The Combined Action Program During the Vietnam War
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Always a Marine” Men’S Hoodie for Me City State Zip in the Size Indicated Below As Described in This Announcement
MAGAZINE OF THE MARINES 4 1 0 2 LY U J Leathernwwew.mca-marcines.org/lekatherneck Happy Birthday, America Iraq 2004: Firefghts in the “City of Mosques” Riding With the Mounted Color Guard Settling Scores: The Battle to Take Back Guam A Publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation Cov1.indd 1 6/12/14 12:04 PM Welcome to Leatherneck Magazine’s Digital Edition July 2014 We hope you are continuing to enjoy the digital edition of Leatherneck with its added content and custom links to related information. Our commitment to expanding our digital offerings continues to refect progress. Also, access to added content is available via our website at www.mca- marines.org/leatherneck and you will fnd reading your Leatherneck much easier on smartphones and tablets. Our focus of effort has been on improving our offerings on the Internet, so we want to hear from you. How are we doing? Let us know at: [email protected]. Thank you for your continuing support. Semper Fidelis, Col Mary H. Reinwald, USMC (Ret) Editor How do I navigate through this digital edition? Click here. L If you need your username and password, call 1-866-622-1775. Welcome Page Single R New Style.indd 2 6/12/14 11:58 AM ALWAYS FAITHFUL. ALWAYS READY. Cov2.indd 1 6/9/14 10:31 AM JULY 2014, VOL. XCVII, No. 7 Contents LEATHERNECK—MAGAZINE OF THE MARINES FEATURES 10 The In-Between: Touring the Korean DMZ 30 100 Years Ago: Marines at Vera Cruz By Roxanne Baker By J. -
From Stalingrad to Khe Sanh: Factors in the Successful Use of Tactical Airlift to Support Isolated Land Battle Areas
From Stalingrad to Khe Sanh: Factors in the Successful Use of Tactical Airlift to Support Isolated Land Battle Areas Dr. David K. Vaughan, Air Force Institute of Technology Major James H. Donoho, Air Combat Command In the last several years, the U. S. Air Force has provided key aerial logistics support for a number of relatively isolated locations where the threat of hostile fire has existed, including Tuzla and Mogadishu. Our airlift forces have been fortunate in that they have been able to conduct their operations into these remote locations successfully and, for the most part, safely. In crucial situations, necessary supplies—ammunition, food, fuel, equipment—are usually delivered by tactical airlift aircraft. From the earliest days, tactical airlift has tried to keep the losses small while delivering the greatest amount of supplies to the people who need it. Unfortunately, in spite of the best intentions of operational planners, that goal is not easily achieved. An examination of three instances should help to illustrate this fact and to suggest some essential aspects of successful tactical airlift in crisis situations. Three twentieth century land battles stand out for the role played by tactical airlift in affecting the outcome: the battle for Stalingrad in 1942-43, the siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and the attack on Khe Sanh in 1968. In each of these three cases, the units under siege were located at some distance (100-200 miles) from their supply bases. Attempts were made in each situation to supply the besieged units through the use of airlift. In each case, the duration of the airlift support effort was about two months. -
W Vietnam Service Report
Honoring Our Vietnam War and Vietnam Era Veterans February 28, 1961 - May 7, 1975 Town of West Seneca, New York Name: WAILAND Hometown: CHEEKTOWAGA FRANK J. Address: Vietnam Era Vietnam War Veteran Year Entered: 1968 Service Branch:ARMY Rank: SP-5 Year Discharged: 1971 Unit / Squadron: 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION Medals / Citations: NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE RIBBON VIETNAM SERVICE MEDAL VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL WITH '60 DEVICE ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL 2 OVERSEAS SERVICE BARS SHARPSHOOTER BADGE: M-16 RIFLE EXPERT BADGE: M-14 RIFLE Served in War Zone Theater of Operations / Assignment: VIETNAM Service Notes: Base Assignments: Fort Belvoir, Virginia - The base was founded during World War I as Camp A. A. Humphreys, named for Union Civil War general Andrew A. Humphreys, who was also Chief of Engineers / The post was renamed Fort Belvoir in the 1930s in recognition of the Belvoir plantation that once occupied the site, but the adjacent United States Army Corps of Engineers Humphreys Engineer Center retains part of the original name / Fort Belvoir was initially the home of the Army Engineer School prior to its relocation in the 1980s to Fort Leonard Wood, in Missouri / Fort Belvoir serves as the headquarters for the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Acquisition University, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Technical Information Center, the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, the United States Army Military Intelligence Readiness Command, the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, all agencies of the United States Department of Defense Lai Khe, Vietnam - Also known as Lai Khê Base, Lai Khe was a former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. -
Vietnam: Tet Offensive Resource Packet
Virginians at War Vietnam: Tet Offensive Resource Packet Contains: Glossary, Timeline, Images, Discussion Questions, Additional Resources Program Description: Virginians at War: The Tet Offensive explores the experience of Virginians that fought during the critical Tet Offensive in 1968, a turning point of the Vietnam War. Launched by the North Vietnamese Army on 30 January, the coordinated attack against thirteen different provincial capitals throughout South Vietnam took Americans and South Vietnamese by surprise. The result was a costly, long campaign that ended in a hard –fought military victory for the United States and South Vietnamese. However, the outcome of the campaign had a significantly negative impact on support for the war in the United States, from which the nation would not fully recover. Copyright: Virginia War Memorial Foundation, 2006 Length: 18:59 Streaming link: https://vimeo.com/367038067 Featured Speakers: MSG Lonnie S. Ashton, Montross SPC Orthea Harcum, Richmond MSG Lauren P. Bands, Colonial Heights LT Hugh D. Keogh, Midlothian COL Robert C. Barrett, Jr., Colonial Heights SGT Prentis Lee, Clifton LT COL Frank S. Blair, Richmond SP/4 Powhatan “Red Cloud” Owen, Charles City MSG Charles M. Carter, Warsaw SGM Douglass I. Randolph, Charlotte Court House SGT Earl E. Cousins, Ashland MAJ John A. Rawls, M.D., Mechanicsville CPT James H. Dement, Jr., Richmond 1st LT Cathie Lynn Solomonson, R.N., Woodbridge 1st LT Daniel G. Doyle, Richmond 1st LT James F. Walker, Roanoke LT COL John D. Edgerton, Williamsburg For a transcript of this program and more information on the Vietnam War, please visit vawarmemorial.org/learn/resources/vietnam. -
Combined Action Platoons: a Strategy for Peace Enforcement
Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement CSC 1996 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement Author: Major Brooks R. Brewington, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The concept of the Combined Action Platoon, as it evolved in Vietnam, has potential applications in operations other than war, particularly Chapter VII UN Peace Enforcement missions. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, cites the Combined Action Program as an example of a short-lived but successful concept. If the Combined Action Platoons were successful, then how would the concept interface with today's doctrine in Peace Keeping/Enforcement missions? Discussion: Earlier this century, the Marine Corps was often called "State Department's troops," and during the 1960's the term "Ambassadors in Green" was used. As the budget dictates a smaller force with no foreseeable respite in overseas commitments, the Marines are searching for a model to handle this challenge. Operations such as those conducted in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are becoming the norm and provide an environment for a CAP-style operation to be successfully employed. Sea Dragon may be the Marine Corp's second generation of a CAP-style operation that handles the challenges of reduction in forces and commitments. The lessons learned from the CAP experience is that the use of firepower is only half of the pacification equation. The other half, as highlighted in the Small Wars Manual, is, in order to have long-term success, winning the trust of the indiginous population is a priority and must occur. For a short time in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program did just that by denying the enemy a safe haven in the local village and hamlets. -
Wall Note Sixteen: 2012 Vietnam Veterans Memorial Interventions
WALL NOTE SIXTEEN: 2012 VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL INTERVENTIONS DANIEL R. ARANT [email protected] DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 MAY 2012 01. PURPOSE. This Wall Note lists the names and locations of the twenty-three service members that compose the 2012 Wall Interventions. The names are divided into three categories: (01) Name Additions, (02) Status Changes, and (03) a Spelling Correction. As in previous years, the original 2012 VVMF list included the names of those whose remains were returned and identified and who already had a diamond symbol; the final 2012 VVMF Interventions list did not include this category. Since I already did most of the research regarding these names, I include them in this Wall Note; their stories include examples of the methodology of how remains are returned and identified. Paragraph 05 contains: (01) a list of all the names, (02) date of incident, (03) date of death, (04) date remains were returned, and (05) date remains were identified. Paragraphs 06 and 07 contain a chronological description of the incidents associated with each name. This information may be helpful for rangers and volunteers to answer Wall visitor questions. A. For the “down-in-the-weeds” readers, “value-added” Indochina historical comments may be found in paragraphs: (01) 06.B. (26 May 1966 Incident), (02) 07.A. (15 March 1966 Incident), (03) 07.D. (03 July 1966 Incident), (04) 07.I. (07 February 1968 Incident), and (05) 08. A Special Note. 02. DISCLAIMER. This Wall Note is not an official publication of the U.S. National Park Service (USNPS), the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF), or the Department of Defense (DOD). -
Vietnam WAR Fact Sheet
Vietnam WAR Fact Sheet † US Troops Who Served in South Vietnam January 1965 – March 1973: 2,594,000 * US Troops from Wisconsin who served in Vietnam: 165,400 * Surviving Vietnam Veterans who are disabled: 11% Average age of the Vietnam War GI: † 19 US Casualties † Killed in Action 47,418 Non-hostile Deaths 10,811 Hospitalized Wounded 153,329 Non-Hospitalized Wounded 150,375 Missing in Action 2338 (at war’s end) Prisoners of War 766 (114 died in captivity) Wisconsin Casualties Killed in Action ‡ 1241 – Missing in Action # 37 Timeline 1950 – 1975 † Beginning of US advisory war in Vietnam. AUG 1950 Battle of Dien Bien Phu. First US casualties in advisory war. MAR – MAY 1954 Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Beginning of US combat operations. AUG 1964 First US POW taken. Operation Rolling Thunder begins bombing raids on North Vietnam. MAR 1965 Marines land at Da Nang. Start of the ground war. MAR 1965 Operation Game Warden begins US Navy inland waterway interdiction. APR 1966 Battle of Khe Sanh. Marines come under siege for 77 days. US KIA 205. JAN – APR 1968 Tet Offensive. US KIA 3,895. Turning point in the war. JAN – FEB 1968 Operation Rolling Thunder Ends. OCT 1968 Battle of Hamburger Hill. After 11 assaults, 1000 troops of the 101st Airborne MAY 1969 capture Hill 937 in the A Shau Valley. US KIA 70. US Navy ends inland waterway combat. DEC 1970 Operation Linebacker/Linebacker I/Linebacker II. Throughout 1972 Concentrated bombing of North Vietnam. Operation Homecoming begins. Release of US POWs. FEB 1973 Last US Ground Troops Leave Vietnam. -
Martial Brilliance Or Marine Corps Propaganda? the Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War
Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 8 11-2019 Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War Beta Scarpaci Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Scarpaci, Beta (2019) "Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War," Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2019.090208 Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol9/iss2/8 This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Scarpaci: Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War Bret Scarpaci Marquette University (Milwaukee, Wisconsin) Historians and military thinkers alike are fascinated with the Vietnam War given its status as one of the few engagements in American military history in which the United States failed to achieve its strategic and political policy objectives. Much attention is paid to the military policies implemented during the war aimed at neutralizing the guerilla threat, propping up the government in Saigon, and pacifying South Vietnam. The prevailing strategy during the war, Search and Destroy, was championed by political and military leaders alike. The strategy is nearly self-explanatory; conventional line units would conduct operations throughout the jungles, hills, and rice paddies of South Vietnam with one goal in mind: to make contact with and destroy the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) units operating in the region. -
Report – Part 2 of 7)
Initial Environmental Examination (Main Report – Part 2 of 7) Project Number: 54211-001 March 2021 Document Stage: Draft Viet Nam: Lotus Wind Power Project Prepared by ERM Vietnam for Lien Lap Wind Power Joint Stock Company, Phong Huy Wind Power Joint Stock Company, and Phong Nguyen Wind Power Joint Stock Company as a requirement of the Asian Development Bank. The initial environmental examination is a document of the borrower. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of ADB's Board of Directors, Management, or staff, and may be preliminary in nature. Your attention is directed to the “Terms of Use” section of this website. In preparing any country program or strategy, financing any project, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, the Asian Development Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK DRAFT INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL EXAMINATION Phong Nguyen Wind Farm Project 3.3.2.3 Involuntary Resettlement Requirements The involuntary resettlement impacts of an ADB – supported project are considered significant if 200 or more persons will be physically displaced from home or lose 10% or more of their productive or income- generating assets For those involving involuntary resettlement, a resettlement plan is prepared that is commensurate with the extent and degree of the impacts: the scope of physical and economic displacement and the vulnerability of the affected persons. The ADB Operations Manual Section F1 describes the categories for SR2: Involuntary Resettlement, and are summarized below: Category A: A proposed project is classified as Category A if it is likely to have significant involuntary resettlement impacts. -
Sufficiency Economy: Making a Virtue out of Low Level Reciprocity
Remembering your Feet: Imaginings and Lifecourses in Northeast Thailand Susan Upton A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Bath Department of Social and Policy Sciences August 2010 COPYRIGHT Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author. This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation. 1 Dedication This thesis is for my mum, Mary. 2 Contents TABLE OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................9 MAP OF THAILAND ........................................................................................................................ 11 MAP OF NORTHEAST THAILAND ................................................................................................... 12 MAP OF MUKDAHAN PROVINCE ................................................................................................... 13 MAP OF BAN DONG VILLAGE ....................................................................................................... -
Media Coverage of the War
Media Coverage of the War No Censorship The ability of the news media to be present throughout Vietnam and cover the war without censorship was unique - - such reporting freedom did not exist before that conflict and hasn’t since. The absence of censorship appears to have been a development that was not given a great deal of thought - - somewhat like the war itself. Under the Kennedy Administration, with relatively few boots on the ground and scarcely any US reporters on the scene, press coverage of events in Vietnam was sparse until the Buddhist protests against Diem’s policies. And in the Administration belated and bungled reaction to that crisis, press censorship was apparently not considered. President Johnson’s efforts to downplay the seriousness of the conflict and paint a rosy picture of Vietnam was a major factor in his administration’s decision not to impose some form of censorship - - since censorship might alert Congress and the public that the US effort was not going as well as the White House said it was. In addition, until 1967 press coverage of America’s conduct of the war was generally very positive. Even reporters who were critical of the military’s conduct of the war, such as Neil Sheehan or David Halberstam in their accounts of the battle of An Bac in 1963, didn’t question the underlying purpose of the war until much later. In Armies of the Night, published in early 1968, Norman Mailer portrayed the mainstream press as highly critical of the anti- war movement and almost a cheerleader for the Johnson Administration. -
3Dmarine Division Fmf (-) (Rein)
DECLASSIFIED SAMARINED 3DMARINE DIVISION FMF (-) (REIN) / MMA OC vv"ND5.u twRoMUNOLOGY for the month of JULY, 19*69 NcOa qSI~LAS9RE~ DECLASSIFIED I DECLASSIFIED 9 28/rad 5750 ~1 i U b S mus NOV 0 5 188 ,(Unclassified upon removal of the basic letter) SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3/WEB/rwb over 5750 Ser: 003A25869 dtd 15 September 1969 From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D) Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 July 1969 1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith. R. D. WHITE By direction Copy to: CG, 3d MarDiv CG, III MAF 0WASS";F,E gji 3 4 DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED SECRET 3K/Jld 5750/1 Ser: UNC IAIjJ 12 OCT 1969 (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter) 0 011 7 3 6 9 FIRST ENDORSEMENT on OG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3/WEB/rwb over 5750 Seri 003A25869 of 15 Sep 1969 From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force Tos Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D) Via: Commanding General, IFleet Marine Force, Pacific Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 through 31 July 1969 (U) 1. Forwarded. BY ODRE0CTIO Copy to: CG, 3d MarDiv ),, 00 I 2 eelFII COPY N4 OF/OFJ COPIES DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS -3dMarli Division (-)(ItRein), MP FPO San Prancisco 96602 3,/WEB/rwb 5750 Seri 003A25669 lf1 St' V4 .classified-ii when enclosureo removed Prou5 ComandMitig General Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3D) vis.$Toia 1) 0Co-•iding General, III Marine Amphibious Force 2 Oommrdln General, sFleet Marine Force Pacific Sub ,is Command Chronoloff for period 1 through 31 July 1969 (U) Reals ( WO P5750.1A b MPACO 5750.SA •n,lsI(1) 3d Marine Division (-)(R•ein), PNMP Command Chronology 1.