United States Army Armor School

Commandant MG FREDERIC J. BROWN Assistant Commandant BG GORDON R. SULLIVAN Deputy Assistant Commandant COLMICHAEL H. CRUMLEY Chief of Staff COL RALPH R. WOLFE Command Sergeant Major CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS

INSTRUCTIONALDEPARTMENTS Maintenance COL G.L. THOMAS Command and Staff COL JAMES M. LYLE Weapons COL DAVID V. HARBACH Committee Group COL BOBBY J. CARTER NCO Academy/ Drill Sergeant School SGM DONALD H. DEVINE

DlRECTORAlES Evaluation and Standardization LTC (PI JOHN C. THOMPSON Training and Doctrine COL DUDLEY M. ANDRES Combat Developments COL ROBERT W. DeMONT

UNITS Center/School Brigade COL WILLIAM M. BOICE 1st Armor Training Brigade COL ROBERT L. PHILLIPS “To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote 4th Training Brigade professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR. preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of 194th Armored Brigade Armor in the Army of the United States.” COL PAUL E. FUNK MMORTheMagazine of Mobile W,

FEATURES Editor-i n-C h ief MAJ (PI CHARLES R. STEINER, JR. 10 Cavalry Action in Central America by Lieutenant Colonel Sewall Menzel and Managing Editor Colonel William Said, Honduran Army JON T. CLEMENS 13 Soviet Enveloping Detachments Assistant Editor by Captain Gilbert0 Villahermosa ROBERT E. ROGGE 18 lnteroperability in NATO Administrative Assistant VIVIAN THOMPSON by Captain Ronald M. Schrock, Jr. 21 Killer Tank Crews by Lieutenant Colonel James Crowley

ARMOR magazine (ISSN 0004-2420) is 24 COBRA: The Normandy Breakout published bimonthly by the US. Army by Captain Stephen Borows Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, Kentucky 401 21. Unless otherwise stated, material does not 30 Thoughts on Counterattacks represent policy, thinking, or endorse- ment by any agency of the U.S. Army. by Captain William D. Hewitt Use of appropriated funds for printing of this publication was approved by the 33 New Roles for Combat Motorcycles Department of the Army 6 January 1984. ARMOR is not a copyrighted publication by First Lieutenant Patrick M. Marr and but may contain some articles which CW3 Daniel Kingsley have been copyrighted by individual authors. Material which is not under co- pyright may be reprinted if credit is given 37 Role of the Fourth Company to ARMORand the author. Permission to reprint copyrighted mater- by First Lieutenant Ralph Peters ial must be obtained from the author. 40 Dauntless Trains for War SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual subscriptions to ARMORare available by Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Bergeron and through the U.S. Armor Association, Post Office Box 607, Fort Knox. Captain Joseph S. Purser Kentucky 401 21. Telephone (502) 942- 8624. Domestic: $1 5.00 one year, $26.00 two years, $37.00 three years. Foreign: $22.00 one year, $35.00 two years. Sin- DEPARTMENTS gle copies, $2.00. 2 Letters 43 Professional Thoughts CORRESPONDENCE:Address all cor- respondence to US. Army Armor Center, 4 Commander’s Hatch 48 Recognition Quiz Answers ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-MAG, Fort Knox, 6 Driver’s Seat 49 Regimental Review Kentucky, 401 21. (Telephone: 8 Master Gunner’s Corner 52 Books AUTOVON 464-224912610 or commer- cia1 (502) 624-2249/2610.) 9 Recognition Quiz 53 Steel on Target

SECOND class postage paid at Fort Knox, Kentucky and additional mailing off ice.

ARMORmay be forwarded to military personnel whose change of address is COVER caused by official orders (except at APO Hemmed into a small beachhead for almost two months after addresses) without payment of addition- al postage. The subscriber must notify the Normandy landings, the Allies finally broke out in Operation the postmaster. Cobra, a classic example of armor in exploitation. Captain Ste- USPS 467-970 phen Borows recounts this exciting campaign of 40 years ago on page 24. September-October 1984 Vol XClll No. 5 w’ve heard about that already!) We re- ment of the combined arms concept at .-r to the MILES (Multiple Integrated battalion level and below. Dear Sir, Laser Engagement Simulation) equip- 1LT McGrath envisions a major role in On your May-June cover I saw an ment in use by the soldiers and on the the modern battlefield for the pure infan- M48A5 and when I opened the magazine vehicle. try battalion. This newborn indepen- was shocked to see you call it an M60A7! Obviously, we don’t know the tactical dence of the infantry results directly Maybe you guys need a refresher on situation under which the action is from the fielding of the Infantry Fighting vehicle iD. After a mistake like that, I occurring; however, we noted some dis- Vehicle (IFV): “. . . the IFV gives properly- wonder about the validity of your “Rec- crepancies which would negatively deployed mechanized infantry the capa- ognition Quiz.” affect the training value of the tactical bility to fight the enemy toe-to-toe with- The cover raised two questions: Why engagement simulation exercise. out tanks.” did only the TC have his protective mask First of all, the dismounted soldier in While this might be mathematically on? (Maybe he was the only one who got the lower right corner has no helmet de- possible under ideal conditions, say, the word?) And secondly, since the tector harness installed. This has the upon a properly configured classroom 194th Armored Brigade has M6O-series effect of negating the “kill” effect of terrain board, it is clearly hardly applica- vehicles, who does the tank on the cover incoming fire by the opposing force. This ble to the European sceanrio, where the really belong to? defect should have been corrected terrain more often than not precludes full immediately by the exercise controller. If exploitation of TOW capabilities. In the MARK HOLLOWAY an operable helmet harness was not middle range band (out to maybe 2,500 National Training Center available, the soldier should have been meters), where one can reasonably Fort Irwin, CA eliminated from the exercise. (See expect the vast majority of targets to first “Rules of Engagement” in any MILES appear, the traditional dominance of the Field Controller‘s Guide) main battle tank (largely as a result of its Dear Sir, The tank and its crew are cheating much greater volume of fire) remains Having just returned from our annual both themselves and the opposing force. unchallenged by ground missile sys- training at Fort Drum, I was glad to see The commander and leader (both of tems. Indeed, the potency of the tank has the current ARMOR Magazine on my whom are riding high on the turret) are been, if anything, enhanced in this range desk, as I enjoy your entire magazine. not wearing Man-Worn Laser Detectors band through the fielding of the latest The tank shown on the cover is an (which are supplied in MILES tank kits), generation of main battle tanks featuring M48A5, our unit‘s assigned vehicle, but and are thus “un-killable” by incoming greatly improved fire control and stabil- on the next page, you identify it as an fire. Again, this is a violation of the MILES ization systems, special armor arrays, M60A 7. . . Rules of Engagement. Secondly, the tank and quantum improvement in cross- cannot deliver effective machinegun fire country sprint capability. GORDON GARDNER since neither M60D machinegun is One would be foolish not to acknow- SSG, VTARNG equipped with a MlLES transmitter or Bradford, VT ledge that the mounting of the infantry in blank adapter (the M279 coaxial ma- TOW-equipped vehicles gives them an chinegun has no blank fire adapter enhanced antitank capability. 1 LT Dear Sir, available: hence, it cannot be used to de- McGrath errs greatly, however, in postu- I just read your latest issue of ARMOR liver fire.) As shown, the tank can deliver lating a pure role for IFV-mounted infan- Magazine and hasten to point out that only main gun fire. try. The ideal employment of the IFV is as you would not pass the section of the One of the MILES cables is hanging off an integral component of the combined TGST on vehicle recognition. The tank the side of the turret near the rangefinder arms team/task force, where the featured on the cover of the May-June bubble. This could easily be damaged. It Bradley’s 25-mm cannon remedies a issue is an M48A5, not an M60A1, as should be secured to well-applied hook long-standing inability to deal with light- stated inside. Perhaps you should fea- fastener tape on the turret roof. armored targets, particularily the BMP ture this tank, along with other (obscure) We do not mean to “come down hard” and variants, short of tank cannon fire. vehicles, in your Recognition Quiz. on the soldiers in the photo, or their lead- The IFV/MBT mix ideally weds the long- Shame, Shame! ers; again, we don’t know exactly what’s range, heavy antitank capability of the going on. However, by pointing out dis- TOW with the intense volume of antiar- J.H. BOWER crepancies, we hope to assist MILES Milford. NJ mor cannon fire, both 25- and 105-mm, users in getting the most out of their critically necessary to “bust” a standard tactical engagement simulation training. Soviet armored array at normal combat (We have no excuse. . . The smoke on ranges. the cover certainly wasn’t thick enough CHARLES R. SOUZA to obscure that curving frontal plate, SFC, USATC That the doctrine accompanying Divi- those distinctive fenders, that command- Fort Eustis, VA sion 86 states that companies will fight er’s station. We just plain looked too fast. pure most of the time is not primarily re- Sources at the 194th tell us they drew sultant from a recognition of the the M48s at Fort Drum, rather than taking enhanced capabilities of the latest gen- their M60s with them. Ed.) eration of combat vehicles. Rather, it Rebuttal on “A New Concept” stems primarily from the reorganization of the battalion into smaller, more numer- Dear Sir, ous companies, providing the battalion I was struck by the ironic contradiction task force commander more flexibility in MILES Off Target between the title and content of 1LT employing his companies than was pre- John J. McGrath’s “A New Concept for viously the case. An avenue of approach Dear Sir, Combined Arms” in the Professional that might formerly have been the sole Although we really hate to nitpick, we Thoughts department of the January- responsibility of a single cross-attached must comment on the cover photo of the February issue of ARMOR. The body of company team is now more likely to be May-June issue. (Yes, we noticed that 1LT McGrath’s contribution advocates the shared responsibility of two pure the tank is not an M60A7. but we’re sure nothing less than the de facto abandon- companies, tank and infantry, operating

2 ARMOR September-October 1984 alongside one another. In this case, the infantry must free itself of the mindset corded! However, one important aspect individual companies’ unity and camara- that it exists solely to clear “tank-proof of the survey was the sub-section enti- derie (by virtue of their organic employ- terrain” (what’s that?), “take the high tled “What Soldiers Think of Leaders.” ment) would heighten their combat ground,” and “dig in.” That is not to say The 12 points covered below are as valid effectiveness while the combined arms that these capabilities of the infantry are today as they were four decades ago. I effect of their mutual employment would not important, but rather that our vision quote from the article: be retained - at battalion level. The doc- of the next battlefield is of one character- “1. Ability. Competence comes first. trine writers probably went too far in pos- ized by bold maneuver and frequent The good officer must know his stuff, for tulating that companies would fight pure meeting engagements, violent collisions on this depends the men’s confidence in “most of the time.” At the Armor School, of rapidly moving armored forces. On his leadership. the doctrine is being more realistically that battlefield the rapid and temporary 2. Next is interest in the welfare of the interpreted to mean that one does not occupation and exploitation of favorable soldier. The officer who can be trusted to automatically cross-attach platoons. The terrain, coupled with the synergetic mas- help the soldier in time of need, or who “Catch-22” is that the cross-attachment sing of the firepower of complementary would be accessible for personal advice, will often prove necessary despite its weapon systems, will yield victory. is a good officer. inherent reduction of unit cohesion and Maneuver units employed in essentially 3. Promptness in making decisions is its logistic headaches. The general trend static roles, particularly those astride next. is toward somewhat less frequent cross- obviously dominant terrain, will be locat- 4. Good teacher or instructor follows. attachment of a more temporary dura- ed by increasingly sophisticated and The leader who has the patience and the accurate stand-off target acquisition ability to make things clear to the men tion, thereby minimizing the logistics ’ problems and capitalizing on unit cohe- systems and either lamed or rendered under him is valued for that reason. sion whenever possible. The prescrip- combat ineffective by increasingly more 5. Judgment, common sense, and the tion for the maneuver force is clearly the lethal area attack cluster munitions, ability to get things done are next in or- development and adoption of Army-wide scatterable mines, chemical munitions, der. SOPS specifically governing combined or nuclear fires. 6. The good leader does not “boss arms operations at the company and bat- The synergetic interaction of armor you around where there is no good rea- talion level. and infantry was previously realizable son for it.” Soldiers dislike an officer who 1LT McGrath would retain a trace of only within a relatively positional context throws his rank around, who tests his combined arms capability in his concep- because of the battlefield vulnerability of own authority continually. They sense tual tank battalion by trading the fourth the personnel carrier and the lack of fire- that he is not sure of himself. tank company for a mech infantry power of the infantry squad when operat- 7. The man who tells you when you company. The combined arms battalion ing mounted. The IFV-MBT combination have done a good job rates well as a does have attractive features, not the opens up a dynamic new range of tacti- leader. Failure in commendation is a least of which are its enhanced cohesion cal options. The IFV does not, as 1LT common complaint among men in the and teamwork, the inherent product of McGrath would have it, free tanks “to do ranks. The best incentive to good work is daily contact and far more frequent com- what tanks do best.” Rather, it offers the the prospect that it will be noticed and bined arms training opportunities. The infantry the opportunity to abandon the remembered by the leader. concept is, however, fundamentally “battle-taxi” mentality of the M113 and 8. Physical strength and a good build flawed in that it “fixes” the infantry/ extends them the capability to maneuver come next. armor ratio, robbing the maneuver com- alongside the main battle tank on a 9. Good education, a sense of humor mander of the flexibility to configure his battlefield where the absolute difference and guts or courage follow in that order. force in order to most effectively accom- between attack and defend has lost 10. Impartiality is next. Leaders who do plish his mission in light of prevailing much of its significance, at least at the not “save the dirty jobs for fellows they METT considerations. One can imagine a lower tactical echelons. don’t like” are valued. The good leader is few situations in which a brigade com- Brother, we need each other alongside fair to all in his command. mander might desire to employ a pure now like never before. Have some of my 11. Next in importance is industry. tank battalion, and a great many situa- mobility, shock action and firepower; Leaders who “do as little work as they tions where the single organic mech mount ’em up, let‘s roll! can get away with” are not respected by company would prove inadequate. An the enlisted men. army that expects to fight outnumbered PETER ALBERT HENRY 12. When an officer “gives orders in and win can afford neither to squander CPT, Armor such a way that you know clearly what to scarce assets where they are unneeded Tuebingen, Germany do.” that, too, is a mark of merit as a nor field battalions whose configuration leader. Soldiers also like an officer with a limits their tactical employment options. ‘clear, strong voice.’ ” A consideration of the more complex Ancient Tenets Still Apply These requirements of a good leader, supply, maintenance, personnel, and so important to the GI of World War II, are weapon systems training demands of the Dear Sir, still vaild with today’s enlisted man. organic combined arms battalion was Recently I was glancing through a 41 - undoubtably a further’reason for its re- year old book (The lnfantry Journal ROBERT E. ROGGE jection by the Division 86 organization Reader, Doubleday Doran and Co.. Inc., MSGT, USAF (Ret) wizards. Garden City, N.Y., 1943) that I’ve re-read Radcliff, KY In 1LT McGrath’s writing, I sense a a thousarfd times and I came across an 1 more fundamentally disturbing notion - article that I had dog-eared as being that armor and infantry perform separate particularly worth re-reading. Armor Trainer Update and distinct functions on the battlefield, The article is entitled “Leadership” The Armor Trainer Update will take that each arm “does its thing” alone, and was the product of the combined place 29 October to 2 November at their sum equating to success. The thinking of the country’s leading psy- Fort Knox. In addition to briefings, battlefield of tomorrow demands quite chologists of the day. It was compiled seminars, and conference time with the contrary. Victory there will demand a from a mass survey made among enlist- the leadership of the USAARMC, a full full exploitation of the AirLand Battle ed men in 1942, shortly after this nation day has been set aside for an update Doctrine and the enhanced capabilities had gone to war against Germany and on cavalry. Questions should be di- of current and future weapon systems. Japan. The survey was an extensive, in- rected to Mr. Sanders, AUTOVON Armor and infantry certainly have unique depth probing into what that citizen-sol- 464-8247. Major Marshall, AUTOVON strengths and weaknesses; success de- dier (read draftee) thought about the 464-1240, is POC for the cavalry mands, however, a closer, more funda- Army. Undoubtedly there were some update. mental interaction than ever before. The pungent comments that had not been re-

ARMOR September-October 1984 3 MG Frederic J. Bro Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

\ i

New Realism in Tank-Pure Training

In my last column, I suggested ways our training must divided into two parts: how to train for tank combat (the change if we are to exploit a new generation of weapons to techniques and procedures) and what to train - the skills, win the AirLand Battle. In this column, I’d like to expand on drills, and exercises that comprise the combat tables. that theme, focusing on tank-pure training - individual tanks, sections, or tanks with wingman, or platoons. In the Introducing the Tactical Tables next issue, I’ll tie that into the bigger, combined-arms train- In the past, the Armor Force has concentrated on crew ing picture; but for now, I want to discuss what we’ve been gunnery exercises in its tank-pure collective training. Tradi- doing at USAARMC to train our force up to platoon level. tionally, this level of training culminated in Table VIII. The While some individual armor crewman training goes on in new tank manuals present a revised tactical gunnery pro- units as regular Soldier’s Manual sustainment work, increas- gram which goes beyond this point, through crew and tank- ingly, the baseline, foundational individual training takes with-wingman training to platoon-level proficiency (Table place in the institution during OSUT and in officer and NCO XII). courses. It is for this reason that we’ve been placing so much The new manuals also present a new training challenge, stress on improving the effectiveness of institutional training the tactical proficiency tables which train those tasks that and also why we are moving to teach all Skill Level 1 tasks in cannot be practiced on a live-fire range because of safety or OSUT. cost constraints. These tactical proficiency tables fill many :‘le’re making training more effective by making it more gaps in the realism of past training, and I think it’s important realistic: potential combat situations faced by the student in to stress here both those past weaknesses that we have all training parallel the situations we anticipate he will face in acknowledged need correction and what we’re doing about actual combat. His success in combat will depend on the them. realism of our peacetime training preparations, hence the While our past emphasis on gunnery tables has been ade- emphasis on training as we would fight. quate to train use of sights and fire control, fire adjustment, Collective unit training begins as crews are formed and night firing, ammunition selection, and a full exercise of learn how to work together in each tank. Tank-pure associa- crew duties, this past emphasis had its limitations. Targets tions - the tank-wingman combination and the tank pla- were not realistic, were relatively easy to acquire, couldn’t toon - are also formed during this stage of training, which is shoot back or evade, and were presented in unrealistic covered in the newly written and redesigned Tank Combat “bowling alley” situations, rather than the 360-degree, in- Manuals (FM 17-12-1 thru FM 17-12-3). Each manual is the-round challenge of the real battlefield.

4 ARMOR September-October 1984 These limitations have prevented us from training as would fight. One example: our AirLand Battle doctrine a for penetrations into Threat rear areas to engage high-va targets such as regimental artillery groups, command PO! trains, and second-echelon units as yet uncommitted to main battle. This task has been virtually “untrainable” the past; there was no way to realistically practice the 3r degree target array, the surprise targets and the cru( maneuver necessary to win this kind of fluid battle. Thi! about to change. Using our newly acquired simulation technology, we n can augment the traditional, straight-ahead, Threat fi echelon-oriented training of the current live-fire range. ’ can do it by teaming our new training devices with the n training exercise we call the tactical table. Now we hc VISMODS, modified vehicles that present a more reali! Threat target signature. They will be tough to acquire, tl are evasive, and - given the potential of laser-engagemi systems MILES - capable of shooting back - a smart el., -11” CU”I-0. lllV WUU.LIV UllUUI.. “1 ULIIII.... .” u .“U..”.UL..Y l”UI my. tion course with the tactical tasks set up as stations. The Crews will have to know how to use their own mobility tables can be run in any environment, day or night, based on and agility to defeat the Threat targets. The tactical tables are the commander’s decision and the available equipment. designed to focus the improved capabilities of our modern- The tank platoon that successfully completes the perfor- ized equipment. mance gates of combat tables XI1 and India will be well Like gunnery tables, tactical tables are progressive, from prepared to take the next training step as they become part of basic (the crew) through intermediate (the tank-working a combined arms team. The descriptive exercises that follow with a wingman) to advanced (the tank platoon). combat tables proficiency are laid out in the ARTEP Mission Each level includes a “gate” table, which qualifies a crew Training Plan’s series of STXs, FTXs, LCXs, and FCXs. to move on to the next level. The tactical tables, which carry Then, combat table proficiency training and platoon/compa- letter designations rather than Roman numerals, culminate ny team AMTP training come together and are demonstrat- at platoon-level proficiency. Table India is equivalent to Ta- ed on a company/team combined-arms, live-fire exercise ble XII, the platoon-level gunnery qualification course. (CALFEX). This final element on company/team unit train- ing provides for an evaluation of combat capability -fire- Tactical Table Training power, protection, maneuver, and leadership - against a Tactical tables progress in difficulty, and in two directions. desired standard. (It is, in effect, the next level of combat The tables progress horizontally - from basic to intermedi- training above our platoon “gates” - Tables XI1 and India ate to advanced - and vertically, from individual tasks - and I plan to go into it in greater detail next issue with a through crew drills to crew reaction exercises. Let’s review discussion of ARTEPKALFEX training in depth.) the progression with some examples. The three basic tables, A, B, and C, take the soldier from Summary individual combat-essential tasks (negotiate a route using The new tactical tables allow a much greater level of reai- terrain for cover and concealment, for example) through ism in our tank-pure training while overcoming many of the crew drills (Table B) to crew reaction exercises (react to limitations of earlier gunnery-based training. This crew/pla- ambush) in Table C. Table C uses the skills trained in tables toon training will be cheaper, too, because we’re using fewer A and B and challenges the crew to make rapid tactical deci- live rounds to sustain the same level of training proficiency sions faced with a controlled OPFOR. MILES adds a degree at the tank level. This allows us to allocate more live rounds of realism and stress. (When the Tank Weapons Gunnery of our main gun ammunition to the multi-tank advanced Simulation System (TWGSS) or the Full Crew Interactive -gunnery Tables X and XI1 and the CALFEX, where these Simulator (FCIS) are available, either can be used instead of rounds will offer a much better training payoff. MILES to permit reinforcement of gunnery skills while The outcome will be better trained crews, tanks with wing- training tactical tasks.) Table C is also the “gate” to the next man sections, and platoons. We feel that we are collectively level. The three intermediate tables, D, E, and F, deal with heading in the proper direction with our gunnery and tactical two tanks supporting each other - the wingman concept. training being combined. The end result of all of this will be These tables progress as the crew-level tables do. Table D more lethal combat units. Forge the Thunderbolt! trains the tasks required for coordination between tank crews in the wingman pair; Table E drills the two crews to work together, and Table F - like Table C - ties it all together. Further along, in Tables G, H, and I, the platoon comes together to perfect its skills as a fighting unit. Table India places the platoon in a scenario that simulates combat as closely as possible: the platoon faces a MILES-equipped OPFOR as it advances through a maneuver area, reacting to a series of combat situations that can be expected in the offense or following a friendly force penetration. Combining the Tables Since gunnery skills decay and tactical application is for- gotten quickly, the tactical tables should be trained as closely

ARMOR September-October 1984 5 Please Send Your Very Best

(The following comments by Command Sergeant Major Jo- to be performed by the Full Time Manning NCO. If, for seph Bossi, CSM,. 2d Support Group, VII Corps, Stuttgart. example, the job description calls for a tank commander but, West Germany, are pertinent to the Armor NCO corps, Active, in reality, the gaining commander also expects that NCO to Reserve and National Guard. There are legitimate problems coordinate and manage the unit’s training program when the presented here, problems that need our undivided attention if we unit is not drilling at inactive duty training, that fact should are to maintain our credibility as Armor force NCO instructors be clearly spelled out. Such clarity is the responsibility of the and mentors to our Reserve and National Guard units who right- gaining commander. fully look to usfor leadership.) Also, Reserve and National Guard units must make clear There has been a plethora of comment, both in the nation- exactly the type of armor equipment they have, for it does al media and within the Armor force, regarding our Reserve nobody any good to assign a highly-qualified and motivated Component and our National Guard units. The majority of NCO of M60A3s to a unit equipped, for instance, with these comments have been unjustifiably negative. No mili- M48A5s. An NCO assigned under such circumstances can- tary unit is perfect in every way and it behooves each of us in not possibly meet the criteria expected of him by the gaining the Active Component to remember that in addition to our commander. As a result, the NCO must understand that primary duty of learning how to fight and survive, we are there are no training schools available to him and that he also responsible for passing on our hard-won knowledges must learn the system on his own. Such intensive learning and skills to our supporting elements. has been done in the past and undoubtedly will be done in In keeping with this latter responsibility, we have develop- the future, but it should not have to happen. It is the cause of ed the Full Time Manning Program in which Active Compo- much frustration for all concerned and denigrates the NCO’s nent NCOs (and officers) are assigned on 3-year stabilized training program. The prevention of such misassignments tours of duty to Reserve and National Guard Armor units to lies in the domain of both the Active and Reserve Compo- provide a leavening of skill and experience upon which those nent personnel systems. units can elevate their combat readiness standards. Another vitally important consideration that must be The selection and assignment of these NCOs to Reserve thoroughly examined by the Active Component prior to and National Guard units deserves the deepest considera- assigning an NCO to a Reserve Component unit is his pro- tion on our part, for upon these men rests, literally, the ven ability to manage his personal affairs - including those credibility of the Active Component. of his family. If that NCO did not think too highly of his If an NCO assigned to one of these units is not the most home base’s personnel support activities, he is in for a rude fuily-qualified man in every respect, not only does the gain- awakening when he is assigned to a Reserve Component ing unit suffer, so does the Active Component that assigned unit for he will be totally dependent upon the community him. That man is looked upon as the expert in his field. If he where he lives. There will be no PX, no commissary, no base is anything less than that, everybody hurts. hospital, no on-base quarters. There will be no chaplain nor There are pitfalls in the program that must be avoided. If legal officer, nor any of the profusion of friends, technical the position calls for a master gunner on the M60AI tank, libraries or “inside dope” to which he had been accustomed. then the assignee must be a fully-qualified master gunner on He will be on his own and if he cannot manage his personal the M60AI prior to his assignment. Anything less is a disser- affairs, he becomes a burden to his gaining unit and may well vice not only to the gaining unit, but to the Active Compo- be relieved of his duty there. Once again, this reflects nent as well. adversely upon the credibility of the Active Component and There may be times when the job description supplied by it is incumbent upon that commander to ensure that every the gaining unit is not complete in its detailing of the duties NCO he assigns to a Full Time Manning position can handle

6 ARMOR September-October 1984 his own affi An addii Manning N ses at his n ease this bu highest leve Perhaps the most important duty of an NCO in a Full and give his total integrity and loyalty to his new commander Time Manning slot is that of setting the example. In no way and unit. He will be alone, without all the influences (good can this be overlooked. Not just the standards of personal or bad) he was exposed to at his home unit. Only the neatness and military bearing - these are expected of every staunchest of personal characters and the most professional senior NCO and need no further comment. What I am re- of attitudes can overcome these factors. ferring to is the application of those standards of training, The above comments must be taken with due considera- maintaining, caring and leading on which the NCO corps is tion and deliberation, for only ten percent of the Full Time based. These standards have been constantly raised over the Manning Force is drawn from the Active Component. The years and many of those that applied as recently as 1982 no remaing 90 percent of these vital positions are filled by Re- longer apply. They have been raised for mission accomplish- serve Component personnel. Since the Active Component ment and survival, not just because somebody dreamed personnel fill so few of these positions, it is especially incum- them up. bent upon us to ensure that only our finest NCOs are select- The selection of the right NCO for a Full Time Manning ed, for we owe it to ourselves, the Armor force, and to our position to teach these standards is of vital importance and nation that only the most highly-qualified individuals are concern to the total force. This selection can only be made by selected. the losing commander. He must certify that the selected Only the best will do.

Who’s Who at MILPERCEN’s Armor Branch

PHONES: AUTOVON - 221-6340,6341, 9696.9658

LTC JamesQuinlan - COMMERCIAL - (202) 325- Armor Branch Chief

CPT Mark Williams CPT GeorgeEdwards MAJ James D. Marlin MAJ (P) Albion Bergstrom CPT Gerald Ferguson LT Assignments CPT Assignments MAJ Assignments LTC Assignments AQAC Assignments

Mrs. Evelyn Ruffin Ms Kathy Williams Miss Kolleen McGrath Mrs Gloria Johnson Mrs Dorothy Groome LT Asgmts Tech CPTAsgmtsTech MAJ Asgmts Tech LTC Asgmts Tech AOAC Asgmts Tech

ARMOR September-October 1984 7 Send Us a Winner!

In recent years, too many administrative, academic, and course, they must obtain authority before they leave their unit-related problems have been adversely affecting the home stations. The DA Form 31 is important, especially if master gunner program. These problems have led to com- the student is attending the course around the Christmas plaints from unit commanders about the quality of master holidays. gunner graduates. Hold Baggage. When orders are-cut assigning the student In many of these cases, candidates arrived at Fort Knox to the Master Gunner course, they should authorize ship- unqualified to attend. They failed to meet the course prere- ment of his course manuals back to his home station at quisites outlined in DA Pamphlet 350-1 (September 1983) government expense or provide an additional weight allow- and the USAARMS school catalogue and should never have ance for personal baggage. been selected. Quarters. Upon reporting to the Student Detachment, US Because the course is expensive and few can attend, it’s in Army NCO Academy, at Building 1479, Eisenhower Ave- the sending unit’s best interest to make sure that only the nue, the student will be billetted at the detachment if space is best qualified NCOs are selected. available or, if not, may be authorized to utilize post BEQ. Briefly, they should meet these prerequisites: This may create an additional financial burden. 0 Be in the grades E6, E7 or E8. Separate Rations. Students reporting to the Student De- 0 Have a minimum of two years’ experience as a tank tachment should be in TDY status. Their orders should state commander. The course is vehicle-specific - M60A1, that separate rations are authorized because there are no M60A3, and M1. The 2-year minimum requirement is dining facilities at the Student Detachment. Without this waived for soldiers in the M1 track. (Instead, they must have authorization, the student may bear an additional financial at least six months’ experience, but this waiver will not be burden. authorized once the M1 is in the field for two years.) Candi- Pay Options. Students who plan to have their paychecks dates from M1 units must have attended and qualified as sent to their units should understand that there will be a tank commanders during NETT and M 1 transition training. delay while checks are redirected through the finance center National Guard and Reserve component students who are to at his home station. attend the M60A1 track should have two years’ experience Transportation. Classes are within walking distance of the as tank commanders on the M48A5. Student Detachment and government transportation is pro- 0 Candidates must be qualified as tank commanders on vided to ranges during the course. While use of privately the Tank Crew Qualification Course within the preceding 24 owned vehicles is not authorized to get to and from classes, months. Active duty candidates must be qualified on Table students may wish to have their cars with them after duty VIII, National Guard and Reserve on Table VII, and M1 hours. If so, they must register the vehicles with the student students on NETT and M1 transition Table VIII. detachment TAC NCO during inprocessing. Students must Candidates must also have qualified on the tank com- have documents proving ownership, state registration, and mander’s portion of the Tank Crew Gunnery Skills test insurance coverage when reporting. (TCGST) within the previous six months. 0 Additional qualifications are that the candidate hold a Some academic problems arise because students need and SECRET security clearance, be selected by his battalion do not have certain documents and data used for class pro- commander, and be a true volunteer. jects. Before leaving his home unit, the candidate should Once a candidate has completed the course, he is eligible obtain the most recent after-action report from his unit’s last to be retained in his unit for a minimum of two years in the Level I and I1 tank gunnery, the skill level and proficiency duty position of master gunner. (SQT score) of each CMF 19 and 45 soldier in his unit, a list As part of his introduction to the course, the student fills of his unit’s current strength, showing positions held and out a candidate survey form. This is usually when we discov- DEROS dates, and a copy of each vehicle’s 2408-4. er that a prerequisite is missing. The most common deficien- Other projects may require certain items that can be pur- cies are too little experience in the tank commander’s slot, chased at the school if the student doesn’t have them. These absence of Tank Crew Qualification Test certification within include a calculator, drawing compass, map protractor, ruler, the preceding 24 months or failure to qualify on the TCGST notebook, pens and pencils, marking pens, paper or tablets. within the required six-month period. Units suffer by not having their very best tankers become Another common deficiency is that the candidate was not master gunners. And the individuals suffer, too. They may selected by his battalion commander, nor was there a one- feel that their units are unconcerned about their career de- on-one interview of the candidate before selection. This may velopment by placing them in situations where they may fall indicate poor command level interest. short of meeting standards. Statistics show that students who do not meet the course By strictly applying the course prerequisites and by going prerequisites tend to be the ones who drop out, or are re- over some of the administrative pitfalls mentioned here, we leased for academic reasons. But aside from the problem of can minimize the problems and hardships the student prerequisites, some common administrative problems also encounters while learning to be a master gunner. And by arise. doing so, we can provide the units with a graduate who is a Leave. If students plan to take leave after completing the true master gunner in every sense of the word.

8 ARMOR September-October 1984

Honduran cavalry defending the Amatillo Bridge used Israeli RBY armored vehicles and armed quarter-ton jeeps. Cavalry Action in Central America by Lieutenant Colonel Sewell Menzel and Colonel William Said

On Friday, 29 April 1983, at 0200 died in their cabs and seats. any intruders who might attempt to hours, Farabundo Marti guerrilla for- The remainder of the local popula- cross the bridge. ces numbering approximately several tion, keeping low and under cover from Some three hours later, at about hundred men conducted a surprise the streams of bullets spattering about 0500, this small defense force came night attack on the Salvadoran end of the bridge and customs houses, clus- under intense rifle and machinegun fire the Amatillo International Bridge sepa- tered in their adobe huts trying to avoid as two squad-sized guerrilla units be- rating Honduras from El Salvador antagonizing the guerrillas. Some were gan working their way along each side (Map 1). This critical bridge carries not fortunate enough: eight houses of the bridge toward them. A third much of El Salvador’s trade with Pana- were grenaded and burned out with group was detected as it began to set ma, Costa Rica, and Honduras, and Molotov cocktails. A few terrified peo- demolition charges along the under- was thus a prime target for the commu- ple made their way down the embank- pinnings of the bridge. The Hondurans nist guerrillas fighting to bring down ments of the Goascoran River and returned the fire with rifles and pistols, the government of El Salvador. crossed the semi-dry stream bed to killing two guerrilla sappers. The guer- The first volleys of rifle and ma- safety on the Honduran side of the rillas on the bridge withdrew. chinegun fire cut down the sentinels bridge. The screams of women and At 0600 hours a demolition charge guarding the bridge, decimated the children were distinctly audible to the was fired and a six-meter span of the Salvadoran customs officials, and Honduran customs personnel who bridge fell into the river bed. The guer- wiped out the dozen-man security po- attempted to observe the obvious car- rillas again opened intensive fire and lice detachment sleeping in their wood- nage taking place in the dim moonlight began to mass for a charge across the en billets. The commander of the police some 400 meters away. river bed with the objective of captur- detachment was captured, tortured, The Hondurans reported the events ing the entire bridge. and shot. taking place on the other side of the The fire was returned at every While this was taking place, other river to their military district com- chance as the attack preparations built guerrillas looted and burned the nine mander some 48 kilometers east, in the UP. cars and commercial trucks waiting to vicinity of San Lorenzo. He ordered the be processed through customs that men manning the border post to occu- Honduran Reaction next morning. The occupants, caught py observation posts and previously The Honduran military district com- by surprise and unable to fight back, prepared security positions to detect mander at San Lorenzo was kept

10 ARMOR September-October 1984 abreast of the situation and at 0620 ordered two platoons of light infantry from Co A, 11th Infantry Battalion, and two platoons of the 2d Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, to re- inforce the beleaguered forces at the bridge. (A squadron in the Honduran Army is equal to a troop in the U.S. Army.) When the 2d Squadron, located some 81 kilometers from Amatillo, re- ceived the alert, the troopers were al- ready at their morning formation and in less than five minutes, the two pla- toons, with full combat loads, were on their way. This force, basically organized for re- connaissance and screening operations, consisted of two Israeli-made RBYs, wheeled, armored reconnaissance ve- hicles, each armed with a 106-mm re- coilless rifle; three additional Israeli RBYs scout vehicles armed with 7.62- mm machinguns, and three %ton jeep vehicles armed with M2 SO-caliber ma- chineguns; a total of eight well-armed and highly mobile fighting vehicles - ideally suited for the action at hand. Traveling at a high speed by road, the Honduran cavalry force reached Locator map, above, pinpuinis IVUIIlV~VI IW porder checkpoint attacked by guer- the Amatillo bridge in less than an rillas in the action described. Map 2 shows how Honduran cavalry and infantry deployed to pin guerrillas down, preventing them from crossing the river and de- hour. Upon arrival, the two platoons stroying the bridge, a crucial link in the Pan American Highway. went into covered and concealed posi- tions about 1 kilometer east of the bridge and south of Nancito Hill (Map

I 1oOo~e= MMUR ' September-October 1984 1 1 2). Captain Carlos Andino - a 1981 to attack the guerrillas on their side of America are no different than those in graduate of the AOAC at Fort Knox, the river. He was wrong. other parts of the world and they dem- Ky., - made a quick reconnaissance to The action had been so intense and onstrate that, in counter-guerrilla establish contact with the local forces prolonged that strict ammunition con- actions, cavalry forces employed in and the two platoons of infantry from servation was now ordered for the accordance with their capabilities, and Co. A that had arrived a few minutes Honduran forces. Fire superiority had resolutely commanded, can often de- earlier from their base a short distance been gained over the guerrillas and feat enemy forces many times their from the bridge. Both infantry platoons their return fire was, at best, sporadic. size. were under heavy machinegun fire and Guerrilla sharpshooters and grena- were unable to relieve the besieged diers using U.S. 40-mm grenade bridge defenders. launchers tried to reverse the fire situ- The guerrillas had now formed a ation and killed a civilian and wounded 100-man force with the objective of three Honduran infantrymen. These storming the river bed to attack the were the only Honduran military casu- Honduran defender's right flank (Map alties of the action. 2). Honduran 81-mm mortars fired sup- Captain Andino, who had stationed pression missions throughout the after- himself with one of his motorized pla- noon and, early that evening, were re- toons, ordered mechanized units into inforced by a three-piece 160-mm mor- the attack to relieve the infantry. tar battery that pounded the guerrillas Using the highway as a guide, the 1st into the night. platoon took the right (north) zone and the 2d platoon the left (south) zone. Action Terminated All vehicles opened fire simultaneously The battle died during the night as LIEUTENANT COLONEL SEWALL MENZEL was and the vehicles proceeded by bounds the guerrillas began to withdraw through the hills to the northwest. The commissioned in artillery toward the river, closing the distance to from the Citadel in 1964 the enemy. Automatic weapons fire Hondurans were now able to take stock when he received his bach- was directed first at guerrilla machine- of the situation. elor degree in history. Two gun nests, then against antitank wea- In addition to the burned-out trucks, years later he transferred to pon sites, and finally at groups of infan- cars, and buildings, with the bodies of armor and later commanded try. the slain civilians still in them, a dozen armored cavalry units in Vi- As the 106-mm recoilless rifles and customs and police security officials etnam. More recently, he had been killed and the bridge had served for 2 years as Chief, SO-caliber machineguns opened fire, Army Section, for the U.S. the scout vehicles moved to the flanks been damaged. The bodies of 60 guerrillas were Military Group in Honduras. of the moving force to screen and pro- He is fluent in Spanish and vide early warning of any enemy move- found in a draw where they had been conversive in Portugese.. ments (Map 2). partially consumed by gasoline fires. Currently, he is assigned to' A guerrilla machinegun nest in the Honduran estimates of guerrilla cas- the DAMO-SSA, DCS-OPS, former Salvadoran customs building ualties ran to some 96 killed with the Pentagon, Washington, was destroyed by a direct hit from a scores of wounded. The hard-hitting D.C. 106-mm shell at 800 meters. cavalry had saved the day. The fire from the recoilless rifles and Some Observations the heavy machineguns was an unex- The cavalry commander used the pected shock to the guerrillas and they factors of mission, enemy, terrain, ceased fire as the Honduran cavalry- time and space to quickly size-up the men concentrated on the machinegun enemy and then he took the initiative. nests. The force that had massed to 0 In encounter-type engagements, storm the river, had sensed the slack- the action usually goes to the side that ening of their supporting fires, pan- plasters its opponent with fire. In this icked, and began to run away up and case, the cavalry opened fire with all its over the barren, grass-covered hills. weapons simultaneously and quickly They were driven by Honduran ma- gained fire superiority. chinegun fire back into the Salvadoran 0 The Hondurans kept the structur- houses. al base of the bridge (lower abutments By 1030, the Honduran infantry had and pilings) under continuous rifle fire COLONEL WILLIAM SAID, worked its way forward and completed and significantly reduced the threat of a cavalry officer in the Hon- the relief of the customs and militia further demolition. duran Army, is a 1977 grad- personnel who were almost out of The enemy snipers could have uate of the Command and ammunition. The Honduran military been better suppressed had the Hondu- General Staff College, US. district commander had by now arrived Army School of the Ameri- ran machineguns saturated their tree- cas, in Panama. He has and ordered that the bridge be defend- top hiding places. been associated with the ed at all costs to prevent further struc- It was noted that the 40-mm gre- Honduran armored force tural damage. A second order pre- nade launcher gave off a distinctive pop since its formation in 1977 served Salvadoran sovereignty by di- when fired giving an alert soldier a sec- and currently commands recting that Honduran soldiers remain ond or two to seek cover. This time-lag the 1 st Honduran Armored on their own side of the river. The was especially true at ranges of more Regiment. Honduran commander believed that than 200 meters. Salvadoran forces would soon arrrive 0 Combat operations in Central

12 ARMOR September-October 1984 A Woria vvar II Formation Lives on in Afghanistan

Soviet Enveloping Detachments by Captain Gilbert0 Vlllahermosa

The Soviet Army places great notes that the enveloping detachment in airborne or airmobile operations, but emphasis on rapid offensive action and usually operates on foot “in those sec- were initially parachuted into action. has developed a number of special tors where terrain proves difficult,” This proved to be costly - the troops formations to ensure continuous working in cooperation with forces suffered heavy losses to Afghani free- movement of its forward elements. attacking the enemy frontally. dom fighters equipped with obsolete Some of these special formations, such Soviet military journals point out rifles but employing very accurate as the forward detachment and the that enveloping. detachments can also aimed fire. For this reason, the Soviets operational maneuver group (OMG), be inserted by airborne, amphibious or now prefer to use airmobile operations have been publicized in the Western airmobile operations. Pack animals are whenever possible. press, but others remain unknown de- to be used in those areas where terrain Because airborne units seldom have spite widespread use during WWII and limits the use of vehicles. the artillery assets available to the mo- in the current fighting in Afghanistan. torized rifle unit, and airborne compa- One such formation, the enveloping Use in WWII ny or battalion is supported instead detachment, is widely discussed in the The use of enveloping detachments with 120-mm mortars. A battalion-size Soviet military literature but little men- during WWII led to high rates of enveloping detachment will be rein- tioned in the West. Seldom a month advance in mountain fighting. In the forced with an air defense platoon, a goes by without an article on this type Northern Caucasus, the Crimea, the combat engineer platoon, and chemical of formation appearing in Military Her- Balkans, the Carpathians, in Central personnel. Companies receive similar ald (Voenny Vestnik) and Military His- Europe and in the Far East, success reinforcements, but on a smaller scale. torical Journal (Voenny Istoricheskiy was often achieved when regular infan- When in the role of an enveloping Zhurnal). Indeed, it is not uncommon try troops were made the foundation of detachment, an airborne battalion will to find three or four articles in a single special combined-arms formations normally operate independently. It’s issueon this formation. which were used to attack the enemy most typical missions include “capture According to the Soviet definition, flanks and rear areas after having infil- of mountain passages and passes, cap- the enveloping detachment can vary trated through gaps in his defensive po- ture of positions favorable for the de- greatly in size, from a platoon to a regi- sitions. fense, and holding them until arrival of ment. It is administratively self-con- In some cases, tanks were used in troops from the front.”, tained. Its mission is “to envelop the direct support of infantry, with decen- Motorized Rifle Troops enemy with the aim of striking him in tralization down to single tanks in sup- Just as the enveloping detachments the flanks and rear in order to seize his port of platoons. With the use of these of WWII were based on regular infan- positions.” special detachments, the Soviets were try units, the modern-day enveloping The Soviets specifically define the able to achieve rates of advance of 1-2 detachment as used in Afghanistan is enveloping detachment as an offensive kilometers per hour, even against the based on motorized rifle troops. Be- formation which - while it can be used best prepared positions.2 cause they can operate on any terrain under normal terrain conditions - There are a number of combat and under any conditions, the Soviets see lends itself to difficult terrain, specifi- combat support elements that make up these troops as best suited to opera- cally mountains, deserts, forested company and battalion-size enveloping tions in the mountains. They recog- areas, swamps, and northern regions. detachments. Examples are common in nized that special training is necessary “Depending on the trafficability of the present mountain fighting in for mountain operations and intensive- the terrain, the enveloping detachment Afghanistan. ly practice negotiating mountainous is normally composed of motorized ri- terrain on foot and in vehicles, the use fle (platoons, companies, or battalion- Airborne Troops of weapons in the mountains, moun- size) elements reinforced with portable During the invasion of Afghanistan, tain climbing, map reading, and small antitank weapons, mortars, artillery elements of three Soviet airborne divi- unit tactics. Great emphasis is placed and other special (units) such as engi- sions were employed. These units have on the development of a spirit of initia- neer troops.”1 since borne the brunt of the fighting. tive in junior officers. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia also These troops can be employed either A company-size enveloping detach-

ARMOR September-October 1984 13 Mission: “To capture dominant heights, passes and pas- sages in the depth of the enemy’s defenses. . .” ment in support of a battalion consists It is also interesting to note that of a motorized rifle company reinforced while there are presently 100,000 to with a mortar battery, a tank platoon, a 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, chemical squad, an engineer squad and “only 12,000 to 15,000 of them are an ADA section or squad. A battalion- actively engaged in fighting Afghan re- size enveloping detachment consists of sistance forces and of those, only an a motorized rifle battalion reinforced average of 500 to 700 are involved in with a mortar battery, an artillery bat- offensive sweeps on a daily basis.”’ talion, a tank company, engineer and provide smoke cover to mask move- chemical platoons, and ADA platoon, Tank Troops ment and deceive the enemy as to the and various service support elements. Terrain restricts tank employment in detachment’s intentions. Both size enveloping detachments the mountains so the Soviets seldom According to several articles in have the same mission: “TO capture use tanks on any scale above battalion Military Herald, artillery is also used in dominant heights, passes, and passages level. Tanks are normally employed the direct-fire role in the mountains. In in the depth of the enemy’s defenses in only in support of the infantry with pla- this type of situation, the battery may order to destroy his weapons of mass toons and companies allocated to be broken up and targets allocated to destruction and command posts and to company and battalion-size enveloping individual guns. While the Soviets nor- accomplish other tasks.”4 detachments. Additionally, individual mally resist this type of decentraliza- This is to be achieved by taking tanks may support the action of motor- tion, they seem to have accepted it as a advantage of the rugged terrain and ized rifle platoons. During the attack, necessity of mountain fighting. When mountain weather conditions to infil- the tanks move behind the dismounted employed in the mobile role in support trate through gaps in the enemy’s de- infantry and their carriers and support of forces in the attack, the artillery will fensive positions into his rear and their assault with fires. The fires are move 500 to 1,000 meters behind the flanks to conduct surprise attacks in conducted over the heads of friendly tanks and personnel carriers and will order to capture the assigned objective troops and to their flanks, with the engage enemy infantry and antitank and to destroy or capture the enemy. tanks moving about 250 meters behind assets. This compensates for the tanks’ The success of the battalion-size them. limited antipersonnel capability, while enveloping detachment in the Afghan- Apparently because of problems supplying immediate suppressive fires istan fighting has apparently led to cre- when firing on the move near dis- for the motorized infantry. It is inter- ation of a new type of Soviet battalion mounted infantry, the Soviets hedge esting that while this employment tech- called the Combined Arms Reinforced their doctrine by firing from the short nique is not approved Soviet doctrine, Battalion (CARB). According to Jossef halt or from stationary positions. it is widespread in Afghanistan. Bodansky, who described this forma- Other problems have been encoun- The Soviet military press makes little tion in a recent articles, “These units tered as well. The limited gun tube de- mention either of multiple rocket laun- have become the core unit for the con- pression and elevation of Soviet tanks, chers or FROGS, in the mountains. duct of small unit military operations in designed for operations in relatively flat This isn’t surprising when one consi- mountainous terrain.” terrain, limits their use against high- ders the limited elevation of Soviet Bodansky, one of the first to describe angle targets. To solve this problem, an MRLs and the poor cross-country per- this new formation, noted in a related officer writing in Military Herald formance of the FROGcarriers. article, “The reinforced battalion is a suggests that the tank be driven up on highly mobile force capable of carrying to boulders or into depressions in the Mortars out autonomous operations. It is satu- ground to compensate for the limited The Soviets see the mortar as the rated with fire support means, especial- gun elevation and depression. He also ideal weapon for mountain fire support ly artillery and air support. It has its recommends extensive use of the because of its light weight, the own tank company.”b The composition tank’s antiaircraft machinegun to increased lethality due to fragmenta- of these CARBs - a motorized rifle engage ground targets.8 tion and the mortar’s ability to cover battalion, a tank company, an artillery Target acquisition is also a problem dead spaces in the terrain. They recog- battalion, a mortar battery, an air de- for tanks working in the mountains. nize that there may be long periods fense company, an antitank company “The uniform color of the terrain and during which the envelopment detach- and various service support elements targets and large numbers of boulders, ment commander will have to rely on - is so strikingly similar to the battal- caves, and other natural cover have a mortar fire support, which accounts for ion-size enveloping detachment that negative influence on the effectiveness the presence of both artillery and mor- this author is convinced their creation of tank fire in the mountains and com- tars in the battalion-size enveloping de- was heavily influenced by the extensive plicate reconnaissance, detection, and tachment. use and successes of enveloping de- identification of small enemy targets.”9 Soviet mortars range in size from the tachments in Afghanistan. The crea- 82-mm series (M-37, M-41, M-42) to tion of these CARBs is an indication Artillery its 120-mm replacement (M-38, M- that motorized rifle troops are regain- The artillery battalion of the envel- 43). The latter are commonly found in ing their predominance in the field of oping detachment is tasked to neutral- motorized rifle battalions (18 tubes per mountain fighting. It should be ize any enemy systems that prevent the battalion) and are used extensively in stressed that the CARB is presently enveloping detachment from accom- Afghanistan, both by motorized rifle employed only in Afghanistan. plishing its mission. Artillery units also and airborne troops.

14 MMUR September-October 1984 r “Reconnaissance is provided by the chemical recon- naissance patrol.. .”

While rarely seen, the Soviets also mountains, this concept is refined, with have 160-mm and 240-mm mortars engineer assets assigned down to the available for deployment. Mortars of platoon level in order to provide sup- this caliber were found at battalion-lev- port during the final assault on the ene- el supporting mountain operations in my. WWII. The Soviets’ continuing com- The mobility mission appears to be mittment to large caliber mortars con- the principal mission of Soviet engi- tinues with the new 240-mm M-1975 neers operating with combat elements self-propelled mortar recently reported and is a full-time job. Denying the ene- in the Western defense press.10 my use of key sectors of terrain and Another new mortar is seeing exten- canalizing him into prepared kill zones sive employment in Afghanistan. With through the use of mines is another a maximum rate of fire of 120 rounds principal mission. per minute (the practical rate of fire is probably much lower) and the ability to Chemical Personnel fire both explosive fragmentation Chemical troops reconnoiter routes rounds and shaped-charge antitank for traces of chemical contamination rounds, the Vusilek mortar can be used and DrOVide the enveloDine.- detach- for both direct and indirect fire. meni with decontamination assets smokescreens and the fire of tanks, June’s Defense Weekly recently re- when needed. Reconnaissance is pro- artillery, machineguns and subma- ported that the Vasilek is also vehicle- vided by the chemical reconnaissance chineguns. After flamethrowing is mounted. “It is believed that there are patrol, which usually travels with the accomplished, the (accompanying three or four self-propelled versions of combat reconnaissance patrol, units) attack and complete the enemy’s the Vusilek, although comprehensive although it can operate independently. destruction.”16 details are lacking. There are reports Soviet doctrine calls for chemical from Afghanistan that the system has troops to use chemicpl agents “to pro- Air Defense Artillery been seen in a turreted mounting on tect the flanks of Soviet troops from When possible, air defense assets are either the BTR-60 or BTR-70 armored ambush during an advance through placed on commanding terrain to max- personnel carriers. The system is also mountain passes exposed to controlling imize range and minimize terrain inter- apparently mounted in the turrets of heights.”l3 They also dispense chemi- ference. If that is not possible, they modified BMP-I and BMD-1 infantry cal agents “to create lethal blocks in operate from roads, despite the limita- combat vehicles.”ll order to deny the resistance access to tions.17 In mountain fighting, the enve- All these factors serve to make the narrow creeks and caves that are inac- loping detachment often has to rely on Vusilek a superb fire support weapon in cessible to mechanized troops or heli- shoulder-fired missiles when terrain the mountains during both offensive copter fire.”l4 won’t accomodate tracked self-pro- and defensive operations. The Vusilek Chemical personnel are also re- pelled systems. is currently replacing the 120-mm mor- sponsible for the use of smoke pots and tar in select motorized rifle battalions grenades in support of the enveloping The March and is issued on a scale of six tubes detachment. The Soviets place great The organization of the march takes (one battery) per battalion. emphasis on the use of smoke both to on greater significance during opera- screen movement and to mark targets. tions in the mountains, according to Engineers One of the most important missions Soviet doctrine, because of the possi- Engineer support of enveloping de- of chemical personnel is the destruc- bility of ambush.18 tachments in the mountains involves tion of the enemy with incendiary wea- On the march, the enveloping de- laying and clearing mines, clearing road pons. Flamethrower teams are often tachment is configured much like a obstructions, rebuilding road sections used during assaults on fortified posi- company or battalion-size advance and bridges along the route of march, tions in the mountains. “They are guard and consists of a combat recon- and constructing bypasses where nec- assigned combat missions of destroying naissance patrol, forward security ele- essary.12 In order to accomplish this, enemy personnel in mountain crevass- ment, and the main body, along with the engineers themselves operate as es, caves, protective works and other associated flank and rear security ele- detachments. These include the obsta- cover.”ls According to Soviet doctrine, ments. cle reconnaissance and clearance de- “In the attack, flamethrower operators Operating icdependently, the com- tachment, the engineer reconnaissance advance and dismount together with bat reconnaissance patrol travels 10 to patrol, the movement support detach- the motorized riflemen and function in 15 kilometers ahead of the main body. ment, and the mobile obstacle detach- their skirmish line at intervals up to It performs reconnaissance by observa- ment. 100 meters. On encountering perman- tion as well as by ambushes and raids. The Soviet concept of engineer sup- ent and other powerful weapon The combat reconnaissance patrol port is based on forward deployment of emplacements hindering the attack, generally consists of a motorized rifle engineer personnel and equipment they move forward, taking advantage platoon or section (for battalion or with reconnaissance and combat ele- of folds in the terrain, and fire on company size enveloping detachments, ments in order to ensure the continued embrasures, entrances and trenches. respectively) as well as scouts. More movement of the main body. In the Their actions are usually covered by often than not, it will operate in con-

ARMOR September-October 1984 15 “During the attack, motor- ized riflemen remain mounted as long as possi- ble. . .”

enemy from above whenever possible and attempt to seize his uppermost de- fensive positions. Once these positions are captured and cleared, the detach- ment then works its way down to the enemy’s lower level positions, pro- gressing until the enemy is captured or destroyed. Once the objective is seized, defensive preparations are made for a possible enemy counterattack. During the attack, motorized rifle- junction with engineer and chemical re- that can be up to 5 kilometers to the men remain mounted as long as possi- connaissance patrols. In some cases, an flanks and 2 to 3 kilometers to the rear ble. When terrain or enemy resistance artillery reconnaissance patrol will tra- of the main body. As the main body precludes attacking mounted, the rifle- vel with the unit. approaches areas where ambushes are men dismount with supporting chemi- The forward security element, tra- likely, an artillery battery deploys to cal and engineer personnel, forming veling 5 to 10 kilometers behind the cover the movement and later rejoins platoon-size assault groups. They combat reconnaissance patrol, is to the column. advance on the enemy position along provide “security to the main body Along the march, vehicles maintain covered and concealed routes wherever against a surprise attack. . . and 50 to 100-meter intervals and move at possible, supported by smoke, direct advantageous conditions for the de- a speed of 15 to 20 km/hr. and indirect fires. ployment of the main body.”l9 The for- The dismounted infantry are fol- ward security element amounts to a The Attack lowed by their BMPs or BTRs which third of the enveloping detachment’s An attack in the mountains is to be support the attack with ATGMs, can- assets and includes motorized infantry, conducted on a frontage two to three non and machinegun fire. Vehicles car- tanks, mortar, artillery, ADA, chemi- times greater than normal for a compa- rying the AGS-17 automatic grenade cal and engineer troops. This subunit ny or battalion. The attack begins along launchers are deployed with the infan- also includes the engineer route recon- mountain roads or trails, valleys, can- try carriers, suppressing the enemy as naissance and obstacle clearing detach- yons, and along the gentle slopes of rid- the dismounted troops advance. Be- ment, movement support detach- ges after the enveloping detachment hind this first line of vehicles, follows a ments, and mobile obstacle detach- has infiltrated through gaps in the ene- second, composed of tanks which ments. my positions or has approached a flank engage the enemy using main gun and The forward security element nor- undetected. An intense artillery or avi- machinegun fire. This line is about 250 mally operates with flank pickets in ation preparation precedes the attack. meters behind the infantry. If automa- mountainous terrain. They occuov kev Elements of the envelooinn detach- tic self-propelled mortars are available, terrain along the march route until the ment will often operate alongseparate they will be found behind the tanks, column passes, then leap-frog forward. axes. Whenever possible, they will try firing in both direct and indirect modes. The main body of the enveloping de- to seize terrain overlooking or border- The Soviets prefer to use their artil- tachment follows 2 to 3 kilometers be- ing the objective. While bringing direct lery from stationary positions. If terrain hind the forward security element with fires to bear from these positions, the permits, the artillery will continue to mobile flank and security detachments enveloping detachment will attack the advance behind the tanks and mortars,

~ A Battalion-Size NOTE: The order of march of the various Enveloping Detachment arms within each element are not necessarily accurate. in March Formation

MAW (-) (-1 (-) (-) (-) (-1 Combat ‘-) MORTAR 5 irn Reconnaissance Forward Security Element f Main Body Rear Detachment Patrol

Flank Detachment

16 ARIWlPm September-October 1984 “. . . They can be utilized in any terrain that presents gaps in the defender’s line of resistance.. .” firing from short halts against enemy strongpoints, ATGM teams, and troop concentrations, but when terrain be- gins to restrict the advance, the artillery will take up stationary positions. Strongpoints and other defensive po- sitions that cannot be eliminated with supporting fire are engaged by assault groups, using flamethrowers, demoli- tion charges, and rocket-propelled gre- nades fired by motorized riflemen. The attack of the enveloping detach- cause of the great steepness of the the Soviets’ employment of these de- ment, as described, takes place while slopes and ascents, dense vegetation, tachments in the mountains, they can other forces are conducting a frontal and snow cover in the winter greatly be utilized in any terrain that presents attack, exposing the enemy to pressure hinder the movement of troops and gaps in the defender’s line of resis- from several directions. The Soviets equipment, delivery of supplies needed tance.22 Such terrain is typical of NA- believe that this type of attack can ra- for combat and the evacuation of the TO’s northern and southern flank pidly destroy an enemy, even in well- wounded.”20 areas of poor mobility, sparse road prepared defensive positions. Events in Another problem encountered is the networks, marshes, forests, and forest- Afghanistan seem to bear this out. unreliability of radio communications ed mountains. in mountain terrain. The mountain A future war will see enveloping de- Problems Encountered ridges screen radio waves and cause tachments used on a wide scale. Insert- Despite wide use and frequent suc- frequent losses of communication.21 ed by airborne and airmobile opera- cess in using enveloping detachments, tions (and along NATO’s northern the Soviets have encountered some The NATO Prospect flank by amphibious operations), enve- difficulties, brought about by the na- Created during WWII and perfected loping detachments will be used to se- ture of the terrain itself. According to in Afghanistan, the enveloping detach- ize bridges, key mountain passes, and Colonel K. Bregman, writing in Military ment has proven itself a hard-hitting, other critical objectives, holding them Herald, “The meager nature of the highly mobile and flexible formation until the arrival of the main body. They road network and the almost complete that can operate independently in will be seeking out and destroying com- impossibility of road movement by all rugged terrain and under the most sev- mand and control centers and other types of transport vehicles, tanks and ere weather conditions, day and night. key installations. Enveloping detach- other fighting vehicles off the road be- While this article has concentrated on ments will continue to advance parallel to the main body along rugged terrain, striking the enemy unexpectedly in his Footnotes flanks and rear. Because of the key role 1 Soviet Military Encyclopediu [in Russian], Mos- 11“AM Vasilek Automatic 82mm Mortar”, enveloping detachments will play in cow: Voyenizdat, 1978) Volume 5, p.676. June’sDefense Weekw, Vol. 1, NO.5, p. 150. military operations on NATO’s flanks, 2See A.I. Radzievsky, Army Operutions [in Rus- 12LTG of Engineer Troops Gorbachev, “Engi- the next war may see considerably sian], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977). pp. 122-135. neer Support of Troop Operations in the Moun- and Tuctics in Combur Exumples-Division [in Rus- tains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], No. 3, 1981, higher rates of advance than those of sian], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976). pp. 126-132. pp. 95-98. the last war on such terrain. 3COL M. Muslomov, “A Battalion Seizes an 13Yossef Bodansky. “The Bear on the Chess- Objective in the Mountains”, Militury Herald tin board: Soviet Military Gains in- Afghanistan”, Russian], No. 2,1982, p. 34. WorldAflairs. Vol. 148, No. 3. Winter 1982-83, p. 4MG S. Kovachev, “In an Enveloping Detach- 285. CAPTAIN GILBERT0 VIL- ment”, Militury Heruld [in Russianl, No. 8. 1977, Illbid, p. 285. LAHERMOSA is a 1980 gra- p. 115. lSLTC I. Mukhin, “Chemical Support in the duate of USMA. He has ’Yossef Bodansky, “The Bear on the Chess- Mountains”, Militury Herald [in Russian], No. 1, served as an armored caval- board: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan”. 1982, p. 34. ry troop platoon leader, line Wor/dMfuirs,Vol. 148, No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p. 283. troop XO and squadron S4 6Yossef Bodansky, “General of the Amy D. T. in the 3-1 2 Cavalry, FRG. He Yazov: Victor in Afghanistan”, June’s Defense is a graduate of the AOBC, Weekly.Vol. 1, NO.12, p. 485. 18LTC Bartkevich, “An Advance Party in the AOAC, Airborne and Junior 7Yossef Bodansky, “The Bear on the Chess- Mountains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], NO. 2, Officer Maintenance board: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan”, 1982, p. 26. Course. He is presently WorldAflairs, Vol. 148, No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p. 19Soviet Milirury Encyclojwdiu [in Russian], (Mos- attending the Joint Firepow- 219. cow: Voyenizdat, 1976), Vol. 2, pp. 594-595. er Course at Hurlburt Field, *LTC I. Sobran, “Firing from Tanks in the 2oCOL Bregman, “Mountains Are No Hindrance be Mountains”, Militury Herald [in Russianl, No. 5, for the Capable”, Militury Heruld [in Russian], No. Florida and will assigned 1982. p. 83. 2 1981,p.l. to XVlll Airborne Corps at Ft. slbid, p. 83. Illbid, p. 1. Bragg, N.C. “khristopher Bellamy. “Conventional Quick 22“An Enveloping Detachment in Battle Forma- Kill”, June’s Defense Week&, Vol. 1, No. 19, p. tion”, Soviet Militury Review, No. 5, 1983, pp. 20- 783. 21.

ARMOR September-October 1984 17 German and American troops confer at a crossroads during fall maneuvers in Europe. Interoperability in NATO by Captain Ronald M. Schrock, Jr. Interoperability amongst land forces in NATO suffers Why? There are many stumbling blocks to effective inter- from a lack of communications and equipment standardiza- operability amongst 16 nations who are also pursuing their tion. Complete standardization may be beyond the realm of own national interests while professing to be part of a defen- reality. Hc-zpver, NATO land force commanders must re- sive alliance. Major obstacles are equipment standardization solve to seek their own mutually agreed upon operative solu- and communications. “No nation has an adequate organiza- tions to interoperability needs. tion to coordinate the activities of its forces with those of its allied neighbors. No nation has designed its communications The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Liaison equipment to net with that of its allies.”7 Without equipment Oflice in Cologne, Germany, publishes information dealing standardization, joint logistical resupply efforts would be with U.S. and German Army interoperability.1 To satisfy a minimal. As a result of lack of standardization of weapon need for definition, the Department of Defense Steering systems and support systems, only 15-20°/o of associated sup- Group on Rationalization/Standardizationz 3 within NATO plies used by both (U.S. and German) armies are similar agreed that the following definition for interoperability will wherein some mutual support would seem possible when apply: “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide needed.* Certainly standardization of weapon systems and services to and accept services from other systems, units, or support systems are complicated by national economic inter- forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them ests and lack of a proven method to “do it together” in a to operate effectively together.”4 It follows, having read the cooperative defense-industrial effort. Until such efforts suc- detinitions of rationalization, standardization, and interop- ceed to promote joint-cooperative results, the ability to net erability, that interoperability comprises those actions need- communications equipment amongst the NATO allies, the ed to produce effective joint operations. AUSA News recent- ability to provide a common logistical support base for com- ly noted, “The need today for interoperability in NATO is mon major weapon systems, the capability to effectively obvious - 16 nations, 15 with military forces, pledged to the interoperate remains within a void. Sixteen nations dedicat- proposition that an attack on one is an attack on all, must ed to a defensive alliance can only hope to achieve their believe that their forces can operate collectively, effectively. common goal as a deterrent force if they are able to “inter- They must believe that their military leaders have developed operate” together. the policies, engaged in the training, and accomplished the The present most effective means of coordinating US/GE preparations essential to assure such a capability.”s Unfortu- command and control communications is thru a liaison nately, the 16 nations cannot be assured that such a belief is team. The field solution has been for units to exchange liai- welLfounded.”6 son teams, utilizing their own national radios, national fre-

18 ARMOR September-October 1984 “. . .The LNO must be able to wear two hats in order to be effective. He cannot only represent the interests of his own force. . .”

quencies and CEO1 equivalents. While this duplication of‘ The ability of 16 nations to have plans that call for a effort may be a workable solution in some cases, it quickly mutual shoulder-to-shoulder defense is undoubtedly the becomes wasteful of personnel, equipment and available fre- major indicator of resolve within the NATO alliance. At the quencies. Also, by utilizing a liaison team to coordinate com- same time, it demands interoperability and prior coordina- mand and control, we are adding another human link to the tion at the flanks where the two shoulders meet. Within their critical chain of communications between commanders. own boundaries, different national forces can utilize their While adding a human link to the chain may be a disadvan- own SOPS; however, at the international flanks we must tage, the advantage is the capability to cover the gap of resolve to coordinate our intentions with our neighbor. current communication difficulties through human under- When we know beforehand what the other guy is planning standing. Leaders of liaison teams need not only to have an for on his side of the fence we can best prepare our own adequate linguistic ability, but also be well versed in the plans. These plans should coincide in a synergistic effect as a tactics, normal operational techniques, and the command- combat multiplier to destroy the enemy. Flanks are made ers’ priorities in order to fully understand both units whose identifiable by boundaries and coordination/contact points. operations he is attempting to coordinate. This is complicat- Boundaries, if properly selected, are on terrain which does ed in that there is currently no methodical or progressive not favor any major mounted approach and can be easily training program for liaison teams. In order to develop any defended by friendly forces. Boundaries can be screened or degree of proficiency, liaison teams must be assigned in overwatched without actual positioning of forces. At points peacetime to live and work, for the majority of their time, where physical coordination is established, a checklist in the with their host unit. appropriate languages is needed to enhance understanding, When it comes to coordinating actual tactical operations, to ensure that all mutual coordination is accomplished. In both US and GE forces proceed from different tactical con- case of a threat from the enemy in the vicinity of the coor- cepts. While tactics will not be developed in detail in this dination/contact point, the senior NATO soldier present, article, commanders and G3s/S3s should be aware that dif- regardless of nationality, should be in command. Boundaries ferences do exist, and know how to approach these differ- at coordination/contact points need not turn into strong ences before conducting any joint ventures. It must be re- points. It is precisely at the flanks where, when needed and if membered that both US and GE forces in the defense have available, we can direct the combat power of not one nation- the same objective of destroying the enemy’s offensive capa- al force, but two! All available combat support (attack heli- bilities, however different priorities develop different meth- copter, close air support, artillery, air defense and engineers) ods. Tactical doctrine is a living, breathing entity as new and reserve combat maneuver elements of both forces can weapons, equipment, research, and changing considerations quickly converge, preferably under a unified command, to urge new emphasis and continuous development. GE defen- destroy the enemy. The boundary is a responsibility of both sive tactical doctrine, as is NATO’s, is based on forward commanders who share it, and depending on the terrain and defense. GE defensive doctrine calls for a delay followed by a their assigned missions, they will jointly determine how best defense on the FEBA and includes counterattacks when the to handle it. The boundary may be screened at some loca- probability of success is high. The main emphasis is to defeat tions, established by coordination/contact points at others, the enemy far forward when possible, and, to be able to and in some instances may require the joint occupation of defend as close to the FEBA as possible. battle positions. Units should have knowledge of each Our “new” U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, leads us other’s intentions, and be aware of the current situation on away from the active dynamic defense to the AirLand Battle the “other side.” in conjunction with Division 86 transition. Such phrases as When a threat along the flanks is foreseen, commanders “interdiction targeting as part of an integrated effort to should have plans prepared and be ready to react if such a create time and space gaps,”9 “attacking deep is essential to reaction is possible. If a flank is broken, the first reaction winning; attacking deep and the close-in fight are insepara- should not be to back up and reestablish the flank, but to ble,. . . and, extending the battlefield.”lO have become new destroy the enemy’s capability to carry on his intrusion any guidelines for American operations officers. The whole pur- further. Any combat force operating on or crossing an pose of coordinating tactical operations is to allow for mutual international boundary should come under a unified com- consultation and transfer of vital information. NATO cannot mand. Procedures for conducting such operations will have afford to have unit commanders fighting their own individu- been developed in a combined Field Standard Operating al battles in their assigned sectors without regard for a com- Procedures (FSOP) document, which is coordinated during bined effort. Through a total effort we have the option of peacetime. Although different national forces may have di- creating a synergistic effect which will overwhelm the ene- verse guidelines and principles for their individual employ- my. “We are taught that flank security, especially in the ment, it is the responsibility of liaison officers (LNOs) in defense, means immediate contact with the units on our left place during peacetime, to coordinate the procedures and and right. . . In the event of an initial enemy breakthrough incorporate them into the combined FSOP for use in war. anywhere along an extended front line, this sort of thinking The LNO must be able to wear two hats in order to be has historically led to overreaction, often a panic to scurry effective. He cannot only represent the interests of his own back to a new defensive line and attempt to reestablish an force, but must able to adequately portray the intentions and unbroken front.”ll Through effective coordination and interests of the neighboring force to which he has been exchange of vital information, our flanks would be the attached. A consistent and truthful information exchange is strongest points on the battlefield. necessary. A combined FSOP that is exercised and revised as

ARMOR September-October 1984 19 . .We must have, within NATO, a renewed concerted effort to resolve to make interoperability a reality.. .”

necessary, coupled with mutual trust for one another ment, armament and training is not, cannot, be the guidance achieved through personal contact, is vital. Boundaries, for other NATO countries to follow. The ROK/US Com- while in effect delineating the command responsibility, have bined Forces Command no longer has the U.S.-controlled historically been a leadership problem. Hauptmann (Cap- rationalization, standardization and interoperability that was tain) i.G. (General Stam R. Ostermeyer, while attending the once possible. These three areas are now a national coordi- German Bundeswehr General Staff School in Hamburg and nated responsibility. We must have, within NATO, a re- thru his studies, has been able to determine that - up to the newed concerted effort to resolve to make interoperability a battalion level - those leaders who have traditionally led reality. To be successful, it will take a major effort, not only from the front have been the most effective at avoiding by the military leadership, but by civilians as well. danger on boundaries. It is at brigade level and higher, Interoperability would not always mean utilization of the where leaders are positioned more to the rear, that danger same systems, but that at least the major systems would be presented itself most often.12 Ostermeyer offers these points compatible as much as possible. Until the time comes when as possible solutions to maintaining a secure boundary: interoperability actually becomes a real capability within 0 Move the boundary to other points when threatened to NATO, military commanders must resolve to seek their own provide for a unity of command over the threatened area. operative solutions to interoperability within the needs that 0 Put units sharing a boundary under a unified command. their subordinate commanders may jointly require with their 0 Have quick reacting reserves available and positioned partners. Commanders can achieve the coordination they behind main forces along the boundary. need with their allies through dedication and by understand- Place counterattacking forces under a unified com- ing the importance of interoperability. mand.13 Moving the boundary may solve the problem of unified command. One questions, however, the practicality and the ability of commanders to move boundaries whenever they Footnotes 1For information write TRADOC Liaison Office, ATTN: ATFE-LO-GA, are threatened; not to mention that, by moving the bounda- Box 1 15, APO New York 09080 and ask for a copy of Periodic Index Number ry, we still have not removed the threat! The availability of 13. quick reacting reserves emplaced along the boundary is a 2JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Mi/itury und Associuted Terms. Rationaliza- tion; Any action that increases the effectiveness of Allied forces through more waste of forces that may be better employed elsewhere. efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the Alliance. Emplacing units which share a boundary and unifying the 3lbid. Standardization: The process by which member nations achieve the command of counterattacking forces who ’ must cross the closest practicable cooperation among forces. boundary are certainly possible and even likely. The key, 41bid. 5Defense Report, “Interoperability - The Glue of Coalition Warfare,” again, is prior coordination incorporated into a combined AUSA News, August 1983, p. 7. FSOP, and interoperability. 61bid. SPRINGEX is an annual interoperability exercise con- ’]bid. ducted between elements of the 4th (GE) PunzepGrenadier *lst (US) Armd Div, 4th (GE) PzGren Div. “G-4 Work Group” study results based upon GE review of U.S. supply catalogs. Division (Mechanized Infantry), and the 1st (US) Armored 9TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5, U.S. Army Operational Concepts, “The Division. The first SPRINGEX was conducted in 1984 under AirLand Battle and Corps 86,” 25 March 1981, p. 20 (7). a U.S.-developed plan. Subsequently, exercises have been IOIbid,pp. 23-24. held each year, alternating responsibility for planning “Peters, Ralph H. Jr.. 1st Lt., “Battlefield Initiative and the Small Unit,” Army, December 1983. p. 50. between participating US and GE units. A major byproduct I2MS., “Grenzen als Fuhrungsproblem” (Boundaries as a Leadership Prob- of the exercise is a “Combined FSOP”. SPRINGEX is nor- lem). Maj. I.G.W. Korte (FRG), Amberg, FRG, 27 December 1983, p. 4. mally conducted in the Spring at the Hohenfels Maneuver I3Ibid, p. 5. Training Area. The exercise has traditionally involved joint 14Cooling, 9. Franklin, “Allied Interoperability in the Korean War,” Milirory training from individual soldier to brigade unit level, and Review. June 1983, p. 27. culminates with a joint field training exercise. This past year’s exercise, SPRINGEX 83, involved participating units from the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and the 12th CAPTAIN RONALD M. Punzer (Tank) Brigade, of the 4th (GE) Punzer Grenadier SCHROCK, JR. was com- ‘L Division. The planning responsibility for the exercise rested missioned into armor as a with the 12th Punzer Brigade. Traditionally, the exercise was distinguished military grad- designed to devote four days to interoperability training and uate from Northeast Mis- three days for a joint FTX. This year’s FTX was designed to souri State University. He is explore methods of conducting joint defensive operations. a graduate of the AOAC and There are many impediments within NATO to achieving has served in a TRADOC BCT battalion, a FORSCOM interoperability. However, we cannot let these blind us from armor battalion and in the those actions that commanders can take to achieve the inter- 1st Armored Division, USA- operability that they need. We are not living under the same REUR. He is currently one of conditions as existed as when the United Nations reacted to two liaison officers from the the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Armored Division to the on 25 June 1950, where, “it may be stated fairly, however, Bundeswehr’s 4th Panzer that some rationalization, standardization and interopera- Grenadier Division. bility had occurred through integration of US doctrine, equipment, armament and training.”l4 US doctrine, equip-

20 ARMOR September-October 1984 Killer Tank Crews by Lieutenant Colonel James Crowley

Tank battles at the National Training val lies in not being acquired or, if deliberately limiting a tank’s sector of Center (NTC), like real battles in real acquired, moving fast, for the phrase fire in order to limit its exposure. Be- wars, have shown that a very special “what can be seen can be hit,” cause the tank’s fields of fire are deli- breed of tank crew exists within the although trite, is very true. Here are berately limited, dependence upon OPs U.S. Army. These are the comparative- some tried and true positioning tech- and mutual support with other posi- ly small number of tank crews that niques: tions are vital to avoid being blindsi- have proven to be superstars. These 0 Have a backdrop and avoid any- ded. elite crews often win battles for their thing that catches the eye. A skylined 0 Move into position carefully. company or battalion. They avoid get- tank is a dead tank. Also, if a tank posi- Quick movements are easily seen. Hot ting killed while they kill great numbers tions itself by a large boulder, it can be rodding can throw up diesel fumes and of enemy tanks. Their presence in the acquired by association. dust. In this respect it is vital to keep battle and their effect on the battle is 0 Use a full-hide position and stay in the air filters clean or excess diesel critical. At times they have literally it until the enemy is where you want plumeing will result when you gun the changed defeat into victory. him for engagement. A prone or dug-in engine. These Killer Tank Crews have con- forward observer gives a very small 0 Shoot, then move. Every shot firmed again and again what combat signature compared to a tank even one fired increases the probability of attack- leaders have been saying for a long in a good firing position. Also, the ideal ing tanks acquiring and engaging the time: the key element in winning wars firing position that puts the tank in full defending tank. Four or five rounds is lies at the crew/platoon level - the defilade against all possible return fire the maximum that can safely be fired people who do the shooting. As such, is very rare. from one position. Only if the crew is they must be trained to survive. 0 Use covered routes into and out of certain that they have not been To examine how these crews operate your firing position. More tanks are acquired can they remain in that posi- we must look at the tank-versus-tank killed at the NTC moving into and out tion. When you see the attacking tank’s battle. The battle is won by the side that of firing positions than are killed in turrets starting to turn toward you, you wins the individual tank-versus-tank open battle. Experienced crews put a have been acquired - move. fights. Usually, these fights are of an higher priority on covered routes than 0 Avoid shine. Plastic map cases, attacker versus a defender, or a moving on the firing position itself. goggles, binoculars, eyeglasses, all can attacking tank versus a stationary de- 0 At night, no lights. Night vision give you away. Use eyeglass shades and fending tank. devices can detect red dome lights use the other items only when needed. Proper offensive and defensive posi- through periscopes. They can see Then stow them inside the tank. tioning are vital to survival. Good posi- blackout markers and even the reticle tioning allows the defending tank to kill light in a gunner’s sight. In MI’S this is The Defensive Techniques a large number of attacking tanks with- a real problem. There are some lights 0 Use wingmen. The wingman tech- out itself being killed. that can’t be turned off. Tape them. nique works. Both tanks cover the An attacking tank crew’s survival is 0 Use window or keyhole position- same sector of fire. When one tank is directly related to its acquiring the, de- ing. This is probably the most success- out of action for any reason, the other fending tank, which means knowing ful positioning technique to come out continues to cover the sector. Wing- where to look. For the defender. survi- of NTC training. Simply stated, this is men also sense each other’s rounds.

ARMOR september-October 1984 21 I‘. . .Ta get acquisition and positioning move- 1 ment are at least as important as steel-on- target gunnery. . .”

0 Tanks must be able to cover all mounted approaches. The company commander must assign all tank sec- tions primary and secondary sectors of fire. He must ensure all mounted approaches can be covered by tank fire. The tank crew’s responsibility then is to select exact positions to cover those sectors of fire, along with covered routes to and from those positions. The company commander should go to the front and observe his tanks’ positions from the enemy side. Exact distances to target reference points (TRPs) are moving crosscountry. The stabilized fast; you are looking at a killing ground. ranged. Dead space can be identified. sight on the M60A3/M1 solves the Also be careful when bypassing AT 0 Practice movements. This practice problem for the gunner, but not for the ditches, mines or wire. Often the by- must be done as it will be done in bat- TC. Many tanks use the short-halt pass route is into a kill zone. tle: buttoned up, in MOPP, and with technique during which the tank halts gun tubes to the rear. Marking and for 5-10 seconds, a quick scan of the Crew Duties walking the routes is the driver’s res- sector of observation is made, and the While the basic crew duties do not ponsibility since he will have to do it tank moves on. change, the experience of Killer Tank during battle while the tank command- 0 Things to look for. The same Crewsat the NTC indicate that a shift in er (TC) is watching the enemy. things you would avoid in the defense: emphasis is necessary. The tasks of 0 Dispersion. The NTC guideline of shine, skylining, diesel plumes or dust, fighting the tank, picking firing posi- 75 meters or more between primary straight lines, anything different from tions, looking for the enemy, maintain- and secondary positions is a proven the natural terrain. Also, knowing how i.ng contact with friendly elements and item. Wingmen must also be dispersed you would position yourself if you were all the tactical aspects of operating the to prevent both being blinded by the defender helps. tank are very much a fulltime job and smoke or both being killed together. 0 Stay together. Tanks achieve their require the TC’s full attention. The rest 0 Don’t use berms. A berm must be maximum effect from mass shock. of the crew must be able to perform at least 20 feet thick to protect you tank Breaking up the mutual support of the their functions with the minimum against an APFSDS round. Instead, dig attacking formation by moving too fast involvement of the TC to allow this fo- the tank down. With enough time and or too slow is a fatal error. cus. equipment, both a hide and firing posi- Never skyline yourself. Keep low Gunner. He handles all functions tion can be constructed. There have and try to keep some cover between of hitting the target once he announces been instances when such well-con- yourself and the enemy. Perfect routes “identified.” The gunner senses his structed positions allowed tanks to suc- just don’t exist, but every little bit of own and his wingman’s rounds. The cessfully fight from unfavorable open cover helps. gunner, with his higher resolution terrain. In fact, there often is a surprise 0 React quickly. When you come optics, must assist the TC in acquiring effect gained by occupying terrain under fire, you have two alternatives: targets. The gunner will often take where you’re not expected to be. stop and kill the enemy tank, or move command of the tank when moving off Now let’s take a look at techniques to cover. You cannot ignore the fire the firing position if he sees the ene- that have proven effective for attacking because modern AT weapons are too my’s turrets turning toward his tank. tanks. accurate and too deadly and have too 0 Loader. Helps the TC acquire tar- The biggest need has already been high a rate of fire for you to ignore gets and serves as air guard. Directs the covered - the attacker must acquire them. Your best answer is to kill the driver when reversing so that the TC the defender. Ideally, defending tanks defender. If you simply try to avoid his can keep watch over the battlefield. are acquired before they begin shoot- fire, he will still be alive when you pass The loader is often assigned close-in ing, but certainly they should be him and he will put one through your areas of watch while the TC concen- acquired after the first round. Each grill doors. It is the ability to deliver trates on areas farther afield. Because tank in an attacking formation must killing tank fire while on the move that his job of loading the gun is hard work have an assigned sector of observation. separates the winners and the losers at in a ‘target rich’ environment, he Flanks and rear must be covered be- the NTC. should be the best conditioned man in cause that’s where antitank (AT) 0 Avoid killing zones. If you see a the crew. weapons will be positioned. The natural tank that has been killed by AT fire, 0 Driver. He is probably the most tendency to observe only in the direc- give it a wide berth because if you underrated crew member. Good terrain tion of travel must be overcome. Bino- move closer than 75-100 meters to it, driving requires a good driver. He se- culars should always be used and the you are in the same sight picture that lects the exact route based on the TC’s gunner must use his sight for search- killed that tank. If you see a group of general directions. He must know ing. The use of optics is difficult when destroyed vehicles - move elsewhere, where the enemy is and keep the tank

22 ARMOR September-October 1984 as much hull-down as possible. He How To Get There MILES and re-boresight it. Always must be alert to ground conditions to So far we’ve described some of the boresight the MILES when changing prevent track throwing. He must check tactics, techniques and tricks that Killer tanks. the route for mines. He must do all this Tank Crews use. None of them is hard Summary independent of TC supervision. The to understand; however, their applica- Engagement simulation with MILES driver of the M6OAS/MI’is almost as tion and execution against a real enemy is the proven method of improving important in hitting a target as the gun- is going to be difficult. tank crew performance. The only prob- ner when firing on the move. He must How do we train our tank crews to lem is the lack of MILES equipment, drive smoothly and steadily. execute their jobs properly on the especially if MILES is to be used as an battlefield? The answer is simple: integral part of tank gunnery programs. Steel on Target MILES. The techniques presented here We must expand our definition of So far, we have gone over lessons were not developed at the Armor tank gunnery skills. Target acquisition that have come out of engagement sim- School; they were developed by tank and positioning movement are at least ulation, or MILES force-on-force crews who learned from their MILES as important as steel-on-target gun- battles at the NTC. A lot of live-fire experience what worked and what nery. In fact, as our gunnery systems lessons have been learned as well and didn’t work. Crews that are trained of- become more and more rapid and accu- they include: ten with MILES learn the arts of target rate, the tactical aspects of gunnery be- 0 Know the ranges to TRPs and use acquisition, positioning, good move- come even more critical. We should precision gunnery. The gunner should ment and all the other techniques that formally include MILES engagement memorize TRP ranges. With a laser make the difference between the live simulations in expanded gunnery pro- rangefinder, use the TRP to confirm tank crew and the dead tank crew and it grams. the target range. makes the training fun and challenging. The revisions of FM 17-12-1,Tank 0 Reload the turrret. During any However, sufficient MILES equip- Tactical Tables, are a step in the right break in the battle, transfer rounds ment is not always available, nor are direction but don’t go far enough. from the hull to the turret. If you fire adequate training areas or time. Here These tables are live-fire gunnery only three rounds, replace them. are some suggestions to help overcome tables using MILES. We should use Learn to use the 105D. It is a these deficiencies: free play force-on-force to train tank more robust sight than the M32. It is 0 Concentrate on crew/section/pla- crews in the basic gunnery skills. This harder to use and requires more effort, toon-level training first of all. Training would require less lead and preparation but gunners mustknow how to use it. at these levels must be learned to stan- time and less OPFOR training and 0 Check defilade from the gun, not dard before advanced training can be coordination than the tactical tables in the sight, because the M32 is well undertaken. If individual crews aren’t the manual. above gun tube level. adequately trained it is impossible to Force-on-force training is more Boresight. Anytime you move, train at higher levels. Multi-echelon battlefield-oriented. It teaches crews to boresighting may be required. Bore- training is your ultimate goal, but the function with the flexibility and initia- sight three times a day - at first light, higher you go, the fewer the number of tive they will need to win in rea1,battle. at midday, and at last light. individual crew actions that can be It provides the motiviation and feed- trained for. At platoon level, perhaps back required for tank crews to build Odds and Ends three or four exercises can be run a themselves into Killer Tank Crews. While not fitting into any single cate- day. At battalion level, one exercise per gory used before, there are numerous day is the norm. other tricks used by Killer Tank Crews 0 Use the after-action review at the NTC: (AAR). A great deal of crew training 0 Use of onboard smoke is fatal if takes place after the exercise when the not used properly. Three keys to suc- opposing crews and evaluators discuss cessful use of smoke are to use it only what has happened, why it happened, when someone is shooting at you, put and how it could be done better. Units it between you and the enemy, and often skimp on providing trained don’t use it longer than necessary. evaluators. Don’t. AAR every training 0 Thermal ID at night is even more event! difficult than daylight ID. 0 KISS. Keep it simple, son. There Ballistic shields down. The first is no real need to develop elaborate thing to do when receiving indirect fire scenarios or to get all wrapped up in is to close your ballistic shields to pre- OPFOR tactics. At the NTC, the vent damage to your optics. OPFOR tank battalion uses simple LIEUTENANT COLONEL Tie down antennas. Point them games like “tank tag,” where two JAMES CROWLEY grad- away from the enemy. This reduces tanks are placed at opposite sides of a uated from USMA in 1967. both the visual and electronic signa- piece of terrain and told to take it. Or He has served as a tank pla- ture. “king of the hill,” where a couple of toon leader in RVN, tank 0 Vehicle recognition. There have tanks are positioned on a hill and the company and HHT com- been many battles where tanks have rest of the company surrounds and mander, and battalion and killed almost as many friendly as ene- attacks. squadron S-3 in USAREUR. He is presently assigned as my tanks. Gunner/TC knowledge of 0 Train your crews to use MILES. vehicle recognition is vital. The old How to mount, boresight, and shoot Chief, Analysis Branch, NTC Division, at the Com- technique of keeping the gun tube to- MILES must be mastered if crews are bined Arms Center at Fort ward the enemy gives a better chance to be effectively trained. Leavenworth, KS. of recognizing a withdrawing friendly Change tanks and rotate crews tank from an attacking enemy tank. rather than taking time to remount the

ARMOR September-October 1984 23 COBRA: The Normandy Breakout by Captain Stephen D. Borows

One month after D-Day, Allied plan- ners had envisaged controlling the whole of Normandy, including the ma- jor town of Caen. But by July, a million Allied troops were still bottled up in a beachhead only 3% miles deep that could be pushed back into the sea by the opposing 650,000 Germans. Only 17 Allied airfields were in operation in the beachhead area with just thirty-one fighter squadrons. And the airfields were subject to periodic shelling. General Eisenhower, Supreme Com- mander, Allied Forces in Europe, wrote to the Army’s Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, of his diffi- culties in achieving a breakout. He attributed his lack of success to three factors: One, the superior fighting qualities of the SS and parachute troops by French farmers generations before of the German Seventh Army; two, the to mark the boundaries of their fields Normandy countryside that was ideal and to protect their crops from the sea Hit by an 88-mm antitank gun as it winds. The bocuge severely restricted approached Avranches, an M4A3 of the for defense and precluded the massive U.S. 4th Armored Division burns in a use of armor and, three, the terrible mobility and visibility and, combined field. weather in the English Channel which with the fact that few good roads exist- had inflicted horrendous damage on ed in the area, gave the enemy great Allied equipment, had broken up the advantages in his defense. It seems that artificial harbors at the beaches and, in the D-Day planners had paid less atten- any great degree prior to the invasion. general, inflicted five times the damage tion to the Normandy bocuge than they A solution to the bocuge problem to Allied equipment than the enemy had to the beaches. came from Sergeant Curtis Culin of the had done on D-Day. It would fall to American ingenuity 2d Armored Division’s 102d Cavalry Among other negative results of the and technical know-how to solve the Reconnaissance Squadron. Sergeant weather, the Allied ammunition supply problem of cutting through the had been reduced by one-third. hedgerows that imposed a style of war The Normandy countryside was an that the Americans were unsuited for, Two Panther tanks of the Panzer Lehr extensive patchwork of tangled shrubs both by temperment and training. This Division knocked out in early July, and trees up to fifteen feet in height was to be a war that demanded com- 1944, when they attempted to counter- attack. and three to four feet thick. These bined arms operations, something the hedgerows, called bocuge. had been set American Army had not practised to

24 ARMOR September-October 1984 Shaded area on map of France pin- points tiny beachhead held by the Allies prior to Operation COBRA breakout. Several earlier attempts made little headway.

Culin welded steel prongs to the front of Allied tanks, which allowed the tanks to dig in and uproot a portion of -- -NUKMANDY oPariS the hedges. The prongs were hastily BRITANY welded up from steel girders that had 5 been part of the German beach defens- I es. General Omar Bradley, 1st U.S. Army Commander, saw the Culin de- f” vice on July 14 and ordered it mass- France produced. During the breakout opera- tions, three out of five U.S. tanks were equipped with the “rhinoceros hedge- cutter” which proved to work, provid- ing much better mobility for the armor. Other improvisations, like external The Allied telephones on the rear decks of the tanks and infantry-frequency radios Beachhead inside the tanks, increased the Ameri- cans ability to tight as tank-infantry July, 1944 1 teams. The leading tanks in the offen- sive were equipped with VHF aircraft- frequency radios, and every armored column had an on-station patrol of 3 to Spain 4 P-47 fighter-bombers orbiting over- head on half-hour shifts, ready for w immediate air strikes. Very rarely -Scale ,01 would the Luftwaffeever contest Allied air superiority over Normandy. This man front as well as the number of re- a further 200 tanks before repulsing a advantage would have a dramatic, serves the Germans would be able to counterattack that ended Goodwood on though not decisive, effect in the commit to their area. Of the 13 divi- 21 July. breakout. sions of Panzer Group West, 10 were Operation Goodwood was regarded as The Germans, despite the need for concentrated on the 35-mile Caen a failure by General Eisenhower be- forces to contain the Soviet armies in front. Among these were five SS Panzer cause it failed to break out and to reach the East and to block Allied advances Divisions, including 250 medium its tactical objectives. Goodwood did in Italy, had amassed 20 divisions to Panther and 150 heavy Tiger tanks. clean out the area east of Caen but at a oppose the 34 Allied divisions in Nor- Allied tanks were hopelessly outclassed cost of 500 tanks. To the British Second mandy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, by the Tigers. Army paradoxically, the bloody British Commander of Army Group B, would On 18 July the British opened Opera- repulse made the eventual American very effectively check the Allied tion Goodwoodwith three armored divi- breakout possible by confirming the advance and would prevent them from sions commanded by Lieutenant Gen- German hunch that Caen was the cru- quickly breaking out onto the open eral Sir Richard O’Connor. The attack, cial area. This contributed to the weak- plains where they could employ their made east of Caen, followed a massive, ness of the German front in the U.S. armored superiority to advantage. 2,100 plane air strike. First Army sector where the Germans On 28 June, the Germans divided The German defenses in the Caen had placed only two corps. their forces into two groups to accomo- area were organized in depth, with General Bradley was already plan- date their newly-arriving reinforce- infantry forward and the panzers back, ning his version of a breakout to be ments and to meet the likely Allied east of Caen. At a crucial moment of made on 8 July. He planned an attack breakthrough attempts. the attack, a Panther battalion of the 1st on a limited front close to the western The logical place for a breakout was SS Panzer Division came up on the dis- end of the beachhead area. It was to cut in the east, in the British Second Army engaged side of an armored brigade of off the German troops and pin them sector around Caen. The ground there the British 11th Armored Division and against the coast of the Cherbourg pen- was flatter and more open, and a break- occupied critical high ground. When insula. The plan was finalized on 13 Ju- out there would threaten the commu- the British brigade topped the open rise ly and Operation Cobra was to begin on nications of all the German forces in east of Caen, near Cagny, it came 18 July. Normandy. Therefore, Rommel placed under murderous antitank and tank The area chosen for this attack was four corps under control of Panzer gun fire. The British pushed forward on Major General Lawton Collins’ VI1 Group Westin the Caen sector. long after they had lost their initial U.S. Corps front of about 4.5 miles. British intelligence, however, momentum, and the 11th Armored General Bradley concentrated three underestimated the depth of the Ger- lost 126 tanks in the first day. They lost infantry divisions (9th, 4th and 30th)

ARMOR September-October 1984 25 for the assault with the 1st Infantry and ments. Similarly, of the total 250 tanks from St. Lo to Periers, but were 2d and 3d Armored Divisions poised lost during this period, only 17 replace- allowed to bomb only on a north-south for exploitation and pursuit. Available ments had arrived at the front. Allied line, rather than parallel to the front artillery tubes amounted to 83 for each air strikes had destroyed most if not all which was roughly east-west. General 1.6 miles of front. of the German reinforcements on their Bradley had withdrawn his troops 800 However, the key to Cobra was a way to the front. yards from the marker road, but some massive aerial bombardment to satu- bombs were released short of the aim- rate a zone of 7,000 yards by 2,500 Counting upon this sheer numerical ing point and 25 Americans were killed yards. This area was to be pounded for advantage in troops and equipment, and 131 wounded. The infantry divi- three hours by more than 1,500 B-17 the Allies set the target date for the sions launched probing attacks after and B-24 heavy bombers dropping attack as 20 July, a two-day postpone- this abortive bombing, but achieved no 3,300 tons of HE; more than 380 medi- ment from the original date. A further significant results. A fresh start was um bombers dropping fragmentation postponement until 1300 hours, 24 Ju- ordered for 1100 the next day. bombs, and more than 550 fighter- ly, was caused by bad weather. That bombers dropping 200 tons of HE and morning, however, Air Chief Marshal Paradoxically, this miscarriage of the napalm. The purpose of this air strike Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, command- Cobra plan made the Germans over- was to severely disrupt, if not destroy, er of the Allied Expeditionary Air confident; they believed they had communications and create havoc in Force, decided that the weather was thwarted a major attack, and subse- the German lines. too overcast and unsuitable and can- quently relaxed their vigil. When the celled the air strike. Unfortunately, the full air bombardment began 22 hours Once the initial rupture had been order did not reach all the air units and later, the Germans were doubly sur- made, the U.S. VI11 and XIX Corps more than 300 bombers went ahead prised. More than 4,150 tons of bombs would launch limited attacks to tie with the mission. The results were trag- were dropped and Punzer Lehr Divi- down the surviving Germans and pre- ic. sion, which took the brunt of the air vent their redeployment to seal off the The bombers were given a clearly- assault, ceased to function as an effec- gap. The 9th and 30th Infantry Divi- defined coordination Doint. the road tive force. Lieutenant General Fritz sions and part of the 4th Infantry Divi- J sion of VI1 Corps were to make the initial penetrations and secure the flanks of the breach, creating a “de- fended corridor.” The tanks would be I*nh*.) above, and at left and right, U.S sent in through this corridor. The mo- 9 units surge into Coutances, ar torized 1st Infantry Division, with part 4 early oDjective of the COBRA breakout of 3d Armored Division, was to bolt The- tank above is a howitzer-armec through the hole and attack toward Sherman, favored for its 105-mm fire- Coutances, while the remainder of 3d power and heavier armor. Light tanks Armored Division was to make a wide like the M5A1 and Shermans with the end sweep toward that town and 2d more common 75-mm gun often facec Armored Division would sweep even murderous antitank fire from heaviei German guns in well-concealed defen. wider to the southeast. sive positions. The Germans were already in a much weakened state. In the fierce fighting since the invasion, Punzer Group West and Seventh Army had suf- fered nearly 117,000 casualties, but had received less than 12,000 replace-

26 ARMOR September-October 1984 P

\ t'

4N DY

Bayerlin, Panzer LehrS commander, la- ter said: ". . . By noon nothing was visi- ble but dust and smoke. My front lines looked like the face of the moon and at least seventy percent of my troops were out of action - dead, wounded, crazed, or numbed. All my for- ward tanks were knocked out, and the roads were practically impassable." Once again, however, some bombs fell short, this time killing 111 Ameri- can soldiers, including the commander of U.S. Army Ground Forces, General Lesley J. McNair, and wounding 490 tion troops. Although the bombings had disrupt- Cobra Breakout ed a number of American assault f oA"ranches formations, the attack went in on time. Remnants of the German units put up a stubborn resistance and the Ameri- cans found that their hoped-for "walk- over" instead turned out to be a hard Scale of Miles fieht.

ARMOR September-October 1984 27 An American 57-mm antitank gun crew, mounted in a halftrack, rolls past the shell-pocked village church at Villeidieu les-Poeles.

General Collins nevertheless decid- ed to commit his armor and the tanks went in soon after daybreak on 26 July. Major General Edward H. Brookes, commanding 2d Armored Division on the left flank, took St. Gilles by the afternoon. They made good progress and, in fact, achieved the greatest penetration on VI1 Corps front. At the same time, the 1st Infantry Division, with Combat Command B of 3d Armored Division under Major Gener- al Clarence A. Huebner, attacked tow- ard Marigny, aiming to capture that town quickly and push on toward Cou- tances. The main attack was held up by stub- born resistance, and was finally blocked when the commander of the German 84 Corps, Lieutenant General von Choltitz, rapidly switched ele- ments of 17 Panzer Division south to block the roads to Coutances. On 27 July, the rest of 3d Armored Divison was committed, but inadequate and bomb-cratered roads did not permit effective deployment. The initial Cobra forces of VI1 Corps had achieved only a disappointing and partial success. What they had done, however, was to attract the slim Ger- man reserves to their area from the Bri- tish area. Thus, when VI11 Corps under Major General Troy Middleton began its holding attack on the morning of 26 July, it found little German opposition. By the 27th, the enemy had disengaged and ordered General George S. Patton, the coast, was to exert the main effort. from the VI1 Corps front. Despite whose Third Army was scheduled to Middleton’s armored division suspicion about a possible German become operational at 1200 hours, 1 advanced more than eight miles a day withdrawal, the Americans were too August, to “supervise” the advance of against weak opposition. The main cautious (after the hedgerow fighting) Middleton’s VI11 Corps on the coastal effort had now shifted from VI1 Corps to prevent it. flank. This command arrangement to VI11 Corps as the flow of the battle On 28 July, Brigadier General Isaac would establish a useful continuity overtook the attack plans. By the even- D. White’s CCB, 2d Armored Divi- between the exploitation of the Cobra ing of 28 July, the German 84th Corps sion, was dispatched southeast to cut breakout and future operations in Brit- had lost effective control of its units. off the German retreat. The 82d Re- tany. Most of the survivors were trying to connaissance Battalion of White’s CCB General Patton immediately took escape and evade to the southeast. On pushed through the defenses before over. Even in his limited supervising the 29th, American fighter-bombers the Germans were aware of what was role, he began to embellish the attack pounced on a traffic jam and destroyed going on and seized blocking positions plan with his own brand of audacity. He more than 500 German vehicles. south of Coutances. Any opposition withdrew his infantry spearheads and In the original plan, Coutances had was eliminated by the combined arms replaced them with two armored divi- been the pinnacle, but the situation team perfected in the hedgerow fight- sions, the 4th, commanded by Major had changed drastically. With the ing -infantry-armor-artillery support- General John S. Wood, and the 6th, entire German Seventh Army on the ed by fighter-bombers. commanded by Major General Robert run, and Coutances already taken by By 28 July, General Bradley sensed W. Grow. Colonel Bruce C. Clarke’s CCA, 4th that the door had been kicked open, Grow’s force, attacking south along Armored, on the 28th, Avranches had

28 ARMUR September-October 1984

~~ These cavalry troopers attached to the bridge within the next three days and 4th Armored Division get a welcome and get behind the German front. a cool bottle of Normandy cider as they The Cobra breakout was complete. pass through Le Repas on the push to- First and Third Armies of General ward Avranches. At left is an Ope1 Blitz Bradley's newly-designated 12th Army truck registered to a German SS divi- Group could now pour through the gap sion. The cavalrymen are in M-8 armored cars, mounting 37-mm guns. and begin to end the war in western Europe. Overall, German losses in the Nor- become the primary objective - it was mandy campaign were 2 10,000 prison- the gateway to Brittany, and, in view of ers and 230,000 other casualties. How- the resistance being encountered now ever, neither the aerial bombardment in all other sectors, it was probably the nor the unplanned advance of VI11 only way out of Normandy for the Ger- Corps had succeeded in destroying the mans. Germans in western Normandy. The CAPTAIN STEPHEN D. BO- On 29 July, with their sights set firm- success of Operation Cobra resulted ROWS is a 1976 graduate of ly on Avranches, 6th and 4th Armored from the Allied preponderance of force Virginia Military Institute Divisions again moved south, with the rather than a novel application of stra- and was a candidate for a more experienced 4th assigned the task tegic airpower. masters degree at the Uni- of taking Avranches itself and securing It is interesting to note that the U.S. versity of Louisville in 1983. bridge crossings over the Selume River Army in Europe avoided the use of car- He was an instructor and to the east. pet bombing in its operational planning military historian at Com- mand, Staff and Doctrine CC B of the 4th Armored advanced throughout the rest of WW 11. Department, USAARMS, 18 miles on 30 July to capture Strategically, however, Cobra broke the Fort Knox from 1980, to Avranches, the vital point in the area Normandy stalemate and prepared the 1981. He is a graduate of for both attack and defense. It con- way for the rapid liberation of Paris on the airborne and ranger tained the only road south within ten 25 August. schools and the French miles of the coast; it was bordered on Just as at Sedan in 1940, when Command School No. 4. He three sides by water; and it stood on a France succumbed to the radical Ger- served as a tank and caval- height of 200 feet that gave artillery man blitzkrieg tactics, it would be the ry platoon leader, a brigade commanding fields of fire overlooking speed of an armored advance and adept headquarters company XO, an armor battalion assistant the bridges over the Selume at Pontau- use of combined arms that would disor- S1 and assistant 54, and an bault. This allowed General Patton, ganize and confuse an enemy who was AIT company commander at with his newly-activated Third Army, too large to destroy with a head-on Fort Knox in 1982 and 1983. to push seven divisions over that frontal assault.

ARMOR September-October 1984 29 Thoughts on Counterattacks by Captain William D. Hewitt

Successful counterattacks at the bri- terattacks. Being severely outnum- gade level and below reduce the attack- bered, with the order to fight for every er’s initiative and present opportunities meter of ground, the Germans turned for division and higher commanders to from the linear defense to the mobile, begin in-depth operations against the elastic defense with reserve forces for enemy’s follow-on echelons. counterattacks. They accepted penetra- Current U.S. doctrine, as stated in tions and planned for them. FM 100-5, Operations, states that coun- Preparation for the counterattack be- terattacks “are based on reasonable gan in training which was “aimed at assumptions about the enemy and on imparting toughness, independence, the battlefield conditions. Once the and willingness to accept responsibility, conditions are met or nearly met, the and the molding of self-reliant indivi- commander launches the attack. . . ” dual fighters as well as leaders who are and “companies and larger forces may willing to take chances”4 in fighting the launch counterattacks.” Red Army. Counterattacks were This brings us to several meaningful planned and the battlefield was organ- questions that must be answered be- ized so that it contributed to the coun- fore proceeding. terattack effort. Deceiving the enemy 0 Exactly what are the assumptions as to friendly intentions and as to the and the conditions to be considered location of the forward line of defense and when are they met? was critical.5 0 Should lower-level commanders Using infantry in the static (holding) not consider the planned counterattack area to shape the battlefield with sup- as part of their defensive plan? If so, porting artillery and antitank weapons, they should then be concerned only the counterattack forces were com- with seizing the initiative if and when After WWII, the Department of the posed of units with firepower and mo- an opportunity presents itself. Army published studies with input bility.6 The Germans believed that 0 If counterattacks can be planned counterattack forces must be concealed from senior German ofiicers that offer ’ as part of the overall defense, are they an illuminating picture of the Soviet from enemy detection until the time of only effective against weakened forces? Army and the evolution of its tactics commitment, with the size of that force Can counterattack be used during from 1941 to 1945. The Germans knew not exceeding one-third that of the any phase of the defensive battle? that the Soviets “will go forward no enemy force.’ The holding force and The lower-level commander has a matter what the consequence”,l that defensive plan had to be such to with- mission to perform counterattacks be- the weakest element (of the Soviet stand a 1:s enemy superiority for a cause seizing the initiative is his con- force) was the intermediate and lower short period.* stant goal. The planning for a counter- commanders;z and that counterattacks Timing was crucial. If the counterat- attack, however, requires him to know at every level had a profound effect on tacking force was committed too early, and understand the overall situation. delaying advances and causing confu- the goal of attacking the flank or rear of Our doctrine and planning assume sion up through the chain of com- the enemy was lessened or lost alto- we will fight the Soviets in Europe. The mand.3 gether. If the force was committed too only history we have of counterattacks Armed with this insight, the Ger- late, it exposed its flanks to follow-on against Soviet breakthrough tactics mans identified the tactical considera- echelons, or the breach of the penetra- comes from the Germans. tions in planning and executing coun- tion became too wide for the counterat-

30 ARMOR September-October 1984 ‘I. . .Remember that the Soviet second echelon follows the main thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That translates to 12 to 18 minutes. . .” tack force to have the desired effect. In According to our intelligence, Soviet ly be used in the counterattack. Before planning, the Germans knew that the doctrine has not significantly changed my infantry friends lose interest, let’s danger to the counterattacking forces with regards to frontages and depth look at the numbers. TOWs - whether was less serious than anticipated be- since WWII. At present, the divisional mounted in M113s, improved TOW cause the Russians usually committed breakthrough attack has a 4-7 kilomet- vehicles, or Bradleys - require more their forces almost exclusively along er front, while in 1941 it had a 4-6 kilo- time for reloading than tanks and the the axis of advance with little attention meter front and in 1945 it had a 2-5 round requires a longer time of flight to their flank@ in executing, the Ger- kilometer front.16 The depth of a divi- than the tank round. Graphically, the mans realized that it was not a cavalry sion mission (intermediate objective) effectiveness of the TOW round charge but rather an attack by fire from is 20-30 kilometers today; in the later catches and surpasses the APDS round stationary positions which might then be stages of WWII the mission was 10-15 at extended ranges. Using the proba- followed by an assault.10 Assaults were kilometers from the point of contact. bility of hit (Ph) factor in FM 71-2, the conducted cautiously as there were nu- The flanks of this breakthrough attack TOW becomes more effective at ranges merous incidents of Soviet tank crews were not heavily defended and could be over 2,000 meters. A word of caution and individuals who played dead or attacked with available resources.17 about published Ph factors: These are appeared to surrender only to begin fir- The effectiveness of Soviet weapon based on the weapons systems charac- ing at an opportune time.” systems and personnel strength levels teristics, not on battlefield experience. The German actions at Kirovograd have certainly increased over the past My computations from observing a in 1944, where 56 tanks and 109 assault 40 years. In WWII, a 500-meter shot unit at the National Training Center guns held and finally neutralized a for a tank required some Kentucky (NTC) for a two-week period indicate force of 620 Soviet tanks. and the windage. the Ph factors drop dramatically in that actions of the 15th Punzer Regiment Today, a 1,500-meter shot is com- environment. Every unit will have dif- near Stalingrad, where 24 tanks des- mon and the range of ATGMs exceed fering Ph factors, determined by train- troyed 72 tanks without the loss of a even that of tanks. Thousands more ing and experience, and type of weap- single man, are worthy of our study. men and many more tanks have signifi- ons and vehicle systems. The Germans made counterattacks cantly affected the factor of mass in So- Air assets for the counterattack are a everybody’s business from company viet units. powerful factor. They are, however, a level through army group. Knowing to some degree of certainty constant for the ground commander, what effects this mass can have against applicable with the same statistics And Today? him, the U.S. commander should de- whether in support of tanks or TOWs. Are these tactics still applicable, and termine whether he can afford to risk a Engineer assets in the defense should are the Soviets and their allies still sus- counterattack, whether or not he can be used for countermobility. Their ceptible to these tactics? METT consi- afford to lose the counterattack force, efforts slow the enemy, protect the derations determine whether or not a and how big the counterattack force holding force from penetration and the counterattack is possible. Obviously, if has to be to ensure success. Situational counterattack force from being out- your mission is to hold a strongpoint, templating, event templating and ter- flanked, and force the enemy into the you’ll probably not be counterattack- rain analysis will give the commander area where you want him. ing. Missions to delay or defend, how- some idea as to how many targets will ever, open the door. face him at any one time. Planning and Execution Looking at the Soviet Army of today, Open, flat terrain with little vegeta- After considering METT and deter- there are striking similarities with the tion and wide avenues of approach les- mining that a counterattack is feasible, Red Army of the past. With regard to sen the possibility for planned counter- the commander begins his preparation the command environment, low-level attacks, because the attacker has more and planning. Templating and terrain commanders still suffer from lack of available maneuver options. Europe’s analysis will provide the required initiative.12 Speed is still an obsession undulating, canalizing terrain with information. Remember that the Sovi- and is preferred over maneuver and thick vegetation along the flanks of et second echelon follows the main accurate fire, and flank security is best avenues of approach offers numerous thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That trans- obtained by aggressive advance.13 The opportunities. Desert wadis and gullies lates to 12 to 18 minutes. This window commander must maintain the offen- present similar opportunities. tells the commander how many weap- sive and forward movement - the Finally, let’s look at troops available. ons systems to commit to the counter- objective must be taken on time be- With the current discussion concerning attack force. cause delays lead to a breakdown in penetrating power, special armor char- In planning, remember that as the plans.14 Although the Soviet regimen- acteristics, and actual probability of hit size of the counterattack force increas- tal commander is less inclined to take factors versus the published factors, es, the risk to the parent unit increases risks, he would prefer the U.S. defend- the weapons of the holding force must because it lessens the size of the hold- well-forward concept, since it thins the be able to penetrate the front slope of ing force. If the size of the counterat- defense in depth and hinders lateral Soviet tanks in order to keep sufficient tack force is too small for the mission, movement and counterattacks.ls pressure on the enemy. The weapons it increases the risk to the counterat- Although the Soviet commander may of the counterattacking force must be tack force; i.e., if situational templating be a bit more sophisticated than his able to penetrate the sides of Soviet indicates that you will be facing one father, he is still limited by his doctrine. tanks. Tank-heavy forces should usual- regiment in the pocket, a company size

ARMOR september-October 1984 31 ‘I. . .A dismounted unit should be detailed to ensure all enemy forces are dead within the pocket.. .”

force is enough. If you can anticipate a quired for movement into firing posi- This is an attempt to identify techni- battalion-size enemy force in the pock- tions. Specific orders and signals must ques and considerations. My observa- et, perhaps due to narrow avenues of be prearranged. tions from the NTC indicate that small approach or other constraints, then a Finally, the fire support officer units should be prepared to be by- platoon is sufficient. (FSO) needs to initially plan support passed, and should be conditioned to Because of the enemy’s doctrinal for the holding force, to include air- continue offensive actions into the fixation to the front, his target acquisi- bursts to keep the enemy buttoned up. flanks and rear of bypassing forces. tion problem, the element of surprise, The FSO must also specifically target These small unit actions can have sig- the advantage of being in well-prepared enemy overwatch positions outside the nificant impact in taking the initiative positions (if the engineers have time mouth of the engagement area for the away from the attacker. after their countermobility mission), purpose of isolating the first echelon All sizes of units should be prepared and the need for high rates of fire for a with smoke or WP. to conduct counterattacks if the situa- brief period of time, firing from one In executing the counterattack, the tion arises; units should also plan coun- position should be considered. Once time of commitment is during the win- terattacks as part of their general defen- the enemy begins to bring effective fire dow between enemy echelons. As the sive plan. Because of their lethality and against the force, then movement to enemy approaches the obstacle protect- effect on our morale, small unit leaders alternate positions must be executed. If ing the holding force, the counterattack need to understand how to apply the a large force is required, the command- force should be in firing positions, and techniques and considerations because er may decide to have an element on begin firing either on order or upon sig- counterattacks are not for the light- each side of the penetration. This adds nal. The FSO shifts some of the fires hearted. Senior commanders must to the confusion, but it also adds to the using smoke, to the key terrain outside have confidence in their subordinates security problem. Protecting the flanks the pocket, while maintaining airburst and need Jingerspitzengefuei (a feel for and rear of the counterattack force is fires above the engagement area. Se- the battlefield and the enemy in his fin- the mission for security forces using curity forces protect the flanks with gertips) to conduct or supervise the hasty minefields along trails and at ambushes and emplaced mines. Again, counterattack. chokepoints. I would recommend that the force The placement of the force during engage targets continuously from one the counterattack should allow position rather than changing to alter- observation and fields of fire extending nate positions until the enemy brings over the engagement area, and should effective fire against them. obviously not surpass the effective After the counterattack, the com- range of the weapons. The location mander must decide whether to move should allow the entire lead echelon the counterattacking force back to the into the pocket, and provide rear (pre- holding force line or use it as an anchor ferably) and flank shots for the coun- to move the rest of his forces back into terattacking force. This force may be in original positions to begin a general hide positions along the enemy axis of offensive against the follow-on echelon advance so that it is either bypassed or before it deploys. A dismounted unit moves forward from the forward line of should be detailed to ensure all enemy troops. The first alternative lessens the forces are dead within the pocket, if an timing problem. The commander can advance into original positions is de- CAPTAIN WILLIAM D. more accurately anticipate the time re- sired. HEWITT was a Distin- guished Military Graduate at Penn State University in Footnotes %bid, p. 9. 1976. He served as platoon 1°Depuy, op. citp. 22. leader, battalion executive lDepartment of the Army Pam 20-230, Russian “Department of the Army Pam 20-269, Smoll officer and company com- Combut Methou3 in World War II, Department of Unit Actions During the Germon Compuign in Russio. mander. He is a graduate of the Army, Washington, D.C., November 1950, p. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., July the Armor Officer Advanced ‘ 4. 1953. p. 4. zIbid, p. 16. lZMajorRobert M. Frasche. TheSovietMotorized Course and recently com- 3Ibid, p. 35. Rifle Bottolion. DDB-1100-197-78, Defense Intelli- manded B Company. 1st 41bid, p. 116. gence Agency, November 1978, p. 46. Battalion, 66th Armor at Fort SGeneral (Retired) William Depuy, ‘%enemls 13FieldManual 30-102, pp. 2-8. Hood, Texas. He attended Bolck ond Yon Mellenthin on Toctics: Implicotionsfor I4A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive -A Soviet the Army Command and NATO Milito~Doctrine”, BDM Corporation, 19 View. US Government Printing Office, Washing- General Staff College, Fort December 1980. pp. 7-21. ton D.C., 1970, p. 72 Leavenworth, Kansas, and 6Department of the Army Pam 20-233, Germon l3Major (P) Donald L. Mea. The Soviet Regi- is currently a project officer Defense Tocrics Agoinst Russian Breokfhroughs, De- mentol Commonder, Military Review, Volume partment of the Army, Washington, D.C., October LXII, No. 8, August 1982. p. 37. at the Army Training Board, 1951, p. 3. I6A.A. Sidorneko, op. cit. p. 81. Fort Eustis. Virginia. ’Ibid, p. 9. 1’LTC John Baker, Jr., “Where the Soviets Are *Ibid, p. 57. Vulnemble”, Army Magazine, August 1978. p. 25.

32 ARMOR September-October 1984 Two motorcycles scouts in training practice off-road driving in remote Western Oregon. New Roles for Combat Motorcycles by First Lieutenant Patrick Marr and CW3 Daniel Kingsley

ty and speed were its major strong from the heavy road versions used dur- points. ing the previous years. Moto-cross and During WW 11, the motorcycle was recreational cross-country motorcycle Two Wheelers Master commonly used in the German Army, riding continued to grow in popularity, Cavalry Missions which employed motorcycle battalion and the need for better trail bikes grew spearheads in the attack on Poland. in demand as well. In fact, the research In 9th ID Test These motorcycle units raced across and development effort by the private the German-Polish frontier to capture sector has now reached a state of the art key river crossings, bridges, intersec- that can meet the military need for a tions and even small towns.1 Mean- tactically-employable motorcycle and Battlefield employment of the mo- while, the U.S. Army decided to dis- for nearly any associated equipment. torcycle is not a new concept. Motor- continue the use of motorcycles be- The U.S. Army has adapted civilian cycles have seen action in every major cause they were considered unreliable motorcycle technology for military theater of war from WW I to Grenada. and unsuited to off-road operations. In application at the Army Development While not new, the development of spite of that, 5,000 of them were used Employment Agency (ADEA) of the motorcycle operational concepts has by the Army during WW 11, mostly in 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) with been one of continuous evolution and courier and traffic control operations.* remarkable success. change. Their capability has now Although some were fitted with ma- reached a new high, and the application chineguns, the Allies never caught the Current Doctrine of their inherent mobility, speed and same offensive spirit in motorcycle Many commanders still view the mo- maneuverability offers exciting poten- employment that the Germans did. torcycle solely in the liaison/courier tial to the enterprising combat com- After the war, military interest in the mission role. But the modern motorcy- mander. utility of the motorcycle waned, cle can provide some amazing answers although many soldiers returned to the in other uses too. History civilian world smitten by the motorcy- The Army has had difficulty in the WW I saw the motorcycle commonly cle bug. Interest in motorcycle racing past marrying reconnaissance units used as a courier vehicle. It proved continued to grow in Europe and with a suitable, uncontroversial vehi- itself in providing rapid battlefield mes- spread to the U.S. In the late 1950s, cle. The A4113 armored personnel car- senger service. It was durable, cheap, cross-country motorcycles grew in so- rier, the A4151 %-ton, the Sheridan and easy to maintain, but its adaptabili- phistication and became more distinct ARAA V (Armored Reconnaissance/

ARMOR september-October 1984 33 A motorcycle reconnaissance trooper negotiates a rugged Oregon logging road wearing night vision goggles in second stage of NVG training. Effective training can qualify a man within a week.

~

Airborne Assault Vehicle) and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle have been employed by scout and cavalry recon- naissance units, and have proven to be adaptable to conventional cavalry re- connaissance operations. But each vehicle has its own set of limitations and none of them meet all reconnais- sance requirements. Another problem is even more acute: motorizing long-range recon- naissance patrols. Many available methods of insertion, extraction and mission execution rule out the present reconnaissance vehicles. Reconnaissance units required to operate forward of the FLOT or deep in the enemy's rear area require a form of transportation that is easily transported and supported by helicopter; one capa- ble of being inserted by parachute; easy to repair in a tactical environment with- out support personnel; fuel efficient, quick, and mobile in broken terrain. It must also be highly reliable, cost effec- tive, and easy to destroy if left behind. It must be suited to all-weather, limited visibility operations, be quiet in its operation, and have a low profile, mak- tinder operations, raids into enemy ers were familiarized with operating the ing it difficult to locate and destroy. rear areas, stay-behind reconnais- motorcycle while wearing NVGs, the These requirements can best be met by sance/harassment, NBC recon, con- platoon moved to the rugged mountain a number of commercially-manufac- duct of NBC warfare and, hasty vehi- trails and logging roads of western Ore- tured cross-country motorcycles. cle/armor ambushes. gon. Within a week, the entire platoon Motorcycle reconnaissance units Training was capable of negotiating any type of have appeared in a number of divisions The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry mo- terrain wearing NVGs. throughout the Army. The Cavalry Bri- torcycle reconnaissance platoon has fo- The platoon continued to maintain gade (Air Attack) organization of Divi- cused its training and resources in four its NVG proficiency at Fort Lewis be- sion 86 has a 14-man motorcycle re- areas; the operation of the motorcycle fore going to the Yakima Firing Center connaissance platoon in the headquar- over various types of terrain during in central Washington five weeks later. ters troop of the air cavalry squadron. limited visibility with AN/PVS-5 night The Yakima Firing Center is similar to The air cavalry squadron of the 9th vision goggles (NVG) , drivedmechan- a Middle East/National Training Cen- Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) at Fort ic training, the development of protec- ter environment and provides an excel- Lewis, Washington, tested the employ- tive clothing and, mission assessment lent testing ground for all types of tacti- ment of motorcycles for reconnais- and evaluation. cal training. Results of the tactical test- sance from November 1981 through The reconnaissance platoon started ing at Yakima proved the validity of the May 1982. The motorcycle platoon aggressive night vision goggle training NVG training. proved that it can perform convention- in July, 1982. The platoon went to The motorcycle platoon has develop- al cavalry missions such as: zone recon, Camp Rilea, Oregon, located on the ed an NVG qualification checklist that area recon, route recon, screening Pacific Ocean, to conduct its initial has been invaluable in the training pro- operations, maintaining contact NVG training. Riders familiarized gram. The instruction begins in the between adjacent units, and courier themselves with NVGs by riding along classroom with the maintenance and service. the beaches at Camp Rilea. As the rid- adjustment of the AN/PVS-5 NVG and Additionally, the motorcycle platoon er's confidence grew, he was required progresses through a series of opera- proved that it can be very effective in to negotiate increasingly difficult obsta- tions on smooth surfaces with daylight such (non-ARTEP) missions as: path- cle courses on the beach. After all rid- filters to riding at night over rough ter-

34 ARMOR September-October 1984 rain using NVG’s. The NVG qualifica- tion culminates with the logging of 24- hours of NVG operation in a tactical environment. Training is carefully monitored, and the reconnaissance pla- toon has not sustained a reportable injury to date in NVG operations. NVG proficiency is maintained by a squadron requirement to conduct an FTX monthly. Drive and Mechanic Training The Fort Lewis School Command has introduced two programs of in- struction (POI) for the motorcycle operator since May 1983. The first is an 18-hour course on motorcycle main- tenance. It includes brake repair, clutch and valve adjustment, tire repair and replacement, engine and chassis lu- brication and overall vehicle troub- leshooting. The second POI is a five-day mo- torcycle driving and safety program. i! The course is administered in both an on- and off-road environment, and is designed to train an unskilled operator and make him a safe, competent and confident motorcycle operator. The 3-5 Cavalry motorcycle platoon goal is to become 100-percent trained in both of these courses. Mission readi- ness has significantly increased since Commercial motorcycle protective gear was adopted for use in 9th ID test. In the inception of these programs. Units two photos above, a soldier wears the commercial protective items used in desiring additional information about the test. The two photos below show how this equipment is integrated with the POI can obtain it by getting in traditionaluniform. touch with MSG Sabourin at Head- quarters, School Command, Fort Lewis.3

Protective Clothing The reconnaissance motorcycle pla- toon has been working extensively with the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) to obtain and develop protective equip- ment. The area of most concern is hel- met and comm u nica t i ons develop- ment. Conventional civilian motorcy- cle helmets have not been adapted for use with military radios. On the other hand, the Army’s Kevlar helmet with H-CCAPS (Helmet-Capability/ Communication/Aural Protective Sys- tem) does not afford protection from the head injuries that could be sus- tained in a motorcycle crash. The mo- torcycle rider needs a helmet that meets Department of Transportation (DOT) head protection requirements, affords ballistic protection, can be cor- rectly worn while wearing the MI 7A2 NBC protective mask or NVGs and, has built-in earphones to monitor radi- os. The communication requirement is for a two-radio-net capability with a voice-activated boom microphone pro-

ARMUR September-October 1984 35 tected by the face shield when worn. A cerned with developing aerial tactics transmitting switch on the handlebars using an armed scout aircraft. The mo- would be needed so the rider does not torcycles assist the aeroscouts by classi- have to remove his hand to communi- fying and clearing routes, lateral cate. approaches and trails and obstructions, Sound attenuation and amplification while the aerial elements conduct the devices in the helmet could provide the route or zone reconnaissance. The mo- scout with a method to adjust and iso- torcycles have been indispensable as an late external noises: for example, to re- extension of the air troop commander’s duce external noise when monitoring battlefield eyes and ears. The capabili- his radio while riding, or to increase his ties of the motorcycle are ideally suited ability to hear outside the helmet when for incorporation into the air cavalry dismounted. mission. A suitable helmet has been develop- ed by the Gentex Corporation and Limitations fielded by DARCOM at Fort Lewis. It Motorcycles are not without their limitations. The most serious inherent meets DOT protection standards and FIRST LIEUTENANT PAT- offers limited ballistic protection. It is limitations are inability to cross water RICK M. MARR was com- electronically compatable with the obstacles of any appreciable depth, missioned in armor from the PRC-77 and can be worn with the poor performance in excessive snow or USMA in 1981. He has MI 7A2 or the AN/PVS-5. Communica- mud, operator vulnerability to extreme attended the Armor Officer tions are now limited to the range of the weather conditions and lack of armor Cavalry Basic Course, the PRC-77. More effort is needed on a protection from small arms fire and Infantry Mortar Platoon longer-range communication capabili- artillery fragments. Course, the Junior Officer Maintenance Course, Air- ty. There are also significant organiza- tional limitations. Command and con- borne, Ranger, and Air The motorcycle platoon is currently Assault School courses. He using commercial protective clothing, trol of the motorcycle is difficult be- has served as motorcycle including shin guards, arm and shoul- cause suitable radios and monitoring reconnaissance platoon der pads, kidney belts, insulated gloves equipment do not exist. Equipment leader, cavalry platoon lead- and protective boots. The research and readiness status is subject to fluctua- er, cavalry troop executive development of protective clothing has tion because of lack of operator main- officer and is currently been completed by the commercial sec- tenance knowledge or instruction. And assistant S3 for 3d Squa- tor. The Army needs to adapt and there are insufficient spare parts availa- dron, 5th Cavalry, Fort configure the protective clothing to ble at DISCOM. Lewis, WA. meet Army uniformity requirements, The majority of these limitations are but otherwise, the needed equipment simply resolved, especially in the areas can be fielded now. of communictions, helmets and protec- tive clothing. The Fort Lewis School Command is taking active and effective Mission Assessment measures to reduce operator-induced The fourth priority of the motorcycle problems and limitations in the areas of platoon is mission assessment and maintenance, services and vehicle evaluation. In addition to the conven- operation. tional cavalry missions stated, the mo- Despite these current limitations, torcycle platoon is assigned to pathfin- the motorcycle is ready to assume a sig- der missions, downed pilot recovery, nificant reconnaissance role in the search and rescue missions and exten- Army. The motorcycle, as it was re- sive air assault operations. cently employed in the Grenada opera- Through numerous field exercises, tion, was relegated to the role of mes- the 9th Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) senger and command and control vehi- and the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry have cle. These missions are minimal in the CW3 DANIEL KINGSLEY evaluated and assessed the employ- light of the overall capability of the ma- holds a bachelor degree in ment of motorcycles in conjunction chine. Field commanders have not yet sociology from New York with aviation. recognized the many possible employ- State University. He served Motorcycle employment in the air ment options available for motorcycle in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1968 to 1974 and cavalry mission has shown itself to be a assets. natural extension of Army aviation entered the Army to attend Scouts mounted on motorcycles are flight school, graduating in assets. A combat-loaded 14-man mo- among the most valuable sources of 1975. He graduated from the torcycle platoon can be inserted by one intelligence the combat commander U.S. Army Aviation Safety CH-47 Chinook or three UH-60Black- has at his disposal. Course in 1982 and is cur- hawks, or by any other conventional rently serving as the avia- method of insertion, including airborne Footnotes tion safety officer for 3/5 drops. Two-man teams can be inserted 1 Panzer Leader by General Heinz Guderian. Bal- Cavalry, Fort Lewis. He is by upgraded OH-58s fitted with cargo lantine Books, New York, 1980. also the winner of the Avia- hooks, as has been demonstrated at * ARMOR, Sept-Oct 1982, “The Military Mo- tion Digest Annual Writing Fort Lewis. torcycle” by Captain Robert R. Sigl, pp. 26-28. Award for 1983. 3 MSGSabourin Four motorcycles have been organic- HQ. School Command, ally assigned to the experimental Light Ft Lewis, WA 98433. Air Cavalry Troop (LACT) that is con- ( AV 3 5 7-2310/23O4/4607

36 ARMUR September-October 1984 The Role of the Fourth Company by First Lieutenant Ralph Peters

Despite th fanfare, much of the U.S. Army’s response to its new tacti- cal and organizational doctrine can be summed up as, “It really doesn’t A change anything.” LP/OP But the addition of the fourth line A company does change things if properly LP/OP employed on the battlefield. First, it offers a commander jTexibiIi@, if it offers nothing else. But it does more than that, too, bringing into focus new possibilities in depth, con- centration, sustainability and speed. There are many ways to operational- ize flexibility. One of the most basic is the designation of a local reserve. Un- fortunately, our present idea of a res- n x erve is both overblown and unneces- sarily passive, partly because in Eu- rope, forward commanders have been conditioned to get every weapons sys- tem into a good firing position early on. While the rear echelon of battle posi- Ii& tions are, de facto, a reserve, we think \ 0 of them as committed, if only to de- u-‘ fending a position. Reserves are casually viewed as a Defense in DeDth: distant force tucked away in a rear assembly area, more understudy than Rearward companies may actor on the corps- and division-level prepare positions, but are stage. This should not be the case. considered as local re- At very least, the fourth company is serve for limited-objective a localreserve, ready to be factored into the commander’s battle plan. While counterattacks. awaiting its turn in the battle, this res- Figure 1. erve may be gainfully employed in pre- paration of alternate and subsequent Along with that depth, flexibility is battle positions, but what the reserve improved: the decision to shift a does before its commitment is less company team is simply not the mo- important than how the commander mentous decision it was before. thinks of it. It is the commmander’s Improvements in flexibility and mental attitude about his reserve that depth apply to the offense as well. A “. . .Perhaps only surprise matters. Rather than seeing this force reserve is often every bit as critical in has proven to be of such con- as a unit married to a specific piece of carrying through a successful attack as stant value as having concen- terrain, he should perceive it as his free it is to a defense. In the offensive, player to kill the enemy, a force capable depth is achieved with echelonment, tration of fires and physical of maneuver and movement, a respon- offering the potential of greater con- mass on the decisive point. . sive tool to alter or accentuate the centration and sustainability (figure 2). J9 course of the battle. Echelonment allows the concentra- Even when designated as a local re- tion of sufficient force - of local mass serve, the fourth company provides - to overcome the defender’s advan- new depth to the defense (figure 1). tage. Furthermore, echelonment Whether the task force commander allows the sustainment of that concen- they crowd toward the slaughter. But intitially organizes with two up and two tration. Of the countless variables in properly understood and applied, mass back, two up and two back in echelon, the attack, perhaps only surprise has is more valuable to the outnumbered three up and one back to cover an espe- proven to be of such constant value as force: the smaller element’s most fool- cially broad front, or in any other ter- having concentration of fires and phy- ish course of action would be to try to rain- or Threat-driven combination, sical mass on the decisive point. be everywhere at once. Mass and there is a depth to the battalion task Mass is another concept we don’t economy of force complement each force defense that did not previously fully appreciate. It summons up images other. exist. of the Red Hordes, shouting “Ura!” as Elevated to the level of a principle of

ARMOR September-October 1984 37 commander’s overall intent. This presupposes that the command- er himself knows what he wants to accomplish, which is not always the case. But without well-defined goals and effective synchronization, much of what the commander has potentially gained in flexibility, concentration, and speed will remain undeveloped or gen- erate into confusion. In this one re- spect, the commander’s job will be har- der than before. It will be especially hard on commanders who have not yet learned to integrate their own combat multipliers, their engineers, air defense troops, or even their organic antitank forces. Having considered the role of the fourth company in the offense and the defense, let us turn to two more spe- cialized situations, the movement to contact and the covering force fight. How will the added element change things? An advantage in the movement to contact is that the commander has an improved capability to balance his advance over multiple axes. He can SCTS shape his movement to fit the mission (Pass forward after as never before. He can tailor his attack penetration is made) to provide the greatest possible shock effect or the fullest flank protection. He Echeloned Attack: can narrow his frontage to penetrate In the echeloned attack, the expected enemy force or he can the mechanized infantry open up his frontage to locate a more elusive enemy. Or he can seek any de- battalion task force is gree of balance between these organized as a balanced extremes. task force. Fiaure 2. In the movement-to-contact mis- sion, several recent elements come to war, mass means the disciplined ganization into four lean direct-fire the commander’s aid. He has a greater application of more physical force at companies is intended to simplify the number of more agile formations and the decisive point, coupled with the commander’s troop-leading procedures the increased speed, firepower and pro- commitment of that force so swiftly to give him a more manageable organ- tection of the new generation of com- that the enemy cannot respond in time. ization. These four lean elements can bat vehicles. As a result, the advance A phrase in current vogue is “opera- load up and go when the situation re- guard task force of a brigade-sized ting within the enemy’s decision cy- quires. attack could, for example, move up on cle,” but in the simplest terms, it The overall speed of a battalion task three parallel axes and still retain an means getting the other guy on the force movement should also increase, integral reserve of company size. Upon ropes and keeping him there. despite the additional maneuver ele- contact, there are more maneuver ele- There is a resultant multiplication of ment. More responsive sub-elements ments available to turn the enemy’s force in the echeloned attack that can- will mean a quicker total organization, flank or envelop him. If the enemy is not be explained in terms of high as long as commanders and operations encountered in superior force, the U.S. school physics. Perhaps it is the sus- officers thoroughly grasp the changed commander should have better inter- tainability of the echeloned attack, the coordination requirements at the bat- nal security and the ability to fight a momentum of the fresh, follow-on talion level. This will require attention, more coherent delay until the brigade force, that keeps the enemy on the planning, and practice. Just as mecha- main body arrives at the scene. ropes. nized infantry company commanders These new opportunities certainly do The echeloned attack gives the com- too often forgot their 81-mm mortars not come without attendant dangers, mander another advantage; it allows as the pace of operations accelerated, however, There is no question: the him to take that most dangerous of the fourth company might also be more fourth element makes the command- steps, changing the plan in mid-course easily forgotten than a glancing consi- er’s role more complicated in certain when it becomes clear the original plan deration suggests. respects, but he must resist the tempta- isn’t working. With the additional time The task force commander will need tion to make his plans and orders more and forces available, he can consider to issue this new maneuver element complicated as well. While simplicity is this kind of option when, otherwise, it clear orders and give it meaningful mis- not always preferable, it generally is would expose his force to great danger. sions. Facing a high-tempo, confused best. If the overall plan cannot avoid The fourth company also contributes battlefield, subordinate commanders some complications, then the missions the potential of greater speed. The reor- will have to have a sure grasp of their to subordinate elements must be kept

38 ARMOR September-October 1984 as simple as possible. Attempting to mesh a number of complicated sub- actions invites disaster and increases the possibilities of confusion. It is likely that more battles have been won by clear orders than by genius. While we LP/OP should never underestimate the value of cunning and brilliance, our talents are better applied to outwitting our enemies than in bewildering our sub- ordinates. Perhaps a good rule of thumb to strive toward is that plans should be G simple enough that the accompanying graphics can stand alone, without a - briefing, in communicating manuever tasks. Conversely, it should be possible to understand the written orders with- out graphic aids. In ordering the covering force battle, the addition of a fourth company Coveri n changes things significantly. On the one hand, the maneuver commander’s Althoug t task force can now cover a traditional talion ti frontage and wage a more energetic lished ini maneuver fight. The earlier organiza- tions, a tion of the company team was probably is anticir too ponderous for the swift, fluid actions expected within the covering force area. The classic delay mission has always had the potential for turning into a stumble ba, organization of thc itself better adapte crisp countering ac the covering forc possess a highly exploit enemy wer or indecision. Along with adc depth, the coverin sustainable. No IC 101 delaying actions c the covering force its own counterbluwJ WlLlIUuL IIGLGJ- 101 sarily baring a flank or stripping a sec- tor and so jeopardizing the overall mis- sion. Now, the covering force can not only fire back; it can fight back in a much fuller sense of the phrase, so FIRST LIEUTENANT long as the additional force element is RALPH PETERS is the not merely used to reinforce and com- chief, Intelligence Produc- plicate a delay on successive positions. tion Section, G-2. of the 1st ElTOC/TRNS Armored Division. An OCS Certainly, there are more possibili- graduate who first entered ties than these in developing the role of the Army as a private in SECURITY the fourth company. The details 1976, his previous tactical sketched in here are really only crude assignments have included outlines that need to be colored in by a tour with the 8th Infantry more expert hands. And no amount of Division (Mechanized) in Movement to Contact: theorizing can fully substitute for Bad Kreuznach, FRG, and experimentation in the field. Our atti- as S-2 of the 1-46 Infantry at Erlangen. FRG. Rated as In this case, the empha- tude must change from “It really does- sis of the armc;i battalion a native speaker of German, n’t change anything” to “New game, his articles on operations task force is to maneuver gentlemen.” and tactics have been pub- around unit that makes Otherwise, we may get little value in lished in ARMOR, ARMY, contact. return for the trouble and expense of and INFANTRY Magazines. the present maneuver battalion organ- Figure 3. ization.

ARMOR September-October 1984 39 Dauntless Trains for War by Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Bergeron and Captain J.S. Purser

The National Training Center successful. These critical tasks are (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA affords the called the No-Slack Ten within 3-37 finest training experience available to Armor and include what the unit must any army in the world. A dedicated do to win in combat. opposing force (OPFOR), highly The tasks are: to conduct emergency 1. skilled observer-controller-evaluators deployment readiness exercises (OCEs) , virtually unlimited maneuver (EDLREs); to draw prepositioned room and state-of-the-art computer overseas materiel configured in unit technology combine to offer an unpar- sets (POMCUS); to conduct tactical allelled opportunity for training and road marches; to organize a deliberate evaluation. The charged realism of bat- attack; to conduct a passage of lines: to tle in the unforgiving environment of organize a defense; to maintain C3; to the desert against a skilled and re- conduct sustaining operations; to con- sourceful foe reinforces success and duct NBC operations and to maintain attaches tangible costs to mistakes. The equipment in a combat ready status. NTC can appreciably minimize the po- Each can be fleshed out as needed tential for future Kasserine Passes and through use of the appropriate docu- out attachments in combat; therefore, do a tremendous job in preparing us for ments and training literature to formu- it should not do so in training. war. late plans for effective battalion train- Immediately following REFORGER The NTC exposes a unit’s strengths ing management. The train-to-fight ’82, 3-37 Armor designed a train-to- and weaknesses as only actual combat mental process followed by every soldi- fight program that would incrementally has done before. If the deploying bat- er in the battalion includes feedback as drill, refine and test every aspect of the talion’s training program has not been an inherent part of the process of pol- No-Slack Ten. Crews, sections, pla- well-planned and boldly executed, that ishing the training, testing relevance, toon, companies and the battalion organization begins much lower on the and ensuring the best possible results would be challenged, each exercise NTC learning curve, and that unit’s consistent with the stated training building on the one before, to mold a opportunity to derive maximum bene- philosophy. formidable fighting force, sure of itself fit from the experience is limited by the A review of the No-Slack Ten reveals and its capabilities. This training pro- progress which must be made to that in training for war, the battalion is gram was slated to occur over an eight- achieve a basic level of combat readi- also obviously training for the NTC. month period, with the battalion pre- ness. The battalion has taken a combined pared to fully accomplish its wartime A productive training program can arms, multi-echelon approach, inte- mission in the crucible of the NTC. be based upon what is known in the 3- grating infantry, engineers, fire sup- Platoon ARTEPs, dubbed Cajun’s 37th Armor (the “Dauntless Battal- port, ground surveillance radars (GSR) Challenge, were held in January, 1983. ion”), as the train-to-fight philosophy. and, when available, tactical air sup- They were designed to sustain collec- This approach involves focusing the port. In working with the slice of sup- tive and individual skills built during limited materiel, time and personnel port assets that the battalion can expect REFORGER, and featured maneuver, resources of the unit towards a specific, to receive in wartime, each learns to live-fire and NBC training. Each pla- well-articulated set of individual and work effectively with the other. Each toon, to include mortars, scouts, collective tasks inherent in the unit’s segment becomes adept at anticipating Redeye and support was evaluated in wartime mission. The plethora of tasks requirements and working jointly as a the following areas: spelled out in FM 21 -2 and ARTEP 7 1- productive member of the task force Pre-combat inspection; defense; 2 can thus be boiled down to the essen- team. attack and NBC collective protective tial tasks the unit must execute to be The tank force will not operate with- measures.

40 ARMUR September-October 1984 Additionally, each maneuver pla- phase line; delayed; and then counter- Slack Ten. toon conducted a live-fire defense of a attacked. All of this was done in a day The maneuver part of the exercise battle position. The mythical medieval and night employing a live-fire target taxed the task force’s leadership. The Kingdom of Dauntless provided the array consisting of 63 main gun targets constant demands of continuous opera- setting for this training challenge and at ranges varying from 1,100 meters to tions forced each command, control, those that followed. Platoon leaders, 2,400 meters. This placed a premium and logistics element to identify a sec- for example, became Knights of the on target acquisition, wing-man sens- ond team that could continue to func- Realm, while company commanders ing and precision gunnery techniques. were given status as dukes under the Knight’s Challenge featured the use benign rule of King Cajun I. The sce- and integration of attack helicopters, nario, involving an invasion by barbar- engineers, artillery, GSR teams and all .As things turned out, ic Kansonian Flatlanders, was thor- those parts of the slice that the battal- “. . oughly briefed to the entire battalion, ionltask forcelcompany team could Dagger’s Challenge proved ensuring that the warriors of Dauntless expect as it went to war at the NTC. much more intense than the (3-37Armor) had fun as well as receiv- The capstone of the train-to-jlghtpro- ing fine training. Cqiun’s Challenge and gram was a battalionltask force actual NTC exercise. . .” the desire to be the King’s Champion ARTEP, Dagger’s Challenge. This (the top platoon leader), captured the served as an integrative event where imagination of the battalion and the elements of the task force were immeasurably enlivened the exercise, brought together to function as a de- tion as the performance of the first setting the stage early for continued ployed task force. Dagger’s Challenge team deteriorated due to fatigue. This platoon and company live-fire exercis- put together the collective and indivi- was perhaps the most important prod- es in the months ahead. dual lessons learned during the previ- uct of the ARTEP. Also helpful were The skills developed in Cdun’s Chal- ous six months. This exercise was the in-depth after-action reviews lenge were amplified a month later in an undoubtedly the most beneficial train- (AARs) following each mission that innovative tank gunnery program, ing experience that the task force gave the leadership a taste of the prob- Dragon Fire I, which focused on tank underwent in preparation for the NTC. ing, no-punches-pulled approach taken crew qualification and the total integra- It featured a dedicated OCE contingent at the NTC. Additionally, the long tion of the wing-man concept. Dragon drawn from the division staff, and AARs forced the second team to Fire I improved crew fighting proficien- OPFOR motorized rifle regiment assume control and initiate prepara- cy under daylight and limited visibility drawn from a battalion (+) divisional tions for the next mission while the and greatly enhanced section fire and unit, and every portion of the battal- first team was held for several hours at maneuver techniques through a com- ionltask force slice of assets. the review. The experience generated a pletely battle-linked tank gunner quali- The battalion task force underwent a Dauntless planning cycle which was fication. thorough pre-combat inspection that event-activated, a process that proved Having built a firm foundation, featured automatic weapon test firing itself effective at the NTC, smoothing company ARTEPs were held from 18- and extensive testing of individual sol- operations and establishing a realistic 25 April, 1983. This was a 5-phase dier skills. This was followed by deploy- time sequence. As things turned out, operation which evaluated the ability of ment and an intensive %day MILES- Dagger’s Challenge proved much more all the companies to prepare for com- driven ARTEP which stretched and intense than the actual NTC exercise, bat, deploy, conduct OPFOR combat challenged the battalion task force in all although it lasted only half as long. with multiple integrated laser engage- of those areas which comprise the No- In order to develop necessary tactical ment system (MILES), and fight and sustain missions in an NBC environ- ment. The last phase of the exercise featured a battalion level field training exercise (FTX) against an OPFOR unit. In May, the battalion built on this experience by again turning to smaller unit operations, seeking to sustain ear- ly training while at the same time fur- ther developing skill and expertise. Dragon Fire II was held to qualify all crews on a rigorous battle-linked Tank Table VIII. It also qualified all scout and mortar crews in the same type sce- nario. This gunnery was immediately fol- lowed by Knight’s Challenge.This Table IX (+) exercise called for each platoon to come to alert status, deploy, and road march to occupy designated battle positions. Again, MILES was featured as the platoons attacked and defended in a free maneuver fashion against an OPFOR. Additionally, platoons con- ducted movement-to-contact as part of a company team; defended along a

ARMOR september-October 1984 41 skills within the battalionhask force in the attack or a motorized rifle staff, the battalion held an extensive company in defense. The article includ- series of command post exercises ed photographs of the actual NTC (CPXs) specifically designed to test the OPFOR visual modification (VIS- MOD) mock-up Soviet vehicles and OPFOR uniforms. In a similar vein, the S3 published a pamphlet entitled ‘: . .In maneuver, the battal- “Winning in the Desert” to provide ion proved adept at seeing the immediate information to the soldier on living, operating, and maneuvering battle and in fighting as a in a desert environment. It included combined arms team. . .’’ hints on vehicle maintenance, dealing with dangerous animals of the desert, and survival techniques. These two publications, allied with the battalion’s ability of the SZ-S3-engineer-air liason tactical standard operating procedures LIEUTENANT COLONEL officer (FSO-ALO) group to function (TACSOP), provided all the relevant as an entity. In most cases, the S4, bat- A.J. BERGERON is a 1966 information that soldiers and leaders graduate of Louisiana State talion maintenance officer (BMO) and would need for successful operations. University. He commanded support platoon group were forced to several cavalry troops in accomplish the tactical tasks which At the NTC, the battalion discovered Vietnam and the U.S., were required to support the operation, that it did many things well. Staff served as squadron S3 and limiting their participation in the staff planning was generally excellent, re- XO and as the regimental S3 process. sulting in the expeditious issue of or- of the 2d ACR for nearly As part of the division field CPX pro- ders. In maneuver, the battalion three years. He has been gram, the battalion tactical operation proved adept at seeing the battle and in the Armor majors assign- center (TOC) and trains complement fighting as a combined arms team. ment officer at MILPERCEN established themselves in a field envi- and served as an assistant A major problem was encountered in PMS at the University of ronment and operated around the clock the employment of artillery. Fire Mississippi. He is a gradu- for a 3-day period. planning, unit use of fire support teams ate of the Command 8 Gen- This tasked each element to main- (FISTS), integration of 107-mm mor- eral Staff College and holds tain constant communications with a tars, and effective fires all arose as a masters degree in interna- higher headquarters through reports areas of concern and the necessary tional relations and political and battlefield information and caused objects of further training. The NTC science from the University the various staff heads to coordinate drilled actions on contact better than of Mississippi. He currently with each other in the planning and any home station exercise. Tasked with commands the 3d battalion, 37th Armor and has been execution of missions. the need to simultaneously return fire, selected for attendance at Additionally, the battalion took deploy, report and develop the situa- the National War College in advantage of the army training and bat- tion, one element or the other some- Washington, D.C. tle simulation system (ARTBASS) times suffered. Most damaging to the traveling computer road show offered task force were inadequate or improper by Fort Leavenworth’s Combined actions on contact when faced with the Arms Center (CAC). This computer- need to conduct breaching operations driven simulation exercise allowed the of obstacles. company commanders to interface with All of the exceptionally valuable the battle staff via FM radio. Again, the feedback highlighted in an extensive entire support and service support slice take-home packet supplied by the NTC was included. will find its way into the battalion’s Lastly, the battalion, as part of the training plan. That training program brigade, conducted a simulation exer- will sustain those items deemed ade- cise on the available NTC terrain quate as well as fix those things that the board. The staff and slice component NTC showed to be deficient. was again deployed in a tactical mode Overall, the battalion enjoyed an and communication between company extremely successful NTC rotation and and brigade was via FM radio. The benefitted immeasurably. Comments CAPTAIN JOSEPH S. PUR- exercise tested the ability of the staff by the NTC leadership indicated that SER is a graduate of Colora- and support apparatus to anticipate, they were singularly impressed by the do State University with a plan for and conduct the required coor- unit’s training program and its ability to bachelor’s degree in politi- dination and continue the reporting to execute its mission and respond to cor- cal science. He has served higher and lower elements that proved as a cavalry platoon leader rections and suggestions. This can be and troop XO in USAREUR so crucial at the NTC. attributed primarily to the train-to-fight and as a SMO and cavalry To aid in the preparation of the philosophy which shaped the battal- troop commander in the US. individual soldiers to face the rigors of ion’s approach to training, emphasizing He is currently assigned as the NTC, the battalion published sev- the collective and individual skills the S3, 3d battalion, 37th eral informative pamphlets. The S2 needed to be combat ready. Training Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. produced a document in handy pocket must provide the crucial bridge He is a graduate of the form that explained in graphic detail between our normal peacetime activi- AOBC and the AOAC at Fort what a soldier was likely to see as he ties and the execution of the battalion’s Knox, Ky. faced a Soviet motorized rifle regiment wartime mission.

42 ARMOR September-October 1984 Battle,” the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection sion such as appears for the employment of weapons. and intelligent leadership. This manual emphasizes maneu- Although an explanation of the concept of the main and ver as the dynamic element of combat power and defines it supporting attacks was given, there seemed to be no distinc- as: tion between mobility and maneuver. The dynamic relation- “The concentration or dispersion of troops to achieve a ship of the forms of maneuver to one another was not cov- position of advantage in relation to the enemy to produce ered. results that would otherwise be more costly in men and The Soviet Army places great emphasis on battlefield materials. . . Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, maneuver, although the dynamic relationship between the the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain the forms of maneuver is not mentioned in the literature availa- advantages of surprise, position, and momentum which ena- ble to the West. Soviet doctrine defines two forms of offen- ble small forces to defeat larger ones.” sive maneuver: the flanking attack and the envelopment. In The new manual also emphasizes the importance of the both cases, the maneuvers are described as occurring in initiative. By adding the concept of freedom of action, we can conjunction with troops acting or advancing from the front. place maneuver in its proper perspective on the battlefield. This could mean that either form of maneuver would be The foundation of maneuver is flexibility - that is, freedom accompanied by a frontal attack. The Soviets teach that these of action. In war, force is used progressively to reduce the two basic forms of maneuver may be used in combination, enemy’s options. The concept of freedom of action, or maxi- with each form adhering to its own definition. Must a flank- mum maneuverability, is found in almost all works on the ing attack andlor an envelopment always be conducted in military art. conjunction with a frontal attack? Not necessarily, because Freedom of action is made possible through the ability to on a fluid battlefield, especially under nuclear conditions, maintain the initiative - to make the enemy react to our forces may encounter one another and initiate maneuver maneuver. This can be done, for example, by a series of without a frontal attack being required. threats to exposed enemy points, thus forcing defense of two For purposes of discussion we can consider the frontal or more positions simultaneously. The results cause disper- attack as a form of offensive maneuver because Soviet litera- sion and rigidity in the enemy’s disposition, thus increasing ture so frequently refers to the need to create, by the frontal his vulnerability and reducing his freedom of action. attack, gaps and breaches as a prelude to flank attacks and Another example is to delay the implementation of a deci- envelopments. sion for as long as possible. An action that has been taken is Both U.S. and Soviet doctrine recognize several forms of no longer a threat. Once an action is taken, the enemy’s maneuver and indicate that they may be employed in con- knowledge of the situation expands because, prior to the junction with one another. What is more difficult to find is a action, he only knew that various courses of action were discussion that goes much beyond giving definitions for the possible. Now he knows which one has been taken and he no forms of maneuver. Without an understanding of this rela- longer must guard against the other courses of action. tionship all we have is a laundry list on maneuver based on The concepts of initiative, freedom of action and maneu- the requirements of firepower. ver are interrelated. They are also interactive; Le., by taking To maneuver effectively, we must maintain our freedom the initiative we enhance our freedom of action and are then of action. An excellent example of the dynamic relationship able to maneuver. Through maneuver we enhance our free- between the forms of manuever and its effect on freedom of dom of action and thus maintain the initiative. action is Napoleon’s classic formula for offensive operations U.S. Army doctrine recognizes three forms of maneuver: on the battlefield. As the French concentrated on the battle- the frontal attack, the penetration, and the envelopment. It field, the part of the force making initial contact conducted a was difficult in the past to obtain a clear-cut definition of series of frontal attacks in order to tie down the enemy. maneuver in U.S. Army texts. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 These attacks were conducted with vigor, forcing the enemy states, “Maneuver must coincide with suppressive strikes to commit his reserves. An envelopment, or flank attack, against enemy weapons which can interfere,” and “Coor- was then conducted in order to draw enemy forces from the dination of suppression with maneuver of forces is the positions next to the threatened flank. Napoleon thus, essence of success.” FM 71-100 Armored and Mechanized through maneuver, created a weakness in a critical part of Division Operations (1978) states: “If no open flank or gap in the enemy line. the enemy defense system exists, gaps can be created by This weakness was then exploited by a penetrating attack fires, fire and maneuver, or a deception operation.” In the to completely defeat the enemy. The enemy’s freedom of section entitled Scheme of Maneuver, FM 71-100 states, action was almost eliminated because of the dynamic use of “Enemy positions can be approached in two ways - from maneuver. The defeat was complete because of the disrup- the front, or from the flank or rear. There are, therefore, two tion of the enemy’s battlefield cohesion. Victory is essential- ways to maneuver - penetrate or envelop.” This was about ly accomplished by force disruption, rather than force des-

ARMOR September-October 1984 43 truction. continue resistance. Maneuver is used to produce psycho- Let us now analyze the various forms of maneuver to see logical effect, like uncertainty, fear for lines of communica- how each, used alone, effects the enemy’s freedom of action. tion, security requirements for command and communica- In the face of a frontal attack, the enemy commander tion centers, and the physical presence of enemy troops in has the freedom of action to use his reserve to stem any rear areas. success developed by the attacker. Our objective is to influence the mind of the enemy com- In the face of a penetration, the enemy maintains free- mander. Mental impressions are more important than physi- dom of action to use his reserve and flanking units against cal damage. A favorable decision is achieved when a psycho- the attack. logical effect has been produced on the enemy and he be- Faced by an envelopment or frank attack, the enemy can comes convinced that to continue his present course of maintain freedom of action with his reserve and unengaged action is useless. flank. Since it is impossible to destroy all the enemy force, our And faced with a frontal attack and a penetration, the efforts should be concentrated in those areas where physical enemy retains his reserve to use against the penetration. destruction will produce the greatest psychological damage. The Napoleonic concept, by using the various forms This concept, with some modifications, can be used at the of maneuver in combination to complement each tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. other - first the frontal attack, then the attempt at Maneuver, the dynamic element of combat when envelopment, and finally the penetrating thrust into employed in its three forms, creates a weak area ripe for the gap created by the threat of the envelopment - exploitation. This weakness in the enemy line can be created takes away the enemy commander’s freedom of action as a calculated effect of our own dispositions and is not left to at the penetration stage. Thus, the final maneuver, the chance to be discovered as the attack progresses. Initiative penetration, cannot be stemmed before the enemy allows us to attack. These maneuvers then help us maintain force’s lines of communication are cut. This brings our freedom of action. Through this freedom of action we about a breakdown in the enemy equilibrium, and vic- keep the initiative. tory. Note that it was three forms of maneuver, used in dynamic combination, that brought success. The concentration of fire WALLACE P. FRANTZ and the opening of the breach are only the means to the true Colonel, Infantry end -the psychological destruction of the enemy’s will to USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The Close Combat Armored Vehicle

As we seek solutions to the problems we will face on track-mounted. The tanks still needed infantry support, but future battlefields, we begin to see signs of the merging of now the infantry had to keep pace with the armor and be design requirements for armored vehicles. This merge is available when strong points delayed the momentum of the caused by the absolute necessity of totally integrated opera- attack. tions in which all combat command elements will be used WWII ended before a full concept of armored infantry together. On an extremely lethal, high-intensity battlefield, took shape. However, the concept of the main battle tank we will not have the luxury of fielding a wide variety of (MBT) took hold, and the light and super-heavy tanks fell vehicles of vastly different armor and firepower modes and aside. The infantry went from trucks and halftracks to fully of differing production levels. armored, tracked, amphibious vehicles. These personnel Looking back, it is interesting to see how long it has taken carriers were a great improvement, but they remained essen- to reach a point where the concept of true inter-operational tially battle taxis. capability became a matter of success and survival, rather The basic problem was that each branch was preparing to than just a tactical goal. In WWI, the tank broke the trench fight the next war from a different approach. The tankers stalemate and brought mobility back to the battlefield. In the were going to arrive at the point of contact in an armored between-wars period, the tank was produced in infantry and vehicle and they would engage the enemy in mounted com- cruiser versions. Infantry tanks were heavily armored and bat. The artillery would move to their point of contact and gunned and were slow moving so that they could support the fight from protected, mobile platforms, but the infantry was slow-moving infantry. Cruiser tanks were lightly armed and to ride into battle, then dismount and fight unprotected and armored and used primarily as reconnaissance and flank se- without mobility. curity elements. Very little armored combat took place in Korea or Viet- These concepts did not jell on the early WWII battlefields nam, and those wars did not present the opportunity to and tank designs evolved the U.S. M-4 Sherman, the Russian properly evaluate these new theories. However, two facts T-34 and the German Panther. These medium tanks had that were made abundantly clear in Vietnam were the terri- good firepower and armor and, compared to the infantry ble vulnerability of infantry personnel carriers and our total tanks, great mobility. Infantry now rode in trucks or lightly lack of a suitable cavalry vehicle. The Vietnam enemy did armored halftracks, and direct-fire artillery support was not use air support or highly sophisticated antitank weapons,

44 ARMOR September-October 1984 but they were able to cat carriers and, to some ex1 It wasn’t until the 19: of the new battlefield bc second day of that war, i been annihilated while Egyptian troops armed equipped with America same weapons we would Russia at the time. The in protected vehicles wh necessary, move ahead ( tank systems, was clear bined arms operations H was the only way to go. P The army is now fie11 terns, the MI MBT, the and the M3 cavalry figf one thing in common; tl concepts of the mid-191 bring these vehicles froi that time, there have bec concepts and intensity Chobham armor and, sc most advanced design of different cases altogetht have been a welcome a( was not that much of ai are, therefore, now prod vastly different levels of having different levels these vehicles must ser same battlefield, againsi system to the exclusion ( ble. Both systems are des Because we will undo1 sonable to expect that tf Threat tanks without hz Although the IFV Carrie: be fired on the run, ar missile in the midst of e suicidal. The IFV’s 25-1 the run, will not defeat ‘ feet higher than the MI, 14.5-mm weapons. It is a disadvantage to tanks, j can’t survive on their o than enough to do engat support of the IFV infan

What Is A Tank?

Today’s tank is basically the same weapon system that it Changes in configuration are most easily noticed, but their was in WW 11. Tank tactics, functions, and general config- effect upon tank design and on what a tank is and what it is urations have changed very little in the past 40 years. How- supposed to do are difficult to judge without knowing the ever, recent developments in tank design hint at a new and reasons for those changes. The driver-in-the-turret feature exciting transition period - one that could lead to new tac- and gun-launcher armament of the MBT 70/XM803, for in- tics, functions and configurations. stance, might have had a significant impact on tank develop-

ARMOR September-October 1984 45 ment if they had been more successful (and cheaper) and if needed against infantry antitank weapons. It would not take the vehicle had been conceived as something different from the place of the armored infantry fighting vehicle, but would a “tank”. accomplish a task that the AIFV is not capable of doing. The The present test rigs for external-gun type tanks being support tank would also provide control and target acquisi- proposed by the U.S.,Switzerland, and others will undoub- tion functions and would have an antitank missile capability. tedly have at least an effect on tank design by lowering all The functions a tank performs are thus divided between two crew members into the hull armor structure. Tactical and vehicles, with some functions expanded; and increased capa- functional changes may ensue from this change, but the bility has been incorporated for dealing with certain threats. limited change of replacing a turret by an external gun The hull of the battle and support tanks would feature a should also limit the change to tactics and functions. front-mounted power plant with front-drive sprockets, hy- Perhaps the Israeli Merkava will have a more profound dropneumatic suspension, rear access doors, and laminated and lasting impact on tank design and use. The most notable armor, an arrangement similar to that of the Merkava. The feature of the Merkava is that the engine is placed in the power plant is placed at the front, primarily for packaging front of the vehicle - the normal placement in a personnel considerations. If it is desired to efficiently use the interior of carrier or light tank, but rather radical for a main battle tank. the tank, and if ammunition or fuel is not to be stowed in the Two opposite trends in the degree of armor protection front of the hull, it is almost imperative that the engine be may herald a change in tactics. One extreme sees lightly mounted there. armored, mobile vehicles. They are the modern day equiva- If a high-speed diesel engine is used, the air exhaust grills lents of the WW I1 M-18 Hellcat tank destroyers and are for engine cooling might present a ballistic problem; but if an represented by the Anti-Armored Vehicle Evaluation armor of ceramic shingles were used, with an air cushion (ARMVAL) test vehicles at TACOM. The other extreme backing, the exhaust air could be sent out through the air includes the MI tank, the Chieftain and some new proposals cushion. This could provide a lightweight and very efficient which emphasize improved armor protection. Since counter- type of armor protection. tank capabilities continue to be emphasized for U.S. tanks, The battle tank would have a three-man crew. It would use these developments could either represent a new generation a three-section turret and a semi-externally mounted gun of tank destroyers, or they could compel new developments with an automatic loader. In this turret, the center section in tactics. contains the main gun ammunition magazine, the automatic Any change in tactics which sees vehicles dedicated to the loader and the gun. It is separated from the two other turret tank destroyer role will certainly cause a change in the func- segments by armored vertical partitions. The main gun, ram- tions a tank performs as well. The same functions will be mer, and coaxial machinegun are mounted in a cradle. The performed, but the priority of functions will be altered. trunnions are attached to the cradle at the rear of the gun Tank-versus-tank capability will most likely remain as the breech. Elevation cylinders are attached to the cradle at the prime function of a tank, but it will not be stressed to the center of gravity of the gun-cradle system and provide a 45- same degree that it is now. Indeed, some of the changes that degree elevation capability. The main gun, preferably a 110- are being made may be the result of the heavy emphasis mm caliber, could use a sliding wedge breech, but a breech placed on tank-versus-tank capability. mechanism based on the 1894 Hall carbine would simplify Tanks normally operate with other vehicles and the total loading and be more compatible with caseless ammunition. of functions which all of these vehicles perform must be Additional ammunition stowage and fuel tanks would be at considered as well as the individual functions. Among these the rear of the vehicle, giving the tank extensive compart- functions are reactions to threats against each type of vehicle mentation. Total vehicle weight should be about 45 tons. and to the group as a whole. The support tanks would serve both to support the main The problem is that there is a void between the main battle battle tank and as a platoon leader’s vehicle. It would have tank and the armored infantry fighting vehicle that needs to two offset turrets and a 6-8 man crew. The forward turret be filled. The Israeli Merkava and the German Geleitzpanzer would be offset on the left of the vehicle and would be armed are approaches to filling this gap. On the one hand, it is with a short-barreled 35-mm cannon and a coaxial machine- questionable whether the armored infantry fighting vehicle, gun to provide suppressive fire against infantry and helicop- such as the M2, can adequately accompany the main battle ters. The rear turret would be armed with TOWand Stinger tank in close enough proximity to protect it from infantry- missiles and would provide antitank and antiaircraft missile directed antitank weapons. The Germans, at least, also seem protection. The vehicle commander/platoon leader would be to have realized that the armored infantry fighting vehicle at the right front of each vehicle next to the forward turret, needs support that is not given by the main battle tank. The and there would be two riflemen. Merkava, therefore, has the capability of carrying riflemen, It is now left to the reader’s judgement to decide if these and the Geleitzpanzer is armed with a 57-mm gun on a are tanks or not. The roles they perform are similar to, but Murder chassis. not identical to, the traditional roles of tanks. They rely on Given all these trends, making judgments about their crew positions, compartmentation, and special armor, rather importance and contemplating their impact on tank design, than weight of armor, for defense. They have assumed some one can come up with any number of future tank designs. of the functions of artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and The antitank role has not been emphasized as strongly as armored infantry vehicles and split them between two com- it is with most tank designs, and other functions that tanks plementary vehicles. Still, they perform the functions of a have been required to perform have been given greater tank. Future developments in armor, armament, power- attention. Chief among these is the ability to deliver indirect plants, and suspension systems will surely provide the tank artillery fire. At the same time, the ability of the tank to with greater capabilities and provide more of an overlap in defend itself against helicopters and other aircraft is the roles of armored vehicles. It will thus become even more improved by the capability of engaging air targets with the difficult to say - What is a tank? main gun. Additional antiaircraft capability would be provided by a ROGER SMITH companion support tank which would use essentially the USA Tank-Automotive Comand, same hull. The support tank would provide the protection Warren, MI

46 AIPMUR September-October 1984 Guides to Speaking and Writing In my 40 years service as a general officer, I have never I am constantly amazed at the poor physical set-ups that served in the Pentagon, but have been in many positions often force guest speakers to operate under adverse condi- where I could orally coach, teach, train, direct, and speak to tions of acoustics and seating arrangements for the audience, a great many people, military and civilian. Conversly, I have many of whom can neither see nor hear the speaker. This been on the receiving end of a great number of poorly deliv- area, as much as the included outlines, needs to be seriously ered speeches. investigated. Recently, an officer contacted me and said that I had once put out a one-page guide on how to write. He asked me if I BRUCE C. CLARKE have ever prepared such an outline on how to deliver a talk General, USA (Ret.) and I had to reply “No, but 1’11 put one together for you.” McLean, VA

EFFECTIVE WRITING SPEECH MAKING Putting one’s thoughts down on paper can be harder The art of speechmaking is essential to anyone in a leader- than it need be unless you are prepared beforehand. ship role in any profession, and especially in the military. There is a logical order of progression for writing just Speeches can be, and often are, presented in many places as there is for speech making. Writing is simply telling and under many conditions, from the formal atmosphere of a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Here the auditorium to the extemporaneous exigencies of the are some points on how to prepare yourself: field. The really good speechmaker can deliver his product under any of these conditions and achieve equal audience Subject interest - and comprehension. 0 If you have a choice, pick a subject that you In order to achieve this modicum of success, there are a know and have an urge to tell someone about. If number of essential preliminary, presentation, and follow- you are assigned a subject, learn all you can about it on steps that must be taken as follows: before you begin to write. Audience Pre-Speech Considerations 0 Select a person in your mind to whom you want Know your audience: size, subject expertise; vol- to tell your story. As you write, keep that person in unteer or forced attendance; civilian or military. mind and tell your story so that he or she will Know your subject: This is an absolute. understand and follow you. How much time will you have, and what time of day or night? Lists 0 Will you speak from notes or a prepared text? Make a list of all facts and points that you want to Have all indoor physical arangements been taken emphasize. Select key points from these for empha- care of: audiovisual equipment, podium, water, sis. lights, etc.? 0 Will your talk be recorded? Outline 0 Will the press be present? Arrange your facts and points in chronological or other logical order so as to introduce your story, tell The Speech it, and finish with a strong conclusion. Ask for a brief introduction only. Tell your audience what you are going to tell Drafting them and why it is important to them. Write a paragraph on each fact or point. Read it Talk up, never down, to your audience. - preferably aloud. Is it generally what you wanted Be logical in your presentation. to say? Does it tell its part of your story? Does it fit Summarize your topic, hit the high points, don’t in with your other paragraphs? go into excessive detail - it bores your audience. Keep within your time limits. Rewriting 0 Keep your language and terminology simple This is the heart of writing. Check for spelling, unless you are addressing a highly sophisticated au- punctuation, grammar, capitalization, etc. (use a dience - and then be certain that you know the good dictionary). You may wish to rearrange some subject well enough to use sophisticated terms. paragraphs into a more logical order at this time. Add a touch of humor now and then, but keep it 0 Rewrite several times until you are satisfied and relevant. believe that your selected reader will like it. Avoid too much use of the pronoun I. Finale Conclusion 0 If you are enthusiastic about your story, type it 0 Give a short summary of your speech. clean and present it. Have a “Q and A” period. If you are not enthusiastic about it, rewrite it 0 If you have a “handout,” distribute it now. until you are. Express your appreciation to your audience.

ARMOR September-October 1984 47 Spirit: Essence of Leadership Leadership is the most important element in the Army asm and charisma can do this. Technical expertise and good and in the nation today. Periodically, Congress tries to de- equipment can be acquired by most men but it is enthusiasm cide if the military academies are worth the high per capita and charisma that drive a team. They are not gimmicks or cost of a single graduate. They study the school’s academic special uniforms. They are the twinkle in your eye, the spirit program, its sports program, its extracurricular program, within your body, your soul. You should be proud of your and its military program and they see little difference with inner strength and allow it to shine. As a result, men will the ROTC programs of the nation’s civilian universities. flock to your banner. They will actually start to imitate you as But they may be failing to study the real reason the acade- well as brag about you like a little brother does about his mies exist: leadership. Different forms of leadership, from older brother. the authoritarian to the ingratiating, are available for the Finally and most importantly, a leader must cultivate the serious young cadet to study and observe. The best advice common spirit between himself and his subordinates. Spirit any leadership instructor can give a young man is to study emanates from the leader and shines upon his men. They those leaders you want to be like, see what they do, how they bask in its light and reflect it back to the leader. Spirit is do it, and why they do it, and then incorporate their best based on sincere concern for one’s men. This concern is so traits into your own style. deep it resembles love. For example, if you loved your son Military leadership classes repeatedly describe traits of and you were teaching him how to play football, you would great leaders in the hope that students will incoporate these not just throw him a football one day and say, go learn how traits into their style. There are many desirable traits, but the to play football. You would coach him, help him, run with most important are honesty, loyalty, and winning. him, watch him, correct him, and ensure he had every Honesty is the strong inner feeling a man has against lying opportunity to become the best. You care about him. Such cheating, stealing, and tolerating a man who does. There is care must be manifested for one’s troops. no reason for compromise in this area. Dishonesty cannot be On the other hand, if a leader exhibits the opposite feeling tolerated among professional men and the nation cannot - one of disconcern and insincerity - he cannot help but to remain strong if it is. repulse his men. Apathy cannot be hidden; it emanates from Loyalty is the strength to stand up for what is right. Philos- the leader like a light from a demon’s eyes. He cannot dis- ophers argue what is right and wrong. But, I believe that guise it. No matter how deceitful he is, his men will know. divine force guides us and man needs only to appeal to it to Therefore, if a leader cares about his men, they will care be shown the moral way. about him. In addition to observing strong leaders and mastering the In conclusion, a winning leader must observe other lead- traits of honesty and loyalty, a leader must be a winner. ers and emulate those dynamic traits he sees. He must be Winning is the American norm. We love to win; it is in our honest and loyal. Furthermore, he must tap the winning blood. We detest the loser and cannot stand to be near him. spirit of Americans by being the best himself and allowing This national spirit must be tapped by today’s leader. He his inner soul to shine. Finally, he must love his men with all must be a winner. To do this, we must be the best and have his heart and care for them like a father for his son. the best working with us. All men have the capability to be JOHN PRESTON MITCHAM the best. The leader must develop this capability in himself 1st Lieutenant, Armor and in his men. Expert coaching, good equipment, enthusi- Fort Benning, Ga.

Recognition Quiz Answers I. PANHARD EBR HEAVY-ARMORED CAR 4. 152-MM SP GUN/HOWITZER M- (Fr.). Crew, 4; 8 x 8 wheel drive; combat weight, 13.500 kg 1 ~~~(ussR).Crew, 6; combat weight, 23.000 kg (26.271 (29,767 Ibs); maximum road speed, 105 kmlh; maximum Ibs); maximum road speed, 55 km/h; maximum road range, road range, 650 km; maximum fording depth, 1.2 m; 12- 300 km; maximum water fording depth, 1.1 m; v-12 diesel, cylinder. air-cooled, gasoline, 200-hp engine; main gun, 1 X 520-h~engine; main gun, 1 x 152.4-mm; antiaircraft, 1 x 90-mm; coaxial and antiaircraft, 2 x 7.5-mm machineguns; 7.62-mm machinegun; gun elevation,+ 65 degrees, maxi- smoke capability; hull and turret front armor, 40-mm; hull mum depression, -3 degrees; possible autoloader; reported sides, 16-mm; turret sides, 30-mm; turret rear, 20-mm. maximum range, 37,000 meters with HE/RAP ammunition. 2. RHElNSTAHL MARDER MlCV (FRG). Crew, 4 5. LEOPARD II (Can.). Crew, 4; combat weight 42,400 plus 6 infantrymen; combat weight, 28,200 kg (56,978 Ibs); kg (87,492 Ibs); maximum road speed, 65 km/h; maximum maximum road speed (forwardand reverse), 75 kmlh; maxi- road range, 600 km; maximum fording depth (wlprepara- mum road range, 520 km; maximum fording depth, 2.5 m; 6 tion) 2.25 m; 10-cylinder, multi-fuel, 830-hp engine; main cylinder, liquid-cooled, diesel, 600-hp engine; main gun, 1 X gun, 1 x 105-m~;coaxial and antiaircraft,2 x 7.62-mm ma- 20-mm; coaxial and hull 2 X 7.62-mm machineguns; smoke chineguns; smoke capability; maximum hull armor, capability. no data on turret armor. 3. AMX-30 MBT (Fr.). Crew, 4; combat weight, 40.000 6. MLRS (U.S.). Crew, 3; loaded weight, 24,564 kg kg (88,200 Ibs); maximum road speed, 65 kmlh; maximum (54,163Ibs); maximum road speed, 64 km/h; maximum road road range, 530 km; 1 2-cylinder, water-cooled, super- range, 483 k; maximum fording depth, 1.02 m; €!-cylinder. charged, multi-fuel, 700-hp engine; main gun, 1 x 105-mm; turbocharged, 500-hp engine; full rocket load, 12; maximum coaxial and antiaircraft, 2 x 7.62-mm machineguns; smoke firing rate (full load) less than one minute; cab armored capability; spaced, conventional and composite armor. against small arms and shell splinters.

48 ARMolp September-October 1984 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment Celebrates The 3d ACR was to celebrate Organization Day on 9- 11 October at Fort Bliss, TX. Former Brave Rifles and fellow cavalrymen were invited. Activities included a parade, military and sports competitions and family activities. The 3d ACR Regimental Museum, also located at Fort Bliss, is open under a new curator and visitors are cor- dially invited.

Three Guard Units to Get M1 Tanks Three Army National Guard armor units will receive the M7 Abrams main battle tank during the next 16 months, according to National Guard sources. Four Guard units will then equipped with the Army’s newest tank. The 2d Battalion, 252d Armor, North Carolina, was the first unit to get the new tanks. Scheduled to receive the Mlsare: 1st and 2d Battal- ions, 198th Armor, Mississippi, and 1st Battalion, 108th Armor, Georgia. Cadets Awarded Cavalry Sabers

Two cadets of the 140 who graduated in June from Three Ms Back Up Armor on the Range the USMA and who were commissioned into armor Mess, Medics and Maintenance, those are the 3 Ms were recipients of the Cavalry Saber, presented by the that keep armor units fighting, well-fed, and cared for if Armor Association in recognition of their outstanding they are hurt. Without them, no unit could function. scholastic and leadership achievements. Shown above When the 2/77th Armor deployed to the Yakima Firing are: Cadet Robert L. Demont, left, and Cadet Christo- Center near Fort Lewis, Washington, their support per- pher Wilson, right, with their sabers. Colonel Jack W. sonnel were there in strength to see that the tankers Dice, deputy director, Department of Military Instruc- were well cared for in every way. tion, USMA, made the presentations. This marks the The 2/77 cooks take their job seriously. “In some 52d year that selected cadets have been so honored units, being a cook is considered a sham job,” said Sp5 by the Armor Association. Robert Crah, a shift leader, “but it‘s not around here. Everybody here,” he said, “is away from home and working long, hard hours. Having good food helps mor- ale, it gives people something to look forward to.” The unit’s 15-man aid station, augmented by 10 med- 37th Tank Battalion Honored With French Awards ics from Co. C,2 FSB, provided health care around the The 37th Tank Battalion, a part of the 4th Armored clock for the tankers. “We haven’t had a major injury,” Division during World War II, was recently awarded two said SFC Steven Ambler, medical platoon sergeant, French Croix de Guerres and a Fourragere for its WW II “but we keep pretty busy what with sore throats, eye actions by Colonel Andre Rilhac, French Liaison Officer problems (due to dust), allergies, hay fever and the nor- at Fort Knox, KY, in the name of the French Govern- mal run of cuts and bruises.” The aid station is ment. equipped with basic life support equipment and a Med- At Investiture Ceremonies held at Fort Riley, Kansas, Evac helicopter is available at all times. the 39th Tank Battalion was twice awarded the Croix de Without roundLthe-clock maintenance, the unit’s Guerre with Palm, each award accompanied by an tanks would be permanently in the garage. CW2 Ri- appropriate battle streamer: Normandy and Moselle chard Dolado, battalion maintenance technician, says River. The 37th also received the Fourragere that every about his men, “We have some of the best mechanics in member of the unit during the above campaigns is enti- the Army right here and I mean that. These guys are tled to wear on his uniform. willing to work any amount of hours to make sure the James H. Leach (Col. USA, Ret.) Honorary Colonel of battalion’s vehicles are ready to shoot, move and com- the 37th Armored Regiment, accepted the awards on municate. Some of them are young, but what they lack behalf of the unit that served as the spear point of Gen- in experience they make up for in motivation.” eral Patton’s Third Army during its drive across France, Besides CW2 Dolado’s 21 mechanics working on the the relief of Bastogne and the subsequent combats in 2/77 vehicles, there was a slice element from Co. B, 2d Germany. FSB to help out. The support battalion provided techni- cal supply, armament, mechanical, communication, recovery, engineer and inspection sections.

ARMOR September-October 1984 49 ~~~~~~ Air Conditioned Uniforms Due for M1 El Crews

An air-conditioned, micro-climate, cooling clothing system will permit combat vehicle crewmen wearing complete NBC protective clothing to continue their mis- sion for extended periods in more comfort. Present NBC clothing induces considerable heat stress when worn in hot environments and can cause heat casualties in less than thirty minutes. The new system, developed by Individual Protection Laboratory, US. Army Natick Research and Develop- ment Center, Natick, MA, will be connected to a refri- geration source within the vehicle and will distribute conditioned air over the wearer’s torso. Tests have shown that crewmen can continue with their operation- al tasks for up to 12 hours without experiencing any ill effects from heat. The new development will be incorporated in all M7E7 tanks coming off the production line in 1985.

M60A3 Sample Data Collection (SDC) information can be accessed for review and used by anyone having the proper computer code. The M60A3 Sample Data Collection began in Novem- When time is critical, the rapidly accessible data can ber 1979 at the 1/32 Armor Battalion and the 1/70 provide information within 24 hours on the equipment’s Armor Battalion in USAREUR. During the following RAM-D performance. years the program has collected data on 343 tanks that The M60A3 SDC has proven to be a prime source of have accrued in excess of 500,000 miles. The objective information in the RAM-D decision-making process. of the SDC is to increase the reliability, availability, The data so far collected are the basis for several maintainability and durability (RAM-D) of the M60A3 improvements that will result in PIPS or ECPs to the tank by providing field performance data to assist in the M60A3 tank, according to a spokesman for the US. design and logistics decision-making process. Army DARCOM Material Readiness Support Activity in The process demands valid, current information and Lexington, KY. the M60A3 SDC can assist by supplying a fast flow of SDC data also assists decision-makers in evaluating accurate, current data to those personnel needing that such things as new versus overhaul performance, oper- information. ating and support costs, training costs, clean air com- The single most important point in the information pliance, useful life, effects of combat vehicle evaluation stream is the source. In each participating tank compa- on operational readiness rates, effects of TMDE on ny a representative of PECO Enterprises collects the maintenance time and many other programs. All these required M60A3 data, relieving military personnel of programs can produce viable cost savings and this additional duty. Each collector records the details improved readiness through enhanced equpment per- of an M60A3 maintenance incident on a form which is formance. then sent to a centralized location to be added to the The M60A3SDC program fulfils a need that so far has computer data base. Once in the data base, the not been met elsewhere.

50 ARMOR September-October 1984 Blackhawks Move, Win Award, Change COS Delta Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 2d Armored Division, has gone as a unit to Garlstadt, FRG where they joined 2AD Forward. C Troop (Ground) 2-1 Cavalry is being disbanded under the new Division 86 T08E. Echo Troop, 2-1 Cavalry, recently received the 2AD’s 304th Light Tank Brigade Trophy. As one of the few Night Vision Goggle-qualified air troops in the Army, Echo Troop won out over more than 100 company-sized units in the competition. On 16 August, Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Schmid, Jr., took over the colors of 2- 1 Cavalry, the Blackhawks, as he assumed command from Lieutenant Colonel William S. Huff, Ill. Colonel Huff supervised the squadron’s reorganization from H-series to J-series TOE and it became the first Division 86 armored cavalry squadron in the Army. Colonel Huff will attend the Armed Forces Staff College. Colonel Schmid is the former XO of 2-1 Cavalry. The ceremony was performed entirely by noncommissioned officers with CSM Albert White as commander of troops.

CO B, 5th Bn, 32d Armor is “Best of the Best” Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander, 24th Infantry Division, awarded the prestigious Draper Armor Leadership Award to Company B, 5th Battalion, 32d Armor and named the unit the “best of the best.” The ceremony, held at Fort Stewart, GA, honored the unit for its performance during the past year and the -judging -- was based upon such things as tank gunnery scores, unit performance in ARTEPs and individual The Command Post Vehicle Test Bed, now under study marksmanship scores. at Aberdeen Proving Ground, based on M109-chas- Captain John N. Duquette, company commander, and sis components. is First Sergeant David W. Tart, received engraved pla- ques and a statue of a mounted cavalryman will be dis- played in the unit’s orderly room for one year. Command Post Vehicle Test Bed A “generic” command post vehicle that will be used 70th Armor Remembers D-Day in Normandy as a test bed to study command, control, and commu- On 6 June 1984, the 40th anniversary of the Norman- nications operations in nuclear and chemical battlefield dy landings, soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 70th Armor environments has been built by the U.S. Army Human took part in 24th Infantry Division ceremonies at Fort Engineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Stewart, GA in remembrance of those landings. MD. This vehicle is equipped with computers, radios, an Normandy marked the 70th’~third amphibious auxiliary power unit and an environmental control unit assault landing in WW II, the unit having taken part in to permit its use in either the open or closed hatch mode the North African landings and the Sicilian campaign. for continuous periods of up to 72 hours. Crews will For the D-Day landings, Companies A and B were wear special protective clothing that can be heated or equipped with duplex-drive (DD) swimming tanks, cooled and will use onboard facilities for eating and Company C was equipped with dozer-bladed Shermans personal hygiene when hatches are closed. The test and Company D went ashore in M-5 Stuart tanks. The bed vehicle will be used to gather data for use in future unit landed at Utah Beach and for its actions that day large-scale field tests. was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

2/66th Concludes NETT with M1 Abrams Tanks The 2d Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment recently 2d ACR Replaces M60A3s with M1 s concluded its Mi New Equipment Transition Training G Troop, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (NETT) at Vilseck, Germany. The 2/66 is the forward- took over the first Mi tank on June 12 to mark the based tank battalion of the 66th Regiment and is home 2ACR’s transition from the M60A3 model. Colonel Willi- stationed in Garlstedt, FRG. am W. Crouch, the 2 ACR’s 62d colonel, christened the The battalion wound up its training in June and is now Abrams tank in a ceremony attended, among others, by fully equipped with the Mi Abrams. Further field train- Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Molino, 2d Squadron ing for 2/66 on its new tanks was to include crew quali- commander, and Captain David J. Shroer, G Trobp com- fication gunnery in July, an FTX on August, a battalion- mander. The 2d Squadron completed its transition on level ARTEP with the Dutch 42d Brigade in October and 15 July. a PBR gunnery in November of this year.

ARMOR September-October 1984 51 The book is quite accurate, though a Army, tends to bog the reader down, but COMMAND, CONTROL & few discrepancies were noted. One for those with an interest in Soviet mobile COMMUNICATIONS (C3) by A.M. interesting bit of information unearthed operations, the payoff comes in a section Willcox, M.G. Slade and P.A. Ramsdale. during the extensive research for the labeled “Concepts”. Here, Simpkin dis- Brassey’s Defence Publishers, Oxford, book was the discovery of the grave of cusses the Soviet concept of the “deep England. $1 2.50 softback, $27.00 hard- Michael Wittman, the legendary tank battle.” “the tank force concept,” Soviet back. 150 pages. “ace” who had been missing in action mobile operations and their applicability since August 8, 1944. His grave, along to the NATO center. The sixth volume in Brassey’s battle- with those of two of his crewmen, was He presents a wealth of new ideas on field technology series is concerned with discovered and the remains reinterred at concepts such as the operational ma- the ability to gather intelligence. formu- the German war cemetery at LaCambe, neuver group and Soviet use of airborne, late decisions, and issue commands at a France. airmobile, and amphibious forces, while rapid pace in a potentially hostile elec- The book’s principal interest is to commenting on how these subjects have tromagnetic environment. This volume those who are students of the Normandy been treated by other Western authors. provides an excellent introduction to key battles from the German point of view. theories and technologies. It is aimed at Many of the photographs are of the both military and civilian readers who re- “then and now” variety showing Norman GILBERT0 VILLAHERMOSA quire knowledge of current or future scenes during or shortly after the battles Captain, Armor communications technology as it relates and also today. Fort Bragg, NC to military applications. No in-depth prior technical knowledge or mathematical ROBERT HODGE skill is required to understand the dis- Bloomington, IL ARMS TRANSFERS UNDER cussions and presentations. It begins with a brief overview of the NIXON; A POLICY ANALYSIS by Lewis Sorley. University of Kentucky, general topic and a review of basic radio RED ARMOUR by Richard Simpkin, Louisville, 1983.231 pp. concepts. Aspects of combat net radio Pergamon - Brassey’s International De- are discussed followed by a look at trunk fense Publishers, McLean. Va, 224 pag- communications, including facilities, es. $36. Growing attention is being paid to the techniques, relay systems and switch- increasingly vital role of Security Assis- ing. The various components of electron- In this new book, Brigadier (Ret.) Ri- tance (SA) in the total spectrum of U.S. ic warfare (EW) are presented in topics chard Simpkin attempts a much needed national security policy. SA is an umbrel- such as direction finding, jamming and understanding of the maneuver theory on la term for a variety of arms transfer encryption. The book closes with a dis- which Soviet land operations are based. measures (Foregin Military Sales-FMS, cussion of strategic communications, Simpkin, a 30-year veteran of Britain’s Military Assistance Program-MAP) and touching on speech compression, adap- Royal Tank Regiment, is a leading expert related programs (International Military tive cancellations and signal processing. in the field of armored vehicle develop- Education and Trainig-IMET; Peace- The volume is written in textbook style ment and a prolific writer on armor and keeping Operations-PKO; Economic with self-test questions after each chap- its employment. Support Fund-ESF). ter. The appendices include answers to His major point is that Soviet concepts Major issues in the contemporary SA the questions and a glossary of abbrevi- can be accurately expressed in terms arena include: the sale of aircraft ations. Many figures and illustrations familiar to the Western reader and (AWACS, F-74, F-75, F-76,€-2C, etc.) to augment the text and the only drawback understood by soldier and politician Mideast nations; concern over loss of is its lack of references to other works in alike. He is convinced that “by using lit- sensitive hardware and technology if a the field. eral translations of Soviet terms, the purchaser’s government falls, as Iran handful of (Soviet) specialists. . . have did; the proper balance between moral- DONALD J. BUTZ created an arcane and detail-ridden lan- ethical values, such as human rights, Battelle Laboratories, guage which blocks, rather than pro- and other considerations in the total Columbus, Ohio motes communication of their expertise” “sell-no sell” equation. The author also and thus fails to answer “the Western’s examines whether the U.S. Government soldier’s need to know his potential ene- should encourage private sector devel- PANZERS IN NORMANDY- my.” His writing style leaves little doubt opment of “designed for export” equip- THEN AND NOW by Eric Lefevre. that he intends the book for a well-edu- ment; what percentage of an arms trans- Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd., cated military or technical audience with feree’s GNP should be dedicated to London, England, 1983. 212 pages. a good grasp of Soviet military organiza- acquiring, operating and maintaining S33 A5 tions and equipment. highly sophisticated military hardware; The author’s technical expertise is evi- and the competition accorded the US. by This volume gives a brief history of the dent in the language and style of the other arms suppliers. In addition to the 17 panzer units that fought in Normandy book, which takes on the format of a USSR, United Kingdom, and France, in June-August 1944. It specifically de- technical report, using such terms as these include a number of smaller na- tails each regiment in each panzer divi- “mass center” to describe the enemy’s tions now emerging as arms sellers, sion, as well as independent battalions. center of mass, “attraction” between particularly of small arms, antiarmor mis- The book is essentially in two parts. attacking and defending forces, and siles, light armored vehicles (LAVs), pa- The first contains a chart showing the “lever arm” when referring to the separa- trol boats, and transport aircraft, wea- theoretical composition of a 1944-era tion distance between a “hammer force” pons categories which are of great inter- panzer regiment, descriptions of the and an “anvil force.” The diagrams illus- est toThird World buyers. armor used by them and the uniforms of trating Soviet technical concepts even army and Waffen-SS armor crewmen. suggest the engineer’s blueprint. JOHN A. HURLEY The second part deals with the battles in The first part of the book, with its vol- Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR Normandy. uminous technical data on the Soviet HQ. USAF

52 ARMOR September-October 1984

- - -

I Ch chc An; C fie/

with titles like, “Dressing For Success, ” “Searching For Excellence, ” and even “Winning Through Intimidation. ” Not long ago, however, a sense of gloom pervaded our country. Success seemed to evade our nation. But, our leaders and people looked inward, saw what needed doing, pulled up their socks, and went to work. Today our nation looks about the world with a renewed sense of pride, optimism and a spirit of winning. Our Olympians measured their success not so much by the medal count as by a phrase we kept hearing - achieving their “personal best. ” As our nation and Army renew the spirit of winning, achieving our personal best should be a motto adopted by every officer, NCO and soldier. Winning is not simply an outcome. Were it so, many in this world who don’t play fair and square, who make their own rules, who bully those weaker than themselves and avoid picking on those their own size, would be called win- ners. But they delude themselves; so they are born losers. Winning is a state of mind, an outlook, a way of life. And, it seems to be catching on, for the men and women joining our ranks today see themselves as winners and view the Army as a winning team. Forty years ago, our soldiers also saw themselves as a winning team. They had cracked the Atlantic Wall, entered Fortress Europe and drove the enemy before them. They were so successful, in fact, that they outran their supplies and had to halt. In the lull that followed, those winners became complacent. Taking advantage of that attitude, Hitler launched a massive counteroffensive that took thousands of lives and became known as the Battle of the Bulge. Complacency turned to desperation as US. forces fought overwhelming odds. In the end, leaders like Patton and Clarke turned the tide by sheer determina- tion and hard work. Winning doesn’t come easily and is never guaranteed. It is always hard work. In our optimism today, let us not fall prey to complacency. Whatever our job, wherever we serve, we must strive for our personal best every day. Whatever the odds, however the outcome, winners play hard all four quarters and fight every round. Lombardi probably said it best. “Winning isn’t everything, it’s the ONLY thing.” The “Pack”came back. So have we! Good shooting.