The Us Army and the Defense of West Germany
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ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: CREATING DETERRENCE FOR LIMITED WAR: THE U.S. ARMY AND THE DEFENSE OF WEST GERMANY, 1953-1982 Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer, Ph.D., 2006 Dissertation Directed By: Professor Jon T. Sumida, Department of History This dissertation addresses the role of the U.S. Army as an instrument of national and alliance strategy in the era of the Cold War. The army was confronted with the fundamental question of its utility in the nuclear age. This dissertation argues that after the Korean War army leaders pursued a consistent policy to create a force that could deter limited, i.e., conventional and tactical-nuclear war in Central Europe. This policy resulted in a three-decade long transition process, as the army had to respond to influences ranging from the Soviet threat to inter-service rivalry, budgetary concerns, rapidly evolving technology, and military and political developments in Europe and Asia. The transition process occurred in three stages. First, army leaders redefined the mission of their institution from war-fighting to the deterrence of war. Then, the structure of combat divisions was altered to reflect the requirements of nuclear as well as conventional battlefields. Finally, and only after the Vietnam War, doctrine was introduced that combined specific objectives in Central Europe, modern divisional structure, weapons technology, and newly defined principles of operational art in a coherent system of air and land warfare. At the heart of the dissertation rests the question of strategic decision-making and the impact of military institutions. But it also addresses NATO’s military and political capabilities and considers the effect of nuclear weapons on land warfare and the deterrence of war. Moreover, it is a study of civil-military relations in the United States. Finally, it offers a fresh view of the Vietnam War by placing both the periphery and center of the Cold War in the context of potentially devastating nuclear war. Scholarship of the Cold War to date has emphasized the effects of nuclear deterrence and neglected the contribution of ground forces to the prevention of war. This dissertation is based on archival research in Europe and the United States, including the archives of NATO and the German military, the U.S. National Archives, the National Security Archive, several presidential libraries, and other major repositories of manuscripts of diplomats, military officers, and political leaders. CREATING DETERRENCE FOR LIMITED WAR: THE U.S. ARMY AND THE DEFENSE OF WEST GERMANY, 1953-1982 By Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer. Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2006 Advisory Committee: Associate Professor Jon Sumida, Chair Dr. Alexander Cochran Professor John Lampe Professor Keith Olson Professor George Quester © Copyright by Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer 2006 Dedication To my parents. Acknowledgements A dissertation in history depends on the professional and personal involvement of many people. First, I must thank my parents for permitting me graciously to pursue my studies abroad and stay away for years at a time. Next, this dissertation could not have been written without the professional guidance of Professor Jon T. Sumida, a true Doktorvater, albeit more approachable and caring than the German academic tradition might imply. A better adviser cannot be imagined, especially since he, a historian of the British navy, allowed me to pursue a topic on dry land. Our shared interest in strategy and policy has made this a very beneficial relationship. In addition, professors Jeffrey Herf, John Lampe, Keith Olson, Shu Guang Zhang, and Madeline Zilfi have made critical suggestions and offered their support. Outside of the Department of History at the University of Maryland, I am particularly indebted to the support of Alexander “Sandy” Cochran. I also want to thank Professor Lawrence S. Kaplan for his comments on several chapters and for his kind and supportive words at critical times. Finally, I am grateful for the support of Randy Papadopoulos, Naval Historical Center, Douglas Selvage, Office of the Historian, Department of State, and Richard Wetzell, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., throughout my career in graduate school. Thanks have to go to the staff at the National Archives in College Park. Surely, I must have taxed their patience over the years, as I have been working on the edges of declassification. Many archivists contributed to this study, but among the most crucial were Larry MacDonald, Rich Boylan, Wilbert Mahoney, Cliff Snyder, and John Taylor of Modern Military Records. I also benefited greatly from conversations with Milton Gustafson, former chief of the Diplomatic Branch. Furthermore, I am grateful for iii conversations with Timothy Nenninger, the director of Modern Military Records, whose busy schedule made them all the more precious. At my home away from home, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, I was always welcomed by Dr. Richard Sommers and Mr. Dave Keough, whose knowledge of the holdings at the institute seems encyclopedic. I also greatly enjoyed working with the friendly and professional staff, led by Mr. Rich Baker. I am grateful for the financial support from the Department of the Army that allowed me to work more extensively at MHI than would have otherwise been possible. I am particularly glad that I had the opportunity to work in both the old and new domicile of the institute. During several visits to presidential libraries, I have come to rely on a number of archivists and librarians. At the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Randy Sowell and his staff made a short stay productive. At the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Barbara Constable, who has since transferred to Austin, Texas, introduced me to the pertinent records of the president and those of his advisors and fellow senior military officers who deposited their personal papers in Abilene, Kansas. I also want to thank Stephen Plotkin and the staff of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library for their efforts. They made my stay both pleasant and productive, in spite of a series of mid-March snowstorms. I would like to express my gratitude to the John F. Kennedy Foundation for a research grant that made my excursion to Boston possible. At the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, I am indebted to archivists Barbara Constable, Charlaine McCauley and John Wilson, as well as the very efficient reading room staff. I am grateful for the financial support from the Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation that permitted for a sustained research trip to Austin. iv At the Combined Arms Research Library, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, I am particularly indebted to Virginia Navarro who was able to find important archival records on rather short notice and who has since provided photocopies of pertinent material. Mike Browne showed me how to use the library’s holdings effectively, but his knowledge of research tools on the internet turned out to be even more important. I still rely on what I learned from him. Finally, I am grateful to James Wilbanks of the Department of Military History, CGSC, who has shared his considerable insight into the Cold War army. I also want to express my thanks to Joanne Hartog of the George C. Marshall Research Library and to the Marshall Foundation for awarding me a fellowship that enabled research in Lexington, Va., and at other locales in the United States. At the NATO Archive, Brussels, Chris Lennaerts was instrumental in granting me access, despite a computer-application glitch that could have turned a trip to Brussels into mere tourism. Annemarie Smith and Johannes Geertz were very kind and resourceful in retrieving and printing documents in this fully digital archive. Winfried Heinemann of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam, Germany, was so kind as to invite me onto the grounds and provide me with a professional tour and many useful contacts. While strictly not an archive, the institute is the premier German research center on issues of military and defense policy. I am grateful to the late Charlie Kirkpatrick and his deputy Al Koenig, historians of V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany. Bruce Siemon, the long-time historian of USAREUR, has been of great help in locating and releasing annual histories of the command and providing additional statistical information. v At the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the interest and insight of Bianka Adams, Andrew Birtle, and Robert Rush greatly enhanced this project. I am grateful to Rebecca Raines for granting access to the research files of John B. Wilson at the center. I also greatly appreciate the comments of Robert Doughty, Kenneth Hamburger, Paul Herbert, Eugenia Kiessling, Gordon Rudd, Thomas Schwartz, and Harold S. Winton on various aspects of the study. I am particularly grateful to the late General Andrew Goodpaster and General Donn Starry for their willingness to invest time during interviews and additional communication, and generally follow the progress of this dissertation. vi Table of Contents Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………...iii Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………….1 Chapter 2: The U.S. Army in National and Alliance Strategy…………………………33 Chapter 3: Atomic Weapons and Limited War: Maxwell Taylor and the Pentomic Reorganization…………………………………………………………………92 Chapter 4: The Pentomic Army in Germany……………………………………….…156 Chapter 5: The ROAD Army and Flexible Response………………………………...214 Chapter 6: The ROAD Army in Germany and Vietnam……………………………...281 Chapter 7: The Cold War Army……………………………………………………....347 Chapter 8: Conclusion………………………………………………………………...404 Appendices……………………………………………………………………………416 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..421 vii Chapter 1: Introduction Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. (Carl von Clausewitz, On War).1 After the Korean War, the army defined its primary mission as the deterrence of war in Central Europe.2 The global nature of the Cold War, however, demanded general- purpose forces that could be deployed to fight elsewhere as well.