress he observed, “was furnished with guns of the heaviest metal,” while within the harbor there was [sic.] five floating fortresses and eight oared under construction. As for warships, Pembroke claimed that there were no less than twenty sail-of-the-line warships “fit to go to sea.” As for the mood of the Danes themselves, Pembroke observed “a dislike to and a jealously of the English which is but too visible even to a resident of a few hours.”57 Arriving as it did in the midst of Canning’s frustration with the Danish Ambassador such a report could not but reinforce the view that Denmark was contemplating, if not preparing for war against Great Britain. It would be easy to dismiss Pembroke’s alarmist report as that of a civilian amateur. However, while not a naval officer, Pembroke was a former army officer and as such familiar with certain aspects of the military world, particularly fortifications and logistics. In addition, Pembroke’s transportation to Copenhagen had been provided by the frigate Astrea, commanded by the same James Dunbar who had submitted the report on the Danish Navy the previous December. Repeating his earlier claims, Dunbar reported that although the deep-water ships of the Danish Navy remained unrigged, the galleys and various floating batteries were all but ready for action, pointing out that, “not a step had been taken to equip proper vessels to cruise in the

56 Ibid. Hanchett to Garlike 2 May 1807. 57 HAR/GC/50 Pembroke to Canning, 28 May 1807. 32

Belt and keep out the French, while nothing had been left undone to hasten the kind of vessel most fit to oppose the English.”58 Yet, upon deeper reflection, Pembroke’s reports are somewhat flawed. Notwithstanding Pembroke’s general military knowledge, the Ambassador did not possess the necessary expertise to assess the Danish Navy and their standards of readiness. It was standard practice for the Danes to keep their navy in a high state of readiness, as a deterrent to possible Swedish aggression and as a ready response to an invasion of Norway. In addition, although describing Danish warships as being “fit for sea,” unlike Hanchett, Pembroke failed to take into account their lack of rigging or the absence of crews to man them. With regards to the seeming hostility of the Danish people, this could well be attributed to the British blockade, which in a city heavily dependent on trade; had caused significant economic hardship and unemployment. As for James Dunbar, Munch-Petersen claims that both he and Pembroke were guided by their pre-existing suspicions regarding Denmark and that they had allowed their opinions to cloud their observations.59 Seemingly in rebuttal is the presence of another British diplomat Lord Granville Leveson Gower, on his way to St. Petersburg, who in his report fails to note any unusual activity in Copenhagen at all.60 Finally, it is also worth noting that Dunbar’s observations were written after-the-fact while his logs of the period in question reveal nothing out of the ordinary. Nevertheless, the arrival of Pembroke’s report coincided with Canning’s frustrating attempt to clarify Danish intentions and while there is no evidence suggesting that it had an immediate effect on the Foreign Minister, it almost certainly reinforced the growing negative view regarding Denmark. Providing a third view of Danish readiness was yet another British naval officer, Captain Francis Beauman of the Procris. Arriving in Copenhagen in late July, Beauman seemed to confirm Hanchett’s report, only adding an additional sail-of the-line for a total of eighteen. Like Hanchett, Beauman described the condition of the Danish Navy as, “in a state of ordinary with their lower masts and part of their ballast in.” He then went on to report that, “I went on board the greater part of the line of battle ships, and found them in a most perfect state of repair;” and

58 A. N. Ryan (ed.) “Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation 1807” The Naval Miscellany, vol. 5 Navy Records Society (London) vol. 125 (1984) Pg. 201. 59 Munch-Petersen, Defying Napoleon, Pg. 80. 60HAR/GC/57, Gower to Canning 29 May 1807. 33 states that they could be ready for sea within six weeks, “provided they had seamen.” Most significant of all was Beauman’s concluding paragraph. I beg you will not conclude from this statement that I mean to insinuate that a fleet is fitting out from Copenhagen. To the best of my judgment and belief there is not the least sign of any unusual or active preparation. From what I could learn it has been the usual state of the fleet ever since Lord Nelson’s battle of the 2nd of April (1801.) And I may venture to assert there is not at present the shadow of appearance for the equipment of a fleet, as it is impossible it could be hid from the eye of any naval officer.61

In some ways, Beauman’s view is the most valuable. Aside from being both professional and objective, Beauman also took into account both Denmark’s long-standing policy of keeping at least a portion of their navy at a high state of readiness as well as the difficulties they had in rigging and crewing their warships. The result was a portrait of a nation prepared to defend itself from outside aggression, but not anticipating imminent hostilities. Unfortunately though, Beauman’s report was made on the 25th of July, a full week after the decision had been made in London to dispatch an expeditionary force to Copenhagen and compel a final confrontation. Despite forwarding the previous reports, by July it had become clear that Canning had lost confidence in Garlike’s ability to represent British interests to the Danish Court, complaining of, “the want of any intelligence from Copenhagen at a moment of such unexpected interest and the present…I am at a loss to imagine what could have prevented your informing me of the event in Poland, of which we hear through every channel but that of our own Ministers.”62 Perhaps as a result of his own dealings with the Danish Ambassador Rist, Canning believed that Garlike was incapable of identifying the Francophile influence within the Danish Court and was therefore blind to their duplicity. A hint of this can be seen in Canning’s mention of, “a rumor that France had obtained permission from the Court of Denmark to take possession of Holstein,” a return to the stand-off the previous fall. While not ascribing any particular credence to that particular report, Canning did use it to express his dismay that it was he who had to bring the matter to Garlike’s attention, rather than the other way around. In a less than subtle form of admonishment Canning

61 FO 22/52 Beauman to Garlike 25 July 1807. 62 FO 22/52 Canning to Garlike 10 July 1807. 34 concluded, “I take notice of it only to show you the extreme importance of my being kept informed of the real state of affairs at the Court where you reside.” 63 In any event, Garlike’s days as British Ambassador to Denmark were numbered and as British policy towards that nation changed, Canning would appoint a new man to convey them to Copenhagen. With Garlike so compromised, Canning turned to other sources on Danish intentions and activities, among them the British Minister to the Hanse Towns Edward Thornton. A long-time confidant of Canning’s who soon after coming to power complimented him on, “His Majesty’s approbation of your active and zealous exertions.”64 Thornton had in fact been residing on Danish soil since the French invasion of Prussia the previous year, giving him ample opportunity to foster contacts not only in Germany, but Denmark as well. Like Canning, Thornton was deeply suspicious of Denmark’s ability to maintain their neutrality in the face of recent French advances and in particular what would happen if Denmark’s patron, Russia should bring its influence to bear. On the first of July Thornton reported that the French Ambassador to Denmark was set to deliver a demand that the latter close the ports of Alton and Gluckstadt to British trade and, In any event of a continental peace or even of a continental armistice dictated by Bonaparte and depending upon his will, to the occupation of the duchy of Holstein and to the exclusion of the English navigation and to deliberate upon such measures as to remain absolutely within the power of England to secure a footing upon the rest of the Danish dominions and a connection through them with the continent of Europe.65

Four days later Thornton would again provide a vital piece of intelligence in the war against France when he reported that Napoleon had issued orders that the Duke of Mecklenburg- Schwerin was to be restored to his title and domains. Given that the duke was related by marriage to the Russian Imperial family, this suggested to Thornton that a settlement between Russia and France was forthcoming, “because it seems to me that neither Bonaparte would have consented to the restoration of the duchy…unless there had been a well grounded expectation that it would be followed by a peace.”66 While seemingly innocuous, this tidbit of information

63 FO 22/52 Canning to Garlike 10 July 1807. 64 FO 33/37 Canning to Thornton 24 April 1087. 65 FO 33/38 Thornton to Canning 1 July 1807. 66 Ibid. 5 July 1807 35 was a reminder that any move taken against Denmark had to take into consideration the reaction of the Russians and that the latter was already less than enamored with their British “ally.”

The discontent of Russia Arguably the biggest challenge facing George Canning when he assumed the position of Foreign Minister in April of 1807 was the deteriorating relationship with Britain’s last major ally on the continent, Russia. With the sudden collapse of Prussia the previous year, it was left to Russia to contain the advancing power of Napoleonic France almost alone. Yet, repeated pleas to their English ally for increased subsidies and/or diversionary landings along the European coast had gone ignored by the preceding Grenville ministry. The high point of this coalition neglect came when the British government refused a Russian request to guarantee a five million pound loan to be drawn from English towns. This was in keeping with the Talent’s position that British resources should be used to further British interests, rather than be expended protecting Russian interests, or as one cabinet minister saw it, It was ridiculous to talk of saving Europe, if Europe could not save herself. It was not in the desperate affairs of the continent that England should step in and save her…she could be most useful in following up victory, not in remedying defeat.67

It was not surprising then that by 1807 a sense of abandonment had crept into the Russian court, a belief that Britain could no longer be trusted to act as an ally. As a means of expressing his frustration Tsar’s Alexander refused to sign a commercial treaty that would have provided greater access to Russian markets while protecting the interests of British merchants in Russia. There was also the real fear that without Russian influence Denmark would be even more likely to submit to French pressure, thereby jeopardizing British strategic interests in the Baltic. Suggestions were also made though the Russian Ambassador of Britain’s willingness to send a similar force into Russia itself as well as possible increases to Russia’s annual subsidy. Finally, there was the decision by Canning to appoint his long-time political and personal associate Lord Granville Leveson-Gower to St. Petersberg as British Ambassador to Russia. Having held that position from 1804-5, it was hoped that he could use that experience to rebuild Anglo-Russian relations.

67 Charles Grey, Some Account of the Life and Opinions of Charles, Second Earl Grey (London) 1861. Pg. 135-6. 36

In a somewhat lengthy letter of instruction, Gower was assured that his mission was of supreme importance, “which the fate of Europe in a great measure depends,”68 and was directed to deny or dismiss any perception or rumor “from whatever source this misrepresentation may have flowed,”69 that Britain intended to abrogate their responsibilities as allies. On a more practical level of support, Gower was authorized to offer up to two and half million pounds sterling in subsides, an almost five-fold increase in funds to help Russia offset her war costs. At the same time there seemed little more that Canning could offer Russia than rhetoric. While Gower was urged to point to the Swedish operation as proof of British promises for greater military commitment, Canning reluctantly had to admit, “it is painful to me not to be enabled to authorize Your Excellency to give more distinct and positive assurances both as to the time and the amount of such a Detachment.”70 With regard to subsidies Gower was authorized to offer more money, but this would be contingent on the Tsar’s signing of the commercial treaty, a move that would almost certainly be seen by the anti-British faction in the Russian Court as blackmail. In addition, the earlier request for a guaranteed five million pound loan remained out of the question. Like the subsidies the refusal to guarantee the badly-needed loan could not help but be seen as more double-dealing, that the British were quick with promises, but slow with actual help. Gower himself seemed to have appreciated the difficulty of the task before him, to persuade the Russians to set aside their frustration with their British ally while offering little concrete evidence that such a gesture would be rewarded. Privately, he conceded that the instructions given to him by Canning, “upon closer examination…there are many points upon which I have not received sufficiently precise instructions, and upon which I am left to guess the meaning and intentions of my employers.” Nevertheless, Gower, like Canning, was confident that Russia remained fundamentally opposed to growing power of the French and that Tsar Alexander would prefer the British as allies over the French. Both however, were to receive a rude awakening. Finally disembarking in St. Petersberg in the first week of June, it was not until the 11th that Gower arrived at Tilsit, where Alexander and his Court were located. There he discovered that many pro-British advisors had fallen out of favor with the Emperor, who received Gower

68 FO 65/69 16 May 1807. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 37 with surprising coldness. In a tone that Gower described as “perfectly unexpected,” Alexander reiterated the long list of British neglect and indifference to their ally, concluding that Britain’s policies was to, “act where you please, provided you act at all.”71 Based on this audience, Gower concluded that Russia dissatisfaction with Britain ran far deeper than anyone had anticipated. “I cannot say,” he reported to Canning, “that the emperor appeared perfectly satisfied with the answers made by me, to the various complaints urged by him.”72 Still, he remained confident that Alexander would continue to resist the French and remain in the Coalition. Three days later came the disastrous Russian defeat at Friedland and the surprising news that Tsar Alexander would indeed meet with Napoleon at that fateful conference at Tilsit.

Tilsit and the myth of Canning’s “Secret Intelligence” It has been long assumed by historians that the decision to attack Copenhagen and seize the Danish fleet had been based on Canning’s receipt of a Franco-Russian agreement reached at the Treaty of Tilsit placing Denmark and its navy at the disposal of the French. Known as the “Secret Intelligence,” it helped Britain define its actions as a preemptive act of defense, rather than an aggressive act against a small, neutral nation. Curiously though, despite years of investigation and speculation, the source of this information remains a mystery. Even assuming the validity of the source, there is the question of how this unknown agent could have conveyed that crucial information to London in time to affect the decision to attack. It was in a letter to British Ambassador to Sweden Henry Pierrepont, written four days after the decision to send the expeditionary force to Copenhagen that George Canning first suggested that he was in receipt of information “received from various quarters” that France to “ultimately persuade or compel the Court of Denmark into acts of hostility against this country.”73 The following day Canning wrote to Gower that, “I have received intelligence which appears to rest on good authority, coming directly from Tilsit, that, at a conference between the emperor of Russia and Bonaparte, the latter proposed a maritime league against Great Britain to

71 FO 65/69 Gower to Canning 17 June 1807. 72 Ibid. 73 FO 334/2 Canning to Pierrepont 21 July 1807. 38 which Denmark and Sweden and Portugal should be invited or forced to accede.”74 This is a curious letter for Canning to write considering that such information would presumably first come to the attention of the British Ambassador to Russia, Gower. The following year the subject of the “secret intelligence” would resurface, this time in response to opposition critics in Parliament. In his address, Canning claimed to possess secret information that France and Russia had secretly agreed “to employ the navies of Denmark and Portugal against this country.”75 Over time the myth of the “secret intelligence,” would be repeated so often as to be generally accepted as fact and thus recorded by history.. An obvious source for Canning’s intelligence was his Ambassador to Russia, Granville Leveson Gower. Not only was Gower trusted by Canning, he had fostered contacts in the Russian Court, established during a prior assignment there. Yet from his arrival, Gower felt himself politely but firmly kept at arm’s distance from the Tsar despite several attempts to obtain an audience. Then, there was the letter written by Canning informing Gower of the supposed secret arrangements between Russia and Britain, hardly necessary if Gower had in fact been the source. Even then Canning appeared far from certain that the information he possessed was accurate. As early as August Gower was urged to forward any details regarding the signed treaty while also securing Alexander’s commitment to the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty.76 In addition the Ambassador was instructed to persuade Alexander to, “feel a deep interest in everything which related to the honor and vital interests of Great Britain.”77 Six weeks later Gower was again instructed, with some hint of desperation, to demand that Russia reveal any secret articles agreed to by both Alexander and Napoleon which have been either written into the treaty, or had been concluded verbally.”78 It could be argued that Canning’s intent was to force a public acknowledgment of France’s desire to acquire the Danish fleet, thereby justifying Britain’s bid to preemptively seize it. However, it could also be argued that Canning himself remained uncertain as to validity of the existence of such a codicil and feared that the confiscation of the Danish Fleet might be viewed not as an act of defense, but rather as an act of war.

74 PRO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 21 July 1807. 75 Wendy Hinde George Canning (London) 1973, Pg. 171. 76 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 4 Aug. 1807. 77 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 5 Aug. 1807 78 FO65/70 Canning to Gower 27 Sep. 1807. 39

In response Gower replied that although he believed that Alexander had agreed to close Russian ports to English trade and to intercede on Napoleon’s behalf to Denmark and Portugal, but that even after all his efforts, no evidence supporting that belief could be found. 79 Nevertheless, for weeks afterwards, repeated requests were sent to Gower demanding that Russia divulge the content of the private agreements made between Russia and France, specifically the former’s agreeing to force Denmark into open hostility against Britain and place their fleet at Napoleon’s disposal, information that, if true, would have justified the attack on Copenhagen after the fact. Historians have offered other individuals as Canning’s source of information, among them the mysterious British agent known only as “Mackenzie”, Lord Hutchinson and Sir Robert Wilson, all of whom were present at Memel at the time of the Tilsit Conference and apparently enjoyed various level of access to the Russian Court. Yet, all these sources were limited by the time and distance between Memel and London, both of which, thanks to the Danish closure of their ports to the British postal service, had been greatly increased. Assuming that any intelligence of such had accord had been learned on or before the official signing of the Treaty of the 7th of July, it is extremely unlikely that any report would have reached London before the 16th, which was the day that the Cabinet made the decision to transform the Baltic expedition from a mere “showing-the-flag” mission to an amphibious assault of a major European port and capitol of a neutral power. A more likely explanation was that Canning, aware of the deterioration of relations between his nation and Russia, and suspecting that the latter was on the verge of reaching an accord with France that threatened to radically shift the balance of power in Europe against Britain, had decided that what was required was a demonstration of British power and resolve, one that would impress, if not awe Russia and possibly persuade them to reconsider their policies. As it turns out, for two weeks prior to the 16th, Canning had in his possession a virtual template for the proposed invasion of Copenhagen, complete with a prediction of how it might persuade Russia to reconsider her actions and return to the anti-French fold. And the source of this was not a mysterious agent but rather Canning’s long-time confidant and Ambassador to the Hanse Towns, Edward Thornton.

79 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 17 Aug. 1807 40

The Thornton Letter As mentioned previously, it was Thornton who had provided Canning with the first inkling of a rapprochement between Alexander and Napoleon when he reported the latter’s decision to restore the duchy of Mecklenburg as well as advising London of the massing of French troops along the Danish border. An individual with a long relationship, both professional and personal, with Canning, Thornton was a person whose advice the Foreign Minister held in high standing. On the first of July, Thornton composed a lengthy letter to Canning of his concerns. “If the embassy should terminate in the pacification of Prussia and Russia with France,” he began, “and if the timidity of the Danish government shall be worked upon, the Danish Islands I know may be occupied in the same manner and we shall be literally excluded from the continent.” Essentially, Thornton had made a link between Denmark’s recent reluctance to confront French encroachment on their borders and rumors of a Franco-Russian accord. Thornton then went on to propose that, It is completely in the power of Great Britain with her naval superiority to carry to successful execution in this. That continuing to avail herself of the Alliance of Sweden she should place a large military force as she may think necessary in Stralsund and keep avenues during the summer with a strong squadron of ships in the Baltic with Bomb Vessels for the purpose of defending Stralsund by sea, that on the first account of a Continental Peace or at the instant of the first appearance of French forces in the Duchy of Holstein (which would be too late if our ships did not prevent the passage of troops across the Great Belt,) the English forces should be embarked from Pomerenia and landed on the island of Zealand of which Copenhagen should be taken in concert with the Danish Government or without if the circumstances should render it necessary: that this might be taken in Alliance and in concert with Sweden, who must inevitably lose Pomerania.80

While conceding that he was not in a position to determine the amount of troops and ships such an operation would require, Thornton does state that, “it is sufficient that the Plan itself is completely in the Power of Great Britain alone.” He then went on to argue that despite

80 FO 933/24 Thornton to Canning 1 July 1807. 41 the disparate size between Britain and Denmark, the former “could scarcely be more secure from the Danger of Attack than the Danish Islands, unless indeed the Great Belt, nearly as wide as the Straits of Dover were completely frozen over.” In that event Thornton warns that France would then readily command the Navigation of the Sound and Belts and command of the Baltic and prevent every other Power from receiving those commodities…or cause Russia or Sweden should be deduced or intimated into an enmity against us.”81 Conversely, British possession of Zealand would give that nation control of the Danish Straits and ensure access to the Baltic trade, including the vitally important naval stores.82 Thus, what Thornton had submitted to Canning was nothing less than the outline of the British attack on Copenhagen, which occurred almost two months to the day that it was written. Arriving on the 11th of July, this gave the Cabinet five days to consider both its feasibility and ramifications. To this must be added Canning’s dispute with Rist and his unsuccessful efforts to have the Danish Ambassador recalled, the Pembroke report on increased Danish preparations for battle, initially dismissed but now given a new-found credibility in the Cabinet’s program to portray Denmark as a hypocritical and hostile power. To this end the rumor of a possible end of hostilities between France and Russia became not the trigger for the British attack, but rather the sign of its’ initiation. As for Canning’s “secret information,” it could be argued that this was an attempt by the Foreign Minister to lend credence to the perceived view of Danish anti-British hostility and that nation’s imminent submission to France be it willingly or no. Curiously, Canning believed that despite the relationship between Russia and Denmark, an attack on Copenhagen might sway that nation away from France and back towards England. This was based on the Foreign Minister’s belief that, The Emperor has been dazzled into this bargain against his taste and feeling, if not against his opinion: that the very violence with which he gives into it now, and out- does all that it was necessary or becoming for him to do in affecting a friendly intercourse with Bonaparte, proceeds from an attempt to disguise from others and to hide even from himself, the disgust which he really feels at the part which he has determined to act: that he will go through with it however: that he will even be elated for a time with the peace- popularity which he will suppose himself to have acquired…but that the time will come

81 Ibid. 82 HAR/GC/44 Thornton to Canning 1 July 1807. 42

when this popularity will grow distasteful: when h will reflect in bitterness upon the humiliations to which he has submitted; and when, if we in the meantime have behaved ourselves to him like friends, have not reproached, or dealt unkindly with him, he will turn thankfully to us again, and may be again won to good politics.83

Accordingly, Canning instructed Gower to avoid giving offense to the Russian Tsar and despite his seeming abandonment of his British ally, Gower was to abstain from recrimination and instead focus on assuring Russia of Britain’s desire for friendship. Gower was directed to continue pressing for a commercial treaty, but as a gesture of goodwill to their soon-to-be former ally and the first towards the eventual return of Russia as a British ally, rather than an attempt to preserve British access to Russian trade.84 Despite this, Canning seemed reluctant to consider the possibility that Russia would not take the invasion of their client state, Denmark, well. When questioned by Gower on a possible response once the Russians had learned of the presence of a powerful British fleet operating off the Danish coast, Canning responded that he saw no reason why the Russian Court might question Britain’s right to act in their defense.85 Even after it had been confirmed that Russia had signed the Tilsit Accords and was distancing itself from Britain, Canning continued to hold out hope that his former allies would accept British arguments at face value. In September Gower had warned Canning that, “the conduct of the British Government towards the Court of Denmark had made a very strong impression upon the mood of the Emperor, his High Imperial Majesty took a very lively interest in the welfare of Denmark.” In response Canning fell back on the claim of self-defense, advising Gower to explain, “that His Majesty’s Government had received undoubted information of Bonaparte’s project of employing the Danish Fleet as part of a combined armament destined to cover the invasion and England and Ireland…that the Court of Denmark had obviously submitted to the whims and decrees of France.”86 The latter is curious given that the previous month Gower had advised Canning that he, “had heard from a variety of sources that Bonaparte had apprised the Emperor of his determination in case of the continuance of war to shut the ports of Portugal, Denmark and

83 PRO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 21 July 1807. 84 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 12 Aug. 1807. 85 PRO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 21 July 1807. 86 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 9 Sept. 1807. 43

Austria against British ships and that His Imperial Majesty had acquiesced in this determination.”87 To be certain, Canning did seem to appreciate at least the short-term consequences the attack on Denmark might have on Anglo-Russian relations. In mid-August Canning directed Gower to encourage British merchant ships, “especially those laden with naval stores” 88 to expedite their departure from Russian waters and that it might be necessary for Admiral James Gambier to detach ships to serve as a possible deterrent to armed Russian intervention. Yet, in another latter Canning remained optimistic that Russian intervention on behalf of Denmark would present an opportunity to repair Anglo-Russian relations, that despite the invasion of their client state Denmark, Russia’s fundamental antipathy towards the ambitions of Napoleon, coupled with the conciliatory and friendly position of England would win through.89 Thus, it could be argued that the attack on Copenhagen may not have been defensive or even directed at Denmark. Rather, this was part of a grand scheme to restore the military and political status quo, repair British international prestige tarnished after years of self-serving neglect and ensure access to the region’s vital resources of naval stores. Once the failure of that plan became manifest, the myth of the “secret intelligence,” was created to only absolve Canning and the rest of the government, but also to assign blame to the machinations of Napoleon Bonaparte.

The Expeditionary Force is Assembled As Anglo-Danish relations made the transition from contentious to conflicted, the options available to the former remained limited; the dispatch of a naval force to demonstrate resolve followed by an invitation that Denmark choose to stand with Britain rather than France. However, on the 17th of July that changed as the British Cabinet made the decision to seize the Danish fleet and bring it to Britain while delivering an ultimatum that Denmark sign a treaty of alliance with Britain and accept British protection from the inevitable subsequent French invasion. It would be a large force, initially numbering some seventeen sail-of-the-line, three frigates and twenty smaller warships such as sloops, brigs and bomb vessels90, with more on the

87 FO 65/70 Gower to Canning 2 Aug. 1807. 88 FO 65/70 Canning to Gower 12 Aug. 1807. 89 FO 334/2 Canning to Pierrepont 1Oct. 1807. 90 Ships equipped with one or two large mortars for bombarding shore fortifications. 44 way. Given that their initial choice to command the Baltic squadron, Sir John Duckworth, who had not yet returned from the Mediterranean, James Gambier was summoned from his position on the Admiralty Board and ordered to take command of the expedition. Although known more for his religious piety than fighting ability, Gambier was at first reluctant to give up his administrative post for sea duty. But nonetheless by the 27th of July Gambier had hoisted his flag on board the 98-gun Prince of Wales and reported himself ready for duty.91 The observations of Pembroke and Dunbar, although seemingly dismissed by Canning, were given new credence by the British Cabinet. Now with the Danish defenses reinforced and garrisoned, it was decided that the expedition to the Baltic be a combined land-naval force. Accordingly, orders were issued to move two battalions of the King’s German Legion, the Second Battalion of the 43rd Foot, elements of the 60th and 95th Rifle Regiments and the headquarters of the Second Guards Brigade to Yarmouth for embarkation.92 Two weeks later Lord Cathcart, who had just landed his 5000-man brigade at Stralsund for operations with the stationed there, was ordered to return to the ships and rendezvous with the fleet and take command of ground operations.93 When informed of the new deployment, the Swedish King, who had long complained of the lack of British assistance, was understandably embittered, denouncing what he called Britain’s “abandonment” at his country’s time of need.94 It was only after the troops had already boarded the ships and left Pomerania did King Gustavus give his consent although the withdrawal did give the opposition movement within the Swedish Court fresh fuel in their ongoing Anglophobic crusade which was further strengthened when Pomerania was lost in September, although the resentful attitude of the largely Francophile officer corps had more to do with the Swedish failure. Gambier’s instructions from the Cabinet were threefold: to cooperate with Sweden and provide security, to provide protection for the troops assisting in the defense of Pomerania or if necessary, to assist in their evacuation should the province fall, and lastly, to protect British merchant ships in the Baltic and ensure that vital flow of naval stores continued uninterrupted.95

91 ADM 1/5 27 July, 1807 Gambier to Admiralty. 92 ADM 2/1364, WO 3/43 21 July 1807. 93 WO 1/88 8 Aug. 1807. 94 FO 73/41 Pierrepont to Canning 5 Aug. 1807. 95 WO 6/14 Castlereagh to Admiralty 18 July 1807. 45

Despite this gathering of military force, it was still unclear if war with Denmark was inevitable. In a somewhat confusing follow-up letter addressed to Gambier, Castlereagh explained that although neutral, there was a real possibility that Denmark’s strategic position and sizable navy might come under French control and had to be guarded against.96 Accordingly, Gambier was authorized to prevent reinforcements from reaching the island of Zealand and while merchant ships and light warships could operate unimpeded, any Danish sail-of-the-line attempting to leave Copenhagen would persuade “in the most amicable manner…of the necessity of their returning into port; and upon refusal it will be your duty to consider their proceeding to sea as intended for purposes hostile to His Majesty’s interests and you will in that case use your best exertions to capture or destroy them.”97 Curiously, Gambier was also instructed to inform the Danes that any actions taken against them was, Proceeding in the first instance from yourself and not as having been previously authorized by the government at home…should you be pressed to declare the ground in which you thought fit to give interruption to the passage of troops or to visit vessels which you may suspect to have troops on board, you will declare that, from the intelligence you have received, you have the strongest reason to believe France is determined immediately to force Denmark to act hostilely against Great Britain…in the execution of this determination you are anxious to avoid any hostile proceedings.98

Presumably, this would allow Gambier to initiate a sort of blockade against the defenses of Copenhagen and the island of Zeeland, while allowing the British government to avoid the stigma of initiating hostilities against what was still a neutral nation. Despite their suspicions that Denmark was on the verge of either allying or submitting to France, there was still hope that a diplomatic solution could be found by which the small, but strategically vital nation could be persuaded to take a pro-British stance. Such caution also reflected the desire not to offend Denmark’s long-time patron Russia, adding further tension to the already strained Anglo-Russian relations.

96 WO 6/14 Castlereagh to Gambier 19 July 1807. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 46

However, three days later those hopes were dashed when Canning made his announcement that the conference between the Russian and French Emperors at Tilsit had yielded a peace treaty, one that pointedly excluded England. For the first time Canning claimed to possess “Secret Intelligence” that such an agreement had been reached. Not mentioned was the prior communication between George Canning and Edward Thornton that effectively laid out the template for British strategic policy in the Baltic. The first step, in Canning’s eyes, was removing Benjamin Garlike as Ambassador to Denmark. Having long lost the Foreign Minister’s confidence as an effective representative of British interests in the Danish Court, Canning had Garlike transferred to Memel to serve as the British Ambassador to Prussia, a demotion of sorts, given that the Prussian Court was little more than a government-in-exile. His replacement was Brook Taylor, a diplomat of somewhat limited experience but someone whom Canning trusted. After some delays by the Danish Foreign Minister Joachim Bernstorff, Taylor was finally granted an audience during which at the instruction of Canning, Taylor brought the supposed secret intelligence from Tilsit and requested if he could confirm or deny whether or not Denmark had been invited to join a maritime league against Britain. Not surprisingly, Bernstorff denied that any such proposal had been made, adding his surprise of the British cabinet’s willingness to believe any rumor that doubted Denmark’s determination to maintain “most perfect neutrality.”99 A strange type of three-way standoff developed in which the Danish Court refused to receive Taylor’s credentials, thereby officially blocking his authority to represent Britain. However Joachim Bernstorff’s attempts to circumvent Taylor and continue to negotiate with Garlike was frustrated by the latter’s refusal to meet with him. An unfortunate consequence of this diplomatic stalemate was Taylor’s inability to formally inform the Danish government of the approach of Gambier’s fleet.100 In any event, Taylor’s presence was soon superseded by the arrival of Francis Jackson, a special emissary sent directly from the British Cabinet in conjunction with the fleet and charged with presenting the Danes with an extraordinary treaty. Self-confidant, experienced, but impetuous by nature and prone to criticize others regardless of rank, Jackson was certain that he was up to the task of intimidating an entire

99 FO 22/53 Taylor to Canning 3 Aug. 1807. 100 WO 1/187 Taylor to Gambier 2 Aug. 1807. 47 country. Unlike Taylor, Jackson bypassed the usual diplomatic channels and instead arrived at Kiel, where the de facto Head of State, the Danish Crown Prince, was in residence. Meeting with Prime Minister Bernstorff on the 7th of August, Jackson began by reiterating the list of British complaints regarding Denmark; their unwillingness to abide by the British blockade, their protests of the Orders in Council, retaining Jacob Rist as ambassador to England despite his dispute with Canning and the supposed naval preparations at Copenhagen. Not surprisingly, Bernstorff rejected the British position, again stating Denmark’s policy of neutrality and returned to the now-familiar series of complaints of British harassment of Danish shipping. It was then that Jackson moved to the reason for his presence, to express his government’s concern over the looming threat of French troops crossing the border and to request a personal audience with the Crown Prince, to take place the following day.101 It was during this audience that Jackson revealed the imminent arrival of Gambier’s fleet. This took the Danes by surprise for while Rist had reported the build-up of ships at Yarmouth, he assumed that this was in support of an amphibious landing along the North Sea coast.102 Jackson then forwarded his country’s demand that the Danes surrender their fleet to Great Britain, arguing that, “in the present state of the north of Europe the delivery of the Danish fleet into his majesty’s hands had become a matter of indispensable necessity.”103 Jackson explained that Britain was prepared to offer an alliance, either secret or open; with Denmark and that the expeditionary force would guarantee the security of all Danish territory at home or abroad from invasion. If this offer were refused, Jackson made it clear that the ships and soldiers of the expeditionary fleet would take possession of the Danish fleet, even if that meant launching an attack more powerful than the 1801 assault on Copenhagen. Belatedly, Prince Frederick pointed out that in the event of a French invasion, Denmark would naturally become a British ally and that to force them to abandon their policy of neutrality would only invite, rather then prevent invasion. Such pleas fell on deaf ears as Jackson only repeated his demand that Danish compliance be immediate. It was then with diplomatic irony that Jackson stated, “I would consider it as the happiest moment of my life could I be the successful instrument of restoring perfect harmony between our two countries. With these words I looked

101 FO 22/54 Jackson to Canning 7 Aug. 1807. 102 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon, Pg. 152. 103 J. H. Rose “Canning and Denmark, 1807” English Historical Review Vol. (London) 1896. Pg. 87. 48 for his bow of dismissal, received it and retired.”104 Hastily, Crown Prince Frederick departed for Copenhagen, sending ahead belated orders that the defenses of Copenhagen be strengthened. Remaining behind was Bernstroff, trying to buy time by inviting Jackson to further negotiations. Instead, Jackson departed Danish soil and rendezvoused with the fleet. There would be one last British attempt at a diplomatic solution, although one made at the point of the proverbial gun. On the 16th of August, Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart issued a joint statement proposing a peaceful occupation of the island of Zeeland, “on the footing of a province of the most friendly power in alliance with Great Britain,”105 while the Danish fleet was “deposited” into British custody. Again, the promise of return at the conclusion of a general peace was made, with the additional incentive of compensation while the ships were in British custody. Made public by the British commanders, this was seen as little more than an ultimatum by the Danish government, particularly as it coincided with the landing of the first British soldiers and sailors on Danish soil. The response was the formal declaration of war on Britain by Denmark. It had been official British history that it had been Danish duplicity and hypocrisy, coupled with the ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte that forced them into acting against this Baltic nation, and that by consorting with France, either willingly or as part of a grand conspiracy hatched during the Tilsit Conference Denmark had violated their own neutrality. This was the position that Canning adopted during Parliamentary debates the succeeding year and has passed into general acceptance. Yet the evidence strongly suggests that British perceptions of the Danish “threat” were more perceived than real. Starting with the withdrawal of Danish troops from Holstein in the fall of 1806 and Captain Dunbar’s report of increased Danish naval activity, the belief that Denmark was moving towards an accommodation with France had begun with the British Cabinet. This belief grew with the arrival of George Canning as Foreign Minister and his determination to restore British creditability in the Baltic region, in particular Russia, which was not only Britain’s most powerful ally in the struggle against Napoleon, but also the primary source of naval stores that was crucial to Britain’s strategic position. In this respect though Canning had

104 FO 22/54 Jackson to Canning 9 Aug. 1807. 105 Lady Chatteron ed., Memorials, Personal and Historical of Admiral Lord Gambier, Vol. 2 (London) 1861. Pg. 49 vastly overestimated the depths of Danish hostility towards Britain as well as their willingness to surrender their neutrality in order gain French favor. Another British miscalculation concerned Russia. It was clear that Canning had underestimated the depths of Russian irritation with their British ally and seemed oblivious to Russia’s inability to regard months of broken promises to the shifting whims of British politics. Despite claims that a secret agreement had been reached at Tilsit requiring Russia to turn on Britain and ally itself with France, Canning chose to believe that the former was acting under duress and that a demonstration of British resolve and power would persuade the Russian Tsar to return to the Coalition. Yet, Denmark was by no means the innocent victim of British paranoia as their history maintains. Although the majority of intercepted Danish merchantmen were later judged not to be carrying contraband cargoes, a sufficient number were to justify, at least in British eyes, a closer scrutiny of their blockade policies. It was also no secret that a strong pro-French element existed within the Danish court, not enough to influence policy, but enough to warrant British concern. The Danes also underestimated the ill-will its insistence on a strict adherence to its assertion of neutral’s rights had generated in Britain and how its strategic position and powerful fleet might be seen as a potential weapon, rather as a defensive shield. In the end, these misperceptions and miscalculations would serve to broaden, rather than narrow the scope of the Napoleonic war and create a new theater in which the French would play at best, a peripheral role. For Britain in particular, the events leading to the second Battle of Copenhagen would create a threat than, in strategic terms, would be at least as dangerous as that of the French.

50

CHAPTER 4

ANGLO-SWEDISH RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF GUSTAVUS IV

Perhaps more so than Denmark, British relations with Sweden could be described as “complicated.” Economically, a lively trade based out of the west coast port of had developed between the two nations. However, thanks to the presence of protectionist tariffs and import restrictions, this trade heavily favored the Swedes and limited British profits. As for politics Britain had on several occasions intervened in support of Sweden, even to the point of stationing British warships in Swedish waters. Despite this, there existed an influential anti- British faction amongst the Swedish nobility, one that lobbied constantly for closer relations with Britain’s primary opponent, France. Yet, British policy makers actively courted Swedish favor, not because it was a producer of naval stores critical to British naval power but because it was a conduit for trade.

The Swedish Military System The Swedish Army at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars was primarily a conscript force with levies raised from the various great estates of the nobility. The officer corps was almost exclusively drawn from the noble houses and while they considered themselves professionals, there was also a considerable amount of political dabbling, particularly with those nobles who favored closer ties with France and who saw Britain as the source of all ills. Like their land forces, the deep-water component of the Swedish Navy was also in a period of decline, and unlike their Danish neighbor to the south, little effort was made to incorporate overseas advances in naval architecture and technology. Consequently at the beginning of the French Revolution only three of Sweden’s sixteen sail-of-the-line warships

51 were 74’s. The rest were of a largely obsolescent design and carried between 60 and 66 guns.106 Training too was lacking, as the Danes soon discovered during their joint exercises. Arguably the elite branch of the Swedish military was their coastal navy, in particular the flotillas of oared galleys stationed along the Finnish coast. Unusually sophisticated in design and purpose, the Swedish flotillas boasted a number of different vessels ranging from small espingars with 14-16 pairs of oars and armed with a single carronade to larger ships that combined oars with sail rigging usually associated with ocean-going ships such as brigs and schooners. The largest of these were the hemmema’s, a ship with a frigate-style rigging (although the sails themselves were lateen, rather than square,) and no less than 34 heavy guns. The flotillas guarded the seaward approaches to Finland, while threatening the flank of any attempt by the Russian fleet to sail across the Baltic and menace Stockholm. The central base of the galley flotillas was the fortress of Sveaborg, built on six islands and boasting nearly 700 cannon. There were smaller numbers of galleys stationed along the western Swedish coast, although these operated in support of the deep-water ships stationed in Stockholm. Because of their performance during the 1790 war against Russia, the galley flotillas were the pride of the Swedish nation and stood in stark contrast to the overall impression of the Swedish military as a mediocre force that had seen better days.

The new “Swedish Lion” Gustavus IV Swedish King Gustavus IV ascended the Swedish throne after the assassination of his father in1792 although, due to his age, his uncle the Duke of Sodermanland ruled as Regent until 1797. Energetic, dynamic and strong-willed, Gustavus was, like his father before him, a strong proponent of autocratic rule and the Divine Right of Kings, a philosophy that often placed him at odds with his nobility. Another point of contention was Gustavus’ desire to maintain relations with Britain, a policy that was at odds with the Anglophobic element within the nobility. Curiously though, among the King’s closest advisors were two of the leading voices of the anti- English lobby, Foreign Minister Frederick Wilhelm von Ehrenhelm and Personal Secretary Gustav von Lagerbjelke. Although Gustavus was convinced that their first priority was offering loyal service to the Crown, over the years, they would go to great lengths to undermine Anglo-

106 Gardiner, Warships, Pg. 146-7. 52

Swedish relations in favor of an alliance with France. Yet, despite their efforts, it was the King’s abrasive personality, self-centered rule and unwillingness to accept any other perspective save his own that would do as much damage to the alliance as did Ehrnhelm and Lagerbjelke. Overall, Gustavus was a capable, initially popular ruler who saw royal absolutism as the defense against the chaos and uncertainty of liberal reform. At the same time though he kept his own counsel and expected national policy to adapt to his personal ambitions and interests, rather than the reverse. The result was a foreign policy that to outsiders appeared mercurial and ego- centric serving no other interests than the King’s. It was a style of rule that aggravated and alienated more than it generated sympathy and respect, with the eventual effect being the destabilization of Sweden and exposing it to the very dangers Gustavus tried to defend against.

Sweden, Denmark and the British Blockade During the French Revolution Sweden, like Denmark, sought to remain aloof from conflict and adopted a policy of neutrality. Also like Denmark, Swedish merchants used their neutral status to carry goods into ports under blockade as well as fill the vacuum left by the absence of merchant ships belonging to belligerent nations. However, this also meant that Swedish trade vessels were subjected to interception and inspection by Royal Navy warships, a situation that King Gustavus saw as not only offensive to Sweden, but to himself as well. In 1798 he ordered that Swedish warships make all efforts to preserve the integrity of all merchant ships under their protection and above all, resist any attempt by the British to search or seize them. Two years later, Gustavus accepted Tsar Paul’s “invitation” to join the League of the Armed Neutrality and with the rash enthusiasm that was typical of his character, pledged to assist in the defense of Copenhagen appointing the experienced Vice-Admiral Olaf Cronstedt to mobilize the Swedish Navy and coordinate with the Danes on how they would be best used. Unfortunately, Gustavus’ portrayal of the loyal ally was undermined by his back-door efforts to manipulate affairs for his personal benefit. Like his late father, Gustavus made no secret of his desire to acquire Norway from Denmark and add it to his realm. Yet, he could not do so as long as Denmark could call upon the assistance of Britain and more importantly, Russia. Accordingly, even while supporting the Danes against the British, Gustavus took every opportunity to pass on rumors of Franco-Danish collusion and the Danes imminent recognition of the legality of the French Republic. Not surprisingly then that the Danish Ministry described

53 their relations with Sweden as “truly wretched,” a situation that was attributed to Sweden’s association with France.107 Further evidence of the Swedish King’s machinations came in December of 1800 when he journeyed to St. Petersburg hoping to persuade Tsar Paul to sign a separate Russo-Swedish alliance and recognize Gustavus’ son as King of Denmark. It was an obvious and heavy-handed maneuver on his part and displayed Gustavus’ less-than subtle approach to diplomacy and for his pains was, “rebuffed in such a manner as to compel the King to leave St. Petersburg.”108 Not surprisingly then that despite Gustavus’ pledge to come to Denmark’s defense floundered on the decades’-long distrust between the two nations. The Swedish King’s offer to send troops to assist in the defense of Zealand was rejected by the Danes while the Danish offer to send floating batteries to Helsingborg to help block that channel to the approaching British fleet came to naught when Cronstedt revealed that there were no land batteries of Swedish guns on their side of the passage.109 Similarly, the promised squadron of Swedish ships took much longer to prepare for action than originally anticipated and it would not be until the 1st of April that the ships were ready to sail. Even then the same southerly wind that carried Nelson to the attack kept the Swedes confined to their harbor and ensured that Denmark would be alone in their fight against the Royal Navy and Horatio Nelson. For Gustavus, who had personally journeyed to Helsingborg only to impotently watch as the British fleet sailed past him, the defeat of the Danes at Copenhagen was a personal embarrassment that demanded a scapegoat, in the form of Admiral Cronstedt. Despite the latter’s assertions that he had done his best and that it was the weather that prevented him from joining the battle, Gustavus publicly reprimanded the popular commander and sent him in disgrace to command the fortress of Sveaborg. It was an impetuous decision that years later would have the most tragic of consequences. Even after the assassination of Tsar Paul and the collapse of the League of the Armed Neutrality, the Swedish King persisted in his efforts to elevate himself to international prominence. While both Russia and Denmark entered into negotiations with Britain to end hostilities, Sweden remained defiant and unwilling to back down from the principle of “free ships, free trade.” From Britain, Gustavus demanded the restoration of their colony of St.

107 FO 22/40 Drummond to Grenville. 31/11/95. 108 Ibid. 27/1/01. 109 Feldbaek, Battle of Copenhagen Pg. 112. 54

Barthelemy, compensation for any ships and cargoes seized by the Royal Navy and a pledge that Swedish ships would be exempt from inspection and interception.110 Gustavus also rejected Russian offers to mediate Anglo-Swedish negotiations, regarding the new Tsar Alexander I as unreliable and untrustworthy. As a result, Sweden found herself temporarily estranged from both Britain and Russia and without a Great Power to claim as a patron and protector. This presented an opportunity for the pro-French faction in the Swedish Court, in particular Secretary Lagerbjlke to press their case for closer relations with that nation. Unfortunately for them, the French had little interest in even opening talks with Sweden, instead placing a tariff on imports of Swedish iron ore. This marked the first, but certainly not the last attempt by the Swedish Francophiles to indulge in their self- delusion and attempt to nurture a non-existent French favor. It would not be until July of 1803 that the discord between Britain and Sweden was resolved. By then Britain was in desperate need to reestablish a trade relations with Sweden and was willing to offer concessions to achieve that. Gustavus’ chose to view the new treaty as personal triumph of the first order and proof that his policies were correct after all. However, that would be soon overshadowed by another perceived affront to the royal personage, this one offered by France.

Gustavus brings Sweden into the Third Coalition Inspired by his seeming “triumph” over the British blockade, Gustavus proposed to take a lengthy tour of central Europe, ostensibly to his wife’s home in Baden, but also to explore the possibility of building a coalition of German states led by Sweden.111 He had just landed in Swedish Pomerania when word arrived that Napoleon had sent troops in to occupy Hanover, the ancestral home of the current British ruling dynasty. Like most European monarchs, Gustavus had welcomed the signing of the Peace of Amiens, but suspected that Napoleon’s ambition had yet to be slaked. Yet, it was the March 1804 kidnapping of the Duke of Enghien from his home in Baden that convinced Gustavus that Napoleon was the arch- enemy of monarchial rule and for that reason had to be destroyed.

110 Christer Jorgensen, The Anglo-Swedish Alliance against Napoleonic France (Hampshire) Palgrace Macmillan. Pg. 11. 111 Raymond Carr “Gustavus IV and the British Government, 1804-9) The English Historical Review Vol. 60 #236 (Jan. 1945) Pg. 39. 55

Trying in vain to curb their impetuous monarch’s outburst were Ehrenheim and Lagerbjelke, both because as long as Gustavus was in Germany he was within reach of French agents and also because such statements ran contrary to their own desires for an arrangement that favored Sweden’s “true interests,” which they interpreted as neutrality endorsed by French friendship.112 As usual though, Gustavus heeded only the voice of his own counsel as well as his vision of personally leading a royal crusade against Napoleon Bonaparte. In the short-run, Gustavus’ pronouncements of French perfidy did lead to a rapprochement with his former antagonists, Russia and Britain. Momentarily forgotten by Gustavus were his suspicions of the sincerity of the Russian Tsar. Instead, Alexander had become a brother monarch with vast numbers of troops to hurl against Napoleon. In addition, an alliance with Russia could also serve to undermine that nation’s association with Denmark and possibly lead to another of Gustavus’ long-cherished goals, the acquisition of Norway. As for Britain, once Gustavus’ beliefs became known, the Foreign Office dispatched a new envoy, Henry Pierrepoint, to locate Gustavus and open negotiations to form an alliance between the two nations. As with Russia, the animosity over free trade and the British blockade seemed to vanish overnight as both sides saw great possibilities in forming an alliance. For the British, Sweden’s presence in the Third Coalition meant another opponent for France as well as greater security for their trade in the Baltic. For Gustavus, an alliance with Britain meant money; subsidies with which meant more power and influence for Sweden in general and Gustavus in particular. An initial and on-going stumbling block in Anglo-Swedish negotiations was the amount of subsidies. British policy was to offer a “standard rate” of ₤12 10s per soldier with a minimum number based on the nation’s manpower base. Gustavus, however demanded that he receive ₤25/soldier with no minimum number required.113 As an alternative, the Swedish King proposed that some ₤100,000 be sent for the defense of Stralund, the capitol of Swedish Pomerania. The British countered with an offer of ₤60,000, along with a requirement that Sweden permit the creation of a depot for the recruitment of soldiers in Britain’s King’s German Legion as well as special concessions for British traders. For Gustavus, who was generally blind to anyone’s interests save his own, this was difficult to accept.

112 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 22. 113 Carr, “Gustavus IV” Pg. 43. 56

Complicating matters further were the efforts of the Anglophobes, who included Gustavus’ representative to the negotiations with Britain. Convinced as they were that an alliance with Britain would be disastrous to Swedish interests and undermine their goal of friendship with France, they made additional requirements on the British, such as supporting a return of the Bourbons to the French throne and any recruitment of German troops take place after Sweden’s formal declaration of war against France. Small wonder then that the British envoys often complained about the obstructionist tactics of their Swedish counterparts who were described, “with the exception of a very few, are men of very doubtful, not to say suspicious characters.”114 Curiously, such obstructionist tactics were in keeping with Gustavus’ unique approach to Coalition warfare. Publicly his enthusiasm for action against Napoleon was as strong as ever. Behind the scenes though, the Swedish king seemed content to wait for the French to come to him, aware that Napoleon had to first pass through Prussia before coming to grips with him. It was if Gustavus desired both neutrality and belligerence, relishing in the opportunity to exercise greater international influence without undue risk. Still, under pressure from both Russia and Britain, royal reluctance and obstructionist negotiators could only go so far and in October of 1805 the final draft of Treaty of Beckaskog was signed. Under its terms Sweden was required to contribute 10,000 troops to the Coalition cause, allow Russian troops to use Pomerania as a base of operations as well the recruitment of King’s German Legion troops. In return, Sweden received a subsidy rate that although far short of Gustavus’ demands, was considerably greater than the standard rate.115 It was an extraordinary exception on the part of the British and an indication of the importance they attached to Swedish participation in the Third Coalition. Unfortunately, such faith was misplaced, as time and again Gustavus proved to be more interested in furthering his own interests rather than his allies.

The Difficult Ally By the beginning of 1807, British leaders were beginning to wonder if the alliance with Sweden was more trouble than it was worth. Instead of fulfilling his promises of providing

114 FO 22/73 Harrowby to Pierrepont 9 Oct. 1804. 115 Courtesy of a lump-sum advance of funds in addition to the agreed-upon standard rate, essentially paying twice for the same number of troops. Carr, “Gustavus IV” Pg. 47. 57

25,000 men for service against the French, Gustavus could only raise a fraction of that total despite the huge subsidies paid by Britain. Even then Gustavus preferred to use his troops not against Napoleon, but rather to pursue a rather petty quarrel with neutral Prussia. So determined was Gustavus to achieve a triumph over the “perfidious Prussians”116 that he was seemingly oblivious to the fact that Prussia was Sweden’s shield against the French, thereby affording him the luxury of taking a hard-line against Napoleon without taking any undue risks. However, that all changed in the fall of 1806 with Prussia’s declaration of war against France and their subsequent defeat at the Battles of Jena-Auerstadt. The unexpected and sudden collapse of the Prussians placed Sweden, specifically their foothold in Pomerania, directly in the path of the French advance. Immediately, Gustavus turned to Britain, demanding a resumption of subsides that had been suspended during their brief conflict with Prussia. However, the ruling government in London, the so-called “Ministry of all the Talents,” limited subsidy payments to only offensive operations against the French, judging that the defense of Pomerania was strictly a Swedish affair and as such, should be paid by the Swedes.117 Never one to allow diplomatic niceties to stand in the way of his interests, Gustavus simply appropriated what he needed, seizing some ₤80,000 in silver intended to subsidize Russia. To everyone’s surprise, Tsar Alexander I did not protest the theft of badly-needed funds, instead blaming Britain and their miserly policies. The dispute over funds continued throughout the winter of 1806-7, with Britain demanding some offensive action of Sweden’s part was required before the issue of increased subsides would be considered while Gustavus countered by insisting that such an attack was impossible without more financial assistance. Unfortunately for the coalition, this dispute was occurring at a time when French forces in northern Europe were advancing into Poland in an attempt to pin down the Russians. So acidic were the negotiations that in February of 1807 British envoy Henry Pierrepoint had requested relief, believing that he could no longer adequately convince the Swedes to carry on the war without either massive subsidies or direct military assistance.118

116 FO 334/9 Pierrepont to Fox, 21 Aug. 1806. 117 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 77. 118 FO 73/36 Pierrepont to Howick 27 January 1807. 58

George Canning, Sweden and Denmark The fall of the “Talents” government in March of 1807 marked a change in British policy regarding both the war and Britain’s relationship with its allies. The new Foreign Minister, George Canning, wasted little time in offering an additional ₤2.5 million in subsidies and promising that an expeditionary force of 30,000 troops would be sent into the Baltic to support to support Coalition operations in the Baltic. Such promises though were poorly received by the Russians, who made their displeasure felt by refusing to sign commercial treaty highly sought after by the British. As for Sweden, the news that subsides were about to be renewed and that reinforcements would soon be appearing in Pomerania seemed to galvanize Gustavus to action. On the 1st of April a Swedish force of 6000 men marched out from Stralsund and launched that nation’s first offensive of the Napoleonic Wars. Taking advantage of French preoccupation along the Polish frontier, the Swedish attack showed initial promise, taking the cities of Rostock and Wismar and taking some 1700 prisoners. True to form, Gustavus portrayed what amounted to a large-scale raid as a glorious victory over Napoleon, ordering that church bells in Sweden be rung in celebration while exhorting his generals to make preparations for a general offensive against Berlin. Such grandiose plans proved premature as additional French troops were diverted from operations in eastern Prussia and sent to confront the Swedes. By the 20th of April Swedish forces were in full retreat, giving up all their gains and prisoners. Even worse, the Swedish field commander, General Henrik von Essen signed an armistice that all but undid even the meager accomplishments of their attack as well as suggest that Sweden was contemplating abandoning her allies and signing a separate peace with France. While not sharing these views, Canning was alarmed over reports he had received suggesting that the Swedish officer corps did not share their monarch’s enthusiasm for the war and had arranged the armistice without the king’s consent. Nevertheless, the following month saw the first orders being cut authorizing the dispatch of some 10,000 men, mostly troops of the King’s German Legion to Stralsund where they would operate in concert with Swedish and Prussian troops already there. For the Swedish King, this was welcome news as it not only demonstrated a clear British commitment after months of procrastination and neglect, but also provided the Swedish King with a force of reliable,

59 professionally-trained soldiers with which he could fulfill his dreams of leading a crusade against Napoleon. Thus, it was with a sense of frustration and resentment that the first British officer to be presented before Gustavus came not at the head of an army, but rather on a fact-finding mission. Brigadier-General Henry Clinton arrived at Stralsund on May 16th on the orders of British Secretary of War Lord Castlereagh, who wanted to know if the Swedish Army was capable of fulfilling their King’s grandiose designs. Neither party came away with a favorable opinion of the other. In the eyes of the Swedish King, Clinton’s presence was yet another excuse by the British to delay and temporize, denying him his destiny of glory and fame and Gustavus wasted little time in venting his displeasure to newly-arrived British envoy to Sweden, Alexander Straton.119 As for Clinton, he observed the lack of discipline in the common Swedish foot soldier and the distinct lack of enthusiasm emanating from their officers, concluding that the Swedish military lacked the morale and confidence to offer effective resistance to the French, predicting that at the first opportunity would abandon their coalition partners.120 In contrast, Clinton was more impressed with Prussian General Gebhard Blucher, who had arrived during his visit at the head of 4000 troops. Blucher’s appeal for supplies was met with a ready promise from Clinton that he would request that the Prussian receive all possible assistance.121 Although the Clinton mission had no direct impact on the preparations of the expeditionary force to Sweden, it does indicate the growing rift between the ambitious King of Sweden’s reach and his grasp. It also provides a clear insight on the rising sense of defeatism within the Swedish military and their discontent with both the British and their own monarch. The chilly atmosphere between Clinton and Gustavus could also be seen as a prelude to brief, but volatile relationship between the Swedish King and another British general, Sir John Moore. Even as Clinton formally presented his gloomy report to the War Office, the first troop transports bound for Sweden were readying to depart. Nevertheless, it did appear that the Clinton mission did have some impact for in his final meeting before his departure Expeditionary Commander Lord Cathcart was informed that he was to consider himself an independent

119 FO 73/39 Straton to Canning 10 May 1807. 120 WO 1/412 Clinton to Castlereagh 3 June 1807. 121 WO 1/412 Clinton to Cooke 18 May 1807. 60 commander not bound to obey any orders issued by the Swedish King.122 It made for an awkward command situation over the long run and would almost certainly have resulted in a diplomatic crisis that might rupture the Anglo-Swedish alliance just as it did a year later. Such a crisis did not arise, as the expected arrival of British troops in northern Europe would be overtaken by dramatic events taking place on both sides of the Baltic. In the east, this was the decisive defeat of the Russian army at the Battle of Friedland and the subsequent Peace Conference at Tilsit. In the west, this came in the form of the deterioration of relations between Britain and Denmark and the rumors of a possible alliance between Denmark and France. Of the two, the latter seemed to offer greater possibilities for the ambitious Gustavus to realize his dreams of greatness.

Sweden and Denmark In general, Swedish attempts to influence Anglo-Danish tensions were consistent with Gustavus’ long-standing desire to undermine Danish standing in the Baltic community, particularly with Russia, while weakening Denmark’s hold on Norway. As with the previous crisis, this initially consisted of forwarding rumors of Danish perfidy and generally portraying the actions of their southern neighbors in the worst light possible. At times, Gustavus’ heavy- handed tactics revealed a motive so obvious that under most circumstances would have been dismissed outright by a politician as sophisticated as George Canning. On this occasion though, the suspicions and distrust Britain had for Denmark made fertile ground for the self-serving Gustavus’, although in the long run, the Swedish King would not profit from his machinations. The first seeds were planted in the fall of 1806 when the Danish Army began their sudden abandonment of Holstein. More so than Britain, Gustavus viewed the official explanation from the Danes for their withdrawal with disdain and suspicion. In his eyes, the retreat of the Danes from Holstein was but the first stage of a process that would culminate with French troops occupying the island of Zealand with only a narrow strip of water separating them from Swedish soil.123 Therefore, Gustavus took the position that Denmark must offer a categorical declaration of her determination to either defend their country or in the event that was not possible, seek the assistance of the coalition. Failing that, then a joint Anglo-Swedish force should occupy Zealand

122 FO 73/40 Castlereagh to Cathcart 9 June 1807. 123 FO 73/36 Pierrepont to Howick 24 November 1806. 61 and secure it from the French. When informed of this the English Ambassador came to the somewhat obvious observation that securing an alliance with a nation by invading it was not a particularly wise course of action.124 Yet less than a month after rejecting the Swedish note, Howick made just such a proposal to the Danish Court, offering to deploy a naval squadron to the Danish Sound and land 25,000 Swedish troops to bolster the Zealand garrison125. Unfortunately, such promises did not extend to the Jutland peninsula or prevent its being overrun by French troops as soon as word of the “secret” treaty reached Napoleon’s ears. In Danish eyes, it was difficult to choose which was worse, surrendering their long-standing neutrality and seeing much of their territory overrun by France, or placing the security of their capital in the hands of their traditional rival, Sweden. Whatever the reason, the proposal was rejected in no uncertain terms and in response to a concentration of Swedish troops in the province of Scania, just across the Sound from Zealand, the Danish Court issued orders for the island’s defenses to be reevaluated and strengthened. In the end, Gustavus had unwittingly succeeded in undermining Anglo-Danish relations as the latter’s reinforcement of Zealand and Copenhagen was interpreted by Britain as a defense against a British attack, one that would inevitably result from the Danes’ abandoning their neutral stance and move towards an alliance with France. Ironically, Gustavus himself would not only fail to profit by his machinations, but would see his bid for greatness end in humiliating defeat.

British priorities shift and the fall of Pomerania. With the arrival of Cathcart’s force, the number of coalition troops stationed in Pomerania had risen to an impressive 18,000. Impulsively, Gustavus cancelled the two-month armistice with the French, calling upon both Prussia and Russia to follow his lead. Not surprisingly, neither did and even Napoleon was moved to question the Swedish King’s sanity and whether he should be committed to an asylum.126 The French Emperor did not confine his reactions to mere musings. With Russia safely bound by the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was free to focus more attention to Pomerania. Within

124 FO 73/36 Pierrepont to Howick 27 November 1806. 125 Just how Gustavus was produce these troops given his inability to meet the levels required earlier by the subsidy treaty went addressed. 126 D. A. Bingham Ed. A Selection from the Letters and Dispatches of the First Napoleon. Vol. II (London) 1884. Pg. 323-4. 62 weeks some 40,000 French and Allied troops had been concentrated along the border and it took only a few brief skirmishes to send the few Swedish troops stationed there running for the protection of the fortifications of Stralsund. In vain, the Swedes called for a second armistice and unlike the Swedish King, British officers stationed there had few doubts has to the quality and morale of their allies.127 No sooner had Cathcart arrived on the 18th of July than he began looking for a way to extricate his troops from what certainly appeared to be a trap. Providentially, such an opportunity had presented itself, in the form of a message from the War Office. On the 19th of July the British Cabinet reached a decision to dispatch a land and naval expedition to Copenhagen for the purpose of forcing the Danes to surrender their fleet and submit to the British will. As the closest British troops to the proposed theater, it made sense that Cathcart’s force would make up at least part of the ground contingent for the invasion. Accordingly, Cathcart was instructed to prepare his troops for re-embarkation by the end of the month. Not surprisingly, the Swedish government did not receive the news of the sudden withdrawal of British troops with good grace, particularly as they had not been consulted beforehand. In the eyes of the Anglophobes, this was yet another example of their being abandoned for the sake of furthering British interests. At the very least, without the British presence, the loss of Swedish Pomerania was all but a forgone conclusion. In fact, for Sweden the strategic situation had been all but turned on its head. As a result of the attack on Copenhagen by their British ally, Denmark had been transformed from wary neutral to bitter enemy of Sweden. France would all but certainly ally with Denmark, shattering the dreams of the Francophile faction of the Swedish nobility. Worse, because of the Tilsit accords, Russia was in a position to threaten Finland, thereby compelling Sweden to fight a two- front war. As Foreign Minister Ehrenheim ominously predicted, “We have not yet seen the full extent of our bitter fate”128 The first concern however was Pomerania. Even as British troops were departing Stralsund, Gustavus arrived, hoping to inspire his troops to greater efforts. In fact, his presence had the opposite effect as his officer corps, the majority of them viewed the war as the result of British machinations and the King’s obsession with personal glory, did their best to sabotage the

127 British Library Manuscripts Collection, Mosheim to Gordon 15 July 1807. 128 Quoted in Jorgensen, Amglo-Swedish, Pg. 102. 63 defense. As Pierrepoint reported, “I do not see a single person here capable of making a vigorous and well-conducted defense.”129 By August 24th, orders had given to evacuate Stralsund and retreat to the island town of Rugen. A week later, Gustavus, ill and dispirited, returned to the Swedish mainland and left command to General Christopher von Toll. It was this officer who managed to halt the French advance long enough to complete the withdrawal of the army from Pomerania, chiefly by suggesting to French Marshal Guillaume Brune of his intent to remove the king from power and sign an alliance with France. Once safely home, the wily old general revealed his promise as a mere ruse and a delighted Gustavus promoted him to Field- Marshal.130 Despite the saving of the better part of his army, the loss of Pomerania was a bitter blow for Gustavus to bear. Pomerania had been his duchy, and at least in his mind, the platform from which the Swedish King could exert his influence on European power politics. The nobility saw things somewhat differently. To them, Pomerania had been a millstone, a magnet that drew them into an unwanted, unpopular war on behalf of the perfidious British. Now it was hoped that with his power weakened, King Gustavus might be persuaded to see reason and return the nation to its “natural” state of pro-French neutrality. Some members of the Swedish nobility could not wait. In September a plot to have the King declared physically and mentally unfit to rule and restore the former Regent to power was discovered. A few months later a group of Swedish officers were caught attempting to communicate with the French, soliciting support for yet another coup d’ etat. In both cases, the conspiracies were largely isolated and were readily rounded up. Rather, resistance to the king remained largely passive and apathetic and could have been turned around by appeal to patriotism and defense of the nation. Instead, Gustavus remained wedded to the philosophy of L’Etat c’est moi and remained deaf to the discontent around him. Still, Gustavus felt he needed some kind of compensation for the loss of Pomerania and he looked to the British for restitution. With Sweden their only remaining ally, Britain felt compelled to oblige and in typical fashion, sought to do so at the expense of their enemies. In October Canning offered to cede to Sweden control of the Dutch colony of Surinam, which for years had been under British military occupation. This would have given Sweden access to

129 Leeds Archive, Pierrepont to Canning 15 July, 1807. 130 FO 73/41 Pierrepont to Canning 19 September, 1807. 64 lucrative trade and would have complemented Sweden’s other colonial outpost, the island of St. Barthelemy. Swift to object was Ehrenheim, who pointed out that a new colony required colonists and garrison troops, both of which would be exposed to the climate and regional diseases. In addition, whatever additional trade that would be generated required protection by Swedish warships.131 There is perhaps a deeper, more insidious concern. By accepting their offer, it would have become harder for Sweden to extricate herself from the British orbit and return to neutrality. Already any overseas colony under Swedish possession did so only at the suffrage of the British and once again Sweden would be compelled to second her interests to that of Britain. Whatever the reason, such opposition did succeed in persuading Gustavus to reject the British offer, something the latter found somewhat baffling. A more attractive offer came in the wake of the surrender of Copenhagen. Through Ambassador Pierrepoint, Canning proposed that Sweden participate in the occupation of Zealand, joining British troops already there. Gustavus was quick to grasp the advantages of such an offer. First, it meant a restoration of British subsidies, halted when Stralsund was abandoned. Next, the island could be used as a bargaining chip, exchanging it for the return of Pomerania. More immediately, control of Zealand gave Sweden control of the entrance to the Baltic, along with the passage fees bringing badly needed revenue to the Swedish treasury. There was even the possibility that the Danes might be willing to exchange Norway for Zealand, fulfilling a long cherished personal goal of the King’s. Yet, there were risks as well, not the least of which was that the commanders of British expeditionary force, Lord Cathcart and Admiral James Gambier, had already agreed to withdraw from Zealand by late-October. Canning, expressing an optimism that bordered on the surreal, was confident that through the deft use of diplomacy, Denmark might be persuaded to rescind their declaration of war and return to neutrality and that Russia would abrogate her treaty with the French and renew her alliance with Britain.132 In a rare moment of lucidity, Gustavus did not share that view. Neither did his ministers, who argued that once the British withdrawal was completed, Sweden would be left to fend off a combined Franco-Danish offensive alone. Even if France refused to join the Danes, Russia

131 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 110. 132 FO 73/41 Canning to Pierrepoint 1 October, 1807. 65 would almost certainly be counted on to come to the assistance of their Danish client and strike through Finland. Consequently, the British offer of joint occupation was declined. Undeterred on the 17th of September Canning made a new offer. Rather than bring home the remaining 10,000 troops of Cathcart’s force, Canning proposed stationing them in the southern-most Swedish province of Scania for the winter and supporting them with a Royal Navy squadron. Based around the town of Gothenburg, (Sweden’s second largest port and center of the Anglo-Swedish trade,) their presence would allow the Swedish Army time to reorganize and recover from their recent defeats while still protecting the nation from an invasion from the south. Canning even went so far as to suggest that the following year might see a renewed invasion of Zealand, this time by British and Swedish troops acting in concert and again, protected by the ships of the Royal Navy.133 Unfortunately, while this proposal intrigued the Swedish King, the anti-British faction within the Court vehemently and energetically opposed the stationing of even one British soldier on their soil. It was argued that the stationing of so many foreign troops would drain the province of food and other material and subject residents to privation and despair over the coming winter. It was also claimed that quartering troops fresh from their invasion of Denmark might implicate Sweden and harm their standing in the international community. In vain the Ambassador Pierrepoint countered by arguing that the troops would be wholly supplied from Britain and thus would have a minimal effect on the Swedish economy and that their presence would be a powerful deterrent to invasion. In the end, Gustavus IV bowed to the opposition’s rhetoric and formally rejected the British invitation to assist in the defense of his country.134 In this instance, the hope that by refusing British offers of participation or assistance in her defense Sweden might avoid further repercussions proved a forlorn hope. Even as the British were preparing to evacuate Zealand, a corps of 18,000 French, Spanish and Dutch troops under the command of Marshal Jean Bernadotte began massing along the Danish border. They were to join forces with the Danish Army and prepare for an invasion of Sweden. Napoleon though, held off authorization deciding instead to leave Sweden and its “mad” king to his Russian allies. As for the Russians, Tsar Alexander had already sent envoys warning the Swedes that her continuing alliance with Britain risked an open state of war with them. To the horror of his

133 FO 73/42 1 Oct. 1807. 134 FO 73/42 Pierrepoint to Canning 20 Oct. 1807. 66 ministers, Gustavus responded by suggesting a Swedish Copenhagen, launching a preemptive strike against the Russian naval base at Cronstadt135, an operation that was only feasible in his own imagination. Equally futile were efforts by the Swedish Foreign Ministry to appease the Russians into remaining aloof and uninvolved. Tsar Alexander had long desired an opportunity to annex Finland, both as a buffer protecting St. Petersburg and as avenging Russia’s loss in the 1790 war. Short of surrendering Finland and placing herself at Russia’s mercy, there was nothing Sweden could offer as appeasement. In the end, it was decided to do nothing. No effort to mobilize would be made, for fear of provoking a Russian attack, all offers for British assistance would be rejected, so as not to prompt and Franco-Danish invasion. Neither would the alliance with Britain be revoked, not as long as King Gustavus sat on the Swedish throne. Instead, Ehrenheim’s proposal was to adopt the feigned neutrality they accused Denmark of following earlier that year, in the hopes that by portraying themselves as non-aligned, the rest of Europe would accept it. Such naïve, almost self-deluded wishes would soon prove disastrous for Sweden.

135 FO 73/42 Pierrepoint to Canning 4 November, 1807. 67

CHAPTER 5

THE ATTACK ON COPENHAGEN

After weeks of assembly and preparation, the fleet that finally set sail from Yarmouth on the 24th of July was the most powerful to enter the Baltic since 1801, but in some ways was still inadequate for the task at hand. In addition to the fleet flagship the 98-gun Prince of Wales there were an additional sixteen sail-of-line136 with additional ships to follow. However, to provide the critical screening and scouting duties, the Admiralty could only produce three frigates, Sibylle (38), Franchise, and Nymphe (both 36’s) and Cossack (22), as well as an additional seventeen smaller sloops, brigs and bomb vessels; large enough to engage a similar armada but less than ideally suited for the task of isolating the island of Zealand or securing the narrow, shallow waters of the Danish archipelago. Following them four days later was the expedition’s land contingent of 14,000 troops, some from England but the largest contingent were the 8,500 men already deployed to Pomerania, the majority of which were Hanoverians of the King’s German Legion. Over the following week the fleet would be reinforced by an additional five sail-of-the- line,137 and further brigs and sloops, but only three more frigates138 Although the first ships arrived off the Danish coast as soon as the 26th of July, it was not until the 2nd of August that the bulk of the fleet, including Prince of Wales, was in place. In accordance with his instructions to isolate Zealand from the rest of Denmark, Gambier assigned the task to Commodore Richard Keats, a relatively junior flag officer but one with a proven combat record. Including his flagship Ganges, Keats was assigned three additional sail-of-the- line, the 74-gun Vanguard and Orion, the 64-gun Nassau139 as well as all four of Gambier’s frigates. In addition Keats was given four 18-gun brig-sloops (Alert, Leveret, Mosquito,

136 Pompee, Centaur, Ganges, Alfred, Brunswick, Captain, Hercule, Maida, Goliath, Resolution, Spencer, Vanguard (74’s, Dictator, Nassau, Ruby (64’s). 137 Mars, Valiant, Defense, Superb (74’s) and Agamemnon (64) 138 Surveillante (44), Cambrian (40), and Hussar (38), 139 Formerly the Danish Holstein, captured during the 1801 attack on Copenhagen. 68

Alacrity,) and the smaller 12-gun Tygress and Urgent the last two being examples of gun-brigs, a relatively recent design of small, shallow-draft warship thought ideally suited for confined coastal waters such as Denmark’s. Finally, to relay messages and reports Keats was assigned the 8-gun Desperate.140 Keats’ seemingly contradictory orders were a reflection of confusing state of the mission, still wavering between a diplomatic and military resolution. Keats was instructed to isolate the island of Zealand from the rest of the country and prevent reinforcements from reaching Copenhagen while, “taking such position with the ships-of-the-line at the entrance of the Belt from the Baltic,” in order to prevent any Danish sail-of the line from exiting Copenhagen. However, this was not the same as imposing a blockade as Keats was directed not to interfere with Danish civilian vessels or even Danish frigates or smaller warships either entering or exiting Copenhagen as long as they were not engaged in transporting troops to Zealand.141 At first the greatest challenge facing the British was navigating the Great Belt itself as the Danes closely guarded all maps of their waters and under the circumstances, were not inclined to be cooperative. Accordingly, the sloop-brig Mosquito was assigned the task of sounding the channels and marking all dangerous shoals and banks. Also slowing passage were the strong currents that at times caused even the large sail-of-the-line to temporarily to lose steering control.142 It would not be until the 9th of August that the squadron, by now reinforced by the 74- gun Superb,143 the 64-gun Dictator frigates Leda (36) and Banterer (22), sloop Combatant (22), the 18-gun sloop-brigs Procris, Sappho and the 16-gun Halcyon, and the gun-brigs Fearless, Turbulent, Flamer, Mariner and Intelligent (12 guns each), before Keats completed passage of the Great Belt, isolating Zealand. In terms of land forces, given that the bulk of the Danish Army was still in Holstein, this left the defense of Copenhagen to some 5000 regular troops and a similar number of militiamen, less than half the size of the approaching British which, now numbering some 25, 000 regular troops. On the 13th of August, the naval and land commanders, Gambier and Cathcart, were joined by Canning’s special envoy Jackson who reluctantly admitted failure writing, “there was no prospect or probability that argument would produce what could only be the effect of

140 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Pole 27 July, 1807. 141 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Keats 30 July, 1807. 142 ADM 52/3835 Master’s Log, HMS Vanguard. 143 Keats’ old command and into which he quickly transferred his flag. 69 force.”144 Three days later, the first British troops began landing at the small village of Vedbaek, some twenty miles north of Copenhagen with close support being provided by the newly arrived frigate Surveillante (40): unnecessary as the 500-man column of Danish troops sent from Copenhagen returned without engaging the invaders.

Rival Commanders Considering the serious possibility of a bloody conflict, it is curious that the senior British and Danish commanders alike were not known for their fighting prowess. The British fleet commander, James Gambier, was very much a product of a military system and culture that, with the exception of Horatio Nelson, prized seniority over ability. As a young officer serving during the American Revolution, Gambier had distinguished himself as a brave and daring officer and as captain of the 74-gun Defense, was the first ship to break the French line at the 1794 Battle of the Glorious First of June. However, once achieving flag rank, Gambier became known for his administrative skills and his religious piety, the latter earning him the lower deck nickname of “Dismal Jimmy.” As mentioned before, Gambier had already assumed a position within the Admiralty and his appointment to fleet command was only made at the last moment. Despite recent reports that the Danes had just begun their preparations and were vulnerable to a seaward assault, Gambier had no intention of following the example set by Nelson in 1801 and directly assaulting the Copenhagen harbor defenses. Rather, Gambier was content with supporting army operations and continuing his campaign of isolating the city from all possible reinforcements. The same could not be said for two of Gambier’s subordinates, Commodores Sir Samuel Hood and Richard Keats. The former was a scion of a distinguished naval family and one of the legendary “Band of Brothers;” those captains that had served under Nelson at the Battle of the Nile. Perhaps even more impressive was his 1804 seizure and garrisoning of Diamond Rock, the promontory dominating the entrance of the French island of Martinique, an accomplishment that earned him a knighthood. Keats’ fighting record was only slightly less impressive, having distinguished himself in numerous single-ship and squadron actions and only narrowly missing the Battle of Trafalgar because Nelson had ordered his ship, the 74-gun Superb, to Gibraltar for

144 FO 353/29 Jackson’s report on Denmark. 70 repairs. Nevertheless, Keats had secured a reputation as a quick-thinking officer who could be trusted with independent command. Ironically, it was Gambier’s main fleet that saw the first encounter with the Danish Navy. On the 13th of August the Danish frigate Frederikscoarn (32) departed Copenhagen harbor for the Baltic. Despite his earlier instructions to Keats regarding not interfering with light Danish warships, Gambier saw fit to detach one of his reinforcing frigates Comus (22) to pursue. Shortly after midnight on the 15th of August, the two ships engaged in combat and although significantly smaller than her Danish opponent, Comus’ main battery was comprised almost entirely of 32-pounder carronades, deadly at close range. After a brief but vicious battle Frederikscoarn had lost 12 killed and 20 wounded as opposed to one wounded sailor on Comus. Forced to strike her colors and surrender, Frederikscoarn became the first prize of Britain’s collection of the Danish Navy.145 Like his naval counterpart Gambier, the British Army commander William, Lord Cathcart had seen action during the American Revolutionary War, but it was his political and social connections that ensured his appointment to the Baltic, first as commander of the expedition to Swedish Pomerania and now as land commander of this latest invasion of Copenhagen. Having successfully securing a landing site for his troops, Cathcart’s style of leadership was cautious and methodical, but effective. Despite the lack of opposition, the army commander appeared content to wait until his entire force had been landed before proceeding, even if that meant allowing the Danes to gather reinforcements and strengthen their defenses. The diplomat Francis Jackson was particularly annoyed at what he regarded as unnecessary caution on Cathcart’s behalf and speculated if the general was mentally up to the task at hand, writing “He had the appearance of a general already half beaten and reflecting only on how he could retrieve a shattered condition.”146 Here again Cathcart, like Gambier, benefited by the presence of more energetic subordinates, chiefly Arthur Wellesley. Recently returned from India, Wellesley had won several impressive victories on behalf of the East India Company, but it was his family and political connections that garnered for him a commission as and a role in the

145 William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV. 4th Vol. (London) 1886 Pg. 203-4. 146 Ibid. 71

Copenhagen expedition. Nevertheless, to his superiors, Wellesley was an untried factor and for much of the campaign his relationship with Cathcart could be described as correct, but distant. Yet it was Wellesley who scored the first clear British victory of the campaign, engaging a force of some 7500 Danish troops near the small fishing village of Koge on the 29th of August. The Danes, consisting primarily of militia drawn from Zealand and adjacent islands, was larger than Wellesley’s force of 6000, although this was more than offset by the fact that the latter were either British regulars or the equally capable King’s German Legion. Using the latter as an enveloping force, Wellesley assaulted the Danish center with three British regiments, among them the 92nd Highlanders, while riflemen of the 95th providing covering fire. At a cost of 29 dead and 121 wounded, Wellesley completely routed his opponents, reporting that, “in their flight they have thrown away their arms and clothing, stands of the former have fallen into our hands.”147 Danish losses were indeed heavy, with 350 killed or wounded and a further 1100 soldiers captured. The victory at Koge proved to be the largest land battle of the campaign and also completed the encirclement of Copenhagen from both land and sea. Impressed, Cathcart acknowledged the ability of his subordinate, writing that Wellesley “distinguished himself in a manner so honorable to himself, and so advantageous to the public.”148 Despite this, Cathcart continued to keep Wellesley at arm’s length and made little effort to include him in the decision- making process.149 As for the defenders, the Danish command structure was more reminiscent of an earlier medieval era where monarchs were expected to be warlords as well as heads of state. With his father, King Christian VII mentally disabled, it fell to Crown Prince Frederick to defend the nation from the British invaders, as he did in 1801. However, despite a high interest in all things military, Frederick lacked the ability and training for actual command and instead had to rely on others. After a brief tour of the Copenhagen defenses and seeing that his infirm father had been taken to a place of safety, Frederick returned to Kiel from where he issued Denmark’s formal declaration of war on Great Britain on the 16th of August. To defend his capitol city, Frederick entrusted the 70-year old Ernst Peymann, a Hanoverian by birth and who up to this point had enjoyed a long and uneventful career in the

147 Naval Chronicle Vol. 18 Pg. 260. 148 WO 1/188 Cathcart to Castlereagh, 8 Sept. 1807. 149 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon Pg. 180. 72

Danish Army, but never commanded troops in battle. Appointed to the defense of Copenhagen after his predecessor had fallen ill, Peymann himself was so infirm that he could not even mount a horse and was obliged to leave tactical decisions to others. The commander of the Danish Navy on the other hand, was no stranger to either battle or the British. Steen Andersen Bille had been the commander of Copenhagen’s harbor defenses in 1801, earning the respect and admiration of no less a personage than Horatio Nelson. As the British fleet approached, Bille again turned to the tactics that had proved so formidable in 1801, a combination of floating batteries, armed barges and older warships stripped of their masts and sails, totaling some 200 heavy guns. Bille also had the benefit of a relatively recent addition to the Danish naval arsenal; oared galleys. Although widely used in the Swedish and Russian navies, the Danish Navy traditionally preferred deep-water vessels like sail-of-the-line and frigates and had previously expressed little interest in the shallow-draft, oar-powered galleys. However, the prospect of war coming closer to their borders prompted the Danish Naval Ministry to reconsider their previous stance and in 1806, funds were allocated for the construction of a large flotilla of oared galleys, of which 26 were available by the time of the invasion. Based on a Swedish design, the typical Danish galley, called a shallop, was powered by thirty pairs of oars and carried one or two 24-pounder cannons along with a number of smaller howitzers. In addition, providing support were several smaller launches, each equipped with a single mortar. With the bulk of the Navy’s warships immobilized in harbor, there was no shortage of crews for the galleys. While fragile and very vulnerable to British gunfire, the galleys proved highly maneuverable in shallow waters and unlike their larger opponents, did not require the wind to move. It did not take long for the galleys to make their presence felt.

The Debut of the Danish galleys On the 17th of August, one day after the declaration of war, a British merchant ship passing near Copenhagen was captured and destroyed by a group of Danish galleys, which had taken advantage of the light winds to evade British patrolling warships. After removing the ship’s crew, the Danes set the vessel on fire, the light of which was visible by the entire fleet. The suddenness of the attack, coupled with the Danish declaration of war, prompted Gambier to lift his earlier restrictions and instruct the ships of the fleet to, “take possession and detain any

73 ships or vessels of war belonging to the King of Denmark, or any merchant vessels whatsoever.”150 That same day saw the largest naval battle of the campaign began ten of the Danish galleys sortied from Copenhagen and took aim at the hundreds of supply and store ships supporting the British landings. Intercepting them was the British inshore squadron consisting of the Brig-sloops Cruizer, Kite and Mutine each armed with eighteen 32-pound carronades, seven of the smaller gun brigs: Fearless, Pincher, Urgent, Safeguard, Desperate and Indignant, similarly armed with twelve 32-pound carronades as broadsides as well as a pair of 24-pounder long cannon mounted as bow chasers, and the bomb vessels Thunder, Vesuvius, Aetna and Zebra, each armed with eight to twelve 6-pounder guns for self-defense. Over the next two weeks the galleys would stage repeated attacks on the British flotilla and while they lacked the firepower to seriously interfere with their opponents’ advance, their long cannons allowed them to pound the British ships well beyond their opponents’ ability to strike back with their short- range carronades. The result was a noisy kind of stalemate in which neither side was able to secure a clear advantage. Witnessing the engagements was the Surgeon of the Bomb vessel Prometheus who in his journal wrote that, Their gunboats behaved remarkably brave and annoyed us extremely…our own ships in conjunction with their batteries and boats kept up a continual fire and constituted with very little intermission a perpetual detonation till half past 9, when the dusk of the evening rendered it necessary to cease firing. I have never experienced so grand an afternoon in my life.151

On the 26th of August, one of the Danish galleys was lost, not to naval gunfire, but by a lucky shot from a shore-mounted mortar. The following day another galley was lost when the Danish flotilla attempting to work their way along the coastline came within range of another land-based battery of artillery. Four days later it was the turn of the British to over-reach themselves when they came within range of the Danish shore batteries and were subjected to an

150 Naval Chronicle Vol. 18, Pg. 255. 151 “Journal of Surgeon Charles Chambers of HMS Prometheus” Naval Miscellany (London) Naval Records Society, 1928. Pg. 386. 74 intense cannonade, culminating with one of their armed transports, the Charles of Kirkaldy exploding and sinking much to the satisfaction of the Danish gun crews. For all their courage and determination, the Danish galleys were unable to halt or even seriously harass the advance of their opponents and with Wellesley’s victory at Koge and with British troops entering the outskirts of Copenhagen Bille called a halt to the galley sorties and ordered them to bolster the harbor defenses in the mistaken belief that the British fleet might attempt to repeat Nelson’s 1801 attack. On both sides, overall losses were relatively light: one British transport exploded and sunk while the Danes lost two of their oared galleys. Still, the foundation of what would become Denmark’s four-year maritime guerrilla war against British shipping in general and the Royal Navy in particular was established, although few on either side realized it at the time.

The Bombardment of Copenhagen By the first of September, with the city of Copenhagen all but surrounded and the possibility of reinforcements all but eliminated, the question was how long could the defenders hold out. As for the British, thanks to their dominance over land and sea, the primary challenge looming before British commanders Cathcart and Gambier was not the resistance of the Danish garrison, but time. The consensus among army commanders was that with 25,000 men, the British were not strong enough to sustain a prolonged siege against Copenhagen and also deal with possible counter-attacks from either the Danish or French armies on the mainland. As for the navy, only a few weeks remained before the onset of winter would render continued operations too hazardous to be risked. Furthermore, the tendency of the waters of Great Belt to freeze would make the continued isolation of Zealand impracticable and render British ground forces far more vulnerable to counter-attack. The conclusion therefore was to set aside traditional siege tactics and instead turn the heavy artillery on the city itself, subjecting it to a “terror bombardment” and force the inhabitants into submission.

It was by no means a popular decision in the ranks of the invading British. In a letter to his political ally Lord Hawkesbury, Arthur Wellesley wrote “I think it behooves us to do as little mischief to the town as possible, and to adopt any mode of reducing it, rather than

75 bombardment.”152 More scathing was Francis Jackson who described Cathcart’s use of terror to induce surrender as, “the horror of knocking down the houses and of the chance of a shell falling upon a girls’ boarding school.”153 Nevertheless, the decision had been made. Thus, in a last-ditch effort to avoid both further loss of life and time, or perhaps to placate whatever moral misgivings existing among the British, on the 1st of September Cathcart and Gambier sent a joint letter to the Danish commander Peymann, “the offer of the same advantageous and conciliatory terms which were proposed through His Majesty’s ministers…to deliver up the Danish fleet and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit…and shall be restored with all its equipment in as good state as it is received as soon as the provisions of a general peace.” Agreeing to the demand, the British commanders suggested, would lead to the eventual restoration of peaceful terms between Britain and Denmark. Conversely, rejection of the terms would lead to, ”the captured property, public and private, must then belong to the captors and the city, when taken, must share in the fate of conquered places.”154 The hapless Peymann found himself presented with a nearly-impossible dilemma. On the one hand, he had to have been aware of the effects an indiscriminate bombardment by heavy cannon and mortars would have on the ancient city and its civilian population. At the same time though, Peymann was being called upon to essentially to make a political decision and accept an offer that had already been rejected by the Crown Prince and the Danish Government. It was simply too big of a decision for the aging, wounded general to make and he attempted to pass the decision on to the Crown Prince but in vain. The following day, the first shots of the opening day’s bombardment were fired and would continue for twelve hours. In all some 90 pieces of artillery were employed: forty siege mortars, ten howitzers and thirty 24-pounder cannon, the latter of which were used to suppress counter-fire from the defender’s155. The bombardment also marked the debut of William Congreve’s rocket batteries, although as Surgeon Charles Chambers of the Prometheus pointed out, they had been used nine days earlier against the Danish galleys’ with such ineffectual results

152 A.R. Wellesley, second Duke of Wellington SupplementaryDepatches and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, KG Vol. 6 (London) 1858-72. Pg. 3. 153 FO 353/29 Jackson’s Report on Denmark. 154 WO 1/187 Cathcart and Gambier to Peymann 1 September 1807. 155 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon Pg. 201. 76 that the rockets became, “the jest of the whole Fleet.”156 Still, against a large target such as Copenhagen, the rockets proved more than sufficiently destructive. The Danes responded as best they could: A sortie by their galleys, supported by the artillery of the Trekonner Battery was able to force the hasty withdrawal of several mortar vessels.157 Nevertheless, some thirty-eight separate fires within the city were reported and damage was extensive, especially in neighborhoods surrounding church steeples as the British used them as aiming points. In all some 5000 rounds were fired the first day, with an additional 2000 the second and 7000 the third day. Civilian casualties were heavy; out of a pre-war population of 100,000, some two thousand people were killed and another twenty thousand forced to flee from the city. After three days of bombardment almost a third of the city had burnt to the ground. In his journal Chambers wrote, “at first the Danes appeared rather unprepared for such a sudden attack…the extreme brilliancy and velocity of the shells as they traverse the air is far greater than I could have imagined…the reflection of the flashes from the mortars on the sky resembled lightning, the night being unusually dark…hitherto this stands first in the list of grand, awful and beautiful sights I have even yet beheld.”158 Even the dryness of Gambier’s official correspondence with the War Office could not ignore the human impact of the bombardment. He wrote that, “the city was set on fire very soon after the batteries were opened and has continued burning in different parts. For the last two days the conflagration has been very considerable and at this moment rages with great violence.”159 On the 5th of September Peymann wrote to Cathcart requesting an armistice during which terms of the city’s surrender might be discussed. British terms were very unusual. Rather than giving the garrison the choice between marching out of the city and becoming prisoners-of-war, they would retain control of the bulk of the city. British troops would take possession of the warships of the Danish Navy as well as the naval stores stockpiled within the Naval Arsenal. British troops would also take possession of the Citadel but only for a period of six weeks, the estimated time it would take to prepare the captured warships for sea, at which time the British

156 Chambers, Journal, Pg. 398. 157 Ibid. 394. 158 Ibid. Pg. 406-7. 159 WO 1/187 Gambier to Castlereagh 5 September 1807. 77 promised to withdraw entirely from Danish soil and return home. In the meantime, a general cease-fire on the island of Zealand would be observed, all prisoners released and Danish persons and property respected. On the surface, this seemed little more than a recapitulation of the terms that had been offered by Jackson in early August and by Cathcart and Gambier before the bombardment began. However, there were some differences. Rather than merely the warships themselves, the British were now demanding all naval vessels in Copenhagen as well as the considerable amount of timber, masts, hemp and other naval stores so painstakingly gathered and stored for the defense of the nation. In addition, the notion that these ships were a “deposit” to be returned at the conclusion of a general peace was no longer an option. Rather, the ships and supplies of the Danish Navy were to be considered prizes of Great Britain, to be used and disposed of as they wished. Within the Danish camp, despite the effectiveness of the terror bombardment, there were those who viewed the terms as nothing less than a national humiliation. Commander Steen Bille proposed putting the entire fleet to the torch rather than witness them become British prizes and had already laid out preparations to that effect. However, the majority view was that doing so might lead to harsher terms from the British, perhaps even a prolonged or permanent occupation of Copenhagen. In the end, Peymann, broken in mind and spirit, agreed to the terms of surrender on the 7th of September.

The Battle Ends Based on contemporary evidence, it is difficult for an objective observer to view the Danes as an imminent threat to British naval supremacy. In contrast to the alarmist reports of Captain Dunbar and Lord Pembroke, the defenses of Copenhagen were not in a heightened state of preparedness, nor were the warships of the Danish Navy, “fit to go to sea with all their stores etc. named and numbered.”160 Perhaps the best evidence of this was Gambier’s estimation that it would take six weeks to prepare the Danish ships for sea, a number that coincided with Commander Beauman’s accurate, but unfortunately late report.161 Indeed, it was only after Francis Jackson presented the Crown Prince with Britain’s demand that Denmark surrender its

160 HAR/GC/50 Pembroke to Canning, 28 May 1807. 161 ADM 1/5 Beaumann to Garlike 25 July 1807. 78 fleet as “proof” of its non-belligerence that that the nation began the transition from peace to war. Caught off-guard by the British and with the bulk of the Royal Army still deployed to counter the French, all that was available to defend the Danish capitol were half-trained and equipped militia…patriotic perhaps, but no match for the long-term professionals of the British Army and King’s German Legion. The end result was predictable and further proof that a neutral’s status only exists at the sufferance of the belligerents. As for the British, for all their concerns regarding Danish hostility, there was also a naïve, perhaps even delusional belief that through diplomacy and a display of force, Denmark would meekly submit to the British will and give up their main line of defense from outside invasion. The fleet that Britain had assembled was for the most part a conventional force arranged to meet a conventional threat. That is, a core group of 3rd Rate 74-gun ships-of-the-line with a supporting force of frigates and smaller vessels, although as a nod to the city’s known defenses, several bomb vessels were included. The troops were drawn from both the strategic reserve based at home as well as a force already deployed in the Baltic to assist their Swedish allies. To assemble such an army and bring them together in sight of their objective without loss was a credit to Britain’s organizational and administrative talents although as future events showed, it created as many strategic problems as it solved. The controversial decision to bombard Copenhagen was heavily criticized both in Britain and elsewhere in Europe and lent weight to the argument that the British were willing to go to any lengths in order to preserve the profit margins of their merchants and bankers. The seemingly wanton destruction of property and the deaths of two thousand innocent civilians also went a long way towards undermining the British portrayal of the French as ambitious, aggressive and disdainful of tradition and the established order. It would take years for the British to overcome the stigma of Copenhagen and even as late as the First World War the word “Copenhagen” would be applied as a verb to any proposal to launch a sudden and unexpected attack on a fleet at anchor. It was a final piece of irony that the Danish fleet, viewed by the Danes as the protector’s of their national honor and by the British as the greatest threat to their naval supremacy since 1805 was almost a non-factor in the Second Battle of Copenhagen. Rather, it was the oared galley, long dismissed by naval traditionalists, that gave the British Navy their toughest

79 opposition and while they failed to stop their enemies’ advance, the episode proved to be a preview of the challenges facing the British over the next four years in the Baltic.

The Aftermath of Copenhagen The capitulation of Copenhagen and the seizure of the Danish Fleet there by the British in September of 1807, while a clear-cut success, did not overnight stabilize the Baltic, certainly not to the satisfaction to the British. Over the coming weeks and months cabinet Ministers in London as well as the commanders in the field, sought to use their recent success to improve Britain’s strategic situation. Unfortunately, there was no clear plan or set of objectives in place and as a result efforts lacked cohesion and more often than not conflicted with one another In the end, the strategic situation for Britain in the Baltic deteriorated rather than improved and what had originally been envisioned as a unique, short-term operation became a long-term military, economic and political commitment that would get worse before it got better. In all, forty-one major warships of the Danish Navy fell into British hands: eighteen sail- of-the-line, eleven frigates, two sloops, nine brigs, one schooner and all of the remaining twenty- six galleys that had so bedeviled the Royal Navy only days before. In addition, three more warships, all 74-gun sail-of-the-line, were in various stages of construction in the Royal Dockyard but because there was no reasonable expectation that they could be made seaworthy within the six-week period of occupation specified by the terms of surrender, they were destined to be destroyed. Several ships, among them the 74-gun Prince Christian Frederick and the older 60-gun Princess Louisa Augusta, had not been present in Copenhagen at the time of the siege and as such remained at large. On the 11th of September the former had been located by a small British squadron led by the 74-gun Spencer in the Norwegian port of Christiansand and protected by two floating batteries, seven galleys and shore-based artillery. Over the next few weeks, this remnant of the Danish Navy played cat-and-mouse with the British, staging brief forays into the North Sea but always within easy reach of a friendly port. On the 2nd of December the two sail- of-the-line actually blundered into a large British convoy, but, unable to discern unarmed merchantmen from escorting warships, both captains chose discretion over valor and retreated into the morning fog.162 They then returned to the safety of Norwegian waters and awaited the coming of spring.

162 Andersen, Naval Wars. Pg. 321. 80

More effective and dangerous were the Danes. Almost as soon as the British fleet departed Danish waters the Danes, taking advantage of their large pool of maritime manpower, began converting merchantmen into privateers and although the first of them had did not sail until November of 1807, they managed to capture or sink 42 merchantmen by the end of the year.163 Within Copenhagen relations between the residents and occupying British were mutually tolerable and despite an understandable degree of tension, no incidents were reported on either side.164 Offsetting this was Gambier’s assessment that few of the prizes were in operable condition and that, “it will take some time to prepare them for sea, but not a moment will be lost in bringing the whole of them to England.”165 It took nine days of feverish labor to equip and rig fourteen of the seventeen Danish sail-of-the-line for sea and which point the emphasis was shifted to the smaller warships. Still, it would be until the 7th of October before the first prize left for Britain. Still, three sail of the line (including one still under construction) and two small frigates were deemed too old to be worth towing and were put to the torch. Also condemned were 23 of the 25 galleys on the basis that they would probably not survive the voyage. Finally, one of the prizes, the 80-gun Neptunos, ran aground on a sandbank in the Sound and was also burned. The only vessel left behind by the British was a yacht that had been presented to the Crown Prince by King George III in 1785.166 Not all British warships returned home. Just before the fleet was ready to depart, Admiral Gambier ordered the 74-gun Vanguard with a small squadron of light ships,167 to remain behind with orders to maintain the blockade of Zealand and protect British trade.168 Of only slightly less importance to the British were the vast stockpiles of material: planks, masts, timber all collectively known as “naval stores,” found within the Royal Dockyard and Arsenal, both of which were now in British hands. With Russia threatening to close their ports to British shipping and nearly every port along the southern Baltic coast under French

163 Ryan, A. “The Defense of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808-1813” English Historical Review (London) Vol. 74, (1959) 448. Lloyd’s List 1807. 164 Raeder, Jacob Danmarks Krigs-og Politiske Historie (Copenhagen) Anden Deel Pub. 1845. Pg. 330-4. 165 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Admiralty 7 Sep. 1807. 166 Apparently, Prince Frederick did not appreciate the gesture and ordered that the yacht be sent back to England, manned by British merchant sailors taken prisoner by the Danes. 167 Sloops Banterer and Cyane (22’s), Brig-sloops Gannet, Goshawk, Belette, Mosquito, and Mutine (16’s), Gun brigs Snipe and Charger (12’s) and Schooner Quail (4). 168 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Vanguard 17 Oct. 1807. 81 control the strategic value of this material was beyond question. It took almost as long for the British to calculate and load the captured material as it was readying the prizes, in part because there was far more than had been originally reported.169 It would take another four days before the first convoy consisting of sixteen transports loaded with stores departed for Britain.170 In all, it took 92 ships to transport the captured material, which were assessed to have a value of ₤320,000 pounds sterling.171 It would not be end of October that the fleet, and their prizes, finally anchored in the waters off Yarmouth and the process of assessing the value of the captured ships and whether or not they were suitable for service in the Royal Navy began.172 In terms of prize money, the Copenhagen operation proved highly lucrative for the participants, with both the army and naval commanders receiving ₤150,000 pounds in prize money while the lowliest subaltern getting ₤97 pounds. In keeping with the long-standing British practice of incorporating enemy warships into the Royal Navy, nearly all of the frigates and smaller warships were taken into service and ironically, many would see service against their original Danish owners. The same could not be said for the sail-of-the-line however, thanks to the chronic shortage of trained sailors in the Royal Navy and the increasing emphasis on using smaller warships to accomplish the various missions. Ultimately, only four major warships, the 80-gun Christian VII and the 74-gun Dannmark, Norge and Princess Caroline saw active service with the British although Christian VII would have the distinction of being the only non-French, foreign design to be copied by the British in the construction of future warships.173

The Question over Holding Copenhagen When originally planned, the Cabinet only envisioned a temporary occupation of Copenhagen, long enough to take possession of the Danish Fleet and see it safely away. However, in early August, British Ministers began to reevaluate their options with regards to a prolonged or even permanent occupation of Zealand.

169 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Admiralty 21 Sep. 1807. 170 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Admiralty 30 Sep. 1807. 171 Cited in Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon Pg. 212. 172 ADM 1/5 Gambier to Admiralty 29 Oct. 1807. 173 Robert Gardiner Warships of the Napoleonic Era (London) Chatham Pub. 1999. Pg. 159. 82

From a military viewpoint, Copenhagen was a large, well-equipped port seemingly perfectly suited to sustain British naval operations in the Baltic. This would greatly ease logistical problems and alleviate the British need to withdraw their ships during the winter, not to mention giving British merchant ships a secure base from which they can conduct trade throughout the region. Conversely, a hostile Copenhagen would be the ideal location from which privateers and in particular oared galleys could harass British trade or even exclude them from the Baltic entirely, a potential economic and strategic disaster. It was with this in mind that Canning wrote to Jackson, “we feel our work to be but half done, if we get the fleet only and have not the option of keeping possession of Zealand.”174 It was in early August, as the fleet finally fully assembled in the waters off the Danish coast that Minister of War Castlereagh sent a letter to Gambier and Cathcart inquiring on the possibility of retaining possession of Zealand under one of three situations: 1) With the willing consent and cooperation of the Danes, 2) with Swedish troops providing the occupying force or 3) with the British themselves holding the island, “as a position commanding the entrance to the Baltic.”175 The first option was rendered ineffective with the Danish declaration of war two weeks later. Nevertheless, Canning believed that despite the bombardment and razing of Copenhagen a restoration of friendly relations between the two countries was still possible. The first step required a resolution to the quarrel between Canning and the Danish Ambassador Jacob Rist. With Edward Thornton serving as a go-between, the two met at the latter’s residence from the 24th to the 27th of September, during which Canning outlined what further punitive actions could be taken against Denmark should they continue hostilities against Britain. These included the seizure of her overseas colonies, confiscation of her considerable merchant fleet as prizes of war and the destruction of the trade network that was the heart of the Danish economy. Moreover, Canning took advantage of Denmark’s long-standing fear of her northern neighbor Sweden, suggesting the possibility of Swedish troops being invited to occupy Zealand as well as the Danish capitol. To avoid this fate, Canning was willing to offer Denmark the choice between neutrality and alliance. In either case, Britain was willing to guarantee the security of the Danish trade

174 HAR/GC/42 Canning to Jackson 5 Sept. 1807. 175 WO 6/14 Castlereagh to Gambier 3 Aug. 1807. 83 economy and overseas colonies and, at the conclusion of a general peace, compensation for all property seized. In the event of an alliance, Britain was willing to provide military assistance and the protection of the Royal Navy along with the possibility one or more overseas territories seized from the enemy in the course of the war.176 Even Canning was forced to concede that, given the events of early September, the possibility that Denmark might even entertain the British proposal was, at best, remote. Such thoughts were justified for even as Rist complemented Canning on his attempts at personal reconciliation, the Danish Court would almost surely see the proposal as little more than adding insult to injury.177 Even if they were willing to overlook the invasion of their home soil, it is difficult to objectively disagree with the Danish position. Although capable of preserving Denmark’s overseas colonies and trade, the Royal Navy was in no position to halt an overland invasion of Denmark by French forces, which would have been likely, once it became evident that Denmark had come under British influence. Indeed, given the implied threat of invasion by Sweden, and the new alliance between France and Denmark’s traditional patron Russia, the nation’s interests, at least in the short-term, were better served by an alliance with France than one with Britain. Such was the message delivered by Ambassador Rist to Canning before his final departure from Britain on the 30th of October, the same day that the last British troops departed from Copenhagen.178 This left the final option, placing Copenhagen and Zealand under permanent British occupation. As previously mentioned, Cathcart had already pointed out that he did not have the troops required to defend the entire island adequately while Gambier argued the difficulties of operating warships in the harsh Baltic winters. Still, the temptation of holding onto Copenhagen and using it as a base to protect British merchant shipping but also, “the immense control [it] would give us over the Baltic powers and interests during the remainder of the war,” 179 was hard the government to overlook. Thus, the news of Copenhagen’s surrender and more importantly, Cathcart and Gambier’s agreeing to evacuate the island after six weeks was received in London with more

176 FO 22/55 Canning to Merry 27 Sept. 1807. 177 DUA/1989 Desp. 68 Rist to C. Bernstorff 26 Sept. 1807 178 FO 22/57 Rist to Canning 30 Oct. 1807. 179 C.W. Vane ed. Correspondence, Despatches and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry (London) Vol. 6 Pg. 175. 84 than a little shock and anger. For a brief moment, the original purpose of the expedition had been forgotten as government ministers, “like hungry street urchins with their noses pressed against the panes of the bakery window,”180 tried to find a pretext by which they could ignore the treaty. For several weeks the commanders in the field were bedeviled with requests to report any signs of Danish sabotage of captured ships or any form of “specious ground we may take for retaining Zealand.”181 Instead, both Cathcart and Gambier proved uncooperative, reporting that the Danes were fully cooperative with their British occupiers. It was this, coupled with the need to deploy troops to Lisbon and the inability of the British to guarantee that they could hold Zealand over the coming winter that moved the Cabinet to allow the surrender treaty to stand. As Castlereagh explained in a moment of historical irony, “we are, above all things, anxious to preserve our character for good faith untainted.”182 Canning though remained somewhat wistful, writing to Leveson-Gower, “I wish we could have kept it: could, morally, that is to say…but against the opinions of our officers, both by land and sea, was so preemptory that no government could publicly have taken itself to act in contradiction to them.”183 Despite the successful conclusion of the military aspect of the operation, Canning, Castlereagh and their fellow ministers still had to contend with the political consequences of their decisions in both the domestic and foreign theatres. The following year would see the opposing Whig party launch a concerted attack on the administration for its decision, as well as the questionable evidence it used in formulating that decision, to launch an attack on a supposed neutral nation. Leading the critics in the House of Lords was the former Prime Minister, Lord Grenville and Foreign Minister Lord Howick,184 who questioned the administration’s claim that Denmark was poised to ally itself to France as it was purported while others raised the question of how could the secret intelligence from Tilsit arrived in time to influence policy towards Denmark. 185 Providing behind-the-scenes support for the critics was the former British envoy Benjamin Garlike, whom Canning had cashiered for his supposed failings with the Danes. The House of Commons went so far as to demand that the government present all documents

180 Munch-Petersen Defying Napoleon Pg. 190. 181 HAR/GC/31 Mulgrave to Canning 20 Sept. 1807. 182 Vane, Correspondence, Vol. 6, Pg. 184. 183 PRO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 5/11/07. 184 Now Earl Grey after the death of his father in Nov. 1807. 185 Annual Register 1808, Pg. 39-40. 85 pertaining to the Danish Navy’s supposed advanced preparations for France against Britain.186 Not surprisingly, the government rejected the last request in order to protect the anonymity of its sources and preserve them for future use.187 Instead, Gambier’s report of the number of ships seized at Copenhagen and the stockpiles of building material seized were read into the official records, although not before the sentence describing the Danish fleet as requiring six weeks to prepare them for sea was carefully omitted.188 In the end the government’s critics, while succeeding in causing some political discomfort, failed to make any serious inroads on the Tory Party’s overwhelming majority in both Houses of Parliament and in March of 1808, their proposals were voted down by a more than 2-1 margin.189 Not realized though was Britain’s hope that Russia might be persuaded to reconsider their alliance with France. In spite of his belief that within the Treaty of Tilsit were contained secret articles calling for a Franco-Russian alliance against Britain, Canning was all but convinced that Russia had been manipulated into signing the treaty and that the possibility that friendly relations between Britain and Russia were still possible. Unfortunately, the British representative in the Russian Court, Lord Leveson-Gower, did not share that optimism. Appointed to the position in part because of his previous experience, Gower quickly realized that the atmosphere at Court had changed considerably. Gower soon found himself all but isolated and complained to Canning that, “I have not in my power to follow your advice of cultivating personally the Emperor: the opportunities of meeting him are rare indeed.”190 Nevertheless, Gower followed his instructions to demand full disclosure of the secret articles of the Treaty if Tilsit be revealed and, as a gesture of Russia’s stated friendship, their signing of the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty. Nonetheless, in early September a ray of hope did appear to emanate from St. Petersberg when Sir Robert Wilson, a British Lieutenant-Colonel who had served with distinction as an advisor to the Prussian Army, was summoned to a private audience with Tsar Alexander. Wilson was asked to convey a private message to his government of Russia’s desire to have

186 Annual Register 1808, Pg. 32. 187 The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time Vol. 10 (London) 1812, Pg. 55. 188 Citd. In Ryan Documents, Pg. 323. 189 Annual Register 1808, Pgs. 50-55. 190 HAR/GC/57 Gower to Canning 17 Aug. 1807. 86 peace with Britain, even to the point that they were willing to accept British occupation of Zealand as long she was assured of Britain’s friendly intentions.191 However, it soon became apparent that Alexander’s gesture towards peace was little more than that. In official circles Gower’s requests for an audience with the Russian Tsar went unheeded, as were his efforts to secure a full disclosure of all terms of the Treaty of Tilsit. Ironically, none of the “secret” clauses of the Treaty of Tilsit directly affected Britain’s strategic position in the Baltic. The one that did; that is Russia’s pledge to declare war on Britain by December 1st if a general peace had not been signed by then, were in fact contained within the main articles of the treaty itself. By attacking Denmark, Britain had not only assaulted a client state of Russia’s, but also posed a direct threat to Russia itself by placing their northern ports within reach of the Royal Navy. This was seen in late September when Gower was informed that Russia had no desire to renew trade relations with Britain as long as, “our fleets and armies were in a menacing position in the Baltic.”192 More telling were rumors of an imminent embargo placed on all British trade followed by orders to detain all British property within Russian borders. Despite attempts by Russian ministers to dispel these rumors, Gower was compelled to advise the immediate departure of all British ships currently in Russian ports.193 The final blow fell on the 8th of November in the form of a printed proclamation declaring war between Russia and the British Empire. The stated reason was Britain’s violation of Danish sovereignty and their bombardment of Copenhagen. In addition, all trade treaties between Britain and Russia were formally repudiated and all British ships and property on Russian soil was to be confiscated. Forewarned by Gower though, the majority of British merchants had already departed, carrying with them a record amount of naval goods and stores. In retrospect, it is difficult to envision Canning’s belief that by striking a decisive blow, Russia might be persuaded to abrogate its peace treaty with France and resume friendly relations with Britain was ever possible. The deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations had been long in coming and was as much as a result of British neglect as they were French battlefield victories. Canning’s pursuit of alleged “secret terms” within the Treaty of Tilsit proved little more than an

191 HAR/GC/44 Wilson’s report to Canning 20 Sept. 1807. 192 FO 65/70 Gower to Canning 1 Oct. 1807. 193 FO 65/70 Gower to Canning 29 Oct. 1807. 87 exercise in self-delusion, or an effort to assign blame on French machinations for what was really the consequence of British pursuit of self-serving foreign polices that alienated their allies. Yet, even as he searched frantically for a way to preserve Anglo-Russian friendship, Canning was exploring the possibility of sending Gambier further into the Baltic with the intent of impressing upon the Russians the reach of the Royal Navy. He even considered launching a second “Copenhagen” like attack on Cronstadt, the main anchorage of the Russian Baltic Fleet. In a letter to Gower, Canning mused, “We could strike a blow against [Russia] which would humble her in the eyes of Europe…We abstain from doing so, in consideration of the hopes held out to us of a change of policy. But these hopes may be delusive.”194 However with Gambier fully occupied in Copenhagen and winter fast approaching, this proposal was shelved.195 Still, in a moment of clarity Canning was forced to confess that, “we must not disguise from ourselves we are hated throughout Europe and that hate must be cured by fear.”196 So, rather than creating a stable, Northern Alliance capable of withstanding the expansionist Napoleonic Empire, Britain now had two new enemies; Russia and Denmark, as well as finding their access to the strategically vital naval stores denied, perhaps permanently. In addition, their remaining ally in the region, Sweden, now faced invasion from two fronts. Thus, the attack on Copenhagen, rather than being a singular preemptive strike, became the precursor to a year-round commitment of British ships and men into a region filled with dangers, both natural and man-made.

Postscript: The Seizure of Heligoland Occurring around the same time as the siege of Copenhagen, yet unrelated to that action was the seizure of the small Danish island of Heligoland. Located in the North Sea, the decision to take this island was made independently by the commanding Admiral of the North Sea station. Unlike Copenhagen, this action was both a short and long-term success, providing unexpected strategic and economic benefits to Britain while allowing the British yet another means to exert their presence into an ostensibly hostile part of Europe. In the summer of 1807 the frigate Quebec (32) was on patrol off the German coast, maintaining the blockade that had been extended to Germany since 1806. As soon as he learned

194 Ibid. 195 Hall, British Strategy, Pg. 163. 196 FO 30/29/8/4 Canning to Gower 2 Oct. 1807. 88 of Denmark’s declaration of war the commander of the North Sea station, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Russell informed Quebec’s captain, Lord Viscount Falkland, to incorporate the Danish island of Heligoland into his patrol pattern and dispatched the sloop Lynx (18) and the gun-brig Sparkler (12) as reinforcements. Without waiting for authorization from London, Russell ordered the three ships to isolate the island from all contact with the mainland. As it turned out Russell’s anticipation of orders were correct as on the next it had been decided in London to occupy the small island, which according to reports supported a population of some two to three thousand residents, primarily fishermen and a garrison of twenty-five men and a single officer. There were also two or three cannon emplaced, but these were used primarily for signaling purposes and had little defensive or offensive value.197 The Admiralty ordered Russell to take his flagship the 74-gun Majestic to Heligoland and assume overall command of what was increasingly becoming an amphibious assault. To augment Russell’s force it was also decided to dispatch the sloop Wanderer (26) gun-brig Exertion (14) and the appropriately named bomb-vessel Explosion. Even before Russell had arrived though, Falkland had taken it upon himself to demand the surrender of the island’s garrison, only to be rebuffed. However, the arrival of Majestic on the 6th of September was sufficient to prompt a reevaluation on the part of the island’s governor. By the afternoon of that same day, he accepted Russell’s call for surrender.198 It was only at this point that the British learned that the island’s garrison numbered 206 soldiers, some eight times larger than earlier intelligence had claimed.199 Ironically, the only British casualties occurred after the island had surrendered as the arriving Wanderer and Explosion ran around on a reef off the island’s north end. Although Wanderer was able to float itself off with the change of the tide, Explosion had sustained additional damage below the waterline, making it impossible to be restored.200 Two days later a storm succeeded in driving the hapless vessel off the reef, only to force it on the beach. It was decided to salvage the ship’s armament of two mortars and eight carronades so as to improve the garrison’s ability to defend their new conquest. Surprisingly, they were aided by the resident population who unlike their fellow countrymen on the mainland welcomed their British

197 Thornton to Bagot, 31/8/07 Naval Miscellany Vol. 5 (London) 1902. pg. 380-1. 198 Russell to Admiralty 6/9/07 Naval Miscellany Vol. 5 (London) 1902. pg. 385 199 Drower, George Heligoland (Gloustershire) 2002. 20. 200 Two days earlier Explosion had run aground off the Texel, but was successfully freed. David Hepper, British Warship Losses in the Age of Sail (Sussex) 1994. 119. 89 occupiers in Copenhagen. In his book Drower attributes this to the common descent of the two island peoples from the ancient Frisian peoples201, although the desire to avoid French occupation and the subsequent loss of their livelihood under the Continental System appears a probable explanation. Despite the loss of the ship, Russell felt entirely justified in claiming success writing that, “With a small expense, this island may be made a little Gibraltar and a safe haven for smaller craft, even in the winter; it is a key to the rivers Ems, Weser, Jade, Elle and Eydar, the only asylum at present for our in these seas.”202 As boastful as this appeared at the time, events soon proved Russell’s comments prophetic. By the 22nd of September British control of the island was formally acknowledged with the raising of the Union Jack over the main community, renamed Falkland town in honor of Quebec’s commander. For the next few months, the island was held by the Royal led by a navy lieutenant until a more permanent garrison consisting of a contingent of the Royal Veteran Battalion arrived. It was not long before the island’s military and economic advantages manifested themselves to the English. Soon after the island was taken the Royal Mail Service established an outpost on the island, replacing the previous post in Altona, Denmark. At the same time the navy began preparing the island as a base from which their sloops and brigs could better enforce the blockade of the nearby coastline. Heligoland was also touted as a shelter, albeit a limited one from the region’s frequent storms. More was to come. In December of 1807, a delegation of British merchants sought permission to establish a brewery on the island so as to cater to the legendary thirst of the British sailor. Close behind were other traders and commercial brokers who saw the island not as a base to keep exports in, but as a conduit for the importation of their goods into mainland Europe. Technically, smuggling was a violation of the rules of blockade, reinforced by the 1807 Orders in Council, which forbade trading with the enemy. In fact, it was the seizure of Danish ship suspected of smuggling that in part led to hostilities between that Denmark and Britain. Yet the European demand for British goods in spite of the Continental System created opportunities

201Drower, Heligoland 21. 202 Annual Register 1807, Letter: Russell to Pole 6/9/07. 90 for trade and profit that was impossible to ignore. And, establishing a precedent that would affect later policies, British officials were willing to do just that. In November of 1807, in response to numerous requests by merchants, the military governor of Heligoland began issuing certificates to those wishing to conduct trade with north German ports, the sole proviso being that all cargoes must first be deposited in a Heligoland warehouse as it constituted British soil.203 This touched off a flood of additional inquiries and within months, approximately two hundred British merchants and agents had arrived on the island, establishing offices and securing space for the storage of their goods. To accommodate them, the British government invested half-a-million pounds in improvements in 1808, improving the island’s main anchorage by providing mooring chains and marking dangerous reefs as well as constructing additional warehouses in the island’s only town. 204 This too met with approval and support of the local residents who profited greatly from the sudden demand for their land as well as catering to the needs of their visitors. An indication of their success could be seen in the fact that within months there were no less than thirteen inns on the small island, but only one church.205 Such expenditures in infrastructure were necessary as ship arrivals to the island in 1808 increased fifteen fold to 328206, importing goods worth two million pounds.207 From this point, the merchants could take advantage of the numerous bays and estuaries of north-west Germany and easily corrupted customs officials to carry out their illicit trade. Providing protection was the Royal Navy, whose vigilance in hunting down privateers ironically made it easier for British smugglers to ignore the blockade. The boom in trade did not last long though as by the following year French troops assumed direct control of the German coast opposite Heligoland and popular landing places came under the guns of newly established shore batteries. As a result, the number of British merchant ships calling on Heligoland went into decline, with 280 ships calling on the island in 1809 and 152 in 1810.208 Offsetting this however was an increasing number of neutral flagged vessels who used the island to take on British and colonial goods for transport into the Baltic.

203 PRO P.C. 2/180 pg. 135. 204 Drower, Heligoland 30. 205 Ibid. 30. 206 Lloyd’s List 1808 207 Williams, British Commercial 357. 208 Lloyd’s List 1808-1810 91

The island served another purpose; as a listening post for French activity in the region as a staging point for the insertion of British agents into continental Europe. One example was the journey of the Irish clergyman–turned British agent James Robertson, who in 1808 persuaded the Spanish General Marquis de la Romana to defeat to the British cause along with his entire command. As reports were received they would be passed on to London via the packet boats belonging to the Royal Mail Service. Although the island provided some protection from danger, both natural and man-made, there remained risks. In December of 1809, a fierce storm drove seven merchant vessels aground, while a large ship carrying colonial goods from the West Indies sank while at anchor.209 An indication of the violent nature of these storms appeared in a June, 1811 edition of the The Times: All of a sudden a white foam was perceived on the surface of the sea, drifting along with astonishing rapidity, and on its approach it blew such a hurricane of wind as has scarcely been witnessed by the oldest inhabitant on this island. In a moment every light article on the ground was carried into the air; for about half an hour the sea appeared one mass of foam, when a tremendous storm of thunder and lightning ensued, followed by a heavy pouring of rain…we much fear that any vessel that came within the sweep of this violent whirlwind must have suffered greatly.210

The man-made threats to the island generally came in the form of privateers who sought to prey on the merchant traffic going to and from Heligoland and while most were driven off or captured by British naval patrols, some merchantmen fell victim. A more serious threat occurred in the autumn of 1810 when British agents reported that a Franco-Dutch expeditionary force of twelve gun-brigs, and twice that number of oared gunboats was being assembled for the purpose of seizing Heligoland. The senior officer on station, Captain Lord Stuart of the frigate L’Aimable gathered the ships under his command, six gun-brigs, one schooner and two gunboats, and carried out an aggressive patrol of the Holstein coastline. Caught off-guard, the French force

209 Drower, Heligoland 27. 210 London Times 15/6/11. 92 withdrew into their fortified harbors, but not before losing three brigs to the dangerous sandbars of the Jade estuary.211 The 1812 invasion of Russia and its diversion of coastal guards and customs helped to fuel a brief resurgence in British smuggling but with the withdrawal of French forces from Germany and the reopening of North Sea ports, the need for smuggling and subsequently the commercial and military importance of Heligoland came to an end.

211 Drower, Heligoland 28. 93

CHAPTER 6

THE “NEW” ROYAL NAVY AND ITS’ FOES

In 1805, the Battle of Trafalgar brought to an end the century-old Anglo-French naval rivalry and confirmed Britain as the preeminent oceanic power in the world. Although the French could (and did) more than replace the ships it lost, they had lost the will to either challenge British naval supremacy or threaten the British Isles with invasion. However, that did not mean that the Royal Navy was left without any missions. There was still the task of keeping open the trade routes and ensuring the flow of resources and commerce that was critical to the survival of the British economy, not to mention the war effort. In this conflict the enemy was not squadrons of stately sail-of-the-line or even the lithe and swift frigates. Rather, the opponents were sloops, brigs and in the case of the Danes, flotillas of oared galleys. To combat them, the British needed not only sail-of-the-line battleships, but also large numbers of smaller warships to patrol enemy coastlines, protect convoys and run down privateers and raiders whenever they appeared. Unfortunately, years of near-continuous combat and decades of ship construction had strained British material and personnel resources to the breaking point. As a result, the Admiralty was forced to utilize non-traditional methods of ship design and construction in order to meet their ever-increasing requirements. This included standardization of designs, use of alternative woods in construction and developing ships that maximized firepower at the expense of utility. Some were more effective than others and all would be make their presence felt in the Baltic theater, the first real test of the Royal Navy in the post-Nelson era.

The “New” HMS Victory At first glance, there appeared little difference between the fleet Saumarez took into the Baltic in 1807 and the one commanded by Nelson at Trafalgar. Indeed, it was hard to escape the shadow of the late Admiral, beginning with Saumarez’s flagship, the long-lived and legendary

94

HMS Victory. Also serving in the Baltic Fleet was the 74-gun Orion, which Saumarez captained at the Battles of Cape St. Vincent and the Nile and along with another 74, Mars, the 64-gun Africa and the 36-gun frigate Euryalus were all veterans of Trafalgar.212 Yet, years of prolonged warfare had taken its toll on the Royal Navy, particularly in the areas of ship construction and crewing. By 1808 naval designers had to consider non-traditional methods and materials in the development of its warships as well as trying to make best use of its diminishing manpower resources. Accordingly, in addition to its’ fifteen sail-of-the-line, the Baltic Fleet also included no less than five frigates, four sloops and two ocean-going brigs. There were also seventeen examples of a relatively new design of warship, the gun-brig. Considerably smaller than the traditional brig design, the gun-brig emphasized firepower at the expense of utility and even after several years of service, they remained sources of controversy. The first example of the Royal Navy’s new priorities was the fleet flagship, Victory. Launched in 1765, Victory was one of the oldest ships in the Royal Navy, but was still regarded as one of the fastest, most capable ships in the fleet and as such, was a highly-sought after flagship. At the Battle of Trafalgar though Victory had been heavily damaged, and repairing the warship took well over a year to complete. Even then, there were serious concerns that the ship was no longer up to the rigors of active service and despite the dearth of three-deckers, Victory spent ten months laid up in ordinary, or reserve. It was the Battle of Copenhagen and the need to provide a flagship for the new Baltic Fleet prompted the Admiralty’s decision to reactivate Victory, although, it was decided that the ship should be “lightened” in order to lessen the strain on the ship’s timbers.213 First the oaken masts and spars that had been part of the ship’s original construction were removed and replaced with lighter woods of elm and ash. The four massive 68-pounder carronades that had inflicted so much damage on the French were also removed and replaced by smaller 32-pounders. The entire middle battery of 24-pounders were also removed and replaced with a lighter battery of 18-pounders while two of the lower deck’s 32-pounder cannon were removed. The end result was reducing the ship from a 100-gun First Rate to a 98-gun Second Rate sail-of-the-line.

212 Another Trafalgar veteran was Implacable (74), although on the opposing side as the French Duguay-Trouin. 213 Kenneth Fenwick HMS Victory (London) Cassell Pub. 1959. Pg. 302. 95

One result of these modifications was a reduction of Victory’s draft from 21 to 19 feet, a depth considered suitable for Baltic waters. Another effect was the reduction of the ship’s complement from 850 to 750 men, a reflection perhaps of the increasing shortage of manpower in the Royal Navy. Finally, while it could be argued that this was an insult to the prestige of the Royal Navy’s most famous ship, it also ensured that this elderly vessel would continue to render valuable service as flagship of a foreign station, one of immense importance to Britain.

Mass-Production Given the expanding sphere of missions facing the Royal Navy, it became evident to British shipbuilders that an expanded program of warship construction was necessary. Given the shrinking amount of resources; both material and human, the navy was forced to develop new strategies and methods of accomplishing more with less. This was particularly evident when it came to “unrated” vessels, that is ships considered too small to rate a Post-Captain. The first example of this was the Cruizer class of Brig-Sloops (which combined the two masts of the brig with the rigging of the sloop.) Based on a single vessel built in 1797, the Cruizer class eventually numbered 104 vessels built during a ten-year period beginning in 1803, thereby making them the largest class of warships ever built during the Age of Sail.214 Their primary advantages was their relatively low-cost in construction and operation, while their armament of sixteen 32-pound carronades gave then a firepower to mass ratio that was unmatched in a sailing warship. In addition, their draft of twelve feet made them ideal for patrolling coastal waters and intercepting smugglers. Offsetting this though was their limited range and endurance which made them less-than-suitable for open-ocean operations and convoy escort. This trend continued in 1807 with the introduction of the Cherokee class of Brig-Sloops. Even smaller that the Cruizer’s, this class was armed with only ten guns, eight 18-pounder carronades and a pair of traditional six-pounder guns for long-range fire. Their primary feature was crew complement, 75 as opposed to the previous class’ of 121. The initial order was for 34 vessels, although in 1812 an additional two were built in Bombay using local teak.215 With a foot less draft than the Cruizer’s, the Cherokee-class enhanced both the strengths and

214 David Lyon The Sailing Navy List: All the ships of the Royal Navy (London) Pg. 140. 215 After the war an additional seventy-eight ships were ordered and built, the most famous being the Beagle of Charles Darwin fame. 96 weaknesses of their predecessors. Additionally, their lower crew complement was seen as a response to the Navy’s twin problems of accomplishing a greater range if missions with a decreasing pool of available manpower. However, such a small crew, these vessels would be hard-pressed to prevail in any type of prolonged engagement with an enemy warship. This would also limit their ability to provide men for cutting-out expeditions or prize crews. In 1806, an attempt was made to introduce economy and mass-production to the sail-of- the-line. This was the Armada class of 74’s, also known as the “Surveyor’s class” because it sought to incorporate the best features of several ship designers. The first of these, HMS Armada, was completed in 1810 and over the next six years, forty of these ships would be built, the largest class of sail-of-the-line of any navy. Unfortunately, the class as a whole received a poor reputation in the navy and quickly gained the derisive nickname of the “Forty Thieves.” Low quality of materials and poor construction methods combined to produce ships with sluggish performance qualities and problematic sailing qualities. Perhaps fortunately these ships were never subjected to the intense combats of previous years where their presence may have affected crew morale. A more favorable result was a design based on the Danish warship Christian VII, one of the ships taken from the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen. British inspectors were quickly impressed with the ship’s clean lines and excellent sea-keeping qualities. An additional point of interest was the robust construction, which allowed for the mounting of 24-pounder cannon on the upper deck, unlike British 74’s, which typically carried 18-pounders. 216 Although incorporating the design-features of foreign warships was by no means unusual in the Royal Navy, it was almost exclusively limited to French warships, which even the British concluded was generally superior to their own. Nonetheless, so impressed were British shipwrights by Christian VII that it in 1810, it was decided to incorporate her lines in several different new classes. First, there was the 50-gun Jupiter, followed by the Cambridge which, like the Danish warship, mounted 80-guns. The largest was the three-ship Black Prince class, a stepped-down, 74-gun version of the original. All were considered successful ships and unlike the earlier Armada class, they enjoyed long careers in the Royal Navy. As impressed as they were by Christian VII though, British shipwrights refused to adopt the most obvious feature of the Danish warship, the Hohlenberg stern. Built with a narrow transom and quarter-galleries set

216 ADM 95/42. 97 at acute angles , the intent was to lessen the damage from a stern rake, while providing gun ports at the corners of the stern. Nevertheless, British shipwrights remained committed to the classic rounded stern and incorporated that design in their copies.217 Perhaps the most radical innovations undertaken by the Royal Navy was the development and adoption of the gun-brig into service. Unlike nearly every other class of vessel in the Royal Navy, the gunbrig was never intended for the deep ocean. Rather, the design was based on a coastal defense used for harbor defense. Originally designated by numbers, it was not until the Conquest class of 1794 that the vessels were given the dignity of names. However, they remained small vessels with a displacement of 146 tons and armed with ten 18-pound carronades and a pair of 24-pound long guns fitted in the bows. Among the unique features of the design was a flat-bottomed keel and small access ports next to each gun-port through which oars could be run out, giving the gun-brig some motive power and maneuverability in periods of calm winds. With a crew of only 50 men, less than half that of a sloop or brig, the gunbrig was considered too small a vessel for even a commander. Accordingly, gun-brig commands were given to lieutenants, a decision that was criticized by no less a figure that St. Vincent, who feared that the stress of commanding such a ship would prove overwhelming for some inexperienced lieutenants.218 With the introduction of the 15-ship Archer class in 1800, the gunbrig gained an additional role, defending the English coast against a possible invasion. As part of that role, several gunbrigs saw their armament modified or removed in favor of a single mortar. Once Trafalgar removed the threat of invasion, began to assume a more offensive role, cruising in enemy coastal waters searching for shallow-draft merchantmen. It was a role the gunbrig was well suited for, but also one that stressful and fraught with peril. Unfamiliar waters, hidden shoals, gun batteries and the occasional foray by an enemy frigate claimed an increasing number of gunbrigs. Still, with the emphasis of naval operations shifting from destroying the enemy’s fleet to wrecking his economy, the gunbrig too made the transition from a defensive weapon to an offensive one. Still, the fundamental features of the gunbrig design; flat bottom, light draft and deadly firepower and short ranges, remained.

217 Gardiner, Warships, Pg. 134. 218 Robert Gardiner, The Campaign of Trafalgar, (London) Pg. 105. 98

The 1807 Copenhagen campaign marked the first appearance of sizable numbers of gunbrigs in fleet operations as a dozen of these vessels were deployed to provide gun support for troop landings and to neutralize enemy gun batteries. Although their performance in this role was less than successful, their ability to operate in the shallow waters of the Danish archipelago more than off-set this and when Saumarez sailed to the Baltic in 1808, included in his fleet were no less than eighteen gunbrigs. High hopes and expectations were placed on these vessels, that they would be able to contain the “remnants” of the Danish navy, freeing the fleet’s sail-of-the- line for what was regarded as the primary threat, the Imperial Russian Fleet.

The Royal Swedish Navy Like other Baltic nations, the Swedish Navy had both deep-water fleet as well as flotillas of coastal oared galleys. Unlike its Danish rival though, it was the Scharensflotten (Shallows Fleet) that enjoyed the admiration of the population, a legacy of their victory over the Russians in 1790. Accordingly, the Swedish galley fleet was both sophisticated and efficient. However, by its very nature, the Swedish galleys were defensive weapons and had little influence over events taking place at the western end of the Baltic. Nevertheless, its’ mere presence was often enough to deter most Russian naval operations. By 1808, the Shallows Fleet numbered 303 vessels of a wide variety of types and configurations. The majority were 100-ton gunsloops armed with a pair of 24-pounders mounted in the bow and stern, with an additional four 3-pounders mounted along the broadsides, although they could not be fired while the oars were run out. Other galleys carried more specialized armament, such as mortars and howitzers while the beginning of the century saw the construction of galleys specifically designed to mount carronades, a weapon relatively new to Northern Europe. An unusual feature of the Shallows Fleet was the inclusion of larger warships that sought to combine the firepower of the frigate with the handiness of the galley. This was the brainchild of the British-born shipwright Frederick ap Chapman, whose design influence stretched across the Baltic. The largest of the oared ships was the Hemmema, a class of frigate-like vessels that boasted no less than twenty-two 36-pound cannon along the broadsides with another pair set in the bows. Remarkably, this 142-foot long vessel had only twenty pairs of oars, relying instead on its three masts and sail rigging similar to an ocean-going frigate save that the arrangement of

99 sails was lateen, rather than square. Slightly smaller were the fourteen vessels of the Turumaa class, which were equipped with 12-pounder cannon and four fewer pairs of oars.219 These vessels were more sea-worthy that the galleys, and with more room for crew accommodations and provisions, were capable of venturing further from land. Although deeper in draft and more unwieldy compared to the galleys, Chapman believed that the broadsides of the Hemmema’s and Turumaa’s would give the galley flotillas a decided advantage against their Russian rivals.220 Unfortunately, this theory would never be put to the test. Like their contemporaries elsewhere in the Baltic, the primary feature of the ships of the Orlogslotten, or War Fleet, was their shallow draft, a fact that limited both size and purpose. Nevertheless, the deep-water part of the Swedish Navy was, at least on paper, an impressive force. In addition to the flagship, the 78-gun Gustav IV Adolf, the battle fleet consisted on one 76-gun ship, five 74’s and a similar number of 64’s. In addition, there were eight frigates of between 46 to 32 guns and a further sixteen lesser warships. As with the galleys, the deep-ocean warships were Chapman designs and new, drew high praise from observers both at home and abroad for their graceful lines and excellent handling.221 The Swedish Navy’s Achilles Heel however, lay not with its wooden walls, but rather the flesh manning them. First, the average Swedish sailor was a conscript, and as such lacked the familiarity with the sea that was typical for his Danish counterpart. This meant that the Swedish sailor required a greater amount of training to be proficient, and as would be seen, was more susceptible to shipboard diseases such as scurvy. Given the confined waters of the Baltic, there were few opportunities for Swedish warships to leave harbor and conduct sail and gunnery drills. Small wonder then that during the brief period and Danish-Swedish cooperation during the French Revolution, officers of the former were less than impressed with the performance of the latter. For the Swedish naval officers, the issue was politics. Like their army counterparts, the naval officer corps came almost exclusively from the nobility, which meant that they were often embroiled in the struggle for power with their erratic, but stubborn –minded King. Another issue grew out of the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen where Gustavus openly blamed the Navy for failing to come to the defense of the Danes. In sacking the popular Fleet Admiral Cronstedt, the

219 Daniel G. Harris, F.H. Chapman The First Naval Architect and His Work ((London) 1989. Pg. 27. 220 Ibid. Pg. 27. 221 Ibid. Pg. 131. 100

Swedish King only fueled the growing opposition within the navy, while dangerously undermining morale. In one area though, Swedish naval officers differed from their army counterparts. For the most part, the Swedish Navy maintained a professional, if not cordial relationship with the Royal Navy. If as government ministers were railing against “perfidious Albion,” the navy remained cooperative and appreciative, as was witnessed in 1808 when British and Swedish warships operated together to contain the Russian threat. In return, British Admiral Saumarez demonstrated considerable tact and understanding with his allies, helping the scurvy-wracked Swedes with supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables drawn from his own stockpiles.

The Russian Navy As it was for much of its history, the size, condition and effectiveness of the Russian Baltic Fleet was something of an enigma. In terms of raw numbers the Russian Navy was the world’s fourth largest in the 1790’s222 and with no less than eight three-deckers in their order of battle, the Baltic Fleet was powerful enough to give even the British pause. The French Revolution witnessed one of the rare deployments of Russian naval power outside of home waters as elements of the Russian Fleet were deployed to England, serving as auxiliaries to the under-manned British North Sea Fleet. Russian frigates and brigs even supplanted frigates and brigs in patrolling the Norwegian coast in search of privateers. The high point in Anglo-Russian naval cooperation occurred in 1799, when no less than fifteen Russian sail-of-the-line participated in the Helder operation. The 1798 and 1805 deployments of Russian warships in the Mediterranean both consisted of warships drawn from the Baltic Fleet and while their record of cooperation with the British was less-than-successful, their performance against both the French and Turkish navies was generally successful. Yet, upon closer inspection, the overall impression of the Russian navy changes considerably. Based on the inside observation of British officers who had served on board Russian warships, the general state of efficiency of the Russian Navy was less than impressive. Sharing this view were dockyard officials who oversaw repairs and refits of Russian warships, who noted the poor quality of timber used in their construction. Considering the importance of

222 Behind the British, French and Spanish navies. 101

Russia as a supplier of timber to Great Britain, this is a curious observation to make and suggests that the problem was bureaucratic, rather than supply. As a result, while in 1800 the Baltic Fleet was estimated to consist of 52 sail of the line, it was uncertain what percentage of that was available for active use. In addition, slightly more than half of their two-deckers were smaller 66-gun ships, inferior to the 74-gun ship that was the English standard. A final consideration were the eight sail-of-the-line and two frigates of the Mediterranean squadron which since the winter of 1807 and lain blockaded in the Tagus estuary. It would not be until September of 1808 that this stalemate was broken, when Vice-Admiral Dmitry Senyavin agreed to have his ships interned by the British and his crews repatriated to Russia. Arguably, the biggest problem facing the Russian navy was not the British, but rather the seasons and geography. Typically, the main fleet anchorages at Cronstadt and Revel were prone to freeze early in winter and it would not be until late March or early April that the waters had thawed sufficiently to allow safe passage. In addition, any venture into the Baltic ran the risk of attack from the vast array of oared gunboats based in Swedish Finland. Finally, any attempt by the Russian to exit the Baltic required that the Danish Sound remain under friendly control. Conversely, containing the Russian Fleet to the Baltic could be accomplished merely by stationing squadrons of sail-of-the-line at either the western or eastern entrances of the Danish islands. Thus, as formidable as the Russian Fleet appeared on paper, containing that threat was relatively straight-forward. The same though, could not be said for the Danes.

The Danish Navy in 1808 For all its political controversy, the Copenhagen Campaign of 1807 effectively eliminated the Royal Danish Navy as a traditional force. Only one sail-of-the-line, the 68-gun Prins Christian Frederick, managed to escape capture and was maintaining a precarious existence amongst the many fjords of the Norwegian coast. Unfortunately, while these waters provided shelter, none of the country’s harbors possessed the facilities necessary to keep a sail-of-the-line in fighting trim. In addition, not a single frigate and only a handful of brigs remained at large and like their larger compatriot, were sheltering in Norwegian waters. So, using the standards typically used to measure naval power, the Danish Navy was an impotent force.

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Nevertheless, the Danes were determined to rebuild their navy. Unfortunately, given the thoroughness with which the British plundered the Copenhagen Arsenal the previous year, building sail-of-the-line was beyond Denmark’s capabilities. Instead, the Danes focused on adding to their collection of brigs in Norwegian waters while gathering the materials necessary for the construction of frigates. In addition 1807 saw Crown Prince Frederick authorizing the construction and deployment of sizable numbers of oared galleys. Although largely dismissed by naval leaders as harbor defense craft, during the winter of 1807 these vessels were seen in a new light, as a means to attack British merchant shipping transiting Danish waters both entering and exiting the Baltic. While the majority of these vessels were built in Copenhagen, galleys could also be built in smaller harbors as well. Indeed, any shipyard capable of building merchant ships or even fishing craft had the means to build galleys as well. An additional benefit would be the brief reinvigoration of the local economy, which was dependent on the sea and trade, as well as galvanize popular support and fuel the desire of the average Dane to avenge themselves on the hated British. The design used for the construction of the Danish galley was remarkably similar to those in the Swedish and Russian navies. Not surprisingly considering all were based on a design developed by the British-born Swedish naval architect Frederik Hennik af Chapman. There were two main varieties of galleys in Danish service. The most numerous were the 100-foot long shallop, which was typically armed with a single 24-pounder cannon in the bows and another in the stern. Their primary motive power was provided by ten pairs of oars, each with three rowers. There was also a single mast and rigging, but unlike their Swedish counterparts, which used lateen sails, Danish galleys used a combination of lug and fore sails, giving them limited open water maneuvering. Shallops required a crew of 76, but the majority of them were rowers who did not require as much experience as professional sailors. Slightly smaller were the gun yawls with only required a crew of 24 and was armed with one 24-pounder cannon mounted in the bows.223 As mentioned previously, constructing these galleys did not require a major shipyard and were built in several ports scattered along the length of the Jutland peninsula as well as the larger

223 Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America 1500-1860 Vol. 2 (Stockholm) . Pg. 47. 103 islands of the Danish archipelago. This made it difficult for the British to isolate and contain the galley threat, thereby surrendering the tactical initiative to the Danes. In addition, the Danish government could easily draw on the large body of merchant sailors and fishermen left unemployed by the British blockade. Finally, there was the appeal to patriotism and an outlet for the outrage still burning from the bombardment and near-destruction of Copenhagen. Still, oared galleys had their disadvantages. Small and frail, galleys were highly susceptible to gun fire and even a single hit would wreak havoc amongst the vulnerable rowers and disable the vessel. For this reason, galleys typically engaged from long-range, particularly when their opponent was a sloop or brig equipped with devastating, but short-range carronades. Even then, with only a single gun per galley, generating the firepower necessary to overwhelm a British man-of-war was a challenging task. Danish tactics were remarkably similar to those later employed by the Spanish guerrillas in the Peninsula War. Lookouts both military and civilian would locate a promising target, such as a small convoy, and track its progress through either the straits or Belt. However, with a favorable wind, the target could simply sail away from the slow-moving galleys and escape unmolested. What was required for a successful interception was for the winds to die down, leaving the sailing ships immobile and highly vulnerable. Typically, the galleys would attack en masse, and in the case of a British warship, would maneuver so as to fire at right angles, thereby keeping out of possible return fire. For their part, the opposing warship would either reply with their bow or stern guns, or attempt to use a combination of kedging anchors and towing hawsers so as to present their broadsides to the Danes. In the case of the gun-brigs, or other ships so equipped, oars could be run out and all available hands pressed into service as rowers. However, this presented its own challenges as the sweeps blocked the ship’s broadside guns. Under such conditions, the British would be content to bring its bow or stern chasers, typically either a 24 or 32-pounder and hope that its fire would deter the Danes. In the case of the gun-brigs, the bow chaser was the only weapon that could reach the Danish galleys at the ranges they prefer to fight. Often affecting both sides in these fights was the wind. Becalmed, the initiative and advantage rested with the Danes, who would press their attack aggressively and tenaciously. The sudden appearance of a breeze and the advantage shifted to the British as they were now able to maneuver and either engage or not as the situation demanded. In fact, a strong enough wind

104 would place the Danes in great peril as the low freeboard of their galleys left them vulnerable to even moderate sized waves. Thus, maritime guerrilla warfare often came down to whichever side could exploit their advantages as long as they had them. For all that, the Danish gunboat tactics proved surprisingly effective. In 1808, no less that 335 merchant ships were either taken or sunk by either the galley flotillas or privateers operating from both Denmark and Norway. On one occasion, an entire convoy of 24 ships was taken by the galleys, an embarrassing blow to British pride to say the least. Also falling victim to the galleys were three British gun-brigs, all during clam conditions. Under as would be detailed later, under the right conditions, the Danish galleys would be bold enough as to attack a sail-of-the-line, all but disabling the ship and forcing it to withdraw. Although ultimately unsuccessful in expelling the British completely from their national waters, the Danish galleys came as a severe shock to the British, prompting them to adopt new tactics to deal with this previously underestimated threat.

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CHAPTER 7

BRITAIN AND SWEDEN

As a result of negotiations conducted over the winter, in May of 1808, the first ships of the new Baltic Fleet arrived to take up their new station. The new fleet command, Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, was given a set of missions that were diverse, complicated and potentially contradictory. In addition to keeping open the entrance to the Baltic and ensuring the safety of trade and commerce, he was also charged with protecting their remaining ally in Northern Europe, Sweden from invasion from both the south and the east. To accomplish this both Saumarez and his army counterpart, Sir John Moore had to deal with the erratic, occasionally volatile Swedish king as well as an Anglophobic government that saw the British, not the French, as the source of all woe and saw as a solution a pro-French neutrality. It was a task that required flexibility of thought and a deftness of diplomacy that neither officer had previously demonstrated.

The Invasion of Finland Even before the British arrived though, Sweden’s strategic situation went from merely perilous to catastrophic. On the 26th of February 1808, the Swedish government’s defensive policy of doing nothing reaped its first bitter fruit as Russian troops began crossing the border and entered Finland. At first progress was slow as the Russians, swayed by false reports that the Finns would welcome them as liberators, only allocated 24,000 troops to the invasion, scarcely more than the Swedish defenders.224 Still, the Swedish field commander, General Mauritz Klingspor, elected to withdraw, abandoning all of southern Finland save the fortress of Sveaborg, to the enemy. The surprised Russians pursued, hampered only by the terrain and harassing attacks being staged by the by the supposedly “friendly” Finns.225

224 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 117. 225 Ibid. Pg. 127. 106

The sudden collapse of organized resistance in Finland was yet another indication of the deep political divisions between the King and the nobles who ran his government and officered his military. Despite the former’s repeated appeals to love of country and loyalty to the King, the prevailing view among the latter was that continued fighting was futile and that the course of wisdom was immediate peace negotiations and neutrality. Stockholm was rife with rumors of plots to overthrow the king in favor of his aging uncle, rumors that were duly reported to London, where Canning was redoubling his efforts to dispatch aid.226 Curiously, it was the imminent arrival of British support that became the one issue on which both sides found common ground. Even the Anglophobes welcomed the infusion if British arms, supplies and gold although their praise was accompanied with ungracious complaints of tardiness and parsimony. Nevertheless, the prevailing hope among the Swedish population was that the British would save their country from disaster, a view that disagreed significantly from the British position that they were merely assisting their ally in time of need and that ultimately it was up to the Swedes to save themselves, by ending their political quarreling and work together in common cause.227

Misadventure in Norway As for Gustavus, displaying the bold energy and self-ambition that was typical of his reign, turned his attention towards Norway. Although at first glance this appeared foolhardy, the King’s strategic reasoning was uncharacteristically sound. After an initial rapid advance, the Russian invasion of Finland had stalled and it was believed would not resume until the summer. This left the Danes, who themselves were awaiting the arrival of Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte’s corps to begin planning the invasion of southern Sweden. However, the imminent arrival if British ships and troops would serve to check that threat, while freeing Swedish troops for duties elsewhere. Rather than transfer them to the Finnish theater, as his generals urged, Gustavus proposed using them to overrun Norway. This would greatly improve Sweden’s strategic situation, simplify their defensive obligations and fulfill the King’s long-cherished dream of adding Norway to his domain. Once accomplished, the full might of the Swedish Army could be concentrated in the east and retake southern Finland from the Russians.

226 Melville MSS Diemar to Melville 30 Mar. 1808. 227 Robert Ker-Porter, Traveling Sketches in Russia and Sweden during the Years 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808. Vol. II (London) Pg. 130. 107

Moreover, with such a string of successes under his belt, Gustavus would be able to reassert authority over his recalcitrant nobility and bring to an end the political division plaguing the country. Gustavus’ vision was based on a pair of assumptions, assumptions that a more objective viewer might have questioned. The first was that the fortress of Sveaborg could successfully hold out against the Russian forces currently besieging it while still threatening the enemy’s line of communications. The second was that the Swedish Army could overcome its malaise of defeatism and mediocrity and carry out its orders quickly and efficiently. To help accomplish the latter, in March, Baron Gustavus Armfelt, a loyal lieutenant of the King’s father, commander of the Western Army, Gustavus felt he could rely on Armfelt not only because of his personal loyalty to the Dynasty, but also because he had previously called for the assimilation of Norway228. Encouraging the dreams of the ambitious Swedish King was the new British Ambassador, Edward Thornton, who again sought to use his personal friendship with Canning to expedite the promised dispatch of troops and ships. As before, Gustavus demanded that subsidy payments be doubled to £2,800,000 per year, an amount that well exceeded the allotted budget. The King also suggested that he expected British troops to participate in the conquest of Norway, as well as defend southern Sweden from invasion. On both points Canning balked, instructing Thornton that preparations were going as fast as possible and should not be expected until late spring. In addition, Gustavus’ demands of increased subsides was wholly unreasonable and would not be contemplated, although Canning was willing to send some 30,000 muskets and supplies of ammunition to outfit the Swedish Army.229 That position would see some modification, as witnessed by Moore’s instructions on how he should use his troops. However, in Gustavus’ mind, any support offered to Sweden was subject to his desires. . As for the invasion of Norway, without British warships severing communications between Norway and Denmark, or tying down coastal defenders, Armfelt’s chances of success diminished considerably. Initially though there was some success as the Swedish invaders quickly overran frontier outposts and took the provincial capital of Christiania. However, as Norwegian resistance stiffened and partisans harassed Swedish lines of supplies, the drive

228 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 131. 229 FO 73/46 Canning to Thornton 15 March 1808. 108 stalled. Even worse, politics again reared its head as the commander of the northern invasion wing halted his advance, allowing the Norwegians to concentrate and deal Armfelt’s force a sharp rebuke, capturing some 600 troops. With that, the invasion of Norway collapsed into another round of blame-casting and squabbling. Ultimately, Gustavus blamed Armfelt for the fiasco, while the General blamed the King for rushing operations rather than wait for the British to make their appearance. The Swedish King alienated yet another of his military commanders and far from neutralizing his opposition, he merely added to their numbers.

The Fall of Sveaborg Despite the withdrawal of Swedish troops from southern Finland, it was impossible for the Russians to declare victory or even continue their advance as long as Sveaborg remained in Swedish hands. Situated along six islands near the modern-day city of Helsinki, Sveaborg’s defenses were formidable indeed and with its garrison of 6500 men and 1200 cannon, all but impregnable to direct assault.230 Moreover, the fortress was also the primary base for 100-plus galleys of the Shallows Fleet, whose presence blocked both Russian efforts to sustain their front- line troops in Finland as well as any attempt by the Russian Baltic Fleet to threaten Stockholm. Commanding both forces was Admiral Carl Cronstedt, the hero of the 1790 Russo-Swedish War and well regarded by both his officers and men. Unfortunately, not only was Cronstedt one of those officers who opposed the war with France, he also nursed a personal grudge against King Gustavus, who had blamed him for Sweden’s failure to come to Denmark’s assistance in 1801 and made it clear that his assignment to Sveaborg was a reprimand. Disgruntled and sullen, Cronstedt was a poor choice for so critical a post. However Gustavus, displaying his uniquely myopic approach to leadership, refused to contemplate that anyone in his service was capable of disloyalty and treason. Even as the garrison prepared itself for the expected siege, Cronstedt, through his Finnish-born deputy Colonel Frederick Jagerhorn, had opened secret negotiations with the Russians, who offered him a title, estate and lifetime pension in exchange for treason. Meanwhile, Cronstedt did his best to undermine the efforts of his troops, allowing minor breaches of his defenses to go unchallenged and refusing to counter-attack, although his garrison

230 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish. Pg. 137. 109 outnumbered the attackers. Finally, on the 5th of May, Cronstedt ordered his troops to cease fighting and opened the fortress gates to the Russians.231 In surrendering Sveaborg, Cronstedt at a stroke shattered any hope Sweden had of retaining Finland as well as Gustavus’ ambitions towards Norway. Even worse, the turncoat admiral also surrendered the galleys of the Shallows Fleet to the Russians almost intact, thus rendering Stockholm and central Sweden vulnerable to invasion. At first the population refused to accept news of the surrender, putting it off as enemy propaganda. But the news was confirmed, disbelief turned to outrage as the extent of the disaster became known. Even the anti- war faction condemned Cronstedt’s treason and at his court-marital, the Swedish Admiral was quickly found guilty sentenced to death, although as he was still in Russia, the court’s verdict was delivered in absentia. Inevitably, the Court indulged in blame-casting, with the King deriding the army’s defeatist attitude and demanding that his officers show a little courage, while the latter pointed out that it was Gustavus himself who placed Cronstedt in command in the first place. It was also at this time that yet another British military mission landed on Swedish soil. This was led by Colonel George Murray, who was the quartermaster general of the soon-to-be arriving military mission and was charged with reviewing the state of the Swedish military and overall morale.232 What Murray found did little to encourage him. Although the average Swedish soldier was loyal and patriotic, Murray described the overall condition of the Swedish Army as under- sized for the tasks expected of it, but that little effort had been made to increase the numbers using popular conscription. As for the officer corps, Murray opined that they were riddled with defeatism, discontent and anti-royalist sentiment.233 As for the Swedish King, Murray described him as an honorable, upright man, but lacking military ability who, “every now and then proposes measures which prove either derangement or the greatest weakness of mind.”234

231 Ibid. Pg. 137. 232 WO 1/188 Castlereagh to Murray 20 Apr. 1808. 233 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 138. 234 J. F. Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, (London) 1904. Pg.209-10. 110

Enter Saumarez At first glance, it seemed as if Sir James Saumarez, despite having a distinguished career and reputation for competence and aggressiveness, was destined for obscurity. In his biography of British commanders, Nicholas Tracy focused on Saumarez’s career as a post-captain while Alfred Thayer Mahan concluded that Saumarez’s military career peaked at the 1801 Battle of Algerciras and that, “he was never again engaged in serious encounter with the enemy.”235 Only Saumarez’s biographer, Sir John Ross236, addresses the admiral’s period as commander of the Baltic Fleet, largely because he had served as Saumarez’s flag lieutenant, translator and spymaster. There was something of the rugged, if occasionally touchy individualist in Saumarez. A senior Post-Captain during the Nile Campaign of 1798, Saumarez, like his future subordinates Richard Keats and Samuel Hood, is often included in Nelson’s legendary “Band of Brothers.” However, he appeared immune to the famous Nelson charisma and briefly quarreled with his commander over the lack of recognition he received at the Battle of the Nile. Promoted to flag rank based on seniority, Saumarez’s career briefly stalled until his long-time patron the Earl of St. Vincent intervened and sponsored his promotion to Vice-Admiral in 1806. After a year as second-in-command of the Channel Fleet, Saumarez was given the choice between commanding British ships in the Indian Ocean or the reorganized Baltic Fleet. Although the former was far more lucrative in terms of prize money, Saumarez thought that such a distant station might prove harmful to his health and accordingly, chose the Baltic assignment.237 In contrast to his predecessor Gambier, Saumarez’s record was one of boldness and aggression. However, in keeping with the murky British understanding of Baltic politics, Saumarez’s instructions were a convoluted combination of offense and defense. He was to reestablish the blockade of Zealand and prevent the transfer of troops and supplies there. He was also to secure the Sound, preventing the French and Danes from invading Sweden. Although he was authorized to seek out and attack Russian men-at-war, and to keep Russian movements in

235 Alfred Thayer Mahan Types of Naval officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy (New York) Books for Libraries Press 1969. Pg. 421. 236 And future polar explorer. 237 Sir James Ross, Memoirs and correspondence of Admiral Lord De Saumarez (London) 1838. Pg. 99. 111

Finland under observation, this was considered a secondary objective and not to be attempted at the risk of exposing Sweden to invasion.238 Finally, written as “one of the principal objects of the service in which you are employed,”239 Saumarez was to provide protection to ships engaged in commerce, despite the fact that with the exception of Sweden, the Baltic was closed to British shipping. Rather, that trade was to be conducted by ships flying neutral colors and possessing British licenses authorizing them to conduct trade. He was to organize and protect convoys sailing from the Swedish port of Gothenburg, through the Sound and into the Baltic. Officially, British ships were only permitted as far as Gothenburg, which would serve as a collection point for all Baltic cargos bound for Britain. Unofficially, Saumarez’s protection also extended to British ships engaged in smuggling operations, an activity that violated not only the French Continental System, but the British Orders in Council as well.

The British arrive in Sweden. In April of 1808, as the Swedish defense of Finland was beginning to deteriorate , the first ships of the reconstituted Baltic Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, had arrived in Swedish waters. In addition to the flagship Victory, the squadron consisted of the 74-gun sail-of-the-line Audacious, Brunswick, Centaur (flagship of Rear- Admiral Sir Samuel Hood,) Implacable, Goliath, Mars, Orion, Pompee, Superb (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats,) and Vanguard, along with the 64-gun Africa, Dictator, Nassau and Stately. In addition, Saumarez had an unusually high number of frigates the 38-gun Africanne and Euryalus, the 36-gun Salsette, Tartar and Tribune and the 6th Rate Daphne (28). For patrols and convoy protection were the sloops Daphne (28), Prometheus (26) Lynx and Ranger (24) and the ship-brigs Hound and Falcon (22). There was even a bomb vessel Devastation, in the event it was needed. Finally, the fleet had no less than seventeen of the increasingly ubiquitous gun-brigs: the 16-gun Cruizer, Kite, Magnet, and Seagull, as well as the smaller, twelve-gun Constant, Snipe, Exertion, Charger, Urgent, Piercer, Tygress, Wrangler, Minx, Forward, Exertion, Tickler, and Turbulent. It was believed that their shallow draft and powerful carronade armament would be

238 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 11-13. 239 Ibid., Pg. 13. 112 sufficient to deter all but the most aggressive privateers while their ability to operate under sweeps would give them a measure of maneuverability under calm conditions. Ostensibly, the “general rendezvous”240 of the Baltic Fleet was Gothenburg, the second- largest port in Sweden and center of the Anglo-Swedish trade. However, the actual anchorage “base” was at Vinga Sound, an open anchorage located some 20 miles offshore. Vinga was a familiar roadstead to the British, who had used it often over the past century and the location of deep and shoal waters was well-known. Another benefit was that Vinga was less than a day’s sail to the northern entrance to the Baltic, the Skaw. This allowed Saumarez to keep his fleet as a force in being, ready to respond to possible attack from either within or without the Baltic. Finally, although lacking supply and repair facilities, the Vinga anchorage could also serve as a base from which the fleet’s lighter warships could establish patrol routes from the Norwegian coast to the entrance to the Danish Sound. There was also a political advantage to the Vinga anchorage. Although the fleet was there at the invitation of the Swedish government, Saumarez was undoubtedly aware of the existence of anti-British sentiment within certain circles of the host nation. By anchoring at Vinga, Saumarez would be able to fulfill his mission of protecting the Swedish coast while maintaining a minimal presence. Adding to this low-profile was the decision to supply the fleet from England rather than from local markets. As a result, the arrival of the transports of the land component of the expeditionary force the following month received a most chilly reception from local authorities, precipitating a crisis that nearly undid the entire alliance. Saumarez arrived at Gothenburg on the 7th of May, the same day that news arrived of the “treacherous conspiracy” surrounding the fall of Sveaborg.241 Undeterred, Saumarez met with the new British Ambassador to Sweden, Edward Thornton and the Swedish naval liasion, Saloman von Rajalin. Together they formulated a division of responsibility and cooperative strategy that was both flexible and served both nations’ interests. The Baltic Fleet would concentrate their efforts on the western coast of Sweden and Norway along with keeping open the Danish Sound and entrance to the Baltic as the British had, “greater interest in these points

240 Ross, Saumarez, Pg. 101. 241 Ryan, The Saumarez Papers, Pg. 14. 113 than in common times the Swedes would have.”242 Meanwhile, the eastern coast of the country, the upper Baltic and in particular the waters around Finland would be left to the Swedish Navy. Of all the individuals who left their mark on Anglo-Swedish relations during this time, Saumarez’s was both unique and influential. Ross writes that Saumarez’s conduct, “was such as to deserve and obtain the high approbation of the government, and the people of both Great Britain and Sweden,”243 while Ryan described the Admiral’s policies as “firm, yet invariably tactful…and to an understanding also of the assurance with which he moved through the tangled politics of the north.”244 The Swedish historian Christer Jorgensen states that, “these naval expeditions succeeded…was due, to a great extent, to the diplomatic skills of Admiral Sir James Saumarez.”245 Unlike his fellow Britons, Saumarez had a high opinion of the Swedes and while the nature of the relationship between the two countries changed radically in accordance with the shifting tide of events, his view did not. It was a consistency that resonated favorably with even the most Anglo-phobic Swede and ensured a correct, if not cordial relationship.

The Landing that Never Was One month after the arrival of the Baltic Fleet came the transports bearing the 10,000- man strong British Expeditionary Force. In command of this force was the newly-knighted Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore. Already famous as a reformer and field commander, Moore had no experience concerning the Swedes and the observations provided by his Quartermaster- General Colonel George Murray, did not provide a positive picture. Adding to Moore’s woes were his orders; vague and in some places, contradictory. Like Saumarez, Moore’s primary task was to aid in the defense of Sweden and was to coordinate his actions with that of the Swedish government. However, Moore was expressly forbidden not to place himself under the Swedish King’s command, or participate in any operation that would take him away from the coast and quick evacuation. In short, Moore believed that he “had no specific plan, and come to no determination beyond that of sending a force of 10,000 men to Gothenberg to be ready to act if occasion offered.”246 In effect, Moore was to assume an effectively passive role, taking over the defense of southern Sweden and freeing up Swedish troops that could be used to reinforce

242 Ibid. 21. 243 Ross, Saumarez, 106. 244 Anthony Ryan, “An Ambassador Afloat: Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez and the Swedish Court 1808-1812.” 245 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 151. 246 Sir John Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, (London) 1904. Pg.203-4. 114 operations in either Norway or Finland. Moore was also to protect Gothenburg and thus, British commercial interests in the country. However, this was not the role described to the Swedish King by British Ambassador Thornton in May. Perhaps reflecting the soon-to-begin offensive into Norway, Thornton allowed the Swedish King to believe that the expeditionary force would be placed under his command and could be used as he saw fit. All that was required was a plan of operation, which Thornton would forward to Foreign Minister Canning for cabinet approval247. Left unsaid was the fact that Moore had to maintain contact with the fleet, and had to remain in close proximity to the coast in the event a quick evacuation was necessary. Given the similarly stubborn and abrasive personalities of both British General and Swedish King, this seemingly innocuous oversight was to have explosive consequences. Difficulties presented themselves with the arrival of the 180 ships transporting Moore’s expeditionary force on May 25th. Unlike the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, Moore’s troops could not be held on board their transports and almost routinely, Moore requested permission to begin landing his troops. Although promises were made by the Swedish Ambassador that British troops would be “hospitably received in Sweden,”248 members of the Anglophobic clique, among them the Governor of Gothenberg, were unwilling to accept British troops on their homesoil, whatever the reason. On his own initiative Count Carl von Carpelan refused to grant permission for Moore to offload his troops, claiming that their presence would drain the region of provisions and thus burden the civilian population.249 It was an excuse almost identical to that used to justify the rejection of Lord Bathurst’s brigade the previous fall. Moore was shocked by the Swedish refusal to land even his sick soldiers on their soil and felt that such an attitude was more appropriate for an invader than an ally. Recalling his experiences in Pomerania, Colonel Ludwig Mosheim of the King’s German Legion, offered the opinion that the culprit was the defeatism and Francophilia felt by the Swedish nobility and that because of this, the nation was beyond saving.250 While negotiating with Carpelan to land his troops, Murray arrived bearing a letter from the King. In it Gustavus offered two proposals for the employment of British troops. The first was to use the corps to reinforce Armstedt and

247 FO 73/44 Thornton to Canning 16 May 1808. 248 Carr, Gustavus Pg. 58. 249 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 140. 250 British Library, Mosheim to Gordon 3 June 1808. 115 reinvigorate operations in Norway. However, this would have required Moore to move inland and sever contact with Saumarez, a situation expressly forbidden by his orders. The other was even more fantastic, to spearhead an Anglo-Swedish invasion of Danish Zealand and engage the approximately 72,000 Danish, French and Allied troops stationed there. According to Murray, there were at most 18,000 Swedish troops available to join Moore’s 10,000 and even these were lacking in equipment and leadership. Finally, Gustavus’ letter included a request that Moore come to Stockholm and present himself to the King and receive his instructions on the employment of the British force. With typical bluntness, Moore wasted little time expressing his opinions regarding his allies, writing that, “the Swedes had no right to look to conquest; the danger to be apprehended was that they would be overpowered and invaded; and, unless they were able to themselves to make far greater efforts than they had done, I did not see how a corps, such as that I command, limited as it was to operations on the coast, could render the Swedes any essential service.”251 Sharing that view apparently was Saumarez, who confided in a letter to his brother, “I never formed any expectation that the troops would be of any essential service to this country and they were too few in number to act separately; and it would not have been right to commit them with the Swedish army, at the will and disposal of the monarch.”252 In response to the King’s request, Moore journeyed to Stockholm although except for a handful of staff officers, his troops were still confined to their tightly-packed transports. Given the recent disaster in Sveaborg and the failure in Norway, Moore hoped that Gustavus would be open to reason and devote himself to defending his country rather than pursue unrealistic offensives. Unfortunately Moore, “soon discovered by His Majesty’s actions that reason had no weight with him when opposed to his own opinions...he is perfectly despotic…does not see the perilous position he is in, and nobody dares represent it to him.”253 With regards to the use of British troops and Moore’s instructions, Gustavus insisted that no withdrawal of British troops could be attempted without providing up to two weeks’ notice and that Sweden would provide similar notice before requesting their departure. In addition, Moore’s instructions that his corps was to remain independent would not interfere with their cooperation with Swedish forces and that, in a seeming contradiction, any British troops

251 Ibid. Pg. 206. 252 Ross, Memoirs, 105. 253 Ibid. Pg.210. 116 operating within Sweden were subject to the King’s authority. In short, the British expeditionary force was to operate as an auxiliary corps of the Royal Swedish Army, to be used as the King saw fit. Over the following days both the General and King became increasingly stubborn, unwilling to contemplate compromise, if indeed compromise was possible. At one point Gustavus proposed that Moore’s force be sent to Finland, to restore the situation there and recover the province in his name. That was of course, wholly beyond the defensive role envisioned by London. Gustavus was unmoved, sarcastically asking, “what use were we if would not act?”254 Still, the Swedish King refused to contemplate any course of action other than aggressive. Again, he proposed using Moore’s corps to invade Zealand, seemingly ignorant of the numerically superior defenses there. Finally, Gustavus seemed to consider a renewal of the invasion of Norway, only to be informed that his troops would not be able to resume operations until August. Still, the king refused to grant Moore permission to land his troops, believing that in doing so he forfeited any opportunity to use them as he saw fit. In a second interview the now frustrated Gustavus turned his full wrath on Moore, accusing the British general of deceit, of deliberately misrepresenting his government’s instructions refusing to accept that his British allies would go through all the effort to send this corps to Sweden, only to relegate them to garrison duty. Angrily, the Swedish king demanded that Moore request new instructions from London, instructions that presumably would place the expeditionary force under Swedish command and that until he received a reply, Moore would remain in the Palace as the King’s “guest.”255 Over the next few days, Gustavus refused to meet with Moore, preferring instead Colonel Murray and Ambassador Thornton, who informed the King that by holding Moore prisoner he risked rupturing the alliance. For his pains the Ambassador was declared persona non grata and banished from the Court. Murray was equally unsuccessful and was unable to dissuade the Swedish King from the notion that Moore had deliberately misinterpreted his instructions in order to get himself and his troops transferred to Spain. In the end it was Moore himself who

254 Maurice, Moore, Pg. 224. 255 Ibid. 225. 117 broke the deadlock, contriving his own escape from the Royal Palace disguised as a sailor and making his way back to Gothenburg, where he sought refuge with Saumarez on board Victory. In the British Admiral, Moore finally found a sympathetic ear. Saumarez shared the general British consensus that the arrest of Moore was, “a most unprecedented measure, and an outrage certainly offered to a friendly nation.”256 Unlike the general however, Saumarez enjoyed the luxury of distance and water and wisely elected not to intervene in what was essentially dispute between two willful, stubborn men. Instead, he simply sheltered Moore, first on Victory and then Audacious, until final arrangements could be made for the return of the expeditionary force to England, which took place on the 6th of July. The farcical manner in which the British land expeditionary force first arrived, then departed, its mission unfulfilled, is an excellent example of how individual personalities can influence, even suborn national interests. Despite the recent setback in Norway and the disastrous events in Norway, Gustavus still saw himself as the Crusader King battling not only the French Ogre, but also those lesser, petty men who refused to acknowledge his glorious destiny. Yet, Moore was not above blame either. Although a brilliant field commander, Moore’s blunt, abrasive personality was singularly ill-suited to deal with the despotic and equally strong- willed Swedish King. Not helping matters was Moore’s overall disdain for aristocracy and privilege. As for Gustavus’ suggestion that Moore was motivated by personal ambition, there is his own poor impression of the state of the Swedish military and letters suggesting that his troops would have little impact in the north and that he would be of more use in Spain rather than Sweden.257 In any event, with the departure of Moore’s expedition, the landward defense of Sweden was left in the hands of the Swedes themselves, a prospect that offered little comfort to those involved. The Anglophobic faction within Sweden was quick to seize upon the entire episode, offering it as further proof that Britain held Swedish interests in low regard. As Ehrenheim saw it, “In Spain there are fleets to win, trade to revive, colonies to raise and a mass of power to direct against points far more sensitive to Bonaparte than Russia and Denmark.”258 While there was a grain of truth in his assessment, Ehrenheim conveniently overlooked the contribution of

256 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 104. 257 Ibid. 212. 258 RA Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 7 July 1808. 118 members of his own faction, particularly the refusal to allow British troops to disembark in Gothenberg. In any event, the presence of Moore’s army would not have significantly added to the security of Sweden, nor did its absence resolve the internal crisis building between Gustavus and his nobility. Rather, it was the presence of the fleet anchored off the Swedish coast that was the nation’s shield and fortunately for all, the fractured relationship between Moore and Gustavus had no apparent effect on the rapport building between Saumarez and the Swedes.

The Anglo-Russian “War” After the fall of Sveaborg, the Swedish government feverishly tried to rebuild its defenses before the Russians launched an attack across the Baltic towards Stockholm. Key to this were the Aaland Islands, a small archipelago located almost in the middle of the Baltic. By late summer though, it had become apparent that the Russians were preparing to take the Aaland Islands, using elements of their Baltic Fleet. Unfortunately the Swedish Navy, despite having a paper strength of ten sail-of-the-line and six frigates, was unsuited for the task.259 Months of continuous service had worn away and hulls and rigging and few ships had the opportunity to seek much-needed dockyard servicing. Even worse, the restricted confines and poor shipboard diet played havoc with the ship’s crews, for the most part conscripts that were unaccustomed to the rigors of a life at sea. Consequently, illness ran rampant through the navy, weakening crews and draining morale. As Captain Byam Martin of Implacable observed, “there were few seamen; the crews are formed chiefly of men drawn by law from the different provinces wretchedly clothed…it is no wonder that such men are already eaten up with scurvy.”260 So severe was the problem that one Swedish warship, the 70-gun Frederic-Adolph was stripped of all but a bare minimum of her crew and sent back to Carlscrona, bearing as much of the fleet’s sick as could be safely loaded aboard. Yet, the state of their Russian opponents was something of a mystery. Like the Swedes, the Russian Fleet appeared powerful on paper, boasting nine sail-of-the-line, including the three- deckers Blagodath (130) and Gabriel (118) as well as seven 74’s and three smaller 50-gun ships. In addition the fleet commander was an experienced and capable officer who, in happier days, had commanded the squadron that had operated with the Royal Navy’s North Sea fleet. At the

259 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 332. 260 Sir Thomas Byam Martin, Letters of Sir Thomas Byam Martin Vol. II, (London) Pg. 32. 119 same time though, it was unclear what percentage of their warships were in suitable condition and Russian sailors, like their Swedish counterparts, were largely conscripts with few opportunities to train or acquire experience. Nevertheless, the threat was real enough to persuade Gustavus to again reach out to the English, in this case Saumarez and the Baltic Fleet, for assistance. As mentioned before, the agreement worked out between Saumarez and his liaison, Rear- Admiral Rajalin, the British would be responsible for defending the western and southern Swedish coasts as well as protecting the flow of trade in and out of the Baltic, allowing the Swedes to focus their efforts on the Russians. Given the weakness of the Swedish Navy, and the seriousness of the danger to Stockholm and the rest of central Sweden, there was no choice but to appeal to the British. It was early August that Saumarez received the request, which placed him in a dilemma. The Danish galley squadrons had proven themselves a greater threat than previously estimated and the British Admiral had been obliged to detach several sail-of-line to reinforce his inshore patrols. In addition, Real-Admiral Keats had begun the evacuation of the Spanish garrisons from the islands of the Danish Belt, which obliged Saumarez to remain in support. Finally, there was the gloomy prospect sustaining operations in the Baltic and running the risk of enduring the region’s notoriously violent storms. Despite these concerns, Saumarez was determined to assist his ally and informed Rajalin that he would detach four sail of the line and whatever smaller vessels that could be spared and send them to assist the Swedes as best they can.261 Commanding this force was another experienced officer, Rear-Admiral Samuel Hood. A scion of a distinguished naval family,262 Samuel Hood, like his superior Saumarez, was a veteran of the Battle of the Nile and thus, one of Nelson’s “Band of Brothers.” In addition, Hood, like Keats, had served under Saumarez at the Battle of Algericas and as such, all three men knew and respected one another. Intelligent, experienced and aggressive, Hood was well suited for the militarily challenging and politically sensitive assignment of operating directly with the main Swedish fleet in the Baltic. On the 20th of August Rear-Admiral Hood, commanding his own 74-gun Centaur and the similarly-armed Implacable had just begun operations with the Swedish Fleet when lookouts

261 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 38. 262 Not to be confused with his namesake and cousin once removed 120 spotted the Russian Fleet exiting the Finnish port of Hango. Over the next five days the two fleets were content to remain within visual contact and allow events to develop. The British though were arguing for a more aggressive posture, “Sir Samuel strongly urged the most active preparations for an attack upon the Russian Fleet,” although it appeared that the Swedes were not particularly eager.263 On the 23rd, the Russians appeared to be contemplating an attack on the British squadron, whose swifter ships tended to outpace the Swedes, only to tack away and take up a position as if inviting battle. It was not until the 25th of August, that the Swedish fleet commander ordered his ships to prepare for battle. With the wind against them, the Russians attempted to disengage and retire to friendlier waters. In accordance to prior agreement, the British ships, with their copper-bottomed hulls took the lead with Implacable pulling steadily ahead. It was not until the following morning when the first broadsides were exchanged between Implacable and the Russian 74-gun Sevolod. As the Centaur closed, Captain Martin of the Implacable attempted to disengage from the Sevolod and move up the line, but was frustrated by the weakening wind. After an hour’s engagement it was clear which ship held the advantage as Martin described it, “our fire seemed to tear the ship to pieces. The captain of marines told me there was not a creature on the quarter- deck of the Russian.”264 After over an hour, and with Centaur about to join the engagement, the captain of the Sevolod was obliged to strike his colors. British losses during this first clash with the Imperial Russian Navy amounted to six killed, twenty-four wounded and heavy damage to Implacable’s rigging while Russian causalities totaled 48 killed and 80 wounded. However, in their pursuit of their Russian opponents, Hood’s little squadron had far outpaced their Swedish allies and now they saw the rest of the enemy squadron come about. Withdrawing to a safe distance, they watched as the crippled Sevolod was taken under tow and the Russian squadron continued towards the friendly harbor of Rogerswick (also known as Baltic Port.) When Sevolod ran aground off the entrance of the port Hood saw this as his opportunity to reclaim his prize. This time it was Centaur that led the way, coming so close that both ships’ riggings became entangled and Hood’s flagship too ran aground. Outnumbered two-to-one, the crew of the Sevolod fought with desperate courage but after ten minutes they once again were

263 Martin, Letters Pg. 31. 264 Ibid. Pg. 33-4. 121 forced to strike their colors. This time Russian losses were much higher, 180 killed and wounded, while British losses on both ships totaled 62. While Implacable was able to return Centaur to deep water, Hood decided that rather than see their prize reclaimed a second time, he ordered Sevolod’s shattered hulk fired and destroyed. Over the next four days the reunited Anglo-Swedish fleet remained off the entrance of Rogerswick, ready to engage the Russian Fleet should they emerge. Then on the 30th Saumarez, the evacuation completed, arrived on scene with Victory, the 74-gun Mars and Goliath, the newly-repaired 64-gun Africa and reinforce Hood. It was a timely arrival, as the number of scurvy cases amongst the Swedish Fleet was reaching epidemic levels. From his surgeon, Saumarez learned that some twelve hundred cases had been reported, with the number of fatalities reaching four hundred. On his own initiative and despite the risk that the disease might spread to his ships, Saumarez ordered that all spare stores of fresh vegetables and lime juice be sent over to the Swedes, a gesture that was greatly appreciated by not only Saumarez’s counterpart, Nauckhoff but by King Gustavus as well.265 For the moment though, with the Swedish Fleet rendered impotent, it was left to Saumarez and the Baltic Fleet to neutralize, if not eliminate the Russian threat. Unable to sortie from Rogerswick, the Russians instead worked to make it impregnable, securing their ships with cables, establishing powerful shore batteries that commanded the harbor entrance and a floating boom to prevent an attack by fire-ships. On the surface, it was a situation similar to that Saumaez faced at Algeciras in 1801, when a Franco-Spanish squadron sought shelter within a heavily-fortified harbor. As then, Saumarez’s first instinct was to see the enemy destroyed and to that end, brought up the bomb vessels Thunder and Erebus and used their mortars to weaken the harbor defenses. When that proved futile, pair of recently-captured prize vessels was outfitted as fire-ships to be sent into the harbor entrance. However, this was frustrated by contrary winds and tide. . Unable to achieve victory through main strength, Saumarez resorted to diplomacy. In a letter addressed to the Russian Emperor, Saumarez pointed to the events in Spain and Portugal as proof that Napoleon’s grasp was already slipping. He proposed that negotiations for peace begin between Britain, Sweden and Russia, with the pre-condition that the latter withdraw from

265 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 48. 122

Finland266. While arguably impudent, Saumarez did have the advantage of holding the Russian Fleet hostage within Rogerswick, possibly to be trapped there by the winter’s freeze. Unfortunately, nothing other than an agreement over the exchanging of prisoners was achieved. Saumarez maintained his blockade until late October, when the approaching winter and the need to return to home waters finally compelled Saumarez to retire. Soon after, the Russians vacated their Rogerswick anchorage for the more familiar and secure anchorage of Cronstadt.267 However, this was not accomplished without loss as the 48-gun frigate Geroi ran aground while departing Rogerswick while a second frigate, the 44-gun Argus met a similar fate off Revel.268

Assessments The year 1808 brought out both the best and worst aspects of the Anglo-Swedish alliance. In the minds of the British cabinet, the dispatch of troops and ships to Sweden was inherently defensive, to buy enough time for the Swedes to stabilize their internal affairs and gather their forces. An additional reason for the British presence was to keep the Baltic open to trade and commerce, and to ensure the flow of naval stores to Britain. A high point in the year had to have been Saumarez’s deft touch in diplomacy and politics. This was surprising given his reputation as a “fighting” sailor and prior lack of political experience. Evidence of both could be seen in his actions against the Russians taken late in the season. Despite the destruction of Sevolod, the Russian Baltic Fleet remained a serious threat to Swedish security, one that their disease-weakened navy was unable to control. Saumarez’s initial attempts to destroy the enemy fleet using bomb and fire vessels were wholly consistent with the British approach to naval warfare. Saumarez’s unauthorized attempt at diplomacy was an uncharacteristic departure for this “fighting” sailor. It certainly invoked inquiries from the Foreign Office, which was responsible for opening and conducting international diplomacy, and from the Swedes, who feared that they might be sacrificed in exchange for an Anglo-Russian treaty. Yet, as Saumarez explained, his actions were motivated by the desire to protect the immense trade being conducted by British-licensed merchant ships in the Baltic, and the belief that British and Russian interests were inherently amicable, while the alliance formed by the

266 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 118-9. 267 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 122-3. 268 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 336. 123

Tilsit treaty was not. By informing Tsar Alexander of events in Spain and Portugal, “a favorable opportunity presented itself of also making known to that monarch the declared sentiments of His Majesty’s government,”269 from which a later peace treaty might be created. Although unsuccessful, his efforts were eventually sanctioned, not only by British Ambassador Thornton, but also by the Swedes, whose letter of farewell was full of praise for Saumarez’s assistance, both military and humanitarian, with no mention of his communications with their enemies.270 In contrast, there was the brief, but contentious relationship between Moore and the Swedes. Here, both parties labored under assumptions and miscommunications, which the stubborn, strong-willed personalities of both Moore and Gustavus only exacerbated. In addition, the prospect of British troops on Swedish soil did not unite, but rather further fueled the political divide between the King and his Anglophobic nobility and fueled fears that Sweden was about to become a British satellite. In the end however it was neither the presence nor absence of British troops, but rather the inability of the Swedes to set their own house in order and their failure to place national security over petty politics that determined Sweden’s immediate future. In contrast, the relationship between the Royal Navy and the Swedes that laid the basis for that nation’s long-term survival. First, by establishing his base at Vinga Roads, Saumarez was able to distance himself from his host’s political turmoil while the decision to draw supplies from England essentially neutralized any attempt by the opposition to accuse him of interfering. In addition, there was Saumarez’s favorable impression of the Swedish people, whom he described as, “a brave and upright people,”271 and while occasionally critical of government policy decisions, he never wavered from that overall impression. By its presence, the Baltic Fleet in 1808 established the foundations of accomplishing its long-term goal, the preservation of Sweden. By deterring the invasion of southern Sweden by the Danes and French, Saumarez prevented the conquest and possible dismemberment of that nation by its enemies. In addition, although it could little to affect Sweden’s political stability, by protecting the flow of trade in and out of Sweden, the Royal Navy could ensure their economic stability In the short-term, the Baltic Fleet could not prevent the Russian conquest of Finland, nor completely neutralize the threat of Russian invasion. Nor could the reduced squadron under

269 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 53. 270 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 127 271 Ibid. Pg. 105. 124

Rear-Admiral Keats left behind during the winter of 1808-9 protect the Gustavus regime from its final, inglorious destiny.

The Swedish Nobility Plots and the “Insanity” of Gustavus IV The long string of defeats and setbacks suffered by Sweden during 1808, particularly the loss of Finland and the fall of Sveaborg stoked the fires of defeatism and war-weariness in the nation while giving increasing support to the anti-monarchial movement growing within the Swedish nobility, in particular the Swedish officer corps. Making matters worse was the October 1807 decision by Gustavus to strip three regiments of their “guards” status and reduce their officers, some of who came from the noblest of families, in both rank and privilege. 272 Gustavus justified his action by the poor performance of these “elite” units during the failed campaign to retake Finland. In doing so, the King only succeeded in adding to the ranks of the opposition who feared that a strong monarchy would threaten their feudal privileges. At the heart of the opposition movement were those who believed that at the heart of all of Sweden’s ills was the alliance with Britain and their belief that Sweden’s best interests lay in neutrality. Ironically, sharing this view to a limited extent was George Canning, who had long become frustrated with the constant demands from the Swedish King for ever-increasing amounts of subsides for an ever-decreasing rate of return. Indeed, the newest British envoy to the Swedish Court, Anthony Merry, brought with him instructions that Britain would support Sweden’s withdrawal from the war into neutrality provided that it did not join Napoleon’s Continental System and closed its ports to British trade.273 There was even debate within the British Cabinet whether or not it should support the removal of Gustavus from the Swedish throne although in the end this was opposed by Canning.274 Nevertheless, Gustavus continued to see the war in personal terms, ignoring the rising tide of discontent around him. Although his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Personal Secretary were among the loudest critics of the alliance with Britain and his war policies, Gustavus continued to keep them in their positions, confident that their loyalties to the Crown outweighed their personal opinions. As for British reluctance to grant his demand to double their subsidies, Gustavus resorted to blackmail, threatening to sever all trade relations with Britain,

272 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 164. 273 Carr, Gustavus Pg. 64. 274 Hinde, George Canning. Pgs. 375-6. 125 even entering an alliance with Denmark and close the Baltic to British trade completely, although in the end, the King agreed to accept the same level of subsidies as previously granted.275 One question asked time and again in regards to the behavior of the Swedish King was his sanity. As early as 1803, British diplomats were describing Gustavus as mentally unstable, prone to explosive outbursts at the slightest provocation.276 His intensely personal animus towards Napoleon was a source of alarm to his ministers who feared that it would lead Sweden to disaster.277 Carr goes on to outline Gustavus’ “strange actions,” his demands for subsidies far in excess than already established by British policy, his insistence on seeing the war against France in personal, almost crusade-like terms, yet allow himself to be diverted into seizing a minor piece of territory belonging to then-neutral Prussia.278 During his brief, but controversial time in Sweden, Moore provided some detailed observations of the Swedish King, describing his decisions as resulting from “derangement or the greatest weakness of mind,” and that, “when he gives orders he depends entirely upon himself and on his own impressions as facts.”279 Building on this Sherwig concludes that Gustavus was “verging on insanity.”280 Finally, there is the naval historian N.A.M. Rodger, who describes Gustavus as “unstable…whose world view was based on a deranged interpretation of the Book of Revelation.”281 Supporting that was Ross’ claims that he had received a letter supposedly written in the king’s hand, describing himself as the Biblical “Man on a White Horse,” supposedly destined to lead the Christian world into battle against the forces of evil beneath the walls of Copenhagen.282 To be certain, a “mad” monarch was a hardly unique phenomenon in the nineteenth century. Denmark’s Christian VII, Britain’s George III and the assassinated Russian Tsar Paul I were all accused of insanity, although it is worth noting that in nearly all such cases, it was the opposition who made such claims, offering their own somewhat biased observations as evidence. Similarly, in the case of Gustavus such assessment is based more on the reactions of those who had to deal with the dynamic, ambitious and egotistical Swedish monarch than any

275 Carr, Gustavus, Pg. 65. 276 FO/73 Arbuthnot to Hawkesbury, 25 Mar. 1803. 277 Carr, Gustavus, Pg. 40. 278 Ibid. Pg. 48. 279 Maurice, Moore, Pgs. 209-10. 280 Sherwig, Guineas Pg.197. 281 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean (New York), Pg. 553. 282 Ross. Nenoirs, Pg. 133. 126 objective clinical assessment. Moore’s observations for example, were based on his limited, but volatile meetings with the Swedish King, while Saumarez, whose relationship with Gustavus was prolonged but indirect, confined his criticisms of the Swedish King to his actions, rather than his character.283 There does seem to a certain degree of self-service when it comes to the “mad” King Gustavus. Jorgensen asserts that British historians, “quite unjustifiably,” insisted on portraying the Swedish King as mentally unbalanced, countering that while Gustavus was eccentric, temperamental and ego-centric; such qualities did not constitute madness. They could, however, justify Britain’s tacit sanctioning of the events of March of 1809 and eventually accepting the removal of their most stalwart and loyal ally in the struggle against Napoleonic France. As far as the British were concerned, what ultimately defined Gustavus as “mad” was his tendency to place his interests ahead of Britain’s and expectation that as an ally, Britain would support his ambitions to the bitter end. In that, Gustavus was mistaken.

The fall of King Gustavus IV The conspiracy to remove Gustavus from the Swedish throne began in the winter of 1808-9 amongst a cabal of military officers led by the former commander of the Western Army, Baron Gustavus Armfelt. Once regarded as a loyal supporter of the Crown, Armfelt’s sentiments changed after Gustavus made him the scapegoat for the failed conquest of Norway. Relieved of command and forced into retirement, Armfelt threw himself into the anti-monarchy conspiracy and even went as far as to use his contacts within the British Foreign Office to sound out the possibilities of their supporting the king’s removal and replacement by a military junta headed by himself.284 However, it was a former lieutenant of Armfelt’s, Colonel Georg Adlersparre, who took the first step towards revolution when on the 5th of March 1809 he issued a proclamation denouncing the king, praised Napoleon and called for an end to the war. Amazingly, supporting Aldesparre and the rebels was the Danish commander in Norway, Prince Christian August, who promised not to take advantage of the weakened border defenses. Now a traitor as well as a revolutionary, Adlesparre led his 800-strong force and marched on Stockholm.

283 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 108. 284 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 165. 127

In response, Gustavus mobilized the city garrison and directed them to close the city and prepare for attack. However, thanks to his earlier demotion of the Guards regiments, Gustavus had few troops that he could regard as reliable. Not even the populace or at least the people of Stockholm could be counted on to resist the rebels. In desperation he summoned the British Envoy Anthony Merry to request military and financial aid to maintain his grasp on power, pointing out that if he should be deposed, any new government would be dominated by the Anglophobes who would immediately repudiate the alliance with Britain and join the Continental System. Aware of his government’s frustration with the Swedish King as well as his belief that the days of the Anglo-Swedish alliance were numbered Merry refused to commit any further British assistance.285 True to form, Gustavus flew into a rage, accusing the British of precipitating the current situation by their refusal to grant the subsidies he demanded and by failing to place Moore and his army under his orders. Refuting the King’s claims, Merry did what his predecessors failed to do, that is blindly submitting to the King’s will. In contrast, Rear-Admiral Keats, still commanding the Royal Navy’s winter squadron, remained committed to Gustavus, pledging his support to the Crown. However, there was little his warships could do to influence events on land and in any event, his pledge of support would not arrive until the 17th of March, four days too late.286 The end of the Gustavian regime finally came on the 13th of March as Aldersparre, in command of over 3000 troops, approached the Swedish capitol, which was defended by 2700 more-or-less loyal soldiers. The government itself was in complete disarray, with some ministers openly supporting the rebels, others remaining loyal with the king and still others fearing the outbreak of civil war. For his part, Gustavus was planning on abandoning Stockholm and take his loyal troops to the southern part of the country. Before he could do so, a group of previously loyal officers entered his personal apartment and placed the King under arrest. Calling for his guards, Gustavus attempted to flee but was quickly overpowered and made prisoner within his own palace. In retrospect, it is easy to be both repelled and have sympathy for King Gustavus IV. In many ways, Gustavus was an anachronism, the quintessential medieval monarch: despotic,

285 FO 73/45 Merry to Canning 10 Mar. 1809. 286 Ibid. 12 March, 1809. 128 willful and beyond question or criticism. He saw the war not as a struggle for national interests, but a personal crusade the “evils” of liberalism and its anti-Christ, Napoleon Bonaparte. To that end, his demands were many, particularly on his nobility, who were more interested in preserving their class privileges and repudiating the English, who they saw as not only the foreign menace, but also the buttress of the King’s rule. The British too had become exasperated with Gustavus’ impetuous ways and increasing demands for more and greater amounts of treasure, yet delivering less and less in return. Yet, of all Britain’s allies, only Gustavus remained consistent to the goals of the alliance, the destruction of Napoleonic France and the restoration of the status quo. Even when Britain had been distracted by self-interest, Gustavus remained focused, even to the determent of his nation and ultimately, himself. Like most despots, Gustavus’ primary flaw was his ego, believing that his interests and those of the state were identical and refusing to acknowledge that both had their shortcomings and weaknesses. He also naively believed that his ministers and subordinates were absolutely loyal and would obey regardless of their individual interests and ambitions. In the end, Gustavus’ reach proved unequal to his grasp and it would be Sweden that would pay the cost of his failings. At the same time though, it could be argued that his loyalty deserved a better reward from his “friends,” both then and afterwards.

Aftermath and Disappointment In the eyes of the coup leaders, the removal of King Gustavus from the Swedish throne seemed the answer to all the nation’s ills. With the King out the way, it was believed that the alliance with Britain would be broken and Sweden would return to its “natural” condition of neutrality. With seeming haste, Duke Charles of Sodermanland was invited to assume the role of Regent, (a position he had held before the ascension of his nephew, Gustavus IV,) while other positions within the government would be filled from within the ranks of the plotters. Less than a week later, at a hastily-assembled meeting of the Assembly of Nobles, it was proclaimed that Gustavus’ removal from power had been prompted by the “fact” that he had been born out of wedlock, a charge that also served to remove his son and heir from the line of succession.287

287 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 172. 129

The deposing of King Gustavus also seemed to spell the end of the Anglo-Swedish alliance, especially with the appointment of Baron Gustav Lagerbjelke as Foreign Minister. One of the loudest of the Anglophobes and a self-professed admirer of Napoleon Bonaparte, Lagerbjelke wasted little time in moving on his desire to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and persuading Napoleon to intervene on behalf of Sweden in their on-going war with Russia. With an optimism that bordered on naiveté, Lagerbjelke was certain that Napoleon would be so desirous of Swedish good-will that he would pressure Russia to not only enter peace negotiations, but also insist on the return of Finland.288 To the surprise of no one save Lagerbjelke, Napoleon had little interest in securing the goodwill of Sweden, particularly as it meant risking the displeasure of his Russian ally. Indeed, with the prospect of war with Austria looming, Napoleon needed to keep Russia both placated and diverted.289 Offering little more than the advice that the new Swedish government throw themselves on the mercies of Tsar Alexander, the French Emperor dismissed the Swedish delegation and returned to his own affairs. For Lagerbjelke, Napoleon’s cold rejection was not only personally humiliating, it was potentially ruinous to the continued existence of the Swedish state as they now faced an imminent Russian invasion of central Sweden without the support of any patron or ally. In desperation, Lagerbjelke tried to mend the breach with Britain, (a breach that he in no small part created,) only to discover that Merry had already left. Similarly, Legerbelke’s entreaties received a cold reception in Britain as the Cabinet saw this as a hypocritical face-saving gesture on the part of one who had foolishly placed his trust on the perceived generosity of the French Emperor and was now desperately seeking to save his political career. Consequently, Canning made no effort to appoint a replacement for the departing Merry, nor recognize the legitimacy of the new Swedish government. Meanwhile, Russia continued its preparations to renewal the war as soon as the change of seasons permitted it. In March of 1809, Russian troops occupied the Aland Islands, placing them in a position to invade central Sweden and placing the capitol city of Stockholm directly in the path of the Russian advance. Only the difficulties of bringing up supplies across the Finnish wilderness delayed the inevitable Russian advance and with war-weariness still high and the

288 Ibid. Pg. 173. 289 Ryan, Ambassador, Pg. 244. 130 military structure still in tatters, there appeared little hope that Sweden could survive a sustained summer offensive.

Deployment to the Baltic It was not until early June that the main strength of the Baltic Fleet, again under the command of James Saumarez returned to Vinga Roads. Reflecting the new danger represented by both the Danes and Russians, the fleet was reinforced with the addition of two more Second Rates, the 98-gun Temeraire and St. George, joining the flagship Victory (flagship), the 74’s Plantaganet, Princess Caroline, Implacable, Saturn and the 64-gun Ruby.290 This time, the fleet was expected to deploy into the Baltic where they would join the previously deployed Bellerphon and Minotaur (74’s). As before, the fleet’s primary task was to serve as a shield protecting Stockholm and central Sweden from Russian attack. However, this meant defending a regime that had just overthrown a loyal, albeit difficult ally to Britain’s, and one whose leaders had made clear their intention to abrogate their alliance with Britain and instead seek the protection of Napoleonic France. Indeed, the British government had yet to extend official recognition to the new Swedish government, or recognize the June 5th ascension of the Regent Duke of Sudermania to the Swedish throne as King Charles XIII. Reflecting this change were the modified instructions given to Saumarez. He was to maintain “an amicable intercourse” with the Swedes and provide for the protection of their shipping and trade. However, he was to remain aloof from the government, offering neither offense nor recognition but instead focus his intention on protecting trade and maintain a vigilant watch over the Russians.291 With the departure of Ambassador Merry, Saumarez’s official contact in Stockholm became the charge d’affaires Augustus Foster. It did not take long before this new relationship was put to the test. In May of 1809, Foster received a letter from Lagerbjelke, fresh from his futile attempt to enlist French assistance, expressing Sweden’s continued desire for friendly political and commercial relations with Britain, as well as a request to dispatch warships into the Baltic and prevent any attempt by the Russians to invade central Sweden. Simultaneously, Saumarez received a similar letter from

290 Ibid. Pg. 340. 291 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 135. 131

Admiral Nauckhoff, arguing that unless checked, the Russians would be able to transform the balance of power in the North, a situation that would not benefit the British. While well aware of the current government’s pro-French sympathies, both Foster and Saumarez agreed that even a hostile Swedish government was preferable to one under Russian thrall. Accordingly, the Baltic Fleet extended its operations into the Baltic proper. Despite his cordial relationship with the Swedes, Saumarez had no clear idea of the forces arrayed against him. There was of course the Russian Baltic Fleet, estimated at numbering anywhere from ten to fifteen sail-of-line, including several powerful three-deckers that had to be contained to their bases lest they break out and endanger the Baltic trade. Then there were the various vessels and oared galleys, estimated by Swedish sources as numbering between “200 to 300 sail,”292 that could be used to either support a sea-bore invasion of central Sweden or a Russian land invasion of eastern Sweden from Finland Entering the Gulf of Finland in late June, Saumarez took up a position near the main Russian fleet base at Revel; close enough to observe or intercept any ships attempting to exit, but not so close as to be vulnerable to a sudden galley attack. This also placed the British in a position to threaten a possible Russian offensive into Sweden by interfering with their supplies. In addition, Saumarez’s forward deployment allowed the Swedes to transfer their western flotillas into the Baltic and add their strength to the defense of Stockholm, although this meant entrusting their trade to the British Navy. While Saumarez’s overall strategy was to serve as a fleet-in-being, the ships under his command were by no means inactive. On the 19th of June, boats from the Bellerophon entered the Finnish harbor of Hango, seizing two coastal luggers and spiking the guns of a nearby battery. British losses were light, with none killed and five sailors wounded.293 A more successful action, but one with a higher cost occurred on the 7th of July, when Captain Thomas Martin took his own Implacable along with Bellerophon (74), along with the frigate Melpomene, and the sloop Promethus, undertook a patrol of the Finnish coast and found a concentration of oared gun-boats and merchant vessels near Procola Point. Given the strength of the covering gun batteries, it was decided to attempt a cutting-out expedition consisting of boats and men from the entire squadron. Despite being detected soon after entering the harbor the

292 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 84. 293 James, Naval Pg. 40. 132 party continued and succeeded in sinking one of the gun-boats and capturing six others, while also seizing some fourteen merchant ships, “laden with stores and provisions for the Russian troops.”294 Casualties among the British were heavy: 17 dead and 37 wounded. It was a high loss considering the forces, particularly as the dead included the commanding officer, Lieutenant Joseph Hawkley of the Implacable, whose loss was noted and lamented in both Britain and Sweden.295 A week later a similar attack was carried out by boats of the Minotaur, Princess Caroline, frigate Cerberus and sloop Promethus which entered the Finnish port of Fredericksham and, despite fierce resistance from the Russian crews, captured three gun-boats and as an armed transport, loaded with supplies for the army.296 Although there had been no battles between the British and Russian Navies, or even single-ship engagements such as between Implacable and Sevolod the previous year, Saumarez had clearly demonstrated his ability to secure naval superiority anywhere he chose to. Although their Baltic Fleet was of comparable size to the English force, the Russians were unwilling to risk themselves against the experienced Royal Navy. Saumarez also proved that while primarily a naval force, he was able to influence land operations in Finland to the point of encouraging the Russians to seek a diplomatic, rather than a military solution to their conflict with Sweden. Still, Saumarez could not maintain this deployment indefinitely. The island that served as temporary fleet anchorage lacked fresh water and Swedish ports were still closed as supply sources. Moreover, as early as July he had been receiving alarming messages from Rear- Admiral Dixon, whom he had left to protect the waters of the Great Belt. Reporting that the Danes had assembled concentrations of galleys at Langeland and Nyborg in preparation for attacks on nearby convoys, Dixon urged that at least some of the sail-of-the-ships return to the Belt to reinforce his command, which were coming under increasing pressure from the Danish galleys.

Sweden struggles to survive While Saumarez and the Baltic Fleet sailed into its namesake body of water, the newly established Swedish government was waging its own battles with legitimacy and survival. With the deposed King Gustavus formally removed from the Swedish throne, the Swedish Council of

294 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 161. 295 Ryan, Saumarez, Pg. 97. 296 James Naval History, Pg.42. 133 the Estates, or Riksdag, moved swiftly to appoint his successor, confirming the Regent Duke Charles as King Charles XIII on June 5th, 1809. As the new King was sixty-years old and childless, securing an heir was equally important. Curiously, the choice fell upon Prince Christian August, a Danish nobleman who the previous year successfully defended Norway from a Swedish invasion. On this occasion though, blood proved thicker than patriotism and Christian was formally, if hastily adopted as Charles’ heir and named Crown Prince in mid-July. Despite this, the new Swedish government remained on shaky ground. Napoleon’s abrupt refusal to come to Sweden’s rescue left government ministers with no option to persuade Britain to reconsider their decision to sever diplomatic relations and formally resume the alliance. Unfortunately, their efforts stumbled almost immediately when their Foreign Minister, Lars von Engestrom, (replacing the temporarily disgraced Lagerbjelke,) opened negotiations by insisting that Britain not only recognize Charles XIII as the legitimate King of Sweden, but also that it should resume its subsidy payments even though the funds would used to underwrite Sweden’s war with Russia, rather than France.297 Such statements failed to move Canning, who while admitting that British recognition of new Swedish government was inevitable, it would not be in the foreseeable future.298 Only Saumarez was disposed to take an optimistic view, although he confessed that this was based on second-hand information based on his conversations with his opposite numbers in the Swedish Navy.299 Nevertheless, acting on his own initiative, Saumarez chose to come to Sweden’s defense and while could not directly block the overland invasion by the Russian, his presence along their seaward flank, provided the Swedes one last opportunity to wrest the strategic initiative from Russia and achieve some kind of success that will improve their bargaining position at the inevitable peace conference. Also working in Sweden’s favor was the rising level of disinterest within the Russian Court for the war. Initially, the invasion of Finland had been justified as a means of avenging Russia’s humiliating defeat at the hands of Sweden in the 1790 war while removing a threat to St. Petersberg. Since then, it was believed that war had been forced upon Russia by Napoleon as a means of distracting them from the Balkans.300 While Finland was valuable was a buffer against future Swedish adventures, it yielded little additional revenue while increasing the

297 RA Engestrom to Brinkman, 7 June 1809. 298 RA Canning to Brinkman, 10 July 1809. 299 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 153. 300 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish. Pg. 177. 134 amount of frontier that had to be guarded. So, even as they continued their preparations to resume the offensive, Russia too was more interested in securing a favorable position from which they could dictate terms. In late June Saumarez received word that in recognition of his efforts to defend Sweden from foreign invasion he was to receive the decoration of Commander Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword and along with his flag lieutenant John Ross, knighthoods within the Swedish nobility. Although flattered, Saumarez was concerned over the possible political consequences of accepting such an award.301 On this occasion Saumarez wrote to the Admiralty for guidance. In August, the Admiral was informed that as the British government had yet to formally recognizing Charles XIII as the legitimate ruler of Sweden and allowing Saumarez to accept the knighthood would be, “a virtual admission of the competence of the authority in the name of which this distribution of honors should be made.”302 It was even suggested that this was the reason why the award was being given. Therefore, rather than give implied recognition to the new Swedish government, Saumarez was directed not to accept the award until told otherwise by the Admiralty.303 With the Royal Navy firmly in control of the waters surrounding the Danish archipelago, the Swedes felt confident to transfer their western naval squadrons, in particular their oared galleys, into the Baltic. Unfortunately, the illnesses that afflicted the Swedish Navy the year before had so decimated the ranks of their naval personnel that they only had sufficient crews to man three of their sail-of-the-line. Nevertheless, in August the Swedes embarked on their last offensive. While the forces defending the Swedish frontier demonstrated against the Russian forces opposite them, a second force of some 7000 men would be landed along the coast behind the Russians. This force would be protected by the bulk of the remaining Swedish Navy while Saumarez was asked to conduct diversionary operations as to confuse the Russians as to where the real objective lay.304 It was a good plan that, if successful, would give the Swedes an important bargaining tool with which they could dictate favorable terms or even exchange in return of Finland.

301 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 91. 302 ADM 1/10 Mulgrave to Saumarez 22 Aug. 1809. 303 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 100. 304 Ibid. Pg. 97. 135

Sadly, the land diversion failed to distract the Russians, who quickly learned of the landing and marched south to meet it. At the villages of Ratan and Salvar the two forces engaged in a pair of engagements that the Russians won, but suffered such losses as to compel a halt to their advance. Once again the Swedish officer corps, whose slowness and mendacity had so frustrated King Gustavus, proved no more adept under a government led by their fellow nobles. In addition the failure of the landing prevented commencement of the second phase of the Swedish counter-attack, the reoccupation of the Aaland Islands and removing their ability to threaten Stockholm. For their part, although victorious, it was too late for the Russians to force a capitulation before year’s end and with anti-war sentiment rising at home, there seemed little alternative but to seek a negotiated end. Among those disappointed with the failure of the Swedish expedition was Saumarez who predicted that given the “slender means” by which Sweden could defend itself over the winter, they would be forced to accept the “very severe” terms the Russians could offer. However, he optimistically that the negotiations would last long enough to allow the trading season to be concluded and British shipping to depart from Swedish waters in the event that their ports become closed to British shipping.305 Given the disastrous state of affairs, the terms signed at the Peace of Fredrikshamn on the 17th September of 1809 was as bad as expected. Sweden was forced to cede control of Finland, which it had ruled for seven centuries, to Russia. In addition the Aaland Islands, which had served as a shield protecting central Sweden, was also surrendered to Russia. At a stroke Sweden had lost one-third of its territory, population and economy.306 It was a humiliating end to a war that was as unpopular as it was mismanaged by the losers. Curiously, one demand not made by the Russians insisting that Sweden join the Continental System and close their ports to British trade. Jorgensen reasoned that this gesture reflected the rising Russian disenchantment with their French allies as well as the blows inflicted on them since their signing the Treaty of Tilsit.307 British Consul Augustus Foster was less optimistic over the chances that Sweden would remain open to British trade. In a letter to Saumarez he described the Swedish government in “great despondency…never will be sanguine about anything again.” In a private letter he urged

305 Ibid. Pg. 104. 306 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 177. 307 Ibid. Pg. 177. 136

Saumarez to expedite the departure of British trade and warships from Swedish waters as, “I see no means they have of resisting. It is a mutilated land, and the resources that remain are ill- managed.”308 After concluding terms with Russia, Sweden’s next task was to bring to an end their war with Denmark. As neither side had seized each other’s territory, and that a member of their ruling house was now the Swedish Crown Prince, the treaty of Jonkoping (signed on December 10th,) was little more than an agreement to cease fighting and return to the status quo. However, the treaty also meant that Sweden could not recoup their loss of Finland by taking Norway. Offsetting this was Denmark’s failure, like Russia’s, to insist that Sweden abide by the Continental System. This was seen as encouraging by the Swedish political leadership, who were preparing to open negotiations with France. As before, leading the Swedish delegation was Lagerbjelke who still saw Napoleon as the great savior of his nation. Despite his prior experience, Lagerbjelke remained confident that not only would Napoleon support Sweden in their bid to retake Finland from the Russians, but that he would gladly accede to Sweden’s desire for neutrality and trading rights to all, including Britain. So confident was Lagerbjelke of success that he ignored a Russian offer to support their claim to neutrality.309 Just as in May, the Francophile Swedes would receive a cold dose of political reality from the ruthless master of power politics, Napoleon Bonaparte. There would be no French support for the return of Finland and while Swedish neutrality would be tolerated, (for the moment at least,) it would be expected to adhere to the Continental System and cease all trade with Britain. For Sweden, the treaty was a disaster. Not only was its trade with Britain, perhaps the most profitable part of its economy, Sweden was now left without a powerful patron. Isolated and impotent, Sweden had seemingly come full circle from the days when Gustavus IV presented himself as the champion of the old order. Self-deluded into believing the nation shared his ambitions Gustavus led Sweden into one misadventure after another, all the while alienating friends and enemies alike. Likewise his successors were blind to all but their ill-placed belief in Napoleon, only to discover that the French Emperor was as much an autocrat as Gustavus. Now,

308 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 103. 309 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 178. 137 abandoned and left to their own devices, Sweden turned to the one person that remained consistent in their dealings, James Saumarez.

Sweden signs a peace treaty As mentioned previously, the pro-French faction within the new Swedish government journeyed to Paris with the high, perhaps even naïve hopes that Napoleon might be persuaded to accept Sweden’s status as a neutral and permit them to continue their lucrative trade with Britain. However, as with the previous spring, Napoleon was wholly disinterested in extending Sweden any special considerations. Under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed January 6th 1810, Sweden was required to sever all trade and diplomatic ties with Britain and adhere completely with the Continental System. In addition, it was understood that at some point Sweden would declare war on Britain and, along with Denmark, close the Baltic permanently to British trade.310 Far from ensuring Swedish security and prosperity, the treaty placed Sweden in a potentially untenable position of choosing between French security and British trade, which from 1809-1812, accounted for 40% of Sweden’s total trade revenue.311 Typically, the Swedes tried to have it both ways, openly agreeing to French demands and closing their mission in Britain, but not before sending their ambassador to the new British Foreign Minister, Sir Richard Wellesley, and assuring him that Sweden would continue to welcome British trade into their nation, so long it was carried in “neutral” ships. Similar promises were made to Augustus Foster in Stockholm. The Admiralty’s instructions to Saumarez in 1810 reflected not the fear that the Swedish government would be unable to resist French pressure, but rather the hope economic necessity would promote cooperation with the British. Reflecting this, Saumarez was expected to continue to protect Swedish merchant shipping which, despite the signing of a peace treaty the previous year, was still being harassed by Danish and Norwegian privateers.312

Another Swedish Crisis As mentioned before, the new King of Sweden, Charles XIII, was in his early sixties when he ascended the throne in 1809. With no living heir and desiring to ensure a smooth

310 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 178. 311 Ibid. Pg. 184. 312 ADM 1/10 Foster to Saumarez 25 May 1810. 138 transition of power, the 42-year old Prince Carl August of Norway was formally adopted into the Royal Swedish family and designated Crown Prince in January of 1810. Despite his Danish birth Prince Carl enjoyed some appeal with the general population, while blocking a possible return to power of the former King, Gustavus IV.313 Unfortunately, the new Crown Prince had little opportunity to make an impression on his adopted nation. On the 10th of May, while participating in a military parade, Prince Carl August reeled dizzily in his saddle and fell off his horse. By the time his aides had reached the Prince’s side he was dead, the victim of an apparent heart attack. The unexpected death of the new Crown Prince triggered yet another Swedish political crisis, particularly as King Charles XIII had himself suffered a recent stroke and was in declining health. Immediately, suspicions of poisoning were raised as well as rumors of the possible involvement by the Gustavian family, particularly the son and until recently Crown Prince of Sweden, Gustavus. With their long history of dabbling in conspiracies, government ministers were quick to embrace such rumors and through propaganda, encouraged the public to blame Count Axel Fersen, a high-ranking member of the Swedish government and a loyal supporter of the former King. Observing these events was Augustus Foster, the departing British Consul to Sweden. Reporting to Saumarez that “all Stockholm was in an uproar,”314 Foster had witnessed the arrival of the funeral procession of the late Crown Prince. Leading the procession was Fersen, who was serving in his capacity as Marshal of the Realm. Almost as soon as it appeared, Fersen’s carriage was subjected to a hail of stones thrown by the grief-stricken crowd, some of whom may have been paid by government agents hoping to incite a riot.315 In vain, Fersen tried to flee the mob, seeking shelter in the barracks of the Royal Guard. However, when the troops either would not or could not intervene, the now infuriated crowd seized the Swedish nobleman and, “proceeded to beat him with clubs, and trample on him, until death put an end to his sufferings.”316 At first government leaders were content to allow the murder of Count Fersen go unpunished as a scapegoat to the mob’s fury. However, when the mob began attacking soldiers

313 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 181. 314 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 189. 315 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 182. 316 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 189. 139 in the streets, holding them responsible for the loss of Finland, the possibility that a popular revolt might ensue finally drove the government to action. Troops were again sent into the streets, this time with instructions to disperse the mob by any means necessary. It took several volleys of musket fire into the mobs to clear the streets, killing some 65 Swedes, the majority of them civilians. The rioting only underscored the Swedish government’s shaky grasp on power. Their erstwhile ally Napoleon had little sympathy for Sweden, suggesting that if the Swedes were unable to maintain order, he would. There were even rumors that Czar Alexander was contemplating taking advantage of the unrest to invade Sweden and install one of his nobles as the new Crown Prince.317 It was ironic then that given such chaotic circumstances that one of the few consistencies available to the Swedes was just arriving in their waters to begin its third year of deployment to protect the sovereignty of what was technically a hostile power.

“An Ambassador Afloat” For the third straight year, the British Baltic Fleet had anchored in the waters of Vinga Roads to begin its dual missions of protecting trade and secure western and southern Sweden from invasion. However, unlike previous years, Saumarez was given broad discretion over the extent of his powers and responsibilities.318 In addition, as Britain had yet to recognize Charles XIII as the legitimate ruler of Sweden, Saumarez was also the de facto Ambassador to the Swedish Court and serve as a surreptitious conduit between the two countries. Through Saumarez, Britain was able to exercise a policy towards Sweden that could best be described as “forbearance.”319 Sweden would be allowed to openly adopt any stance they wished, from alliance to neutrality to even hostility, so long as they did not interfere with British trade in the Baltic. In return, the Baltic Fleet would continue to protect Swedish marine commerce and protect Sweden from threats to the west and south as long as they coincided with the overall protection of trade.

317 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 183. 318 Ryan, “An Ambassador Afloat: Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez and the Swedish Court, 1808-1812” Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfire (eds.) The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester), 1988. 319 Ibid. Pg. 245. 140

As Britain did not officially recognize the legitimacy of the Swedish government, Saumarez could not formally engage or communicate with the Swedish Court. Rather, it was through Saumarez’s personal relationships with individuals such as Rear-Admiral Peter Krusentjerna, commander of the Western Squadron of the Swedish Navy, and Axel von Rosen, governor of Gothenburg, that the two nations maintained an active, albeit tenuous line of communications. Through such contacts Saumarez was informed that the Swedish government had every desire to maintain the status quo with Britain regardless of changing outside circumstances. For his part, Saumarez was content to allow Sweden to define and protect their interests, rather than force the Swedes to choose between Britain and France. To this end, he maintained a relaxed, non-confrontational attitude towards his hosts and deal with problems as they came up. For their part, although there remained a strong, pro-French streak within the Swedish government, it had become obvious that an alliance with Napoleon would not fend off Russian aggression nor return Finland but would cost them the economic prosperity resulting from their trade with Britain. In contrast, through their Baltic Fleet, Britain provided security along both their eastern and southern borders, as well as valuable revenues through the collection of port fees from thousands of merchant vessels, while not requiring any modifications to their policies and interests. It was a far cry from two years before, when Britain insisted that neutral nations like Denmark had to adhere to their policies or risk war. As proof of the success of the forbearance policy Saumarez was able to arrange for the surreptitious purchase from Sweden of supplies of fresh food for the fleet, as well as the construction of warehouses on the island of Hano for the benefit of “neutral” traders. In addition, Swedish officials continued to issue certificates to merchant ships arriving in their ports while accepting at face value the forged documents identifying them as neutrals. British convoys continued to assemble at Gothenburg in the West and Hano in the east awaiting the escorts that would see them safely through the Belt. Indeed, in one of his last actions before departing from Sweden, Foster petitioned Saumarez to cease intercepting Swedish vessels suspected of trading with the enemy, a request that was readily granted.320 Consequently, before his departure, (forced upon Sweden by an increasingly frustrated Napoleon,) Foster forwarded the thanks of his

320 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 198. 141

Swedish hosts who, “seemed convinced that you had executed your orders with as much mildness and consideration for this country as could possibly be expected.”321 Still, of immediate concern to both Sweden and Saumarez was deciding who would fill the-now vacant position of Crown Prince. Given the failing health of Charles XIII, the nominee was in the position of exerting a major influence on Swedish policy and by extension the future of Anglo-Swedish relations, both public and private. Therefore, it was with some astonishment that Saumarez and the British government learned that the next ruler of Sweden would be a French Marshal.

From French Marshal to Swedish Crown Prince For the second time in less than a year, Sweden found itself searching for a new heir to the throne. One early and obvious candidate was the son of the deposed Gustavus IV. However, the unpopular memory of his father’s reign served to poison his appeal to all but the most adamant Gustavians. Given the recent disastrous war with Russia and that the desire to reclaim Finland was still strong, most Swedes wanted their new Crown Prince to be someone with proven military leadership and ability, as well as a strong figure that would make the reestablishment of stability and order a top priority. However, while there were some who wanted to offer the title to another Dane or perhaps a German noble, the prevailing view within the Swedish officer corps was to nominate a French Marshal. Specifically, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, the Prince of Porte Corvo. Bernadotte had always been something of an enigmatic figure. One of the original group of Marshals, Bernadotte had earned praise for his service during the 1805 campaign. However, Napoleon rebuked him for his failure to come to the aid of his fellow Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout at the 1806 Battle of Auerstadt. His first contact with Sweden came in 1808 when he entertained several captured Swedish officers before their repatriation. Offsetting this was the embarrassment of seeing the Spanish troops under his command desert and successfully evacuated from Denmark by the Royal Navy. The following year saw Bernadotte’s star further sink when he was again chastised by Napoleon, this time for issuing a bulletin claiming that the

321 Ibid. Pg. 200. 142 victory at the 1809 Battle of Wagram was due chiefly to the troops under his command, an exaggeration that ultimately cost him his command. Thus it was that this capable, experienced, but controversial general was available just as the Swedes were looking at him to fill the role of Crown Prince. From their perspective, Bernadotte appeared the ideal choice, an individual with both ability and ambition, but also one who was not likely to blindly follow the dictates of the Emperor Napoleon. The British perspective, was understandably pessimistic, suspecting that the election of a Frenchman, not to mention a Marshal hand-picked by Bonaparte himself, could hardly be conducive to British interests. It was for this reason that on the 21st of August Admiral Krusenstjerna came abroad the flagship Victory to assure Saumarez that the decision to invite Bernadotte to Sweden should not be seen as an indication of a change in Anglo-Swedish relations and that as Crown Prince, he would place Swedish interests as the forefront. Unable to halt or even delay the election of Bernadotte, it was up to Saumarez to determine Britain’s reaction to these proceedings. He had only his impressions of the Swedish national character and interests as well as his personal trust in the sincerity of Krusenstjerna’s claims that he was accurately relaying the views of his government. At the same time though, Saumarez was well aware that he had the power to cripple the Swedish economy by simply blockading their ports and coastline. More importantly, he knew that the Swedish government appreciated this as well.322 Nonetheless, it was to be expected that assurances offered by the Swedish government notwithstanding, it was inevitable to the election of Bernadotte would lead to closer relations between France and Sweden. At the very least, the presence of Bernadotte might encourage the Swedes to believe that France might support a return of Finland. A far more likely prospect was that France would use the elevation of one of their generals to the Swedish throne as an opportunity to bring that nation into the Continental System and force a permanent sundering with Britain and a declaration of war.323

322 Ryan, Ambassador Afloat, Pg. 248. 323 Ibid. Pg. 249. 143

The New Crown Prince and New Disputes It was on the 21st of August, the same day of Krusenstjerna’s meeting with Saumarez that the Swedish Riksdag had selected Marshal Bernadotte as Crown Prince of Sweden and Commander of the Armies. This confirmed Britain’s worst fears, that Sweden was on the verge of slipping into the French orbit and complete the cycle from friend to enemy. In an act of ill- timing, Saumarez received two reports of clashes between British warships and Sweden that threatened to throw fresh fuel of an already incendiary situation. The first incident occurred in early September when the British cutter Hero while escorting a convoy, spotted a Danish privateer. Setting off in pursuit, the privateer attempted to evade capture by entering Marstrand, a port located in Swedish Pomerania. As a neutral port, the Danish vessel was entitled to sanctuary under international law. Apparently, the captain of the Hero thought otherwise and launched a boat action in to the harbor without prior advising the Governor of his intent. Although successful, the action cost the life of a young midshipman along with several sailors wounded.324 The second involved a Captain Acklom, commanding the 16-gun sloop Ranger. On the 18th of September Acklom boarded the Swedish schooner Celeritas on suspicion that the latter was engaged in an illicit trade. Although he did not seize the ship as a prize, Acklom did order the schooner’s guns be spiked and thrown over the side. Several days later Acklom compounded his “offense” to Swedish interests by entering the Swedish port of Stralsund and seizing the French privateer Wagram. These events placed Saumarez in a difficult dilemma. He could not censure his officers for pursuing and capturing enemy shipping, even when they sought shelter in neutral harbors. On the other hand, such incidents could very well reinvigorate the Anglophobic faction within the Swedish government into renewing their calls for an open alliance with France, especially since that nation had selected one of his Marshals to become Crown Prince.325 At the same time though, the vigilance and aggressiveness with which the British pursued their duty benefited Swedish interests as well as British ones. As Krusentjerna explained to Saumarez in another meeting on board Victory, Danish privateers had become a bane to the Swedish coastal trade and while they had stepped up naval patrols along their western coast,

324 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 211. 325 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 153. 144

Sweden was still looked to the Royal Navy as the primary source of protection. In addition, the Swedish Admiral pointed out that Stralsund had only recently been returned to Swedish control and that the Wagram had been outfitted as a privateer before then. Therefore, Krusentjerna had arrived to pass on his government’s satisfaction of Saumarez’s somewhat mild reprimand of his captains as well as the British Admiral’s assurances that the trade between Sweden and their Pomeranian province could continue unmolested so long the as the ports of the latter would not be used as bases for French privateers.326 This marked another success of Saumarez’s forbearance strategy and his determination that if there was to be break in Anglo-Swedish relations, it will not be of Britain’s doing. Apparently, neither did the Swedes. In his meeting with Saumarez Krusentjerna again passed on his government’s assurances that the selection of the Marshal as Crown Prince did not mark a dramatic shift in their policies towards Britain. Indeed, it seemed as if it was Bernadotte who was going out of his way to adopt to Swedish ways than the other way around. Days after his selection, Bernadotte resigned his French rank and surrendered the title of Prince of Porte Corvo as well as converting to Lutheranism. In deciding to name Bernadotte Crown Prince, Krusentjerna promised that no French influence or pressure had been brought to bear. The Swedish Admiral also offered his private opinion that Bernadotte is, “the only man who, at the head of the Swedish Government, will be capable to oppose the despotic influence of Bonaparte and his agents, to maintain the independence, and promote the true interest of the Swedish nation.”327 As the trading season came to a close though, Saumarez was presented with a unique opportunity to make an impression and possibility influence future events.

Saumarez delivers a Message By mid-October the Baltic Fleet was looking towards the end of that year’s deployment and its return to Britain. Already orders had been issued to the ships stationed at the eastern end of the Great Belt to gather up all remaining commerce in the region and escort them through the Belt. Saumarez’s original plan was to leave for England with the bulk of the fleet while leaving the sail-of-the-line Plantagenet, Minotaur and Africa to escort the last convoy of the year.328 At the same time Saumarez would take Victory from its forward anchorage at Hano Bay, where it

326 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 214. 327 Ibid. Pg. 213. 328 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 156. 145 had deployed as a possible counter to the Russian sortie, and after rendezvousing with Rear- Admiral Reynolds, proceed through the Belt. Before he did, Saumarez had received word that Bernadotte was at Nyborg, Denmark and was preparing the cross the Belt en route to Stockholm and his impending coronation as Crown Prince. The notification was accompanied by a request that the Royal Yacht bearing the soon-to- be Royal personage be allowed to be sail unmolested by the British.329 Resisting the temptation to seize a person who was still, technically, a French citizen and Marshal, Saumarez chose instead to, “make a deep impression.” Gathering up all to trade ships he could, some 1000 sail in all, along with the warships of the fleet, six sail-of-the-line and an equal number of frigates and sloops, and set out in one massive convoy. On the afternoon of the 16th, lookouts onboard Victory spotted the Royal Yacht, distinctly flying the flag of the Swedish Crown, in the distance. Closing to within a mile of each other, no signals were exchanged, nor were salutes offered. Nevertheless, as he sailed through the vast collection of vessels, Bernadotte later confessed that, “it was the most beautiful and wonderful sight he had ever beheld, being one of which he never formed an idea.”330 It was a subtle, but unmistakable display of British naval power as well as the wealth to be had through trade with Britain. Arriving at Vinga Roads on the 18th of October, Saumarez sent the convoy on to England. However, the possibility of a break-out by the Franco-Dutch squadron still in the Scheldt and rumors that the Russians might attempt to move their warships stationed at Archangel into the Baltic required Saumarez to remain behind until all remaining trade ships had vacated the region and enemies’ intentions clarified. It was during this period that Saumarez received an unexpected and, in some ways, inconvenient caller.

The Return (and Departure) of the King After a brief imprisonment following his deposing, Gustavus had traveled through Germany and Russia a bitter, but pathetic figure, trying without success to garner support to reclaim his throne. And while his movements were subject to constant observation by French agents, he was considered not worth the effort of arresting. Eventually, he made his way to

329 Ross, Memoirs. Pg. 215. 330 Ibid. Pg. 215. 146

Russia, where he was regarded as little more than an embarrassment. However, in Sweden the fear was that he might succeed in persuading the Russians to support his return to power and in October of 1810 they formally requested that Gustavus leave Russian soil.331 Making his way to Vinga Sound, Gustavus, now known as Count Gottrup, was received and feted by Saumarez on board the flagship Victory. Not surprisingly, Gustavus’ presence caused some consternation within the Swedish government, particularly those who recalled that as far as the British government was concerned, Gustavus was still the legitimate ruler of the nation. It was now Saumarez’s turn to offer assurances and convey the informal policies of his government, To Count Rosen, Governor of Gothenburg, Saumarez confided that Gustavus’ presence should not be seen as an attempt to undermine relations with the current Swedish government by supporting Gustavus’ return to power. Indeed, Saumarez informed Rosen that it was Gustavus’ intention to sail to England and that he would be transported there not in a majestic sail-of-the-line, but rather in the bomb vessel Tartarus. This seemed to satisfy the Swedes, who made no further comment on the matter. Arriving in Yarmouth on the 12th of November, Gustavus was given a hero’s welcome, and praised for his loyalty and courage in standing up to the “Corsican Ogre”. In the minds of the British public at least, Gustavus’ moods and tempers, as well as the frustrations and consternations generated by his obsessive desire to champion the Divine Right of Kings and the former monarch basked in the adoration and appreciation that he never received at home. The official response, was far more circumspect. Francis Pierrepont, the Former Ambassador to Sweden, was recalled to duty and sent to inquire as to what, if any plans the ex- king had for the future. To Pierrepont’s relief Gustavus assured him that he only desire was to live in exile in Britain and recover from the personal and political exertions of the past few years and that he had no intention of causing his hosts any inconvenience or embarrassment. However, it appears that Gustavus could not resist one last contrary impulse. Soon after Pierrepont completed his mission, Gustavus, without the consent of either King George III or the British government, traveled to London and insisted on a formal audience. He was received by a reluctant, but gracious Foreign Minister Wellesley, which in turn, raised fears in Stockholm that the British might be conspiring with Gustavus for a return to power. It was now the turn of the

331 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 185. 147

British government to placate the informal representative of the Swedish government, G. M von Rehausen, a former Consul now living with his British wife. Wellesley confirmed that Gustavus’ trip was neither arranged nor sought after and that there was no desire within the British government to alter their relations with Sweden. In any event, Gustavus, like the proverbial restless frog, did not remain in Britain and by March of 1811 he again returned to the continent.332

Sweden Declares War…Sort Of On the 2nd of November, Bernadotte arrived in Stockholm and was greeted with wild adoration by the public. Three days later, he received a similar greeting by the Riksdag of the Estates, during which he was formally adopted by King Charles XIII and confirmed as Crown Prince of Sweden. As he promised previously, Bernadotte officially renounced his French citizenship as well as all military rank and title and converted to the Lutheran religion. Ten days after this the worst fears of the British were seemingly confirmed when Sweden formally declared war on Britain. The genesis of Sweden’s declaration began the previous month when Lagerbjelke, on his second assignment as Swedish Ambassador to France, was summoned to an audience with the Emperor.333 Concerned perhaps that Bernadotte’s tendency towards independence might make him less inclined to serve as a French puppet and aware of Sweden’s continuing relations with Britain, Napoleon presented the Swedish government with an ultimatum: either declare war on Britain or find herself again at war against France and her allies. By now the image of France as Sweden’s savior against British perfidy and interference had long since run its course and within the halls of the Swedish government there were few, if any, ministers who enthusiastically supported the French point of view, not even Bernadotte, who had significantly excused himself from the 15 November proceedings. During their deliberations, the prevailing concern was not what France could do to Sweden should they reject Napoleon’s ultimatum, but rather what Russia might do on behalf of their French ally. The Russo-Swedish frontier was still dangerously vulnerable, not to mention uncomfortably close to the Swedish capital. In addition, while the Royal Navy had proved itself

332 Ibid. Pg. 186. 333 Ryan, “An Ambassador Afloat,” Pg. 249. 148 capable of protecting Sweden from an invasion from the south and west, British warships could not stop a Russian invasion. Finally, with the Baltic Fleet preparing to depart home waters for the winter, there would no outside support in the event of war. As Ryan observes, “in yielding to the ultimatum, Sweden yielded not to the coercive power of France but to that of Russia.”334 In the end, the dominant view was that a declaration of war against England was the lesser of two evils and the only means by which Sweden could retain its independence. Despite this, it was hoped that somehow the informal arrangement with Britain that had been worked out during the course of the year might still be salvaged. As soon as he became aware of the Swedish declaration, Saumarez sent his Flag-Lieutenant John Ross to confer with the Governor of Gothenberg, Count von Rosen. Through Rosen, Saumarez was informed that the declaration of war was not based on any offense or grievance offered by England. Rather, it was due solely to the pressure brought on by France and their desire to avoid a renewal of hostilities with Russia. As such, although Sweden was formally at war with Britain, the Swedish had no intention initiating any hostilities against that nation.335 One particular point insisted upon by Napoleon was that all British ships and property found on Swedish soil were to be seized and confiscated. However, Rosen pointed out that since April, Swedish ports had been closed to British shipping, (conveniently overlooking the fact that throughout the year, scores, if not hundreds of British ships had indeed entered Swedish harbors under no more elaborate disguise of a neutral flag.) and they anticipated few, if any ships affected by Sweden’s change in status. Nevertheless, Rosen assured Saumarez that any British merchant ships still in Swedish waters after the departure of the Baltic Fleet would detained rather than seized and that British merchants and their property would not be disturbed. Another point that Rosen made concerned the imported goods known as colonial produce. Officially Rosen declared that a sufficient amount of colonial produce had been brought into the country to satisfy Sweden’s internal consumption and that in accordance with the Continental System, Sweden could neither import any more nor pass on such goods to the European continent. At the same time, Rosen pointed out that under the French system no such prohibition applied to American vessels. Therefore, Rosen believed that once trade resumed in

334 Ibid. Pg. 249. 335 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 163. 149

1811, neutral vessels would be free to import colonial goods to Sweden who would, in turn, pass on any surplus to the continent. The significance of this point becomes apparent with the recollection that as recently as 1809 British vessels were entering Swedish ports flying neutral flags, including that of the United States. This all but assured the British that Sweden’s willingness to accept “neutral” vessels at face value, regardless of that ship’s homeport. Another point concerned the English packet mail system. Since the closure of the Danish port of Husum in 1807, the British mail packet service had been routed through the Swedish port of Gothenburg. Rosen promised that when trade resumed in 1811, British mail packets would be free to resume their schedule, albeit with some precautions that could be worked out later. Saumarez was not the only recipient of Swedish assurances. A prominent British merchant residing in Gothenburg, one Mr. Johnson, was summoned to an audience with Governor Rosen, and was informed that despite the declaration of war, Anglo-Swedish relations would remain the same as they had been over the previous six months and that he and his fellow merchants need have any fear of seeing their goods or property taken from them.336 Another Englishman residing in Sweden, George Foy received a similar message directly from the Swedish Foreign Minister, Lars von Engestrom albeit in a verbal format unaccompanied by a formal written document.337 Finally, there was von Rehausen who, in his capacity as unofficial Swedish Ambassador to Britain, explained to Foreign Minister Wellesley that the declaration of war was not a consequence of the elevation of Bernadotte and that Sweden had no intention of following up their declaration of war with actual hostilities unless the British initiated it.338 So far, the British only had the verbal promises made by a variety of Swedish officials that the declaration of war was a mere formality, rather than the beginning of a new war, against a new enemy. Skeptics could point to the presence of notorious Francophiles such as Lagerbjelke and Engstrom holding important and influential positions within the Swedish government and the figure of the former King of Sweden, removed in part because of his enthusiastic support of the Anglo-Swedish alliance, now an exile living on English soil. Finally, they could point to the French Marshal turned Crown Prince of Sweden as proof that that Baltic

336 Ibid. Pg. 163. 337 FO 73/65 Foy to Smith 9 May, 1811. 338 Ryan, “Ambassador Afloat” Pg. 251. 150 nation was only biding its time, awaiting the best opportunity to inflict the most damage on English strategic interests. However, this view was not shared by those Englishmen who had had prolonged contact with Swedish people, or understood the extraordinary pressures faced by Sweden as it struggled to maintain its independence and integrity during this struggle between giants. Foremost among their number was James Saumarez, who was convinced of the fundamental character of the Swedish people and appreciation of the Swedish government of the practical value of good relations with Britain and the subsequent disaster that would befall the nation if that relationship were to come to an end. And he could point to physical evidence of Swedish non-belligerence. Before his departure on the 3rd of December, Saumarez concluded that the Swedish Navy at least, was showing no signs of imminent hostility. He notes that the thirty-three oared gunboats that made up the bulk of the naval force in Western Sweden had been hauled out of the water and were largely dismantled, leaving only a pair of brigs to patrol the coastline and deter Danish privateers still based in Norway. To be certain, to the officers left behind to maintain the Vinga Sound anchorage over the coming winter months, Saumarez left instructions to maintain a state of vigilance and to resist any attack launched against him, but that he was “not on any account to commence hostilities against the Swedish flag of the trade of that country until you receive orders for that purpose.”339 Finally, there was Sweden. Again, it was only a few years before that a Baltic nation with a small, but creditable navy and the potential of severely disrupting British trade in the region was seen as edging closer to an alliance with France. Indeed, in Sweden’s case that was all but a certainty once it became apparent that a French Marshal would become that next ruler of that nation. However, rather than embarking on a preemptive strike similar to the 1807 attack on Copenhagen, a policy of forbearance, of accepting Swedish platitudes at face value rather than forcing compliance was adopted. Rather than formal, written treaties, Britain and Sweden were instead bound by mutual interests and practical concerns as well as the levels of personal trust built over a daily basis between Admiral James Saumarez and certain individuals with the Swedish government, none with the authority to make policy, but rather its execution. It is ironic

339 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 165. 151 that as an “enemy,” Sweden had proved herself more loyal and trustworthy than she ever did as an ally.

152

CHAPTER 8

BRITAIN VS. DENMARK

As a result of the British assault on Copenhagen in 1807, the Royal Danish Navy had effectively ceased to exist. However, the Danes remained determined to defend their territorial waters from those whom they considered enemies. First and foremost on that list of enemies were the English, who were expected to sail hundreds, if not thousands of vessels through their waters in pursuit of trade. To prevent that the Danes had a handful of warships, those that had escaped the disaster at Copenhagen and several hundred merchant ships, many of whom could be armed and converted into privateers. Also at their disposal was a type of warship that had been common in the Baltic, but until recently rarely used by the Danes, the oared galley. Deployed in flotillas of up to several dozen, these galleys presented the Royal Navy with a most unexpected challenge. Across the North Sea, the British Admiralty, to their credit, appeared to have anticipated some measure of difficulties facing them. In addition to stately sail-of-the-line and agile frigates, there were also numerous smaller vessels commonly used for convoy escort and inshore patrolling, among them no less than seventeen gun-brigs. With their shallow draft and carronade armament, it was believed that the gun-brig was the ideal counter to the Danish galley threat. The reality though was quite different. As for the fleet commander, despite having a distinguished career and reputation for competence and aggressiveness, it seemed as if Sir James Saumarez was destined for obscurity. In his biography of British commanders, Nicholas Tracy focused on Saumarez’s career as a post- captain while Alfred Thayer Mahan concluded that Saumarez’s military career peaked at the 1801 Battle of Algerciras and that, “he was never again engaged in serious encounter with the enemy.”340 Only Saumarez’s biographer, Sir John Ross341, addresses the admiral’s period as

340 Alfred Thayer Mahan Types of Naval officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy (New York) Books for Libraries Press 1969. Pg. 421. 153 commander of the Baltic Fleet, largely because he had served as Saumarez’s flag lieutenant, translator and spymaster. After a year as second-in-command of the Channel Fleet, Saumarez was given the choice between commanding British ships in the Indian Ocean or the reorganized Baltic Fleet. Although the former was far more lucrative in terms of prize money, Saumarez thought that such a distant station might prove harmful to his health and accordingly, chose the Baltic assignment.342 In contrast to his predecessor Gambier, Saumarez’s record was one of boldness and aggression. However, in keeping with the murky British understanding of Baltic politics, Saumarez’s instructions were a convoluted combination of offense and defense. He was to reestablish the blockade of Zealand and prevent the transfer of troops and supplies there. He was also to secure the Sound, preventing the French and Danes from invading Sweden. Although he was authorized to seek out and attack Russian men-at-war, and to keep Russian movements in Finland under observation, this was considered a secondary objective and not to be attempted at the risk of exposing Sweden to invasion.343 Finally, written as “one of the principal objects of the service in which you are employed,”344 Saumarez was to provide protection to ships engaged in commerce, despite the fact that with the exception of Sweden, the Baltic was closed to British shipping. Rather, that trade was to be conducted by ships flying neutral colors and possessing British licenses authorizing them to conduct trade. He was to organize and protect convoys sailing from the Swedish port of Gothenburg, through the Sound and into the Baltic. Officially, British ships were only permitted as far as Gothenburg, which would serve as a collection point for all Baltic cargos bound for Britain. Unofficially, Saumarez’s protection also extended to British ships engaged in smuggling operations, an activity that violated not only the French Continental System, but the British Orders in Council as well. In March of 1808, before his departure from British waters, Saumarez was given an additional assignment; that of escorting Sir John Moore’s 10,000-man corps to Sweden. Once landed, Saumarez was expected to cooperate with both Moore and Swedish authorities and

341 As well as future polar explorer. 342 Sir James Ross, Memoirs and correspondence of Admiral Lord De Saumarez (London) 1838. Pg. 99. 343 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 11-13. 344 Ibid., Pg. 13. 154 provide such support as was possible without compromising his other responsibilities.345 It was a daunting set of tasks, requiring not only combat expertise, but administrative, diplomatic and political skills as well and all from an officer whose reputation had been that of a “fighting” sailor rather than as a diplomat or executive.

Opening Shots As previously mentioned, when Gambier departed the Baltic in October of 1807, a small squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats remained behind to maintain the blockade of Zealand and secure the Sound. After a few cruises the weather had turned so foul as to compel the squadron to retire to the Vinga Roads346 anchorage, where in February of 1808 they were locked in by ice.347 However, this changed when in February 1808 the last of the Danish Navy’s sail-of-the- line the 68-gun Prins Christian Fredrik emerged from its Norwegian sanctuary at Kristiansand and began making its way towards the Copenhagen Sound, perhaps to cover the Danish invasion of Sweden. The Danish warship came perilously close to striking a near-fatal blow to the Anglo- Swedish alliance when it came upon and very nearly captured the frigate Quebec (32), which unknown to the Danes was transporting the British subsidy to Sweden, over two million pounds sterling. With the Baltic Fleet still being assembled the Admiralty ordered two of the North Sea Fleet’s 64’s Stately and Nassau into Danish waters and reinforce Vanguard, which itself had just been freed from its icy prison.348 On March 20th, another Danish warship, the 20-gun brig Lougen, came upon the smaller British brig Childers (14) while the latter was securing a small vessel. Launched in 1778, Childers was the oldest ship of her type in the Royal Navy and was not the fittest ship in the fleet, for as her commander admitted, “I was suddenly seized with a fit of despair,” over his commanding a “rotten vessel.” However, his opinion of the crew was higher and that, “it was more manly to trust my fate rather than make difficulties.”349 In addition, Childers was armed with the powerful, but short-ranged 12-pounder carronades.

345 Ibid. Pg. 14. 346 Also referred to as Wingo Sound or Hawke Roads. 347 Peter Kemp Nine Vanguards (London) Hutchinson & Co. 1951. Pg. 175. 348 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 322. 349 Dean King ed. Every Man Will Do His Duty: An Anthology of First-Hand Accounts from the Age of Nelson (London) Conway Maritime Press, 1999. Pg. 197. 155

The opening shots were not fired until after sunset, and in the darkness both ships had only gun flashes to aim by. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that Lougen, with its armament of 18-pounder long guns, enjoyed the advantage of firepower. After initially closing in order to bring his guns to bear, Childers’ captain soon realized that he was in danger of being caught dangerously close to a hostile, unknown coast. Accordingly, the British ship increased the range, but remained in the fight. The two ships continued to exchange broadsides, with the elderly Childers receiving the worst of it, with seven shots hitting below the waterline, flooding the ship’s magazine.350 However, in what would become a familiar pattern, Lougen appeared reluctant to close the range and around two in the morning, broke off the action and retired into the darkness. Although claiming victory, Childers had sustained serious damage and casualties, along with two dead and nine wounded, the captain being included among the latter.351 A more clear-cut British victory occurred two days later when Prins Christian Frederik came upon Stately and Nassau off Zealand Point. Unable to escape, the Danish warship nevertheless engaged both British ships until 2100, when the latter drew off for repairs. The reprieve proved all too short as the two ships, this time reinforced by the frigate Quebec renewed the engagement. The battle finally ended when Prins Christian ran aground while attempting to disengage. Now immobile, and with enemies closing in at 2230 the Danish captain ordered the ship’s colors struck and surrendered. Danish losses were heavy, with one-third of the crew either killed or wounded. The following morning the British attempted to re-float the ship and take her home as a prize. But when Danish field artillery were spotted preparing to open fire the decision was made to burn Prins Christian’s and destroy her. The British made their presence felt in the waters off of Norway as well. On the 23rd of April the sloops Daphne (22), Tartarus (16) and the gun-brig Forward (12) captured a Danish vessel loaded with supplies for Norway. Learning that it had been part of a convoy then lying at anchor near the port of Flodstrand, it was decided to send in a “cutting-out” operation using boats from all three ships. Attacking two nights later, the British raiding party discovered some ten vessels of various sizes, all loaded with grain and provisions, lying beneath a small fort

350 Ibid. 209. 351 Andersen, Baltic Pg. 323. 156 equipped with ten cannon. In the darkness, the panic-stricken Danes abandoned their ships and despite heavy fire from the land, the British sailors took control of the entire convoy and worked them out of the harbor.352 Less successful was the 32-gun frigate Tartar, which was assigned the task of patrolling the many inlets and fjords of the Norwegian coastline, perfect havens for not only Danish warships and privateers, but those of her allies as well. Receiving a report that a Dutch frigate was sheltering in Bergen harbor, instead they found three privateers taking on supplies. On the evening of the 12th of May, the ship’s captain led a force of boats on a cutting-out expedition into the harbor. Unfortunately, the raid was detected and repelled and while returning to open sea, Tartar came under attack by a schooner and five large boats each armed with one 24-pounder cannon. Although able to sink one of the frail gunboats, Tartar was herself badly damaged with eleven holes fired into the ship’s hull. Casualties were low, with two dead and several wounded, but among the fatalities was the ship’s captain. One British warship, the 22-gun sloop Falcon enjoyed a particularly successful patrol along the northern entrance of the Danish waterway known as the Great Belt. On the 27th of April boats operating from the warship staged a cutting-out expedition on a group of small craft lying in the shallow waters between the islands of Endelau and Thuno and four days later pursued and almost captured a large schooner attempting to carry supplies to Norway. On the 7th of May another cutting-out expedition rowed into the fortified harbor of Lundholm, located on the island of Samso.353 There they discovered two large merchant ships, capturing one and putting the other one to the torch. Both had been loaded with war supplies, including some fifty heavy cannon.354 For the British, the destruction of Prins Christian Frederik completed what had begun the previous September, the elimination of the Royal Danish Navy as a threat to Britain. In addition, the capture of the convoy effectively isolated Norway from Denmark, splitting the kingdom in two. From the standards of naval warfare familiar to British , the absence of major enemy warships all but ensured British naval supremacy save for the handful of Danish frigates and smaller ships still at large. In addition, the return of British warships to the Danish Sound forced the Danes to postpone their planned invasion of Sweden indefinitely as they shifted their

352 James, Naval History, Vol. V, 353 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 324. 354 ADM 1/6 Falcon to Saumarez 15 May 1808. 157 shipping to ports along the Great Belt. As for Bernadotte’s corps, although they had finally been given permission to enter Danish territory, they were left languishing on the various islands of the Danish Belt. Thus, it must have seemed that the objectives of the Baltic Fleet had been secured even before that fleet proper had arrived on station. Unfortunately, as the events of the summer of 1808 would prove, that would not be the case.

The British arrive in Sweden. Even as the situation in Finland was reaching its climax in April of 1808, the first ships of the reconstituted Baltic Fleet, now under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, were arriving in Swedish waters. In addition to the flagship Victory, the squadron consisted of the 74-gun sail-of-the-line Audacious, Brunswick, Centaur (flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood,) Implacable, Goliath, Mars, Orion, Pompee, Superb (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats,) and Vanguard, along with the 64-gun Africa, Dictator, Nassau and Stately. Supporting the sail-of-the-line ships and to hunt down privateers Saumarez had at his disposal five frigates the 38-gun Africanne and Euryalus, the 36-gun Salsette, Tartar and Tribune and the 6th Rate frigate Daphne (28). For patrols and convoy protection were the sloops Daphne (28), Prometheus (26) Lynx and Ranger (24) and the ship-brigs Hound and Falcon (22). There was even a bomb vessel Devastation, in the event it was needed. Finally, the fleet had no less than seventeen of the increasingly ubiquitous gun-brigs: the 16-gun Cruizer, Kite, Magnet, and Seagull, as well as the smaller, twelve-gun Constant, Snipe, Exertion, Charger, Urgent, Piercer, Tygress, Wrangler, Minx, Forward, Exertion, Tickler, and Turbulent. With their flat-bottoms and shallow draft, the gun-brigs were considered ideal for the waters of the Danish archipelago while their armament of 18-pound carronades provided an impressive amount of firepower for ships their size. In addition, most gun-brigs were equipped with side-ports so that in the event of dead calm, sweeps could be run out and provide some degree of maneuver, although doing so would prevent use of the broadside guns and limit the gun-brig to the pair of 24-pound bow-chasers. Ostensibly, the “general rendezvous”355 of the Baltic Fleet was Gothenburg, the second- largest port in Sweden and center of the Anglo-Swedish trade. In fact however, the fleet “base” was at Vinga Sound, an open anchorage located some 20 miles offshore. While lacking in

355 Ross, Saumarez, Pg. 101. 158 support facilities and exposed to bad weather, Vinga was less than a day’s sail to the northern entrance to the Baltic, the Skaw, Thus, Saumarez could keep the bulk of the fleet at Vinga ready to move into the Sound in the event of invasion, while keeping his sail-of-the-line safe from Danish harassment. In the interim, Saumarez could keep the Sound secure using light warships. Perhaps more importantly, by anchoring at Vinga, Saumarez lessened the impact the British presence would have on Swedish politics, in particular the anti-British faction within the government that still sought a severing of relations with Britain and neutrality was in Sweden’s best interests. Even the supplies and provisions required by the fleet would be transported from England rather than purchased from local markets. Saumarez arrived at Gothenburg on the 7th of May, the same day that news arrived of the “treacherous conspiracy” surrounding the fall of Sveaborg.356 Undeterred, Saumarez met with the new British Ambassador to Sweden, Edward Thornton and the naval aide of King Gustavus IV, Saloman von Rajalin. Together they formulated a division of responsibility and cooperative strategy that was both flexible and served both nations’ interests. The Baltic Fleet would concentrate their efforts to the western coast of Sweden and Norway along with keeping open the Danish Sound and entrance to the Baltic as the British had, “greater interest in these points than in common times the Swedes would have.”357 Meanwhile, the eastern coast of the country, the upper Baltic and in particular the waters around Finland would be left to the Swedish Navy. Of all the individuals who left their mark on Anglo-Swedish relations during this time period, Saumarez’s was both unique and influential. Ross writes that Saumarez’s conduct, “was such as to deserve and obtain the high approbation of the government, and the people of both Great Britain and Sweden,”358 while Ryan described the Admiral’s policies as “firm, yet invariably tactful…and to an understanding also of the assurance with which he moved through the tangled politics of the north.”359 The Swedish historian Christer Jorgensen states that, “these naval expeditions succeeded…was due, to a great extent, to the diplomatic skills of Admiral Sir James Saumarez.”360 Unlike his fellow Britons, Saumarez had a high opinion of the Swedes and while the nature of the relationship between the two countries changed radically in accordance to

356 Ryan, The Saumarez Papers, Pg. 14. 357 Ibid. 21. 358 Ross, Saumarez, 106. 359 Anthony Ryan, “An Ambassador Afloat: Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez and the Swedish Court 1808-1812.” 360 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 151. 159 the shifting tide of events, his view did not. It was consistency that resonated with even the most Anglo-phobic Swede and ensured a correct, if not cordial relationship.

Dangerous Passages Even as the clash between Moore and King Gustavus was reaching its peak, the Anglo- Danish Gunboat War began with a series of engagements that challenged British naval confidence and showed that although despite being deprived of their ships of war, the Royal Danish Navy was still a formidable and dangerous opponent. On the 4th of June the gun-brig Tickler (14) was patrolling at the southern entrance of the Great Belt near the island of Langeland when she was engaged by a half-dozen oared galleys which were taking advantage of calm conditions to begin maneuvering around the now- immobilized British warship. Thus, when the engagement began in mid-afternoon, Tickler was heavily out-gunned, with only a pair of bow-chasers able to reply. One of the first to fall was the ship’s commander and although attempts were made to bring a broadside to bear using a ledge anchor and sweeps after four and half hours the ship was forced to surrender. Although the captain was the only fatality, another eleven were wounded, almost a quarter of the ship’s total complement.361 Five days later a convoy of seventy merchantmen departed the Swedish port of Malmo bound for England by way of the Danish Sound. The convoy boasted a rather significant escort consisting on the gun-brigs Charger, Piercer and Turbulent along with the bomb vessel Thunder. No sooner had the ships entered the strait separating Copenhagen from the Swedish mainland did the wind fail, stranding the convoy. Taking advantage of the situation some twenty-one galleys and seven mortar boats sailed out of Copenhagen harbor and attacked. Stationed at the rear of the convoy, Turbulent was isolated and subjected to concentrated attack, although Thunder tried the unusual tactic of firing grapeshot from her mortar, with little effect. After a three-hour engagement, Turbulent was captured along with a dozen merchantmen, although by the time the Danes were in position to attack Thunder, the wind had picked up and the advantage shifted to the British, whereupon the Danes withdrew. More was to come. On the 19th of June the brig-sloop Seagull (16) was on patrol off the Norwegian coast when attacked by the Danish brig Lougen (20). After twenty minutes of

361 ADM 1/5388 Loss of Tickler. 160 exchanging broadsides the Danish ship received assistance in the form of six oared galleys from the nearby port of Kristiansand. Again, the wind fell away and the Danes were able to subject Seagull to punishing broadsides from both bow and stern. After two hours further fighting and with the ship in sinking condition, Seagull’s captain was forced to surrender, although in the subsequent court-martial the ship’s commander was commended for his bravery and promoted to Post-Captain.362 As for Seagull, the Danes managed to salvage the vessel and taking a page from the Royal Navy, put the ship into their navy’s service. Within the space of one month, the Royal navy had lost three separate engagements, losing three of their warships in the process. Even worse, their carefully laid-out system of convoys was in jeopardy, along with the trade that was the island nation’s lifeline. It was a creditable accomplishment for a supposedly impotent navy, and more was to come. On the 2nd of August, the gun-brig Tygress had been carrying dispatches through the Great Belt when she was immobilized by the periodic calms common to the region. While riding at anchor, lookouts spotted a force of sixteen Danish galleys approaching from nearby island of Langeland. Cutting her cable, Tygress’ crew sought to take advantage of every brief gust to take the ship towards the nearest friendly vessel, the 74-gun Edgar. However, when the breeze again died, the crew was left with no alternative but to fight. After an hour’s cannonade which accounted for a fifth of the crew, Tygress struck her colors, making her the fourth British warship to surrender to the unconventional Danish Navy. When the fleet was initially deployed, a half-dozen oared galleys seized from the Danes the previous year were towed in as well, possibly to guard the fleet anchorage at Vinga Sound. However, in the wake of the Danish attacks in June, Saumarez saw them as a possible answer, directing that all convoys entering the Baltic would be escorted by at least one of these “guardboats.”363 Unfortunately, there were not enough British galleys to pose a sufficient deterrent. Another possible solution was to deploy some of his sail-of-the-line ships, or at least the smaller, shallower 64’s into the Great Belt where they could provide direct support for the ships on patrol and as a deterrent to the Danish galleys. In fact, just the opposite occurred as the Danes, filled with confidence by their recent victories, eagerly sought larger prey.

362 ADM 1/5390 Loss of Seagull 363 ADM 2/1960 Saumarez: Standing Instructions 161

The first major warship to experience the attack of the Danish galleys was HMS Dictator (64). On June 26th the ship was on station outside of Kioge Bay when set upon by six of the oared vessels. At first the ship fired a series of long-range broadsides in an attempt to keep the galleys at bay. However, in the light winds Dictator found it difficult to retain maneuverability and several of the Danish vessels were able to work around the larger ship’s stern, from where they subjected Dictator to punishing raking broadsides. It was only the appearance of a convoy, and the long-range fire of the escorts that allowed Dictator to extricate itself. Although casualties were low, with one sailor killed and two wounded, the damage to the ship was serious, with sails and rigging badly cut up and several shot holes along the waterline.364 Somewhat luckier was the veteran HMS Africa, which on August 18th was attacked by a dozen galleys while on patrol off the entrance to Copenhagen harbor. Prudently, the ship’s captain withdrew into the Swedish harbor at Malmo and found shelter beneath the port’s gun batteries. In all, the summer of 1808 was a difficult one for the Royal Navy, with the activities of the Danish galley flotillas proving far more challenging than the British anticipated. Already Saumarez had been forced to detail his scarce and valuable sail-of-the-line into the Danish straits as a support of their patrolling gun-brigs. Considering Denmark’s long-standing emphasis on “traditional” warships like sail-of-the-line and frigates, the success of their oared galleys was as ironic as it was effective. Nevertheless, the Danes continued their attempts to acquire major warships. The Danish and French governments signed an agreement in which the latter transferred two 74-gun sail-of- the-line under construction in Holland to Denmark on the provision that the Danes produce the crews. This was accomplished by simply recruiting from the large body of merchant sailors left unemployed since the declaration of war. Unfortunately, when the crews reached the Scheldt shipyard the river entrance was being blockaded by British warships, whereupon the French revoked their agreement and reassumed control of the two ships. Over the next three years two more attempts were made to acquire sail-of-the-line, only to be frustrated by French bureaucracy and/or British diligence before the crews finally returned to Denmark.365

364 ADM 53/406 Ship’s Log Dictator26 June 1808. 365 Anderson, Baltic Pg. 337. 162

“Saving Spaniards from Drowning” Before Moore left Sweden he forwarded to Saumarez a report that as a result of Napoleon’s arrest and deposing of the King of Spain an insurrection had begun and had already spread to the provinces. Although there were doubts that such a plan could possibly succeed, Saumarez was directed to assist “the escape of the Spanish army from its present perilous position.”366 The troops in question belonged to the Spanish division assigned to Bernadotte’s corps. With an estimated strength of between 6000 to 7000 men, they were stationed on several of the eastern islands of the Danish archipelago. Although Thornton and Moore remained skeptical, Saumarez believed that evacuation was possible if a sufficient number of Danish vessels could be seized and pressed into service as makeshift transports.367 However, that was not the only demand facing the Baltic Fleet. In mid-July Saumarez received word that the Swedish King had, in yet another of his impulsive decisions, left Stockholm to join his battle fleet then operating off the Finnish port of Hango and requested that the British Admiral come to his support. Given Moore’s recent experience, Saumarez feared that he too might be drawn into some sort of misadventure.368 Nevertheless, Saumarez felt obliged to provide some support to the Swedish Navy and so dispatched Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood’s squadron into the Baltic and attach itself to the Swedish Fleet. This would allow Saumarez to remain at Vinga and continue his primary task of keeping access to the Baltic open. Meanwhile, although Canning had entrusted one of his favorites to make the initial contact with the Spanish, British Minister of War Lord Castlereagh instead recommended, at the suggestion of Sir Arthur Wellesley that the mission be entrusted to Father James Robertson. It was believed that Robertson, an Irish Catholic priest, would be better able to gain the trust of the Spanish rather than a Protestant British officer. Arriving on the island of Heligoland on the 6th of June, Robertson was transported to the German coast by a friendly trader although it took several attempts and close encounters with French coastal patrols and revenue agents before he could make contact with the first of several

366 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 31. 367 Ibid. Pg. 30. 368 Ibid. 32. 163 friendly merchants that would convey him to his destination, the town of Nyborg and headquarters to the commander of the Spanish contingent, the Marquis de la Romana.369 Posing as a merchant bearing gifts of chocolate and cigars, Robertson was able to secure an audience with de la Romana. At first Robertson’s assertion that he was a British agent was met with some suspicion by the Spanish aristocrat who thought he was a French agent testing his loyalty. However, the priest’s recalling of a mutual associate and his accurate description was enough to satisfy the Spanish General, although he was deeply concerned over the possibility of word leaking out their meeting and demanded assurances that Robertson had not revealed the intent of his mission 370 In a subsequent meeting de la Romana was informed of the Spanish King’s arrest and that Napoleon had turned over the Spanish throne to his brother Joseph. Although expressing the view the he and the majority of his officers and men had grown weary of their French service and were willing to be repatriated to Spain, but that because of the effectiveness of the British blockade, his command had been dispersed among the various islands as well as the Danish mainland and that he doubted that it was possible to evacuate his entire force.”371 Having confirmed the willingness of the Spanish to evacuate, Robertson next had to make contact with one of the British warships patrolling just off shore. This proved more difficult that it first seemed and at one point, Robertson had been taken captive by a Danish patrol.372 Eventually, he was able to catch the attention of the Navy and by the 28th of July Robertson was on board Victory and reported that not only were the Spanish awaiting rescue, but that the suspicious French had dispatched troops to cow their allies back into submission.373 Therefore, Saumarez directed Rear-Admiral Richard Keats, with the 74-gun sail-of-the-line Superb (Flagship), Edgar and Brunswick along with the ship-brig Hound, gun-brigs Kite and Minx and the bomb vessel Devastation374 to look into how an evacuation of Spanish troops might be affected. As the troops were dispersed amongst several of the Danish islands, this appeared to have required several evacuation efforts, each one requiring a given number of ships and running an

369 Alexander Fraser Ed. Narrative of a Secret Mission to the Danish Islands in 1808 by Rev. James Robertson (London) 1863. Pg. 18-36. 370 Ibid. 71. 371 Ibid. 77. 372 Ibid. Pg. 86. 373 Ryan Saumarez Papers, Pg. 36. 374 ADM 1/6 Saumarez to Keats 2 Aug. 1808. 164 increasing risk of detection by the French or Danes. However, Keats came up with the imaginative solution of evacuating the garrisons from several of the smaller islands and shift them to Nyborg, using shipping seized from the various Danish fishing villages. From that point the squadron could evacuate the Spanish troops en masse.375 Starting on the evening of the 9th of August, parties of British sailors and marines began landing on several of more isolated of Danish islands, remaining just long enough to take into possession whatever fishing boats, small coastal vessels and ferries that could be used to carry troops. Meanwhile, the Spanish took possession of Nyborg, along with its small flotilla of oared galleys. The largest of the operations occurred at Langeland in which several score vessels were seized, along with the 18-gun brig Fama and the 12-gun cutter Salorman, both of which were bought into Royal Navy service376 and while losses were light, they did include the commanding lieutenant, Superb’s second officer. In all, Keats’ ships evacuated 9275 Spanish soldiers, including de la Romana and his headquarters staff.377 Left behind were the corps horses and artillery. Also left behind were some 4000 men stationed on Zealand and Jutland, deployed too far away to make evacuation practicable.378 As a bonus, Keats reported that de la Romana informed him of Danish plans to fortify several of their islands in order to further hinder passage through their Great Belt. Saumarez was effusive in his praise of his subordinate, complementing Keats, “in the important service you have rendered to the country in extricating the Spanish troops from being any longer in the power of the enemy.”379 In assessing the impact of the Spanish evacuation, Ryan suggests that it ruined Bernadotte’s army and contributed to “the deliverance of western Sweden from the enemy threat.”380 Jorgensen agreed that without the Spanish, “Bernadotte did not really have an army worthy of the name,” while also demonstrating that the Baltic theater did not exist in an isolated vacuum, but rather was part of the greater war against Napoleonic France.381

375 ADM 1/7 Keats to de la Romana 5, 7 Aug. 376 However, rather than being brought to England for reequipping and over hall, both vessels remained in the Baltic, retaining their original armament. Rif Winfield British Warship in the Age of Sail 1793-1817 (London) Pgs. 321, 367. 377 ADM 1/7 Saumarez to Admiralty 19 Aug. 1808. 378 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 113. 379 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 40. 380 Ryan, An Ambassador Alfoat, Pg. 241. 381 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish Pg. 149. 165

Not sharing this opinion was the Swedish nobility who as always viewed British actions with the darkest of suspicions. In their eyes, the evacuation of Spanish troops, like the abrupt withdrawal of Moore’s army, had less to do with protecting Sweden than it did furthering British interests and opportunities elsewhere. Making his displeasure felt was the Governor of Gothenburg who, as he did with Moore, refused to allow Spanish evacuees to disembark in his port, even temporarily. Reinforcing such beliefs were reports of Canning, through his Ambassador, was urgently urging Gustavus to negotiate a peace treaty with the Russians, even if it meant yielding Finland to the invaders. Although they themselves were opposed to the war, the nobles suspected that the real intent of the perfidious British was to secure a separate peace with Russia at the expense of Sweden. As one noble sarcastically observed, the British were less interested in fighting the Russian Navy than they were “fishing Spaniards out of the water.”382 Such sentiments were not only self-serving, but were also inaccurate. By indulging in their anti-British, anti-monarchial rhetoric, the Swedish nobility conveniently overlooked the fact that by removing the Spanish, Saumarez was not only serving British interests, but Swedish ones as well. In addition, even as Keats was completing his mission, another squadron under Sir Samuel Hood was entering the Baltic intending to rendezvous with the Swedish Navy and confront the Russian Baltic Fleet. Finally, with the evacuation completed, Saumarez was now free to join Hood.383

Closing Shots While the number of attacks by the Danish galleys on British convoys declined during the fall, they did not cease. Although the evacuation of the Spanish troops took the galley flotillas by surprise, they remained alert to any opportunity to attack their enemy. To be certain, the gunboats did not win every engagement. Under conditions where there was sufficient wind to maneuver, it was the British who could dictate the conditions of battle, while even moderate- sized waves could ruin the galley’s stability as a gun platform, if not threaten to swamp the vessel. Such was the case on October 1st, when the brig-sloop Cruizer (18), which was employed as a floating beacon marking the entrance to the Vinga anchorage, came under attack from a

382 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish, Pg. 149. 383 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 114. 166 motley collection of some 20 vessels, including cutters, luggers, oared galleys, even row-boats. Unlike previous engagements, Cruizer had the advantage of the wind was able to employ its armament of 32-pounder carronades to great effect. Like its June battle against the Danish galleys, Cruizer successfully forced the rag-tag flotilla to retire, but not before capturing one of the largest vessels, a 10-gun cutter.384 Nevertheless, so effective had the attacks of the galley squadrons become that when the fleet returned in 1809, it was decided that convoys would routed through the Great Belt, a longer and more difficult navigation, but one that would bypass Copenhagen and its galleys.385 Two weeks later would see the Danes conduct their largest and in a way, boldest attack. On the 15th of October, the 64-gun sail-of-the-line Africa, along with the bomb vessel Thunder and a pair of gun-brigs was escorting a large convoy of 137 merchant ships out of the Baltic through the Sound. As the convoy entered the waters off Munen Island, it came under attack by a force of no less than twenty-five oared galleys, some of which were equipped with light mortars with a further seven launches filled with soldiers providing support. As the nearest safe harbor was the Swedish town of Malmo, Africa’s captain ordered the convoy to seek shelter while remaining behind dropping anchor and prepared for battle. This proved a mistake as over the next four hours the Danes subjected the larger warship to raking fire from both bow and stern. Like Dictator earlier, Africa had suffered severe underwater damage while much of both standing and running rigging was shot away. On at least four occasions, the ship’s colors were shot away, but were replaced before the Danes mistook it as a sign of surrender. It was only with the coming of darkness and the rising of the wind that the Danes finally withdrew, allowing Africa to limp to safety.386 HMS Africa succeeded in her task of covering the retreat of the convoy, at a cost of seven killed and 51 wounded and so much damage inflicted as to be forced to return to England for repairs. Nevertheless, in their haste four of the merchant ships ran aground and fell into Danish hands. Of these, three could not be easily repaired and were burned while the last was taken into Copenhagen. Danish losses were similarly heavy, with 28 killed and 36 wounded.387 This was

384 James Naval History, Pg. 369. 385 Richard Woodman, The Victory of Seapower (London) 1998. Pg. 132. 386 ADM 53/28 Log of HMS Africa. 387 Anderson, Baltic Pg. 327. 167 the last clash of the year between the British and Denmark, although not the end of the perils of operating in the Baltic.

The Baltic Fleet Withdraws Winter comes early to the Baltic, and with it the notoriously violent storms and freezing temperatures. Throughout October and November, the ships of the Baltic Fleet were fully occupied providing escorts for convoys of merchant ships heading for safer waters. It would not be until the 2nd of December that Saumarez and Victory departed Vinga, leaving behind the newly-knighted Sir Richard Keats in command of a reduced squadron consisting of the 74’s Superb and Orion along with the sloops Hound, Ranger and Rose, brigs Alaart and Fama, gun- brigs Fama, Starling and Urgent, cutter Sacroman and the bomb-vessel Etna.388 His orders were to continue protecting British trade and the Swedish coastline. Significantly, despite the difficulty Keats would continue to be supplied from England so as not to further inflame the ire of the Anglophobic clique by drawing up Sweden’s winter stockpiles. Upon his return in December, Saumarez was summoned to appear before the Admiralty Board and have his actions subjected to review. Of particular interest was the Admiral’s response to complaints by British merchants that their ships had been subjected to long delays until a sufficient number had been gathered to form a convoy, and that after they had formed, an inadequate number of escorts had been provided389. The second of course, reflected the unexpected threat posed by the Danes while the former the merchant’s ever-present concern with profit. In response, Saumarez admitted that the Danish galley threat had been unforeseen or at least underestimated at the beginning of the year and that changes in both tactics and operations were necessary in order to minimize losses. The positing of sail-of-the-line along the Belt Route to serve as floating fortresses for example, although as Dictator and Africa discovered, their size and armament did not make them immune from Danish attack. More effective was the decision to cease sailing convoys through the Strait, thereby avoiding the largest concentration of galleys in Copenhagen. However, this meant that ships had to make their transit through the Great Belt, nearly tripling both the sailing time and exposure to attack. All this Saumarez argued, was clear

388 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 57. 389 Ibid. Pg. 53. 168 proof of the “unremitted care and attention,” he had given to trade protection and while the Navy suffered heavily at the hands of the Danes, the losses suffered by British merchants as “very trivial.”390 Supporting this claim was Lloyd’s of London, whose records for 1808 stated that in the Baltic some 164 ships were lost, of which 110 were the rest of enemy action.391 In comparison, some three thousand vessels of all flags sailed under British protection in and out of the Baltic, while hundreds more sailed to Sweden delivering Baltic goods for transfer to British merchant ships. Thus, while there was greater risk sailing in and out of the Baltic, it was not so great as to render it impossible. Additionally, some 62 Danish merchantmen attempting to run the British blockade were seized while at least a dozen privateers were captured or destroyed by the Baltic Fleet. While this did not break Danish resistance, it created greater risks to them as well. As far as lifting the blockade “prematurely,” Saumarez pointed out that in their current situation the fleet would have been poorly placed to survive a storm coming in from the north- west, which would have put the ships on a lee short with little room to maneuver. There was also the deteriorating condition of Swedes of which, “four thousand sick have been landed,”392 and daily fatalities of between 25 to 30 sailors. Under those conditions it was imperative that the Swedish Fleet had to return to port and without their presence, it was impractical to expect the British to maintain the blockade in addition to their other responsibilities in the Danish Belt. Saumarez’s explanations proved acceptable as Ross observed that, “there lordships were pleased to signify their high approbation of every part of his conduct,”393 and that command of the Baltic Fleet would be his the following year. As for the other major figures in the theatre, Major-General Moore would indeed find himself in Spain, where he found both controversy and glorious death. As for Edward Thornton, his stubborn defense of Moore had irreparably ruined his relationship with Gustavus while also marking him as the epitome of the perfidious Englander. Ironically, when he was first appointed Thornton was suspected of being overly pro- Swedish in his views.394 In any event, after less than a year in this post, Thornton was utterly exhausted and requested relief, finally departing Sweden during the winter.

390 Ibid. Pg. 57. 391 Lloyd’s List 1809. 392 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 55. 393 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 128. 394 Jorgensen, Anglo-Swedish. Pg. 124. 169

1809 Operations Vice-Admiral Saumarez had little opportunity for rest during the winter of 1808-9. Soon after submitting his report to the Admiralty, Saumarez was ordered to take command of a hastily assembled squadron to locate a group of French warships that had managed to evade the British blockade outside of Brest. However, before his new command was ready to set sail, the French returned to harbor, thereby negating his mission. Once again, Saumarez was offered command of the lucrative East Indies Squadron and as before turned down the command out of concern for his health. Thus, he was able to reassume command of the Baltic Fleet just before it deployed in late April.395 As before he would hoist his flag on HMS Victory, which itself had seen an active winter, having been briefly employed as flagship of the squadron assigned to cover the evacuation of the troops commanded by the late Sir John Moore.396 Meanwhile, Saumarez was concluding his final preparations before deployment. As with 1808, the fleet would consist of fifteen sail-of-the-line. However, in a departure from the traditional belief that the waters of the Baltic were too shallow to operate large warships, the fleet included three large Second Rates, the flagship Victory as well as the 98-gun St. George and Temeraire. In addition to serving as the flagships of Rear-Admirals Thomas Pickmore and Manley Dixon, their presence also reflected the very real possibility of conflict with the Russian Baltic Fleet and its three-deckers. These flag-officers would be replacing the Baltic veterans Hood and Keats, the former as a result of illness and the latter for a brief rest before serving in the ill-fated Walchern campaign. Once again, the basing of the fleet at the Vinga Roads anchorage rather than nearby Gothenburg was paying dividends. By doing so, Saumarez could continue to execute his mission of trade protection and security of the Belt, but in a manner that minimized contact with the new regime in Stockholm and by extension, legitimize its’ existence. This was especially important to Saumarez as, with the departure of Anthony Merry in early May, made him the senior-most British official in the Baltic. One major change from the previous year was that Saumarez was given the authority to issue licenses and offer protection to ships wishing to trade with ports in French-controlled

395 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 134. 396 Fenwick, Victory, Pg. 320. 170

Europe.397 This was an exception to the 1807 Orders in Council, which required any ships wishing to enter a blockaded port had to first stop at an English port submit to inspection and receive a license allowing them to continue trading. It was an important concession to make and an indication of the importance attached to the Baltic trade. It also made Saumarez the de facto Ambassador and representative of Great Britain in the Baltic. Curiously, although Britain had yet to recognize the legitimacy of the new government in Sweden, Saumarez was to continue his protection of that country’s merchant vessels and maintain friendly trade relations for as long as Sweden was willing to accept them.398

The convoy system Based on the events of the previous year, it was clear that the British had underestimated the danger posed by the Danish oared galleys, prompting changes to British operations. It was also necessary to clarify with British merchants the circumstances under which they would receive naval protection and what was expected of them. All shipping would be required to enter or exit the Baltic under convoy, which would operate along a schedule established by Saumarez. Starting from the 15th of April, convoys would depart Vinga Sound for the Great Belt, the only passage available as Copenhagen Sound was still closed to shipping. Once in the Belt, merchantmen would be protected not only from their assigned escort, but also from warships stationed along the Belt. As before, sloops, brigs and gunbrigs were assigned guard duty. However, there were also several 4th and 3rd Rates present, one at either entrance of the Belt with four others stationed near the mid-way point of the passage off the large island of Sporgo. Even the Second Rates were not spared this duty, despite concerns over their operating in relatively shallow waters. Once in the Baltic proper, these ships would be on their own, but could still call upon the support of the frigates and sloops maintaining the blockade or searching for enemy privateers. As before, it was Saumarez’s intention that the trading season would conclude before the onset of winter and all merchant ships were instructed that the last convoy would depart Vinga Sound no later than the 15th of November. With the memory of the previous winter fresh in his mind, Saumarez was determined no amount of pleas or complaints that such instructions

397 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 68. 398 Ryan, Ambassador Alfloat, Pg. 244. 171 interfered with their business would persuade him to violate this policy. 399 Nevertheless, the system proved surprisingly effective with 2210 merchantmen escorted though the Belt during the 1809 season without loss.400 As previously mentioned, convoys would no longer be routed through the temptingly short, but highly perilous Danish Sound. Rather, merchant ships would be required to sail along the Great Belt, a passage that added anywhere from four days to two weeks, depending on the winds. Still the passage had its dangers; numerous unmarked shoals and shallows, currents strong enough to render a ship unmanageable and the frequent calms that immobilized convoys and presented the galley flotillas with ideal attack conditions. However, the Belt was wide enough to allow the British to send substantially sized convoys in and out of the Baltic with escorts large enough to deter all but the most determined attack. Playing a crucial role in Britain’s convoy scheme was the cooperation of neutral shipping, many of whom found them in a dilemma. Under Britain’s Orders in Council, they could not conduct trade in French-occupied or allied ports nor receive the protection of the Royal Navy unless they had received a license to do so. However, possessing such a license was a violation of France’s Continental System, and as such subject to seizure and arrest. To circumvent this merchant ship’s masters possessed papers, often forged, stating that they had sailed from a French port and were in compliance with French regulations. It could be argued that a neutral merchant could well produce similar forgeries allowing them to operate with British regulations. But while acknowledging that such practices could and did occur, Ryan pointed out that it was easier for a typical merchant vessel to comply with British regulations because of the effectiveness with which the Royal Navy enforced them, while the French did not..401 Not everyone supported such a system. For example there was the argument by the former British consul to St. Petersburg, Sir Stephen Shairp that by making such concessions to their Orders in Council, Britain had shown signs of political weakness and that only a rigidly- enforced blockade could nations like Russia be pressured to return to the British fold.402

399 Ryan, “The Defense of British Trade in the Baltic1808-1813.” English Historical Review Vol. 74 1959, Pg. 450. 400 Ibid. Pg. 457. 401 Ryan, “The Defense of British Trade with the Baltic 1808-1812,” English Historical Review Vol. 74, Pg. 465. 402 BT 1/38 Shairp to Canning 18 Feb. 1808. 172

There were also concerns from British ship owners that reliance on neutral shipping was limiting their opportunities for trade and profit403 and that protecting foreign-flagged ships engaged in trade with ports closed to British shipping was a grave violation of their interests. Not everyone shared this view however, as merchants with a long history in the Baltic trade generally supported such a policy as it kept out competition.404 There was also Heligoland and the Swedish ports, through which Baltic goods could be transferred from neutral ships to British ones for the final voyage to the British Isles. Indeed, the last named undoubtedly influenced the Foreign Office’s leisurely approach regarding Sweden’s change in government.

Seizing Denmark’s Sentinel: the island of Anholt Lying in the middle of the Kattegat, halfway between Sweden and Denmark, the eight-and-a-half square mile island of Anholt acted as a watch-post guarding traffic entering and exiting the Baltic. Lacking a harbor from which galleys could operate, Anholt was largely ignored save Britain’s stationing of a warship to serve as a floating lighthouse. However, with the loss of the bomb vessel Proselyte the previous winter, Saumarez and the Admiralty agreed that the island had to be placed under British control and the beacon light, extinguished since the attack on Copenhagen almost two years before, had to be re-lit. On May 18th, two weeks after Saumarez’s arrival on-station, a small flotilla consisting of the 64-gun Standard, the frigate Owen Glendower (36), sloops Avenger (20), Rose (22) and Ranger (26) and the gun-brig Snipe (12) appeared off the coast of Anholt and began landing both sailors and marines under the overall command of Standard’s Marine Captain Edward Nicolls. The Danish garrison of 170-strong put up a sharp, but ineffective defense and with a loss of one Marine killed and two wounded, the defenders were obliged to surrender. In his after-action report to the Admiralty, Saumarez conceded that the island had limited potential as a military base, but believed that it could prove useful in the event Sweden should close its ports to British shipping. As was customary, Saumarez recommended several officers, among them Nicolls, as commanders of the island’s garrison.405 However, the Admiralty had other ideas. Based on the experience with Martinique’s Diamond Rock, it was decided to commission Anholt directly into the Royal Navy as a stationary warship, with a “crew” of 450

403 BT 1/36 Memorial of London Shipowners, 26 June 1807. 404 BT 1/36 Memorial of British Subjects trading with Riga. Pg. 141. 405 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 146. 173 sailors and Royal Marines. Chosen as commander and military governor was Commander James Maurice, whose previous service included HMS Diamond Rock from 1804-5. In British hands, Anholt did prove useful; as a emergency source of water, as a forming- up point for convoys in and out of the Baltic and with the relighting of its beacon, and as an aid to navigation. Nevertheless, it was believed that the island was vulnerable to a Danish counter- landing and Saumarez ordered the stationing of a gun-brig or similar warship off the island as well as including Anholt in the patrol routes of his frigates. However, while recapturing the island was certainly desirable to the Danes not just from a military standpoint, but also in terms of national pride, it was not immediately feasible from an economic standpoint. Ever since the declaration of war, Denmark’s maritime commerce, a major source of tax revenue, had come to a standstill, with hundreds of ships and thousands of sailors lying idle and unemployed. In addition, with all ship traffic under the protection and/or control of the enemy, the collection of dues for ships entering the Sound had also been suspended, creating yet another revenue gap that would only grow worse as the war continued. While the success of the galley flotillas led to an increase of their construction throughout the kingdom, the building of more traditional warships such as sloops and frigates lagged. For much of 1809, the largest ships in the Royal Danish Navy were the brigs Lougen and Seagull, the latter being the former British warship captured by Lougen the year before.406 Several more ships would be added to the Danish order of battle but it would not be until 1811 that the Danes would possess anything larger than a brig and thus believe that they were capable of challenging British naval superiority.

New Battles, Old Foes As the sailing season got under way, it became evident that the new convoy system and patrol routes established by the British were having an effect in deterring the Danish galley flotillas, although there was still the occasional protest over the time lost transiting the Belt as opposed to the Sound.407 For the English, the year 1809 began well with the capture of no less than four Danish privateers. The first, a two-gun schooner, fell victim to a cutting-out raid conducted by boats of

406 Ryan, Defense of British Trade, Pg. 440. 407 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg. 92. 174 the 74-gun Majestic while the gun-brig Earnest captured two more privateers carrying four and two guns respectively.408 Finally, on the 15th of May, the 36-gun frigate Tartar, while on patrol in the eastern Baltic, intercepted and took a 4-gun privateer while it searched for additional prey. Not every event occurring in May went Britain’s way though. On the 19th of May HMS Ardent (64) landed a large party of sailors and marines on the island of Romso in search of water. This was a not-uncommon practice for ships on patrol and generally speaking, as long as the inhabitants were unaware of their presence, the landing often went without incident. On this occasion however, the nearby Danish garrison had been alerted to the Englander’s presence and they fell upon the surprised party and took them prisoner. Four nights later, the previously underemployed galley flotillas again went after larger prey. On t evening of the 23rd of May, the 38-gun frigate Melpomene was lying becalmed in the Great Belt when some 20 galleys attacked. It had been almost a year since the Danes attacked a large warship and unlike the gun-brigs, Melepomene was incapable of maneuvering under oars. Fortunately, a series of light winds allowed the frigate to close with the galleys, compelling the latter to draw off and maneuver again for position. At the same time, the crew of the frigate set off a series of blue flares, gaining the attention of the 98-gun Temeraire, which was lying at anchor some five miles away. Unable to move in the light winds, the large warship instead sent their boats, the largest of which carried 12 and 18-pounder cannon to the rescue. It would not be until one in the morning that Temeraire’s boats came into view, convincing the Danish galleys to break off the action and withdraw. As in previous encounters, the tendency of the Danes to fire high caused few casualties amongst the frigate’s crew, but heavy material damage. Sails and rigging were badly cut apart, the mizzen-mast all but shot away and several holes were shot into the hull both above and below the waterline. As in the case of Africa the previous year, so extensive was the damage that it was necessary to recall Melepomene to England for extensive repairs.409 The end of the month would see further successes by the Royal Navy in its anti-privateer patrols. On the 31st, the sloop captured a Danish privateer patrolling off Bornholm and later took the Tilsit, a French privateer operating off of Danzig. In the first half of June, an

408 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 338. 409 James, Royal Navy, Pg. 39. 175 additional four privateers were taken in a successful series of boat actions that went some way towards making the Baltic more secure for trade and commerce.410

The Loss of Alaart and Minx On the 10th of August the brig Alaart (one of the ships captured in 1807) was on patrol off the Norwegian coast when lookouts spotted two small vessels hugging the coast bound for the port of Fredericksaven. Unable to prevent their would-be prey from reaching safety, matters became suddenly worse when Alaart spotted two Danish brigs of war, the 20-gun Lougen and the ex-British Seagull along with no less than 15 oared galleys. As the wind had suddenly failed, Alaart’s crew ran out the sweeps and began rowing their way to safety. While the Danish brigs were unable make sufficient gains to overtake Alaart, the same could not be said for the galleys. Over the next five hours, the gunboats, divided into three divisions, sought to overtake the British warship while laboring to approach Alaart from the stern and both beams. As the galleys reached to appropriate range, their bow guns opened up, flailing the brig with round and grapeshot, the intent not being the ship’s destruction, but rather to disable it. Likewise, Alaart’s return fire was limited to her stern chasers, the intent being not to destroy the galleys, but rather to deter them from their current course of action. By two in the afternoon, it had become plainly evident that it was the British ship that had suffered the heaviest, with the main-topmast and bowsprit shot away, the mainmast itself had been severely damaged and nearly all the rigging, both standing and running, severed. Because the Danes were aiming high, British casualties were low; one man killed and three wounded. But with the ship rendered effectively immobile and enemy galleys coming from all directions, the ship’s captain, Commander James Tillard, was forced to surrender. The episode demonstrated once again that even despite the increased measures, the Danish Navy remained a dangerous foe. The “mobbing” tactics employed by the galleys were particularly effective, defying the best efforts of the British to deter them using stern chasers only. Less than a month later this point was reinforced when the gunbrig Minx came under attack. Like Proselyte several months earlier, Minx had been stationed at the Skaw as a light

410 Anderson, Baltic, Pg.338. 176 vessel. Although it was understood that any ship assigned to this duty was being placed in extreme risk, it was deemed necessary in order to aid navigation. On the morning of the 2nd of September, lookouts aboard Minx noticed several vessels gathering along the Danish coast, although it was not until 10 that six galleys were seen rowing towards her. Hastily, the gunbrig weighed anchor and got under way, knowing that under sail, the British would have the advantage of maneuver and speed. But as it so often happens, the wind suddenly died and although Minx’s crew quickly ran out the ship’s sweeps, it was the Danes who now enjoyed the initiative. Around four in the afternoon the Danish vessels began their attack on Minx’s stern while the British replied with their stern-chasers, even as they sought to bring their broadside to bear. Over the next two and a-hour hours the duel continued at the range of five hundred yards, with Minx taking damage in her sails and rigging, although three of the ship’s guns were also disabled. No longer able to maneuver, and with the galleys closing in and preparing to board, it was decided to strike the ship’s colors and surrender. With Minx’s loss it was obvious that stationing single vessels in the Skaw was far too dangerous to be risked. Given the lateness of the season however, there was little that could be done this year. But an alternative had to be found.

1810 Deployment Barely had Saumarez established the new patrols and convoy routes through the Belt when in early June he took the bulk of his fleet, including Victory (flagship), fellow 98’s Temeraire and St. George, the 74’s Plantaganet, Princess Caroline, Implacable, Saturn and the 64-gun Ruby,411 into the Baltic where they would join the previously deployed Bellerphon and Minotaur (74’s). Once there his command would serve as a shield protecting Stockholm and central Sweden from Russian attack. This is significant in that he would be defending a regime that had just overthrown a loyal, albeit difficult ally to Britain’s, and one whose leaders had made clear their intention to abrogate their alliance with Britain and instead seek the protection of Napoleonic France. Indeed, the British government had yet to extend official recognition to the new Swedish government, or recognize the June 5th ascension of the Regent Duke of Sudermania to the Swedish throne as King Charles XIII. Therefore, it is curious that the primary

411 Ibid. Pg. 340. 177

British military force in the region would commit itself to the defense of a potentially hostile country. Saumarez’s actions however, could be explained by the rapport he had established with prominent Swedish naval and government officials and how through them he had developed an understanding of the situation his hosts were facing, an understanding that could not have been through official channels. He had remained largely aloof from the political tensions of the previous year and while he had given shelter to Moore after his escape from Gustavus’ arrest and in part shared Moore’s assessment of the Swedish King’s abilities, Saumarez remained untainted by the cynicism that permeated the views of so much of official Britain.412 Similarly, Saumarez was perhaps the only British official not viewed with suspicion by the Swedes, in part because the decision to base his fleet at Vinga and draw supplies directly from Britain left little for the Swedish Anglophobes to object to. In addition, through his network of contacts and associates, Saumarez was able to form an objective, realistic assessment of the Anglo-Swedish relationship and determined that his presence served both nations’ interests; Sweden’s because he provided security and stability in a time of disarray and turmoil and Britain’s because he preserved access to a region all but closed to British trade. For these reasons Saumarez felt comfortable in broadly interpreting his instructions and altering his fleet deployments, “without having received any special instructions on the subject from His Majesty’s government…and I hope to receive the sanction of ministers on the measures I am adopting.”413 It was an action whose significance was not lost on the Swedes and arguably did more to counter the image of “perfidious Albion” than all the diplomacy and treaties of the past five years. In short, Saumarez saw British and Swedish interests as intertwined, even if officials on both sides did not. Despite his cordial relationship with the Swedes, Saumarez had no clear idea of the forces arrayed against him. There was of course the Russian Baltic Fleet, estimated at numbering anywhere from ten to fifteen sail-of-line, including several powerful three-deckers that had to be contained to their bases lest they break out and endanger the Baltic trade. Then there were the various vessels and oared galleys, estimated by Swedish sources as numbering

412 Ryan, Ambassador Afloat, Pg. 245. 413 ADM 1/9 Saumarez to Foster28 May, 1809. 178 between “200 to 300 sail,”414 that could be used to either support either a sea-bore invasion of central Sweden or support a Russian land invasion of eastern Sweden from Finland In the case of the former, Saumarez and the Baltic Fleet would serve as a physical barrier and be prepared to engage the Russian Navy in a traditional sea battle while in the case of the latter, the fleet would harass the lines of communication and supply and give the Swedes the necessary time to strengthen their defenses. Entering the Gulf of Finland in late June, Saumarez took up a position near the main Russian fleet base at Revel; close enough to observe or intercept any ships attempting to exit, but not so close as to be vulnerable to a sudden galley attack. This also placed the British in a position to threaten a possible Russian offensive into Sweden by interfering with their supplies. In addition, Saumarez’s forward deployment allowed the Swedes to transfer their western flotillas into the Baltic and ass their strength to the defense of Stockholm, although this meant entrusting their trade to the British Navy. While Saumarez’s overall strategy was to serve as a fleet-in-being, the ships under his command were by no means inactive. On the 19th of June, boats from the Bellerophon entered the Finnish harbor of Hango, seizing two coastal luggers and spiking the guns of a nearby battery. British losses were but slight, with none killed and five sailors wounded.415 A more successful action, but one with a higher coast occurred on the 7th of July, when Captain Thomas Martin took his own Implacable along with Bellerophon (74), along with the frigate Melpomene, and the sloop Promethus, undertook a patrol of the Finnish coast and found a concentration of oared gun-boats and merchant vessels near Procola Point. Given the strength of the covering gun batteries, it was decided to attempt a cutting-out expedition consisting of boats and men from the entire squadron. Despite being detected soon after entering the harbor the party continued and succeeded in sinking one of the gun-boats and capturing six others, while also seizing some fourteen merchant ships, “laden with stores and provisions for the Russian troops.”416 Casualties among the British were heavy: seventeen dead and 37 wounded. It was a high loss considering the forces, particularly as the dead included the commanding office, Lieutenant Joseph Hawkley of the Implacable, whose loss was noted and

414 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 84. 415 James, Naval Pg. 40. 416 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 161. 179 lamented in both Britain and Sweden.417 A week later however a similar attack was carried out by boats of the Minotaur, Princess Caroline, frigate Cerberus and sloop Promethus which entered the Finnish port of Fredericksham and, despite fierce resistance from the Russian crews, captured three gun-boats and as an armed transport, loaded with supplies for the army.418 The significance of these operations was that while there had been no fleet battles or indeed, single-ship engagements between the English and Russian Navies, Saumarez had clearly demonstrated his ability to secure naval superiority anywhere he chose to. Although their Baltic Fleet was of comparable size to the English force, the Russians were unwilling to risk their chances against the experienced Royal Navy. Even if successful, the Russians might lose so many ships and men as to affect their ability to protect their interests in the region. Saumarez also proved that while primarily a naval force, he was able to influence land operations in Finland to the point of encouraging the Russians to seek a diplomatic, rather than a military solution to their conflict with Sweden. Still, Saumarez could not maintain this deployment indefinitely. The island that served as temporary fleet anchorage lacked a source of fresh water and Swedish ports were still closed as supply sources. Moreover, as early as July he had been receiving alarming messages from Rear-Admiral Dixon, whom he had left to protect the waters of the Great Belt. Reporting that the Danes had assembled concentrations of galleys at Langeland and Nyborg in preparation for attacks on nearby convoys, Dixon urged that at least some of the sail-of-the-ships return to the Belt to reinforce his command. As it turned out, despite the effectiveness of the new patrols and convoy schedule, Dixon’s warnings came not a moment too soon.

Summer Battles While Saumarez and the bulk of the Baltic Fleet were protecting Stockholm and the eastern Swedish coast, the rest of the fleet under Rear-Admiral Thomas Dixon were engaged in the Great Belt, escorting convoys and containing the Danish threat. In this they were largely successful, safely escorting thousands of merchant ships in and out of the Baltic. However, this was not accomplished without loss, nor was the threat entirely eliminated.

417 Ryan, Saumarez, Pg. 97. 418 James Naval History, Pg.42. 180

On the 10th of August, the brig HMS Alaart was on patrol off the Norwegian coast when the ship’s lookout spotted two vessels heading for the nearby port of Fredericksvan. Pursing to the harbor entrance, Alaart discovered that she had been chasing two of the remaining ships of the Royal Danish Navy, the 20-gun brig Lougen and the ex-British Seagull (16) as well as fifteen oared galleys. At that moment the wind failed and all ships resorted to oars and sweeps. In this, the purpose-built Danish galleys enjoyed the advantage and they quickly closed the range to Alaart, all the while subjecting the vessel to a cannonade from their 18 and 24-pounder long guns. After three hours the Danish gunboats were both astern and on both sides of the British brig and began subjecting the vessel to a merciless bombardment. The English vessel replied as best as she could and it would take an additional two before Alaart, her mainmast shot through, main-topmast and bowsprit shot away as well as most of the rigging, was forced to surrender.419 For the Danes this was a particularly sweet victory as Alaart had been originally part of their navy and had been one of the vessels seized in 1807. Two days later another action took place on the other side of North Sea along the Danish coast. The British sloop Lynx (18) and the gun-brig Monkey (12) spotted a coastal lugger and gave chase. By mid-afternoon the lugger reached what the crew assumed was safe anchorage, shallow waters close in shore and in the company of two other luggers, both of which had been outfitted as privateers. After a brief conference, it was decided to send in Monkey, supported by boats from Lynx. From the moment the British were sighted, all three luggers opened fire with their long guns. As Monkey was equipped with carronades, the crew refused to return fire until the flotilla closed the range. Once that happened, the devastating firepower of the carronade made its presence felt and after a few salvoes, all three Danish vessels cut their anchor cables and attempted deliberately ran themselves onshore. The crews then tried to scuttle their vessels but were foiled by the boats of the Lynx, which subjected all three vessels to a hail of grapeshot fired from a carronade mounted in the ship’s launch. Boarding the vessels, the British were able to successfully re-float their prizes and sail them away.420 The following month would see the final British loss of the year. On the 2nd of September the gun-brig Minx was serving as light-ship, marking the entrance to the Skaw when several vessels were spotted near the Danish shore. By mid-morning, those vessels had been

419 ADM 1/5400 Loss of HMS Alaart. 420 James, Naval Battles, Pg. 42-43. 181 identified as six oared galleys, prompting the brig to raise anchor and set sails. However, the wind failed and Minx’s crew broke out the sweeps and attempted to row the vessel to safety, only to be overtaken by the Danes. Taking up positions astern and along the aft quarters, the galleys opened fire, prompting Minx to forego escape and fight back. After two-and-a half hours, the British ship was badly damaged, with three of her guns disabled and her mainsail shot away. As the galleys closed preparing to board and with twelve of her forty-seven man crew killed or wounded, the ship’s commander saw no alternative but to surrender.421 Despite these engagements, the Royal Navy successfully accomplished their primary mission, the protection of trade and commerce traveling in and out of the Baltic as the once dangerous passage through the Danish archipelago became an almost routine passage for merchant ships, or at least those who adhered to British regulations concerning licensing and sailing under convoy. It was by no means convenient from the standpoint of the ship owners, who continued to complain that the convoy system hurt their profits and interfered with traditional practices of commerce and trade. Offsetting this though was the extraordinary drop in ship losses and the fact that throughout 1809 not a single merchant ship traveling in convoy was lost. However, the loss of Alaart and Minx and the attack on Melpomeme provided fresh evidence that the Danish threat had not been eliminated, merely temporarily contained. Like the British, the Danes too would adapt and develop new tactics while new opportunities to challenge their British enemies.

1810: Friends and Enemies The spring of 1810 saw Britain prepare to deploy a fleet of warships to the Baltic for the third consecutive year. And there was some reason for the British to be optimistic. At long last, a coherent strategy regarding the protection of trade in and out of the Baltic had been developed and the region’s supplies of crucial naval stores resumed flowing to Great Britain. Simultaneously, the maritime guerilla threat of the Danish galley flotillas appeared to have been contained and while there were still concerns that the Danes were building more conventional warships like brigs and frigates, they posed no immediate threat.

421 ADM 1/5400 Loss of Minx 182

Offsetting these successes however was the very real possibility that the Baltic Fleet might not have a base from which they could operate. The winter saw Sweden locked in intense peace negotiations with France and despite informal assurances that the nation’s ports would always be open to Britain; it was unclear whether the Swedes would be able to maintain their neutral stance under Napoleon’s pressure. And without Swedish cooperation, it would be all but impossible for the British to establish either a military or commercial presence in the Baltic. Given the circumstances, there was no question that the Sir James Saumarez would again hoist his flag aboard Victory as commander of the Baltic Fleet. The close relationships he had with various Swedish officials and the high regard the Swedish government had for his previous service made him the ideal person to navigate through such murky waters and as in the previous year, Saumarez had met with agents representing British merchant firms to establish the rules and schedule of that year’s convoys. Included among these arrangements was the “suggestion” that any ship wishing to trade in the Baltic should first enter Gothenburg in order to receive the certificate confirming this port as their port of departure, rather than a British port as required by the Orders in Council.422 Such subterfuge would be necessary in order to circumvent Napoleon’s Continental System. Thus, although no longer allied with Britain, Sweden remained central to British policy in the Baltic. However, even before the fleet had deployed, events in Paris threatened to undermine all of Britain’s plans and policies.

The British Return As with the previous year, the Sound was closed to all shipping and convoys would be routed through the Great Belt. As before, major elements of the fleet, namely the 74-gun sail-of- the-line Vanguard423, Ganges, Hero and Plantagenet along with the 64-gun Dictator gun-brigs Snipe and Earnest and the bomb vessel Prometheus would be stationed at intervals throughout the Belt to both patrol the waters and to reinforce any convoy under attack.424 Meanwhile, stationed astride the eastern entrance of the Belt was Rear-Admiral Reynolds with a small, but powerful squadron consisting of his flagship, the 98-gun St. George, the older 90-gun Formidable, the 74-gun Resolution and Standard (64), with the cutter Swan (14) is

422 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 120. 423 Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Manley Dixon. 424 ADM 1/10 Saumarez to Croker 17 Apr. 1810. 183 support. While their primary purpose was to help secure the Belt, they also served as a deterrent to any sortie by the Russian Baltic Fleet. In addition, Saumarez was informed that the Danes had resumed the collection of fees for ships entering or exiting the Baltic via the Sound. While technically, this would allow neutral ships to take advantage of the quicker, more direct Sound passage, they also risked being confiscated by the Danes should the falsified documents and papers provided to them by the British should be discovered. Accordingly, Saumarez was instructed to place the port of Ellsinore under tight blockade; both to deny the Danes the revenues of the Sound fees, but also to discourage neutral ships from circumventing British convoy rules and deny the Danes the opportunity to gain intelligence on British procedures. In fact, it was the British who were in a position to receive intelligence on Danish operations, courtesy of a privateer captured by the frigate Fisgard (40). Through captured documents, Saumarez learned that Danish privateers were under standing orders to seize any ship carrying British cargo or carrying British licenses, regardless of the flag they are sailing under. Even ships carrying French licenses must be subject to search, as it was assumed that such documents were forgeries and that the real, British-issued documents had been hid, perhaps even on the captain’s person. The privateers were instructed to pay particular attention to Swedish merchantmen, as those were assumed to be carrying British or colonial goods under another name. While the two nations were technically at peace, this would not immunize Swedish vessels from Danish scrutiny. Even vessels belonging to Denmark’s ally, Russia would not be exempt from the attentions of Danish privateers unless they are carrying licenses issued by the French consul in St. Petersberg.425 The effect of these instructions was to place Denmark in the ironic position of enacting much the same heavy-handed, indiscriminate polices regarding neutrals that the Danes accused the British of less than three years before. In part it contributed to the aggressiveness of the Danish privateers, at least when it came to dealing with unescorted merchantmen of every nationality.

425 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pgs. 126-128. 184

Already British efforts were beginning to show fruit. In addition to the aforementioned privateers, Fisgard had successfully seized and then destroyed the Trindelen lighthouse, hampering future privateers from using the Wismar channel to infiltrate British shipping lanes. On the 12th of May, the frigate Tribune (36) was on patrol near the southern-most part of Norway when she spotted two Danish brigs-of-war, the former British warship Seagull (16) and the newly-built 20-gun brig Samso. Chasing them into the small port of Mandal, the captain was shocked to see two more brigs, Alsen (20) and Allart (18). With number and firepower on their side, the Danish squadron sortied out and attempted to close with the British frigate. However, through skillful maneuvering and taking full advantage of the available winds, Tribune was able to avoid the Danish trap while severely punishing Samso. After over two hours, the Danes returned to port, their withdrawal covered by the ubiquitous oared galleys. Although severely damaged, Tribune was able to remain on station until she was relieved, whereupon the frigate returned to England for extensive repairs.426 While the increased strength and vigilance of British patrols meant fewer attacks by the Danish galleys, they remained a creditable and dangerous threat. This was proven on the 23rd of May when seven of these vessels operating out of one of the many fishing villages located along the eastern coast of the Skaw rowed out and attacked a British inshore squadron consisting of the 18-gun brig Raleigh, cutter Princess of Wales (10) and the 10-gun schooner Alban. Although there was no doubting the courage of the Danish sailors, the wisdom in attacking a trio of Royal Navy warships prepared and ready for action was, at best, questionable. Stunned by the overwhelming firepower put out by the English carronades, the Danes hastily withdrew, but not after seeing one number explode with all hands after taking several hits near the ship’s magazine.427 Again, there were a few Danish successes. On the 13th of April, one of the few oared gunboats in the Royal Navy, the 4-gun Grinder, fell victim to four Danish galleys near the island on Anholt, where Grinder had been posted as guard-ship. Two weeks later three armed boats conducting a reconnaissance-in-force into the Danish port of Amrum were surprised and taken captive by two gun-sloops. The following day saw a sharp action between four oared galleys and a becalmed English frigate near Skagen. In this instance the Danes were able to gain an

426 James, Naval History, Pg. 98-9. 427 Anderson, Baltic Pg. 343. 185 advantageous position outside return fire and it was only the return of the wind, coupled with the arrival of the 74-gun Minotaur forced the Danes to withdraw.428 Overall, the fleet did succeed in reestablishing naval supremacy over the Baltic and ensuring that all trade and commerce within the region would conform to British policies and goals. However, no sooner had Saumarez arrive in the Baltic with the bulk of the fleet than he was confronted with yet another political crisis, one that threatened to undermine all his efforts to date. Not surprisingly, it was events in Sweden that triggered the crisis.

Summer successes and setbacks While Sweden lurched through its latest crisis, the Baltic Fleet turned its attention on its primary responsibility, the protection of trade in and out of the Baltic. The threat of the galley flotillas remained ever-present as were the danger of privateers. In addition though, there were reports that the Danes had succeeded in forming a squadron of between four to six brigs and stood poised to strike out from one of the many ports located along the Norwegian coast and fall upon an unsuspecting convoy. Accordingly, patrols were stepped up along this region and efforts made to neutralize or at least contain this new threat. It was on the 9th of July that this squadron achieved Denmark’s biggest victory over the Royal Navy in two years. Then five brigs, the 20-gun Samso and Alsen, the 18-gun Kiel and Allart and the ex-British Seagull (16) engaged a convoy of 48 merchantmen while it was in the Skaw. Due to a breakdown in communications the four-ship escort that had left Vinga Sound had been reduced to a single gun-brig, Forward (12) a vessel that was no match for even one of the Danish brigs, let alone five. As Forward’s captain later wrote, “at 3:45 conceiving that the very superior force of the enemy rendered it impossible for me to afford the smallest protection to the convoy”,429 all he could do was save himself. By cutting away his anchors and using his stern chasers to keep the enemy at bay, Forward was able to survive until reinforcements, in the form of the escorts of two other approaching convoys. However, all of the ships in Forward’s convoy were lost. Not since the disaster on June 1808, when a British convoy and its escort was taken by a massive Danish galley flotilla off Copenhagen Sound were so many trade ships lost with a single

428 Ibid. Pg. 342. 429 Naval Chronicle Vol. 24. Pg. 252-3. 186 stroke. It is significant that compared with the previous year there were fewer ships available for convoy escort. The reason for this was a report forwarded to Saumarez by the Admiralty for a squadron of nine to ten French sail-of the-line being readied in the estuary of the Scheldt.430 Although this area fell with the neighboring North Sea station, Saumarez was advised to ready his ships to intercept the French should they succeed in breaking out. At the other end of the Belt, Saumarez reported that there was no indication that the Russian fleet was preparing for sea, although with ten to twelve sail-of-the-line, the possibility of a joint action with the Scheldt was too great to ignore. Still, the overall impact of the encounter was less than it was two years before. For one thing, only 24 of the merchantmen taken were of English registry, while the other 18 were American. Also, three days after that loss the next regularly-scheduled convoy, this one of 175 sail, cleared the Belt and exited the Baltic for England while a few days after that another convoy of 332 sail entered the Skaw under the protection of a single frigate Hussar (28). Indeed, throughout the summer a total of 1675 merchant ships sailed under British protection without incident,431 as well as 301 British ships trading directly with Sweden and an additional 280 calling on Heligoland supplying the illicit trade between Britain and Northern Germany.432 Although serious, it can be concluded that the loss of this one convoy had but a minimal effect on the British presence in the north. Still, in late July, the increased British patrols along the Norwegian coast yielded some results when the frigates Belvidera (38) and Nemesis (28), while on patrol near the port of Bergen spotted three Danish schooners being outfitted as privateers as well as a single oared gunboat. Unable to directly attack the flotilla due to their unfamiliarity with the waters, it was decided to launch a boat attack. Rowing in under cover of darkness, the raiding party caught the Danes by surprise and despite heavy resistance by the ship’s crews all three schooners were taken, while the gunboat ran aground and was abandoned. The strengthening of British patrols along the Norwegian coast also served to deter privateer activity as well. Throughout 1810 a total of 108 privateers were fitted out for service and succeeded in taking some 42 merchant ships, the majority Swedish coastal vessels operating

430 Ryan, Saumarez Papers Pg. 143. 431 Ibid. Pg. 144. 432 Lloyd’s List, 1810. 187 independently of the convoy system.433 In return 29 privateers were either destroyed or captured by the Royal Navy while many more undoubtedly deterred by the presence of British warships. Similarly, the naval brigs that had captured the July convoy were forced into the shelter of their Norwegian ports because of the increased level of British naval activity.434 Still, there were losses. On the 12th of September the 10-gun cutter Alban was on patrol near the island of Laeso when a flotilla of six galleys were spotted rowing in her direction. These were of a new design, larger than previously encountered and more seaworthy thanks to their improved sails and rigging.435 Already similar vessels had been involved in the first successful attacks against the British Belt convoys in three years, although these were in the nature of nighttime hit-and-run raids and soon ceased once escorting vessels were instructed to exercise greater vigilance. Breaking out their own sweeps, Alban’s crew attempted to open the range but was overtaken by the galleys. At 2:15 in the afternoon the first shots were fired beginning an engagement that lasted over three hours. Around four in the afternoon, Alban’s commander was decapitated by a round-shot, leaving command to a midshipman. The action continued for another hour until Alban, the ship’s sails and rigging in tatters and the rudder shot away, was forced to strike her colors and surrender.436 This too however, was an isolated incident rather than the start of a renewed offensive.

The Trade Debate Renewed As during the previous year, the Baltic convoy system and the policy of escorting neutral vessels to conduct trade in closed ports was meeting with resistance within Britain. In the spring, ship owners from London, Hull, Scarborough, Newcastle, Glasgow and Liverpool all submitted petitions calling for an end of all timber imports carried in foreign-flagged vessels or failing that, the establishment of an import fee to protect domestic shippers.437 Opposing this were merchants and timber dealers from London and Liverpool as well as salt manufacturers from Cheshire and linen manufacturers from Glasgow. Each had their own reasons to maintain the Baltic trade, from preserving their long-standing trade relations in the

433 Ryan, “In Defense of British Trade” English Historical Review (London) Vol. 74 (1959) Pg. 453. 434 Ibid. Pg. 454. 435 Ibid. Pg. 458. 436 ADM 1/5400 Loss of Alban 437 Ryan, “Trade with the Enemy” Pg. 129. 188

Baltic, to exporters providing goods to the trade to importers who were dependent on Baltic goods to keep their businesses operating. For every complaint filed by a ship owner, there were sufficient numbers of merchants and industrialists who argued that yielding to such demands would cripple the British economy and undermine Britain’s ability to defend itself from Napoleonic France. In an attempt to achieve a compromise, the year also saw a brief return to an idea that had been periodically considered for decades, importing timber from British Canada. It had the advantage of avoiding the political and military entanglements inherent in the Baltic trade while utilizing a resource that was safety out of Napoleon’s reach. Most important, from the ship owner’s perspective, it was a market that gave their ship’s employment while allowing them to exclude all competition.438 Offsetting this however was the perception that Canadian timber was inferior in quality to Baltic woods and that transporting it across the Atlantic was at least equal in cost. This was the argument made by dealers engaged in the Baltic trade and one supported by the Admiralty Board, the most prominent being the naval architect Sir Robert Seppings. In the end, the government was reluctant to rely on the abundant, but uncertain quality of Canadian timber as a substitute to timber of the Baltic, even though acquiring the latter required Britain to violate their centuries-old practice of using British ships to supply British markets.

The Second Battle of Anholt Since its capture in 1809, Anholt has served as a navigational aid to British and neutral shipping, an emergency source of water and a handy point from which home-bound convoys could assemble and get organized. From the Danish perspective though, the British occupation of Anholt was a constant source of humiliation to the Danes as well a reminder of the presence of their enemies. However, given British naval superiority and that priority of Denmark’s scarce resources had been given to warship construction, it would not be until the beginning of 1811 that the seemingly right combination of men, ships and timing favored an recapture attempt. The invasion force numbered some 1000 men, including elements of two Jutland regiments the Royal Danish Army, local militias and some 200 sailors of the Royal Danish

438 P.C. 2/186 Cottrell to Barrow 14 Apr. 1810. 189

Navy.439 The transportation flotilla was equally diverse, consisting of a dozen of the ubiquitous oared galleys providing escort for an equal number of transports, mostly fishing vessels and coasting craft commandeered from local resources. Unbeknownst to the British, their defenses had already been reconnoitered by a Danish officer, one First-Lieutenant Holstein, who had been described as “brave and intelligent.”440 The plan called for the invasion to be mounted in mid to late March, just after the winter’s ice had dissipated along the Danish coast, but before the expected arrival of the British Baltic Fleet and the reestablishment of their patrols. It was also hoped that the assault would take the island’s defenders by surprise although that proved to be a forlorn hope. As previously mentioned, Anholt had been commissioned into the Royal Navy as the sloop-of-war HMS Anholt, and placed under the overall command of Captain James Maurice of the Royal navy, although the majority of the 400-man garrison were Royal Marines commanded by Captain Robert Torrens. Maurice also benefited from contacts he had formed with the small civilian population on the island, many of whom communicated with relatives on the mainland. It was though one of these contacts that Maurice learned in February of the build-up of ships and troops and, correctly deducing their purpose, sent an emergency dispatch to the Admiralty requesting help. In response, on the 20th of March, Saumarez dispatched the 32-gun frigate Tartar and the 16-gun brig-sloop Sheldrake to reinforce the island’s defenders and engage any Danish ships supporting the invaders. Arriving on the 26th, the two warships were at anchor off the north side of the island when Maurice received word that the lands were already taking place along the southern coastline. Swiftly, the garrison was mobilized and marched out to meet the invaders. However, upon realizing that they were outnumbered, Maurice fell back to the prepared positions at a placed called Fort Yorke. Using their superior numbers, the Danes attempted to outflank the positions, only to be forced back by concentrated volleys of musket fire a grape-shot fired by fort’s cannons. Countering this however were the guns of the Danish galleys, which in the clearing fog, were able to close and prove fire-support for their comrades.

439 Naval Chronicle Vol. 25 Pg. 453. 440 James, Naval History of Britain, Pg. 223. 190

In response, Maurice signaled for the British warships still at anchor sail around the island and intercept the Danish flotilla. Unfortunately, the wind was coming of the west, and Tartar was obliged to beat against the wind for some distance in order to clear the offshore reefs. Anticipating though that the sight of his ship would provoke the enemy into flight, Tartar’s captain signaled Sheldrake to sail with the wind and round the Swedish side of the island and place himself in position to intercept.441 In the meantime, after subjecting the British positions to a brief, but intense bombardment from both ship and shore the Danes attempted to storm the British positions, only to meet with intense defensive fire that killed many, including their commanding officer, the same Lieutenant Holstein who had conducted the earlier reconnaissance of the British positions. The loss threw the attackers into confusion, which allowed Lieutenant Baker, commanding the supporting schooner Anholt, to fire into the Danish flank, causing further disorientation and breaking their morale and compelling their surrender.442 This put Maurice in the unusual position of trying to deal with some six hundred prisoners, one and a half times the strength of his own force. It was around this time that Tartar came into view and as anticipated, the Danish transports and their escorts raised their sails and attempted to run with the wind towards the Swedish coast. While this took the flotilla out of the frigate’s range, it also brought them closer to Sheldrake. Observing that five of the gunboats were maneuvering to attack, the brig obliged them, beginning an engagement that lasted until eight in the evening with one of the vessels, a lugger armed with two 24-pound cannon and four howitzers captured and one galley sinking after receiving a broadside of the sloop’s carronades.443 As for Tartar, with the Danish flotilla scattered, it fell to the frigate to pursue the Danish transports, which were sailing towards the Danish mainland. Choosing a trio of large transports, sailing in company, Tartar managed to capture two before the presence of shoal water compelled the frigate to break off pursuit and return to assist Sheldrake. Meanwhile, on Anholt, the departure of most their naval support and the collapse and surrender of their flanking force placed the main body of the Danish force still on the island in considerable jeopardy. Retreating to the western end of the island, both invader and defender

441 ADM 51/2871 Log of HMS Tartar 442 Naval Chronicle. Pg. 314. 443 James, Naval History, Pg. 226. 191 spent the afternoon in a nervous standoff while those galleys that managed to evade pursuit returned to evacuate the surviving troops. Despite the intensity of the fighting, the casualty count favored the British, who lost only two killed and thirty wounded, while Danish losses numbered forty dead and twenty-five wounded, including nearly all the commanding officers.444 Finally, some 500 soldiers were taken prisoner, while Tartar and Sheldrake, added another 200 crewmen and passengers from the captured ships. It was a stunning British victory, one made possible by the close cooperation of the Royal Navy and Marines and a testament to the advantages of well-experienced chain of command. In contrast, the Danish invaders were drawn from three separate regiments and the officers, while praised by their opponents for the courage and determination, lacked both experience and coordination. The defeat struck a bitter blow to Danish national morale and the belief that after years of struggle, they were on the verge of prevailing against the British. Yet, despite the bitterness of the war and the disastrous effect it was having on the Danish economy, there still remained some vestiges of honor. An example of this occurred shortly after the victory of Anholt when Captain Maurice wrote to the Danish government, offering to parole all his prisoners and return them in exchange for the survivors of the Pandora, and any other British prisoners in their keeping.445 In any event, even before the arrival of the Baltic Fleet and its commander, British control over the entrance to the Baltic had been confirmed.

The Battle of Lynger and the end of the Danish Navy Despite the actions of its flotillas of oared galleys and brigs, it was always the hope of the Royal Danish Navy that they could commission larger ships of war, particularly frigates. However, the thoroughness with which the British ransacked their carefully-hoarded stockpiles of building materials in 1807, coupled with the demands to build more galleys, severely hampered warship construction. Nevertheless, during the winter of 1811-12, the Danes finally succeeded in commissioning their first major warship in five years. The frigate Nayaden was originally designed as a 36-gun vessel, but during construction the hull was expanded to accommodate an additional six cannon. Unusual for the professionally-

444 Naval Chronicle Pg. 453. 445 Ibid. 348. 192 minded Danes, at least two of the ships burned by the British in 1807 were scavenged for materials incorporated into Nayaden and it was only through such cannibalization that the expansion of the basic design was accomplished. Nevertheless, while the use of such materials made for a larger, more powerful vessel, there had t have been some doubts over the basic soundness of the design and its ability to withstand English cannon fire. Almost as soon as the frigate was commissioned in February of 1812, and weeks before the British were expected to returned, Nayaden departed Copenhagen for Norwegian waters. There, the frigate would complete the fitting-out process and the crew trained in their duties. Still, the existence of such a powerful enemy vessel was of considerable concern to Vice- Admiral Saumarez, now set to resume his duties as commander of the Baltic Fleet for the four straight year. An even greater concern was that Nayaden might join forces with the four Danish brigs known to be sheltering in one of the many ports or fjords scattered along the Norwegian coast. Such a powerful squadron might venture at will into British shipping lanes and start targeting convoys. Such a force would easily overwhelm the escorting gun-brigs and sloops before wreaking havoc on the hapless merchantmen. One or two such disasters would undo much of the hard work of the previous years, especially those ships belonging to neutral nations who only accepted British controls on the promise that their property would be protected. Accordingly, almost as soon as he arrived at Vinga Roads, Saumarez made locating Nayaden and her consorts a top priority. Patrols along the Norwegian coast were strengthened and instructed to investigate even the most insignificant of harbors or anchorage. Finally, a special “squadron of vessels was assembled and assigned the task of eliminating this latest threat to British maritime superiority. At the heart of this impromptu squadron was the 64-gun sail-of-the-line Dictator. A veteran of both the 1801 and 1807 Copenhagen battles, Dictator’s crew was well familiar with northern waters and eager for battle. Likewise, the ship’s captain, William Stewart was an experienced officer with a reputation for aggressiveness. Supporting Dictator was the 18-gun brig-sloop Calypso, the smaller 14-gun brig Podargus and the gun-brig Flamer (12). Departing Vinga Roads in early July, the squadron patrolled along the south-east coast of Norway . It was in the evening of the 6th of July that Nayaden was spotted hugging the coast near the port of Lindesnes. As feared, the frigate was in the company of three brigs, Laaland, Samso

193 and Kiel, each armed with eighteen guns.446 Immediately, the British set off in pursuit, with Podargus, whose civilian pilot claimed to know the waters, in the lead. However, the folly of relying on the claims of non-professionals was demonstrated once again as Podargus ran aground. Unwilling to allow his quarry to escape, Murray continued the pursuit, leaving Flamer behind to attend the grounded vessel. Finally, Stewart ran the Danish ships down, sheltering in the port of Lynger, which was protected by several gun batteries and a flotilla of oared galleys. Nevertheless, Dictator edged in, at times her yard-arms within inches of the shoreline, until the ship got within range. Through clever use of the ship’s kedging anchors, Dictator was able to maneuver her broadside to fire along Naysden’s stern quarter, while the frigate was unable to reply. Meanwhile Calypso, despite having run aground herself, was able to provide support. Around half-past nine in the evening, the British ships opened fire and in the space of half-an-hour, “the frigate was literally blasted to atoms, and the flames bursting forth from her hatchways.”447 Equally punished were the Danish brigs, two of which, Kiel and Laaland struck their colors. Danish losses were heavy, with 133 dead and 82 wounded on the frigate alone. Meanwhile, the grounded Podargus and Flamer came under attack from five galleys, which stalked the British vessels using the numerous small islands as cover. Once again, the Danes aimed high, cutting up the British rigging and sails, but doing little to affect the enemy broadsides. Even after Flamer ran aground, the British were able to keep their opponents at bay until the galleys, responding to the sounds of gunfire coming from Lyngor, broke of the engagement. Now free of distraction, the British brigs were soon unable to refloat themselves and rejoin their consorts, whose situation was becoming precarious. Throughout the evening, Dictator sought to work her way out of Lyngor harbor along with the two captured Danish brigs while Calypso’s crew struggled to refloat their ship. At three A.M. the ships again came under attack, from the galleys returning from the earlier engagement. Compounding the situation, both prize brigs ran aground and a fire broke out on board Laaland. Unable to free the vessels due to the fire from the enemy galleys, yet unwilling to destroy the vessels due to the presence of the Danish crews taken prisoner, Stewart was left with no option other than abandoning them to the enemy. Nevertheless, with the destruction of Najaden,

446 Anderson, Baltic, Pg. 346. 447 Naval Chronicle Vol. 28, Pg. 80. 194

Saumarez proclaimed the engagement a victory and arranged to have the brig’s commander all promoted to Post-Captains. The Battle of Lyngor effectively ended Denmark’s ability to affect British control of northern waters. They were still capable of inflicting losses, as demonstrated by the capture of the gun-brig Attack in August. But their ability to threaten British convoys or prevent the flow of trade in and out of the Baltic, had been crippled. Almost five years after the seizure of their battle fleet, the Royal Danish Navy ceased to exist. Even more telling for the Danes was the outbreak of war between France and Russia and the resulting termination of their patron-client relationship with the latter. So stunning was this turn of events in the Baltic that in October of 1812, Tsar Alexander ordered both his Baltic Fleet and the eight sail-of-the-line from the Arctic port of Archangel to sail to Sweden and place their ships under British protection. Although by then the crisis had passed and Napoleon’s were in full retreat across the icy steppes, the ships of the Russian navy accompanied Samaurez back to England, where they spent the winter as the guests of their former enemies, the British. Relations between Britain and the Baltic had come full circle as Russia was again a British ally and Britain’s access to the region’s vital resources finally secured.

195

CHAPTER 9

THE HAZARDS OF THE SEA

Almost as big a danger to the ships of the Royal Navy as the enemy was the Baltic itself. Hidden reefs, unmarked shallows, unpredictable winds and tidal conditions all combined to make the region particularly hazardous for the British. To their credit, the Royal Navy went to considerable lengths to minimize the danger, among them the constant updating of charts and maps, the stationing of ships at crucial points to serve as floating navigational guides and employing civilian sailors with supposed experience in the Baltic as pilots. Most important was Saumarez’s policy to terminate all convoys and vacate the Baltic well before the onset of winter. However, such measures were often in conflict with the desire for profit and the all-important desire to keep the flow of strategic resources from the Baltic to Britain. As a result, from 1808 to 1812 the Royal Navy lost no less than nineteen ships-of-war, most in individual accidents, but also including the great single maritime disaster suffered by the Royal Navy in modern times. December of 1807 saw winter claim its’ first victim, the 36-gun frigate Crescent. One of those ships scheduled to return home for the winter, Crescent was within sight of the Danish coast when she ran aground on an unknown shoal. Unfortunately, even as the crew worked to refloat the vessel, a massive storm front passed overhead, sending high waves and heavy gusts against the hull, driving it against the reef and creating leaks that the already taxed crew was hard-pressed to control. The following morning saw the ship still hard aground, but also dismasted and immobile. Finally despite the treacherous surf pounding around the ship, it was decided to build rafts and evacuate both crew and passengers to the Danish mainland, choosing captivity over death. Sadly though, only 38 of the crew made it to safety before the ship broke up and sank, taking with 220 people, including the captain, to their deaths.448

448 ADM 1/5394. Loss of HMS Crescent. 196

Disaster in the Ice As previously mentioned, it had been the intention of the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice-Admiral James Saumarez to have all trade ships out of the Baltic by mid-October, with the last escorted convoys departing Vinga Roads no later than early November. However, the unwillingness of merchants to adhere to that schedule, insisting that trade (and the potential for profit) continue up to the very last moment As a result, convoys continued to depart from the Baltic until late December, well into the winter season, with disastrous results. The first of the Royal Navy ships lost over the winter of 1808-9 was also one of the most unusual. Sitting astride the entrance of the Kattegat was the small island of Anholt. In more peaceful times the island served as a lighthouse, marking the location of the island and warning ships to stay clear of the nearby shoals and reefs. When war broke out though, one of the first actions undertaken by the Danes was the dousing of the Anholt light, preventing that navigational aid from assisting Denmark’s enemies. In response Saumarez was obliged to station one of his warships near the island and serve as a floating beacon. It was a tedious, but nonetheless perilous duty as the station was vulnerable to a sudden foray from the Danish mainland, despite its proximity to the Vinga Roads base. On the 5th of December the bomb vessel Proselyte was fulfilling that role, enduring the harsh winter weather settling over the Baltic. Originally, the ship had been one of these assigned to Keats’ squadron and thus should have been seeking shelter along the Swedish coast. However, the presence of trade ships in the Baltic and the late departure of the last convoy obliged Proselyte to remain on station. It was during the evening of the 5th that Proselyte’s lookouts spotted the first ice floes closing around the vessel. Despite the danger, it was decided that attempting to navigate in the darkness was more hazardous and it was decided to remain in place. That proved a mistake as by dawn the ship’s crew found themselves completely iced in. Even worse, the current was pushing the forward, inexorably forcing Proselyte against the island. By mid-morning the vessel had run aground and being ground to pieces by the ice and the crew was forced to abandon the ship and surrender to the island’s garrison.449 Three weeks after Proselyte’s destruction the last convoy of 1808 departed Carlscona bound for England. Although all merchant ships were required to quit the Baltic the previous

449 ADM 1/5396. Loss of HMS Proselyte. 197 month, there were always those who were willing to risk winter’s wrath in search of one last opportunity to turn a profit. That convoy boasted an unusually large escort consisting of the 74’s Mars and Orion, the 36-gun frigate Salsette, sloops Fama, brig Magnet, cutter Salorman and two Swedish warships. However, no sooner had the convoy left port that a particularly violent storm struck and scattered the convoy into individual and small groups of vessels struggling for survival. Both 74’s were able to survive the rough weather, as did those merchantmen fortunate enough to have been in good repair and condition. For those older and smaller trade vessels, as well as smaller warships, the combination of high winds, freezing rain and pack ice strained their endurance and from the British perspective, claimed more than a fair share of victims. The first warship to be lost was the former Danish prize Salorman. Swept westward away from the convoy by the storm the cutter was forced against the Norwegian coast. Surrounded by blizzards that blinded Salorman’s lookouts, the crew was unable to spot the tall- tale waves of shoal waters until it was too late. So violent was the impact that both Salorman’s rudder and keel was shattered, all but dooming the vessel. Immediately the ship began breaking up and it was only the arrival of boats from the Norwegian town of Ystad, whose inhabitants witnessed the event that any of the crew was saved.450 Meanwhile the same storm swept Salsette, Fama, Magnet and several merchantmen. On the morning of the 23rd, while struggling against heavy winds and storm seas, Fama ran aground off the Danish island of Bornholm and despite the drastic step of cutting away the mainmast in order to improve stability, the ship began breaking up. As with Salorman, local Danes, drawn by the instinctive desire to assist mariners regardless of nationality, turned out to help the crew to safety, although five of the crew, including the captain, and one female passenger perished.451 Like Salorman, Fama’s career in the British Navy proved all too short, a mere five months after the ships had been captured during the Spanish evacuation. Meanwhile, those ships of the convoy that were unable to escape the storm found them trapped by the rapidly freezing of the waters of the Kattegat. Those lucky enough to find themselves along the eastern coast were able to find shelter in a nearby port. Others however, were less fortunate.

450 ADM 1/5396. Loss of Salorman. 451 ADM 1/5394. Loss of Fama. 198

On the 6th of January nine of the convoy’s merchantmen, along with the Swedish sloop Camilla and the British brig Magnet were laboring to reach the Swedish port of Malmo. When they got there however, they discovered the harbor’s entrance choked with ice and impassable. In trying to get clear six of the trade ships and Camilla ran aground on a shoal north of the entrance while the other three vessels and Magnet ran aground on Saltholm shoal to the south. It took two days for Magnet’s crew, using a combination of sweeps and kedge anchor, to work themselves clear to deep water. During the evening of the 10th however the ship was caught by a strong current, which was carrying it towards a dangerously large sheet of pack ice. Despite the best efforts of the crew to arrest their momentum, Magnet was irresistibly drawn towards shore until the ship finally ran aground near the entrance to Malmo. Within fifteen minutes the pressure from the ice increased until the ship was on her beam ends and began breaking up.452 The winter ice would claim yet another victim, the one attempting to enter the Baltic. On the 20th of January, the newly completed 10-gun schooner Claudia was off the Norwegian coast when the ship encountered a fierce north-blowing snowstorm that drove the vessel towards the shore. To make matters worse, once the storm abated, the crew found themselves surrounded by ice floes that frustrated their every attempt to find open water. Striking a reef near the town of Kristiansand, the hull sustained heavy damage and water came flooding in faster than the crew could pump it out. An attempt was made to launch the ship’s boats however, before that could be accomplished, Claudia sank. Through the efforts of the ship’s captain, who swam several times through freezing water to assist non-swimmers and again to guide Norwegian rescuers the majority of the 35-man crew were saved. Nevertheless, fourteen men perished through drowning or exposure to the extreme cold.453 The loss of Claudia brought to a total to five the number of Royal Navy warships lost in a seven-week period in the Baltic, none to enemy action. Ironically, in several cases, it was the Danes who prevented this series of disasters from becoming even worse, placing themselves at risk in response to the drive of coastal inhabitants to come to the assistance of mariners in distress, without regard to the flag they might fly. One ship that escaped this fate, although for several months it was presumed that she had been lost, was the frigate Salsette. Originally built for the British East India Company, Salsette

452 ADM 1/5394. Loss of Magnet 453 ADM 1/5397. Loss of Claudia 199 was one of the few Royal Navy ships constructed of teak rather than the traditional oak and fir and had been one of the escorts of the ill-fated December convoy. Swept up in the same storm that claimed Fama and Salorman, Salsette came close to being run aground near the island of Bornholm, but was able to anchor with a bare four feet of water to spare.454 Nevertheless, the crew found themselves trapped by the frozen waters of the Sound for over two months and it was not until spring that the “lost” frigate reached the safe harbor of Carlscona and after some repairs, rejoined the returning ships of the Baltic Fleet. As a result of the disaster of the winter of 1809, Saumarez was determined not to give into to ship-owners demands that convoys continue to operate into the winter season. Unlike the previous year, all trade ships desiring naval protection had to vacate the Baltic by mid-October. In addition, the closing of the Sound to all trade ships and convoys and the strengthened patrols in the Great Belt reduced, but never completely neutralized the Danish threat, either from the galleys lurking along the Belt or from the brigs operating from Norwegian waters. Nor could it take into account the predictable, but no less serious peril posed by the weather.

The Loss of HMS Minotaur Perhaps the only positive result of the disastrous winter of 1809 was that Saumarez was able to ignore ship-owners’ complaints of lost profits and adhere to the safety procedures he imposed. Coupled with other procedures such as sailing in company through unknown waters and utilizing more up to date charts the Baltic Fleet avoided losing another ship through accident for almost two years. Still, the danger posed by storms remained and were not always confined to the Baltic. The winter of 1810 witnessed the departure from Gothenborg of the last trading convoy of the year and the end of yet another trading season. Although that convoy was departing later than the date specified by Saumarez’s standing instructions but as the climate throughout the year was generally mild, it seemed an acceptable risk. In addition, its’ departure coincided with the return of the Baltic Fleet to home waters, that last convoy enjoyed the benefit of a significantly larger escort than the norm. At approximately the middle of the North Sea, the convoy parted ways. Most of the trade ships were bound for the Downs and as its path took it close to the Dutch coast, Saumarez chose

454 Ross, Memoirs Pg. 130. 200 to accompany these ships in his flagship Victory as well as the 74’s, Resolution, Saturn,and the 64-gun Africa and Ardent. Meanwhile the rest of the trade ships took a more northerly course under the protection of the 74-gun ships Plantagenet and Minotaur. It was on the evening of December 21st, that the latter convoy encountered severe weather and contact was lost with Minotaur. Relying on the civilian pilots’ assurance that they were heading west, Captain John Barrett was unaware that the ship was in fact heading south towards the Dutch coast. It was not until it became evident that Minotaur had been caught on a lee shore that Barrett realized the peril and ordered the ship to come about, too late as it turned out. Midway through the maneuver, As However, while the ship was mid-way through the maneuver, Minotaur violently ran aground off the Dutch Texel coast, on Haak Sands.455 Despite the storm-tossed surf, it was decided to launch the ship’s boats and attempt an evacuation. The first boat reached land, only to be overturned and destroyed in the surf. After the second boat succeeded, the captain made the attempt, only to drown with all hands. At two in the afternoon, the great warship broke in half and sank, taking with it four hundred of the ship’s crew. The remaining one hundred and forty survivors were taken by the Dutch and made prisoners-of-war. It would not be until the ship’s gunner made his escape from captivity and returned to England were the details of the ship’s loss known, and the resulting inquiry determined that the ship was lost through an error in navigation.456 It was the single most serious loss yet experienced by the Baltic Fleet and underscored the hazards of the sea. Sadly, it would be soon overshadowed by an even greater tragedy.

Loss of HMS Pandora Although the bulk of the Baltic Fleet were either undergoing refit, or in the case of Victory, or temporary reassignment, a few ships were assigned to patrol the Danish coast, less to protect British shipping, but rather to intercept ships attempting to carry supplies to Norway. Among the ships assigned to this arduous duty was HMS Pandora. On the 13th of February, 1811 the 18-gun brig-sloop was operating in company with the 38-gun frigate Venus off the Skaw when they encountered bad weather, including high winds and snow. While investigating a wrecked vessel, the two ships became separated. It was while

455 David Hepper British Warships Losses in the Age of Sail 1650-1859 (Sussex) Jean Bondriot Pub. 1994. Pg. 134- 35. 456 ADM 1/5442 Loss of Minotaur. 201 searching for Venus, Pandora herself ran aground on an outlying reef. Immediately, water started flooding in and the rudder had to un-shipped in order to prevent damage. Hoping to attract the attention of their companion, Pandora fired her guns in the prearranged signal for distress and in order to improve stability, the ship’s masts were cut away. No sooner had this been completed though, than the rough surf caused the ship to careen on her side. Unable to launch any boats because of the waves, Pandora’s survivors were forced to spend a miserable night on the reef, huddled against the cold and rain. It would not be until the morning of the 15th that the rescue arrived, in the form of Danish fishing boats from nearby coastal villages. Although the wreck itself did not claim any of the 121-man crew, 27 men succumbed to their exposure to the elements. Later, both the captain and the civilian pilot were held responsible for Pandora’s loss, for failing to maintain sufficient sail to retain control, and for failing to take sufficient soundings to determine their position.457 In addition to illustrating the omnipresent danger of the environment and the need to remain in sight of friendly warships while in hostile waters, the Pandora episode provided another example of the unreliability of employing civilian pilots. Usually drafted from the merchant service, these pilots were hired ostensibly for their experience and familiarity with local conditions. The fact was that all too often, the pilots knew little more than the naval crews they were assisting, and placing an over-reliance of trust on their judgment was often the first steps to disaster. Yet, it was not until the end of the year that the Royal Navy would experience its greatest loss, both in material and human terms.

Winter Disaster As with previous years, the coming approach of winter marked a dramatic increase of trade activity and sailings as merchants and ship-owners sought to squeeze in one more profit- earning voyage. The result was that the convoys of September and October, 1811 were particularly large with three to five hundreds either in transit through the Great Belt or riding at anchor at Matvik near the Swedish port of Hano awaiting the next convoy departure. And, as in previous years, Saumarez felt tremendous pressure to delay departure of the last convoy to the last possible moment. There was of course the disaster that had befallen the convoy of December of 1808 but after three years it was believed that the precautions placed within the

457 ADM 1/5416. Loss of Pandora. 202 current convoy system would allow trade to continue while still allow a sufficient margin of safety. Originally, the plan was to have the last convoy of that season depart Hano on the 14th of October. Escort would be provided by the eastern squadron of the Baltic Fleet, under the command of Rear-Admiral George Reynolds flying his flag in the 98-gun St. George. However, adverse winds and the tardiness of many merchant ships compelled Reynolds to delay departure until the 1st of November,458 which left little margin for error. The convoy consisted of 129 merchant sail escorted by the gun brigs Rose, Belette and Urgent. Also sailing in company with the convoy were the sail of the line St. George, the 74-gun Cressy, Defiance and Hero and the 64-gun Dictator. The convoy did not get far however when they encountered the first of the season’s fierce winter storms. Forced to seek shelter in the shadow of Mon Island, the ships remained at anchor for several days until the storm had dissipated itself. Resuming sail on the 12th, the convoy had made it halfway up the Belt when they were struck by a second storm, this one from the West South-West. Again the ships dropped anchor and tried to ride out the storm as best they could but as the winds increased to gale force, it started to take a toll amongst the under-manned merchant ships. The flowing morning saw the convoy scattered and in dire condition. A dozen merchant ships had been driven aground on various nearby islands while several others had disappeared altogether while another thirty were able to make their way back to Hano, many without anchors and with severe damage to their rigging. On the 21st of November Reynolds reported to Saumarez that of the original 120 vessels, only 76 were in suitable condition to continue.459 And while the remainder feverishly worked feverishly to make repairs and secure replacement anchors and cables, there was little hope that they would be ready to resume sailing in the immediate future. As for the escort, they did not escape the storm unscathed either. Worst damaged was Reynold’s flagship St. George. Early in the storm, the flagship’s anchor cable had been fouled and broken by a large merchantman and swept towards the Danish coast. Desperately, additional anchors were dropped, with little effect. Next, the ship’s captain ordered that the ship be deliberately dismasted in the hopes that the inert hulk would be more stable. Unfortunately, as

458 Ryan, “The Melancholy Fate of the Baltic Ships in 1811.” Mariner’s Mirror (Greenwich) Vol. 1, 1964. Pg. 124. 459 Ibid. Pg. 126. 203 this was accomplished the ship did indeed run aground, tearing away the rudder and rendering the ship all but unmanageable. Remarkably though, not a single member of the ship’s crew had been hurt. After this storm had subsided part of the escort turned themselves to the task of rounding up survivors and reforming the convoy. Meanwhile, while the gun brigs Rose and Belette stood by in the event it was necessary to abandon St. George, the crew of the Cressy prepared a temporary rudder while on the flagship the crew jury-rigged a new set of sails. Nevertheless, it was necessary for Cressy to take the flagship under tow before the survivors of the convoy could resume their voyage through the Belt. Of the missing ships, two were seen to have collided during the storm and sank, while another dozen had been spotted wrecked upon the Danish coast.460 Fortunately, some thirty vessels, nearly all of them missing their anchors, managed to make their way back to their starting point at Matvik, where they came under the authority of Captain Charles Dashwood of the frigate Pyramus. In his report to Saumarez, Dashwood acknowledged that the ship’s masters were making every effort to repair damages but that it would take at least sixteen days for the necessary materials to arrive, far too late to ensure a safe passage. Therefore, he recommended that the ships remain where they were, despite the possibility that the Swedish government would in all possibility take possession of them. As Dashwood noted, such detention was usually a formality in order to satisfy the French and within a few months, control would return to the crew.461 In the however, the demands of the ship’s masters that they be allowed to depart regardless of the dangers compelled Dashwood to hastily organize a convoy and risk a winter voyage through the Great Belt. Meanwhile, at the other end of the straits, Saumarez was facing a similar dilemma. One the 2nd of December the remnants of the last convoy had arrived at the Vinga Roads anchorage and he had an opportunity to survey first-hand the extent of the damage inflicted on St. George. His observations were not encouraging. The ship’s jury-rigged masts, although made of lighter woods such as elm and ash had been seemingly well-fitted as was the temporary rudder. Provided that the seas remained calm

460 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 254. 461 Ryan, Saumarez Papers, Pg.204. 204 and the winds favorable, there was every reason to believe that the big ship would reach safe harbor where more permanent repairs could be made. However, with the winter season already in place, Saumarez was concerned that St. George would not be able to another storm as severe as the one that had very nearly wrecked her the previous month. Given the situation, Saumarez considered leaving St. George in the anchorage when the fleet departed for the winter.462 In Vinga’s sheltered waters, the ship would be protected from the worst of the winter storms and would be able to return to England in the spring, when calmer weather prevailed. There was the possibility that the ship might be seized, but through his contacts with the Swedish government, Saumarez was confident that they would continue to play the role of congenial, if distant, host. Objecting to this proposal was Rear-Admiral Reynolds, who confidently expressed the view that the St. George was “as fit to make her passage with the assistance of another ship of the line as any in the fleet.”463 Sharing in this view was the ship’s captain Daniel Guion, and although he still harbored certain doubts, Saumarez was reluctant to override the opinions of his officers. Reynolds’ and Guion’s confident expressions were both confusing but at the same time not surprising. Both officers were tested veterans and had several years experience in the Baltic. Presumably then, this gave them insight into the weather conditions in the Baltic, in particular the severity of the winter storms. Given the current state of the ship, it would seem that the prudent and responsible option would be to spend the winter lying at anchor in Vinga Roads until the spring. Offsetting this however, was the professional confidence of the British naval officer, from the quality of the ship under feet, or the sailors under his command or his own personal training and experience. There was also the prospect of a powerful and valuable warship like St. George spending the winter lying impotently at anchor in Swedish territorial waters. While Saumarez believed that there was more than sufficient evidence to trust the hospitality of the Swedes, their unwillingness to openly commit to a policy of friendship, there was still the possibility that under French pressure, the Swedes might suddenly turn and confiscate St.

462 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 256. 463 Ryan, “Melancholy Fate” Pg. 127. 205

George. In short, given the choice between inactivity and action, both Guion and Reynolds were inclined towards trusting in the proven ability of the British sailor to overcome all challenges. However, Saumarez had two other factors to consider. One was Dashwood’s convoy still making its way through the Belt although it was eventually decided to depart without them. The second was the presence of unfavorable winds that prevented a departure from Vinga. It would not be until the 17th that the weather was sufficiently moderate to begin their voyage. While waiting, Saumarez again visited the possibility of leaving St. George behind for her own safety. Once again, Reynolds and Guion expressed their full and complete confidence in the soundness of their vessel and the ability of their crew.464 It proved to be a fateful choice. The final voyage of the year began under near-perfect conditions: mild seas and a moderate breeze from the north-east almost on a direct line for England. The fleet sailed in three divisions. The first consisted of the flagship Victory, the 98-gun Dreadnought, and the 74-gun Orion and Vigo as well as the brig-sloop Mercurius (18) and the gun-brig Snipe(12). The second division consisted of St-George, towed as before by Cressy, with escort being provided by the 74-gun Defense and the brig-sloop Belette(18). The third division was comprised of the convoy of 76 merchant ships escorted by the 74-gun Hero, the 18-gun brig Grasshopper, sloop Egeria(16) and armed ship Prince William. By noon however, the wind had shifted to the north north-west, meaning that it was now blowing across the bows of the ships as they struggled to clear the northern-most point of the Jutland peninsula. This proved too much for the merchant vessels Saumarez ordered that they and their escorts return to Vinga to await better weather. The warships of the first and second divisions continued on, but progress was slow and it was not until mid-day on the 19th of December that the fleet finally cleared the Danish and Norwegian coasts and entered the North Sea. That evening though the wind shifted again, this time from the south-west, and in increasing strength. Early the following morning the decision was made for the two divisions to separate and make their own way home. Still fighting strong headwinds, it was not until Boxing Day that Victory and her consorts reached the safety of the anchorage at Spithead and Saumarez was writing his report to the Admiralty. There had been no report concerning the status of the St. George and her companions and in his report Saumarez expressed his belief that given the

464 Ibid. Pg. 127. 206 worsening weather, Reynolds would elect to return to Vinga with the convoy. However, in the margin, Saumarez wrote the comment, “I am uneasy about St. George.”465

Loss of St. George and Defense In fact, on the 20th of December, Reynolds, still facing stiffening head-winds, decided to wear ship and return to Vinga. Normally, a dangerous, but routine operation for the ship’s crew, the combination of changing winds and strong currents made the task extremely difficult and it took almost a full day before the ships of the squadron came in sight of the Swedish coast. At this point, Reynolds held a shouted conference with Captain Dudley Pater of the Cressy, who recommended that the ships should drop anchor and wait out the storm. At that moment however the wind shifted yet again, this time from the north-east. Faced with the opportunity of seizing a following wind carrying them to home waters, Reynolds overruled Pater and ordered his ships about. The necessary precautions were taken: topgallants taken in and topsails and courses reefed and trimmed so as provide minimal leeway. Significantly, Reynolds ordered the tow between Cressy and St. George be severed, presumably in a bid to lessen the danger to both ships. It was not long before the jury-rigged ship found itself again in distress. On the morning of the 23rd one of the fastenings securing the St. George’s temporary rudder had fallen off, hindering the ship’s already sluggish maneuverability. However, when Cressy closed and offered to restore the tow, Reynolds, either believing that repairs could still be made or still not wanting to place another ship at risk, replied in the negative.466 Once again the wind had shifted, this time to the north-west, and was strengthening to gale force. This meant that the squadron was now caught on a lee shore. Making matters worse the predominant current ran to the south, increasing a ship’s tendency to drift towards the coast of Danish Jutland. To compensate, the ships of the squadron turned into the wind and fought to maintain headway. However, in her weakened and crippled condition, St. George found this impossible to accomplish and slowly, but irrecoverably, the large Second Rate found itself drifting towards disaster.

465 Ibid. Pg. 128. 466 ADM 51/2216 Captain’s Log, HMS Cressy. 207

Struggling to remain on station with the flagship were the 74’s Cressy and Defense and by the afternoon the captains of both ships were forced to make a difficult choice, stand by their struggling flagship and render such assistance as they could, or abandon St. George and see to their own safety. Aboard Cressy Captain Pater held a brief conference with his officers, who informed him that the ship was nearing dangerous shoal water and unless they wore immediately, they would be forced into the same predicament that St. George found itself the month before, cutting away their masts and dropping their anchors. Making matters worse the cables securing the anchors were reported as worn and might not be able to take the strain. At half past ten in the evening the order was given for the ship wear away and beat clear. The maneuver also took Cressy close to St. George where Pater made one last attempt to communicate with the flag, either to lead the ship to safety or to remain in company if required. It was only after Reynolds failed to reply did Pater look to the safety of his own ship and continued to sail to the north-west.467 Yet, while Cressy fought to save herself, Defense struggled desperately to maintain in company of the flagship. Whether this was out of a sense of loyalty to the flagship or the belief that they could render assistance remains unclear but it is possible that the ship’s captain, David Atkins, was reminded of an earlier event that had reached legendary status in the Royal Navy.468 Like Pater, Atkins hailed the flagship, seeking orders to either remain in company, render assistance or to seek their own safety. When Reynolds failed to reply, Atkins chose to remain on station saying, “I will never desert my admiral in the hour of danger or distress.”469 Finally, around one in the morning St. George, with flooding reaching as high as the lower deck, ran hard aground along the Jutland coast. Between the storm and grounding, all the ship’s boats save the yawl had been wrecked and although several sailors volunteered to risk the storm surf in order to reach land and seek assistance, this was ultimately refused. Throughout the evening and much of the following morning, the remaining crew struggled to reach safety, even as the ship was breaking up beneath their feet. In the end, of the ship’s original crew of 750

467 Ibid. 468 On May 12th 1798, Nelson’s Mediterranean squadron had been hit by a gale so violent that it tore the masts off Nelson’s flagship, Vanguard. At considerable risk to himself and despite repeated orders from Nelson to save himself, Captain Alexander Ball held his ship, HMS Alexander, in company and ultimately saved the flagship from destruction. 469 ADM 1/5425 Loss of HMS Defense. 208 men, only seven survived, and then only with the assistance of the local residents, who risked their own lives to rescue their exhausted foes. Five hours after St. George ran aground, the elderly Defense470 followed suit, not far from the flagship. The impact was particularly violent and waves broached over the ship, sweeping several crewmembers overboard. Atkins ordered that several of ship’s guns be fired on a periodic basis, both as a means of identifying their location and to signal for assistance. Unfortunately, high waves continued to pound the ship apart, killing and injuring sailors and making an orderly evacuation impossible. Like St. George, the death toll was appallingly high, and only six of the ship’s original complement of 600 was able to make their way to the beach, where they too benefited from the care and compassion of the Danish populace. Indeed, it would be from the Danes that the Admiralty received first conformation of the loss of both ships. On the 21st of January a boat sailing under a flag of truce arrived at Anholt and delivered a message to Captain Maurice. It was a report written by Danish Major-General Tellequist who had supervised the search and recovery efforts along that stretch of coastline. He lamented that the storm-driven waves had made it impossible for the populace to render any rescue, although the thirteen survivors were receiving all necessary care. Tellequist also explained that among the bodies recovered was that of Captain Atkins and that he had been buried with full military honors.471 The loss of two major warships, with almost their entire companies, represented the heaviest loss suffered by the Baltic Fleet in its entire four-year deployment. Sadly, the list of tragedies was not yet complete as the third squadron was still locked in the grip of the same storm that had claimed St. George and Defence.

Loss of Hero and Grasshopper Like Reynolds’ squadron, the convoy returned to Vinga, departing again on the 18th of December. This time the convoy divided itself, with the merchant ships bound for the North of England sailing due west escorted by Egeria and Prince William while eighteen ships headed for the Thames and Portsmouth took a south-westerly heading protected by Hero and Grasshopper. While the winds buffeting them was slightly less intensive than the ships in the north

470 Built two years before Victory, Defense had also participated in nearly every major fleet action of the Napoleonic Wars. 471 Ross, Memoirs, Pg. 262. 209 experienced, they had to contend with showers of sleet and snow, which hindered visibility. Under such conditions, it was impossible for the convoy to maintain cohesion and the ships became badly scattered. At noon on the 23rd of December the two warships came within hailing distance. Captain James Newman of Hero estimated their position at being just north of the 54th parallel of latitude, in waters known as the Great Silver Pits. He announced that he intended to sail to the South- South West and use the prevailing winds to carry them to the Channel. As senior officer, Grasshopper and any merchant ship within sight was obliged to follow suit. Unfortunately, Newman had miscalculated and was in fact some 90 miles to the east of his estimated position. This meant that a course of South-South-West would take the ships not to the Channel, but rather the Dutch Texel coast, to be specific the Haak Sands, which had claimed Minotaur almost exactly a year before. It also meant that as the weather worsened, there would be little sea room for the ships to maneuver. At ten that evening Newman, still believing that he was further west that he actually was, ordered the ships to steer two points to port. As Grasshopper’s captain later recounted visibility had been so reduced that only four merchant ships could be seen, and then only briefly. At around half past three in the morning, lookouts reported breakers an indication of shallow water. Hastily, the anchor was let go and the in the distance, the crew could see and hear blue distress lights and signal guns, presumably coming from Hero. It would not be until the morning that the full extent of the situation was seen. Hero had indeed driven aground on Haak’s Sand and lay dismasted and on her lardboard beam. Also nearby was the wreck of at least one of the convoy’s ships and like the big Third Rate the hull was being battered apart by the storm waves, which also prevented the flotilla of Dutch craft wishing to render assistance. As for Grasshopper, the brig’s condition was less dire, although equally problematic. In trying to refloat herself, Grasshopper had actually passed the off-shore sandbar and was now inside the inland waters of the Dutch Helder. With the surf making escape impossible, the commander of the ship had no choice but to surrender to Dutch authorities, a decision that was confirmed by the inevitable court-martial, which absolved both commander and crew of all blame.472

472 ADM 1/5436 Loss of Grasshopper. 210

As for Hero, the combination of high seas and winds prevented not only rescue, but also nearly all attempts at rescue. Only twelve men out of an original crew of 530 managed to make their way ashore, were they were taken prisoner by the Dutch. Like the Danes, the Dutch saw the survivors not as the enemy, but rather as fellow mariners is distress and although technically prisoners-of-war, there was considerable praise for the compassionate and sympathetic care offered by the Dutch people.

Finding Blame The British public greeted the loss of almost 2000 British sailors, twice the number of those killed at the battles of Cape St. Vincent, Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar combined, with shock and outrage. Officially, the Admiralty regarded the losses as resulting from the “perils of the sea,” and in subsequent courts-martial, chose not to assign blame to any one individual. Yet, it could be argued that at least some measure of human judgment, if not over- confidence, played no small role in the various tragedies. For example there was the insistence of Rear-Admiral Reynolds’ and Captain Guion that St. George was capable for making the voyage, despite her jury-rigged masts and temporary rudder. It was an assessment totally in keeping with the professional confidence expected from officers of the Royal Navy. However, in light of subsequent events it is clear that their belief in the fundamental seaworthiness of their ship was, at best, less than objective and not reflective of the severity of winter storms of the North Sea, a fact that would have been known to both officers, being veterans of several years of service in the region. There is also the matter of Reynolds’ lack of signals to Cressy and Defense on the 23rd of December. Even taking into account the natural desire on the part of Reynolds to assist Guion473 in regaining control of the ship, as a Flag-Officer Reynolds’ responsibility was to the other ships in his squadron, and to respond to their request for instructions. By failing to do so, Reynolds passed the initiative to the respective ship’s captains, to make their decisions based on their own perceptions and motivations. The disaster of the winter of 1811 underscores the point that throughout the Age of Sail, the weather was a far greater threat to the Royal Navy than all their enemies combined. Ironically, it was the Navy’s very success that exacerbated the threat of nature, as it required a

473 Who was not only Reynold’s Flag-Captain, but his cousin as well. 211 greater commitment of British ships to maintain and protect their global interests. And while planning and the high degree of skill and experience could, and often did, lessen the danger, it could not eliminate it altogether. It was, in the end, part of the price of naval supremacy.

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CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular belief, Britain’s struggle for survival did not end in the 1805 in the waters off south-west Spain. Nor was British control of the seas concluded with the destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet. In fact, a protracted, complicated challenge occurred from 1807 to 1812 in the northern waters of the Baltic. It was here that the resources so vital to the survival of Great Britain were located and unlike her overseas empire, British access to these resources was by no means assured. Yet, it was here that the British not only fended off the economic threat of the Continental System, but exposed its weaknesses, exploited its vulnerabilities and undermined French hegemony and assertion of imperial authority. For the various participants in the drama of the Baltic campaign, the end of the Napoleonic Wars brought a curious mixture of triumph and disappointment. In the case of Russia, the acquisition of Finland from Sweden largely avenged their defeat at the hands of the latter in 1790, while greatly enhancing the security of St. Petersberg. In addition, despite a brief dalliance as a French ally, Russia returned to the anti-Napoleon coalition as a Great Power with all the privileges and influence that implies. Yet, it remained a relatively isolated Empire, with access to the outside world dependent on the largess of others, particularly the British. As for Sweden, they would not only see the loss of almost half its domain, but with the deposing of Gustavus IV the end of the Vasa Dynasty. To the chagrin of the remnant of the pro- French lobby, neither the new King, Charles XIII nor his heir, the former Marshal Jean Bernadotte demonstrated any particular loyalty to Napoleon, abandoning their alliance with the French Emperor and joining the Sixth Coalition. As a reward, Sweden gained Norway, exchanging it for Pomerania in the 1814 Treaty of Kiel. Thus, the ambition of the former monarch Gustavus IV, were finally realized. This arrangement though did not sit well with the Norwegians, who took the opportunity to declare their independence, naming as their monarch the Danish Crown Prince Frederick. In

213 response, King Charles authorized Bernadotte to lead an army on an invasion of what was his ducal home. After a brief and relatively bloodless campaign, the Norwegians “surrendered,” although they did retain much of the local autonomy they had previously enjoyed with Denmark. In many ways, the most unfortunate, even tragic of the Baltic nations was Denmark. The beginning of the Napoleonic Wars saw that nation prosperous, respected and neutral. However, like similar nations throughout history, Danish neutrality was maintained, not through force of arms, but because it was in the interests of greater powers to allow it to continue. When those circumstances changed and Denmark found itself on the firing line, it was unable to maintain its neutrality and was “forced” into belligerence, although given its bellicose assertion of “neutral’s rights” and protest over British blockade polices, it would be an exaggeration to assert that Denmark was completely innocent. Then there is Great Britain. For decades British leaders had been aware of the vital importance of the Baltic in supplying the nation with the materials so necessary to its economic and strategic survival. Time and again, Britain intervened in Baltic affairs and sought to maintain a balance of regional power that would allow the continued flow of naval stores, enduring profit-cutting tariffs and high prices. By 1807 though, a series of disastrous policies formulated by short-sighted politicians, coupled with the battlefield successes of the Emperor Napoleon saw Britain on the verge of losing access to the Baltic market. In desperation, the new Foreign Minister Lord Canning, undertook a risky endeavor intended to restore British prestige while persuading the Baltic nations that Britain was still a power to be reckoned with. This was the 1807 attack on Copenhagen, traditionally, but mistakenly described as a reaction to a secret agreement in the Treaty of Tilsit to turn over the Danish fleet to France. Although tactically successful, the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen proved to be a lesson that complex strategic problems could not always be solved with a sudden, decisive blow. Rather, Copenhagen demonstrated that a hastily-conceived and planned operation often raised more issues than it resolved. Finally, this leads to the legacy established by the operations of the British Baltic Fleet over the ensuing four years. Originally conceived as a stop-gap gesture to defend Britain’s remaining northern ally from invasion, the Baltic Fleet became the epitome of the purpose of naval power. From 1808-1812 under the command of James Saumarez, the Royal Navy not only

214 defended a friendly coast from attack, they also kept open the lanes of trade and communication, rebuilt relations with local governments and above all, ensured the economic and political survival of Great Britain at a time when they stood effectively alone against a determined foe. To be certain, such success did not come cheap. Ships were sunk and lives lost both to enemy action and to the hostility of the sea itself. Such losses were made all the dearer as after twelve years of war, both ships and men were in increasingly short supply and greater demand. Sadly, such service and sacrifice have gone largely unnoticed by history, although a sailor who drowned in the waters of Haak Sands, or died in action against Danish galleys in the Kattegat is no less heroic than one killed on the quarterdeck of a ship at Trafalgar. All three have contributed to the security and prosperity of their nation and as such, is deserving of notice and remembrance. Almost as important, the efforts of the Baltic Fleet prove that the impact and influence of naval power on the Napoleonic Wars did not end at 1805. That Britain’s maritime struggle against France was more than the occasional clash of fleets. Instead, British naval dominance was achieved through the seemingly mundane, day-to-day tasks of patrol, convoy escort and trade protection. And while leaders such as James Gambier, Samuel Hood, Richard Keats and above all James Saumarez lacked the inspired leadership and romantic dash of Horatio Nelson, they were nevertheless men of courage, talent and determination who made their own individual contribution to Britain’s final triumph. It is also perhaps fitting that the flagship of the Baltic Fleet was HMS Victory.

215

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David J. Raymond

David J. Raymond was born in Hawaii, and attributes his interest in Naval History to a combination of being raised in the shadow of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and a fascination with the works of C.S. Forester and Alexander Kent. A 1998 graduate of Hawaii Pacific University with degrees in History, Humanities and International Relations, David went on to earn a Master’s and Doctorate degrees in European History at Florida State University. David’s interests includes reading, traveling and studying all aspects of Military History with the sincere hope that someday his knowledge may only be applicable in the past tense.

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