ARMOR January-February 2004

Dismounted Combat Tankers The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-04-1

Editor in Chief LTC DAVID R. MANNING Features

Managing Editor 6 ARMOR Magazine Survey CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 9 Task Force Death Dealers: Dismounted Combat Tankers by CPT Donald Stewart, CPT Brian McCarthy, and CPT James Mullin Commandant MG TERRY L. TUCKER 13 A Company Commander’s Thoughts on Iraq by CPT John B. Nalls 17 1-64 Armor’s Rogue Gunnery Training Program ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by LTC Eric Schwartz, MAJ Daniel Cormier, and SSG Bobby Burrell month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 1109A Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 21 Treachery and Its Consequences: Civilian Casualties During Operation Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- Iraqi Freedom and the Continued Utility of the Law of Land Warfare MOR represents the professional opinions of by MAJ Dennis P. Chapman the authors and does not necessarily refl ect the offi cial Army or TRADOC position, nor 26 Company Operations During the Establishment does it change or supersede any information of Stability Operations in Baghdad presented in other offi cial Army publications. by CPT Roger Maynulet Offi cial distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 34 The First Afghan National Army T-62 Tank Gunnery cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by CPT Jonathan Byrom and CPT Aaron Parker ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- 39 Back to the Basics: The Noncommissioned Offi cers’ Corps quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- by 1SG Keith J. Santos pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army li- 42 Successful Scout Mounted Infi ltration braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and by MAJ O. Kent Strader MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fi re, ground combat systems, 46 Musings of An Armor Offi cer organizations, and the training of personnel MAJ Mark Salas for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor in chief. 53 Feedback from the Force Improves Training and Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only Supports Change in 1st Armor Training Brigade those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fi re ground combat Departments systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Contacts any miscellaneous items of equipment which 3 Letters armor and armored cavalry organizations use 7 Commander’s Hatch exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C offi cers and for all CMF-19-series enlist- 8 Driver’s Seat ed soldiers; and information concerning the 50 Reviews training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/ regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. January-February 2004, Vol. CXIII, No. 1 USPS 467-970 Once More Unto the Breach

Another new year has arrived. I want to thank all our readers and and matter-of-fact approach, provide a valuable and keen insight for contributors for supporting ARMOR and the U.S. Armor Association. units preparing to deploy to Iraq or other combat zones. I believe our magazine is the finest, most relevant professional jour- As mentioned earlier, prior to OIF, the term “dismounted tanker” was nal available. Since 1888, when ARMOR ’s predecessor, The Cavalry an almost sacrilegious thought. But the current contemporary oper- Journal, began publication, this magazine has been at the forefront ating environment in Iraq has changed that mentality. Captains Don- of all professional journals, and it is my intent to raise the bar. ald Stewart, Brian McCarthy, and James Mullin dispel the myth and With that, we can’t sit on our laurels and pat ourselves on the back. offer their perspectives on the necessity of dismounting armor crew- It has been over 20 years since ARMOR ’s last reader survey. In this men in their article, “Task Force Death Dealers: Dismounted Combat issue, we have developed a survey requesting your input to make this Tankers.” journal an even better forum. Please take the time to answer the sur- Stability and security operations continue in Afghanistan and as part vey and mail it in or visit our website at www.knox.army.mil/survey/ of that, the armor community is contributing its expertise at training armormagazinesurvey. From your own computer, you can complete and shaping the Afghan National Army tanker corps. Captains Jon- the survey and, with the click of a mouse, submit it. Technology is athan Byrom and Aaron Parker coauthor, “The First Afghan Nation- great. al Army T-62 Tank Gunnery,” and describe the trials and tribulations Operation Iraqi Freedom introduced the need in our Army and armor they went through in training this new Afghan army unit. forces for dismounted combat tankers. Our armor and cavalry units Not since Vietnam has the U.S. Army been involved in so many large have quickly adapted to the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time combat operations around the world. War is hell and full of unpre- available (METT-T), and have shown once again that tankers and cav- dictable situations, but what differentiates us from many other na- alrymen know how to respond and overcome asymmetrical threats tions is our Army’s professionalism and obeying the law of land war- and nontraditional battlefield operations, and do so effectively. fare. Major Dennis Chapman’s timely article, “Treachery and Its Con- sequences: Civilian Casualties During Operation Iraqi Freedom and In light of our ever-changing environment, leaders at the U.S. Army the Continued Utility of the Law of Land Warfare,” reminds us of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Armor Center, and importance, no matter how treacherous the enemy acts, of following the 1st Armor Training Brigade should be commended for their ef- the rule of law as it pertains to combat operations. Civilian casualties forts in implementing changes after a thorough review of both ba- are unfortunate and sometimes an unpreventable by-product of war. sic combat training and one-station unit training based on lessons We must do our best to mitigate these tragedies and not allow our- learned from ongoing operations and feedback from the field. The selves to be drawn down our enemy’s path. goal is to improve the training in these courses to better prepare new soldiers for joining an “Army at war” by incorporating more field and Task Force1-64 Armor learned many lessons during combat opera- weapons training. This is great news for our units that are preparing tions against Iraqi military and paramilitary Fedayeen forces. On their for duty in Iraq and in line with Chief of Staff Army, General Peter J. return to Fort Stewart, Georgia, 1-64 Armor immediately implement- Schoomaker’s intent that all soldiers are to be proficient in basic sol- ed changes in their training strategy by incorporating lessons learned diering skills. on the battlefield. One of the major lessons that leaders learned was in tank gunnery. In their article, “1-64 Armor’s Rogue Gunnery Train- In his article, “Successful Scout Mounted Infiltration,” Major Kent Strad- ing Program,” Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schwartz, Major Daniel Corm- er addresses the importance of the battalion staff in preparing scouts ier, and Staff Sergeant Bobby Burrell address how 1-64 Armor has for mission and combined-arms infiltration training techniques. His modified tank gunnery to enhance the unit’s preparation against fu- article is an excellent reminder of the importance of staff interaction ture asymmetrical threats. in planning combat operations. That’s all for now. Please continue to support the magazine and the Captain John Nalls’ article, “A Company Commander’s Thoughts on U.S. Armor Association by writing and providing feedback. ARMOR ’s Iraq,” offers his observations on soldiering in Iraq from a company success is completely driven by its readers. Keep up the great work in commander’s perspective. His experiences, along with his profound defending this Nation. – DRM

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0330110 DSN preﬁ x – 464- Points of Contact Commercial preﬁ x– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Ofﬁ ces U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC David R. Manning 4087 MG Terry L. Tucker 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 TBA 7555 E-mail: [email protected] Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Editor COL Robert T. Gahagan 1101 Vivian Oertle 2610 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Art Director CSM George DeSario Jr. 4952 Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) Editorial Assistant CSM Otis Smith 7091 Kathy A. Johnson 2249 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) Joe Hughes 5050 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- E-mail: [email protected] ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, COL Douglas L. Fletcher 7809 WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indicate E-mail: douglas.fl [email protected] wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e- Cavalry and Armor Proponency Offi ce (ATZK-CA) mail or attachments at: COL Timothy R. Reese 1050 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Offi ce, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- Aubrey Henley 5155 dress and daytime phone number. E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for COL Randal Milling 1315 publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only E-mail: [email protected] one Army journal at a time. TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7955 will accept electronic graphic and photo fi les in no less than 300 dpi E-mail: [email protected] format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- COL Timothy D. Cherry 4009 cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- E-mail: [email protected] tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Assistant TRADOC System Manager Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- LTC Craig H. Carson 3519 ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- E-mail: [email protected] es, and delivery problems, or for awards in formation, contact Con- nie Stiggers, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Knox, KY 40121; E-Mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; COL John D. Rosenberger (ATZK-TD) or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their E-mail: [email protected] 8247 website at www.usarmor-assn.org. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com mercial: U.S. Army Armor School (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the offi cial distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief. NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) CSM Phillip D. Finerson 5150 EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, E-mail: phillip.fi [email protected] Bldg 1109A Sixth Avenue, Room 371, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine website COL George Lockwood 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, COL James K. Greer 8736 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — January-February 2004 Hayes and Charlton Commended Altieri Takes Hostile Fire tlefield” (many haven’t checked the height of the Bradley, apparently). Following his logic, Dear ARMOR, Dear ARMOR, however, the majority of infantrymen in recent In the November-December 2003 ARMOR, Major Altieri invited us to fire when ready and actions no more qualify for the CIB than do Captain Brian Hayes, “Simplifying the Heavy I’m sure many have. He points out that infantry tankers. Time away from their vehicles is pri- Brigade/Task Force Operations Order,” identi- and medics don’t have the protection of sever- marily devoted to maintenance, observation fies a true problem in the era of rapid move- al inches of armor — the bad guys don’t fire posts, chow, and local security. This is not to ment of forces on the digital battlefield. He cor- 125mm APDS rounds at grunts, either — that disparage or belittle their heroism, but I ask rectly identifies the growth of the long com- argument is pretty specious. I don’t see where does it really involve more courage to charge plex order being the requirements at the Na- improving the morale of tankers and scouts (run) across a field to assault a position, than tional Training Center. Unfortunately, he does will hurt the morale of infantry — I earned an it does to deliberately move out and draw tank/ not clearly suggest a solution! expert infantry badge during my 5 years in the antitank fire so your buddies can pick off the infantry and wear it with pride — I earned shooter? Is it necessary to put a measure on Let me suggest that subsequent to an initial something during my 15 years in armor and either? situation briefing and terrain appreciation al- would like to wear that with pride as well. (I most all subsequent operations will be done Strictly speaking, following Major Altieri’s log- managed to be in the right place at the right ic, the only infantrymen that qualify for a CIB by a fragmentary order (FRAGO). The require- time, and in 3 years of Regular Army service ment then produces both FRAGOs and situa- would be those assigned as dismounts, in a and 31 years of National Guard, I never heard mechanized unit, or to the 10th, 25th, 82d, or tion reports that can be displayed in the turret a shot fired in anger. But if I had heard one, it of the subordinate leader’s armored vehicle. 101st divisions. More to the point by the origi- probably would be just one, because I was well nal standards, only those soldiers in those units LTC Charlton suggests one solution in his ar- within the circular area of probability and radi- ticle, “Digital Battle Command: Baptism by who spent 30 days or more in actual combat us damage of anything the Group of Soviet (define that please) would qualify. On the other Fire.” He suggests a revamping of the mission Forces, Germany, cared to shoot at the 530th data loader (MDL). The MDL’s modernization hand, how about the cavalry, armor, artillery, and 559th Field Artillery Missile Battalions, and or (yes) even quartermaster soldiers who are could go beyond Charlton’s suggestion. It could if Ivan came over the line, he would have shot include dynamic sequenced overlays that re- patrolling the streets and fields of Iraq?I think I something big at them, since their job was to understand General Shinseki’s logic with the flect the commander’s intent and scheme of shoot something big at him.) maneuver. There should also be the ability to beret; it involves inclusion and appreciation of continually update a synchronization matrix We don’t have colored piping on our over- the total Army. I do not claim to know what based on the flow of the battle. This would pro- seas caps any more, as a matter of fact, I General Marshal’s intent was when the award vide the situational awareness on current sta- guess we don’t have “overseas” (I won’t use was established (reference: Major General tus of enemy and friendly units, in addition to the more common name) caps any more, so I Tait’s letter). Perhaps Lieutenant General Reno anticipated branches and sequels to the basic feel every armed service should have an ex- can enlighten us. But it seems to me that in plan. These branches and sequels then could pert whatever badge similar to the EIB, in the line with General Schoomaker’s “every soldier become the basis of the FRAGOs mentioned branch color, with a representation of the sym- is an infantryman” effort, that, at minimum, sol- before. bol of the branch — good motivation to learn diers who meet all the criteria of the award, ex- and do your job, whatever it may be, to the cept for MOS, be awarded 11B as a second- Both Hayes and Charlton are to be com- best of your ability. And if you come under hos- ary MOS, with service in that MOS for the pe- mended for their efforts and if they were to col- tile fire, a silver wreath should surround the riod of the award and the CIB be granted for laborate on a solution, the Army could have a badge — you don’t have to be Brand X to get that service. Would this “reduce the value of much more user friendly command, control, shot at, ask Jessica Lynch. the award”? I would say that the standards for communications, computers, intelligence, sur- granting it are clearly different today than they veillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system. With all due respect, I’d also like to remind were in 1944 or 1968, but that does not mean Major General Tait that the colors red and today’s infantryman is less deserving. I do not COL BRUCE B.G. CLARKE white are the colors of a cavalry guidon, just think so. So perhaps there is room (and rea- U.S. Army, Retired as dark blue and white are the colors of an in- son) to be more inclusive with the original fantry guidon. Dark blue is not infantry’s color award, rather than create a separate award for — I believe it’s officially “robins’ egg blue” — each branch. 1-35 Armor First to Air Land M1A1s like on an infantry shoulder cord or a CIB or EIB; and red and white are not cavalry’s colors A retired command sergeant major told me Dear ARMOR, — “around her neck, she wore a red-and-white that if you were not Airborne, you were not re- I read with interest Major Maddox’s article, ribbon,” might be hard to write music to. And a ally in the Army. I understand the pride from “Checkmate on the Northern Front,” in the yellow guidon would be just as hard to see which that comes, but can we afford, in this September-October 2003 issue of ARMOR. against the setting sun during a retreat parade modern smaller Army, to continue to foster Although it was an interesting and informative as light blue against a beautiful clear sky. these attitudes, which serve to tear down comrades rather than build each other up. This may piece on the deployment of Task Force 1st Bat- The next order may move to the firing line. talion, 63d Armor, I would like to suggest one be the more important question. MSG CARL A. PAVEL correction. Major Maddox states that this was 1SG TERRY FOLSOM U.S. Army, Retired the first time an M1A1 had air landed in sup- U.S. Army, Retired port of combat operations. I would suggest that 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, stationed in Baum- Dear ARMOR, holder, Germany, has that distinction. Charlie Dear ARMOR, Company, 1-35 Armor, as part Task Force I read Major Jayson Altieri’s letter with inter- I have written on the subject of a combat Hawk, air landed a company of M1A1 tanks est regarding the combat tanker badge in the tanker badge numerous times over the past twice in support of combat operations in the November-December issue. 12 years, with my letters appearing in Army Balkans. Charlie Company left Ramstein Air Times, Stars and Stripes, and ARMOR. Given Force Base and landed in Tirana, Albania. Char- I must admit he made some valid points. my interest in the topic, I was gratified to see lie Company then landed in Skopje, Macedo- Among them that Sergeant Graves could have the historical background of the issue covered nia, and led ground forces into Kosovo as part chosen to enlist in the infantry branch. I will so impeccably by CPT Shawn Monien in his of Task Force 1-6 Infantry. note that the biggest reasons given by my infantry friends as to why they want nothing to article, “Reinstating the Combat Tanker Badge” EDWARD L. COX do with tanks usually involves comments about (ARMOR , September-October 2003). Having CPT, U.S. Army “iron coffins” or the “biggest targets on the bat- said my peace so many times in various fo-

January-February 2004 — 3 rums, I was not inclined to offer further com- of steel,” as well as the “benefit of some type of Army Transformation Done Right ment. I quickly changed my mind however, af- mechanization.” Of course, no one wants to see ter reading through the “Letters” section of the that happen. However, if mere vulnerability were Dear ARMOR, Novem ber-December edition of ARMOR. Three the issue, I’d submit that a tank has more As the Army continues to pursue rapid trans- letters concerning the combat tanker badge weapons systems pointed at it in a fight than formation, the solution is at hand here and appeared in this section and I’d like the oppor- nearly anything else on the battlefield. now. The foundation has long since been laid tunity to address the authors of each one. and the project can be completed almost im- The issue is recognizing participation in di- First, as a tanker who fought during Desert mediately. The solution lies in exploiting our suc- rect-fire, ground combat through a specific uni- cesses in command, control, communications, Shield/Storm, I’d like to express my personal form device. The badge indicates the wearer’s gratitude to retired Major General Thomas H. computers, intelligence, surveillance, and re- personal contribution to that unique form of connaissance (C4ISR) and begins with con- Tait. Sir, your efforts to secure that which mem- armed conflict. A combat patch indicating, “I bers of our branch have rightfully earned and verting heavy divisions and heavy separate was there,” is simply not enough for those at brigades into Armored Cavalry Regiments. long deserved are much appreciated. As a lieu- the tip of the spear. As you so accurately point- tenant writing to ARMOR 12 years ago, I was ed out, each of us had a choice as to what we Regarding a lighter, more deployable and sus- unaware of the campaign you were waging on signed on to do in the Army. Many of us opted tainable force — we’re there! The transformed behalf of the badge. A much belated thank you, for combat arms — those that close with and current force was demonstrated during Oper- sir, for the good fight you fought then and for destroy the enemy. While not detracting from ation Iraqi Freedom. We just haven’t noticed it keeping up the fire now. the considerable contributions of other branch- as we confuse light forces with light vehicles. es toward this end, their efforts are conducted Retired SGM Healy, with respect, I hope that Since the early 1980s, armored family of ve- in support of combat operations; the essence your prediction concerning awarding the badge hicles (AFV), heavy force modernization (HFM), of what we do in this profession is defined by proves incorrect. I have always contended that and armored systems modernization (ASM) combat arms. If we see fit to recognize one awarding the badge should be retroactive. The were all simplistic modernization approaches branch that engages the enemy on the ground badge is an outward symbol of the direct-fire of one-for-one swaps with lighter equivalent with direct fire, we need to recognize all branch- contribution that our branch makes to every systems. Their focus on commonality, while es that have this as their primary battlefield hostile engagement the Army fights as a com- trading off capabilities (limited by technologies), role. bined arms team. That contribution began 85 guaranteed unaffordable failures. years ago on 12 September 1918, when the As a final note MAJ Altieri, I question the mo- first American tanks took to the field of battle Those dead-end efforts and even the still-on- tivation of anyone who would deny recognition going Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at St. Mihiel, France, and has been maintained of achievement to those who have rightfully by tankers and cavalrymen since. have been overcome by events. War came and, earned it. This is particularly curious when it like a decade ago, we deployed the heavy divi- In the paragraph above, I used the words comes from an individual who is not a member sions. Only this time, the Current Force ex- “rightfully earned and long deserved” with a of either of the branches immediately affected ploited its advanced C4ISR to confidently de- particular intent. The recognition due to the sol- by this issue. Allow me to be a bit more mag- ploy a dramatically smaller force. Instead of diers of the Armored Force has no “shelf life,” nanimous than others have been: I gladly sup- deploying corps, our heavy divisions sufficed. nor should an artificial one be contrived and port branch-specific combat badges for each Situational understanding and precision ma- instituted. Consider for a moment the American of the combat arms — armor, infantry, field ar- neuver achieved efficiency. The Army needs to tanker who faced Tigers in his hopelessly out- tillery, air defense artillery, aviation, engineers, quit lamenting the logistics cost of sustaining gunned M4 during the Normandy breakout. and Special Forces. The contributions ren- the most lethal, survivable, and maneuverable How about the Korean War tanker who pushed dered on the battlefield by the soldiers of these force on the planet just because the vehicles his M26 to the banks of the Yalu with scores of branches deserve special recognition. are heavy — they are “war winners.” Red Chinese in front of it? What about the M48 Regarding organizational changes — let’s do tanker or the ACAV crewman who escorted con- RONALD J. BASHISTA it! The Army has spent decades evolving into voys along Highway 1 in Vietnam while nurs- MAJ, U.S. Army Division ’86, Army of Excellence (AOE), Force ing a transmission weak from “jungle busting” XXI, Mobile Strike Force, Conservative Heavy in pursuit of an elusive foe? Can anyone hon- More Badge Comments Division, Army After Next (AAN), and so on. estly say that their contributions are less wor- Although combat capability obviously improved thy of recognition because time has elapsed?! Dear ARMOR, through new equipment, the organizational These individuals built the reputation the Ar- changes were little more than shuffling around mored Force enjoys today and are as equally Perhaps I can shed a bit of light on the dispa- subunits. Aside from new equipment (especial- entitled to the badge as the contemporary tank- rate nature of expert and combat badges. One ly aviation), today’s heavy division looks much er and scout, if not more so. On reinstating the of the key reasons why there are so many in- like its WWII ancestor. Even the yet-evolving fu- combat tanker badge, every effort should be fantry-type badges, and virtually none for any- ture combat system (FCS) units of action/units made to ensure our comrades from previous one else, has its roots in World War II. Late of employment (UA/UE) are simply convention- conflicts receive what they have earned. in the war, General George C. Marshall be- moaned the fact that few men wished to join al brigades, divisions and corps, only under MAJ Altieri, your comments indicate that you the ranks of his beloved infantry. Quite frankly, new names. What is constantly being sought do not truly understand the issue at hand. In I find this humorous to a degree, since as the but never resolved is creating a smaller (bri- regards to CPT Monien’s article, your com- Army Chief of Staff, one would think he could gade-sized) unit with robust combat power and ments strike me as non-sequitur and I’d en- have ensured that sufficient manpower was extreme flexibility. courage you to reread his article. This is not a steered to the infantry. Instead, the way to bring For once, let’s try something that we know question of who faces the greatest danger incentive to the PBI (poor, bloody infantry) was can work; something that we already have. The with the least amount of protection. Were this to give them a series of distinctive badges to Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) is the most the case, we’d be well advised to supplement enhance their status. Only over the years have flexible and potent combat organization we the CIB with an award for those who opt to go other branches been grudgingly granted a few have. It is structured for independent opera- into battle wearing nothing more than a pair of badges of their own. As serious competitors to tions over a large area, yet can concentrate boxer shorts and carrying a slingshot. If “pro- the PBI, armor and armored cavalry soldiers tremendous combat power. It is far leaner and tection” or, more precisely, the lack thereof, was have been neglected. Until the U.S. Army has yet more lethal than any comparably sized bri- the all-important criterion, then by your own a Chief of Staff with an extensive armor back- gade. logic, the mechanized infantryman who fought ground, this will not change. from a Bradley should be stripped of his CIB. The ACR has three cavalry squadrons, an After all, he had the “benefit of several inches ANONYMOUS aviation squadron, and a support squadron,

4 — January-February 2004 along with regimental chemical, engineer, air two air recon troops and an aviation service cial armor package and side skirts to create a defense artillery, and military intelligence com- troop. I suggest that they remain until the divi- tank with a weight of 50 tons or less. Equip panies. sion cavalry is assigned to a regiment, at which three battalions with the light M1 — the 82d time the aviation assets will either join the new Airborne, 101st Air Mobile, and XVIII Corps. Each cavalry squadron has 3 cavalry troops regiment’s aviation squadron or revert to the This provides the U.S. Army a tank with no (9 tanks and 13 cavalry fighting vehicles), a parent division’s aviation brigade. capital expenditure, no new training for tank tank company (14 tanks), and a field artillery crewmen, no new maintenance training, all battery (6 155mm SP). This is the equivalent Adding an infantry (mounted rifle) platoon (4 parts in the inventory, larger amount of on- of a full tank battalion, a full infantry fighting IFVs) to each cavalry troop may be desirable. board main gun ammo, more types of main vehicle (IFV) battalion, and a field artillery bat- The total increase to the regiment is 9 pla- gun rounds, and two of these light tanks can tery. toons of 36 IFVs and about 320 soldiers. be carried in a C5. The empty special armor Accordingly, even though it has less than As units convert to ACR structure, brigade re- pockets can be used for additional storage, or 5,000 soldiers, the ACR has the equivalent of con troops (BRT) of heavy divisions and scout armor packages can be shipped separately for three tank battalions, three IFV battalions, a platoons of tank and mechanized battalions field installation. The light M1 will have lower field artillery battalion, and an aviation battal- become redundant and are a ready pool of sur vivability, less firepower than the 120mm, ion. Except for the limited artillery, this is twice trained cavalrymen. and cannot be air dropped. The one training is- the combat power of a divisional brigade and sue will be crews having less protection against is as large as a World War II armor division! At some point, sooner rather than later, we direct fire attack. Deploying two ACRs together would provide must also consider (again) a light ACR and about the same combat power as an entire squadrons (with emphasis on “A” for “armored”). CHRIS SCHNEIDER heavy division while staying below 10,000 sol- This is easiest of all, since the 2d ACR (Light) U.S. Army, Retired diers. is undergoing conversion plans right now. Just do it. Throw out the never-ending, ever-expand- The best part is that we know exactly what ing draft operational and organizational con- Corrections an ACR is. We have the doctrine, organization, cept and simply use existing doctrine and struc- training, materiel, leader development, person- ture, but substitute light vehicles. Where the In its November-December issue, ARMOR nel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) already in place. ACR has Abrams tanks, substitute Bradleys printed the Army National Guard Unit List on We know what sort of corps augmentation is now as a “page-holder” until a light tank or ar- page 46. While compiling the unit lists, one needed for tailored and sustained operations. mored gun system is available. Where the ACR unit was inadvertently overlooked. We apolo- The modular common structure of the various has Bradleys, insert armored personnel carri- gize for the oversight and thank Lieutenant platoons, troops, and companies allow for rap- ers or Strykers until a future recon scout vehi- Colonel Walter Lord for bringing this to our at- id conversion from existing tank and mecha- cle is available. The remaining regimental and tention. nized battalions and separate companies. Lead- squadron units remain identical. DONE! The unit, 2d Squadron, 104th Cavalry (RSTA), er development at squadron level and above serves as the recon, surveillance, and target Really — it’s that simple! Pump the bellows needs to be intensive, but so what else is new? acquisition squadron for 56th Brigade, 28th In- and get the fire hot! Forge that transformed In fact, isn’t that the way it should be? fantry Division, and is the Guard’s only Stryker thunderbolt! As an initial step, we should modify existing Brigade Combat Team. They are actively seek- divisional cavalry squadrons to mirror the or- LTC CHESTER A. KOJRO ing qualified soldiers to join their ranks. The ganization of regimental squadrons. Adding a U.S. Army, Retired unit is a member of the Pennsylvania Army tank company and a field artillery battery is an National Guard, located at 2601 River Road, easy first step and leads to doctrinal and orga- Reading, PA 19605; telephone (610) 929-8130; nizational commonality. As the conversion of The Light M1 for Light Divisions fax (601) 378-4515. Serving as commander is Lieutenant Colonel W. Lord and serving as divisions begins, cavalry squadrons can be- Dear ARMOR, come the cadre or, if needed, elements of the command sergeant major is CSM R. Heller. initial deploying cavalry regiment. A light M1 is not a perfect solution, but such Also, 2-194 Armor, Minnesota Army National a vehicle can be in units in less than 60 days: Of course, there will be numerous “adjust- Guard was incorrectly listed as 2-94 AR. We ments” to be considered. Unlike a regimental Take the first production series 105mm-armed apologize for the error. squadron, the division cavalry squadron has M1 tank (shorter turret) and remove the spe- Author Seeks Consultants on Tank Warfare in North Korea Dear ARMOR, 75 Years Ago: I have just been commissioned by Berkley books to write a series of novels about near- future tank warfare in North Korea. I am seek- Experiments on Motor Transport for Horses ing as much information as I can about the The continuation by the War Department of experiments in transportation of horses units operating in the region (such as First Tank by motor has resulted in the issuance of instructions to the Quartermaster General to — I’ve visited their web page). Also, I would conduct tests on the carrying of six horses in a truck. These experiments are to be dif- like to engage in some e-mail contact with real ferent from the ones conducted so far in that the horses are to stand facing for and aft veterans who can lend their insights to make and three abreast, to facilitate loading to maintain better balance against the sway in- my books much more believable. If you are cident to movement. Heretofore as many as six horses have been loaded in a truck but interested and have time to answer a few ques- they have been faced alternately to the sides of the truck. The ordinary Army trucks tions via e-mail, I would be happy to thank you now in use are believed to be of too short a wheel base to permit transportation of in the novels and give you free, signed copies more than three horses facing to the front or rear. If Army trucks of sufficient wheel for bragging rights with your buddies and base and body length are not available, the Quartermaster General will consider the spouses. I wish I could do more, but my name use of a commercial vehicle specially designed for this purpose. is Peter Telep, not Tom Clancy. Contact me at [email protected]. — The Cavalry Journal, January 1929 PETER TELEP Department of English University of Central Florida

January-February 2004 — 5 ARMOR Magazine Survey

The purpose of this survey is to improve the quality of ARMOR Magazine, produced at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The data you provide will allow us to shape the future of the magazine.

1. How do you usually get a copy of ARMOR Magazine? 4. How often have you used ARMOR as a source document in preparing briefings, reports, policy papers, and information papers? ! Have a subscription ! Borrow a friend’s personal copy ! Never/Not applicable to me ! Read it at the library ! Rarely ! Read the unit’s copy ! Sometimes ! Rarely see a copy ! Frequently

2. Overall, how satisfied are you with ARMOR Magazine? 5. How often do you read the following standard features? ! Very Dissatisfied ! Dissatisfied Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always ! Neutral ! Satisfied Commander’s Hatch !! ! !! ! Very Satisfied Driver’s Seat !! ! !! Once More Unto 3. If you were going to decide the content of ARMOR, would you give less, !! ! !! more or about the same emphasis to the following kinds of articles? the Breach Letters to the Editor !! ! !! Less Same More Book Reviews !! ! !! Platoon-Level Tactics !!!

Company-Level Tactics !!! 6. Rate your level of agreement with the following statements. Large-Unit Tactics !!!

Historical Analysis !!! Agree Agree Neutral Strongly Strongly

Research and Development !!! Disagree Disagree

Training !!! Articles and information meet my !!!!! professional needs. Gunnery !!! Articles are relevant and valuable. !!!!! Maintenance !!! Articles are normally easy to read. !!!!! NTC/CMTC Lessons Learned !!! The graphics enhance the articles. !!!!! Communications !!! The graphics are clear and !!!!! Logistics !!! understandable. The artwork enhances the articles. !!!!! Professional Development !!! The photos enhance the articles. !!!!! Leadership !!!

Personnel Management !!! 7. Which one best describes you? Book Reviews !!! ! Active Duty Officer ! National Guard ! DOD Civilian Regimental System !!! ! Active Duty NCO ! Army Reserve ! Contractor ! Active Duty Enlisted ! Military Family ! Other Weapons Analysis !!! ! Retired Military Member

8. How can ARMOR Magazine be improved? Return completed surveys to: USAARMC & Fort Knox ATTN: ATZK-TAQ (Survey Office) 1109B 6th Avenue, Room 370 Fort Knox, KY 40121

The survey deadline is 3 February 2004. If possible, please take the survey online at: www.knox.army.mil/survey/armormagazinesurvey If you would like to discuss particular concerns about ARMOR, please e-mail us at: [email protected] Survey questions can be directed to (502) 624-3850. Major General Terry L. Tucker Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor and Cavalry NCOs Leading the Army

As we enter another year, it is important career path, provide relevant guidance for to realize that change is as much about selection boards, and create opportuni- looking forward as it is about reflecting ties for tankers and troopers such as the and reminiscing. These are extraordinary Excellence In Armor program. Command times for our Soldiers, who stand in harm’s Sergeant Major John Stephens, the lon- way, protecting our rights and the rights gest serving CSM, held the post from ties as commandant of the U.S. Army of others. As a Nation and an Army, we August 1983 until September 1990 and Sergeants Major Academy. have much to be proud of. Over the past served with Major Generals Brown, Tait, Other “Top Soldiers” who served at the 2 years, we have proven that this Nation and Foley. My wingman is CSM George Armor Center and Fort Knox have also and its forces are up to any task. DeSario, Jr., and I am proud to serve with moved on to greater responsibilities in Throughout our Nation’s history, scouts him. As the Chief of Armor and Regi- other commands. CSM David Lady most and tankers have put it all on the line, and mental CSM, we count on each other, as recently served as the CSM for USAREUR courageously stood shoulder to shoulder we march in the footsteps of former lead- and 7th Army and is now the CSM for to defend any and all threats. Warriors, ership teams like Lynch and Price, Funk the Space and Missile Defense Command. such as Old Bill and The Tanker, conjure and Ross, and Bell and Christian. CSM Carl Christian is the CSM for U.S. up images of Cavalry and Armor Non- Fort Knox has a distinguished honor roll Army FORSCOM, and CSM Joe Gainey commissioned Officers — images that of other tankers and cavalrymen who left Fort Knox for duty as the CSM for are forever burned in our minds through served here during their careers, includ- III Corps and Fort Hood. Clearly, the po- pictures and sculptures displayed in hall- ing as unit Command Sergeants Major. sition of command sergeant major in ar- ways, offices, orderly rooms, and head- Sergeant Major of the Army Jack Tilley mor and cavalry demands the best, which quarters for decades. They epitomize what served as the Basic Noncommissioned Of- is evident by the selection of these sol- is expected from tankers and troopers. ficer Course Division Chief for the NCO diers for other demanding positions around the world. The history of Fort Knox is full of sto- Academy (NCOA), and later as CSM for ries of great Armor and Cavalry NCOs — the 194th Separate Armored Brigade. Ser- The cover of ARMOR shows dismount- men who have left an indelible mark on geant Major of the Army designee Ken- ed combat tankers. Here at Fort Knox, the Mounted Force and the Army. They neth Preston is currently the V Corps we acknowledge the requirements of the have led and trained cavalrymen and tank- CSM and once served as an instructor in force and are adjusting training to prepare ers since the early days. the Abrams Master Gunner course at Fort Soldiers for new combat scenarios, while Knox. CSM John Beck, another great continuing to balance training for more Since 1958, when Congress authorized leader, served at Fort Knox as the NCOA traditional 19K and 19D skills. As al- the rank of sergeant major, and in 1967, commandant, and recently retired from ways, our NCOs, led by the Armor Force when the Chief of Staff of the Army cre- his position as TRADOC CSM. CSM Jim Senior Trainer, CSM DeSario, are at the ated the Command Sergeants Major pro- Dale served as NCOA commandant, most heart of this training. gram, 19 soldiers have held the title of recently as CSM for the U.S. Army Ca- Sergeant Major or Command Sergeant det Command, and will soon assume du- FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT! Major (CSM) of the Armor Center and Fort Knox. Each one of these leaders made immeasurable contributions to training, readiness, force development, and building the best NCO Corps in any Army, any- The 2004 Armor Conference was originally scheduled for the where. week of 24 May 2004. Due to a scheduling conflict, the Conference Command Sergeants Major, such as Orr, will be held during the week of 17 May 2004. I guarantee it will be Belcher, Gillis, Fryer, and Davis worked yet another spectacular event! I will address the Conference’s hard to build the NCO education system, agendas and highlights in the March-April 2004 issue of ARMOR. define the Career Management Field 19

January-February 2004 — 7 CSM George DeSario Jr. Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Combat Vehicle Crewman Uniform Safety In Armor Vehicles Prevents Burns

As the U.S. Army Armor Center’s com- vital information to address this very These natural fibers won’t melt under mand sergeant major, it is great to visit concern — mixing the NOMEX CVC the heat and will provide protection that units across the globe, watch them train, uniform with synthetic underwear is an will keep the heat away from your body and share my own firsthand training ex- invitation for pain! in a flash fire. periences. I recently had the honor of visiting with the 3d Infantry Division at Armor soldiers in the field need to be Lastly, keep your NOMEX CVC uni- Fort Stewart, Georgia. I would like to made aware that a safety hazard exists form clean. Oil, grease, or household thank the soldiers and the command of if this type of synthetic underwear is starch will cause the NOMEX fabric to the 3ID for their gracious hospitality. worn under their NOMEX CVC uni- burn. Dry cleaning or laundering to re- Command Sergeant Major Kellman, your form in the event of a fire. This includes move these contaminates will restore the Armor/Cavalry troopers are magnificent. the new moisture wicking tee shirt the NOMEX’s fire retardant state. Don’t be Also, I extend a warm thanks to Com- Army is in the process of fielding. Ny- the soldier who survives a vehicle fire mand Sergeant Major Barnello and First lon and synthetics, such as polyester only to find yourself with melted poly- Sergeant Stephenson: your gunnery pro- and polypropylene, melt at about 480- pro stuck to your skin. Worn properly, gram is right on. Rock of the Marne! degrees and 300-degrees Fahrenheit, re- the CVC uniform will protect you from spectively. Heat transfer through the NO- burns, should the unexpected happen in On a trip to Alaska, I had the privilege MEX (which is resistant to tempera- your combat vehicle. So make sure you of meeting the troopers of our newest tures up to 700-degrees Fahrenheit) could are wearing underwear made of 50-per- unit, the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Reg- be high enough to melt these synthetic cent cotton/50-percent wool or 100-per- iment (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tar- undergarments. I’ll use a quote that Chief cent cotton under your NOMEX CVC get, and Acquisition), 172d Infantry Bri- Warrant Officer Boyd Tacket III made uniform. If you have any additional ques- gade at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. It was in Flight FAX regarding an experience tions on this subject or other CVC cloth- a pleasure to see such dedication in such he had when his aircraft caught fire: “My ing and individual equipment, please a young outfit. Command Sergeant Ma- chest, back, and buttocks were spared contact the Assistant TRADOC System jor Dunham, I extend my admiration to from any burns at all due to the cotton Manager-Soldier at Fort Knox, Lieu- your first sergeants for a job extremely underwear that I had on. The burn liter- tenant Colonel Craig Carson, DSN 464- well done. ally went to where the underwear was 3519, or Mr. Larry T. Hasty, DSN 464- and stopped. If I hadn’t been wearing 3662, commercial (502) 624-3519/3662, Around this time each year, we ad- my NOMEX protective equipment and or e-mail [email protected] dress the safety issue of combat vehicle wearing it properly, there is no doubt in and [email protected]. crewmen (CVC) wearing underwear my mind that I would very probably made with synthetic fibers, like poly- have either died in the fire or died as Thanks to Mr. Hasty for his dedication propylene or polyester, under NOMEX a result of the burns I would have re- to our Armor troopers; and thanks to all CVC uniforms. The good folks at As- ceived.” For your protection, wear un- our troopers and leaders. sistant TRADOC System Manager-Sol- derwear made of 50-percent cotton/ dier, here at Fort Knox, have provided 50-percent wool or 100-percent cotton. IRON DISCIPLINE!

8 — January-February 2004 Task Force Death Dealers: Dismounted Combat Tankers

by Captain Donald Stewart, Captain Brian McCarthy, and Captain James Mullin

Iraq remains a combat zone and the enemy’s tactics continue ticle addresses terrain, civilians, enemy threat and weapons, and to evolve toward a form of guerrilla warfare, and the Army con- friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and encour- tinues to tailor its operations to deal with the threat. Terrain, en- ages follow-on forces to form training plans at home station pri- emy, civilians, and mission — these competing factors have or to deploying. The Death Dealers are doing nothing revolu- forced the Death Dealers of Task Force 1st Battalion, 67th Ar- tionary in Southwest Asia, but these issues do warrant the atten- mor Regiment (TF 1-67) to adopt an outside-the-box mentality tion of the force so that follow-on forces can train to prepare for instead of employing a traditional armor role during Operation Iraq’s COE. Iraqi Freedom. The old tanker cliché of “death before dismount” has officially The Terrain gone by the wayside and has led to the unimaginable dismount- A country the size of California, Iraq has several distinctly dif- ed armor crewmen. The current contemporary operating envi- ferent environments. Central Iraq, the 4th ID’s area of opera- ronment (COE) in Iraq calls for tankers to dismount. However, tions, is definitely not a desert environment. There is a fair share a large number of tankers continue to ride steel on most missions, of sand and open terrain in the area, but central Iraq is primarily and tanks remain a critical element in the COE. in the Tigris River valley. The 3d Infantry Division’s (ID) charge into Baghdad reaffirms Besides palm groves and farmland, the Tigris, Euphrates, and the Abrams’ speed and lethality on the battlefield. Continuing Diyala Rivers further divide the country. Additional obstacles this trend, the 4th ID employs tanks daily and continues to en- include large concrete canals, some as wide as 6 meters and as gage the enemy with its M1A2SEP. Firepower and accuracy, deep as 4 meters. Additionally, farmers have cut numerous ca- psychological effect, speed, and survivability — the tank brings nals and irrigation ditches throughout the land, few of which are all of these to the fight. represented on maps; on imagery it is impossible to tell the ex- When thrust into an urban environment, tanks can act as mo- tent of the irrigation. Cross-country travel, although possible in bile roadblocks or control crowds with engine exhaust. This ar- the area, is limited by both the thick palms and irrigation canals.

January-February 2004 — 9 “New lieutenants and staff sergeants are oftentimes senior leaders on the ground and must know how to react to any situation. At home station, tactical vignettes can be used to rehearse actions on contact so that these section leaders, tank commanders, gunners, loaders, and drivers know what to expect and have an idea of how to react.”

ers and anticoalition personnel with large weapons caches use any means to hide weapons, to include hiding them in Mosques and cemeteries. Dismounted units carry AN/PSS-11 mine detector sets to search for bur- We conduct many operations in urban areas, which presents an ied weapons and contraband. The mine detectors work well additional set of issues. In many cities, the infrastructure has when adjusted properly — we have found weapons buried up to crumbled from more than a decade of neglect. The streets are 2-feet deep. narrow, many with a web of low-hanging power lines and ca- To better protect our soldiers and combat complacency, espe- nals that impede vehicle movement. Additionally, most families cially at fixed sites, we rotate troops often. Each company has an have adobe walls ranging in height from 1-to-3 meters surround- area of responsibility, so soldiers become familiar with the area ing their homes. and its people, and can spot when something has changed or Task Force 1-67 has found it necessary to confirm routes into does not seem right. We have also installed Kevlar doors on all and out of an area, and when at all possible, conduct a recon- M998s to offer increased protection against small arms and naissance of all routes. Additionally, we found that in built-up thrown objects. areas, the military grid reference system (MGRS) gives way to Enemy a terrain index-reference system (TIRS) and an urban reference system. Our brigade combat team (BCT) has a consolidated The enemy continues to refine their tactics. One of those for- TIRS overlay. When planning missions, the task force uses Fal- eign to the Death Dealers before deployment was using impro- con view and ArcView satellite imagery and tactical unmanned vised explosive devices (IED). There is a plethora of ordnance aerial vehicle shots, on which we then number all of the build- throughout the country, giving prospective bomb makers a great ings within the target area of operations to give ground and air deal of ammunition. We have encountered IEDs that have been elements a common, more precise set of graphic control mea- rigged in soda cans attached to telephone poles; 1.5-liter water sures. bottles left on the road; explosives stuffed in the carcasses of dead animals; and 155mm artillery shells, daisy-chained together and Civilians placed along the shoulder of routes used mainly by coalition forces. Iraqis tell us regularly, and it is probably true, that 90 percent of the Iraqi people want us here and appreciate what we are do- Vehicle commanders and drivers need to be observant of ob- ing. The other 10 percent becomes the problem when trying to jects and loose soil in and around the roadway. Also, look for maintain stability among an entire population. Force protection berms and structures 20 to 30 meters away from your location must always be the primary focus. The Iraqi people, especially that can provide cover and concealment from which to com- the children, are very friendly and courteous. They have had lit- mand detonate devices. Once we identify an IED, we establish tle to no exposure to the outside world for more than 30 years a cordon 300 meters away from the device and secure the area. and are eager to learn about Americans and want to engage sol- The tactical operations center will then contact the explosive diers in conversation. Generosity and gift giving are cornerstones ordnance disposal (EOD) and they will assess the situation. of their culture, and because of this, it is difficult not to become Additionally, avoid setting a routine. The enemy continually complacent. collects intelligence, knows soft points, and is acutely aware of Everyone has a weapon. When the Hussein regime fell, sol- times, routes, and composition of logistical convoys. Unlike con- diers simply left their posts and ran home, many with as much ventional operations and experiences at combat training centers armament as they could carry. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), where it is important to establish a battle rhythm, in Iraq we assault rifles, and mortars are the weapons of choice. Most citi- found that unpredictability is essential to force protection. We zens were merely looking for self-defense against the ever-pres- have also conducted offensive operations against our resident ent Ali Babba; but the more nefarious purchased and stockpiled bombers. Using pattern and terrain analysis techniques, the task weapons for anticoalition activities. They have them in their force S2 identified areas where IEDs were prevalent or likely. homes and cars, and buried in yards and gardens. The arms deal- We used two tanks to establish observation posts and await am-

10 — January-February 2004 bush opportunities. From a distance of over one kilometer, the Since validation in country, our dismounted tankers perform a section engaged and observed several individuals drive up to myriad of tasks. They conduct foot patrols throughout their the target area, dig holes in the roadway, lay wires, and began AORs, stand sentry in watchtowers, and execute raids, includ- removing artillery shells from the bed of their truck. ing air inserting onto objectives. In preparation for deployment in the COE, units must cross-train soldiers on basic infantry Rocket-Propelled Grenades tasks. When possible, get the infantry involved. They are the subject-matter experts, and having infantry involved in training RPGs are simple and inexpensive enemy weapons. The enemy your tankers fosters mutual team spirit and confidence. At a uses them to snipe at convoys in an effort to execute an ambush. minimum, train basic patrolling and focus on built-up areas and The RPG attacker prefers a concealed position from which he actions on contact. If possible, incorporate an expert and train can see vehicles approaching along the route. Typically, they room-clearing techniques. shoot at night with either no sight or a crude sight, and likewise, are not very accurate. Air insertion has been key to gaining surprise and quickly se- curing an objective. As 19Ks are generally not familiar with As with IEDs, leaders must look at locations conducive for fir- Army aircraft, units need to familiarize them with both UH-60s ing RPGs. It is imperative that crews maintain individual sec- and CH-47s. Schedule static load training at home station regu- tors and sections maintain sectors. Scanning discipline is key be- larly to train and familiarize crews. Training before you arrive cause the launch flash of an RPG only lasts about a second, and puts you ahead of the power curve. soldiers must act quickly to capture or destroy the enemy before he flees the scene. Equipment

Friendly TTP Increased dismounted operations have necessitated redistribu- tion of equipment. As tank companies traditionally do not train Due to the nature of current combat operations in Iraq, our pri- to operate dismounted, they are likewise not equipped to oper- mary mounted maneuver unit is the section. Tank sections con- ate dismounted. For instance, we have to cross level M16/M4s duct mounted patrols, and therefore, conduct actions on contact within companies to fully equip two squads. Cross leveling as a section. New lieutenants and staff sergeants are oftentimes across the task force allows us to operate like this regularly. senior leaders on the ground and must know how to react to any Lack of night vision devices is the biggest shortfall. Addition- situation. At home station, tactical vignettes can be used to really, more wheeled assets, squad radios, such as integrated com- hearse actions on contact so that these section leaders, tank communications and laser-designating devices, would help conduct manders, gunners, loaders, and drivers know what to expect and dismounted operations more safely and efficiently. have an idea of how to react. As in any situation, we continue to Operational readiness has been difficult to sustain. High oper- refine and rehearse our actions and TTP. As previously men- ational tempo coupled with extreme temperatures has reduced tioned, leaders must know and rehearse individual and section mean time failure on many assemblies. Road wheel arms and sectors of fire. engine exhaust seals have been the two biggest problems. The Dismount! Task Force 1-67 is a tank-heavy Force XXI task force with two pure M1A2SEP tank companies, an M2A3-equipped mechanized infantry company, a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), and a forward support company (FSC). While an awesome organization designed for high-intensity combat, it is not the optimal task organization for our current battlefield in northeastern Iraq. After 3 months of dismounted patrols and raids, our infantry brothers, scouts, and mortars were working non- stop, and to be perfectly honest, the 19Ks were tired of hearing the words “traffic control point.” In an effort to maximize combat power and maintain flexibility, the task force instituted a dismounted training plan. Initially, the plan was to train tankers on the basics of dismounted security and patrolling so they could conduct dismounted patrols in the tank company’s area of responsibility (AOR), and facilitate interaction with the Iraqi people. However, after a couple of dismounted armored “Initially, the plan was to train tankers on the basics of dismounted security and patrolling so they could conduct dismounted patrols in the tank company’s area of responsibility crews were trained, we realized it offered great- (AOR), and facilitate interaction with the Iraqi people. However, after a couple of dismount- er flexibility to the task force in the form of in- ed armored crews were trained, we realized it offered greater flexibility to the task force in creased capability — more boots on the ground the form of increased capability — more boots on the ground — across the full spectrum — across the full spectrum of operations. of operations.”

January-February 2004 — 11 “In preparation for deployment in the COE, units must cross-train soldiers on basic infantry tasks. When possible, get the infantry involved. They are the subject-matter experts, and having infantry involved in training your tankers fosters mutual team spirit and confidence. At a minimum, train basic patrolling and focus on built-up areas and actions on contact. If possible, incorporate an expert and train room-clearing techniques.”

ple, in the Arab culture a man is forbidden to touch a woman unless they are married. To maintain cultural sensitivity and facilitate cooperation between Iraqis and Co- alition Forces, our task force created female search teams. The task force deploys a team of female soldiers from the FSC on supply system took a while to catch up with both the distances every raid and to every deliberate checkpoint. These soldiers and the demand, but is now consistent, if not swift. Be flexible underwent training from the military police and linguists regard- in your task organization; you cannot use it if it is broken. We ing personnel searches and cultural awareness. regularly used tanks with broken number two arms on perime- Although focused for a high-intensity conflict, Iraq has shown ter guard —they could fight but could not roll outside the gate. that our TTPs have to adjust to the changing environment. Flex- Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) — ibility is the key. We are not breaking any new ground, merely the backbone of Force XXI — has worked very well. It gives us raking over it. Tanks continue to provide overwhelming fire- an amazing advantage over the enemy. The ability to pull up power, protection, and shock effect to any fight. However, to be imagery, quickly analyze a route (to include march time based successful in the COE, we must remain flexible and continue to on the route speed), the ability to navigate along that route, and evolve in our tactics, training, task organization, and equipment. the situational awareness to see all of your units vectoring in on Missions require only the services of highly trained, motivated the target is amazing. It is a beautiful sight to watch the FBCB2 soldiers, like the dismounted armor crewmen of TF 1-67 Armor. screen and see all of your units closing on the objective from multiple directions, on time, as planned, all while keeping radio chatter to a minimum. CPT Donald Stewart is currently en route to his new duty station at the Vehicle commanders can post enemy icons to orient friendly Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. He received a units. Additionally, FBCB2 has allowed us to operate over ex- B.A. from Bellarmine College in Louisville, KY. His military education intended distances because it retransmits through any system, not cludes Armor Officer Basic Course, the Armor Captains Career Course, just those operating on our net identification. If we get out of and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in voice communication range, we can usually send a text mes- various command and staff positions, including commander, B Com- sage (e-mail) situation report or spot report. Like any electronic pany, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment (1-67 AR), 4th Infantry Divi- system, it does not fare well in extreme heat, and repair parts sion (Mechanized), Iraq and Fort Hood, TX; assistant S3, 1-67 AR, Iraq have been slow to arrive, but it definitely has given us a marked and Fort Hood; executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Com- pany, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (M), Schweinfurt, Germany; exec- advantage. utive officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (1-77), 1st Infantry Division (M), Kosovo and Schweinfurt; platoon leader, C Com- Civil Affairs pany, 1-77 AR, 1st Infantry Division (M), Kosovo and Schweinfurt; and Prepare your company fire support officer (FSO) to be your assistant S4, 1-77 AR, 1st Infantry Division (M), Schweinfurt. civil affairs/information officer. As a company commander, I CPT Brian McCarthy is currently serving as an assistant S3 with Task was responsible for a town of about 10,000 people, including Force 1-67 AR, 4th Infantry Division (M), in Iraq. A graduate of the Vir- the function of the town. The executive officer was the security ginia Military Institute, he received his commission through officer candi- officer, and platoon leaders served as minister of public works date school. His various duty assignments include executive officer and (water and electricity), minister of oil (gas and propane), and scout platoon leader, E Troop, 9th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division (M), Fort minister of education. The FSO tracked the progress and kept a Stewart, GA; and scout platoon leader, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp database of people and locations within the town. The task force Garry Owen, Korea. set up city councils in each of the larger towns within the area CPT James Mullin is currently serving as commander, B Troop, 1-67 AR, of operations so that with our help, they could get the city func- 4th Infantry Division (M), in Iraq. He received a B.S. from the United tioning until the government was running. Our focus was to help States Military Academy. He has served in various positions, including in whatever way we could to get the city functioning. S3 Air, 1-67 AR, Fort Hood, TX and Iraq; executive officer, C Company, 1-77 AR, 1st Infantry Division (M), Schweinfurt, Germany; platoon lead- It is also necessary to include cultural awareness training in er, C Company, 1-77 AR, 1st Infantry Division (M), Kosovo and Schwein- your home station training plan. Many Arab conventions are furt, Germany; and assistant S3 (LNO), 1-77 AR, 1st Infantry Division (M), quite different from ours, especially regarding women. For exam- Kosovo and Schweinfurt, Germany.

12 — January-February 2004 A Company Commander’s Thoughts on Iraq by Captain John B. Nalls ments by your blackout lights. They have plenty of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) to launch. Do not be a target. Expect This article shares some of my experiences in Iraq that will help mounted patrols from a mismatch of different HMMWVs. The prepare commanders and platoon leaders on what to expect and parade-ground, pretty-boy type will really hate what we are do- how to better prepare soldiers for the tasks ahead. These tasks ing to trucks in Iraq, as they look like something out of a Mad are not covered by a supplement or manual, and are not a joy to Max movie. But nothing is worth the price of losing a soldier, if learn in midst of a firefight. I know there are more than a hun- we know we can prevent it. dred correct responses to every issue. These opinions are based Prepare your HMMWVs at home station. Most of us have re- on my experiences as a tank and headquarters company com- moved the doors from our trucks to increase our fields of fire mander in an armor battalion preparing for and executing com- when returning fire. Canvas doors offer no protection and only bat operations in a stability and support environment. serve to reduce your fields of fire while on the move. Order Kevlar blankets and purchase infrared lights and mount them on Before Deployment trucks. Sandbag everything. Either fabricate or order mounts for Equip all of your soldiers, even the diehard “death before dis- crew served weapons for every HMMWV, take them to a range mount” tanker noncommissioned officers, with either M4s or and have them fire stationary and on the move, both during day- M16s. Also, the headquarters and headquarters company com- light and darkness. Have the tank commander fire his M16 from mander, the battalion commander, XO, S3, and staff will want a moving truck while seated. M16s/M4s. An M9 makes a nice decoration, but is not worth While in Iraq, your convoy will get ambushed. I know all the spit in a firefight. The folks who think differently usually learn range control geeks are going to have a heart attack when you the hard way — after their first engagement. You do not want the make this suggestion. Any one of them is welcome to ride a pa- “old man” to take his driver’s rifle during a raid, as I have seen trol with me in Iraq. This is what we do, and what we should happen. train. Experiencing an ambush for the first time is unpleasant, Get dismount kits for your M240Bs. You will need crew served especially while a hail of RPG and small-arms fire rains down weapons; all you can muster. Determine ways to mount M240s from multiple directions. and M2 .50 calibers on your trucks — all your trucks. Get the Train as many combat lifesavers (CLS) as you can. Order the parts to turn your M1A1 tank version .50 cals into flexes — you correct number of CLS bags needed — not what is indicated on will need the flexes in your trucks. I’m a nice guy, but when I go the MTOE. Several companies sell stocked CLS bags for about home, I’m taking my .50s with me, as my unit is M1A2SEP 25 dollars. Most of these companies accept government credit equipped, and the flex .50 is our baby. The good news is most cards. The budget geek who tells you it is too expensive needs of the up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles to be around when the frantic scramble for the CLS bag occurs. (HMMWVs) come with .50s. However, due to the limited num- He would only have to witness it once in his career for him to ber available for the task force, you will want crew served weap- get the point. Since there are no rear areas over here, he just ons on everything. might. Train your drivers to drive with no lights — not even blackout Train your soldiers — all of them, even the cooks, clerks, and markers. The noncompliant forces (NCF) will track your move- command drivers, on dismounted operations. Teach dismounted patrol, ambush, and counterambush techniques. Tankers, what lies ahead. Commander, you will take casualties. Make sure scouts, mortarmen, you will need to do this. Teach everyone your supply sergeant knows how to inventory and ship personal how to react to ambushes — mounted and dismounted. You can- effects. Ensure your soldiers’ deployment readiness is tight, to not take your tanks and personnel carriers everywhere. include NCOs getting involved with soldiers’ finances. If one of Teach your soldiers how to clear houses. Set inner and outer your soldiers is having marriage difficulties now, you can bet cordons, and designate search teams to enter houses. Develop they are not going to get any better during a yearlong deploy- your techniques before you go to Iraq. Beat up your boss so you ment. can train with tactical human intelligence teams and tactical psy- Prepare your soldiers to deal with wounded and dead Ameri- chological operations teams before you deploy. I know this will cans and Iraqis. You will see and treat them. Tell your medics up be difficult because most of these units are either Army Reserve front they cannot save every life — people will die. An intrave- or National Guard. These soldiers can keep crowds back with nous infusion and a few bandages will not save a man whose their speakers, and their translators will help you sort out good lungs are shredded by a 5.56 round, even if the guy was shot on guys from bad guys. They can identify the difference between the operating table at the combat support hospital. deeds to homes and instruction manuals for mortars. Unless you Tell family support groups what to expect. Do not sugarcoat can read and write Arabic, you are just plain out of luck. the message. If you do, spouses will think they have been lied Train your first sergeants how to process detainees. Have mili- to, and you will lose their trust. Tell the spouses the truth; hold tary police and military intelligence soldiers teach you how to back nothing. For example, Specialist Jones cannot come home do the paperwork correctly, to include witness statements. If the because granddad passed away, the family has financial prob- paperwork is incomplete, really bad people end up getting re- lems, or the first baby is born. Ensure your soldier’s family mem- leased. Do not get frustrated if you have to redo a form. Getting bers know how to contact the American Red Cross in the event the yardbird orchestrating attacks off the street is far more im- of a family disaster. Your family support group leader must be portant to the lives of your soldiers than a little wounded pride willing to contact family members for all your soldiers, not just over a screwed up form. the married ones. Know your soldiers’ family support group contact and keep the rosters tight. Mom and Dad want to know how Get your mind right. You will be in firefights. Your tankers will Johnnie is doing just as badly as a husband, wife, or fiancé. Get dismount. Mentally prepare your families and your soldiers for accurate contact information from spouses who return home for the deployment duration.

While In Iraq: What to Expect and a Couple of Recommendations Not all of Iraq is a big desert. The river valleys are loaded with date palm groves, vineyards, and sunflower fields. The ground is covered in waist- to chest-high grass. Vegetation is very thick. The roads are elevated from the fields, and are usually bordered by walls, fences, or canals, which cross the landscape in all directions of the compass. Most groves are separated into 5- to 10-acre plots surrounded by walls or fences. The walls and fences provide good cover and make great obstacles, as do the canals. Most canal bridges will not support a tank’s weight. The towns and villages have narrow streets; more narrow than Europe. Electrical wires hang about 8 to 10 feet off the ground and cross each other in no particular pattern. Running an M1 tank through these areas is possible, but due to the amount of collateral damage, it would be unwise. Remember, we are re- storing the Iraqi infrastructure, not destroying it. Most buildings are made of bricks and concrete, while others are made of adobe-style mud. Key leaders (platoon sergeants and up) need to carry a couple of body bags and sets of rubber gloves. Initially, my battalion chain of command felt it was counterproductive to morale. What was actually counterproductive to morale was the pieces of human remains my soldiers had to pick up and place on a litter and cover with a blanket because nothing else was available. Remem-

“Train your soldiers — all of them, even the cooks, clerks, and command drivers, on dismounted operations. Teach dismounted patrol, ambush, and counterambush techniques. Tankers, scouts, mortarmen, you will need to do this. Teach everyone how to react to ambushes — mounted and dismounted. You cannot take your tanks and personnel carriers everywhere.”

14 — January-February 2004 “Teach your soldiers how to clear houses. Set inner and outer cordons, and designate search teams to enter houses. Devel- op your techniques before you go to Iraq. Beat up your boss so you can train with tactical human intelligence teams and tactical psychological operations teams before you deploy.”

ber, not all casualties will be Americans. We are a civilized nation, and we recover the remains of our enemies and civilians as well. Expect combat stress and have your chaplain and medics lo- cate and tie into your servicing combat stress teams. Have the combat stress teams pay periodic visits to your soldiers. It will pay off in the long run. Let your soldiers know that the effect of combat stress makes you no less a man. Think before you announce, “on the way” with a high-explosive antitank round. The NCFs will fire at you from or near occupied homes. Once the sun comes up, you will see several small children emerge from these homes. Imagine if you would have let go with your big gun. How many deaf children on the block did you create? How will this impact community relations? Use appropriate force. Yes, there are times to let loose the big bul- lets, and I am more willing to let one fly than most, but make sure it is an informed decision, and a price you are willing to pay.

A Trip Down Canal Road The B Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment commander and I planned a simple night operation to engage and destroy a few NCFs along a specific narrow road where our elements were ambushed in the past. Our combined team consisted of two M1064 mortar tracks, two M1A2SEP tanks, three up-armored HMMWVs, and my M1025 scout HMMWV. The HMMWVs The ambush was initiated by seven 152mm artillery rounds hid- and personnel carriers were armed with .50 cals. We had two Ki- den in the weeds on the shoulder of the roadway that paralleled owa Warrior helicopters from E Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav- the canal. They were daisy-chained together. The lead tank ab- alry in support. Our battalion S2 and S3 joined our mission. sorbed the bulk of the blast, shrapnel cutting through the main Our plan was to conduct a presence patrol through the town of gun tube in several locations. The blast created a debris field of Al Abbarah, and split into two separate groups of one tank, one dust and asphalt, denser than any smoke screen I have ever seen. M1064, and two HMMWVs to cover two additional villages The truck in front of me stalled in the debris field. To my rear, along the Dyalia River Valley. Once we reached a designated one of my mortar tracks engulfed the narrow roadway. Then the point, we would turn around and head back the way we came small-arms fire started. We could not go forward or backward. and linkup for the trip through the hotspot near Al Abbarah. Dur- We were in the kill zone, unable to move. Tracers flew over, un- ing the time when our forces were split, we had 2 kilometers be- der, in front of, and behind my truck. Every soldier in my truck tween us. returned fire. My supply clerk and .50-cal gunner laid down blistering fire, as the rest of us fired our M16s out the windows; Varying routes is a very important thing to do; however, in this aiming at the muzzle flashes from both sides of the road. particular area, there is only one bridge that can support the weight of tanks and we were restricted to using the same route There is a time when training takes over your actions, and this in and out. The Kiowas provided route reconnaissance for our was one of those times, which is why it is so important to train move into and out of the river valley, thus mitigating the tacti- to standard all the time. I counted six separate muzzle flashes cal risk of using the same ingress and egress routes. Or so we from the left side of the road, and four separate muzzle flashes thought. from the right side of the road. With my magazine empty, I grabbed a fresh one and seated it firmly. An RPG flew over top. The move in went on schedule, the tanks, personnel carriers, I shot at muzzle flashes until they stopped blinking. Then, as and HMMWVs rolling along smoothly while the Kiowas, who abruptly as it started, it stopped. The firefight lasted about 45 dropped to our company frequency, flew ahead observing any- seconds: it was the longest 45 seconds of my life. thing unusual. We split from each other, turned around at the appropriate point, and linked back up on schedule. Negative con- Grabbing the hand mike while yelling for a crew report, I learned tact. We held our move back through Al Abbarah for 15 minutes that our S3 was wounded. I fed reports to the tactical operations to allow the Kiowas to observe any NCFs attempting to set a center (TOC) while our team split into two separate columns. trap for us on the way back through, thus allowing us to ambush The wheels and the personnel carriers raced to the brigade aid those who were trying to ambush us. Easy 14 and Easy 16, the station, and the tanks turned around at our rally point and moved Kiowa pilots, spotted nothing through the thick canopy of date in to secure the ambush site. Easy 14 and 16 responded to the palms, and no activity along the roadways on either side of the ambush site with 14 rockets, once we were clear. I believe it was canal. We started our move back, the Kiowas with us the entire their rocket run that settled the hash of the NCFs for the remain- way. der of the night.

January-February 2004 — 15 “Train your first sergeants how to process detainees. Have military police and military intelligence soldiers teach you how to do the paperwork correctly, to include witness statements. If the paperwork is incomplete, really bad people end up getting released.”

We discovered a small cache of hand grenades, RPG pro- jectiles, and explosive materials. We pieced together the daisy-chained artillery rounds that initiated the ambush and the RPG launch that signaled break contact. We questioned the local populace and found them all to be very upset by the massive amounts of fire- The tank commander on B22 knew something was wrong. His power displayed a few hours earlier, but claimed ignorance as to tank lost turret power, so he lost the thermal imagery and the who planted the improvised explosive device (IED) and who commander’s independent thermal viewer. Still, he did not hes- was responsible for the ambush. itate to move back in and secure the ambush site. He requested artillery illumination to aid observation. I will never forget his We learned a few days later that, shortly after we departed the words over the net when he was told his request was denied: “Il- area, a funeral was held. We were unable to determine how many lumination denied. I’ve lost turret power; I have my nods and had “died” the day or evening prior, or from what cause. A fu- my .50. Hooah. I will stay until relieved. White 2 out.” neral may be for one or many. The local populace tends to keep to themselves; as during the Baath party rule, it was better to be Our battalion quick reaction force relieved the crew on B22 a ignorant of what your neighbor was doing for reasons of self- couple of hours later. The rest of the patrol drove back to our preservation. forward operating base. The B Company commander and I re- One of our challenges is to teach the Iraqi people not to fear ported to the battalion TOC and debriefed the battle captain and the truth of any situation. Thirty-five years of living under a the battlefield information center. I volunteered to take the bat- ruthless dictator whose retributions were swift and terrible will talion XO out to the ambush site at first light. We were fortunate take a long time to flush out. to only suffer one casualty, as the following day we learned several things about the techniques used by our enemies. Conclusively, I offer a few recommendations based on my limited experiences and observations. In no way does this apply We discovered only four of the seven daisy-chained artillery to the whole of Iraq, as each area has its own particularities. rounds detonated. God was with me — my truck was beside one Train — both physically and mentally — for what lies ahead. of the rounds that did not explode. My scout platoon found det- Learn tactics, techniques, and procedures during your upcom- onation wire and traced it back along a wall between two fields, ing leader recons. During transfer of authority, talk to those of out of sight from the road. We found a stake and a screwdriver. us who are here, experiencing it now. Bring fresh ideas into the The device was most likely fired by a car battery, and the screw- fight. Learn from us. We have knocked our unconventional en- driver was used to complete the circuit. From the position of the emies back on their heels, when it’s your turn to jump into the individual who initiated the blast, he must have been in commu- ring, may you deliver the knockout blow. nication with a cohort who had direct observation of the roadway, because he was unable to observe the roadway from his position. CPT John B. Nalls is commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Com- On the left side of the road, the NCFs used a cinderblock wall pany, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, for cover, and the canal as an obstacle. From the right side of the TX, currently in Ba’Qubah, Iraq. He is a graduate of Old Dominion Uni- road, they used climbing rigs (used for harvesting dates) to shim- versity. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Ar- mor Officer Advanced Course, the Armor Captains Career Course, and my up palm trees and engage us with direct fire, using a wire the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in vari- fence and depression as an obstacle. Once return fire became ous command and staff positions, to include platoon leader and company too hot, they dropped from the trees and fled through the groves, executive officer with 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry which have a floor 8 to10 feet lower than the roadbed. Our rounds Division, Vilseck, Germany; and brigade planner, 2d Brigade, 4th Infan- passed harmlessly over their heads. try Division, Fort Hood, TX.

16 — January-February 2004 1-64 Armor’s Rogue Gunnery Training Program

by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schwartz, Major Daniel Cormier, and Staff Sergeant Bobby Burrell

On 5 April 2003, Task Force 1st Battal- a foundation for the modification of doc- engaging targets, except those to its di- ion, 64th Armor Regiment (1-64 Armor), trine and future tactics, techniques, and rect front. The enemy’s ability to attack 3d Infantry Division, was directed to con- procedures. The attack also revealed the from perpendicular alleyways or door- duct a mounted attack into the heart of necessity for armored crews to master all ways, and then quickly hide, prevents the Baghdad. The goal was to destroy the en- of their weapons systems and be prepared tank’s main gun from reacting decisive- emy’s will to fight by demonstrating our to engage and fight the enemy in very ly. Therefore, if crews button-up and rely superiority and ability to attack into their close terrain. on their armor protection and gunner’s strongpoint defenses in and around the weapons, they limit their ability to en- city at will. The mission, which lasted 2 Six Months Later gage enemy targets and must rely on mo- hours and 13 minutes, was to attack along The soldiers of 1-64 Armor recently com- bility or supporting fires to survive at- Highway 8 from the south of Baghdad pleted a Level I tank gunnery, which al- tacks. This is a potentially deadly sce- (Objective Saints), through the heart of lowed them to critically compare their nario, as the Russians learned in Grozny. the city to the Baghdad Airport (Objective experiences in OIF with the Army’s tank These problems paint a general picture Lions). Throughout the mission, the task gunnery training program. The results are of the problems faced by tank crewmen. force was in constant contact with ene- a picture of many successes due to the They present the necessity for well- my forces. The soldiers and leaders were exceptional training that tank gunnery pro- trained and coordinated task force oper- incredulous when they first heard of the vides. The training also revealed some ations to adequately conduct mounted mission — they never expected to attack clearly identified shortfalls in current urban operations. We are not advocat- into a city of over 6 million inhabitants gunnery training. This article addresses ing tank companies as the solution to with a task force numbering just over 700 the shortcomings of the current gunnery military operations in urban terrain soldiers. training program and begins the debate (MOUT). We are suggesting that to inte- The soldiers who participated in the at- and the process of modifying tank gun- grate tanks into urban or close terrain tack performed remarkably. They direct- nery training to better prepare soldiers for warfare, we need to develop focused ly contributed to the decisive success of future combat. training programs for tank crews to pre- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as they Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed a need pare for this type of combat. broke the will of the enemy forces in the to train armored crewmen to fight under As we avoid preparing solely for past city, which lead to the rapid conclusion of close combat conditions and in urban ter- wars, we must also be willing to learn major hostilities. The attack debunked the rain. The difficulties of an urban environ- from those wars past and adjust training notion that heavy armored forces are not ment are numerous. The crew must ac- to better prepare soldiers. Any effort to the weapons of choice in urban terrain. quire targets three dimensionally. The lim- predict future conflicts will be limited by Task Force 1-64 Armor demonstrated the itations of the main gun of the M1 Abrams unforeseen events. Our Nation’s enemies essential capability of heavy armored ve- tank, which can only elevate 20 degrees will adapt their tactics and change their hicles, which are able to sustain numer- and depress 10 degrees, forces the loader preparations based on their own conclu- ous hits from enemy fire, while protect- and tank commander (TC) to acquire and sions and experiences in OIF. However, ing the crewmen inside. They reconfirmed engage targets on rooftops and in base- we can adapt our training to prepare for that armored forces have an extreme shock ments. The nature of close urban terrain likely combat scenarios. Any analysis of effect on enemy soldiers and established will at times prevent the main gun from potential future combat scenarios leads

January-February 2004 — 17 “Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed a need to train armored crewmen to fight under close combat conditions and in urban terrain. The difficulties of an urban environment are numerous. The crew must acquire targets three dimensionally. The limitations of the main gun of the M1 Abrams tank, which can only elevate 20 degrees and depress 10 degrees, forces the loader and tank commander (TC) to acquire and engage targets on rooftops and in basements.”

Gunnery modifications must focus on two main areas. First, we have to reduce the “gamesmanship” of gunnery, which requires modification of the current scoring system. Presently, our scoring method rewards crews that master the intrica- cies of scoring. The brake time given for to the conclusion that enemy forces We reviewed unit after-action reviews obscuration, experienced crews, to the will seek to fight in close terrain. Close (AARs) and conducted interviews with detriment of combat training, have mas- terrain, whether urban or otherwise, ne- key leaders, master gunners, and soldiers tered stoppage and defilade. Crews need gates some of our technological advan- to accurately capture lessons learned from to fight through their problems, as op- tages. Therefore, close terrain offers our OIF. Our collection method stressed im- posed to using them to increase their enemies the best chances of success, partiality. The surveys were anonymous scores. We believe that efforts by leaders and it will be the enemy’s environment of to avoid “bragging.” We also stressed to to prevent crews from applying “games- choice or eventual necessity. The armor crews and leaders that their comments manship” are doomed to fail. The only community can no longer afford to focus would help to reform tank gunnery train- solution is a scoring system that rewards primarily on the conventional fight. We ing, which would save lives. crews who fight their tanks. This might must adapt our training to likely future require giving partial points for “sup- scenarios and, for the purpose of this ar- The survey results reveal that when com- pression” of targets — a crew that has a ticle, tank gunnery must adapt to the pared to current tank gunnery training, main gun malfunction could then use an changing threat environment. there is a need for revision. For example, alternate weapons system to engage and during OIF, the gunner engaged targets suppress a tank. We have to build an adap- Our “rogue gunnery” proposal focuses 47 percent of the time, the loader 32 per- tive focus into our gunnery scoring, which on Tank Table VIII qualification for two cent of the time, and the TC 21 percent of will reward crews who use initiative and reasons: standards in weapons training the time. The current Tank Table VIII qual- train as they will fight. and resource limitations prevent us from ification crewmember-to-target break- developing an ideal training system; and down has the gunner shooting roughly Second, we have to adapt tank gunnery crew-level gunnery, from Tank Tables IV 92 percent of the time, the loader 0 per- to train crews for the asymmetrical fight. to VIII, is ideally a foundation for further cent, and the TC 8 percent. Another ex- This means increasing crew close com- tank crew training, but because of current ample is that crews were forced to fire at bat competence and integration. Modifi- limitations, it is the primary live gunnery multiple targets in close terrain. This in- cations should be focused in crew capa- crew training event. We developed our creases the crew’s observation area and bility and environment realism. Crew ca- modifications under existing conditions also demands rapid response from all pability training focuses on better prepar- and focused on tank gunnery tables as crewmembers. A final example is over- ing tank crews to fight in close or urban training events that have the most realis- emphasizing defensive gunnery (60 per- terrain. The glaring conclusion here is tic impact on developing combat-ready cent in gunnery versus 10 percent in OIF), that loaders must be trained to fight their crews. We also realize that current loader tank targetry (almost 50 percent in gun- weapons station. The loader’s ability to and TC weapons station capabilities pro- nery versus 2 percent in OIF), and long- use his M240 was essential to Task Force duce some risk. Therefore, we decided to range engagements in our current gun- 1-64 Armor’s survival in urban and close focus our modification approach on crew- nery training. These glaring differences terrain. This requires upgrading the load- level training and not at platoon or sec- mandate we adapt our gunnery training. er’s weapons station for survivability (gun tion level. This currently appears to be the shields) and safety (M240B kits). The safest way to integrate necessary training We are not saying that current gunnery close fight also demands that TCs fight training has ill prepared our crews for with .50 cals and be prepared to use per- changes. These two factors resulted in our combat. On the contrary, we believe the recommendations being focused on im- sonal weapons as well. mediate emphasis on mastery of weapons sys- , applicable, and safe changes to tems, to include degraded modes, crew Engagements must force crews to en- tank gunnery training. integration, and safety, were essential com- gage enemy targets at short range, on the To begin our analysis, we applied a sys- bat enhancers in preparing our crews to move, and with multiple weapons sys- tematic method to capture our lessons win decisively. Some shortfalls exist, tems simultaneously. All of these chang- learned from OIF. While deployed, we which can be remedied with modifica- es can be implemented immediately with conducted a tank crew survey in which tions to selected engagements of current slight modifications to gunnery engage- every crew in the task force participated. gunnery tables. ments. We will have to create a three-di-

18 — January-February 2004 mensional fight to replicate a realistic age laid out in U.S. Army Field Manual loader has properly identified the target training environment. Possible solutions 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams).1 We at- and his M240 is oriented within the range are mock buildings that can be assembled tempted to identify redundancies in the fans. A personnel carrier (PC) target pres- on ranges with targetry presented from engagement package, which we saw as ents 15 seconds later for the TC to engage basements to rooftops. Safety constraints potential opportunities to modify or im- with .50-cal, allowing the loader and TC may limit this training and force us to con- plement changes. We then developed en- to simultaneously engage targets while duct close combat training in simulations gagement scenarios that maintain a fo- in the defilade. A third set of troops pres- or with multiple integrated laser engage- cus on safe crew training and the limita- ents a 25-second delay, which allows the ment simulation (MILES). Regardless of tions of current ranges. We did not change TC to decide whether to have the loader the method chosen, crew and unit train- our focus on safe training by retaining all (gunner traverses turret to the right) or ing for close combat is essential to main- of the current scoring and focus on crew gunner engage. The loader is given 100 taining our train-as-you-fight focus. fire commands. Finally, we tested our pi- rounds of 7.62mm ammunition to ac- lot program during gunnery density, which count for the limitations of the current Rogue gunnery is a way to begin train- resulted in recommended changes to three weapons station. Scoring adjustments will ing crews for close combat. It offers an target engagements. have to be made to account for the longer immediate solution that can be applied to time it takes the loader to engage troop crew live-fire training today. These mod- Figure 1 shows recommended modifica- targets. An M240B modification could ifications were intended to be a first-step tions to Tank Table VIII (A-day) engage- possibly reduce both the scoring prob- approach to changes to tank crew train- ment scenarios. The B3S task is assumed lem and the ammunition requirement to ing. We expect to build on our rogue gun- to be a daytime engagement. This allowed 50 rounds. Under current scoring stan- nery experiences and that upgrades to us to sustain some of the other day en- dards, no break time is given for stop- training resources will permit more real- gagements that we felt trained essential page since there are three machine guns istic and unit-level close combat training skills. Of course any modifications that and the crew can switch to alternative for our soldiers in the future. This near- increase loader and TC integration of fir- weapons. This also reinforces the focus term approach focuses on modifying tank ing will have to be on the day portion of on training crews to fight through their gunnery engagements to better replicate tank gunnery training. problems. the close fight, integrate all crewmembers’ weapons systems, and build crew On the A1 task, the engagement was On the A5 task, the engagement was competence and confidence. modified to train the crew to integrate all modified to replicate a close fight on the machine gun fires. The first set of troops offense. A moving PC presents with a sec- To modify tank crew gunnery, we first is presented with subsequent targets on a ond PC presenting on a 15-second delay. looked at the current 10-engagement pack- delay. This allows the TC to ensure the This allows the gunner to fire and adjust,

Proposed TT VIII Training — A (DAY)

T Ammunition Training Intent: All tasks train target a # CONDITIONS Proposed TT VIII Targets acquisition and crew integration/ s 120mm 7.62 synchronization/switchology .50 k mm SABOT HEAT TC GNR LDR Troops 15-second delay, exposed 35 sec 300-500m 100 x DEF, GNR Trains the LDR and TC to A1 system Stationary PC, 10-sec delay, exposed 50 sec 600-800m 100 x coordinate fires Inop Troops 25-sec delay, exposed 35 sec 300-500m 50 x Stationary PC, exposed 75 sec 1400-1600m 1 x Trains the GNR to engage A2 enemy in NBC, also trains OFF-NBC Stationary PC, exposed 75 sec 600-800m 2 x S the crew to fight in NBC with Troops 15-sec delay, exposed 60 sec 600-800m 50 x change in weapons system Stationary Turret, exposed 60 sec 700-900m 1 x DEF, LRF, Stationary Frontal Tank, exposed 60 sec 1000-1200m A3 GPS, TIS Trains the GNR to use the Inop Stationary Frontal Tank, exposed 60 sec 1400-1600m GAS Moving Tank, exposed 50 sec 1200-1400m 2x Trains the GNR to engage A4 DEF- Long Range Moving Tank, exposed 50 sec 2200-2400m 2 x long-range targets Evasive Flank PC, exposed 50 sec 600-800m 1 x Allows the LDR, GNR, or Stationary PC 25-sec delay, exposed 50 sec 600-800m 2 x A5 OFF TC to engage troops Troops 40-second delay, exposed 75 sec x 100-200m 50 based on crew decision Troops 40-second delay, exposed 75 sec 600-800m 50 x Stationary Tank, exposed 75 sec 1400-1600m 2 x B3 Defensive PC 15-sec delay, exposed 60 sec 700-900m 100 x Trains the crew to coordi- DEF S Troops 25-sec delay, exposed 50 sec 200-300m 50 x nate and integrate fires Troops 25-sec delay, exposed 50 sec 300-500m 50 x Figure 1 Changes

January-February 2004 — 19 “Second, we have to adapt tank gunnery to train crews for the asymmetrical fight. This means increasing crew close combat competence and integration. Modifications should be focused in crew capability and environment realism. Crew capability training focuses on better preparing tank crews to fight in close or urban terrain. The glaring conclusion here is that loaders must be trained to fight their weapons station.” Photo by SPC Mason Lowery

and the TC to fire the .50-cal while on conventional and asymmetric fights in talion XO and battalion S3, 1st Battalion, 68th the move. After a 40-second delay, two close terrain. Our proposals for gunnery Armor Regiment, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Divi- sets of troops present, allowing the crew are an immediate solution to current tank sion, Fort Hood; and company commander, A to engage with multiple weapons choic- gunnery training. They build better crew Company, 1-64 Armor, 2d Brigade, 24th Infan- es. This also trains the loader transition integration and competence in all weap- try Division. from loading to acquiring and engaging ons systems and emphasize close fight- MAJ Daniel Cormier is the battalion S3, 1-64 targets. To present this scenario safely, ing capabilities, while sustaining conven- Armor, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort the tank had to be down range, allowing tional skills. Future tank gunnery modi- Stewart, GA. He received a B.A. from the Uni- an expansion of the safe firing area. Ad- fications should modify the current scor- versity of New Hampshire and an M.A. from ditionally, crews had the option of per- ing system to reduce gamesmanship and Boston University. His military education in- forming a short halt based on TC evalua- teach crews to fight through problems. cludes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Of- tion of crew capability. Additionally, we should develop live-fir- ficer Advanced Course, Scout Platoon Lead- ing scenarios that replicate the urban ers Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Airborne On the B3S task, which is similar to A1, School, Ranger School, and Command and the engagement was modified to train the three-dimensional fight. These modifica- General Staff College-France. He has served crew to integrate all machine gun fires, tions will begin the process of training in various command and staff positions, to in- while building the loader transition from tank crews and units as they will fight. clude foreign area officer, Morocco; commander, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry loading to acquiring targets and firing. A Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and tank and scout stationary tank presents with a PC and platoon leader, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored two sets of troops on a 25-second delay. Cavalry Regiment, Germany. This allows the gunner to engage the tank Notes and then transition the crew to close fight- 1U.S. Army Field Manual 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams), SSG Bobby Burrell is the battalion master gun- ing of their weapons stations. The TC U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1 Octo- ner, 1-64 Armor, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Divi- must ensure the loader has properly iden- ber 2001. sion, Fort Stewart, GA. His military education tified the target and his M240 is oriented in cludes Primary Leadership Development within the range fans. The TC has numer- Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officers LTC Eric C. Schwartz is the battalion command- Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officers ous methods to attack this engagement. er, 1st Battalion, 64th (1-64) Armor Regiment, Course, Airborne School, and M1A1 Master He can remain in defilade and attack 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Gunners Course. He has served in various with the loader and TC machine guns, or GA. He received a B.A. from Lynchburg Col- command and staff positions to include, com- go to hull-down and include the gunner’s lege and an M.A. from Clemson University. His pany master gunner, B Company, 1-64 Armor, coax machine gun. military education includes Armor Officer Basic Fort Stewart; tank commander, B Company, 1- Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, and 64 Armor, Fort Stewart; tank commander, C To better prepare our tank crews for U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- Company, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor Regiment, combat, we must implement OIF lessons lege. He has served in various command and Camp Casey, Korea; and tank commander, C learned into our gunnery program. This staff positions to include, brigade XO, 3d Bri- Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, will ensure crews are prepared for both gade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; bat- Fort Hood, TX.

20 — January-February 2004 Treachery and Its Consequences: Civilian Casualties During Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Continued Utility of the Law of Land Warfare

by Major Dennis P. Chapman en women and children killed — all un- posing as civilians, sometimes feigning armed.1 Within hours, U.S. Marines south distress. On 29 March 2003, a man pos- Among the themes pervading our recent of Baghdad gunned down an Iraqi driver ing as a taxi driver approached a check- invasion and occupation of Iraq, two mer- at a checkpoint and, like the women and point and gestured for the soldiers man- it particular attention: civilian casualties children above, he proved unarmed.2 Trag- ning it to approach his vehicle, as if re- and Iraqi violations of the law of war. ically, these are only two of a number of questing assistance. When soldiers did ap- While both phenomena are ubiquitous in such killings by coalition forces in Iraq proach, he detonated a car bomb.5 Two the annals of warfare, their occurrence during Operation Iraqi Freedom. weeks later a vehicle stopped near a check- during Operation Iraqi Freedom illumi- point and discharged a hysterical, preg- nates a crucial fact — collateral injury to How did these tragedies occur? Why did nant woman. As our troops approached civilians and violations of the law of war American servicemen — overwhelming- to offer assistance the driver detonated do not merely occur in parallel. Howev- ly decent, moral, well-trained, and well- another car bomb.6 er, they are often causally linked. Many disciplined young men and women — tragedies in Iraq amply demonstrate that find themselves mistakenly killing the These attacks, where Iraqi fighters ex- where one or more parties to a conflict very innocents they were sent, in part, to ploit the protected status of noncomba- regularly disregard customary moral and save? They did so because they were pro- tants as cover for attacks on coalition legal constraints on the conduct of oper- voked: not by the innocent victims them- troops, create a climate of apprehension ations, increased civilian casualties inev- selves, but by agents of the dying Iraqi re- and mistrust among our soldiers, who find itably result. gime.3 The soldiers and Marines who themselves not knowing whether the peo- fired these shots did so because they were ple coming and going around them are On 31 March 2003, a van sped through a afraid of becoming the latest victims of civilian noncombatants or a covert and U.S. military checkpoint near Najaf, Iraq. Baath Party treachery.4 deadly threat.7 While civilian casualties After the driver ignored warnings to stop, always occur in war, the ambiguous and the troops opened fire, bringing the ve- Early in the invasion, American troops uncertain environment spawned by this hicle to a halt. Inside, soldiers found sev- fell victim to suicide attacks by fighters enemy misconduct almost certainly exac-

January-February 2004 — 21 erbates the situation, greatly increasing propriate, why do we muddy the waters International law differs significantly the risk of harm to innocent civilians and by attempting to shield certain persons from the national law of individual coun- causing many needless casualties among from the ill effects of war, while deem- tries. Whereas the domestic law of states them. ing others legitimate targets and thus fair is generally founded on compulsion — In deliberately disguising themselves as game to be killed? Having once deemed that this, the power of the state to compel civilian noncombatants, Iraqi fighters it necessary and proper to seek and ex- compliance — international law is built ploit almost any advantage in our quest on the twin bases of consent and consen- violate one of the most widely accepted sus norms for the conduct of warfare. The to weaken and destroy our enemy, why . The basic laws governing the behav- hideous and all too foreseeable conse- do we cloud the issue by singling out cer- ior of states are simply those customs and quences of these acts point the way to a tain practices and stratagems as perfidi- practices that most countries acknowl- renewed understanding of the rationale ous and hence prohibited? edge as appropriate. This is known as — the moral basis — for the constraints We do so because we disagree with Gen- customary law, the “consensus” compo- on combat action that we know collec- eral Sherman. While war certainly is hell, nent of international law. Like the com- tively as the law of war. mon law with which we are familiar in we reject the temptation to conclude that English-speaking countries, customary “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine because it is hell we are released from all moral restraint during armed conflict. Al- international law develops and changes it.”8 So wrote William Tecumseh Sher- over time as social and political norms man, an early practitioner of total war. Is though we accept the premise — reluc- evolve. he right? He certainly has a point. By the tantly — that violence is sometimes a nec- mere act of maintaining an armed force, essary and appropriate means of settling The second basis of international law international controversies, it remains a consists of the treaties and agreements society implicitly accepts that, under cer- disfavored tain circumstances, the ordinary rules by means: a method of last resort by which states voluntarily undertake to which we live our lives may not apply: to be used only under exceptional cir- regulate their own conduct.9 This is the rules against killing, against destruction cumstances and, most importantly, the “consent” component of international law. of property, and against compelling citi- scope and impact of which is to be strict- U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law zens to act against their will (by serving ly limited to the objects in question. To of Land Warfare, sets forth a list of such in the armed forces). When a government the extent possible, the damage inflicted treaties that pertain to armed conflict. makes the decision to go to war, it has should relate to the objective and end state The most prominent of these are the Ge- concluded that the controversy at issue sought; it should never be inflicted arbi- neva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague trarily or vindictively. Toward this end, Conventions of 1907.10 or the values at stake are so profoundly society at large has erected a structure of important or so dangerously threatened rules, norms, and agreements that aim to The twin pillars of consent and consen- that such extreme measures are justified. limit the social costs of war. We know sus exist in a state of tension. The idea Having accepted the infliction of such these rules collectively as “international that no state can be bound except by its damage as sometimes necessary and ap- law” or the “law of armed conflict.” own consent is the foundational concept

“In deliberately disguising themselves as civilian noncombatants, Iraqi fighters violate one of the most widely accepted norms for the conduct of warfare. The hideous and all too foreseeable consequences of these acts point the way to a renewed understanding of the rationale — the moral basis — for the constraints on combat action that we know collectively as the law of war.”

22 — January-February 2004 of international law, one vigorously maintained by many countries. Despite this, “During the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, fighters loyal to Saddam Hussein violated the international community expects ev- all of these. The most common such violation — and the one attended by the most tragic ery state to adhere to the basic standards results — attacking U.S. forces while under civilian disguise. Protecting civilians from the evil of customary law, whether or not a given effects of battle has long been a fundamental goal of the law of armed conflict. To that end, country acknowledges such an obliga- international law has long sought to “maintain the distinction between combatants and tion. The importance of consent in the in- noncombatants with as much clarity as possible.” ternational system has led some to argue that international “law” as such does not exist at all. At the opposite extreme are those who argue that the evolving web ries to them, they may constitute evidence to bear arms openly; prohibitions against of multinational organizations, treaties, of what the customary international law abuse of flags of truce or equivalent sym- conventions, and institutions currently in is. Furthermore, some treaties or their bols, and against the misuse of symbols place has displaced the principle of con- provisions may achieve such widespread such as the red cross or red crescent; and sent, and that the wide recognition and acceptance and legitimacy that they may rules concerning the status of cultural and legitimacy of these international struc- come to be accepted as declaratory of humanitarian sites during wartime.13 tures invest them with quasi-legislative customary international law — that is, authority. In my view, the truth lies in the they may be incorporated into the cus- During the course of Operation Iraqi middle: the principle of consent not only tomary law of nations and become bind- Freedom, fighters loyal to Saddam Hus- endures, but remains the cornerstone of ing on all states as a result.11 sein violated all of these. The most com- the international system. That said, it is mon such violation — and the one at- perfectly clear that states are not abso- The law of war seeks to limit or restrain tended by the most tragic results — at- lutely free to act in any manner they deem the social costs of war in three ways: by tacking U.S. forces while under civilian fit, save for restraints that they voluntari- protecting “both combatants and non- disguise. Protecting civilians from the evil ly assume. While states may not be com- combatants from unnecessary suffering;” effects of battle has long been a funda- by “safeguard[ing] certain fundamental mental goal of the law of armed conflict. pelled to take specific, detailed actions human rights of persons who fall into the without their own consent, they must still To that end, international law has long adhere to the broader standards of con- hands of the enemy, particularly prison- sought to “maintain the distinction be- duct embodied in customary internation- ers of war, the wounded and sick, and tween combatants and noncombatants al law, whether they consent to be bound civilians;” and by “facilitat[ing] the res- with as much clarity as possible.”14 toration of peace.”12 In pursuit of these or not. aims, international law imposes certain Prior to 1977, this was accomplished by A final, critical note on the concepts of standards on all combatants in armed focusing heavily on wearing uniforms consent and consensus — while treaties conflicts. These include requirements to and distinctive insignia. The Hague Con- generally do not bind states not signato- wear uniforms or distinctive insignia and vention (IV) of 1907 sought to incentiv-

January-February 2004 — 23 “...the requirement seems to be that combatants refrain from holding themselves out as something they are not — they cannot pose or pass themselves off as civilians. Even when dressed in civilian garb, fighters must make it clear that they are combatants and not bystanders. Under this standard, the mere act alone of Iraqi fighters attacking from civilian vehicles or while wearing civilian clothes would not automatically violate international law.”

ize compliance with this norm by estab- that participated in the international con- nizing, however, that there are situations lishing the following qualifications for ferences that adopted the additional pro- in armed conflicts where owing to the na- the status of belligerent, and hence for the tocols of 1977 were sympathetic to the ture of the hostilities an armed combat- protections afforded to legitimate combat- insurgent sides in the so-called ‘wars of ant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall ants under international law: “the laws, national liberation.’ Such insurgents usu- retain this status as a combatant, provid- rights, and duties of war apply not only ally did not wear uniforms or carry their ed that, in such situations, he carries his to armies, but also to militia and volun- arms openly, but concealed themselves arms openly: 17 teer corps fulfilling the following condi- among the population at large.” (a) During each military engagement, tions: and 1. To be commanded by a person re- Such practices, while arguably unavoid- (b) During such time as he is visible to sponsible for his subordinates; able for poorly trained and under-financed the adversary while he is engaged insurgents confronting powerful regular in a military deployment preceding 2. Have a fixed distinctive emblem rec- armies, nonetheless pose a great risk to the launching of an attack in which ognizable at a distance; civilians because they make it difficult or 18 impossible for uniformed soldiers to dis- he is to participate.” 3. To carry their arms openly; tinguish between friend and foe. Recog- Controversy surrounds the 1977 Proto- 4. To conduct their operations in accor- nizing this dilemma, the drafters of the cols.19 Nonetheless, the position they es- dance with the laws and customs of 1977 Protocols tried to craft a compro- pouse has probably achieved broad enough war.”15 mise that would legitimize the insurgent acceptance to be deemed declarative of movements they supported while still af- customary international law.20 At bottom, The rationale for such qualifications is fording some protection to the innocent the requirement seems to be that com- clear: “The concealed combatant certain- civilians caught in the inevitable cross- batants refrain from holding themselves ly has an advantage over the uniformed fire. They did this by deemphasizing the out as something they are not — they can- soldier, but it is a price that others must Hague Convention requirements that bel- not pose or pass themselves off as civil- pay. It inevitably leads to increased casu- ligerents wear uniforms and distinctive ians. Even when dressed in civilian garb, alties among the civilian population, as insignia, focusing instead on the require- fighters must make it clear that they are the uniformed adversary can no longer the combatants bear their arms clearly distinguish between combatant ment that combatants and not bystanders. Under 16 openly. The 1977 Protocols state: “In or- this standard, the mere act alone of Iraqi and noncombatant.” der to protect the civilian population from fighters attacking from civilian vehicles The Hague Convention standard has been the effects of hostilities, combatants are or while wearing civilian clothes would weakened in recent decades with the ne- obliged to distinguish themselves from not automatically violate international gotiation of the 1977 Protocols to the Ge- the civilian population while they are en- law. The law has shifted from a proce- neva Convention of 1949. As noted in gaged in an attack or in a military occu- dural focus on the wear of distinctive one commentary: “A majority of states pation preparatory to an attack. Recog- clothing and insignia, to a substantive fo-

24 — January-February 2004 cus on the conduct of fighters. Those who legal fig leaf created to paper over the bru- effective, the laws of land warfare none- forthrightly show themselves for what tality of war with a veneer of gentility; nor theless remain our best means of mitigat- they are (combatants) will generally fall are they a relic, well-intentioned but ren- ing the awful consequences of war. within the bounds of the law, while those dered obsolete by the advance of technol- who deceptively masquerade as what they ogy and the rise of terrorism and guerril- are not (civilians) generally do not. Un- la warfare. On the contrary, when taken fortunately, Iraqi conduct falls far short as a solemn obligation, the laws of war re- Notes even of this pragmatic standard. In delib- main a bulwark for protecting the inno- 1Nadim Ladki, “Check Point Killings,” Reuters at www.att. erately concealing their identity as com- cent. As gruesomely illustrated by recent net, accessed 1 April 2003. batants, using civilian disguise as a ruse tragedies in Iraq, deliberate and recurring 2“U.S. Sticks to Iraq Check Point Rules Despite Deaths,” Re- to get close enough to our troops to strike, disregard of established legal and moral uters at www.att.net, accessed 1 April 2003. Iraqi fighters commit a serious breach of standards during combat sets the stage international law. for needless tragedy. While not perfectly Continued on Page 49 Perfidious acts prohibited under international law are not limited to posing as civilians. Nor, regrettably, is Iraqi misconduct. Iraqi violations include feigning surrender as cover for an attack;21 using emblems of international organizations, such as the red cross or red crescent, as cover for hostile action;22 and exploiting the protected status of humanitarian and cultural sites such as mosques, schools, and hospitals, for military advantage.23 Fortunately, these violations are not attended by tragedies like the checkpoint killings. But the potential for such tragedies is always there, and grows with each succeeding Iraqi violation. As one commentator has said, “the Iraqi regime, by blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians, has caused numerous casualties and has put thousands of … Iraqi civilians in harm’s way.”24 This increased risk goes to the heart of why international law prohibits such conduct. When combatants pose as civilians they “break down the distinction between fighters and civilians,” and so put all civilians at risk.25 When combatants deliberately seek out protected sites, such as mosques, churches, and hospitals, for military use they erode the sanctity of these sites by teaching the enemy to view them as likely enemy strongholds, thereby placing all such sites at risk. When fighters feign surrender or attack under a flag of truce, they “destro[y] the basis for rees- tablishing peace short of the complete annihilation of one belligerent by another”26 and, by teaching the enemy to view surrendering troops as a threat, endanger all soldiers attempting surrender. Like- wise, fighters who feign wounds or injury to lure the enemy within striking range teach their foes to view enemy wounded as a threat, placing all injured soldiers at risk. If anything redemptive emerges from the tragic checkpoint killings in Iraq, it “If anything redemptive emerges from the tragic checkpoint killings in Iraq, it may be a renewed ap- may be a renewed appreciation for the preciation for the value of restraint in the conduct of war. The laws of land warfare are not merely a value of restraint in the conduct of war. collection of compacts promulgated for the convenience of elites; they are not a legal fig leaf creat- The laws of land warfare are not merely ed to paper over the brutality of war with a veneer of gentility; nor are they a relic, well-intentioned a collection of compacts promulgated for but rendered obsolete by the advance of technology and the rise of terrorism and guerrilla warfare.” the convenience of elites; they are not a

January-February 2004 — 25 Company Operations During the Establish

by Captain Roger Maynulet The 2d Battalion, 37th (2-37) Armor Regiment arrived in Bagh- dad and began conducting relief in place and simultaneously es- “Units may have to conduct operations in environments that tablishing systems. Leaders at the company level and below be- do not involve traditional combat. A unit may also be utilized in gan operations by assuming the mission and commander’s in- a stability or support operation at the successful conclusion of tent of the force in place, which allowed the battalion staff to get a combat mission. While stability and support operations can their feet on the ground and become familiar with operations occur anywhere, they will most likely occur in an urban envi- prior to tasking units. ronment. During a stability operation or support operation, units perform many activities not necessarily contained in its mission Predeployment essential task list.”1 A Company, 2-37 (A/2-37) Armor’s train-up at home station consisted of level one gunnery, company and platoon situational training exercise (STX) lanes, and a combat training center In May 2003, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division arrived in live fire. During deployment preparation, the company also con- Baghdad as peace operations began replacing the high-intensity ducted focused military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and conflict operations of the 3d Infantry Division and U.S. Ma- stability operations and support operations training, to include rines. Until the majority of the units were physically within the checkpoint operations, cordon and search, react to ambush, and city limits, commanders were unsure of the task organization many other tasks the company was likely to encounter. their units would assume and of the sectors in Baghdad they would control. This article outlines some essential tasks and les- The situation in Iraq continued to develop during the training sons learned from one armor company’s assumption of mission and deployment process; therefore, leaders could not focus on in Baghdad, Iraq. These essential tasks include task organiza- any particular sector, specific mission, or task organization. Fo- tion, relief in place, forward operating base recon and establish- cusing on soldier-level tasks allowed flexibility in the training ment, command post operations, and establishing the neighbor- schedule during a time when conflicting requirements were com- hood advisory council (NAC). mon.

26 — January-February 2004 ment of Stability Operations in Baghdad

The company was deploying from the cool temperate climate Task Organization of Central Europe to the oppressive heat of the Kuwaiti and The task organization for the company (and the battalion) was Iraqi deserts. Increased water intake prior to deployment, ensur- uncertain until arriving in Baghdad. Once they arrived in Bagh- ing soldiers are eating three meals a day despite a decreased ap- dad, 2-37 Armor was cross-attached to the 2d Light Cavalry petite, and constant supervision by leaders will lower the likeli- Regiment (2LCR) to provide heavy armor assets to the high mo- hood of heat casualties. bility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) of the LCR. During the staging period in Camp Udairi Kuwait, the most The 2-37 Armor cross-attached one tank company to 1st Squad- useful and motivational training for the soldiers was the short- ron, 2LCR while the battalion received one troop from the same range marksmanship (SRM) training that is operated by con- squadron. The task force commander attached one scout pla- tractors. These experts (former special operations noncommis- toon to A/2-37 Armor from his new cavalry troop and provided sioned officers) led the tankers through the basics of SRM in the the troop with one platoon of tanks. wide-expanse of the Kuwaiti firing ranges. The ability to shoot the M4 or M16 accurately while standing, advancing, and side- The tank company commander’s effective employment of this stepping laterally, as well as inside buildings, is critical during scout platoon hinged on several factors and can best be deter- enemy confrontation. Most company firefights were less than mined using mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available 150 meters. (METT-T). The company’s mission on arriving in May was to conduct combat operations in a sector of Baghdad and provide While still in Kuwait, company and battalion commanders ben- security and stability to allow reconstruction efforts to begin efited from eavesdropping on the division and corps battle up- (mission statements must change depending on the operational date briefs. Listening to the kinds of engagements, hotspots, and environment just as in high-intensity conflict operations). other issues concerning operations in Baghdad allowed commanders to become familiar with the operational environment The enemy consisted of Baathists, former regime loyalists, and and begin building a broad plan on how to execute missions in common criminals attempting to undermine coalition forces’ that environment. authority through guerrilla attacks, using the local population as

January-February 2004 — 27 its camouflage. The terrain on which the company would be conduct tank crew gunnery skills training to be qualified on tank conducting its mission is built-up urban terrain with a mix of weapons systems. Eventually, the line between scout and tanker residential streets in linear and rectangular pattern, highways, within the company blurred because everyone executed similar and a limited number of neighborhoods with “rayed” streets.2 missions. The scout platoon’s integration was a welcome event Trafficability depended on location, but also on time of day. Ci- and a pure tank company could not have been as successful with- vilian traffic cycles need to be considered (although not exclu- out the scout platoon’s skills, experience, and leadership. This sively) for determining whether tanks or wheels will roll on a task organization also allowed for an easier rotation of red, am- mission. Building size varied from one-floor shack houses, two- ber, and green cycles during the yearlong mission. Rotating these story mansions, and multilevel apartment and office buildings. duties is an excellent way to mitigate complacency by varying Troops available were one headquarters section, two tank pla- the soldiers’ mission and tasks. toons, and one scout platoon with eight M1026s. The medic (red- cross covered) and maintenance M113s were also sliced to the Relief In Place platoons to provide flexibility to transport raid teams or evacu- Relief in place is an essential task of assuming any long-term ate wounded personnel. Time available for the mission is one mission in the stability operations and support operations en- year or until mission complete. vironments. The time frame of the relief in place varies de- To provide each subordinate maneuver element the flexibility pending on mission requirements. The relief in place is a leader- to conduct the varied missions required for combat and support intensive mission that needs to have a clear focus culminating in operations and stability operations, the scout platoon was bro- a commander’s assessment. A/2-37 Armor’s tasks included: ken down by section and cross-attached to each of the remain- • Fully immersing into the outgoing company’s everyday oping two tank platoons and the headquarters tank section (the erations, focusing on getting every soldier into sector with his counterpart. • Platoon leaders and company commanders meeting with community leaders in sector. • Assessing the status of all elements of the sector’s infrastructure, to include electricity, water, police, schools, hospitals, and demographics. • Providing the task force commander with a comprehensive commander’s assessment and recommended plan of action to meet the higher command’s intent. • To relieve the 3d Infantry Division outgoing company as quickly as possible to allow them to reconsolidate, refit, and prepare for redeployment. Most leaders are familiar with the basic concept and intent of the relief in place from missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Leaders must ensure everyone is comfortable with the tasks they will be required to accomplish for the next several months. The earlier “Civilian traffic cycles need to be considered (although not exclusively) the commander can arrange patrols into sector and get soldiers for determining whether tanks or wheels will roll on a mission. Building immersed in the operational environment, the more confident size varied from one-floor shack houses, two-story mansions, and multilevel apartment and office buildings.” they will be when the training wheels come off and transfer of authority is complete. Task force staff and leaders will most likely not supervise the relief in place closely because they will be busy learning their jobs and becoming familiar with the multi- scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant controlled two re- ple sectors under task force control. Company leaders must pro- maining scout sections and the headquarters tank crews). This vide clear guidance and initiative for a successful relief in place. task organization provided each platoon with the ability to con- Company leaders will be required to meet with community lead- duct the full spectrum of operations, to include zone recons ers and influential Iraqis in sector to minimize confusion among (formerly known as presence patrols), raids, and other activities the populace by identifying the responsible authority in sector related to light operations. It also allowed each platoon to con- and establish close relationships necessary for stability opera- duct missions, such as fixed checkpoints, fixed-site security, tions and support operations. Visits to all pertinent centers of grav- zone recons (during hours of light traffic), quick reaction forces ity in the sector will familiarize leaders with these areas and (QRF) for raids, cordon missions, and other activities, with the help build the template for future patrols and humanitarian proj- heavy armor of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. During the ects. Political party headquarters, community leaders, and tribal occasional task force-level operations, the task organization was leaders all have influence in sector and can serve as force mul- adjusted to give the scouts more consolidated manpower for tipliers when conducting operations by spreading information on raids and building clearing, and allow the tankers to concentrate coalition projects and positive propaganda. Community leaders on outer-cordon security. legitimize their positions and increase their clout by being seen Cross training 19Ds and 19Ks on each other’s respective tasks with coalition forces and participating in reconstruction projects. improved the company’s ability to accomplish missions with Properly assessing the state of the infrastructure in sector is ob- this unique task organization. HMMWV driver’s training was an viously key to reconstruction efforts and building the local pop- ongoing event and curfew hours were a perfect time to train new ulace’s trust. The residents of the sector will expect miraculous soldiers on driving in realistic terrain. Select scouts could also speed in re-establishing electricity, sewage, water treatment, and

28 — January-February 2004 “Establishing observation points and direct-fire planning can be conducted exactly as in a high-intensity conflict environment, with particular attention to fighting-position construction, wire communications, wire obstacle emplacement, barriers to protect from drive-by shootings, and lighting. Three observation posts (OPs) were used to cover the portion of the perimeter the company manned.”

security. At first glance, the commander will believe that he cannot influence city-level issues such as power and water. In reality, some problems were fixed by replacing common generator parts or wire, or by the coalition simply supervising the station’s management at the local site. The residents can provide some insight into the state of basic utilities, although nothing can replace a visit to the actual power substation, sewage department, or water-pumping facility. Producing electricity may be a theater-level problem solved at higher echelons, but local commanders can improve distribution of available electricity, gar- bage trucks, and clean water. Assessing the competence of city workers and agencies is also vital to improving services since many workers were employed by the former regime based solely on party affiliation and not technical expertise.

Forward Operating Base Establishment and Life Support Mission requirements may require the company to establish a arating sleeping areas for noncommissioned officers (NCOs), forward operating base (FOB) away from the task force head- officers, and soldiers must be considered if space is available. A quarters. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Op- little privacy and time away from the platoon sergeant and pla- erations In Urban Terrain, provides an excellent list of planning toon leader is important to a soldier enduring a yearlong deploy- factors and work priorities for establishing a company FOB.3 ment and is vital to maintaining a healthy command climate and When deciding whether to establish an FOB, the following is- good morale. This, of course, does not excuse leaders from con- sues were considered: ducting regular health and welfare inspections and regularly su- • The company’s sector was located away from the task force pervising soldiers’ living areas. headquarters along a main supply route. Establishing observation points and direct-fire planning can be • The proposed FOB site was already manned (but not devel- conducted exactly as in a high-intensity conflict environment, oped) by the outgoing company in charge of the sector and was with particular attention to fighting-position construction, wire tied in to the perimeter of another brigade’s FOB. communications, wire obstacle emplacement, barriers to protect from drive-by shootings, and lighting. Observation posts • The proximity to the company’s sector allowed informants, (OPs) were used to cover the portion of the perimeter the com- community leaders, and police access (after the required secu- pany manned. The OPs used wire and FM communications to rity search) to meet with company leaders and discuss issues con- cross talk and communicate with the command post. The com- cerning crime and reconstruction. mander of the relief used a Motorola radio to communicate with • The pre-existing buildings located within the FOB allowed the OPs and the command post (CP) without having to stay at soldiers improved quality of living and a measure of comfort the CP. An FOB defense plan was also devised, which required conducive to a long-term mission. increased manning at the OPs, and a wheeled and armored QRF to counterattack enemy forces or provide medical assis- Establishing the FOB and the relief in place should occur si- tance and security to casualties outside the perimeter. Using an multaneously. The first sergeant and the company commander M1A1 tank at an OP is not only an advantage for its thermal should do a joint reconnaissance and assessment of the viability capabilities, multiple weapons capability, and excellent armor, of the site. The first sergeant can provide a realistic expectation but also a psychological deterrent to would-be attackers. The of the site’s potential for improvement and can direct work pri- Iraqis still respect the capabilities (true and exaggerated) of the orities while the commander concentrates on relief in place and Abrams, and placing a tank section on a perimeter or near a soft familiarization of the sector. The first sergeant also decides target greatly reduces the possibility of an attack. Each OP where each platoon will live and how many soldiers can safely must have the basic equipment required by doctrine to be effec- occupy each room since not all the room sizes are the same. Sep- tive such as maps, sector sketches, fire plans, and binoculars.

January-February 2004 — 29 “Once battalion commanders had access to discretionary funds to work on projects, the information officer would write proposals for projects in sector nominated by the NAC. The NAC was required to provide three estimates from three different contractors. Detailed receipts and a scope of work were also required. The information officer would then write a proposal, including digital photographs of the site.”

Coolers and overhead shade are also required during the sum- Repairing the electrical system was a joint effort between lo- mer months. cally hired electricians (some with questionable technical skills) The company’s battle rhythm will also be an important aspect and a member of the company who happened to be a former of conducting sustained operations that will last up to a year. generator mechanic and licensed electrician. Overhauling the The task organization was adjusted to allow for three platoons wiring and circuit breakers was necessary to manage the load to rotate red-, amber-, and green-cycle duties. The red platoon produced by the air conditioners. The battalion’s purchase of a was responsible for force protection duties, dining facility/day 100-kilowatt generator provided the company with enough pow- room cleaning, serving during meals, logistics and commander er to run the air conditioners and power the FOB when the city’s escort duty, and improvement projects inside the FOB. The am- power grid was down. ber platoon was in charge of fixed-site security at remote loca- A separate structure for the dining facility and the day room tions, and last minute, directed missions from higher command. allowed soldiers to eat their meals away from their sleeping ar- The green platoon focused exclusively on patrols and projects eas (minimizing vermin and parasites in the rooms) and provid- in sector. The rotations for these cycles were 1-week intervals. ed company leaders a separate place to inspect soldiers and A week is the perfect balance between having a constant state equipment. On entering the dining facility for a meal, an NCO of change and becoming stagnant and risking complacency. would stand at the door and observe weapons clearing proce- Guard duty and other red duties are essential tasks, but unless dures and cleanliness. The communal setting of the dining facil- properly rotated into other duties, soldiers can easily become ity allowed for more interaction among leaders and soldiers and bored and careless. A weekly change of pace and operational also provided a family dinner time atmosphere that increased in tempo is enough to keep the company mentally alert and profi- importance during the holidays or special events such as birth- cient in all company operations. days or promotions. Field sanitation standards must be enforced rigorously to main- Other contracts secured for improving the company FOB in- tain health. The lack of working latrines, limited sources of po- cluded overhead shade for the HMMWV line (the heat caused a table water, and a preponderance of flies and other parasites can fail-5 message on the radios), repairing drainage and sewage render a company combat ineffective if company leaders do not lines to minimize standing water, and an internet cafe for sol- enforce hygiene discipline. One platoon took the initiative and diers. The company FOB did not fall into the division plan for built a burn toilet, shower (nonpotable), and washbasins out of internet kiosks, and the soldiers had limited access to morale pre-existing materials. All of the platoons cleaned up the area phones and e-mail. A local national working as an interpreter with the help of local hires (using funds provided by the battal- had extensive computer and network knowledge and set up a ion). Each element of the field sanitation kit was used in this en- cluster of five computers and a satellite internet connection in vironment — mousetraps, bug repellent, flypaper, mesh screen- the day room. After signing the division’s computer-use agree- ing, lime, and bleach was consumed very quickly, so purchase a ment concerning restrictions and operations security measures, surplus of these items. the soldiers used the computers for e-mail and internet calls for After establishing security, company battle rhythm, and ad- a low hourly fee. Adding internet kiosks was the single largest dressing field sanitation issues, leaders prioritized other proj- morale event for soldiers. Soldiers could now stay in touch with ects for improving the company FOB: their families, stay updated on world events, and conduct video teleconferences with their loved ones almost daily. • Establishing the company command post inside an existing structure. The division did provide Armed Forces Network decoders and • Repairing the looted and damaged electrical system. televisions just in time for football season. Commanders should assess what higher headquarters will realistically provide ver- • Obtaining air conditioning for sleeping areas. sus what will be resourced at their level. Internet access at the • Furnishing another existing building as the company dining company level was a very simple and inexpensive process where- facility/day room. by the provider fronted the costs for all the equipment, to in-

30 — January-February 2004 clude surge protectors and fans to protect the computers. Usage ements in sector (during a crisis event like the UN bombing this was the only cost to soldiers and they were more than willing to will include multiple battalions, civilian agencies, news media, spend a couple of dollars to talk to or e-mail family and friends. and VIPs), coordinate link-up points, and alert QRF personnel. The company executive officer will take over CP duties during Establishing and improving the company FOB is essential to a task force operations or mass casualty events to provide accu- successful long-term deployment. Occupying and improving ex- rate assessments to the task force while the commander devel- isting buildings is much easier, cheaper, and less resource-in- ops the situation on the ground and often away from the task tensive than creating buildings from nothing. Soldiers can sur- force net. vive in any environment and will accomplish their mission while enduring a very low standard of living as shown in recent The best map product for conducting sector operations in Bagh- media reports. During a deployment that is going to last several dad is the satellite imagery (1:5,000-scale with gridlines) pro- months to a year, commanders will improve the morale and ef- vided for each sector. This map was mounted in the CP and fectiveness of their soldiers if they can give them a comfortable streets were labelled using white strips of paper taped to the ac- place to rest, conduct maintenance, and train. Existing struc- etate. Churches, mosques, hospitals, political party headquarters, tures will also improve the effectiveness of a company CP and banks, and other key facilities were also labelled. A series of planning cell by keeping documents, tools, maps, and equip- checkpoints were included and a patrol went out into sector to ment protected from the elements. get 10-digit grids for all the checkpoints in sector (easily identi- fiable intersections and squares). A list of these checkpoints and Command Post Operations grids were given to battalion so they could assemble common Rapidly establishing a working company CP is crucial to sta- graphics for the battalion and use the checkpoint system when bility operations and support operations in Baghdad. The com- referring to areas or points in sector. Another map useful for find- pany CP will bear many similarities to a CP used in a high-in- ing important areas across Baghdad was the tourist map the tensity conflict environment, but the information and tracking company ordered through Amazon.com. This map labelled many requirements will be much greater for a company CP in an FOB. key facilities, hotels, and monuments, and was helpful in navi- Essential tasks to complete during the establishment of the com- gating the streets of Baghdad, especially when patrols were re- pany CP include FM communications, properly labelling all quired to link-up outside of the assigned company sector. Bagh- maps and battle tracking tools, a board for the information offi- dad’s neighborhoods are broken down into sections known as cer and civil affairs-related projects, and a method for recording “mahallas.” A three-digit number similar to an area code identi- end of mission reports. fies these mahallas. The locals use this numbering system often when describing events in certain areas. Because of this, label- The company will need a minimum of three secure nets run- ling the map with each of the mahallas is very important. The ning at any one time. To include all elements of the CP in one 1st Armored Division’s terrain team was also helpful in provid- room, we removed the radios from the first sergeant’s M113 and ing special maps covering specific areas in sector. placed them in a large ground-floor room in one of the buildings in the FOB. The M113 stayed right outside the CP room to The popularity of the satellite imagery cannot be overstated. provide power for the radios. This required the CP NCO in The imagery provided resolution that allowed leaders to plan charge (NCOIC)/officer in charge (OIC) to start the M113 ev- raids and cordons for individual houses, and its large size al- ery two hours to keep the batteries charged. The nets used were lowed for easy battle tracking. Properly labelling the map also the battalion command, company command, and force protec- allows for quick identification of key sites and familiarization tion nets used by the entire perimeter, to include adjacent units with the sector. and gate guards. The force protection net was necessary in the Several large dry-erase boards are also important for battle event that a local national visitor (council member, informant, or tracking in the CP. The company tracks each patrol and every interpreter) was present at the gate and needed an escort to the section of troops on fixed-site security. Key information, such company area. The CP also had a Motorola radio as a secondary as number of troops/vehicles, bumper numbers, route, purpose, method of communication. Two OE-254s were placed on the roof of the CP building to maximize the range for communications with battalion and the majority of downtown Baghdad for patrols in or out of sector on the company net. Baghdad has very few buildings over three stories tall and raising the base of the OE-254 to a height of 15 feet provided excellent range, out to 20 kilometers in most instances (with working power ampli- fiers). As in any combat environment, proper battle tracking, situational awareness, and command and control are key to any successful military operation. The first and most important element of a successful CP is the capabilities of the soldier behind the radio. During operations in Baghdad, at a minimum, one NCO or officer was always on duty in the CP. Too many units put young privates and specialists on radio watch/CP duty, who do not have the experience, authority, or confidence to make maneuver decisions or answer complex questions to higher units about operations in sector. At any given time, there may be four or five maneuver elements in sector and the commander and first sergeant may be in a council meeting, or unable to commu- “Large projects, such as soccer fields and road repair, would be given an nicate with all the elements on the ground. The CP NCOIC/OIC opening ceremony and advertised throughout the neighborhood as a will provide accurate reports to battalion, accurately track all el- joint coalition and NAC project.”

January-February 2004 — 31 and OIC/NCOIC, are tracked on the patrol board. This informa- sector. Police stations, political party headquarters, hospitals, tion is forwarded to battalion and updates on the patrol’s loca- clinics, and key religious sites should form the majority of these tion are tracked on the satellite imagery board with an adhesive photos. The information officer will also have various psycho- sticker. Another dry-erase board is used for tracking significant logical operations and civil affairs pamphlets and handouts so events in or out of sector — our “bolo” list that contains suspi- patrols can grab a stack and hand them out while on patrol. cious vehicles or people to watch, and significant route clos ings A patrol completes its mission with an end of mission report. due to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These reports should include detailed information on the route, As the number of IED attacks increased in July 2003, the commission, significant events, and a small narrative about the pa- pany started tracking IED trends by marking the locations of trol. The patrol leader completes the report and the commander IED attacks on a 1:50,000 Baghdad special map. This allowed reviews it before sending his daily commander’s update. leaders to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and route planning prior to executing a mission. Main sup- An organized CP with the adequate tools and products will ease ply routes were exclusively targeted and therefore avoided when- the burden on leaders to continuously pull information from ever possible. Overpasses were also popular with terrorists for stacks of daily staff journals (DA Form 1594) and allow the com- IED and grenade attacks. pany to focus on its mission. Good standard operating procedures and leaders engaged in CP operations are crucial when The company fire support officer served as the information of- routine patrols become crisis events such as the UN compound ficer or targeting officer. This role was possibly one of the most bombing and other mass-casualty events. demanding in the company. He accompanied the commander to all neighborhood council meetings, tracked all reconstruction The Neighborhood Advisory Council projects in sector, and wrote proposals for future projects. Some projects proposed by the company may cost more than $60,000 The neighborhood advisory council (NAC) is the primary link and include nongovernment organizations and government con- between the military and the local population. These NACs are tractors, and require constant supervision of Iraqi subcontrac- elected officials who work in each mahalla and represent local tors at work sites. The information officer’s position is impor- residents. Although these NACs were elected, the sector com- tant because he is the buffer between the commander and the in- mander has every right to dismiss a representative or appoint a fluential (and less-than-influential) personnel in sector. If the new one, depending on performance, attitude, and willingness company commander met with everyone who wanted help or to serve the community. A company commander in charge of a needed something, that would be his only mission. Therefore, sector can be supervising up to three NACs, depending on the the information officer needs to have a special place in the CP size of his sector. The first meetings with the NACs could be de- to present his information so patrols can identify key locations scribed as chaotic, unproductive, and frustrating. The confusion and projects in sector. stems from both parties (U.S. forces and council members) not really understanding the NAC’s purpose. Some thought it was a The information officer should display photographs of influ- neighborhood watch program or an informant network; some ential people in sector with a brief biography. This includes believed it was a steppingstone to joining the city council. The neighborhood action council members, political party leaders, fact is, the NACs reflected the will of what the commander on police chiefs, and religious leaders. Having the photographs the ground believed the neighborhood needed. posted in the CP allows patrols to become familiar with these individuals and meet with them regularly during patrols to form A/2-37 Armor was responsible for two NACs. The first few good relationships. A similar collection of pictures can be formed NAC meetings were huge gatherings of people lining up to ask of criminals or suspicious personnel in sector who are known to for help from coalition forces and complain about the lack of be trouble. The same system must be used for buildings in sec- security, utilities, and jobs. The NACs had to be taught how to tor. Pictures of key facilities and buildings are important for the run an effective meeting. They were also taught how to present first few weeks so patrols can easily identify the buildings in their problems. The best teaching model to use to train the NACs

“The Iraqi police force has become a mobile, professional force with radio communications. The reaction time for the police has increased ten-fold due to effective training and improved patrol techniques. U.S. forces trained the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and implemented them into daily patrols, which has made enormous positive impacts on Iraqi life.”

An Iraqi Civil Defense Course instructor teaches an Iraqi recruit room clearing techniques during urban warfare training.

32 — January-February 2004 how to function is the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). media representative who can invite local journalists to attend The MDMP is just a model based on problemsolving tech- the opening ceremonies of certain projects. niques. It teaches people how to approach a problem and decide the best course of action to solve the issue. After a short class on In time, a good NAC will present their projects at the weekly the MDMP, the meetings became much more effective. The meeting, brief what they have accomplished on their own, and meetings went from, “we don’t have any electricity, please fix present any issues that specifically need solving through mili- it” to “we don’t have any electricity in mahalla 706 due to a cir- tary or police channels. The commander of the sector should be cuit box that has been damaged. We need a new circuit box that there to provide guidance, reassurance, and answer any ques- will cost $200.” Addressing the problems in this manner gives tions NACs might have. The information officer will be there to the commander a quantifiable problem and the information nec- provide updates on funding for future projects, collect feedback essary to solve the problem. It also empowers the council to on the projects in sector, and coordinate any further meetings find civil engineers, electricians, plumbers, and phone techni- throughout the week. cians needed to diagnose real problems. The Next Step It took several weeks for us to determine how to best solve these problems once they were reasonably presented. The chair- Since August 2003, the company has placed more emphasis on man of each NAC would present their individual issues. After reconstruction-oriented patrols, as opposed to security patrols. all the issues and possible solutions were presented, the com- The Iraqi police force has become a mobile, professional force mander allotted assets to each problem. Many utility issues with radio communications. The reaction time for the police has were solved with a visit to the power substation, water pumping increased ten-fold due to effective training and improved patrol plant, or sewage treatment facility. Many workers in those plants techniques. U.S. forces trained the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were unwilling to leave their offices to actually repair neglected (ICDC) and implemented them into daily patrols, which has utilities. A U.S. Army patrol with heavily armed soldiers enter- made enormous positive impacts on Iraqi life. Dismounted pa- ing a sewage treatment facility is usually enough motivation to trols of U.S. forces and ICDC personnel were literally applaud- persuade workers to get in a truck and go repair a problem. The ed by locals as they patrolled. As ICDC personnel gain confi- patrol leader may have to threaten the foreman with his job if he dence and experience, they will take over more patrolling duties is unwilling to help, but mostly all they want is an escort to the in sector and put more of an Iraqi face to reconstruction efforts. site. It became common practice to assign patrols to a weekly Terrorist attacks remain a threat and targeting former regime “utilities recon” and visit all the power substations, water plants, loyalists and foreign-based terrorists must continue. However, telecommunications sites, and other city functions to ensure good if reconstruction efforts are ignored, local residents will become working relationships and update supervisors on problems in the more frustrated with coalition forces. Company commanders neighborhood that need addressing. and platoon leaders will need to conduct more direct coordina- Once battalion commanders had access to discretionary funds tion with nongovernment organizations and the Coalition Pro- to work on projects, the information officer would write propos- visional Authority (CPA) to focus on infrastructure projects in als for projects in sector nominated by the NAC. The NAC was every sector of Baghdad. Escorting civil engineers to inspect required to provide three estimates from three different contrac- school reconstruction projects, bringing CPA personnel into sectors. Detailed receipts and a scope of work were also required. tor to evaluate water-pumping and power stations, and support- The information officer would then write a proposal, including ing the local government in sector through an aggressive infor- digital photographs of the site. The battalion commander would mation operations campaign are just some examples of the mis- approve or disapprove projects, and as soon as the money was sions that are making the biggest impact. Every sector in Bagh- available, the information officer would tell the contractor to dad is different, and commanders need to make judgments based start work (some more expensive projects were forwarded to non- on security, demographics, and available assets. Commanders government organizations who occasionally attended NAC will not find instructions on how to pacify their sector in a field meetings). This system worked much faster than expected, and manual or mission training plan. They need to think creatively, once the NAC understood the process, they had a true purpose: be flexible, and empower their subordinates. identify where the neighborhood needs reconstruction, provide fair and reasonable estimates from local contractors, and supervise the project. This gave each individual member a pet project, in which they took great pride. Large projects, such as soc- Notes cer fields and road repair, would be given an opening ceremony 1U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 28 February 2002, Chapter 14: Stability Operations and and advertised throughout the neighborhood as a joint coalition Support Operations, p. 14-1. and NAC project. 2Ibid., p. 2-9. Projects completed in sector within a given month included: 3Ibid., p. 14-4. two road repair projects totalling $90,000; two $7,000 soccer fields; a $4,000 sewage project, with new pipes installed to improve drainage; a new $300 circuit switch at the telephone sta- CPT Roger Maynulet is currently serving as commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Baghdad. He tion; and an $800 generator to provide power to the community received a B.A. from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. His swimming pool filter system. Other projects, such as trash bins military education includes Aviation Captains Career Course, Scout Pla- for the entire neighborhood, a construction project to replace the toon Leaders Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, run-down market stands with permanent kiosks, and more road and Combined Arms and Service Staff School. He has served in various repairs, have also been completed. command and staff positions, to include battalion S4, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Friedburg, Germa- Giving due credit to the NACs for their hard work and ensur- ny; S3 plans officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg; task ing these accomplishments are passed on to the local media is force scout platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cav- crucial to establishing the trust between the NACs and the alry Division, Bosnia; and M1A2 tank platoon leader, D Company, 1st neighborhoods. One NAC member should be designated as the Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX.

January-February 2004 — 33 The First Afghan National Army T-62 Tank Gunnery by Captain Jonathan Byrom and Captain Aaron Parker

As the 11 members of the Blackhorse ar- a tank crew gunnery skills test (TCGST). • Station 3 – PKT 7.62mm machinegun. mor embedded trainer team wearily de- The first issue that arose in developing • Station 4 – prepare the T-62 turret for planed the C17 in the middle of the ear- this skills test was that the team had no operation. ly-June night at the blacked-out Kabul air- training on the T-62 tank. Our only means port, they had no clue as to the challeng- to learn the tank was through a Roma- • Station 5 – boresight the T-62 tank. es that waited. Who knew that months nian mobile training team. We spent nu- • Station 6 – clear and load the 115mm earlier, numerous dilapidated T-62 tanks merous hours climbing around the turret main gun. were delivered on heavy equipment trans- with these Romanians as they explained ports and then towed to position in the the operation of the gun system. These • Station 7 – perform misfire procedures ankle-deep dust of the motor pool. Poly- Romanian T-62 experts proved helpful for the T-62 main gun. charki, the future home of the Afghan Na- both in teaching the Afghan crews and tional Army, would be home for the next teaching the Americans enough about the The first Afghan TCGST took place on 5 months. tank that we could guide training toward a hot and dusty day in late-August 2003. the common goal of firing gunnery. The trainer team for 1st Company spent The team’s ultimate mission was to mo- the morning in the motor pool on the tur- tivate Afghan soldiers to train as a quick- Another method used in training the Af- ret tasks, coordinating with the Roma- reaction force for the Central Afghanistan ghan crews was to draw from their inter- nian soldiers, as they tested the leaders Corps. The team, made up of one major, nal knowledge of the T-62 tank. The com- of the Afghan National Army. They then four captains, one lieutenant, one first ser- pany commander, 1st Company, 3d Bat- supervised the Afghan leaders as they geant, and three sergeants first class, be- talion, 3d Brigade, Central Afghan Corps, tested their soldiers. This system of train- gan the arduous task of preparing the for- had been fighting in wars for the past 14 the-tester was efficient and allowed the eign soldiers for combat. To prepare the years (he was only 28 years old), and had entire company to test in one morning. battalion for combat, we identified the top commanded a tank company against the We learned during the testing that the priority of teaching crews to accurately Taliban in the defense of Bagram. He week of classes taught by the Romanian fire tanks as quickly as possible. This ab- knew the tank intimately and was ex- trainers had been very effective in pro- breviated journey toward the first gun- tremely valuable in teaching his soldiers viding the groundwork for basic T-62 op- nery for the Afghan National Army was and evaluating them during training. erations. The trainer team noticed, though, a wild ride and led to many lessons that Our three master gunners on the team that the best teachers for the young Af- we want to share with the armor commu- ghan privates and sergeants were the ex- nity as other teams prepare to train dem- applied these sources of knowledge to create a T-62 TCGST. Although there perienced Afghan leaders — the platoon ocratic armies in Iraq and other parts of leaders and company commander. Un- the world. could be much debate about which tasks to include in this list, our gunnery ex- like the U.S. Army, which takes prides in Train Up perts chose the most important tasks to the expertise of its senior noncommis- master to conduct a safe and efficient sioned officers, the new Afghan Army The first step toward gunnery for Af- gunnery. The final product consisted of: relies heavily on their officers because ghan soldiers was the train up on the T- they were chosen for these leader posi- 62. The trainer team decided to use the • Station 1 – ammunition identification. tions due to their combat experience and U.S. Army’s method of training crews for • Station 2 – vehicle identification. education level.

34 — January-February 2004 We finished the day by focusing on the gunnery administration area, ammuni- es. This enabled the battalion to execute vehicle identification testing. Afghan sol- tion point, the security guard force posi- a 2-week gunnery using the tools and in- diers were especially interested in the ve- tions, and the medical area. As we com- formation described within the SOP for hicles of their neighboring countries. We pleted the diagram for the range set-up, future gunneries. Focusing on support briefed the normal slides that all U.S. all of the resupply factors were identified. prior to execution yielded huge benefits tank battalions use, focusing on Soviet, during the gunnery and set the standard American, and European vehicles; how- The embedded trainers’ goal was to en- for future tank gunneries. ever, the soldiers asked many questions sure that the gunnery support would set about neighboring countries’ vehicles, the standard for future gunneries, and re- Range Execution such as Iran, Pakistan, India, and China. inforce the availability of resupply through For those teams preparing to train Iraq’s contractors until the battalion could be- The first day of gunnery fell on a Satur- emerging army, we recommend perusing come logistically self-sufficient. Our train- day in early September following a week Jane’s er team established guidelines in the fol- of mechanical and electrical remote tank vehicle identification books prior lowing weeks, and Afghan leaders and firing. The Afghans found this foreign to these types of classes. Another prob- the trainer team executed all control mea- idea of firing the tank while outside lu- lem during the vehicle identification test- sures for range operations and support dicrous, but nonetheless conducted the ing was that over 50 percent of the com- execution on 6 September 2003. The bat- mandatory test-fire of the 40-year-old vin- pany was illiterate. We solved this prob- talion completed a final planning/support tage tanks. To our surprise, every tank lem by testing these soldiers verbally. recon and coordination meeting prior to fired, no turrets were sent into the air, nor The other obstacle encountered during day 1 of the tank gunnery. This coordina- were any breeches blown out of battery. the TCGST testing was acquiring the tion meeting settled any unresolved is- Gunnery began on schedule. We found it PKT coaxial machine gun. We discov- sues or supply shortfalls and ensured ef- interesting that the armor battalion com- ered that the Afghan National Army does ficient execution of the range. mander, a former general in the fight not own any PKTs. Therefore, we fo- against the Taliban, cancelled weekend cused on the loader’s 12.7mm DShK ma- Trainer team members used the plan- duty for the Afghan tankers because he chine gun, which the Afghanistan minis- ning process to assist the support compa- did not want them to lose focus prior to try of defense provided days earlier. Be- ny commander and battalion S3 in devel- this historic day. cause of the absence of the coaxial ma- oping a battalion T-62 tank gunnery stan- chine gun, we were unable to conduct a dard operating procedure (SOP). This The first safety briefing to the firing traditional Table V during this first gun- SOP clarified for the battalion the pro- crews was conducted early in the morn- nery, or incorporate coaxial machine gun cess of how to identify, establish, assess, ing; then the company commander was engagements into the tables. We did con- develop, and coordinate all executions of provided a translated copy of the brief- duct a familiarization fire with the 12.7- a standard T-62 tank gunnery range. It al- ing for the following days on the range. mm loader’s machine gun to give the so provided guidance for company-level The trainer team used this method of crews some machine gun capability with small arms ranges and live-fire exercis- teaching — show them once, then have their tanks. The trainer team’s mission of preparing the Afghan National Army for combat and security missions forced us to modify our vision of the perfect T-62 gunnery. We trained the Afghan National Army on the weapons they already had in their possession, in case they received urgent missions to conduct checkpoint and presence patrol operations in the tu- multuous world of Afghan politics. Range Set Up and Support After verifying the basic tank gunnery skills of 1st Company, the trainer team began the arduous task of training 3d Company on how to set-up and support a tank gunnery range. Members of the trainer team received this assignment and set to work on this task. In the beginning, there were many coordination areas to cover. To identify logistics requirements for gunnery support, 3d Company trainers set-up a coordination meeting with the battalion staff and headquarters company elements. Once all parties involved in the gunnery execution understood what they where expected to do, 3d Company “The first step toward gunnery for Afghan soldiers was the train up on the T-62. The trainer team trainers conducted a reconnaissance of decided to use the U.S. Army’s method of training crews for a tank crew gunnery skills test (TC- the gunnery range, with the supporting GST). The first issue that arose in developing this skills test was that the team had no training on company commander, and developed a the T-62 tank. Our only means to learn the tank was through a Romanian mobile training team. We range plan for support assets. The focus spent numerous hours climbing around the turret with these Romanians as they explained the op- of this recon was the organization of the eration of the gun system.”

January-February 2004 — 35 “The first day of gunnery fell on a Saturday in early September following a week of mechanical and electrical remote tank firing. The Afghans found this foreign idea of firing the tank while outside ludicrous, but nonetheless, conducted the mandatory test-fire of the 40-year-old vintage tanks. To our surprise, every tank fired, no turrets were sent into the air, nor were any breeches blown out of battery.”

them execute — because we found it to target acquisition and crew drills before ing to the tower. (The tower was a fold- be very successful. The Afghan soldier’s bounding and firing-on-the-move. ing table with multiple radios). We held paradigm of army operations and sys- an in-depth after-action review following tems differs greatly from the U.S. Ar- We began the first day of gunnery by ze- the completion of day 1 firing. After mov- my’s methods. This difference in range roing/confirming boresights of the T-62 ing tanks around the range for the after- execution created problems when we did tanks. For the confirmation firing, each noon following the loss of control by the not use both a rehearsal and an embed- crew received three rounds. As soon as Afghan tower, the trainer team advisors ded trainer to augment the explanation of a tank hit a target at 1500 meters, we explained range operations again to Af- our systems to show the Afghans what moved that tank from the range and al- ghan leaders to prevent repeating the first we thought right looked like. lowed the next vehicle to fire. If the tank day’s growing pains. After analyzing these had problems with the first two rounds, problems, our team concluded we could The gunnery tables put together by our we would send the contracted Afghan tur- have avoided these problems by conduct- outstanding team of master gunners con- ret mechanics or the Romanian experts ing a mounted rehearsal of range opera- sisted of three tables. The first table was to the tank to confirm that the crew had tions with the Afghan leaders. the typical Tank Table IV, consisting of boresighted properly. Most of the prob- the tank crew proficiency course. We then lems with first-round hits were due to On day 2 of gunnery, focus shifted from designed a Tank Table V, the machine gun improper boresight or a mechanical prob- zeroing the main gun to 12.7mm DShK table, followed by a culminating Tank Ta- lem with the tank. After a full day of con- familiarization. The Romanians and Af- ble VI or qualification table. The tough- firming boresights, over 80 percent of the ghans had helped teach classes on this est obstacle was the range. The only tar- available tanks verified their boresights weapon, but we found during the initial gets we could use were hard targets be- with hits on a 1500-meter tank hull. firing that the weapons were not func- tween the ranges of 400 and 1900 me- tioning efficiently and needed some work ters. Also, we could only fire from four The biggest issue during this first day by the Romanian weapons experts. We concrete pads, eliminating the option of was controlling the range. As embedded also determined that the Afghans were firing on the move. Range control dictat- trainers, we wanted the Afghan armor not as well versed in this machine gun as ed that we only fire from these pads be- companies to learn to run their own rang- with their coaxial. For example, after cause dismounted infantry uses the mul- es without the embedded trainers com- close inspection of the ammunition belts, tipurpose range complex for live fires, pletely taking over the range. This goal we determined that the Afghans had made precluding the use of dud-producing am- proved unattainable during the first day a minor error in loading the ammunition munition. As the only available ammuni- because the Afghans did not have proper belts, which was causing the weapons to tion was dud producing, high-explosive radio control between the tower and the fire single shot. One lesson learned for rounds, we were limited to firing station- tanks. We found ourselves chasing tanks future trainers in various countries is to ary main gun scenarios from one firing whose crews decided to move from the insist on receiving training on various line. These limitations were welcomed, staging area, past the ammunition point, weapons and vehicles in the country’s only because they allowed us to focus on and directly to the firing line without talk- inventory prior to arriving in country.

36 — January-February 2004 Our trainer team received familiarization took one look at the American and Afghan er still did not understand the necessity classes on the weapons when we arrived soldiers with their weapons and took off of pushing tanks through the firing order. in country, but we were not experts and running. Thus, we had to move the herd The Afghan commander did not have relied heavily on the Romanian trainers. off the range, which may be a future call- tanks waiting to occupy the firing pads ing for some members on our team. I ex- when the others finished. He also did not In the afternoon on day 2, we began Tank pect that other teams throughout Afghan- have a comfortable tracking system for Table IV, tank crew proficiency course istan or Iraq may encounter similar diffi- the scenarios, which would allow him to (TCPC). The in-depth rehearsals for the culties with local wildlife. control the tanks on different scenarios. tank tables we would fire on day 3 proved Thus, whenever a tank had a problem on highly effective as a rehearsal for the qual- After clearing the range, we began the the firing line, the tower waited for the ification table. The trainer team walked qualification run with a live-fire rehears- crew to fix the problem before continu- the platoon leaders through the TCPC al for the entire company. Because the ing. The Americans fixed this problem scenarios (the same scenarios we were idea of gunnery was so new for the Af- by taking over the range operation for a using for actual firing) by sitting on the ghan tankers, the trainer team embedded few hours and pushing tanks through the tanks and pointing out exactly at which advisors decided to have the company scenario to show Afghan leaders how the targets to fire. After they trained a num- commander fire the entire scenario for his range could run when managed efficient- ber of key leaders, these key leaders soldiers as a makeshift rehearsal. We gath- ly. Once again, a mounted rehearsal with trained the other crews. This method ered the entire company just behind the four tanks would have prevented the train- forced the key Afghan leaders to master firing line and explained each scenario to er team from running the range and helped the Table VI scenarios. After completing the tankers as the commander fired. This accomplish the higher goal of advising, the leader training, the TCPC lanes moved rehearsal process proved very effective rather than running the tank range. very quickly and the rest of the 16 crews in focusing crews on which targets they completed their proficiency course. should shoot in each scenario and gave The second day of qualification, day 4, was a huge improvement over the first The highlight of this second day of us a chance to discuss points of improvement directly with the crews before they day of Table VI. During our after-action training was the improved control of the review the day before, we challenged Af- range by the Afghan leaders. Our after- fired. The soldiers asked many questions that saved time later in the day. After the ghan leaders to begin boresighting much action review achieved its purpose as the earlier and have the first round down- range support company established a ra- rehearsal, we moved the first tanks up to the firing line and began Table VI. range by 0900 hours. Much to our sur- dio plan for controlling movement on the prise, they fired their first round the next range. They emplaced one radio at the Table VI went fairly smooth, although morning by 0855 hours. Another point of tank parking line, one radio at the ammu- we had a number of problems with crews discussion during the after-action review nition point, one radio at a control point, trying to figure out why we were shoot- was pushing crews through the scenarios one radio at the firing line, and multiple ing a set scenario. The trainer team advi- with efficient and safe throughput. After radios at the tower. A tank received or- sors had envisioned the four tanks firing seeing the trainer team coordinate tank ders to move from the support area to the in succession down the line, but the tow- movement on the range the day before, ammunition point, then to the control point, and finally on to the firing line. The Afghans insisted on moving four tanks on-line, after passing the control point, and parking four tanks on the concrete pads simultaneously. We were very pleased with the control of the range after these minor adjustments by the Af- ghan supporting and firing companies. On day 3, the qualification run began with high hopes for firing the entire company in one day. The qualification day, though, began later than desired due to the recurring problem of timely boresighting. The Afghan leaders decided to boresight on the four “level” concrete pads to ensure accuracy. Hence, the tanks had to move through the various control points in groups of four to the concrete pads, which took longer than desired. Therefore, the company did not start firing until mid-morning. Second, a large herd of sheep wandered onto the range just as the range prepared to go hot. This herd allowed the trainer team to receive job-training experience “The biggest issue during this first day was controlling the range. As embedded trainers, we wanted the Afghan armor companies to learn to run their own ranges without the embedded in herding sheep. Accompanied by a cou- trainers completely taking over the range. This goal proved unattainable during the first day be- ple of Afghan soldiers, the trainer team cause the Afghans did not have proper radio control between the tower and the tanks. We members raced onto the range in their found ourselves chasing tanks whose crews decided to move from the staging area, past the SUV to ask the shepherd to move his ammunition point, and directly to the firing line without talking to the tower. (The tower was a large flock off the range. The shepherd folding table with multiple radios).”

January-February 2004 — 37 the Afghan leaders responded with an essary coaxial machine guns. We had ini- gained confidence that their weapons sys- amazing change of pace the second day. tially planned for moving engagements tem can fire and destroy targets, which The armor embedded trainers made nu- on Tables IV and VI to verify the work- is a necessity as they prepare to conduct merous changes to the range that proved ing stabilization systems on the tanks, but real-world checkpoints and presence pa- highly beneficial during the next day of sharing the range with dismounted in- trols within weeks. qualification gunnery. First, we moved fantry prevented us from using dud-pro- the tower close to the firing line so that ducing ammunition. Our armor embedded trainers experi- the range officer in charge (OIC) could enced many frustrations as we prepared influence the firing line if a problem oc- To evaluate the crews on these tables, for this first gunnery. This gunnery, though, curred. Moving leaders forward greatly the trainer team decided to use a “T” was not even close to our vision for what increased safe tank throughput. (trained), “P” (proficient), and “U” (un- the Afghan National Army armor battal- trained) scoring system for the gunnery, ion can accomplish in the near future. On day 1 of qualification, seven Afghan rather than a numerical score. We also We plan to continue to improve the gun- crews fired. On day 2, the Afghan com- did not have the capability of using “jump” nery train-up and execution and eventu- pany fired 16 crews including re-fires, and plugs on the radios to monitor the crew ally reach the goal of firing at moving was completed with the range by 1500 fire commands because the crews were targets from a moving T-62 using ther- hours. Rather than break for chow, the using Russian radios. We had initially mals. As we gather the logistics resourc- leaders rotated crews through lunch. Over- planned to time the crews but discarded es and the Afghan crews become more all, the tank company fired 16 tanks dur- the idea to focus on crew drills and safe- confident on their tanks, we foresee this ing this first gunnery and qualified 13 of ty. Therefore, we either scored the crew advanced gunnery becoming a reality. For these tanks with four tanks having to re- with a hit or miss on the target. If the those teams coming to Afghanistan or fire. crew hit the targets on the first round, we going to Iraq or other countries to help gave them a “T” for that engagement. If with nation-building, we encourage you Tank Table Scenarios and Scoring they hit the target with the second round, to push through the frustrations and lo- Included are the gunnery tables we used we gave them a “P” for the engagement. gistics/maintenance challenges because for this first gunnery. If they completely missed the target with these armies have the potential to defend both rounds, then they received a “U” for their newfound democracy with the weap- Table IV (rehearsal)/VI: the engagement. For a crew to qualify, ons systems they possess. A1: Stationary flank tank @ 1300-1500 they needed to receive a “T” or “P” in We hope this short glimpse into our ad- meters. Ammo allocation 2 rounds HE. three out of four scenarios. If they did not qualify, then the crew re-fired. Overall, venture allows you to avoid the mistakes A2: Stationary frontal tank @ 800-1000 16 crews fired during the first gunnery. we made and develop a plan far better meters. Ammo allocation 2 rounds HE. Thirteen of the crews qualified on a total than our own! A3: Stationary frontal tank @ 1600-1800 of 23 runs. Some crews had to fire mul- meters. Ammo allocation 2 rounds HE. tiple times to qualify, but the majority A4: Stationary flank tank @ 900-1100 performed well. We found that platoon CPT Jonathan C. Byrom is an armor embed- meters, stationary flank BMP @ 900- leader and platoon sergeant tanks fired ded advisor, 1st Company and Headquarters 1100 meters. Ammo allocation 4 rounds very well and qualified their first time and Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 3d HE. down range. The younger crews had is- Brigade, Afghan National Army, 10th Mountain sues due to lack of experience or lack of Division, Kabul. He received a B.S. from the Table V (coax machine gun): focus on training for gunnery and had to U.S. Military Academy. His military education A1: 1 set troops @ 400-600 meters. Am- re-fire in some cases. includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne mo allocation 100 x 7.62mm. School, and the Scout Platoon Leaders Course, During this first Afghan National Army Armor Captains Career Course, Combined A2: 2 set troops @ 400-600 meters. Am- T-62 gunnery, the Blackhorse armor em- Arms and Staff Services School, and Cavalry mo allocation 200 x 7.62mm. bedded training team learned a great deal Leaders Course. He has served in various A3: Moving, 2 set troops @ 400-600 me- command and staff positions, to include tank about how to train an army of experienced platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and troop ters. Ammo allocation 200 x 7.62mm. warriors who have been fighting for over XO, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regi- A4: 1 set troops @ 400-600 meters. Am- a decade against both the Russians and ment, Buedingen, GE; S3 Air, 1st Squadron, mo allocation 100 x 7.62mm. the Taliban. Afghan army leaders did not 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort A5: Moving, 2 sets troops @ 400-600 always understand our methods of con- Irwin, CA; and commander, A Troop and Head- ducting a safe and efficient gunnery but quarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squad- meters. Ammo allocation 200 x 7.62mm. with many hours of persistent training, ron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin. The constraints for this first gunnery coordination meetings, and after-action CPT Aaron Parker is currently assigned to the were primarily due to logistics and range reviews, we saw them grasp and under- 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA, control issues. The Afghan soldiers fired stand a new method of training soldiers with duty as an armor embedded trainer for the Tables IV and VI, but not Table V be- for combat. It was extremely satisfying 3d Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Brigade, Afghan cause they did not have PKT coaxial ma- for the trainers to see the birth of an or- National Army, Kabul. He is a graduate of Tex- chine guns. We did not feel the crews ganized tank battalion over a 120-day as Christian University. His military education were properly trained to fire a complex period, from tanks that were pushed off includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Air- scenario with the 12.7mm weapons sys- trucks in the motor pool to organized fir- borne School, the Armor Captains Career tem, and we also had to fight through is- ing crews on a gunnery range hitting tar- Course, and Combined Arms and Staff Servic- sues with both machine gun and 12.7mm gets at 1700 meters. During the actual es School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include tank platoon mounts. Therefore, we only conducted the gunnery, we saw them progress in four leader, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 12.7mm familiarization due to safety con- days from having no idea of tank range Fort Hood, TX; support platoon leader, 2d Bat- cerns with the weapons. The team’s mas- operations to having four tanks fire an talion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; and ter gunners prepared Table V scenario for engagement successively with mere sec- regimental training officer, 11th Armored Cav- future gunneries when we have the nec- onds between shots. The Afghan soldiers alry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA.

38 — January-February 2004 Back to the Basics: The Noncommissioned Officers’ Corps

by First Sergeant Keith J. Santos itself as an “Army of One.” In that trans- flanks of an assembly area. What initial- formation, NCOs have slipped in their ly caught my eye about the squad’s de- Looking back over the past 20 years, roles as leaders of soldiers. It is perfectly ployment was their use of terrain: they there have been many changes in our Ar- evident here at the JRTC and in garrison. were in a low area and could not possibly my. We have grown smaller, not an idle Using an after-action review (AAR) ap- see their area of responsibility. But they or mistaken choice of words, as reduc- proach, we need to stop and ask where and were on the flank. The squad leader did ing the size of a force is a simple matter when did we lose focus on what it means not have the experience to adjust the po- of cutting troops. The Army has built to be a noncommissioned officer — a lead- sition based on the local terrain. Yet, as I down, shifting in basing, force structure, er of soldiers. talked with one of the soldiers about missions, and culture. Transformation is, how they were set up, I noticed another therefore, not a new thing for us. The As observer controllers (OCs), we are soldier, a specialist, who had a compass Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) not above the rest of the Army. We have on his load carrying equipment (LCE). I and the Objective Force were mere con- years of experience as troop leaders, and asked him if he knew the proper way to cepts not long ago. The SBCT certifica- as such, this AAR applies to us as well. use and hold the compass. He responded tion exercise is being completed here at the We speak from that experience and our that he knew how to use it. But when I Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) expertise as OCs in saying that junior asked if he knew the proper way to hold as I write this article. NCO ranks of E-5 and E-6 are due for a and use the compass, he admitted that he renaissance of leader values — team lead- Overall, the changes that have taken did not. His sergeant then looked at me ers and squad leaders need to get back to and remarked, “that is a board question,” place in the Army have been positive. In- basics. This not only means understand- creased mobility and flexibility, digitized as if I had somehow tricked his young ing responsibilities and duties, it requires troop. I told both of them, the sergeant command and control, and the lethality identifying shortcomings in meeting chal- of joint combined arms effects recently and his soldier, that knowing how to hold lenges and correcting those failings. If and use a compass is not a question re- demonstrated their significance in Af- the NCO corps will take these steps now, ghanistan and Iraq. But as our Army moves served for boards to trip up the unwary. we will become better and stronger than But it is a common 10-level soldier skill. forward, we need to be certain that we ever as the backbone of the Army. preserve what is important, and correct What really stuck with me in this ex- those areas that need fixing. For the non- Remain Tactically and change was how did an infantry squad commissioned officer (NCO) corps, we Technically Proficient leader come to believe that? Who, if any- need to revalidate our basic values. one, told him that a compass was some- During one of my most memorable ro- thing only to remember when studying Our society has become much more in- tations, I was talking to a dismounted for promotion? Who, if anyone, showed dividually centric — our Army refers to squad that was pulling security along the him what right looks like when it comes

January-February 2004 — 39 to using a compass? Sad to say, he prob- promotion board and pass. All you have it? Did you test him on it? Did you su- ably got that very question on a board to do is memorize a study guide. But can pervise while he was doing it and make and he probably answered it correctly, you apply what you have memorized for corrections to ensure he meets the stan- without having to demonstrate that he the board? That is the fundamental mea- dard?” To all, he answered, “No!” The actually knew what he was talking about. sure of tactical and technical proficiency. staff sergeant had forgotten the NCO Is this what NCOs refer to as “remaining promise that “soldiers are entitled to out- tactically and technically proficient?” Soldiers Are Entitled to standing leadership — I will provide that Outstanding Leadership leadership.” Over the years, we have seen a great many and many great noncommissioned One cold winter morning, one of my fel- Leaders ensure that basic soldier skills officers at the JRTC. Of the latter, there low OCs and I walked around and talked remain the norm. Basic soldiering means have been those who understand and as- to soldiers who were gathered in an as- returning to the basics. There is nothing pire to lead, those who have already per- sembly area. We noticed a soldier on the fancy or secret about basics — precom- fected the art. Of the former, there have perimeter behind a ground-mounted .50- bat inspections (PCIs) and precombat been many who could be great leaders, caliber machine gun. The young soldier checks (PCCs) are basics. At best, they given the proper guidance, mentoring, and looked bewildered. Intrigued, we asked are boring and often painful tasks. It is most importantly, experience to develop him what he was doing, to which he re- for that reason that they are one of the as NCOs. And then there are those who plied, “Watching the road.” We then asked most missed and overlooked tasks. Lead- should have never put on NCO stripes. if he knew how to use the .50-caliber. He ers do not allow PCIs and PCCs to slip. They are, gratefully, in the minority. But said “no,” and explained that his NCO This starts at the lowest level as soon as there are still too many junior NCOs who had just put him on the position. We sought a mission is received. All soldiers should need assistance in developing as leaders. the NCO responsible and asked him why be moving and checking equipment. And he had a soldier on a .50-cal who didn’t NCOs should be right behind them dou- In examining soldiers who lack leader- know how to operate it. The NCO, a staff ble-checking, giving guidance and en- ship, we have to ask if an NCO failed sergeant, replied, “He had a class on it. suring that all tasks are done to standard them along the way. Most failures at the He is just being a knucklehead.” Then we with no short cuts. Performing PCIs and JRTC stem from lack of guidance, expe- asked the harder questions: “Did you re- PCCs early means mistakes are correct- rience, and subsequently knowing what ally teach the soldier or just go through ed early — before they cost lives. When right looks like. Any soldier can go to a the motions? Did the soldier practice with in combat, we must be able to use all as-

“We noticed a soldier on the perimeter behind a ground-mounted .50-caliber machine gun. The young soldier looked bewildered. Intrigued, we asked him what he was doing, to which he replied, “Watching the road.” We then asked if he knew how to use the .50-caliber. He said “no,” and explained that his NCO had just put him on the position. We sought the NCO responsible and asked him why he had a soldier on a .50-cal who didn’t know how to operate it. The NCO, a staff sergeant, replied, “He had a class on it. He is just being a knucklehead.” “...as I talked with one of the soldiers about how they were set up, I noticed another soldier, a specialist, who had a compass on his load carrying equipment (LCE). I asked him if he knew the proper way to use and hold the compass. He responded that he knew how to use it. But when I asked if he knew the proper way to hold and use the compass, he admitted that he did not.”

signed weapons. This means having all needed equipment and the knowledge necessary to use it effectively. Set the Standard; Set the example Early one morning, I noticed a soldier walking across an open field during logistics operations. He had no LCE, no personal weapon, and the chinstrap of his Kevlar was swinging in the breeze. I stopped him, intending to ask what he afternoon, and I was in the assembly area we are bound to do the same for our was doing. To my surprise, the soldier was talking with the first sergeant and XO, young NCOs and soldiers. If we use the a staff sergeant. When I mentioned his when a soldier came running down the basics to guide us, we will get it right. chinstrap swinging, he grew irritated, hill, breathing heavily, and fell almost at abruptly grabbed his strap, and snapped my feet. I looked closer and noticed that it. I told the sergeant he didn’t have to it was the motor sergeant. All he could snap it; I was just making an observation. muster was, “ I’m alive, but wounded. We 1SG Keith J. Santos is currently serving as I saw him about 15 minutes later. He again were ambushed near Youngstown!” Af- the first sergeant, Armor/Mechanized Infantry had the chinstrap undone and still was ter being treated, he had run 1,200 meters Team, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort without LCE or personal weapon. He did cross-country to warn his leaders about Polk, LA. His military education includes Pri- not adhere to the NCO dictum, “no one the situation near the town. His warning mary Noncommissioned Officers Course, Ba- is more professional than I.” saved further loss, because other units sic Noncommissioned Officers Course, and were prohibited from going through the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course. “Set the example,” “lead by example,” He has served in various positions, to include “set the standard,” and “enforce the stan- town until it was secure. Later, all sol- tank platoon sergeant, B Troop, 1st Squadron, dard,” are phrases we use daily. But do we diers inside the town evacuated. Vehicles 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, mean them? Do we adhere to what they and supplies were recovered. The motor CO; gunner, B Company, 1st Battalion, 72d Ar- mean? Do we measure ourselves against sergeant had remembered, “my two ba- mor, Korea; and tank crewman, B Troop, 3d those same standards? And if we do, how sic responsibilities will always be upper- Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Schweinfurt, GE. do we hold up? Soldiers will do as we most in my mind; accomplishment of my do, if we do as we say. If we are not set- mission and the welfare of my soldiers.” ting standards and adhering to them, then our soldiers will do the same no matter Regardless of changes in the Army, the how severely we enforce them. NCOs NCO remains the link between the con- who serve as the standard, teach soldiers ceptual and the physical. NCOs make what looks right. Good soldiers, and most things happen and that remains the bed- are, will follow that correct model. They rock purpose for the NCO corps. Implic- will be happier in doing so because posi- it in that fundamental are some of the tive behavior generates pride. That is things I have mentioned in this article. As why we have standards in the first place. NCOs, we need to step up to the plate and They help maintain good order and dis- lead by example. This means setting and cipline — if they are enforced. Failing to enforcing the standards. It means choos- set standards, or failing to enforce stan- ing the hard right and not the easy wrong. dards, means losing order, discipline, and We are teachers, coaches, and mentors worst of all, control. We all learn this ear- for our own successors. We learned what ly in our careers, which is why we decide right looks like from our predecessors — to stay and become professional leaders. If you allow yourself to slip, you are failing yourself and every soldier who sees you. If you allow your soldiers to slip, “In examining soldiers who lack leader- you are no less guilty. ship, we have to ask if an NCO failed them along the way. Most failures at the Accomplishing the Mission JRTC stem from lack of guidance, expe- and Taking Care of Soldiers rience, and subsequently knowing what right looks like. Any soldier can go to a It would be unfair if I failed to tell you promotion board and pass. All you have about the positive efforts of NCOs. It was to do is memorize a study guide.”

January-February 2004 — 41 Successful Scout Mounted Infiltration by Major O. Kent Strader “Collective training should proceed to section level only after every squad is capable of infiltrating a defile; suppressing, destroying, or obscuring the enemy to allow the HMMWV-mounted element to successfully traverse the defile. Section-level training should stress the ability of the section leaders to command and control their sections, process calls for fire, manage the tempo of infiltration, provide situation reports and updates to platoon headquarters, and coordinate efforts with other ISR collectors, such as engineer reconnaissance teams, brigade reconnaissance team scouts, and combat operation and lasing team (COLT) vehicles.”

Successful scout infiltration is a com- the scout platoon leader’s success. The prepares for the COA decision brief or bined-arms operation. Defining infiltra- battalion S3 is the scout platoon leader’s confirmation brief, as appropriate. Fol- tion is much easier than accomplishing trainer, and in most cases, his rater, and lowing COA approval, the battalion staff it. Current trends at combat training cen- as such, he must take primary responsi- should prepare a reconnaissance and sur- ters show scouts attempting to penetrate bility for the scout during the military de- veillance operations order (OPORD) un- a counterreconnaissance screen or defen- cisionmaking (MDMP) process to ensure der the supervision of the battalion XO, sive position without applying combined he is properly briefed and prepared for with each staff section contributing to the arms or reacting to contact, as prescribed the mission, as well as properly trained. final product. Beginning with the staff in the mission training plan. Additional- Nevertheless, the battalion executive of- principles, the S1 or S4, depending on ly, they conduct poor battle handover be- ficer (XO) synchronizes the staff’s ac- who attends the MDMP, is responsible tween elements and fail to template prob- tions during scout mission preparation. for advising the battalion commander of able lines of contact or probable lines of the scout personnel strength, as well as deployment, resulting in unnecessary ca- Before continuing the discussion on the briefing the scout platoon leader on the sualties. They also have poor crew coor- battalion staff’s responsibilities, it is es- status of casualties and replacements for dination, which exacerbates their reaction sential that we first understand what scout the mission. The S2 should brief any up- to contact deficiencies. platoon leaders need to prepare for the dates to the ISR plan, NAI changes, and mission. Following the mission analysis, priority intelligence requirement (PIR) Complicating the issues even further, bat- scouts should receive a warning order refinement. The S3 should brief the ap- talion staffs typically expend very little from the S3. The S2, with the aid of the proved battalion mission statement, com- energy on preparing the scout platoon for task force engineer should prepare a de- mander’s intent, acceptable risk and con- infiltration — intelligence officers usual- tailed terrain analysis, an enemy situa- cept of the operation. The S4 should prob- ly do not plan redundancy or reposition- tion template, and the most likely cours- ably brief refuel, refit, and rearm times ing contingencies into their intelligence, es of action (MLCOA) and most danger- and locations. The signal officer (SIGO) surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ous enemy courses of action (MDCOA). should brief the retransmission plan and operations. Furthermore, scouts habitu- Once the S2 has conducted terrain anal- line-of-sight (LOS) analysis to maintain ally underutilize dismounts to clear ter- ysis to standard with line-of-sight analy- uninterrupted communications, the re- rain ahead of their trucks. sis, terrain analysis, enemy situation tem- dundant communications plan, and the This article is intended to get all respon- plate down to squad level, air avenues of no-communications contingency. The en- sible parties involved in planning infiltra- approach (AAOA) with the aid of the air gineer officer should brief the enemy ob- tion training and preparing the scout pla- defense officer (ADO), and the MLCOA stacle set, the anticipated reconnaissance toon for infiltration under combat condi- and MDCOA with the approved named objectives of the engineer reconnaissance tions. This article addresses how the staff areas of interest (NAI), he can begin troop teams (ERT), requirements for obstacle should prepare scouts for mission and leading procedures. Additionally, any reports from scouts, and where the bat- combined-arms infiltration training tech- known or suspected enemy locations that talion’s point of penetration is templated. niques. the brigade reconnaissance troop has The chemical officer (CHEMO) should identified must be annotated on the scout brief the scouts on the enemy chemical Planning and Preparing platoon leader’s map board. capabilities, templated targets, down-wind We begin with the battalion staff’s re- After the mission analysis brief is con- hazard areas, and mission-oriented pro- sponsibilities in preparing the scout pla- ducted and the reconnaissance warning tective posture (MOPP). toon leader for the mission. Every staff order has been given to the scout platoon The fire support officer (FSO) provides member has something to contribute to leader, he begins planning while the staff the most important elements of the re-

January-February 2004 — 43 Scout Mission Preparation Checklist

Commander personally gives the scout his intent, commander’s critical informa- pared and die needlessly for is to capture an orange traffic cone with 1 tion requirements (CCIR), and accept- want of information. a chemlite attached for night identifica- able risk tion. Four or more vehicles would start Successful Infiltration at points one kilometer from the cone at S3 provides a detailed ISR Warning Or- 12:00, 3:00, 6:00, and 9:00; or at 12:00, der or OPORD to include concept of the Planning is the cornerstone in 2:00, 4:00, 6:00, and so on, with a terrain operation and PIR any successful synchronized mission; however, the founda- feature of separation. The objective was S2 provides enemy MLCOA/MDCOA, tion is combined-arms infil- to maneuver the vehicle without being enemy situation template, friendly ISR tration training. My experience detected using short halts, crew coordi- locations and T/P nation, terrain driving, and superior gun- with infiltration training was nery to destroy other vehicles, or out ma- S4/BMO provides maintenance priority, learned by trial and error dur- neuver them and get to the cone without status, recovery plan, and resupply plan ing 16 months of command at the Combat Maneuver Train- being killed. This game enhanced crew FSO provides target list and assets avail- pride and esprit and fostered friendly com- able ing Center, Hohenfels, Ger- many, as the chief of recon- petition within the platoon. ENG provides terrain analysis, obstacle naissance and regimental re- The next step in the train up was night template, and ERT locations and T/P connaissance company com- infiltration of a defile blocked by two ADO provides likely enemy AAOA, en- mander, 4th Guards Motorized BMPs or two tanks. The standard was a emy most likely COA and counter COLT Rifle Regiment, and as a scout HMMWV scout squad, consisting of two activity observer controller at the Na- dismounts and a two-man crew, who must tional Training Center, Fort Ir- identify the enemy and use lethal and non- Medical officer provides battalion and win, California. brigade CASEVAC plan for scouts lethal indirect fires to infiltrate through The first building block in the defile without loss. Habitually, the dis- SIGO provides LOS analysis and lost night infiltration training is to mounted scouts would be let off the ve- and redundant communications plan conduct mounted terrain fa- hicle at least four kilometers from the de- CHEMO provides enemy chem/bio weap- miliarization and identify all file, out of sight and sound of the ene- ons capabilities, most likely COA, and primary, secondary, and later- my’s suspected screen line. They would templated targets al routes throughout the train- then attempt to move undetected into the screen line and identify the overwatch- Battalion XO synchronizes the efforts of ing area. Combat crews that cannot be afforded this oppor- ing vehicles, call for fire, adjust smoke the staff to prepare the scout platoon for or illumination, and identify any enemy the mission tunity can benefit from new technological advantages, such dismounted observation posts. It goes Figure 1 as live unmanned aerial vehi- without saying that the coordination be- cle feeds to surmount this ob- tween the crew and the dismount team stacle. Nonetheless, at home sta- was essential to the survival of the vehi- tion our crews worked on crew cle; however, the MTOE in most scout coordination, terrain driving, oc- platoons supports six scout HMMWVs, cupying hull-down positions, plus two-man dismount teams. After the connaissance and surveillance OPORD and selecting hide sights. It is important platoon leader receives the warning or- — the approved essential fire support to note, all our high mobility, multipur- der from the staff, he must conduct a mis- tasks (EFSTs), the method to suppress, pose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) scouts sion analysis and, if need be, tailor his neutralize, destroy, and the requested de- had crew vehicle communications (CVC) task organization to support dismounted livery assets and volume of fire. Scouts helmets and 1790s (ve hicle intercom sys- teams or obtain infantrymen from a line must understand how EFSTs are refined, tems), which enhanced crew coordina- company as augmentation. Augmenting and which NAIs are associated with what tion, produced a faster response to con- scouts with infantry must be a conscious targets and EFSTs and how. Beware — if tact, and made orders between the driver, decision undertaken by the chain of com- the scout platoon is not involved in con- gunner, and vehicle commander clear- mand, and should only be mission spe- firming or denying a COA, you are wast- er. It is my belief that the absence of the cific to avoid reducing the combat power ing your time sending him into sector. 1790 will be a significant detriment to of the rifle companies. Detachment of EFSTs are oriented on enemy formations scouts during infiltration. If our modi- combat power must be weighed against and functions. But, until the scout can fied table of organization and equipment scout survival and the commander’s ac- give the fire support element (FSE) a lo- (MTOE) were to support a 1790 for each ceptable risk. cation, we must rely on the S2 situation- scout HMMWV, the effectiveness of crews Collective training should proceed to al template. The fact that battalions and would double. section level only after every squad is ca- brigades execute planned targets that have Infiltration training began with multi- pable of infiltrating a defile; suppressing, not been adjusted since the MDMP is a ple integrated laser engagement system destroying, or obscuring the enemy to al- disturbing trend at the National Training (MILES) gunnery. A game called “catch low the HMMWV-mounted element to Center. the cone” was developed in the regiment. successfully traverse the defile. Section- Battalion staff officers must exercise This game accomplished several things; level training should stress the ability of preparedness, precision, and thoroughness it developed crew coordination, it taught the section leaders to command and con- while preparing the ISR OPORD. If the drivers to maximize cover and conceal- trol their sections, process calls for fire, scout does not receive a synchronized and ment, and it emphasized observation and manage the tempo of infiltration, provide standardized OPORD, he will be ill pre- gunnery skills. The objective of the game situation reports and updates to platoon

44 — January-February 2004 headquarters, and coordinate efforts with tration without effective command and the information battle is the scout pla- other ISR collectors, such as engineer re- control by the scout platoon leader, re- toon’s ability to successfully infiltrate en- connaissance teams, brigade reconnais- sulting in a maximum of one to two ve- emy defensive positions. sance team scouts, and combat operation hicles infiltrating successfully. and lasing team (COLT) vehicles. The jug- It is imperative that the scout platoon gling act of managing all this informa- crosstalk, with the brigade reconnaissance tion is a fine art and requires a substan- 1 troop platoon leader to his front, and es- U.S. Army Field Manual 17-98, Battalion Scout Platoon, tial amount of practice before a degree of U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 10 April expertise is achieved. Therefore, the tablish an information handover line for 1999, p. 2-2. training time allocated must be requisite command and control of the reconnais- to the level of expertise to be achieved. sance zone. A collective exercise at brigade level is highly recommended be- MAJ Kent Strader is the operations and intel- Platoon training across a doctrinal front fore a combat training center rotation or ligence advisor, and brigade advisor for the should be planned, resourced, observed, combat deployment. Saudi Arabia National Guard Region. He is a and controlled by the battalion S3 in con- I attended a very productive meeting for graduate of Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. junction with the Headquarters Compa- His military education includes Infantry Officer ny commander. The opposing force (OP- regimental and motorized rifle battalion Basic Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, scouts. It was a luncheon, which I coined Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course, Ar- FOR) should consist of a scout screen a scout symposium, where we discussed and a counterreconnaissance company mor Officers Advanced Course, Cavalry Lead- minus. An adequate OPFOR for this mis- issues relevant to scouts and shared and ers Course, and Combined Arms and Service exchanged tactics, techniques, and proce- Staff School. He has served in various com- sion might consist of a sister scout pla- dures. My scout platoons and I were also mand and staff positions, to include observer toon with dismount teams; a tank pla- invited to a symposium hosted by the Cav- controller, scout trainer, and live fire trainer, toon; a Bradley platoon, with an associ- alry Branch, where U.S. Army Europe’s Light Infantry Task Force, National Training ated company headquarters; two to three brigade reconnaissance team command- Center, Fort Irwin, CA; Headquarters and Head- point minefields; and two fire markers quarters Company commander and chief of and observer controllers. The standard is ers or first sergeants met via video tele- reconnaissance, 4th Motorized Rifle Regi- the scout platoon leader systematically phone conference. This meeting, though ment, Hohenfels, GE; commander, C Com- infiltrates his platoon, synchronizing le- a first, was a productive discussion and pany, 1st Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry thal and nonlethal fires across a doctrinal left me with the impression that divisions Regiment, U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort and brigades should consider the value of Benning, GA; senior platoon trainer, Infantry distance, without being 65 percent below idea sharing with the scout community Officer Basic Course, 2d Battalion, 11th In- combat effectiveness. Tempo is impera- to enhance their effectiveness. fantry, Fort Benning; and XO, Headquarters tive. Infiltrating all the vehicles at the and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, same time is suicidal. Nonetheless, the Reconnaissance sets the conditions for 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, trend is a broad-front simultaneous infil- battlefield success. The key to winning NC.

Photo by SPC Mason Lowery Photo by Dudley Harris Musings of An Armor Officer

by Major Mark Salas seal hunt as hopelessly overmatched blue centers are not prepared for the training forces (BLUFOR) units stumble from event. They need time to get out on the clubbing to clubbing. Many crews do not ground and refresh/reinforce their tacti- I have spent some time in armor battal- cross line of departure (LD) because they cal skills. Why not make the first task ions and more than my fair share of time fall victim to artillery, air strikes, chemi- force attack against a reinforced pla- at combat training centers. I have talked cals, partisans, and family of scatterable toon? Why not make the first task force to a lot of armor leaders and seen a lot of mines (FASCAM). Sound familiar? meeting engagement against a reinforced units in action at our training centers. company? This allows units to survive These experiences have led me to sup- Why not design rotations in which a bri- long enough to move, shoot, and com- port some of our techniques and ques- gade deploys with all three battalions and municate. You don’t learn to box by step- tion others. This article is a compilation then “round robin” OPFOR duties? For ping in the ring with Mike Tyson. What of thoughts and ideas for improvement. the National Training Center (NTC), there is the utility of conducting an attack that Some of them smack of heresy/out-of- would be a requirement for another task gets destroyed in the OPFOR security the-box thinking, but they all should be force equipment set. For the Combat Ma- zone? Ask yourself if the level of train- good food for thought. As professionals, neuver Training Center (CMTC), there ing for actions on the objective increased we should look at the way we do things would be no change. There would be no or decreased since the implementation of to improve. Not “rocking the boat” or sug- requirement for an OPFOR surrogate ve- the CTC system. I can state unequivocal- gesting room for improvement leads to hicle, as the designated OPFOR battal- ly that the overwhelming majority of our turgid, moribund organizations that fail ion would strap on visual modifications units do not make it to the objective dur- under duress (French army 1919–1940). such as 55-gallon drums, camouflage nets, ing an entire rotation. Why not design at- and red stars. tacks to get onto the objective after a The Training Center Experience My best training was as an OPFOR pla- breach and then defend against a coun- The training centers are the best things toon leader in the nonpermanent OPFOR terattack? Most units do not live long for the armored force. There is no substi- at the CMTC in the late ’80s, early ’90s. enough to see what right looks like. They tute for getting out on the ground and ma- We had minimal observer controller (OC) start out behind the power curve with neuvering large forces. However, train- coverage and our chain of command took their entry-level training and never re- ing concepts needs to be relooked to get the opportunity to conduct real training. cover. the most bang for the buck. Another idea might be allowing National An interesting study would be to see There are several potential fixes to im- Guard units to rotate in as OPFOR when how long individual vehicles stay alive prove the quality/endstate of training. The active duty units arrive. This would re- across the LD during a 2-week rotation. following proposals can be used as stand- quire some cadre at the operations group We may be surprised to find that the av- alone or combined solutions. level to handle command and control and erage crew spends five to six hours alive base support. There would be a need for across the LD or defending during their Do away with permanent opposing contract maintenance support. The net re- entire capstone training event. I am con- forces (OPFOR). Sound pretty radical? sult is that the total (deployable) force vinced that the repeated beatings we suf- Think about it — three mechanized, per- would conduct all CTC training. There is fer at our training centers make us more manent OPFOR battalions that will nev- a dollar cost; however, there would be risk averse and cause us to overestimate er deploy waste training time and dol- 2,000 plus soldiers available for the force our enemies. On the other hand, we do lars. The intent of a world-class OPFOR if the heavy OPFOR were eliminated. know how to take a beating. is to make training at training centers as rigorous as possible. Often times, this rig- Gradually ramp up the OPFOR. Most Reduce OPFOR artillery and increase orous training takes the form of a baby units that currently deploy to our training BLUFOR artillery. I would submit there

46 — January-February 2004 is minimal training value in being killed • Does the MDMP get more or less ef- The commander already read the order. by artillery at or near the LD or immedi- fective when you are tired? Issue warning order (WARNO) one. ately on defend-no-later-than time. Con- Commander develops scheme of ma- versely, we are underwhelmed with the • Does the MDMP get more or less ef- • fective with new personnel? neuver and mission = 30 minutes. The amount of BLUFOR artillery available. commander develops a rough scheme of Look at historical experiences. Ameri- • Does the MDMP get more or less ef- maneuver using a map and alcohol pens. can artillery gets us onto the objective; fective with a chaotic situation? No need for two courses of action — use where we are defeated is in actions on Sound like combat? If no plan survives the commander’s course of action. The the objective when the enemy hugs our commander develops the scheme of ma- belt buckle. In addition, commanders and first contact then why do we exhaust ourselves as slaves to a process that is only neuver, no need to brief anyone about it. staffs are not forced to manage the amount While the commander is developing a of firepower/artillery that we traditional- going to result in a less effective product when we go to war? Fine, if I have 6 scheme of maneuver, the staff preps the ly take to the fight. Destroying BLUFOR wargame board. units repeatedly with notional artillery in months to plan the invasion of Norman- the security zone is not effective training. dy, then I would use the MDMP. If I have • Commander, staff, and subordinate 24 hours to plan a brigade attack, then I commanders conduct wargame/rehearsal Spend less time prepping and more am going to time constrain the hell out of time executing and issue orders = 3 hours. Start with a . Lethal platoons are the the MDMP. 10-minute overview brief of the area of key to winning engagements and therefore operation and mission. There is only a battles. We spend an inordinate amount Brigades and below should adopt a pro- brief overview of enemy forces — only of time talking about it. Why not give a cess that results in a more coherent prod- hard data. Save the doctrinal templates unit their mission set before the deploy- uct, provides more time to supervise prep- for home station officer professional de- ment and let them knock out their orders aration, and does not exhaust staffs — for velopments. The commander, staff, and process at home station? Once the unit lack of a better term, the “tactical deci- subordinate commanders then conduct a arrives, they can be given a fragmentary sionmaking process” (TDMP). TDMP is wargame/rehearsal. During this wargame/ order (FRAGO) that forces them to re- a formalization of a process that is al- rehearsal, the commander issues intent fine their order and complete an abbrevi- ready occurring in units; namely, doing and guidance and takes feedback from ated MDMP. Sound like combat? Also, the MDMP faster. The TDMP has five subordinate commanders. The command- the movement-to-contact mission should steps: have a fixed LD, recock, and second LD er concludes step three with direct verbal time briefed. For example, units would • Commander and staff read order and orders to his subordinates on what he LD at 0630 hours, fight without casualty write down essential tasks = 1½ hours. wants them to do. Subordinate command- evacuation until 0900 hours, recock/re- The commander and staff conduct mis- ers ask questions. The result of this is the key, and LD again at 1100 hours. Every- sion analysis. There is no brief to follow. decision support matrix, reconnaissance one would know that a recock is a given, and there would be no hesitation as units wait on decisions by senior trainers to recock. Precombat inspections and rehearsals are good training, and can be accomplished at home station. When you deploy to a combat training center, you should spend most of your time in the turret on the radio and not in an after-action review or orders process. Training the MDMP and maneuver should not be mutually exclusive events; the reality of the situation is that they are. The “Tactical Decisionmaking Process” “A good plan now is better than a perfect plan too late.” — General George S. Patton How many times have you received a tactical order that was an uncoordinated, cut-and-paste paperweight? How many times have you gone to a rehearsal and a wargame developed? How many times have you heard a commander say, “That’s not what I want,” during an orders brief? Photo by SPC Mason Lowery The MDMP is broke. It does not work “Most units that currently deploy to our training centers are not prepared for the training event. in tactical units. There, I said it — it is They need time to get out on the ground and refresh/reinforce their tactical skills. Why not make counterintuitive, has too many steps and the first task force attack against a reinforced platoon? Why not make the first task force meeting normally does not result in a coherent engagement against a reinforced company? This allows units to survive long enough to move, product. Consider these questions: shoot, and communicate.”

January-February 2004 — 47 and surveillance matrix, and instance, the M1A2 — I the combat service support would have loved to have matrix. Issue WARNO two. this tank back in the days • Staffs produce supporting of the Fulda Gap, but the matrices and graphics = 2 8th Guards Tank Army is hours. Staffs clean up their not coming. This multi- products and reproduce them. million-dollar tank can download more informa- • Supporting matrices sent tion than the average tank to subordinate units. Products commander can handle issued to subordinate units. but does not even have an Commander supervises sub- external radio/telephone. ordinate units. Your average armor officer would be at a loss on The advantages of TDMP are how to use dismounts ef- clear. Less time is spent pre- fectively in a MOUT situ- paring an order that will have ation. We need to be pre- marginal benefit and the staff pared to fight a people of can spend more time coordi- character in a close, urban nating and assisting subordi- fight. Our Army has done a nate units. There is only one lot of MOUT in the past brief. The commander is the century, and we need to key player in TDMP. If the have the experience, train- plan is one man’s idea, it will ing and mental dexterity to be more coherent and coordi- do it again. nated. All players will be better rested and prepared for execution. Savage execution is Training the key to success in the cha- We have made training os of war. During the 3-hour An M1A1 Abrams tank stands guard in front of the Baghdad Conventon Center. too difficult. Here is an ex- period with the commander ample list of assets needed during the wargame/rehears- to conduct a to-standard al, subordinate commanders will have am- vanced noncommissioned officers course platoon simulated training exercise lane: ple time to get guidance, ask questions, honor graduates, warrant officer (WO) and recommend solutions to tactical prob- course graduates, platoon leader/WO1, 1. OPFOR. lems. Subordinate commanders will par- BIC/WO2; battalion S2/WO3; and bri- 2. Sandtable. tially own the plan. Staffs can be small- gade S2/WO4. Either way, the net result 3. OCs. er. Parts of MDMP are used in TDMP, would be intelligence officers in maneu- 4. After-action review tent with which brings institutional knowledge on ver battalions who have on-the-ground generator, light set, stove, and procedure. experience in tactical operations. This warm/cool beverages. would allow the MI branch to focus on 5. Firemarkers with pyrotechnics. Armor Branch vs. Military Intelligence higher-level intelligence and provide more 6. MILES with blanks. What is the second largest branch in the combat arms officers in tactical units. 7. Scenario and 30-page task force Army? Field artillery? Quartermaster? If OPORD with annexes and over- you said military intelligence (MI), you Digital and Military Operations lays. are correct. Forty years ago MI was not a in Urban Terrain (MOUT) 8. Hot chow. branch — now they rank second in num- As a military profession, we are con- 9. Doctrinal minefields, fighting bers only to infantry. Isn’t this a prob- fused about the next war. On one hand, positions, and wire. lem? When was the last time a MI unit we read that the world is becoming in- 10. Task force tactical operations cen- killed anything? Combat arms should creasingly urbanized and more wars will ter deployed. take tactical intelligence from MI and take place in urban settings. On the other 11. A headquarters and headquarters give it back to the tactical intelligence hand, we see the Army’s fascination with company support element de- professionals. digitization. The Marines are preaching ployed. Tactical intelligence officers should be- that the next war will be fought and won come a career track. This can be accom- in urban centers. The Army’s heavy forc- Our training doctrine has been com- plished by training the battalion intelli- es are spending a lot of money preparing bined with the 8-step training method to gence coordinator (BIC), the battalion S2, to win a war that will look like an NTC create a mini combat training center ev- and brigade S2 during a 2-week school on rotation. The common operating envi- ery time we roll out the back gate. In- available intelligence systems and brief- ronment is changing the complexion of a stead of training, we are attempting to ing formats for each job. Career progres- rotation, but not the substance. Does dig- “teach the test.” Training is so excruciat- sion would be: platoon leader; XO/scout ital technology work in large urban ar- ingly painful and expensive to conduct platoon leader; BIC; battalion S2; com- eas? Is anyone experimenting? to standard, most units miss or avoid op- pany commander; brigade S2; and bat- Because we are preparing for a massed portunities to conduct training at all. talion S3/XO. Another option might be armored war, we do limit training with Somewhere after creating the combat sharp, combat arms staff sergeants, ad- infantry dismounts in urban terrain. For training centers, we lost the ability/men-

48 — January-February 2004 tal dexterity to conduct training exercis- nicating. It was an outstanding training What about OCs? Don’t need them ei- es without troops (TEWT). One of my event. Our Army could use more of these ther. The chain of command are smart best training experiences was during a events. guys with a breadth of experience and TEWT, traveling in a high mobility, mul- are more than capable of OCing their tipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), Company TEWTs could be expanded subordinates. Units should not have to and maneuvering through our general into task force TEWTs by placing pla- fight through an entangled bureaucracy defense plan. The company commander toon leaders and first sergeants in M113s of overhead and requirements to train. briefed an operations order and handed and maneuvering full up with scout pla- TEWTs allow units to “crawl” cheaply, out an overlay that included designated toons and mortar platoons, while XOs with an opportunity for multiple itera- roads as minefields. The commander was and above are in HMMWVs. The pla- tions. Wars are won with savage execu- in his HMMWV with the fire support toon tracks could occasionally kick out tion by tactical units. The chain of com- team, the XO was in the first sergeant’s four sandbags tied together as casualties mand should keep in mind that the high- HMMWV, and all the platoon tank com- that the first sergeant could take back to er the level of training, the less focus will manders were in borrowed four-door the battalion aid station. A task force go to platoons. Simplify events and fo- HMMWVs. We then maneuvered across could roll to the field and maneuver all cus on the killers. the German countryside, calling in check- day for the operational tempo cost of 10 points, occupying battle positions, and HMMWVs, 14 M113s and 5 M577s. breaching minefields. We learned how to What about the OPFOR? You don’t need navigate, use terrain, talk on the radio, them. MAJ Mark A. Salas is currently serving as ad- and maneuver as part of a company. Ev- jutant, Operations Group, Combat Maneuver ery time we reached an objective, we Get systems in place and let people Training Center, Hohenfels, GE. He received a would occupy an assembly area that was learn their jobs before they get killed at B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. from the University of Oklahoma. He is a identified on the move and have an infor- LD. Our current training technique of graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Gen- mal after-action review. Required sup- the mini combat training center allows eral Staff College. He has served in various port included a tank of gas, a box of crews to be killed repeatedly without command and staff positions, to include com- meals ready to eat per truck, and water. ever reaching the objective. We have to mander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 66th Ar- The event was not “leveraged” into a com- train people how to think, use terrain, mor, Fort Hood, TX; observer controller, Com- bat service support training event or some and communicate before we put them to bat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels; and sort of brigade tactical exercise. It fo- a real test, if we expect them to be suc- observer controller, Team C, Battle Command cused on platoons moving and commu- cessful. Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Treachery and Its Consequences from Page 25

3It should be noted, however, that in some cases, Iraqis killed 13Customary international law encompasses all of these is- ard Prosper, “Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPWs and War or injured at checkpoints did behave in ways that may have ap- sues. Treaty law addresses them as well. Uniforms, insignia, Crimes,” DefenseLink at www.defenselink.mil/news/apr2003/ peared threatening to our troops, such as failing to stop at or and bearing arms openly are addressed under the Hague Con- t04072003_t407genv.html, p. 4. speeding through checkpoints. Nonetheless, our forces may vention (IV) of 1907, Annex to the Convention, Article I; and 20This position is bolstered by the fact that the Hague Con- have been able to deal with such behavior in a less lethal man- Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of ventions of 1907 embraced the underlying concept of the 1977 ner, but for the very real threat of suicide bombings. 1949, Article 44, paragraph 3. Flags of truce and the Red Protocols as: “The inhabitants of a territory which has not been 4 Cross/Red Crescent are addressed under Article 23, paragraph occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously “Who is the Enemy?” CBSNews.com at www.cbsnews.com/ f of the Annex to the Convention, Hague Convention (IV) of stories/2003/03/27/iraq/main546378.shtml, accessed 27 March take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had 1907. The status of cultural and humanitarian sites is addressed time to organize themselves … shall be regarded as belliger- 2003. in the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, Annex to the Conven- 5 ents if they carry their arms openly and if they respect the laws “Suicide Bomber Kills Four U.S. Troops at Iraq Check- tion, Article 27; Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombard- and customs of war.” See Reisman and Antoniou, p. 41. ment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 1907; Convention for point,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review at www.pittsburghlive.com/ 21 x/tribune-review/specialreports/iraq/s_126421.html, accessed the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con- Whitman, Parks, and Prosper. 29 March 2003. flict, the Hague 1954; and Protocol I (1977) Additional to the 22Ibid., p. 5. 6 Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 53 (also of interest is 23 “Car Blast Kills 5 Near Iraq Check Point,” Milwaukie Jour- General Eisenhower’s Memorandum of 26 May 1944, outlin- Ibid. nal-Sentinal at www.jsonline.com/news/intl/ap/apr03/ap_war_ ing allied policy toward historical monuments and cultural 24 car_exploi040503.asp, accessed 5 April 2003. Ibid. centers during the invasion of Europe). All of the above are set 25 7“Who is the Enemy?” CBSNews.com. forth in Michael Reisman and Chris T. Anoniou, The Laws of Reisman and Antoniou, p. 41. 26 8William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sher- War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on FM 27-10, p. 22. This statement is admittedly hyperbolic, man, Volume 2, Da Capo Press, New York, NY, 1984, p. 126. International Laws Governing Armed Conflict, Vintage Books, but the point still holds. Such actions certainly make it harder New York, NY, 1994, pp. 47, 94, 96-104, and 105. to restore peace and cause more casualties than would have oc- 9 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land 14Reisman and Anoniou, p. 41. curred otherwise. Warfare, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 15 18 July 1956, takes the analogy to domestic law farther, com- Ibid., 41. paring these treaties to laws passed by legislatures within the 16Ibid., 43. United States, but the analogy is a poor one. International trea- 17Ibid. MAJ Dennis P. Chapman is currently a staff ac- ties and domestic legislation are not analogous. Laws enacted 18Ibid. tion officer (mobilization), Army National Guard by Congress or state legislatures bind everyone. Treaties, how- 19 ever, are not created by some overarching international legisla- Despite U.S. reservations, our own words and deeds seem Readiness Center, Arlington, VA. He received tive authority, but are entered into voluntarily by the individual to indicate, implicitly at least, that we are moving closer to- a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and grad- signatory states and bind those signatories only, except to the ward the position of the 1977 Protocols. In Afghanistan and uated Magna Cum Laude from Thomas M. extent that the treaty provisions coincide with or become incor- other places, we have actively supported or fought side-by-side porated into customary international law. with non-uniformed combatants. In Afghanistan, our special Cooley Law School. He has served in various operations forces have sometimes operated in a “modified uni- 10 command and staff positions, including assis- Ibid., pp. 4-5. form,” consisting of a mixture of civilian clothes with military tant operations officer, deputy S3, and brigade items. In distinguishing this last practice from the conduct of 11In this article, I am not concerned with the matter of what S3, 75th Division (Training Support); assistant international conventions Iraq has or has not joined. I assume the Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam, the Department of Defense cited that any pertinent provisions have become incorporated into the wear of at least some uniform items by these forces, but pri- professor of Military Science, Michigan State customary international law, thus binding Iraq whether it is a marily relied on an argument consistent with the standard set University; and commander of an infantry rifle signatory to any particular treaty or not. out in the 1977 Protocols: our special operations soldiers in Af- ghanistan always bear their arms openly, while Saddam’s fight- company, 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry, Michi- 12FM 27-10, p. 3. ers don’t. See Bryan Whitman, W. Hays Parks, and Pierre-Rich- gan Army National Guard.

January-February 2004 — 49 Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The to refer to themselves as “National Guard” and abling them to focus more on unit-level train- Army National Guard, 1636-2000 by Mi- marked their equipment as such with the in- ing, reducing the post-mobilization training chael D. Doubler, University Press of Kan- signia “NG.” time for National Guard units. sas, 2003, 460 pp., $17.95 (paperback). The modern National Guard really came into As the Cold War began to evolve in the early being at the dawn of the 20th century due to 1950s, Soviet nuclear developments changed Michael D. Doubler’s book Civilian in Peace, greater involvement by the United States in the nature of the threat that existed in Europe. Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, world affairs. As the foreign policy of the Unit- Now there was a viable threat to the Continen- 1636-2000 provides the reader with a com- ed States began to expand outside of its bor- tal United States. The result was the integra- prehensive history of the National Guard from ders, there was an increased requirement to tion of the National Guard in an extensive air its earliest inception. While the book gives the use military forces as an instrument of foreign defense network to protect the United States reader deep insight into the origins, roles, and policy. This necessity resulted in laws and pol- from a Soviet long-range bomber threat. In the development of the National Guard, it does icies that made the National Guard more stan- true spirit of the 18th-century minuteman, Na- not make for light reading. However, Doubler’s dardized and in-line with Regular Army forc- tional Guard units in a state status were now book and its extensive list of sources will prove es. charged with the full-time mission of protect- an excellent resource for anyone conducting Due to the unrest in Europe and the chal- ing critical sites in the United States against So- in-depth research concerning the Army Nation- viet nuclear aggression. al Guard or American History, as both are in- lenges of a new technological war, combined extricably intertwined. I recommend this book with the German policy of unrestricted U-Boat Initially, National Guard units manned the con- to personnel who are going to or currently in warfare, the United States entered the Euro- ventional air defense guns and artillery of the an assignment where they work with the Na- pean conflict. This tremendous undertaking day. But this all changed with the advent of tional Guard, as the book broadens the read- required the transformation of our National anti-aircraft missile technology and produced er’s perspective on the duality of our Active Guard into organizations that could operate an air defense program that, at its peak in and National Guard forces and how the his- better with Regular Army forces. This inte- 1962, saw 48 of the 112 Nike-Hercules sites de- torical catalysts of our Nation’s history devel- gration was achieved during the conflict in fending the Continental United States manned oped this relationship. Europe, however with the cessation of hostili- by National Guardsmen. By the early 1970s, ties, the focus on the National Guard dimin- the air defense missile technology was ren- The very foundations of American military tra- ished and there was no centralized plan for dered obsolete due to developments by both dition lie in the deeply rooted militia tradition rebuilding units upon redeployment to the Unit- sides in intercontinental ballistic missiles and that early European colonists brought with ed States. the resulting policy of mutually assured de- them to the New World. A tradition which can struction. However, the National Guard’s in- be traced to ancient Greece, where the sur- The National Guard’s involvement in Nation- volvement in providing CONUS air defense vival of Hellenic culture and society hinged on al Military Strategy rose to the forefront again firmly established the Guard’s role by demon- the service, training, and employment of citi- in the late 1930s due to events that were un- strating their ability to master technological zen soldiers who could rapidly turn their hand folding in Germany and Asia. At the begin- developments in warfare to complement the from the toil of daily work necessary to pre- ning of World War II, the U.S. Army was only Active Army. serve their society to face down threats that the 17th largest army in the world and initially sought to destroy it. was not technologically on-line with the powers involved in the conflict. Just as in WWI, Not only does Doubler’s book deal with the While many often believe that the earliest mi- guard divisions filled the gap, augmenting the role of the National Guard in our country’s litias in the New World were those of the En- standing regular Army until the draft system wars and the nation building of America, but glish, there were even earlier militia organiza- could provide the necessary soldiers for vic- also discusses integration of the Active Army, tions, which were established by the French tory. Reserve, and National Guard, the Civil Rights and the Spanish, before the arrival of English Movement, and incorporating women into the colonists in the early 1600s. Just as the Greek With victory achieved in Europe and Asia, a military. It also deals with the role of the Na- city-states, and many other Western institu- new conflict of ideologies arose between the tional Guard both in Vietnam and here at tions and nations, had relied on militia forces Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Due home, along with the “total force policy” that for continued existence, so did the early Euro- to the looming communist threat, the role of began in the early 1970s and placed heavy pean colonies rely heavily on the militia to the National Guard in American military poli- reliance on the combat readiness of the Na- guarantee their safety in a hostile New World. cy as a means of checking Soviet aggression tional Guard. This policy contributed signifi- In these foreign surroundings, the very envi- was assured. Lessons were learned from de- cantly to ending the Cold War and helped set ronment provided a significant challenge whose mobilizing the Guard following WWI, and af- the stage for victory during the Persian Gulf only solution was hard labor, not to mention ter WWII measures were employed for the Na- conflict in the early 1990s. the difficulties presented by marauding In di- tional Guard to initially establish major com- While the preface of Doubler’s book touches ans and competing colonizing powers, which mands, followed by their subordinate com- on the Army National Guard and its role in a necessitated the employment of citizen sol- mands, to create viable units that could be rap- post-September 11 world, the actual book ends diers. idly mobilized, trained, and deployed to West- ern Europe. with the National Guard in transition as it de- The book is full of interesting, and little known, velops its role in the new world order of a facts, for instance the origins of the term “Na- The Korean War was the first real Cold War post-Cold War world on the doorstep of the tional Guard.” During the Civil War, as south- test for using the Army National Guard. The 21st century. The book is an extensive histor- ern militia units were taking over and disman- Guard was significant not only in its involve- ical record, and a tremendous academic un- tling federal military institutions in the south, ment in the Korean theater of operations, but dertaking. As such, it should be treated as a northern militia units were being called on to also in the role of freeing-up active forces in living document, expanded, updated, and sub- augment hard-pressed regular Union forces. Germany for use in Korea. Combat operations sequently published to document the tremen- For the Union leadership, one of the top pri- in Korea, coupled with the threat of a Soviet dous accomplishments of National Guards- orities was to secure the Capital against at- attack in Europe, resulted in fielding much men and National Guard units in diverse op- tack by Confederate forces. In the opening heavier units within the National Guard to meet erations currently taking place both at home days of the conflict, militia units were rushed the growing communist threat. Another devel- and abroad. to Washington to perform this function to free opment that resulted was the implementation up regular forces for operations elsewhere. In of a standardized basic training system that CPT DONNIE R. YATES this capacity, Militiamen of the 7th New York freed the Guard from not having to focus as 3d Bn, 307th Regiment, 218th eSB Infantry became the first militia units to begin heavily on training individual skills, thus en- Mount Pleasant, SC

50 — January-February 2004 The New Face of War: How War Will Be The War of Atonement: The Inside Sto- fective mobilization. The Israelis would have Fought in the 21st Century by Bruce ry of the Yom-Kippur War by Chaim Her- less than a 24-hour notice of a planned attack, Berkowitz, The Free Press, New York, NY, zog, Introduction by Brigadier General which began on two fronts (Syrian and Egyp- 2003, 224 pp., $26.00 (hardback). Michael Herzog, Stackpole Books, Me- tian) on 6 October at 1400 hours local time. chanicsburg, PA, 2003, 328 pp., $19.95 The Arab plan also capitalized on the amount If there is one attitude more dangerous than of their infantry and equipped them with SAG- to assume that a future war will be just like (paperback). GER antitank missiles and rocket-propelled the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so When studying the Arab-Israeli Wars, this grenades to counter Israel’s reliance on mo- utterly different that we can ignore all the les- book and The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and bile armor with little to no infantry. sons of the last one. Peace in the Middle East, From the War of In- Herzog takes readers first to the critical Syr- — Sir John Slessor, RAF dependence Through Lebanon, Knopf Paper- ian Front; due to the proximity of the Syrian back, New York, 1983, by the late Chaim Her- One of the oldest criticisms of military com- border to northern Israeli cities there was no zog, are required classics on the subject. The margin for error. The 5th, 7th, and 9th Syrian manders is they are constantly trying to fight War of Atonement was originally published in the last war. Bruce Berkowitz’s The New Face infantry divisions hugged the entire length of 1975, the author conducted numerous inter- the Golan Heights and were reinforced by the of War puts a new spin on this axiom by show- views from Israeli defense ministry officials ing military thinkers of all services that there 1st and 3rd Syrian armored divisions. The Is- down to the unit tank commander offering the raelis focused their defense around Kuneitra really is nothing new under the sun. Berkow- clearest details of the tactics employed dur- itz shows reader that the future of 21st-cen- and paid no attention to Brigadier General Ra- ing the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, known to the ful Eytan’s warning of the potential for Syria tury warfare can be found in informational trans- Arabs as the Ramadan War. Herzog, who died formations of the past. to concentrate its efforts on Kuneitra and the in 1997, was a member of British forces in Rafid openings simultaneously. In the open- Berkowitz’s intent is to give military and civil- World War II before joining the Israeli Defense ing hours of the war, 60 Israeli tanks faced ian leaders a better understanding of the new Forces, rising to become director of military murderous artillery fire and 600 Syrian main face of war and how the United States will intelligence and then President of Israel. battle tanks. Herzog describes how the Syri- be impacted especially with regard to the in- President Nixon is quoted as saying that the an armor order of battle consisted of tank doz- formation revolution, which has always been 1973 War was Israel’s Pearl Harbor and war ers and bridging tanks leading their armored a part of combat. The New Face of War as- colleges throughout the world devote hours column in formation. The Israeli brigade picked serts that information, not technology, has al- to the study of this war. This 2003 paperback off Syrian armor, yet they still came in forma- ways provided the edge to any successful mil- edition is published on the eve of the 30th an- tion. The book also discusses stories of indi- itary operation. Berkowitz uses history to show niversary of this war and should be rediscov- vidual Israeli tank commanders and gives a that the commander who can use relevant in- ered by a variety of military readers. Readers firsthand account of several of their personal formation to get inside an opponent’s deci- of ARMOR magazine will enjoy the detailed experiences. sion cycle will triumph in combat. If this con- descriptions of tank battles in the Sinai and The author admires the methods Egypt and cept sounds like Air Force Colonel John R. Golan Heights, as well as the methods used Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, Syria used to find solutions to Israeli military by Arab forces to counter Israel’s advantage proficiency. Initial Israeli air strikes into Egypt it should. Berkowitz cites Boyd’s theory numer- in rapid mobile armor. Intelligence specialists ous times throughout the book. and Syria were met with a forest of surface- will find this a valuable lesson in indications to-air missiles. Israel’s 7th Brigade realized What is insightful about The New Face of War and warnings, understanding the elaborate de- they had to get out of range from Syrian artil- are the links between previous military revo- ception plan concocted by the Egyptians and lery, regroup, and maneuver around the Syr- lutions and our own transformations. Two that Syrians prior to the start of hostilities. ian 7th Infantry, which was reinforced by the standout are the Internet and asymmetrical Syrian 3rd Armored Infantry. Maps take read- warfare. The Internet, Berkowitz shows, is not Herzog begins by arguing that the roots of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War can be found in the ers from the initial Syrian breakout on 6 Octo- new. The development of spin off technologies, ber to the Israeli counterstrike on 10 October. such as the telegraph and semaphore flags, lightning success of the 1967 Six-Day War. linked Civil War commanders on the first in- The Israelis, overcome with the success of the On the Egyptian front, soldiers exercised along formation net. Second, Berkowtiz shows that Six-Day War, settled into the belief that Arab the Suez so that Israelis became desensitized asymmetrical warfare has existed for centu- forces could not take the initiative. For the as to when the real war would break out. Six ries. The most striking example is the compar- first time, Israel began to discuss the options October looked like a regular day along the ison between the 1993 attack on the U.S.S. of strategic depth that the capture of the Sinai Suez Canal, with Egyptian troops swimming Cole by al-Qaeda terrorists and the 1864 at- provided, the West Bank offered 40 miles of and fishing along the canal. The difference tack on the U.S.S. Housatonic by the subma- depth through the Judean Desert and the Go- came at 1400 hours, when 2,000 cannons, rine Hunley. Both attacks used small water- lan Heights offered limited depth, less than 10 240 planes, and 3,000 tons of ordnance land- craft ladened with explosives to attack larger miles. The author points out that Israel began ed on the 14 Israeli fortifications along the Bar- and better-armed vessels. to have a more defensive posture building the Lev Line. Herzog estimates 175 shells per sec- massive Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal ond. What seemed like the Egyptians driving Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover with objections raised by General Israel Tal, their pontoon bridge on the water’s edge looked Institution at Stanford University and a senior arguing that the series of towers and logisti- like what they did on a regular basis, except analyst at RAND. He is the author of Ameri- cal fortifications had become sitting targets for this time the bridges opened and rubber boats can Security, Calculated Risks, and Best Truth: Egyptian air and artillery forces. The book de- were placed in the water. Within hours, over Intelligence in the Information Age. He is also tails how the Israeli general staff argued about 8,000 Egyptian troops overwhelmed more than a frequent contributor to the Wall Street Jour- the Bar-Lev Line being a warning or defen- 500 Israeli troops manning the Bar-Lev Line. nal. The New Face of War is an easy read. He sive system. This lack of clarity, the book ex- uses a number of historical examples to sup- plains, is why Israel’s defense leaders would Eventually, IDF units cornered the Egyptian port his thesis. In addition, the notes and be surprised. 3rd Army and were able to push back Syrian sources are of a quality expected of a RAND tank divisions, opening the road to Damas- scholar. The only criticism is the book’s lack The Egyptians and Syrians began studying cus. Herzog describes the relationship of Is- of solutions for the reader. Unlike Breaking the 1967 Six-Day War in detail; the Arabs be- raeli field commanders under the pressures of the Phalanx or Fighting for the Future, Berko- gan their first serious assessment of every war. In addition, the book goes into the super- witz’s book merely cautions the reader to not Arab-Israeli War and engagement. They un- power politics of the United States and the So- lose the information edge. derstood the speed with which IDF reserves viet Union. could mobilize to answer Egyptian and Syri- JAYSON A. ALTIERI an attacks; they designed a plan to give the The final chapter describes lessons learned MAJ, U.S. Army Israelis little of the 72 hours required for ef- by the Israelis, with a focus on the intelligence

January-February 2004 — 51 failure. After the end of the war, the govern- so you can find out where old Belgian AMX- explains in clear, understandable terms how ment of Prime Minister Golda Meir collapsed 13s and AMX-VCIs or German Saladins end- maneuver warfare works from the infantry pro- and the Israelis appointed Supreme Court Jus- ed up. But where else can you see WWII-era spective. The other two parts offer practical ex- tice Shmuel Araganat to a commission. Herzog halftracks and M8 armored cars still in ser- amples, using extensive historical quotes, to book’s on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is a time- vice today? teach junior leaders these concepts. less classic and will be read by many genera- tions trying to understand the tactics and strat- Alongside these, this book includes descrip- The Marines attempted these ideas for their egy of this war. tions and photos of the various locally de- land-war doctrine in the late 1980s, but be- signed and manufactured armored vehicles. cause they failed to evolve the culture (or peo- Editor’s Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is a Mid- In most cases, these are unique, as well as un- ple aspect) with the ideas, the Marines have dle East Foreign Area Officer assigned to the usual such as rebuilt M114 APCs and a range gone back to attrition. Even so, doctrine in- Pentagon. of designs of patrol and personnel carriers built volving infiltration was so effective in combat on commercial chassis. There are over 240 against the Iraqis in 1990 that the U.S. VII YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN black and white photos, plus eight color pag- Corps had to move up its attack by approxi- LCDR, MSC, USN es that illustrate current and older equipment mately 48 hours to prevent the Iraqis from com- with specifications of those designs unique to pletely escaping before the Marines pushed this region and orders of battle for each na- them out of Kuwait. Mexican and Central American Armor tion, including what vehicles they have in cur- by Julio Montes, Darlington Productions, rent service. Also included are vehicle mount- This book will serve for years as an unoffi- Darlington, MD, illustrated throughout with ed antitank weapons and details of other equip- cial “bible” (alongside William Lind’s Maneu- black and white photographs plus color ment, making this a comprehensive survey, ver Warfare Handbook) for maneuver warfare section, 175 pp., $19.95. shedding much new light on a neglected sub- officers looking for a resource to help train ju- ject. nior leaders critical maneuver warfare con- Although close to home for many ARMOR cepts. While many look for technological an- readers, most will not know much of what Cen- PETER BROWN swers to fourth-generation warfare, this book tral America has in the way of armored forc- gives ideas that apply instead to people and es. What is there and where it is located is Phantom Soldiers: The Enemy’s An- tactics. It leaves the reader with a solid under- usually little known outside each nation’s own swer to U.S. Firepower by H. John Poole, standing how men make decisions in combat, borders, apart from official military intelligence Posterity Press, www.posteritypress.org, as well as how to translate that knowledge to a communities or reading basic details in heavy- 2001, $16.95. military advantage. It is a must-have book for weight and expensive specialist publications. combat arms officers and junior leaders. Some countries possess large numbers of John Poole continues to do our nation and modern armor, while others have more mod- the military great service. Phantom Soldier is This book suggests recorded history can est levels of equipment, which is not always the third in an evolution of books — Last Hun- sometimes change as one comes to better new. Most of these nations do not actively pub- dred Yards and One More Bridge to Cross — know his highly deceptive opponent. It talks licize details of their armed forces, which means that gets it right on future battlefield tactics. about what goes on at the nitty-gritty level of a lot of research is needed to discover their ve- infantry combat: the squads, platoons, com- This book must be read and implemented as hicle holdings. panies, and battalions. It shows how various part of Transformation. Poole’s book provides systems succeed or fail at tasks, such as flex- Julio Montes has made an in-depth study in the blue print for reforming U.S. ground forces ibility, maneuver, combat cohesion, and mo- this area and equally, if not more, importantly for the 21st century. We will pay with lives if rale, and why the German army was general- made the results available in this book. It cov- we do not reform our military from a second- ly qualitatively superior to both Western and ers eight countries, in alphabetical order Be- generation warfare force to one that can deal Eastern rivals in both world wars. lize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon- with threats in third- and fourth-generation war- duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. In re- fare. Because of the depth of his subject, Poole cent times, this region has seen several ma- necessarily has to stick to a discussion of the jor and minor conflicts, as well as tensions This is a truly influential book, written by a former Marine who has tested and experi- light infantry aspect of what is admittedly a within and amongst its nations, one of which much bigger area of knowledge. resulted in building and maintaining various enced small-unit tactics, unlike today’s experts we see today talking about the war in Afghan- armored vehicles. Usually, these come from On the whole, this is an excellent book. The istan. It shows the oriental equivalent to the the major producing nations, typically the Unit- concepts and techniques that Poole is trying Jager or Sturm infantry concept of maneuver ed States, Great Britain, France, and the for- to get across are not new or original, as he warfare. It contrasts with the U.S. Army’s attri- mer Soviet Union, reflecting various allegianc- implicitly states, but the genius he shows is in tion based air-land battle doctrine. It covers es and recent sales and disposal efforts, explaining it all so clearly and then applying it topics like mission orders, recon pull, decision though several countries have designed and to modern situations. The style of writing is cycles and tempo, use of the reserves, com- built their own equipment. very easy to follow, and the book was a joy to mander’s intent, and other key concepts that read. The more I read, the more lights came teach a junior military leader how (versus what) The countries covered vary greatly, some on in my head. have very few vehicles and the entries on them to think. are understandably short, but the author does Based on the oriental approach to warfare, While I couldn’t say that I am now an expert provide a complete picture. Others have a which when combined with the German ap- on this approach to war (or even competent at wide range of vehicles, tracked and wheeled, proach to warfare, evolved into revolutionary it), understanding the principles behind it means in service and this account includes short his- OODA-cycle theories, Poole shows how a quick I can begin to apply and practice them. This tories of each country’s armored heritage. In acting, agile force can constantly beat larger, book is ideal reading for anyone in the senior some cases, this goes back to even before the heavier-equipped foes. After reading this book lieutenant level, as a primer for junior staff 1920s and 1930s, though most received their you will understand exactly why the oriental courses (although instructors tend to preach first armor during or just after World War II. forces, while occasionally losing tactically, over- maneuver and then practice attrition, it will Some of these vehicles remained in service all are so effective operationally against the still help you). It should be required reading for many years and some even survived into larger and better-equipped U.S. forces. for all officers who take their calling seriously. a new century in various degrees of modern- If nothing else, it will encourage debate, and ization. Most of the modern vehicles are stock The book is divided into three parts: “The that is always healthy and desirable. items, such as Commandos, Scorpions, and Eastern Way of War,” “The Differences in Tac- T-55s, differing only in color and markings from tical Technique,” and “The Next Disappearing DONALD E. VANDERGRIFF those in larger armies. Others are second hand, Act.” The critical part is the first part, which MAJ, U.S. Army

52 — January-February 2004 Feedback from the Force Improves Training and Supports Change in 1st Armor Training Brigade

Commander Command Sergeant Major COL James K. Greer CSM James L. Green

In this issue, we focus on updating and the installation staff will determine the improving training based on feedback we impact on resources and the ITMB will receive from invaluable sources in the make a recommendation, but the Chief field. If we are not responsive to the needs makes the final decision on whether to of the force, then we have failed the mis- change the POI. sion, and this is even more critical to an • POI changes to tactics, techniques, and Army at war. Even though most of our procedures/conditions, or the order of train- cadre will contribute indirectly to the war ing events are approved by brigade and by training soldiers, many of our soldiers battalion commanders. Some examples will contribute directly to the fight and it of recent innovations in the brigade to im- is our mission to train them to this stan- prove training include: discussing War- dard. Our premise is that our soldiers will rior Ethos as well as Army Values train- deploy into a combat zone within 30 days ARMOR Magazine. Of course, our most ing; less emphasis on drill and ceremony of graduation, and it is our moral imper- recent initiative to gather feedback is and more on tactical formations, culmi- ative to train them to survive and contrib- through this feature. Please continue to nating in a tactical exercise we call War- ute to their unit. send comments to : rior Challenge; consolidating the eight in- [email protected] dividual tactical training lessons into one Feedback Sources integrated operation in a mission setting Cadre and redeployed units. As pro- Responding to Feedback to drive the training; more training on im- fessional soldiers and warriors, it is our provised explosive devices and unexplod- duty to keep track of ongoing operations Once we get feedback and assess nec- ed ordnance during our mine warfare and assess how the contemporary oper- essary changes, there are several levels of classes; and transforming our entire train- ating environment (COE) impacts train- coordination that must be completed being methodology toward more hands-on ing. As part of this effort, we recently sent fore implementing changes: performance oriented competition and a team to Fort Stewart, Georgia, to gath- • If the change involves basic training very little lecture-style instruction. We are er information from the 3d Infantry Di- or a basic training core task in one station also adding training on tactical question- vision. We also invited leaders from 3d unit training (OSUT), we must have ap- ing to develop and train the concept that Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment to Fort proval from Fort Benning, Georgia, be- every soldier is a warrior and a collector. Knox to talk to our leaders and visit our fore making any significant changes to • According to the Armor School mod- training. the program of instruction (POI). For ex- el, once a major POI change is approved Cadre recently assigned from combat ample, based on feedback from the force, by the Chief of Armor, or new courses training units to the 1st Armored Train- we will add .50-caliber M2 heavy MG will be taught, the Directorate of Train- ing Brigade are a tremendous source of and Mk-19 to basic training and 63A/M ing, Doctrine, and Combat Development information and ideas on how to shape OSUT, since most of these soldiers will (D/TDCD) develops the training plan for initial entry training (IET) to prepare sol- use these crew served weapons in their us to execute. D/TDCD is currently de- diers for the COE. It is also of enormous first unit. The good news is that TRADOC veloping our POI for the Stryker and Mo- benefit that the 1ATB brigade command- is undergoing a fundamental analysis of bile Gun System so we can train soldiers er was on the ground for several months basic training and we hope to report on when the equipment and instructors are doing research to write the history of the some needed changes that will be re- available. war in Iraq. sourced in the next issue. Please continue to provide feedback so Annual field survey. We conduct an an- • Changes to the 19D or 19K POI go we can channel your ideas into the train- nual field survey to gain empirical data through the Chief of Armor for approval. ing development systems at TRADOC and conduct trend analysis on training ef- We brief the Chief on recommended chang- and Fort Knox. General Schoomaker’s in- fectiveness. This year’s survey is out, so es, and those approved go forward to the tent for the Army is to prepare every sol- please take some time to give us accurate Institutional Training Management Board dier to be a warrior. To address General feedback. Rest assured that we closely (ITMB) for review on the impact on in- Schoomaker’ intent, TRADOC is current- scrutinize the results and analyze how to stallation resources and tenant units. For ly reviewing many changes to the brigade best adjust training in accordance with example, in our upcoming ITMB, we are combat team, which will impact OSUT, your feedback. Another valuable source recommending adding combat pistol tasks including a rapid fielding initiative (RFI) of information for this data set is the sur- to 19K OSUT, increased field time during to provide initial entry soldiers with the veys we send to the basic noncommis- OSUT, and adding more field and mili- same equipment they will use in their first sioned officers course and the advanced tary operations in urban terrain (MOUT) unit. By next issue, we hope to report on noncommissioned officers course here at training for tankers and scouts. If the some of these changes and look forward Fort Knox. Chief of Armor approves these concepts, to responding to your feedback.

January-February 2004 — 53 ARMOR continually endeavors to meet the needs of the armor force by providing a forum that focuses on concepts, doctrine, and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war; and supports the education, training, doctrinal development, and integrated missions of the U.S. Army Armor School. To fill this tall order, we have developed a survey that provides us the opportunity to improve ARMOR based on reader opinion. It is imperative that readers take a moment to complete the survey, which is available on page 6 of this issue and at our website: www.knox.army.mil/survey/armormagazinesurvey. The data you provide allows us to shape the future of ARMOR. Thank you for your contributions.

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