KEEPING THE FISH OUT OF THE WATER: UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR A Dissertation Presented to The Graduate Faculty of The University of Akron In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy Theodore Easterling August, 2016 KEEPING THE FISH OUT OF THE WATER: UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR Theodore Easterling Dissertation Approved: Accepted: _____________________________ _____________________________ Advisor Department Chair Dr. Walter L. Hixson Dr. A. Martin Wainwright _____________________________ ______________________________ Committee Member Interim Dean of the College Dr. Gregory Wilson Dr. John Green _____________________________ ______________________________ Committee Member Dean of the Graduate School Dr. Michael Sheng Dr. Chand Midha ______________________________ Date _____________________________ Committee Member Dr. Mary Ann Heiss ____________________________ Committee Member Dr. Robert Figler ii ABSTRACT The United States is often criticized for using ineffective strategies and tactics to fight the Vietnam War, but the United States Marine Corps attempted to use strategies and tactics it considered appropriate for a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. As part of its counterinsurgency plan, the Marine Corps used Combined Action Platoons, and whether or not these units were effective as a counterinsurgency tactic in the war is the topic of this study. This study concludes that Combined Action Platoons were not a successful counterinsurgency tactic in the Vietnam War. To the extent the Combined Action concept might have been well-conceived and successful, it was overwhelmed by a number of problems. The conflict over strategy between the Marine Corps and the US Army hampered the development and the performance of the Combined Action Platoons. Other critical problems for the Combined Action Platoons resulted from the weakness of the government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the strategic ability of the North Vietnamese Army. The primary problem was that Vietnam was a poorly chosen battlefield , and the war was unwinnable. This study of the US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons is a qualitative study based on research in a variety of primary and secondary sources. Research at the US Marine Corps Archives at Quantico, Virginia was especially useful for acquiring original information related to the Combined Action iii Platoons (CAP) in the Vietnam War. Primary sources for the study included books written by participants in the war, and veterans of the CAP. A collection of the private letters of a CAP veteran was also used. Among the secondary sources for the study were books by historians who studied the war, and books by counterinsurgency theorists who study counterinsurgency warfare. iv DEDICATION The first people I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my mother and father, Rachel Hollys Easterling and George Riley Easterling. I also dedicate it to my wife, Mary E. Quinn, and my family. Among my family members, I especially dedicate it to Riley Grace Goch, who always had a smile to make me feel better. Last, I dedicate my dissertation to the memory of my friend, Guy Richard Barattieri. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to my advisor, Dr. Walter L. Hixson, for his assistance in helping me complete my Ph.D. studies. I doubt I could have accomplished this without his help. The other members of my committee, Dr. Wilson, Dr. Sheng, Dr. Heiss, and Dr. Figler, helped me more than they know with their teaching, their advice, and their examples of what it means to be a scholar and a teacher. My friend, Dr. Larry Fallis, was a source of advice and inspiration. The staff members in the history department were always courteous and helpful when I needed them. Among my friends who gave me support and advice are John Wunderle, Bill Eckels, and Joe Green. I thank you all for your patience, your help, and your encouragement. The success I achieved in accomplishing this work is due to your help. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………1 II. THE START OF THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS..................................39 III. COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE OF THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS………………………………………………………………………..87 IV. COMBINED ACTION PLATOON PACIFICATION AND THE PHONG BAC EXPERIMENT……………………………………………………………..145 V. THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS BECOME A SEPARATE COMMAND ……………………………………………………………………...186 VI. A CHANGING ROLE AND THE END OF THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR……………………………………….…227 VII. CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………274 BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………………298 vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION During the Vietnam War one of the greatest challenges US military forces faced was finding effective ways to fight the guerrillas of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Among the various attempts, one of the most innovative was the Combined Acton Platoon program (CAP) of the United States Marine Corps. The CAPs were platoons comprised of a squad of approximately fourteen US Marines and a Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) militia platoon of approximately thirty- five men. The Marines and the PFs in these small units learned to live and work together as they performed their mission of fighting the NLF guerrillas and pacifying the villages of Vietnam. This study assesses the effectiveness of the CAP program as a counterinsurgency tactic during the war. The Cold War was a defining feature of world politics after World War II, and it played a central part in the Vietnam War. Shortly after World War II ended the United States and other nations became concerned with the ambitions of the Soviet Union in Europe as the Soviets solidified their control over Eastern Europe and the U.S increasingly assumed the role of stopping the spread of Soviet communism. This confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union became more rigid, and this Cold 1 War eventually affected a great deal of the political, economic, and military interactions of many of the nations of the world. 1 After World War II the French attempted to regain control of their colony of French Indochina, a struggle that took on added significance in the context of Cold War. Led by the nationalist and communist Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam declared itself to be an independent state at the end of World War II, but the French soon used military force in an attempt to reassert control over their former colony. This resulted in the French Indochinese War that lasted from 1946 to 1954.2 Initially the US opposed the French effort to attain colonial control of Indochina, and because of this the US gave the French little support for the war. For various reasons including China’s becoming a communist state in 1949, the anti- communist stance of the US increased. The French war in Indochina was no longer seen as a colonial war, but instead it was seen as part of a larger war against international communist expansion. The US backed the war extensively until all French will to continue the fight was crushed in the catastrophic defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954.3 A settlement of the war divided Vietnam into the areas of North Vietnam and South Vietnam. This was intended to be a temporary division until an election in 1956 unified the country under one government, but as the French withdrew from its former colony, the US increased its support for the government of a newly created South Vietnam. 4 1 John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1946- 1975 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.) 19. 2 Ibid., 20-21. 3 Ibid., 20, 23- 24. 2 The US backed South Vietnam as an independent state, but opposition to the new government soon grew. The elections scheduled for 1956 were rejected, and South Vietnam declared itself to be the independent Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem. However, Diem’s rule was brutal as he attacked those he saw as his enemies. Truong Nhu Tang was a founding member of the National Liberation Front (NLF) who said Diem soon made himself a dictator with a narrow base of support and” Most damning of all, he had murdered many patriots who had fought in the struggle against France and had tied his existence to the patronage of the United States, France’s successor.” Tang said Diem’s actions made acceptance of his presidency impossible because” The country had settled into an all too familiar pattern of oligarchic rule and utter disregard for the welfare of the people.” In addition to this he said,” We had a ruler whose overriding interest was power and who would use the Americans to prop himself up- even while the Americans were using him for their own strategic purposes.” The choice for Tang became clear, and he said,” As far as I was concerned, this situation was intolerable.”5 In 1960 Tang and others who felt similarly toward Diem’s rule formed the NLF. The NLF sought out help from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) partly because as Tang said,” Ho Chi Minh was the spiritual father, in the South as well as the North, and we looked naturally to him and to his 6 government for guidance and aid.” For the NLF two of its primary goals were to 4 Ibid., 35, 39. 5 Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath (New York NY: Vintage Books, 1986), 65. 6 Ibid., 68. 3 overthrow Diem’s government and to unite South Vietnam and North Vietnam through negotiations. 7 In the early 1960’s the situation for Diem’s government grew more precarious as the NLF grew in strength and the GVN military forces were defeated in an increasing number of engagements by the NLF guerrillas. The US deepened its commitment to the GVN by sending more military equipment and advisers to the Army of Vietnam (ARVN), but this did not reverse the situation.