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Operation in Iraq OPERATIONS IN IRAQ Lessons for the Future IRAQ PUBLISHED DECEMBER 2003 Produced by Directorate General Corporate Communication Design by Directorate of Corporate Communications DCCS (Pubs) London Contents Foreword 2 Chapter 1 - Introduction 3 Chapter 2 - Planning and Force Generation 5 Chapter 3 - Lessons from the Operation 8 - The Al Faw Peninsula Operation 11 - Trends from Recent Operations: Some Signposts to the Future 13 Chapter 4 - The Maritime Environment 15 - Mine Counter Measures Operations 19 Chapter 5 - The Land Environment 21 - The Battle for Basrah 25 Chapter 6 - The Air Environment 27 - The RAF Campaign 32 Chapter 7 - Working in a Coalition 34 Chapter 8 - Logistics 38 - Fighting in the Desert 44 Chapter 9 - People 47 Chapter 10 - The Information Campaign 57 Chapter 11 - Post-Conflict Operations 61 Chapter 12 - Drawdown, Recuperation and Costs 70 Annex A - Chronology 73 Annex B - Forces Deployed 77 Annex C - Statistics 84 Foreword by the Secretary of State for Defence In July this year, the Ministry of Defence published an account of the coalition military operation against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq together with some early indicators of lessons for the future1. In my foreword to that report, I promised to publish a fuller report after a thorough examination of all aspects of the operation. Since then a substantial number of UK Servicemen and women, supported by MOD civilian staff, have continued to undertake vital operations in Iraq. They are working with UK personnel from other Government Departments, contractors and non-Governmental organisations and with colleagues from 32 other nations to bring security and stability to the country, facilitate national recovery and to restore government to the Iraqi people. This has been difficult and often dangerous work in harsh conditions, and sadly, a number of our Service personnel as well as those from coalition partners and civilians have lost their lives in pursuit of these aims. The successful generation and deployment of a large-scale UK force contribution to coalition operations in Iraq was all the more creditable when viewed against the other tasks the Armed Forces continued to meet at the same time such as providing emergency cover for the Fire Brigade strike, as well as commitments in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. This report presents the conclusions of our analysis of the Iraq operation to the end of the combat phase and the early post-conflict period and identifies the key lessons we can draw for the future. It also provides an account of the excellent further work our Armed Forces have undertaken since the end of combat operations. There are lessons at all levels, from strategic policy to unit procedures, setting out both what went well and the areas where we could do better. We have also examined how the military contribution fitted into the wider Government and coalition approach to Iraq. We will consider all these lessons carefully in our planning and procedures, so that the conduct of operations in the future can gain the maximum benefit from the experience of today. But the clear message that emerges from this operation - as from others in recent years - is that of the enduring courage, determination and professionalism of our Servicemen and women in carrying out this country’s commitment to act as a force for good in an uncertain world. 1 Operations In Iraq - First Reflections Published 7 July 2003 2 3 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1.1 Earlier this year, some 46,000 UK Servicemen and women joined a US-led coalition in military operations against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The campaign began on 20 March, and by 1 May President Bush had declared the end of major combat operations, although the regime had been removed and most of Iraq taken under coalition control after just four weeks. The background to the conflict, and the planning, deployment and combat phases of the operation, together with some early lessons identified, were described in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) report “Operations in Iraq – First Reflections”2 (hereafter referred to as First Reflections). This report provides a deeper analysis of the lessons we have drawn from the operation, together with a more detailed insight into particular combat missions, and describes the continuing coalition operation to bring stability and regeneration to Iraq since the end of the combat phase. The MOD Lessons Process 1.2 MOD has a well-established and comprehensive process for identifying and implementing the lessons from operations. This requires all Service units, MOD directorates and agencies directly involved in an operation, whether in theatre or elsewhere, to submit frank reports via the chain of command on their experiences. Such reports highlight areas where things worked well, but there is a deliberate focus on identifying lessons in areas where we need to continue to improve in the future. This process culminates in an overall internal report on the operation. The subsequent implementation of the lessons identified, where necessary and possible, is then closely monitored. This publication, with the earlier First Reflections report, represents the Department’s account to Parliament and the public on the results of that process for operations in Iraq. 1.3 The identification and evaluation of lessons from operations takes time. It is important neither to make snap judgements, nor to take inappropriate action in response to lessons that may be unique to the circumstances of a particular operation. Moreover, it is essential to gather and analyse evidence to support individual lessons. Careful judgements then have to be made as to what action should be taken in response to lessons that have been identified. The defence budget is finite, and difficult decisions are constantly required as to the prioritisation of demands on resources, taking into account factors such as business and operational risk. All lessons requiring action are allocated an ‘action lead’ to ensure they are implemented as soon as practicable or resources permit. 1.4 In drawing lessons from coalition operations in Iraq, it is important first to set the operation in context. This was primarily a US-shaped and led operation, with the UK force contribution adopted into US plans where it could best complement and enhance US capabilities. Coalition military capabilities effectively dominated the battlespace, such that Iraqi opposition was rapidly overcome. The operation was conducted at a time of the coalition’s choosing, and coalition forces enjoyed technical superiority in nearly all areas. They could, for example, operate through most conditions of visibility and weather, day and night. Moreover, the Iraqi armed forces had been seriously weakened during the first Gulf Conflict and by over a decade of sanctions and containment, and failed to mount a co-ordinated defensive campaign in response to coalition attack. 2 Published 7 July 2003 3 1.5 Work now continues to identify the best and most cost-effective solution to address each of the lessons identified. As solutions are identified and validated, they will be implemented as rapidly as possible. A number of major reviews have been set in hand, and where these have already resulted in new policy they are outlined in this report. Other changes are even now benefiting the ongoing operations in Iraq, including the increase in mobilisation notice for reserves. Where solutions have significant cost implications, they will be taken forward into the Departmental planning round for consideration. The lessons process has also identified many areas of success, and here the process will be used to support and improve existing practice. As a result of these streams of work across the Department addressing all aspects of the operation, our experiences during the Iraq campaign will benefit future military operations and help to develop further the Armed Forces’ expeditionary strategy. A Fusilier gets to know the locals in Basrah 4 5 CHAPTER 2 – PLANNING AND FORCE GENERATION Key Lessons • The successful and rapid generation and deployment of a balanced joint force of 46,000 personnel was an exceptional achievement and confirmed MOD’s ability to deliver the UK’s expeditionary strategy. • Given the unpredictable nature of emerging operations, the Department needs to review its methodology for effectively generating appropriately trained and equipped forces at the necessary readiness to meet UK defence needs, consistent with this expeditionary strategy. • Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) were a key part of the planning process for the operation and contributed significantly to its success. • Not all capability gaps can be filled quickly under UOR action. We need therefore to consider key war-fighting capabilities and review the Equipment Programme to ensure that we can deliver them within planning timescales. • Development and evaluation processes required for task-specific equipment on more complex platforms should, where identified, be undertaken in advance if possible, to facilitate the achieving of operational capability in compressed timescales. • To be effective, the UOR process must deliver not just equipment, but operational capability. UOR procurement must therefore allow sufficient time for integration and training. Force Generation 2.1 The successful generation and deployment of a balanced joint force of 46,000 personnel confirmed MOD’s ability to deliver the UK’s expeditionary strategy – indeed, the deployment was at a larger scale and completed in shorter timelines than were allowed for in the way the Armed Forces are structured and resourced. This achievement was despite the complications of the uncertain diplomatic and political process in the run-up to the start of the operation and changes to the campaign plan which meant UK forces would operate in the south, not the north. Both factors had a significant effect on the smooth provision of deployed forces, ready for operations. Forces were generated in reduced timelines, using mechanisms and pragmatic solutions that by-passed readiness and resourcing assumptions, reflecting the commitment of our Service and civilian personnel.
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