DOCSLIB.ORG

Mills, Jeffrey 11-18-15

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mills, Jeffrey 11-18-15 No Path to Victory: MACV in Vietnam 1964-1968 A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Jeffrey P. Mills December 2015 © 2015 Jeffrey P. Mills. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled No Path to Victory: MACV in Vietnam 1964-1968 by JEFFREY P. MILLS has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Ingo W. Trauschweizer Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT MILLS, JEFFREY P., M.A., December 2015, History No Path to Victory: MACV in Vietnam 1964-1968 Director of Thesis: Ingo W. Trauschweizer The scholarship regarding US policy and military strategy in Vietnam is substantial, and by no means conclusive. To provide clear focus within the realms of national policy and military strategy, the analysis provided by this thesis is focused on the advice and actions taken by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and its commander General William Westmoreland from 1964 to 1968. Within the actions of MACV, this thesis seeks to determine the contribution of MACV in the decision to escalate US involvement in the Vietnam War. This thesis analyzes the US Army’s doctrine, structure, and culture related to civil-military relations. Also, this thesis analyzes the military approach taken by MACV in fighting the Vietnam War at the operational level, and concludes with an analysis of a possible alternative to MACV’s military strategy in the form of the Combined Action Program (CAP). This thesis concludes that MACV’s operational approach was correct. 4 DEDICATION For my family, who make everything possible. May my words bring answers to some, and inspiration to others. 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Ingo Traushweizer, for his support and patience in guiding me through the process of developing this thesis. His mentorship and patience have been invaluable in forcing me to think in far broader terms than I thought possible. I also wish to acknowledge the administrators and professors of the Ohio University History Department for challenging my preconceived notions, and providing me the opportunity to grow as a scholar and person. Additionally, I wish to acknowledge the outstanding support I received from my peers. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife Brittany, and children Grayson and Myla, for their patience, encouragement and support that enabled me to complete my thesis. Without the support of my family this project would have been impossible. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 3 Dedication ............................................................................................................................ 4 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................... 5 List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... 8 Introduction: No Path to Victory: MACV in Vietnam 1964-1968 ...................................... 9 Chapter 1: The Role of MACV in the Decision to Escalate in Vietnam .......................... 15 The U.S. Army in a Cold War Context ......................................................................... 16 U.S. Army Cold War Counterinsurgency Doctrine ................................................... 19 Civil-Military Relations: A Clear Divide ...................................................................... 25 The Chain of Command ................................................................................................ 29 NSAM 288 .................................................................................................................... 34 Military Advice 1964 and 1965 ..................................................................................... 38 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 45 Chapter 2: Westmoreland’s War in South Vietnam 1965-1967 ........................................ 46 Critics of Westmoreland’s Strategy ............................................................................... 46 The Army Learning and Preparing ............................................................................ 50 The Value of Education and Training ....................................................................... 52 The Man, the Myth, the Legend ................................................................................ 55 Malaya is not Vietnam ............................................................................................... 57 The Enemy Has a Say ................................................................................................ 60 Pacification, Advising, and Search and Destroy: A Balancing Act 1965 ..................... 63 1966 ............................................................................................................................... 68 1967 ............................................................................................................................... 72 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 3: The USMC Combined Action Platoons .......................................................... 80 Marines Arrive in Vietnam ............................................................................................ 80 The Marine Response ................................................................................................ 83 Birth of the CAP Program ............................................................................................. 85 CAP Purpose, Selection, Training, and Task Organization ...................................... 87 7 The ARVN and PF ........................................................................................................ 90 CAP Successes .............................................................................................................. 94 Why CAP Failed ............................................................................................................ 96 Doctrine ..................................................................................................................... 96 The Enemy ................................................................................................................. 99 South Vietnam: It Was Their Country ..................................................................... 101 The US Military…Good Intentions. ........................................................................ 104 Was CAP an Alternative? ............................................................................................ 108 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 110 Conclusion: 1968 to the Present ...................................................................................... 112 Abrams, Right Man, Right Strategy? .......................................................................... 112 Post-Vietnam Army ..................................................................................................... 115 Iraq—Vietnam, Part 2? ................................................................................................ 117 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 119 8 LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1. Command Structure for Politico-Military Decision Making ............................. 30 Figure 2. III MAF Area of Operations ............................................................................. 82 9 INTRODUCTION: NO PATH TO VICTORY: MACV IN VIETNAM 1964-1968 The scholarship regarding US policy and military strategy in Vietnam is substantial and by no means conclusive. To provide clear focus within the realms of national policy and military strategy, the analysis provided by this thesis is focused on the advice and actions taken by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and its commander General William Westmoreland from 1964 to 1968. The analysis of MACV and Westmoreland’s advice and actions are based on the relationships between US military doctrine, organization, training, and civil-military relations during the early 1960s. The purpose of this thesis to challenge the long held narratives of the Vietnam War put forth by Andrew Krepinevich, and supported by scholars Lewis Sorley and John Nagl. Theirs are narratives that continue to impact the dominant discourse related to the importance of counterinsurgency in contemporary US military operations. When approaching the topic of how the US fought the Vietnam War, there are many themes to choose from. Was Vietnam a policy failure? Was the failure of the US in Vietnam related to a flawed national and military strategy? Did an alternative exist to Westmoreland’s approach? The above questions are but a few of the questions scholars have attempted to answer regarding the defeat of the US in Vietnam. The problem with such questions is that they are broad and ignore the complexity of the situation faced by General Westmoreland in South Vietnam. In
Load more

Recommended publications
  • W Vietnam Service Report
    Honoring Our Vietnam War and Vietnam Era Veterans February 28, 1961 - May 7, 1975 Town of West Seneca, New York Name: WAILAND Hometown: CHEEKTOWAGA FRANK J. Address: Vietnam Era Vietnam War Veteran Year Entered: 1968 Service Branch:ARMY Rank: SP-5 Year Discharged: 1971 Unit / Squadron: 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION Medals / Citations: NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE RIBBON VIETNAM SERVICE MEDAL VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL WITH '60 DEVICE ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL 2 OVERSEAS SERVICE BARS SHARPSHOOTER BADGE: M-16 RIFLE EXPERT BADGE: M-14 RIFLE Served in War Zone Theater of Operations / Assignment: VIETNAM Service Notes: Base Assignments: Fort Belvoir, Virginia - The base was founded during World War I as Camp A. A. Humphreys, named for Union Civil War general Andrew A. Humphreys, who was also Chief of Engineers / The post was renamed Fort Belvoir in the 1930s in recognition of the Belvoir plantation that once occupied the site, but the adjacent United States Army Corps of Engineers Humphreys Engineer Center retains part of the original name / Fort Belvoir was initially the home of the Army Engineer School prior to its relocation in the 1980s to Fort Leonard Wood, in Missouri / Fort Belvoir serves as the headquarters for the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Acquisition University, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Technical Information Center, the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, the United States Army Military Intelligence Readiness Command, the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, all agencies of the United States Department of Defense Lai Khe, Vietnam - Also known as Lai Khê Base, Lai Khe was a former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Combined Action Platoons: a Strategy for Peace Enforcement
    Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement CSC 1996 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement Author: Major Brooks R. Brewington, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The concept of the Combined Action Platoon, as it evolved in Vietnam, has potential applications in operations other than war, particularly Chapter VII UN Peace Enforcement missions. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, cites the Combined Action Program as an example of a short-lived but successful concept. If the Combined Action Platoons were successful, then how would the concept interface with today's doctrine in Peace Keeping/Enforcement missions? Discussion: Earlier this century, the Marine Corps was often called "State Department's troops," and during the 1960's the term "Ambassadors in Green" was used. As the budget dictates a smaller force with no foreseeable respite in overseas commitments, the Marines are searching for a model to handle this challenge. Operations such as those conducted in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are becoming the norm and provide an environment for a CAP-style operation to be successfully employed. Sea Dragon may be the Marine Corp's second generation of a CAP-style operation that handles the challenges of reduction in forces and commitments. The lessons learned from the CAP experience is that the use of firepower is only half of the pacification equation. The other half, as highlighted in the Small Wars Manual, is, in order to have long-term success, winning the trust of the indiginous population is a priority and must occur. For a short time in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program did just that by denying the enemy a safe haven in the local village and hamlets.
    [Show full text]
  • Accounting for Counterinsurgency Doctrines As Solutions to Warfighting Failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
    The Essence of Desperation: Accounting for Counterinsurgency Doctrines as Solutions to Warfighting Failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan William Bryan Riddle Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Planning, Governance & Globalization Gerard Toal Timothy W. Luke Joel Peters Giselle Datz May 4, 2016 Alexandria, Virginia Keywords: Counterinsurgency, Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Geostrategic Reasoning, Narrative Analysis Copyright 2016 By William Bryan Riddle The Essence of Desperation: Accounting for Counterinsurgency Doctrines as Solutions to Warfighting Failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan William Bryan Riddle ABSTRACT Why does counterinsurgency emerge during periods of warfighting failure and in crisis situations? How is it conceptualized and legitimized? As the second counterinsurgency era for the United States military ends, how such a method of warfare arises, grips the military, policy makers and think tanks provides a tableau for examining how we conceptualize the strategy process and account for geostrategic change. This dissertation takes these puzzles as it object of inquiry and builds on the discursive- argumentative geopolitical reasoning and transactional social construction literatures to explore the ways in which the counterinsurgency narrative captures and stabilizes the policy boundaries of action. It conceptualizes strategy making as a function of defining the problem as one that policy can engage, as the meaning applied to an issue delimits the strategic options available. Once the problem is defined, narratives compete within the national security bureaucracy to overcome the political and strategic fragmentation and produce consensus. A narrative framework is applied to study counterinsurgency strategy during the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghan wars.
    [Show full text]
  • The Vietnam War: Critical Reviews by Mackubin Owens, Mark Moyar, & Lewis Sorley
    SYMPOSIUM BURNS & NOVICK’S THE VIETNAM WAR: CRITICAL REVIEWS BY MACKUBIN OWENS, MARK MOYAR, & LEWIS SORLEY wenty-eighteen marks the 50th Tanniversary of a number of critical events that transpired during the Vietnam War, including major fights such as the Battle of Khe Sanh, the Tet Offensive, and the Battle of Huế. Other incidents dominated the news as well, such as the release of American photographer Eddie Adams’ image, arguably misunderstood, of General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan executing a Viet Cong prisoner, and the American massacre of civilians at My Lai. In the light of all this, Walter Cronkite spoke for many when he urged an honorable departure from Vietnam, already predicting there would be no light at the end of the tunnel. Leading up to this anniversary milestone, it was an opportune time to investigate the the filmmakers Ken Burns and Lynn Novick counter-narrative to the prevailing views released a 10-part, 18-hour documentary en- regarding the Vietnam War. Following a series titled The Vietnam War. Airing in September of online reviews, interviews, and a panel 2017, the film is intended to be a simple dis- discussion at the Institute of World Politics, play of facts. Burns insists he will only be we’re pleased to have assembled a robust, if “calling balls and strikes.” Half an episode revisionist, view. The following symposium is in, however, attentive viewers are quickly drawn from an original review by Providence reminded of the subjective dimensions of contributing editor Mac Owens and from two umpiring. presentations delivered at the IWP event by Lewis Sorley and Mark Moyar, preeminent Believing that the first task of responsible scholars of the Vietnam War.
    [Show full text]
  • Martial Brilliance Or Marine Corps Propaganda? the Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War
    Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 8 11-2019 Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War Beta Scarpaci Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Scarpaci, Beta (2019) "Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War," Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2019.090208 Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol9/iss2/8 This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. Scarpaci: Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War Bret Scarpaci Marquette University (Milwaukee, Wisconsin) Historians and military thinkers alike are fascinated with the Vietnam War given its status as one of the few engagements in American military history in which the United States failed to achieve its strategic and political policy objectives. Much attention is paid to the military policies implemented during the war aimed at neutralizing the guerilla threat, propping up the government in Saigon, and pacifying South Vietnam. The prevailing strategy during the war, Search and Destroy, was championed by political and military leaders alike. The strategy is nearly self-explanatory; conventional line units would conduct operations throughout the jungles, hills, and rice paddies of South Vietnam with one goal in mind: to make contact with and destroy the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) units operating in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Commander-In-Chief Power
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2008 On the Commander-In-Chief Power David Luban Georgetown University Law Center, luband@law.georgetown.edu Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 1026302 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/598 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026302 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 477-571 (2008) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons ON THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER ∗ DAVID LUBAN BRADBURY: Obviously, the Hamdan decision, Senator, does implicitly recognize that we’re in a war, that the President’s war powers were triggered by the attacks on the country, and that [the] law of war paradigm applies. That’s what the whole case was about. LEAHY: Was the President right or was he wrong? BRADBURY: It’s under the law of war that we . LEAHY: Was the President right or was he wrong? BRADBURY: . hold the President is always right, Senator. —exchange between a U.S. Senator and a Justice Department 1 lawyer ∗ University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University. I owe thanks to John Partridge and Sebastian Kaplan-Sears for excellent research assistance; to Greg Reichberg, Bill Mengel, and Tim Sellers for clarifying several points of American, Roman, and military history; to Marty Lederman for innumerable helpful and critical conversations; and to Vicki Jackson, Paul Kahn, Larry Solum, and Amy Sepinwall for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
    [Show full text]
  • 42, the Erosion of Civilian Control Of
    'The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense or the US Government.'" UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY Develops and inspires air and space leaders with vision for tomorrow. The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today Richard H. Kohn University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History Number Forty-Two United States Air Force Academy Colorado 1999 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Lieutenant General Hubert Reilly Harmon Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon was one of several distinguished Army officers to come from the Harmon family. His father graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1880 and later served as Commandant of Cadets at the Pennsylvania Military Academy. Two older brothers, Kenneth and Millard, were members of the West Point class of 1910 and 1912, respectively. The former served as Chief of the San Francisco Ordnance District during World War II; the latter reached flag rank and was lost over the Pacific during World War II while serving as Commander of the Pacific Area Army Air Forces. Hubert Harmon, born on April 3, 1882, in Chester, Pennsylvania, followed in their footsteps and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1915. Dwight D. Eisenhower also graduated in this class, and nearly forty years later the two worked together to create the new United States Air Force Academy. Harmon left West Point with a commission in the Coast Artillery Corps, but he was able to enter the new Army air branch the following year.
    [Show full text]
  • The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations by Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 33 The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations by Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: General William Westmoreland luncheon meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson, The White House, April 6, 1968 (Yoichi Okamoto/ Courtesy LBJ Presidential Library/C9391-17A) The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations By Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 33 Series Editor: Thomas F. Lynch III National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. August 2020 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the State Department, Defense Department, or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Nixon's Path from Vietnam, Obama's
    HOW THIS ALL ENDS: NIXON’S PATH FROM VIETNAM, OBAMA’S AFGHAN GAMBLE AND FORGING PEACE FROM WAR A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Marc V. Schanz, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April 1, 2013 Copyright 2013 by Marc V. Schanz All Rights Reserved ii HOW THIS ALL ENDS: NIXON’S PATH FROM VIETNAM, OBAMA’S AFGHAN GAMBLE AND FORGING PEACE FROM WAR Marc V. Schanz, B.A. MALS Mentor: Prof. Pamela Sodhy, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This thesis is a conflicts study - but rather than primarily examining origins or conduct, it aims to explore and illuminate the causes and conditions for reconciliation in wartime, successful and unsuccessful. This study takes in-depth looks at two periods of history in two Asian conflicts – the Vietnam War in 1972, and the United States’ intervention in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2012, and how their similarities and differences hold implications for reconciliation and peace in the midst of war. The scope will cover specific time periods of these conflicts – 1972 being a pivotal year of the Vietnam War, directly preceding the Paris Peace Accords, the other an eventful period of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan – President Barack Obama’s surge of combat forces from 2009 to 2012. The thesis is organized in four chapters, with the first, “Introduction,” laying out the premise, that the two periods are vital to this study, and some background on policies and assumptions in both the Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Łam 3 Zesz.Indd
    ZESZYTY NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU JAGIELLOŃSKIEGO Artykuł recenzyjny Prace Historyczne 140, z. 3 (2013), s. 299–303 IN THE SEARCH FOR A SCAPEGOAT On the Margin of the Book: Lewis Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, New York 2011, Houghton Miffl in Harcourt Publishing Company, XX + 398 pages Jarema Słowiak Uniwersytet Jagielloński The Second Indochina War, commonly known as the Vietnam War, remains one of the most controversial confl icts in the history of the United States. It still divides not only American society, but also professional historians, who have been trying to fi nd answers to numerous questions associated with this war for years: Why did America decide to engage in Indochina? Was it necessary? Was this war possible to win? And, asked probably the most often, why did the U.S. lose? Many history schol- ars tried and still try to fi nd an answer to that specifi c question. Even before enemy tanks rolled into Saigon, and the whole South Vietnam ul- timately fell into the hands of triumphing Communists, on the other side of Pacifi c the search for people guilty of Indochina debacle had begun. The bulk of criticism fell on American leaders from the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive – President Lyndon B. Johnson and General William C. Westmoreland.1 Despite the long duration and complexity of the Second Indochina War, many historians and journalists have been tempted to generalize and depict complex issues in a simplifi ed way. Sadly, it seems that dr. Lewis Sorley, author of presented here biography of the MACV2 commander, also wasn’t able to escape from those schemes in his book, as he drops the responsi- bility for the outcome of the long-running confl ict on the shoulders of one man.
    [Show full text]
  • Spring 2019 75Th Ranger Regiment Association, INC. Volume 31 Issue Ll
    PATROLLING Spring 2019 75th Ranger Regiment Association, INC. Volume 31 Issue ll Merrill’s Marauder and Point du Hoc Vets start the BRC/Photo-SOJ Patrolling Grenade Toss/Photo-SOJ Patrolling At the Finish Line/Photo-Patrick Albright MCoE CHINA—BURMA—INDIA—KOREA—VIETNAM—IRAN—GRENADA—PANAMA—IRAQ—SOMALIA—AFGHANISTAN TO RUN ©2018 H-D or its affiliates. HARLEY-DAVIDSON, HARLEY, H-D, and the Bar and Shield Logo are among the trademarks of H-D U.S.A., LLC. Third-party trademarks are the property property the are trademarks Third-party LLC. U.S.A., H-D of trademarks H-D, and the Bar Shield Logo are among HARLEY, ©2018 H-D or its affiliates. HARLEY-DAVIDSON, closed the highest paved roadway in U.S. to show true power of Milwaukee-Eight® engines. We Closed Roadway. owners. respective their of FEEL THE POWER OF THE MILWAUKEE-EIGHT ® 114. The size of the news for touring riders this year can be measured in ft. lbs. Depending on model and configuration, you get up to 121 ft. lbs. of peak torque from the Milwaukee-Eight® 114 that’s available in the Road Glide® Special, Street Glide® Special, Road King® Special, Road Glide® Ultra, Ultra Limited and Ultra Limited Low. Feel it for yourself. Unleash one for a test run at your dealer. Take a test ride. h-d.com/testride www.75thrra.org—June Issue-2019 1 75th Ranger Regiment Association Editor’s Corner PO Box 348360 By Stephen Odin Johnson—Editor Sacramento, CA 95834-8360 www.75thrra.org Hello Patriots! President On the front cover of Patrolling, a Merrill’s Marauder and Point du Hoc 2nd Richard S.
    [Show full text]
  • Patrolling Fall
    PATROLLING SPRING 2008 75 TH RANGER REGIMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. VOLUME 22 ISSUE IV Recon element, mass tactical, Officers’ Messages .................................1-11 Ranger Rendezvous, 2007. General ..................................12-19 & 63-72 Photo by: J. Chester Unit Reports ........................................20-62 CHINA - BURMA - INDIA VIETNAM IRAN GRENADA PANAMA IRAQ SOMALIA AFGHANISTAN PATROLLING – SPRING 2008 ReadyReady forfor youryour nenextxt advadvententure?ure? QUALIFIED APPLPLIICACANNTSTS ARE: BORDER PATROL AGENTS protect our American way of life by repelling multiple • U.S.S.. Citizeizens threatsthreats atat ourour nation’snation’s borders.borders. PreventingPreventing terroriststerrorists andand theirtheir weaweapons fromrom eenteringring oour • Physicallically Fit country is the primary objective. • Under Age 40 The Border Patrol missiissionon focuscuseses on: • And of Good Character detecting, apprehending and deterrringring smugglers of humans, drugs, contraband, and Additional career and applicaicatiotion iilllelegal entrants. infoinformationrmation ccan be found at:: www.BorderPatrol.gov The Border Patrol offers competitive pay, clicklick onon rrace car logo: Federal benefitsfits aand extensive trainraining.ing. CBP is a equal opportunity employer. PATROLLING – SPRING 2008 WHO WE ARE: The 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc., is a We have funded trips for families to visit their wounded sons and registered 501 (c) corporation, registered in the State of Georgia. We were husbands while they were in the hospital. We have purchased a learning founded in 1986 by a group of veterans of F/58, (LRP) and L/75 (Ranger). program soft ware for the son of one young Ranger who had a brain The first meeting was held on June 7, 1986, at Ft. Campbell, KY. tumor removed. The Army took care of the surgery, but no means existed OUR MISSION: to purchase the learning program.
    [Show full text]