The Professional Bulletin of the , Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-15-4

Editor in Chief Features LISA ALLEY 8 Combined-Arms Gunnery: Restoring the Fundamentals LTG Michael S. Tucker Commandant 12 Mount, Saddle, Soldier: Overcoming a Decade of Concierge Maintenance BG SCOTT McKEAN LTC Jeffrey Paine and MAJ Lance Leonard 17 Forward-Support Employment in a Decisive-Action Environment ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the LTC C.J. King Jr. and MAJ Chris Dempsey U.S. Army Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 22 Training to Win in a Complex and Uncertain World 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, , GA 31905. BG Joseph M. Martin, COL David S. Cannon and LTC Christopher W. Hartline Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR rep- 32 Unified Land Operations in 2040 – Autonomy-Enabled -Level Missions resents the professional opinions of the authors and does Retired COL Michael N. Smith, retired COL R. Craig Effinger III and Dr. Paul D. Rogers not necessarily reflect the official Army, U.S. Army Train- ing and Doctrine Command or U.S. Army Armor School 43 Mission Command on the Move position, nor does it change or supersede any informa- MAJ Adam R. Brady, LTC Tommy L. Cardone and CPT Edwin C. den Harder tion presented in other official Army publications. 47 Mission-Command Culture: A Leader-Subordinate Contract Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become gov- LTC Chad R. Foster ernment property and public domain upon receipt in AR- 50 Mission Command and Mental Block: Why the Army Won’t Adopt a True Mission- MOR editorial offices. (The ideas within the manuscript Command Philosophy remain the author’s intellectual property and may be re- MAJ Thomas A. Rebuck used by the author, but the work itself — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public domain upon 55 Human-Performance Optimization: Social Considerations for Leadership and Team receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec- Cohesion essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text MAJ Robert L. Green and Dr. Jessica Gallus to meet publication standards and will redesign illustra- 59 Building Effective Leaders in a Complex Era tions and charts for clarity and to standards as neces- 1LT David G. Forney sary. ARMOR staff may coordinate changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content remains accurate 64 Advanced Situational Awareness and professionally developmental. As a non-copyrighted Retired MAJ Vern L. Tubbs government publication, no copyright is granted if a work 67 The Headquarters and Headquarters Commander as Combat Team is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted Chief of Reconnaissance works should be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, ARMOR may wish to publish copy- CPT Michael L. Hefti righted material, and in that instance, individual authors’ 70 Scouts In: Reimagining Reconnaissance copyrights will be protected by special arrangement. CPT Eric Glocer As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the profes- 74 Bridging the Gap – Outfitting Standard Scout with M113A3s sional development of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR SFC David J. Neuzil focuses on materials for which the Armor School has pro- 76 2016 General Donn A. Starry Writing Competition ponency: armored, direct-fire ground combat systems not serving primarily as carriers; weapons used Staff exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlist- 77 The Army Reconnaissance Course ed soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which ar- MSG Jacob Stockdill mored and armored organizations use exclusive- ly; training for all 19-series officers and CMF 19-series 79 Experiences in International Competitions and Opportunities That Follow enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the train- SFC Michael A. Deleon ing, logistics, history and leadership of armor and ar- 82 Sullivan Cup 2016 mored cavalry units at a brigade/ level and be- Staff low, to include Threat units at those levels. 83 U.S. Army Observes 75th Anniversary of Armored Force Part II Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution Compiled by Lisa Alley is unlimited. Official distribution is made as one copy for 100 Chief of Armor’s Solicitation for Doctrinal Feedback each armored brigade headquarters; armored cavalry Commandant’s Initiatives regiment headquarters; armor headquarters; armored cavalry headquarters; reconnaissance Departments squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop, armor 1 Contacts company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S. 2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch. Draper winners Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, 5 Gunner’s Seat HQDA and Army Command staff agencies with responsi- 6 Armor Branch Update bility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, 101 Reviews organizations and training of the personnel for such or- 104 Letter to editor ganizations may request two copies by sending a request 105 Featured unit: to the editor in chief. Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and is in the public domain ex- cept where copyright is indicated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to ARMOR and the By Order of the Secretary of the Army: author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR, McGin- nis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Official: RAYMOND T. ODIERNO Fort Benning, GA 31905. General, Army Chief of Staff GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army October-December 2015, Vol. CXXVI, No. 4 1525909 Armor School Points of Contact ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as email at- tachments to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@ ARMOR Editorial Offices mail.mil. For all submissions, please include a complete mail- ing address­ and daytime phone number. Editor in Chief Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per is- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 sue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, Deputy Editor and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bul- Gary A. Jones (706) 545-8701 letins. Please submit your article to only one Army profession- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 al bulletin at a time. Editorial Assistant GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional photo Vacant (706) 545-2698 prints or electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 Email: DSN 835 dpi TIF or JPG format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use Power­Point for illustra- Covers and Art Support tions, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shad- Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754 ing. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or Email: [email protected] DSN 835 photo submissions, contact the Editor in Chief. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, email usarmy.benning. U.S. Army Armor School [email protected]; phone DSN 835-2698 or com­mercial (706) 545-2698. Requests to be added to the Commandant (ATZK-DF) official dis­tribution list should be in the form of a letter or BG Scott McKean (706) 545-2029 email to the Editor in Chief. Email: [email protected] DSN 835 Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor School, ATTN: COL Charles D. Freeman (706) 545-2029 ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W142, 1 Kark- Email: [email protected] DSN: 835 er Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of CSM Alan K. Hummel (706) 545-3815 Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided cred- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 it is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copy- right is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with 194th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) the Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduc- COL John M. Cushing (706) 626-5969 tion/reprinting permission. Inquiries may be directed to Ed- Email: [email protected] DSN 620 itor in Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), 316th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ) Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. COL William L. Thigpen (706) 626-8670 ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine Email: [email protected] DSN 620 Website­ at www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) George DeSario (706) 545-1352 ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626- (8265)/DSN 620: The Ar- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 mor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and equipment of the armor force. CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG Scott McKean Chief of Armor/Commandant U.S. Army Armor School

Mastering Sustain- ment Operations

The 2015 Maneuver Warfighter Con- on in this issue. ference provided a forum for discus- Feedback from senior leaders and sion on the future of joint combined- much-needed repetitions and provide combined training centers have con- arms maneuver (CAM) and wide-area a better understanding of logistical sistently reported that junior leaders security. Specifically, the discussion fo- requirements. Gunnery, situational- lack the knowledge and skills to mas- cused on operationalizing the Army training exercises, combat training ter the fundamentals of Army mainte- Operating Concept and focused on center train-ups and Sergeant’s Time nance systems and maintenance oper- how to prepare formations to continu- training provide many opportunities to ations. The trend demonstrates that ously develop situational understand- create a culture where lethality is leaders are challenged in building and ing, rapidly task-organize for purpose complemented by sustainability. sustaining combat power in joint CAM and synchronize warfighting functions in an expeditionary operating environ- with joint, intergovernmental and mul- MLMC ment as part of a joint task force or tinational partners. The endstate is to The MLMC fills a capability gap with BCT. As LTG Michael S. Tucker states in present the enemy with multiple di- junior leaders in mastering fundamen- his article in this edition, “Soldiers lemmas, across multiple domains, to tals of maintenance systems and op- need confidence in their training.” Al- achieve a position of relative advan- erations to build and sustain combat though he is referring to achieving le- tage and consolidate gains. power in an expeditionary operating thality through precision gunnery, the environment. MLMC instructors train Through the use of both live and vir- same concept applies to mastering maintenance management at the com- tual communication channels, we sustainment operations. This year, the pany and battalion level; manage and learned four main outcomes of this Armor School established the Maneu- implement a command maintenance- multi-day discussion: ver Leaders Maintenance Course discipline program; and enhance • Interoperability between brigade (MLMC) to fill this critical gap and knowledge on maintenance informa- combat team (BCT) types limits build a foundation of maintenance tion systems and how to conduct tac- commanders’ ability to task orga- knowledge throughout the Armored tical field maintenance/tactical plan- nize for purpose from one BCT to Force. ning considerations and operations. another; Sustaining distrib- The standard course size is 24 stu- • Task organizing for purpose works uted operations dents. The target audience consists of if units build interoperability at the pre/post-Maneuver Captain’s Career lowest level through habitual rela- Operating in an expeditionary manner Course (MCCC) captains, executive of- tionships, including National and sustaining distributed operations ficers/pre-MCCC lieutenants and mid- Guard and Reserve units; presents significant challenges to the grade noncommissioned officers. • A lack of standardized communica- Armored Force. Reduced operational- These are the leaders who will estab- tions platforms limit mission-com- readiness rates constrains lish, operationalize and maintain sus- mand effectiveness; and commanders’ ability to task-organize tainment systems that enable units to for purpose and sustain momentum • Maintenance readiness continues achieve overmatch in any environ- during operations. Making to detract from operations. ment. sustainment operations an integral It is this last point I would like to focus part of all training events will gain For more information on MLMC,

2 October-December 2015 Figure 1. Units conducting training at the National Training Center routinely struggle with maintaining their equip- ment and completing reconstitution in a timely manner due to lack of good maintenance standard operating proce- dures and reporting; lack of proper Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services 5988E flow; and non-aggressive parts tracking, which leads to incorrect and lost Class 9. Battalion-level leaders do not have the skills required to man- age or influence sustainment systems in a BCT fight. MLMC educates maneuver leaders to apply maintenance man- agement in garrison and operational environments.

contact 1-16 Cavalry Squadron’s S-3, ARMOR magazine. For more informa- preparing sustainment systems for MAJ Ralph Aaron, at (706) 626-8237. tion and requirements, see http:// upcoming training events? What are www.benning.army.mil/armor/starry. you doing personally? What are your As we begin 2016, the U.S. Army Ar- Also, we are excited to announce the thoughts on MLMC and how it will mor School and U.S. Cavalry and Ar- help shape armored warfare? mor Association have announced this 2016 Sullivan Cup “Best Tank Crew year’s General Donn A. Starry Writing Competition” hosted by the Maneuver Share your leader development and , the U.S. Army Ar- education plan, best practices and les- Competition. The competition evalu- th ates and recognizes outstanding writ- mor School and 194 Armored Bri- sons-learned on Facebook (https:// ers from across the Army who demon- gade. The competition is set for May www.facebook.com/USAARMS) and strate clarity and vision about the fu- 2-6, 2016, at Fort Benning, GA. The on milSuite (https://www.milsuite.mil/ ture of the mounted force. Articles for competition tests tank-crew maneu- book/community/spaces/apf/maneu- 2016 will answer the question: Given ver, sustainment and gunnery skills. ver_net/maneuver_center_of_excel- no restraints, what would be the op- These competitions foster the compet- lence/armored_force). And of course, timal design for an expeditionary and itive spirit of our Armored Force and you may email me directly. sustainable armored cavalry regiment are included in U.S. Army Forces Com- in Eastern Europe or the Middle East mand’s training guidance. For more in- and why? Participation confirmation formation and requirements, see is due no later than March 18, 2016, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/ Acronym Quick-Scan with article submission due no later sullivan. BCT – brigade combat team than April 15, 2016. Recognition of the I encourage leaders to use Armor CAM – combined-arms maneu- winning author will occur May 6, 2016, School media outlets to present your ver during the Saint George Ball at Fort viewpoints on establishing MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Ca- Benning, GA. He or she will receive a maintenance systems, unique reer Course $1,000 check from the Cavalry and Ar- sustainment training plans or how to MLMC – Maneuver Leader’s mor Association, a 1911 commemora- best operationalize those systems to Maintenance Course tive pistol and possible publication in the rest of us. How is your organization

3 October-December 2015 Figure 2. MLMC 10-day course.

Draper Armor Leadership Award Winners Announced The Draper Armor Leadership Award The 2015 annual unit Draper Armor • Company C, 1-35 Armor, 2nd Ar- Program has proven over the years to Leadership Award winners: mored Brigade Combat Team st be effective in enabling professional • Troop B, 2-14 Cavalry, 2nd (ABCT), 1 Armored ; development in the leaders and Sol- Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 25th • Company D, 2-7 Cavalry, 3rd ABCT, diers of implementing units. Profes- Infantry Division; 1st Cavalry Division; and sional organizations maintain a con- rd • Troop B, 6-9 Cavalry, 3rd ABCT, 1st nection to the legacy of those who • Troop K, 4-3 Cavalry Regiment; rd Cavalry Division. have gone before them and mentor • Troop A, 2-106 Cavalry, 33 Infan- their members through lessons- try Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), For more information regarding the learned in past conflicts and world 35th Infantry Division, Illinois Army Draper Armor Leadership Award, con- events. Recognition of excellence and National Guard; tact the Office of the Chief of Armor positive competition further encour- • Troop D, 1-509th, Operations (OCOA) at usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx. ages leaders to develop their respec- Group, 509th Infantry Regiment; [email protected] or visit the tive formations into more effective or- • Troop B, 1-16 Cavalry, 316th Caval- OCOA Website at http://www.benning. ganizations. ry Brigade, U.S. Army Armor army.mil/armor/ocoa. The Draper Armor Leadership Award School; promotes combat leadership in Armor • Troop A, 1-105 Cavalry, 32nd IBCT, th Branch units. The award is given annu- 34 Infantry Division, Wisconsin Acronym Quick-Scan ally to promote, sustain and recognize ; excellence in leadership in Armor and rd th • Troop A, 2-183 Cavalry, 116 ABCT – armored brigade com- Cavalry units, and is presented to a de- IBCT, 29th Infantry Division, Virgin- bat team serving unit selected by the unit’s di- ia Army National Guard; IBCT – infantry brigade combat vision/regimental commander accord- nd st team • Troop A, 1-32 Cavalry, 1 IBCT, OCOA – Office Chief of Armor ing to Draper standard operating pro- st cedure. 101 Airborne; SBCT – Stryker brigade combat • Troop C, 6-1 Cavalry, 1st SBCT, 1st team The program was established in 1924 Armored Division; as a means to competitively test the leadership of small Cavalry units.

4 October-December 2015 GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Alan K. Hummel Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor School

Make Maintenance Noncommissioned Officer Business Again

This Gunner’s Seat will cover several diers, families, equipment and train- Current operational readiness (OR) areas. First, I’d like to give our thanks ing. rates coming from NTC are 83 percent to CSM Michael Clemens, who’s faith- for Stryker brigade combat teams and fully served the Armor community for Last, I’d like to address something in 81 percent for armored brigade com- the past couple of years. CSM Clemens my first article that I feel is critically bat teams (ABCTs). Let’s break that has been instrumental in navigating important to mission success for our down into actual numbers of vehicles the Armored Force through some chal- formations, and that’s basic vehicle readily available for operations. For an lenging times as we continue to down- maintenance. Vehicles are the back- ABCT, with an OR rate of 81 percent, size the current force and realign our- bone of an army. Operations and logis- you are looking at a company-plus of selves from full-spectrum combat op- tics depend largely on the reliability pacing items unavailable for combat erations to getting back to the basics and adequacy of vehicles. I’d like to operations at any given time. To me, of Soldiering – with a focus on doc- begin by stating the importance the that is shocking and unacceptable. As trine while still maintaining the valu- noncommissioned officer (NCO) has NCOs, we have to ask ourselves: are able lessons-learned from overseas. regarding vehicle maintenance. Re- we teaching our drivers, gunners and CSM Clemens will continue service as gardless if you’re a tank commander crewmembers how to properly PMCS the command sergeant major for Com- charged with the care of and operation their vehicles? Are we supervising bined Security Transition Command- of an M1A2 tank or a supply sergeant those PMCSs? Are we assisting our pla- . operating an Light-Medium Tactical toon leaders in tracking the 5988-Es Vehicle, you are an integral part of daily, weekly and monthly until defi- Next, a short introduction of myself. overall mission success. ciencies are properly corrected? My most recent assignment was as the command sergeant major of 4th Infan- Historically, mission success has been We’ve always stressed that training try Brigade Combat Team out of Fort directly tied to logistics and mainte- Soldiers is NCO business, but I chal- Stewart, GA. I have served our Army nance. As an NCO, you are the “tech- lenge you to make maintenance NCO for more than 27 years in every lead- nical expert” for the vehicle assigned business again. Let’s get our Soldiers ership position a 19K tanker can hold to you, and it’s incumbent on you to into the motorpools and train them on – from tank crewman through brigade fully understand the 10-level preven- how to maintain their vehicles proper- command sergeant major. I’ve also tative-maintenance checks and servic- ly. gained experience by serving as a se- es (PMCS) required for that vehicle, as nior-enlisted trainer with Operations well as to ensure your crew are as- signed the PMCS checks for their re- Group National Training Center (NTC) Acronym Quick-Scan and as Active Component/Reserve spective part of that vehicle – with you Component division adviser. It is an as the NCO supervising and spot- checking them as they conduct their ABCT – armored brigade com- honor to further serve our cavalry/ar- bat team mor Soldiers. My top priority is aligned PMCS. Always remember that “Sol- NCO – noncommissioned officer with the Army: readiness of our Sol- diers do what leaders check.” NTC – National Training Centers OR – operational readiness PMCS – preventative-mainte- nance checks and services

5 October-December 2015 ARMOR BRANCH UPDATE A Look at the Officer Assignment Process

by MAJ Michael R. Berriman tribution of future billets. geographic location, unit identifica- tion, requested report dates and, in Following is an informative look into Step 2. OIM declaration conference. some cases, duty descriptions. Requi- how Armor Branch conducts the Hu- Within the Operations Division, a con- sitions within the DRL are prioritized man Resources Command (HRC) as- ference is held where branches and based on the Active Component Man- signment process within a given distri- AOs “declare” the total numbers of of- ning Guidance (ACMG) received by the bution cycle (DC). ficers available to PCS during a given Army Chief of Staff. The ACMG lists cycle. Once these numbers are identi- DCs are the six-month periods when which units are priority for fills and the fied, the HRC Operations Readiness Di- officers are ordered to conduct a per- acceptable total percentage of fill for vision (ORD) assigns a total number of manent change of station (PCS). Cycles these units. billets to each AO for fill. This number are broken into two overall periods, is based on the amount of officers de- Within the Operations Division, a sec- traditionally known at the winter cycle clared. ond conference is held, sometimes re- (DC XX-01) and the summer cycle (DC ferred to as the “Fantasy Draft.” Simi- XX-02). Within these cycles, Armor Important during this step: Once offi- lar to a Fantasy Football draft, AOs of Branch will typically move 25 percent cer numbers are declared, the number each branch within Operations Division of a given population in the -01 (win- of billets is identified for that grade (by grade plate) meet in a room and ter) cycle and 75 percent of a given plate. If an officer (or his chain of com- “draft” billets from the DRL to ensure population in the -02 (summer) cycle. mand) at a later date determines he distribution across all branches. The The following information is an at- cannot PCS, this creates a billet that draft order is randomly selected. The tempt to show “how a bill becomes a potentially goes unfilled. In the larger result of the draft is a list of all imma- law” – or better, how an officer who is picture, this means an organization will terial billets the AO will fill during the initially identified to PCS ends with a not receive an officer it was expecting DC. “request for orders” (RFO) released. to receive. Step 5. Preference sheet. AOs create Step 1. Officer-identified-to-move Step 3. Distribution of billets. With the the preference sheet (typically in the (OIM) scrub. Assignment officers (AOs) conclusion of Step 2, the total amount form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) conduct an initial query of their given of billets is identified, and the AO re- for distribution to the OIM population. population through use of the Total ceives a list of potential billets that The preference sheet, at a minimum, Army Personnel Management Informa- ORD created. AOs will first be issued an has all billets available for consider- tion System (TOPMIS). This system amount of hard-code billets – assign- ation. The preference sheet will typi- identifies when officers are available ments that only their branch can fill. In cally include billet location, duty title, to PCS by month and year. The initial some cases, AOs will then be given a report date (if known) and special con- scrub looks for officers available to PCS number of O2B billets (Infantry Branch/ siderations for the billet (Joint, depen- within a given DC: winter (October to Armor Branch only) to fill. The number dent-restricted, nominative, etc.). March) and summer (April through of hard-code and 02B billets subtract- September). This query produces a list ed from the amount of billets leaves This is the officer’s formal opportunity of officers able to PCS in the particular the rest of billets to be O2A and O1A to provide feedback to the AO on DC and initiates contact from the AO billets (combat-arms immaterial and where he’d like to be assigned during to the identified population. branch immaterial respectively). As a the DC. This is also the opportunity to math problem it might look like this: provide important assignment consid- This notification starts the dialogue Total billets – hard-code billets – O2B erations like Married Army Couple’s among the AO, the officer, his unit and billets = immaterial billets. Program (MACP), Exceptional Family his chain of command. Important to Member Program (EFMP), availability understand: The TOPMIS scrub will Step 4. Immaterial draft. With the date or other information. generally produce an 85 percent to 90 number of immaterial billets identi- percent answer for OIMs. We further fied, AOs will then go through an ORD- Important during this step: While this rely on interaction from units and offi- produced document called the Distri- will be the first time an officer sees the cers on their availability. The result of bution Requirements List (DRL). The preference sheet, it is expected there this step is a total amount of officers DRL is the list of billets considered for has been some type of ongoing dia- identified to PCS, which drives the dis- fill during the DC. The DRL provides logue for assignment considerations

6 October-December 2015 among the officer, the AO and possibly Educational Requirements System use executive officer, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the chain of command. or Joint considerations. When an Vilseck, ; squadron S-3, 4th officer has these considerations, the Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Step 6. Slating. Once all preference RFO goes through an internal HRC Vilseck; aide-de-camp for the com- sheets are returned to the AO, slating voting process, where experts in those manding general of U.S. Army Europe, begins. Considerations for slating in- fields review the special considerations Heidelberg, Germany; and aide-de- clude officer performance, chain-of- and the RFO’s circumstances, and camp for the deputy commanding gen- command communication, dwell time, determine if the billet location is right eral-initial military training, U.S. Army MACP and EFMP, and officer prefer- for the officer. Once approved and Training and Doctrine Command, Fort ence. This process is a multi-week pro- voted, the AO can release the RFO. Monroe, VA. His military schooling in- cess, as the AO develops slates, com- cludes Command and General Staff municates with the population and ul- This process can take up to three College (via distance learning), MCCC timately produces a slate for the Armor weeks because it relies on individual and Armor Officer Basic Course. MAJ Branch chief’s review. The AO briefs people to review the officer’s file and Berriman holds a bachelor’s of science the Armor Branch chief, and only on his considerations. The voters are looking degree in psychology from Missouri concurrence is the slating complete at the same type of considerations for State University and a master’s of arts and approved. all officers across all branches at the degree in leadership and management same time while conducting their nor- Step 7. Notification. With the slate ap- from Webster University. mal HRC duties, thereby creating a lon- proved by the Armor Branch chief, the ger process. AO begins the notification process. No- tification typically happens through With the release of the RFO, officers Acronym Quick-Scan email or by telephone and is based on then go to their Military Personnel De- the AO’s assessment of how best to tachment for generation of orders. ACMG – Active Component communicate. Size of the population Manning Guidance and amount of time to notify are the As demonstrated, the assignment pro- AO – assignment officer key driving factors. In some cases, the cess is a multi-month event. Officers DC – distribution cycle DRL – Distribution AO will get the opportunity to provide are typically identified to PCS about one year out from their actual PCS. The Requirements List notification face-to-face. During noti- EFMP – Exceptional Family fication, the AO and officer discuss/ process requires interaction (at a min- Member Program confirm report dates and any other imum) between the AO and the identi- HRC – Human Resources special considerations for release of fied officer. Preferably the chain of Command the RFO. command is involved, providing feed- MACP – Married Army Couple’s back in preparation for the distribution Program Step 8. Release of RFO/assignment of billets and considerations for assign- OIM – officer identified to move ORD – Operations Readiness instructions. The RFO’s release is the ment slating. The result of the process last step of the process and can take Division is an officer with RFO in hand, pre- PCS – permanent change of anywhere from 10 minutes to three pared for his next assignment. station weeks. The amount of time it takes is RFO – request for orders based on special considerations for MAJ Mike Berriman is the HRC Armor TOPMIS – Total Army Personnel each officer. These special Branch lieutenant colonels AO. Previ- Management Information considerations can include EFMP, ous assignments include the HRC Ar- System MACP, time-on-station waivers, Army mor Branch’s majors AO; regimental

7 October-December 2015 Combined-Arms Gunnery: Restoring the Fundamentals

by LTG Michael S. Tucker some, the ideas expressed in this arti- which are gradually returning as the cle are not new and reflect how units gunnery culture is relearned. LTC Highspeed, battalion commander prepared for gunnery prior to opera- for 3-99th Combined Arms Battalion, tions Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring was frustrated. Though fairly new to Gunnery top 10 Freedom. In fact, these were practices command (approaching 60 days), his Following are my “top 10”– actions many units employed prior to opera- unit’s execution of qualification gun- that assisted me during four decades tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm nery was winding down, but admitted- of gunnery training. These observa- and during the early years of OIF, prior ly things were not quite right and his tions are based on my own hard- to the transition to counterinsurgency frustration was changing to embar- earned experiences when I often failed (COIN) training. Over time, the know- rassment. The level of organization on but learned from each failure. I believe the ranges was lacking, indicating that how and institutional memory for these observations can help you pre- key personnel within his organization these fundamental practices faded pare your unit for gunnery, increase did not fully understand gunnery plan- from our noncommissioned officer your unit’s overall gunnery perfor- ning and execution. (NCO) and officer through attri- mance and, most importantly, create tion (retirement, end-term-of-service lethal crews. As he witnessed several runs from the and atrophy). To reverse this trend and tower, it was obvious that armament improve the rate at which the mount- 1. A hot or wet range is a precious accuracy checks and prep-to-fire ed force resharpens its saber, we must resource that cannot sit idle. Once checks were not being conducted to ensure our training is tough, realistic granted permission to fire by Range standard, with multiple alibis due to and cost-effective. Control, your crews should be faults which would have been caught putting rounds downrange. While in these earlier checks. Also, his crews Our Army has faced adversity many crews are firing, there must be a appeared to be slow during engage- times during the course of its several- supply of crews “waiting on deck” ments, and Table VI qualification scores hundred-year history, and today’s to begin their run as crews did not match the success the crews at- Army is no different. Traditional gun- complete the course or in the event tained on the previous gate tables. nery skills eroded as the Army focused that a crew is directed to leave the Safety was emerging as an issue, which on COIN, resulting in generations of of- course prior to completion of the indicated some of the crews were prob- ficers and NCOs well trained in motor- table it is executing. As a rule, for ably lucky on the previous tables and ized-infantry tactics at the expense of every crew negotiating the course, not as skilled as they needed to be for armor/mechanized-infantry tasks, there must be another crew at the qualification. He noticed that even though his units employed Thru-Site Video (TSV) on pre- liminary ranges, the vehicle-crew eval- uators (VCEs) did not appear to under- stand or leverage captured video in crew debriefs to enhance self-discovery learning and correct crew error. Disor- ganized range operations resulted in wasted live-fire time, and the overall lack of efficiency caused his battalion to extend their gunline into his sister battalion’s range time. He was not looking forward to explaining this to his brigade commander, COL Hardcore. He promised himself that the next time the unit went to gunnery, it was going to be different! This article’s purpose is to share more than four decades of experience in both the art and science of planning, Figure 1. An M1A2 Abrams fires a 120mm round at a target during live-fire preparing and executing tank and var- qualifications at the Udairi Range Complex in Kuwait April 26, 2015. (U.S. ious mounted-platform gunnery. To Army photo by Capt. Shaun Manley)

8 October-December 2015 ready: prep-to-fire checks also need to know the number of 7. Records management as it per- complete, boresighted and rounds fired (by type) to track both tains to crews is often overlooked. communications tested, standing gun-tube and breech-block life. Create a folder/file for each crew by on the ready line. The ideal time to collect this and place previous gunnery scores information is either when the and AAR information in the file for 2. Maintain situational awareness. If vehicle is cleared at the completion review. Include the crew’s gun- firing behind another company, of a run or when the last firing nery-skills testing data and Ad- coordinate with the unit to have at vehicle returns to the ammo pad vanced Gunnery Training System/ least a platoon’s worth of vehicles when dunnage is turned in. Bradley Advanced Training System arrive at the next range the day information, as all this information prior and offer to repay the favor 5. Video feeds provided by TSV are provides critical information to the at a later date. Anticipate success an invaluable source of informa- VCE. This folder supports the iden- and position your unit to take tion – use it! Live audio-video pro- tification of trends, positive and advantage of time available. The vides an inside look at crew inter- negative, for the crew and/or the time you gain may be needed to action during execution of an en- unit that can be addressed by unit offset range time lost due to range gagement, which can help the VCE master gunners and chain of com- fires, inoperable targetry, weather with the AAR process (see Figure mand. conditions, etc. Require crews 2). VCEs can determine switcholo- identified to fire later in the firing gy errors by the gunner or vehicle 8. Battlefield presence. Similar to order to monitor the admin-net commander (VC), observe safety mission command, the battalion (you must run a range admin net) violations and actually observe the commander or command sergeant throughput to anticipate engagement through the gunner’s major should be present in the opportunities to move forward in or commander’s sight. This pro- tower during crew qualification. the firing order. This is inevitable. vides the VCE an accurate assess- Again, if the crews see that qualifi- 3. Set conditions for success. ment of reticle aim, range to target, cation is important to the battalion Designate and empower your ammunition and tracking of tar- commander/command sergeant beachmasters early, and ensure gets. More importantly, the collec- major, this reinforces the gunnery they understand their roles. The tion of video files provides a great culture within the unit. Master beachmaster ensures the range is library from which commanders gunners should be present in the organized and efficient, and crews and master gunners can leverage tower to interface with VCEs and are where they need to be. This examples of what right looks like ensure they are maintaining gun- individual is constantly on the or common mistakes as part of nery standards. Consider recogni- move among the boresight line, their VCE training program and for tion of crews who qualify on the ready line, ammo pad, range tower training new tank crews. The Army first qualification run with a steak and after-action-review (AAR) has invested a significant amount dinner from the dining facility or shack to ensure tempo is not lost. of money on these devices for a some other meal in their honor. Units that fail to designate a strong reason: they work! Honoring a crew for a successful beachmaster will pay a heavy price qualification run encourages crews in disorganization and wasted 6. Mission command. A representa- to train harder, as no crew wants range time – your most precious tive from the chain of command to fail to qualify. Crews who do not resource. (company commander, battalion qualify on their first run will re- commander, battalion command member this and will train harder 4. Establish “smart” business rules. sergeant major or master gunner) for the next qualification gunnery At the completion of each crew’s should observe every main gun en- so they can get recognition in front firing run, require the vehicle gagement throughout gunnery. of their peers. Leader vehicles commander to report the number This command presence reinforces (commander, executive officer, S-3, of rounds expended by type to the the emphasis on gunnery to the company commander, platoon ammo pad and the tower on the unit and provides leadership an op- leader and platoon sergeant) are admin net. Why is this important? portunity to conduct mission com- always expected to qualify the first Range regulations require the unit mand. Should a crew miss two con- time and lead from the front by be- have accurate inventories of ammo secutive targets during a precision ing the first crew downrange at on the ammo pad. Often ranges are engagement, the chain of com- echelon. shut down until the unit can mand is in a position to direct the generate an accurate report. Also, range officer in charge to remove 9. Failing to plan is a plan to fail. the unit master gunner needs to the crew from the range immedi- Units cannot have the attitude that know how many rounds are ately to determine if the problem all they need to do is simply show available to support the refiring of is mechanical or crew error. Main- up on the range and qualify with engagements for unqualified tenance personnel correct me- little to no preparation time invest- crews. Whomever is designated chanical errors; master gunners ed. Gunnery is what crews live for. within the unit to fill out the 2408- and unit leadership correct crew- If there are crews in your organiza- 4 Weapon Record Data Card will induced errors. tion who are not excited about

9 October-December 2015 gunnery and are unwilling to invest endeavor your unit should enjoy in our gunnery culture will ensure our in the time required to make them- because the ability to fire live am- formations are ready when the nation selves better, maybe those person- munition is typically limited to one calls. nel should consider a different mil- or two opportunities per year. Gen- itary occupation specialty. Think of erations of crews have spent count- LTG Michael Tucker commands First the training gates for gunnery as less hours in garrison and in the Army. He entered the U.S. Army as a playoff games that lead to the Su- field retelling gunnery “war sto- private in 1972 and has served in a per Bowl of qualification gunnery. ries,” so help your crews continue variety of leadership positions, Consider awarding a trophy and/or this time-honored tradition and completing his enlisted career as a drill streamers that are displayed on the train them well. sergeant in 3rd Basic Combat Training unit for the company and Brigade at , MO. He platoon who earns the highest av- Conclusion was then commissioned as an Armor erage scores on Table VI. A compa- The importance of preparing our crews lieutenant through Officer Candidate ny or platoon that has an unquali- for gunnery cannot be underestimat- School. Previous assignments include fied crew after a Table VI qualifica- ed. It is those skills each crew employs commanding general, 2nd Infantry tion gunnery should be ineligible during gunnery that carry over into Division, and commander, 1st Brigade, for a trophy or streamer, thus rein- combat. If we as leaders fail to develop 1st Armored Division, which included a forcing the importance that every lethal crews during peacetime training, deployment in support of OIF. During crew must qualify Table VI on its we are doing a great disservice to his 44-year career, he has commanded first attempt. Remind crews that if those Soldiers, their families and the at platoon through division level, they are good enough, they may nation. When training is complete, our including tank-platoon leader; tank- earn the right to represent their Soldiers need confidence in their train- company executive officer; battalion unit in a “best of the best” compe- ing, confidence in their equipment and motor officer; battalion adjutant; tition against other units across the confidence in their leaders. Finally, re- battalion operations officer; U.S. Army for the title of best crew (i.e., member that gunnery is about putting Military Academy professor of military Sullivan Cup for Abrams crews). “steel on target,” and that is what the science; division G-3; executive officer mounted force brings to the com- to the commanding general of U.S. 10. Have fun! Gunnery should be bined-arms fight. Developing lethal Army Europe; assistant division a positive, morale-building crews and restoring the required rigor commander for both maneuver and

Figure 2. VCE checklist (M1A2) when using TSV.

10 October-December 2015 support; deputy commanding general Storm, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring of the U.S. Armor School; deputy Freedom. His military schooling Acronym Quick-Scan commanding general of Walter Reed includes Armor Officer Basic and Army Medical Center; assistant Advanced Course, Canadian Land AAR – after-action review surgeon general for Warrior Care Forces Command and Staff College, BIOC – biocular COIN – counterinsurgency Transition in the Office of the Surgeon U.S. Army Command and General Staff NCO – noncommissioned officer General, Washington, DC; deputy chief College and U.S. Army War College. His OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom of staff, operations, for the civilian education includes a bachelor’s TIS – thermal imaging sight International Security Assistance Force; of science degree in psychology from TSV – Thru-Site Video and assistant deputy chief of staff, the University of Maryland, a master’s VC – vehicle commander G-3/5/7, Headquarters Department of degree in military arts and sciences VCE – vehicle-crew evaluator the Army. Tucker’s 25 years of overseas from U.S. Army Command and General assignments and deployments include Staff College and a master’s degree in multiple tours to Germany, the Republic public administration from of Korea and operational deployments Shippensburg University. to operations Desert Shield/Desert

11 October-December 2015 Mount, Saddle, Soldier: Overcoming a Decade of Concierge Maintenance

“First the horse, then the saddle, then of war, this scenario is increasingly • Vehicle services; and the man.” -old cavalryman’s creed common among our maneuver battal- • Flow of repair parts. ions1 in brigade combat teams (BCTs). by LTC Jeffrey Paine and The operations tempo, frequency of Mechanics have occupied guard tow- MAJ Lance Leonard deployments and the Army Force Gen- ers and entry-control points when de- It is late afternoon in March 2011 when eration cycle’s “train/ready” phases ployed, while of contractors a platoon returns to Forward Operat- have created very tactically sound and troubleshoot and repair deadlined ing Base (FOB) Frontenac from a day- savvy junior leaders who develop cre- equipment. Therefore, Army mainte- long security patrol throughout Shah- ative solutions to problems they en- nance at the company and battalion Wal-e-Kot in southern Afghanistan. counter in their deployed areas of op- levels has become a mysterious “black Three of the four mine-resistant am- eration. However, the optempo has box” in which broken equipment goes bush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain ve- also driven organizations to streamline in and, at some indeterminate point in hicles (MATVs) move under their own and “outsource” maintenance opera- the future, comes out the other side power, while the second vehicle in the tions away from maneuver platoons to fully mission capable. This is the prob- column uses a heavy tow bar to pull maintenance platoons in the forward- lem. When units must maintain their another vehicle. There is no obvious support companies (FSC) augmented own equipment without contractors, battle damage to the towed vehicle, by contractors. Army senior leaders de- have no excess equipment and per- but dark oil stains coat the exterior of liberately decided to implement this form maintenance in a tactical assem- the transfer case underneath the ar- concept of support to maximize end- bly area (TAA) and not in an FOB, they mored truck. strength in combat forces in and struggle with the basics. Moreover, as Afghanistan. units return to operating and training The platoon goes through the rote solely with their modified table of or- movements of clearing personal and The result is that junior leaders in com- ganization and equipment (TO&E) as- crew-served weapons and moves along panies have become accustomed to sets, they have exactly the amount of the graveled road to the FOB mainte- dropping off deadlined vehicles and equipment they need. This requires a nance area, where the squad leader equipment for routine maintenance, fundamental shift in thinking and op- and platoon sergeant meet the battal- which often includes operator-level erating for our junior leaders. ion maintenance technician (BMT). The tasks. This “concierge maintenance” crews drag the powerless MATV to the mentality – exacerbated by the avail- Recent rotations at the combat train- ing centers (CTC) confirm this observa- maintenance shelter and detach the ability of excess theater property and tion about maintenance systems. As tow bar while the squad leader de- equipment, especially vehicles – allows the Army moved from mission-rehears- scribes to the BMT what happened. platoons and companies greater flexi- al exercises to training rotations based The maintenance platoon takes the bility to execute the requisite number on the decisive-action training environ- MATV so the platoon can complete its of patrols while maintainers repair ve- ment, units had to operate continuous- post-patrol operations, cleaning weap- hicles. Unfortunately, maintenance ur- ly from TAAs and battle positions, away ons and equipment before the Soldiers gency only comes when a platoon is in from secure bases and fixed mainte- head to the dining facility for dinner. danger of not meeting the ubiquitous nance facilities. Platoons and compa- They have patrolled daily for the last four-vehicle patrol requirement. 47 days and will patrol again tomorrow nies failed to complete basic daily with the same three MATVs, plus one Due to this method of maintenance, a PMCS as evident by the number of De- additional from the six assigned to the significant portion of company-grade partment of the Army Forms 5988-E platoon to meet the four-vehicle re- officers, junior field-grade officers and turned in to the FSCs. This resulted in quirement. The squad leader would noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who few Class IX parts ordered for repairs, prefer to have “his” MATV and offers a serve as squad leaders and platoon which caused minor deficiencies to be- momentary gripe to his lieutenant over sergeants do not understand the basic come major deadline issues as the ro- chow but shrugs it off as “just the way tenets of Army maintenance systems: tation progressed. it is.” His squad works into the night • Preventive-maintenance checks The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine preparing the loaner truck for patrol and services (PMCS); Command (TRADOC) Capability Man- and then beds down for the night. • 5988-E flow; ager-Armored Brigade Combat Team Over the past nearly decade and a half • Command maintenance programs; (ABCT) observed that in most cases,

12 October-December 2015 Figure 1. Turn-in rate of 5988-Es from units during a typical National Training Center (NTC) rotation and the correlation with combat power.

5988Es return to the unit-maintenance • 5988-E flow; operate supported by immature the- point without National Stock Numbers • Dispatching; ater-sustainment systems. Maneuver identified for the proper repair parts. • “Circle X” approval; units, down to and including platoons, Leaders exacerbate the problem by im- • Controlled exchange; and will operate far away from the sustain- properly allocating maintenance assets • Class IX tracking.4 ment bases and FOBs to which we have without enough mechanics forward to become accustomed, living solely out validate faults and identify repair After 14 years operating from FOBs in of rucksacks and bustle racks. The abil- parts.2 Analysis of unit-maintenance Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army now ity of junior leaders to plan, execute data also reveals units are routinely must return to expeditionary and joint and supervise operator-level mainte- unable to maintain a 90-percent oper- operations in austere and immature nance and then request appropriate ational-readiness (OR) rate, which is theaters of operation. This makes the assets and supplies to sustain combat the Army standard. In some cases, the ability to generate and sustain combat power is critical during high-tempo and OR rate slipped to as low as 70 percent power for high-intensity operations su- mobile operations. for the rotation.3 premely important. The Army Operat- ing Concept5 describes an expedition- Potential solutions Commanders of and battal- ary Army capable of rapid deployment ions interviewed during their rotations that is task-organized into a tailored The Army should adopt solutions at at CTCs regularly discuss the difficulty combined-arms force capable of de- several levels to address the lack of in maintenance operations and its im- feating threats to U.S. interests.6 With maintenance knowledge and experi- pact on maintaining combat power. Re- that in mind, Army forces (as part of ence in maneuver formations. In ef- porting from battalion commanders in- the joint force) must be able to execute fect, we are talking about changing our dicates maintenance programs suffer across the range of military operations organizational culture, a culture em- from poor services; overreliance on in austere environments. bedded and reinforced during the last field-service representatives and logis- 14 years of deployments and combat tics-assistance representatives; and an Fully developed sustainment assets are operations – a time when organiza- inability to comply with Army mandate not present in such environments. “De- tions and their cultures adapted to the programs such as the test, measure- centralized operations in complex en- demands placed on them and took ad- ment and diagnostic equipment pro- vironments” will be the norm.7 As joint vantage of available efficiencies, spe- gram. Unfortunately, the Army has few forces seize the initiative in contested cifically surplus equipment and addi- BCT sustainment systems published regions, whether in joint forcible-entry tional assets to maintain combat and enforced that incorporate now- operations or more traditional ground equipment and vehicles. This mindset critical procedures: invasions, maneuver units will have to now must change to develop and

13 October-December 2015 maintenance pro- focusing on maneuver leaders, MCoE gram or provide demonstrates maintenance is not just quality advice to the job of the mechanic/maintainer; the commander, the leader who owns the equipment is so creating a posi- ultimately responsible. Competent ma- tion on the battal- neuver leaders who understand and ion staff (vice the can supervise field maintenance in FSC) for a maneu- their formations will provide units ca- ver-branch battal- pable of employing their combat sys- ion maintenance tems, which gives their brigade and/or officer (captain) battalion commander increased tacti- could bridge this cal flexibility. experience gap. MLMC develops the maintenance and Ideally, the officer logistics competencies of maneuver would be a cap- leaders by focusing on three areas: tain’s-career- maintenance fundamentals, mainte- course graduate in nance information systems and tactical the queue for maintenance planning. company com- mand, who is The maintenance-fundamentals sec- trained in staff tion of the course teaches maneuver processes and has leaders how to manage maintenance Figure 2. OR rates brigades maintained over the duration served as a lieu- systems within the battalion. Leaders of their NTC rotation, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. No unit was tenant in a ma- learn such topics as: able to maintain a 90-percent OR rate for more than one neuver platoon • Effective command maintenance; day. In a BCT, this prevents employment of two compa- and company. • Managing programs such as the nies’ worth of firepower and reduces tactical options. Working in con- Army Oil Analysis Program; junction with the • Implementing standard operating reinforce a culture in which equipment existing MCO and maintenance-tech procedures; and maintenance is once again central to warrant officer, this organizational so- • Multiple approaches to conducting preparation for combat. We must im- lution could be a powerful catalyst for maintenance services. plement structural changes at the or- invigorating battalion-level mainte- ganizational level, inculcate them at nance systems as well as leader-devel- Leaders then move on to maintenance the institutional level through leader opment opportunities. information systems. This block of in- functional training and professional struction gives leaders the tools and military education (PME), and rein- MLMC skills to take full advantage of informa- force them with unit-level leader-de- Merely adding an additional staff offi- tion systems to maintain combat sys- velopment programs. By doing this, we cer to the battalion staff will not re- tems. This section covers the use of can prepare and develop innovative duce the knowledge gap. TRADOC Global Combat Support System-Army, leaders to operate in conditions of un- should implement institutional educa- the Non-Mission-Capable Report (O26) certainty. tion and training to increase leader and compliance with Army-level main- knowledge of maintenance operations tenance messages. Changing the organizational structure and systems. Unfortunately, this is of- of maneuver battalions would greatly The final block of instruction provides ten a slow process; Army centers of ex- improve leaders’ understanding and a structured approach to incorporating cellence can provide a more rapid so- ownership of maintenance systems maintenance operations into tactical lution to the problem using internal re- and begin to affect the cultural change. planning. This section covers echelon- sources. Leaders throughout the Ma- As an example, the current TO&E for ing maintenance assets and planning neuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) combined-arms battalions and cavalry considerations in offensive and defen- recognize that maneuver leaders now squadrons assigns an Ordnance Corps sive operations. struggle with maintenance compe- lieutenant as the battalion mainte- tence at battalion level and below. At the course’s conclusion, leaders will nance-control officer (MCO) in the FSC. That is why MCoE closely coordinated have the knowledge to properly train This officer, teamed with the mainte- with the Ordnance School (the Army’s Soldiers on crew and operator field- nance technician and maintenance ser- proponent for maintenance) to ad- level maintenance tasks and effective- geant, is supposed to be the subject- dress this shortfall through develop- ly maintain combat-power-projection matter expert on maintenance systems ment of the Maneuver Leader’s Main- platforms to sustain land-warfare dom- and procedures. Generally an ord- tenance Course (MLMC). inance capability. nance lieutenant does not have ade- quate experience in managing mainte- This course focuses on maintenance at Maneuver leaders should also receive nance systems or combined-arms battalion level and below, using hands- training on maintenance fundamentals maneuver to supervise a battalion on and how-to methodology. By through PME. Newly commissioned

14 October-December 2015 lieutenants need to learn the basics of Command and General Staff Officer’s deployments and prepares to fight as how best to supervise their NCOs and Course and the U.S. Army Sergeants an expeditionary ground component of Soldiers in conducting PMCS and oper- Major Academy as they prepare for the joint force, we must now ensure ator-level maintenance and repairs. duty as battalion operations/executive our leaders are capable of maintaining NCOs who attend the Advanced Lead- officers and command sergeants ma- their equipment with their organic as- er’s Course and Senior Leader’s Course jor, respectively. Finally, battalion and sets to generate combat power. should receive similar training. brigade commanders should integrate Through re-examining and changing maintenance-leader training into their our battalion structures, training lead- Captains attending the Maneuver Cap- unit leader-development programs to ers in functional courses like MLMC tain’s Career Course should gain a sustain and reinforce the education re- and PME, while reinforcing these skills broader understanding of maintenance ceived through MLMC and PME. through solid leader-development pro- management as a company command- grams, the maneuver force will be bet- er and as a battalion staff officer, with Summary ter able to fight and win in a complex some familiarization in maintenance world. information systems. They should also Fourteen years of constant combat and be able to apply basic tactical-planning contingency operations have eroded LTC Jeff Paine commands 1st Squadron, considerations through the military de- our Army’s ability to maintain our own 16th Cavalry, Fort Benning, GA. Previ- cision-making process in planning bat- equipment and generate combat pow- ous assignments include division chief talion and brigade operations. Field- er in our companies and battalions. of operations, 4th Infantry Division, Fort grade officers and sergeants major Our senior leaders prioritized resourc- Carson, CO; battalion executive officer, should be offered (and strongly en- es to maximize combat forces while 2-8 Infantry, 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Divi- couraged to accept) electives that pro- fighting in two theaters of operation. sion, Fort Carson and Kandahar, Af- vide them battalion-level-and-above They made the best use of contracted ghanistan; battalion S-3, 2-8 Infantry, understanding of maintenance sys- support to do it. As the Army transi- 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car- tems. This should happen at the tions away from static, fixed-base son; tactical officer, U.S. Military Acad- emy (USMA), West Point, NY; and cav- alry troop and headquarters troop MLMC timeline commander, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Ger- The 2016 and 2017 schedule for MLMC: many, and Ad Duluiyah, Iraq. His de- • Dec. 7-18, 2015 ployments include Bosnia-Herzegovina • Feb. 22-March 4, 2016 (February-September 1999), Operation • May 2-13, 2016 Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II (February 2004 • June 13-24, 2016 through February 2005) and Operation • Aug. 15-26, 2016 Enduring Freedom 11-12 (May 2011- • Oct. 3-14, 2016 May 2012). LTC Paine’s military school- • Dec. 5-16, 2016 ing includes Command and General • Feb. 6-17, 2017 Staff College, Armor Captain’s Career • May 1-12, 2017 Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course and • June 19-30, 2017 Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds a • Aug. 14-25, 2017 bachelor’s of science degree in aero- • Oct. 9-20, 2017 space engineering from USMA and a • Dec. 4-15, 2017 master’s of arts degree in organiza- Note: All dates are pending due to scheduled training holidays and can be tional psychology and leader develop- moved to the left or right. ment from Columbia University. MLMC was developed to address the knowledge and skill gaps of junior lead- MAJ Lance Leonard is the brigade ers in the fundamentals of Army maintenance systems and maintenance pro- operations officer, 316th Cavalry grams. Without the skills addressed in the course, leaders have difficulty Brigade, U.S. Army Armor School, building and sustaining combat power in combined-arms maneuver in an ex- MCoE, Fort Benning. Previous peditionary operating environment as part of a brigade combat team. assignments include operations officer, 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, MLMC is intended to develop senior lieutenants and captains for the battal- Fort Benning; executive officer, 4th ion maintenance officer position reflected on the current K-series tables of Squadron, , 1st organization and equipment. MLMC further prepares junior officers for posi- ABCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp tions of increased responsibility and benefits the maneuver force and Army Hovey, Republic of Korea; operations as a whole. officer, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry MLMC is not in the official Army Training Requirements and Resources Sys- Regiment, 1st ABCT, 2nd Infantry tem reservation program at this time. Interested officers should coordinate Division, Camp Hovey; division directly with 316th Cavalry Brigade. maneuver planner, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea;

15 October-December 2015 and Interagency Fellow at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Acronym Quick-Scan Springfield, VA. He deployed multiple times to Iraq for OIF I (2003-2004), OIF ABCT – armored brigade NCO – noncommissioned officer III (2006-2006) and OIF V (2007-2008). combat team NTC – National Training Center BCT – brigade combat team OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom His military schooling includes the BMT – battalion maintenance OR – operational readiness Command and General Staff College, technician PMCS – preventive- Armor Maneuver Captain’s Career CTC – combat training center maintenance checks and Course, Scout Platoon Leader’s Course DA – decisive action services and the Air Assault Course. He holds a FOB – forward operating base PME – professional military bachelor’s of science in degree in FSC – forward-support company education Economics from USMA and a master’s FY – fiscal year SBCT – Stryker brigade combat MATV – MRAP all-terrain vehicle team of arts degree in business MCoE – Maneuver Center of TAA – tactical assembly area administration-entrepreneurship and Excellence TD – training day innovation management from Portland MCO – maintenance-control TO&E – table of organization State University. officer and equipment MLMC – Maneuver Leader’s TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training Notes Maintenance Course and Doctrine Command 1 This phenomenon is not limited solely to MRAP – mine-resistant USMA – U.S. Military Academy maneuver battalions but is common ambush-protected throughout all types of formations. The authors are writing from their own expe- riences in maneuver battalions. 2 TRADOC Capability Manager-ABCT and Reconnaissance semi-annual report, Sep- tember 2014. 3 Personal correspondence with CPT Chris- tina Shelton, Goldminer battle-staff ana- lyst, NTC Logistics Group, Jan. 22, 2015. 4 Ibid. 5 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Com- plex World. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

16 October-December 2015 Forward-Support Company Employment in a Decisive- Action Environment by LTC C.J. King Jr. and concept of support. As a result, com- most of our battalions would be to re- MAJ Chris Dempsey munication challenges, situational un- tain a portion of each unit’s trains in derstanding and support inefficiency the BSA and push the combat-trains Forward-support company (FSC) em- often emerge when exposed to the command post (CTCP) along with each ployment is a topic that emerges fre- slightest friction. Simple functions such battalion’s unit maintenance-collection quently, particularly as brigades ap- as logistics-status (LOGSTAT) submis- point (UMCP) forward. By doing so, the proach combat training center (CTC) sion and logistics-synchronization BSB could employ its distribution com- rotations and begin to examine how (LOGSYNCH) meetings are often seem- pany primarily for supply-point distri- freedom of maneuver and momentum ingly impossible endeavors; manage- bution, which maximized its capability can best be maintained over ground ment of liquid logistics (fuel and water) to receive, store and issue one day’s lines of communication (LOC). The 2nd across the BCT suffers gaps; and bri- worth of commodities for the BCT. This Armored Brigade Combat Team’s gades often culminate very early in the model provided the BSB with flexibility (ABCT) most recent National Training fight due to sustainment shortfalls to conduct up to two independent re- Center (NTC) rotation made one thing rather than due to gaps in intelligence, supply operations forward daily, either crystal clear to both maneuver and lo- communication, fires or any of the oth- in the form of a standard or emergen- gistics commanders: in most environ- er warfighting functions (WfF). In cy-resupply logistics package (LOGPAC) ments, under most conditions, support short, brigades are often unable to when needed, or in the form of a for- efficiency is maximized when most of maximize training on other WfFs sim- ward logistics element (FLE). the FSC’s distribution assets along with ply due to poor logistics planning and a mission-command node (essentially the BSB’s inability to effectively inte- We saw a marked improvement in di- the battalion trains, which many still grate FSCs into the concept of support. rect communication among the FSC refer to as the field-trains command commanders, our S-3, support-opera- post (FTCP)) are co-located in the bri- To be clear, the purpose of this article tions (SPO) officer and the BSB com- gade-support area (BSA) with the bri- is not to advocate for a specific com- mander as our NTC rotation ap- gade-support battalion (BSB). mand or support relationship between proached. FSC commanders became FSCs and maneuver battalions, as ATP increasingly aware a portion of their Problem 4-90 and Field Manual 6-0, Command- trains would be co-located with the While Army Techniques Publication er and Staff Organization and Opera- BSB. As such, the BSB became much (ATP) 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, tions, already provide doctrinal guid- more aware of FSC personnel and states FSCs are assigned to the BSB and ance to commanders regarding options equipment limitations; far more in- may be attached to or placed under on this subject. However, regardless of formed and able to provide effective operational control of maneuver units the command or support relationship advice on logistics matters unique to for short durations, many brigade com- employed, taking deliberate steps to each supported battalion; and better bat teams (BCTs) arrive at NTC with improve communication and reinforce armed to immediately address leader- FSCs already attached to or already un- relationships between the BSB and the ship and equipment capability gaps der opcon of maneuver units well be- FSCs while in garrison is absolutely a within each organization. As a result, fore the rotation. Given this relation- prudent and necessary measure that our brigade overcame many issues be- ship, the BSBs sometimes struggle to will lead to efficiencies during a CTC ro- fore our NTC rotation. For issues not communicate with FSCs; are not fully tation or a deployment. fully addressed prior to our rotation, aware of FSC personnel strengths and we determined exactly where we could weaknesses; do not fully understand While FSCs were attached to support- assume risk and where we needed to FSC voice and digital communication ed battalions in our own brigade well surge logistics effort to ensure the challenges; and lack clarity on FSC prior to NTC, as our rotation ap- BCT’s momentum and its commander’s training proficiency or the FSC’s ability proached, maneuver and logistics com- freedom of maneuver during move- to manage maintenance for its sup- manders and planners analyzed how ment-to-contact. ported unit. we could best support a brigade move- ment-to-contact over extended LOCs. We would be remiss if we did not point Perhaps most importantly, supported Given that the BSB’s distribution com- out that two battalions retained con- units sometimes view FSCs as subordi- pany was not robust enough to execute trol of their entire FSC throughout our nate units and dictate the FSC’s em- daily tactical convoy operations in sup- decisive-action rotation; in one case, a ployment, preventing FSC representa- port of six independent battalions, it unit reverted to dated doctrine and tion in the BSA, regardless of the BSB’s became clear the best way to support employed a combined-arms BSA

17 October-December 2015 concept with the FTCP, CTCP and UMCP – and what worked for our brigade may • It eliminates the voice and digital co-located far forward. The other unit not work in all situations – what fol- communication issues often simply pulled its trains out of the BSA, lows is our honest assessment of how present between BSBs and FSCs; pushed them a few kilometers forward the BSB’s core companies and FSCs • It enables a true and far more on the battlefield and pushed supplies might be employed to maximize the accurate and robust logistics from its trains to its CTCP and compa- sustainment WfF within most BCTs in common operating picture; nies forward. most situations. • It ensures some logistics capability While our brigade was ultimately very First, the BSB should have a formal, es- and most of its maintenance and successful from a logistics perspective, tablished relationship with the FSCs, medical assets are located as far tailoring support to those two units re- regardless if FSCs are attached to ma- forward as possible; inforced that the BSB would be ex- neuver units for short or longer dura- • It ensures the BSB has organic tremely challenged to support more tions. At the command level, this distribution-company assets on than two complete FSCs forward at any means FSC commanders clearly under- hand to receive and temporarily given time, given the limitations of its stand their logistics professional devel- store commodities as EAB LOGPACs distribution company. Simply put, opment and guidance for employment arrive at the BSA; without control over disposition and comes from the BSB commander, employment of the FSCs, the BSB and • It increases security and force thereby preventing them from seeing its distribution company is not de- protection for the FSC; and their companies as subordinate to the signed, manned or equipped to push a maneuver battalions they support. At • It enables the BSB’s distribution brigade’s worth of requirements for- company to provide up to two well- ward of the BSA on a daily basis, par- the staff level, this means FSCs com- municate frequently with the BSB’s planned, well-resourced, ticularly when the BCT has enablers independent LOGPACs daily if (additional consumers) attached. Un- SPO and actively participate in key planning and coordination meetings, required. These two elements fortunately, that is exactly how many could be standard LOGPACs to units attempt to support brigade re- including LOGSYNCH and the brigade maintenance meeting. units unable to co-locate their quirements. Contrary to popular belief, trains in the BSA, emergency the BSB does not exist simply to resup- Second, in nearly every instance, ma- resupply operations, FLEs or any ply the FSCs; instead, the FSCs and neuver units should co-locate a portion combination. their distribution assets exist to enable of their battalion trains (with a compe- the BSB to extend operational reach to Third, each brigade should plan and ex- tent leader and most of the FSC’s dis- support and resupply the brigade. ecute a logistics leader-development tribution assets) inside the BSA while program, followed by a logistics exer- To be completely transparent, the co-locating their CTCP, UMCP and bat- cise (LOGEX) – ideally conducted on method our brigade used very success- talion aid station (BAS) forward in their terrain that enables doctrinal distanc- fully during Rotation 15-06 requires unit area. Doing so ensures the sup- es between support areas – to build FSCs to co-locate a portion of their ported unit has a strong, credible pro- foundational logistics competence trains along with a mission-command ponent in the BSA who presumably will within the BCT. The former creates node at the BSA; draw commodities stop at nothing to make sure his/her shared understanding and expecta- from the BSA; push supplies forward to unit’s needs are met. logistics release points (LRPs); resupply tions on how BCT logistics and medical platforms at the company trains; and This also has the following benefits: support will be executed. The latter return to the BSA to synchronize logis- tics and set conditions for future re- quirements. This technique works ex- ceptionally well when the brigade is in defense or operating over short- to medium-range LOCs of 25 kilometers or less. However, it cannot be sus- tained for long durations over extend- ed LOCs (greater than 25 kilometers). To do so requires the BSA to either jump forward – thereby reducing the ground LOC to something more man- ageable for the FSC to negotiate – or risk overextension and set conditions for massive echelons-above-brigade (EAB) backhaul by pushing multiple (more than two) convoys from the BSB’s distribution company daily. Figure 1. 299th BSB’s BSA setup during NTC Rotation 15-06 at Fort Irwin, CA. Depicted in the photo are elements from all four core companies and four of A way the six FSCs supporting 2nd ABCT, 1st Infantry Division. (Photo by Eagle (Avia- While we do not have all the answers tion) Team pilot, NTC Operations Group)

18 October-December 2015 50 percent) and black (less than 25 percent), or GARB, means is important. The whole BCT also needs to know when cross-leveling within organiza- tions is appropriate rather than calling for an emergency resupply and why that’s critical; it minimizes the number of unplanned (emergency) missions that can desynchronize the BCT’s logis- tics plan. Keeping those definitions the same for all classes of supply is highly recommended, and it simplifies report- ing as well. Fifth, units must plan and execute LOG- SYNCH meetings with appropriate play- ers over appropriate mediums well be- fore a CTC rotation or combat deploy- ment. While LOGSYNCH players can vary, there is no substitute for “repre- sentation by committee” when time and location allow; having the battal- ion executive officer, logistics officer Figure 2. LTC C.J. King, 299th BSB’s commander, explains LRP operations to lo- (S-4) and/or FSC commander represent gistics and maintenance representatives from units across . Before nd st the supported unit at these meetings its NTC rotation, 2 ABCT, 1 Infantry Division, executed a robust LOGEX dem- virtually ensures all friction points will onstration for leaders, emphasizing the functions, placement and capabilities be identified and deconflicted with the of critical logistics nodes across the BCT footprint. (Photo by COL Robert A. Law) SPO. Also, executing the meeting over multiple mediums – face-to-face, De- fense Connect On-line, frequency- provides a visual and mental frame of The results were undeniable: leaders, modulation radio, Joint Capabilities Re- reference for each logistics leader, maintenance managers and medical lease Chat or Secure Voice-Over-Inter- maintenance manager and medical personnel at all levels quickly under- net Protocol – ensures the unit not representative when considering how stood how and when to report LOG- only has a primary, alternate, contin- best and where to best employ LRPs, STATs, LOGSYNCH and brigade mainte- gency and emergency communication ambulance exchange points, trains, nance meeting requirements. They plan, but it also sets conditions for UMCPs, BASs, the BSA and the like. also knew how to execute LRPs, time- those mediums to be sequentially re- and distance-planning factors, and In 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, our verted to and employed should the what various logistics nodes look like former commanding general, MG Paul need arise. and consist of in terms of capability. Funk, provided guidance, time and While time- and resource-intensive, It is important to note that co-locating space for both events prior to our NTC the foundational competence and lo- trains in the BSA enables successful rotation, and we were able to capital- gistics understanding these two events LOGSYNCHs, maintenance meetings ize on Fort Riley’s robust capability to built across our formation cannot be and sustainment rehearsals, as there is support a BCT-level movement-to-con- overstated. no substitute for face-to-face commu- tact operation to demonstrate these nication. Doing so negates any poten- support functions while the BCT simul- Fourth, every unit in the BCT must un- tial voice or digital connectivity chal- taneously conducted gunnery and derstand the importance of a LOGSTAT. lenges so often experienced at the company-level live-fire exercises While multi-page, complex LOGSTATs CTCP and tactical-operations center throughout the training area. By posi- are a method, simple and to-the-point and tactical command posts forward of tioning elements of 1st Infantry Divi- LOGSTATs designed to provide just the BSA. On the flip side, any risk ma- sion’s Sustainment Brigade in the logis- enough detail to ensure that Class I neuver commanders might assume by tics support area (LSA) at Smoky Hill (food and water), Class IIIB (fuel), Class placing FSC elements in the BSA is mar- Army Airfield near Salina, KS (about 90 IIIP (petroleum products), Class IV ginal at best, with heavy FSC represen- kilometers from Fort Riley); deploying (barrier material) and Class V (ammu- tation in the CTCP, maneuver com- 2nd ABCT elements throughout Fort Ri- nition) requirements are known and manders retain the ability to commu- ley’s large northern training area; and understood more than 24 hours out is nicate quickly and efficiently with sup- positioning the BSA in the southern often far less laborious and far more porting elements. training area, we were able to extend effective. Also, ensuring the entire BCT LOCs to meet or exceed doctrinal dis- understands what green (greater than Finally, when most or all these condi- tances between support areas and 75 percent), amber (50 percent to 75 tions are met, the BSB should take a far LRPs. percent), red (25 percent to more active role in helping maneuver

19 October-December 2015 Figure 3. Concept of the LOGEX. While the BCT simultaneously conducted gunnery and company-level live-fire exercises throughout the training area, 1st Infantry Division’s Sustainment Brigade positioned elements in the LSA about 90 kilo- meters from Fort Riley; deployed 2nd ABCT elements throughout Fort Riley’s large northern training area; and posi- tioned the BSA in the southern training area, extending LOCs to meet or exceed doctrinal distances between support areas and LRPs.

commanders shape maintenance plans and the sustainment WfF enable the strategic-initiatives officer, Officer for each supported battalion within BCT’s momentum and freedom of ma- Personnel Management System Task the BCT. While BSBs stay busy manag- neuver. Given the complexity of this Force, HRC, ; logistics ing organizational maintenance for task and the personnel and equipment observer/controller/trainer (Goldminer core companies, NTC quickly reinforces required to achieve success, co-locat- Team), NTC Operations Group, Fort that the more combat power generat- ing a portion of each FSCs’ trains in the Irwin, CA; and executive officer, 610th ed across the formation, the more BSA when ground LOC distances are BSB, Fort Riley, KS. LTC King’s military combat-effective the BCT is, which re- negligible is a critical measure to that schooling includes Intermediate-Level sults in less Class IX (parts), Class IIIP end. Also, employing some or all of the Education (ILE), Joint Course on (petroleum products) and emerging recommendations cited in this article Logistics, Support Operations Course, distribution requirements. This ulti- may help units who struggle with de- Combined Logistics Captain’s Career mately benefits the distribution com- velopment and execution of their Course, Combined-Arms Services Staff pany and the FSCs. In other words, by maintenance plans. School, Bradley Fighting Vehicle taking more ownership in a supported Commander’s Course, Infantry Officer units’ maintenance program, the BSB LTC C.J. King commands 299th BSB, Basic Course and Ranger, Air Assault can directly help the BCT while indi- which supports 2nd ABCT, 1st Infantry and Airborne schools. He holds a rectly helping itself simultaneously. Division. Previous assignments include bachelor’s of science degree in chief, G-3 Operations Division, Human criminology from the University of In summary, as logisticians and BCT lo- Resources Command (HRC), Fort Knox, Missouri-St. Louis and a master’s of gistics/maintenance managers, our job KY; executive officer to HRC’s science degree in administration from is to ensure our concept of support commanding general, Fort Knox; Central Michigan University.

20 October-December 2015 Acronym Quick-Scan

ABCT – armored brigade combat team ATP – Army techniques publication BAS – battalion aid station BCT – brigade combat team BSA – brigade-support area BSB – brigade-support battalion CTC – combat training center CTCP – combat-trains command post EAB – echelons above brigade FLE – forward logistics element FSC – forward-support company FTCP – field-trains command post GARB – green, amber, red, black HRC – Human Resources Command Figure 4. Battalion-level logistics planners and managers from across 2nd ABCT, ILE – Intermediate-Level 1st Infantry Division, conduct a face-to-face LOGSYNCH meeting at NTC. Stand- Education ing is CPT Sean A. McFarling, 299th BSB’s medical planner. At the table, left to LOC – lines of communication right, are CPT Joseph M. Bower, commander, Delta Company, 299th BSB; SFC LOGEX – logistics exercise Michael A. Lewis and CPT Bobby T. Hundemer, both from Headquarters and LOGPAC – logistics package Headquarters Company, 299th BSB; and SFC Damon K. McCullough, Alpha Com- LOGSYNCH – logistics pany, 299th BSB. (Photo by SGT Jin Nakamura) synchronization LOGSTAT – logistics status MAJ Chris Dempsey is the surveillance schooling includes distance-learning LRP – logistics release point LSA – logistics support area officer, J33 (Joint Staff), Pentagon, ILE, Combined-Arms Service Staff NTC – National Training Center Washington, DC. Previous assignments School, Armor Captain’s Career Course, SPO – support operations include brigade executive officer, 2nd Scout Leader’s Course, Armor Officer UMCP – unit maintenance- ABCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley; Basic Course and Air Assault School. He collection point brigade operations officer, 1st ABCT, 1st holds a bachelor’s of science degree in WfF – warfighting function Infantry Division, Fort Riley (held this economics from the U.S. Military position during NTC Rotation 14-06); Academy and a master’s of arts degree squadron operations officer, 4-4 in history from North Carolina State Cavalry, 1st ABCT, 1st Infantry Division, University. His awards and decorations Fort Riley; deputy chief, G-3 Future include the orders of St. George Operations, 1st Infantry Division, (bronze), St. Barbara and St. Michael; Bagram, Afghanistan; and instructor, two awards of the Bronze Star Medal; Department of History, U.S. Military and two awards of the Meritorious Academy, West Point, NY. His military Service Medal.

21 October-December 2015 Training to Win in a Complex and Uncertain World by BG Joseph M. Martin, senior noncommissioned officer know attributes and prowess of a true-to-life COL David S. Cannon and whether or not they and their unit are action figure – would one day be com- LTC Christopher W. Hartline tactically and technically proficient.” – mand-photo material. With proven tal- GEN Robert W. Cone, Leadership: The ent and some luck, I am certain to rise (Authors’ note: This article creates a Warriors Art to positions of increased command re- st protagonist, the motivated 1 Brigade sponsibility. If only I could obtain the operations officer, MAJ John J. Plan- First dream meaning to that dream. In the mean- swell. Planswell’s experiences mirror I awoke in despair from a restless time, I will have to content myself with those of the lieutenant in MG Sir Ernest night’s slumber. How could it be? Re- finalizing and executing the 1st Brigade Dunlop Swinton’s The Defence of Duf- flecting on my favorite movie, Patton, Combat Team’s (BCT) training strategy fer’s Drift. In that book, the lieutenant how could it be that American forces in support of its upcoming decisive-ac- learns about Boer War infantry tactics performed so poorly at the Battle of tion training environment (DATE) rota- through a series of dreams. In keeping Kasserine Pass? While the defeat at tion at NTC. with Swinton’s style, Planswell’s Kasserine provided the segue for the It’s Feb. 3. I am excited; I begin the dreams help him understand how he dramatic entrance of my hero, GEN day’s work by reviewing the brigade’s can better use home-station training George S. Patton Jr., there had to be UTP to ensure it accounts for all subor- resources to prepare for a National something more. Historians accurately dinate units. No time to waste: we are Training Center (NTC) rotation. These recorded the event, but is there some- eight weeks out; Red Cycle taskings realizations offer the Army training thing more? Maybe the lesson is that end in eight weeks. We must make the community thoughts and best practic- men of superior physical ability and most out of every training day, espe- es on maximizing the capabilities pro- élan such as my hero are not bested by cially our live training events. Today we vided by the Integrated Training Envi- technology and training. ronment (ITE). The best practices iden- brief Hammer 6 on the result of tified in this article provide leaders in- As this thought crosses my mind, I no- months of planning. We forecasted all sights on ways to leverage the resourc- tice my son’s Captain America figure ly- necessary resources and training en- es at home station and the ITE to bet- ing on the floor, vacant eyes staring up. ablers, integrating them into a com- ter train agile and adaptive leaders. He lies there like a Soldier lying on the plete training plan that optimizes train- The ITE provides leaders the ability to field of battle. Refocusing on the Pass, ing at the Soldier and small-unit level. conduct complex, realistic training that it seems to me that Germany’s Field We reserved every training area, en- represents the operating environment Marshal Erwin Rommel and the Afrika abler and range on Trained (OE) where Soldiers and leaders con- Korps had superior tactical command and Ready (JBTR). We packed the front a myriad of dilemmas they must and operational employment – that schedule with activity, creating as address. Three major lessons are of- much is obvious – but there had to be many moving parts and opportunities fered: 1) Units must begin planning for something more. as possible to create a complex train- the integration of training enablers ing environment. Commanders and Momentary relief was gained through early in the development to the unit- their units will be training all over the a brisk and demanding physical-train- training plan (UTP). Army training aids, installation. ing session. The staff completed the devices, simulators and simulations weekly five-mile run at record pace. We began our work on the UTP months (TADSS) provide commanders the abil- However, the exertion provided only ago. We started with a review of our ity to represent the complex OE at temporary respite. The disturbing training objectives, key collective tasks home station. 2) The ITE provides lead- thoughts returned, and I began to pon- (KCT) derived from our unit mission- ers the ability to execute multi-echelon. der their meaning. I reassured myself essential task list. These tasks were de- 3) The execution of a gated-training that the stoic countenance and name veloped over the preceding months concept, a progressive and iterative of John J. Planswell – possessing the through mission analysis and dialogue training methodology, provides an ef- fective mechanism for the creation of a rich collection of experiences that can be called upon to guide decision-mak- ing. Finally, the article infers the impor- tance of training overmatch as an en- abling capability in the Army’s operat- ing concepts.)

“Tested or untested, today’s Soldiers from the greenest scout to the most Figure 1. 1st BCT modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

22 October-December 2015 with the BCT commander (Hammer 6) at the TF-and-below level. The Home- and the BCT command sergeant major 1st Brigade KCTs Station Instrumentation Training Sys- (Hammer 7). tem (HITS) kept track of the engage- 1. Conduct mission command ments and casualties during the train- Following the mission-analysis brief, (Army Tactical Task (ART) 5.0) ing event. Afterward, the system pro- the commander said, “It is my intent 2. Conduct offensive operations vided an AAR capability to assist lead- that we leverage the live, virtual, gam- (ART 7.0) ers in determining “what happened” ing and constructive environments to and “why.” We spent a few hours at the replicate the complex OE and a tough 3. Conduct tactical tasks (ART Mission Training Complex (MTC) ob- opposing force (OPFOR). Emphasize 7.5) serving company and platoon maneu- leader and operator mission-command 4. Integrate fires (ART 3.1) ver training using the Close Combat information-system proficiency to in- 5. Conduct FPoL (ART 1.2.8.1) Tactical Trainer (CCTT). As an added crease the agility and lethality of units 6. Perform intelligence, surveil- bonus, we visited with fire-support but don’t do so at the expense of team lance and reconnaissance teams training through the Call-for-Fire cohesion – we fight and win as a team. (ART 2.3) Trainer (CFFT). By my score, we are fir- Finally, aid commanders at each eche- ing on all cylinders at each echelon. We lon in developing their mission-com- 7. Conduct intelligence support are addressing or will address every mand ability and the capacity for time- to targeting and information one of the KCTs. We are achieving ly and decisive decisions based on in- superiority (ART 2.4) training objectives. tent.” 8. Provide logistics support (ART 4.1) Outrageous. Apparently, during what Now that we have concluded the plan Sustainright characterized as a “chance and its associated schedule, we realize Figure 2. Extract from 1st Bri- encounter,” the support-battalion com- we will never be able to get more than gade training objectives. mander voiced “concern” over the lack a battalion-sized maneuver space. We of integration among the BCT, its sup- will have to adjust to and work with porting enablers and the support bat- what we have. It is probably just a mi- We will address these concerns during talion to Hammer 6. Nonsense. Sus- nor issue. In the end, competent bat- our three-day BCT command-post ex- tainright and I spoke. He agreed that talion commanders and well-trained ercise (CPX). This will be enough to en- he would determine and execute the Soldiers and leaders will carry the day sure we arrive at NTC in top shape. best method for integrating his compa- at NTC. Therefore, while we have to cy- Confident of this fact and my astute nies into battalion events. This por- cle units through training areas, and skill, I walk down the street to the sup- tends trouble. we do not have the ability to replicate port-battalion headquarters. all aspects of the DATE’s complex OE, I o say that we experienced am confident that the realism provid- I arrive and review their training plans; challenges during our CPX ed by live training will pay dividends in things are clicking. Our initial discus- would be an understate- the end. sion turns into a monologue by the support-operations officer, MAJ Sus- ment. The simulation was Besides schedule conflicts, other nasty tainright – a tired treatise on the im- running in the MTC, and constraints are collaborating to con- portance of incorporating logistics op- we established the bri- found my ability to resource training erations into the total training plan. gade tactical-operations center (TOC) for our three maneuver task forces – a My only reply is to point out Task 8. onT the concrete pad behind the MTC. fires battalion, a brigade-support bat- The brigade staff will address the inte- That said, none of us could remember talion (BSB) and our brigade engineer gration of brigade logistics. Neverthe- when any of us had previously set up battalion (BEB) – and associated bri- less, he will ensure that the support the TOC. In hindsight, my remarkably gade (the military-intelligence battalion’s training plan addresses its liberal timeline was exceptionally ag- (MI), signal and military-police compa- unique mission task requirements. Live gressive. As day turned to night, plas- nies). Without adequate training maneuver training cannot be jeopar- tic panels became the stone of a cru- space, how do we conduct integrated dized by lengthy sustainment training. cible, crushing will and soul of the training at echelons above task force There are enough external constraints headquarters staff. The battalions had (TF)? The available terrain is not inhibiting our training. We cannot af- set out their Deployable Rapid-Assem- enough and does not provide the com- ford to exacerbate the situation. bly Shelter tents with shells of the plex urban areas we will require to staffs to control their respective com- train the BCT. This will require TFs to Over the next six months, I observe pany training events (force-on-force, cycle through training areas, limiting battalions and companies employing FTXs and live-fire exercises). However, the development of company-level the full set of TADSS available at home I had never forced the establishment mission-command proficiency. The station. Hammer 6 and I observed an of brigade TOC and execution of a teams do not get the number of repe- after-action review (AAR) for 1st TF’s knowledge-management plan and our titions required to gain proficiency. field-training exercise (FTX). The TF TOC standard operating procedure What’s more, this precludes the com- employed instrumentable Multiple In- (SOP). The brigade staff contained bined training of brigade enablers and tegrated Laser Engagement System many newly minted Command and our TF formations. (MILES) gear to train tactical maneuver General Staff College (CGSC) graduates

23 October-December 2015 and a batch of recently arrived cap- guidance given the lack of proper staff companies, the companies within tains from their respective career work. the fires and engineer battalions courses, anxiously awaiting company trained predominantly at or below We had to fight the enemy of the mo- command. As we concluded the CPX, the company level, with minimal ment – and our own cynicism. Our abil- now approaching our leadership-train- interaction between the compa- ity to anticipate was extremely limited, ing-program exercise, my concerns re- nies or their peers in the maneuver and our ability to initiate was close to garding the BCT’s ability to execute battalions. We could have integrat- impossible. mission command grew as I began to ed more of the fires battalion into appreciate the staff’s inexperience and Prior to the CTE, we assumed we would the training conducted by the ma- lack of training. We clearly lacked co- collectively know what to do. We had neuver companies. Likewise for the hesion as a complete staff. We had no all been in the Army a decade or two. engineer battalion. How could we idea how to integrate operations with My peers in the battalions lamented have created a shared training en- the TF staffs, let alone how to synchro- that their single TF collective-training vironment for the cavalry squadron nize the actions of key enablers. Our event, though under field conditions, and the fires battalion? We did not NTC rotation is going to be rough. was inadequate to get them to where exercise casualty evacuation. This they need to be. could have easily been done in any he BCT returned from its of the training events. In the fu- Upon returning to JBTR from the CTE, culminating training exer- ture, the brigade only truly trains COL Dowell (Hammer 6) and CSM Try- cise (CTE) at NTC exhaust- when the brigade trains together. harder (Hammer 7) stoically reviewed ed and disappointed. The the BCT’s NTC take-home packet and rotation in summary: • As identified on the scorecard (Fig- the execution of the BCT’s training While we were initially en- ure 3), our TADSS utilization was strategy. They gathered the BCT’s lead- couraged by the adroit professionalism paltry. Rather than integrating ership and led a post-rotation AAR that andT cheerful mannerisms of our ob- TADSS to create a single, complete, resulted in the following lessons- servers/controllers/trainers, their as- medium-fidelity training environ- learned: surance of “better every day and much ment focused on allowing maxi- better by the end of rotation” fed • Nothing replaces the realism pro- mum iterations, we executed our growing self-awareness. That new- vided by live training under field training plan, using TADSS in a se- found awareness was rarely pleasant. conditions. However, the amount quential manner leading up to our It became clear that we had not suffi- of live training a unit can conduct live training events. We had enough ciently maximized our home-station is limited by competing resources CCTT man-modules to form two training in preparation for our rotation. and the live training environment’s mechanized teams but instead We came to realize that trained units ability to replicate facets of the trained armor and mechanized in- required trained and ready staffs pro- complex OE. The BCT used 46 of 53 fantry company-pure. The battal- ficient in the exercise of mission com- available ranges; that sounds great, ions trained as battalions and not mand and disciplined execution of but it was not enough by itself. as task forces, and the companies SOPs. Although the companies’ train- What’s more, we had companies trained as companies, not as com- ing was accomplished to standard, and moving all over the installation to pany teams. The CFFT was used even though they operated well as execute training. Administrative once to train a handful of new per- teams, they rarely trained together movement between training areas sonnel. We never used the Virtual during the train-up as part of a TF. diminished training time. We had Route-Clearance System. Frankly, this lack of iterative training at not expected this to become the • Our understanding of the complex- TF level left companies unprepared for significant overhead it was deter- ities of a DATE scenario was inad- the burdens and simultaneous de- mined to be. In short, live training equate. We focused on combined- mands pressed upon them by the should be one aspect of a total arms maneuver (CAM) and spent DATE. The high-fidelity training envi- training environment. Live training little time on wide-area security. ronment at NTC presented many com- events are costly, time-consuming After a decade of counter-impro- peting and conflicted demands. Lead- and require more control, all of vised-explosive-device operations, ers and their teams were not anticipat- which effect throughput and re- we accepted risk here. We did not ing threat actions and shaping the OE. peatability. However, they are crit- realize that what we experienced They were reacting to the enemy and ical and require significant prepa- individually was not shared collec- bending under the pressure. ration to get the most out of the tively, that collective-training event. For their part, the staffs were lagging events were necessary to develop indicators, providing factual reports – • Brigade training does not occur un- future shared understanding. Com- not synthesized staff analysis – that less the whole brigade trains. That mon experiences are the founda- would enable decision-making and the seems intuitive, but our UTP failed tion for shared understanding. We execution of mission command. Stated to include the support and fires did not leverage our virtual and plainly, commanders were unable to battalions in a meaningful way. We constructive capabilities to con- make timely and accurate decisions or did next to nothing with the engi- duct leader’s certification training to provide subordinates informed neers. And like the maneuver and Tactical Exercises Without

24 October-December 2015 Figure 3. ITE scorecard.

Troops. Our newly arrived leaders Informed by this, I strike out, required junior leaders to train individ- would have benefited from the ex- determined to address the ual through crew collective training us- perience of our senior and experi- shortcomings so painfully noted. When ing Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) enced leaders. we review the BCT commander’s 2000 for individual weapons proficien- training objectives this time, we are cy; Virtual Land-Navigation Trainer; In the end, I realized I must improve going to do better. We will design our CFFT II; crew training on scenarios in my understanding of all TADSS and training program informed by last CCTT; Aviation Combined Arms Tactical how they can be best brought together night’s fevered vision. Trainer (AVCATT); Reconfigurable Vehi- into a training plan to enable complex, cle Tactical Trainer (RVTT); and Virtual robust and realistic iterative training in In the office, I begin to gather the team Battlespace 3 (VBS3) scenarios. Once echelon. I sought the advice of our di- and align events and a common sce- deemed proficient, Soldiers would ad- vision modeling and simulation officer nario around all the KCTs. After a few vance to the next level in this “gated and reviewed ITE best practices at phone calls, we assembled our team training strategy” (Figure 4), from https://milgaming.army.mil/Entrance/ with personnel from the MTC and the training on individual tasks to small- Product.aspx?productid=20 and within division’s modeling and simulation of- unit collective training. the Leader’s Guide to the Integrated ficer. As a group, we dug into the prob- Training Environment to improve my lem. Meanwhile, the BCT commander im- understanding of the capabilities and plemented a leader-training strategy Informed by Army training doctrine, prepare the brigade for our follow-on that used VBS3 scenarios to educate we quickly designed an iterative train- mission. and train leaders on the complexities ing methodology that allows Soldiers of DATE scenarios and the contempo- and units to progress through a series Second dream rary threat portrayed in the OE. This of gates that require proficiency in vir- provided all involved with some famil- Could it be? It’s Feb. 3. I awake with tual-training systems prior to progress- iarity of the terrain and conditions the excitement and according optimism. A ing to live training. CSM Tryharder led BCT would face during the impending second chance? In the recesses of my the effort by enlisting the BCT’s non- NTC rotation. memory, I recall our previous training commissioned officers in developing plan and the outcome of our CTE. and implementing a training plan that Also, the BCT leadership team

25 October-December 2015 Figure 4. Training strategy – a gated approach.

implemented a leader-certification at operator level while validating unit reached the aid station, program. Leaders would undergo cer- SOPs. medics on-site at MTC would go tification training that displayed profi- through the process of triaging the ciency in each supporting leader task Progression brings a richer experience wounded. Further evacuation was ac- before beginning squad through TF col- and more complex tactical problems – complished in a similar manner until lective training. We added leadership we discovered this through the “crawl- Soldiers reached Role II care the BSB professional-development seminars to walk-run” methodology identified in provided. our UTP. The seminars took the form of The Leader’s Guide to Unit Training professional discussions on dilemmas Management. With a little imagination The treatment of casualties and execu- we would face in the conduct of uni- and ingenuity, we conceived a plan for tion of refueling operations brought fied land operations within a DATE sce- the inclusion of the engineer, fires and the support battalion into the CPX nario. I watched, surprised and satis- support battalions. We proposed the while providing another training op- fied, as this effort and these events addition of a “subordinate inclusion” portunity for one of our mechanized took on a life of their own in profes- (Figure 4) into the BCT staff exercise teams. The engineer battalion would sional dialogue – and off-duty. (STAFFEX) to drive blended training at execute their constructive training the BCT level. We would set two com- event before the BCT CPX. During the The BCT executive officer and I, along panies into CCTT and a handful of CPX, they played a critical role in the with the TF and battalion field-grade crews in the RVTT. The companies forward-passage-of-lines (FPoL) of the officers, developed a training strategy would fight through contact in CCTT. maneuver task forces through the re- to conduct TF and BCT mission-com- connaissance squadron. They would mand exercises. Paramount to the The general idea was that CCTT casual- also conduct mobility/counter-mobility strategy was emphasizing operator ties would be treated and medically operations in one sector and assured proficiency on mission-command infor- evacuated. Once a Soldier became a mobility operations along major lines mation systems. As operator proficien- casualty in a CCTT simulator, the Sol- of communication in another sector. cy progressed, BCT, TF and battalion dier would be treated by combat life- This realistically depicted the complex- staffs began conducting collective savers and evacuated by the company ities of the contemporary OE. Army Low-Overhead Training Toolkit first sergeant. An aid station was (ALOTT) DATE-scenario staff collective- placed in the simulation. This required The assured mobility operations would training exercises. Battalion staffs companies and platoons to address all occur in the Virtual Clearance Training trained mission command while involv- phases of a tactical operation, includ- Suite (VCTS). While an individual was ing company headquarters in the re- ing the establishment of casualty col- responsible for aligning the VCTS with sponse cells to reinforce proficiency on lection points as part of consolidation units in the constructive simulation, mission-command information systems and reorganization. When the they call it swivel-chairing; we thought

26 October-December 2015 that additional effort was a minor nui- arrived ready for the experience. Our train complex multi-echelon and true sance considering the return-on-in- focus on individual, leader and small- CAM. The reconnaissance squadron vestment for the incorporation of BCT unit training left too little time to ef- joined CCTT (14) and CFFT (two) and enablers. fectively achieve the mission-com- pulled them into a CFFT scenario, exe- mand proficiency required to achieve cuting across campus for observer-fire- Finally, with the assistance of the MTC the requisite level of readiness to face maneuver training at the troop level. personnel and the division’s modeling a world-class OPFOR in a complex OE. and simulation officer, we developed a • We improved the incorporation of plan to feed BCT and TF TOCs with a Upon returning to JBTR, COL Dowell TADSS into our training plan. Our common operating picture (COP). The and CSM Tryharder reviewed the BCT’s strategy ensured that Soldiers and result was enriched training that pro- NTC take-home packet and the BCT’s units were prepared to conduct in- vided iterative decision-making drills training strategy. They gathered the creasingly complex training and that improved proficiency and, most leadership and led a post-rotation AAR. progress toward task proficiency. importantly, Soldier and leader confi- As the executive officer and I walked Concerning that, I am reminded of dence in their equipment and SOPs. into the BCT conference room for the a previous time when I stated that AAR, I had an eerie feeling I had been Two weeks into our training plan, the UTPs need to include all enablers here before in the alternative future battalion, TFs and BCT were required and expected attachments – in this imagined in my dream – the future to establish CPs. The units were en- case, the MI company. Our inabil- where events had not turned out as couraged to migrate relevant functions ity to synchronize effects and to well as they just had. from their fixed sites into their CPs. We discern the enemy’s intent, or even agreed that mission-command infor- The AAR went well and emphasized the how to collect accurately on him, mation systems would be the device of following lessons-learned: was a heavy weight we carried into choice for information exchange. To every fight. Poor planning resulted • Begin preparations early in the that end, we even had first sergeants in conflicted plans – improper air- planning process to exercise all submitting daily unit reports to the TFs space management and asset de- echelons. As TADSS were built and battalions for inclusion in Battle- confliction shut down fires and lim- around legacy training models – Command Sustainment Support Sys- ited the movement of air assets at they are optimized to train certain tem (BCS3). The best first sergeants re- critical times. We were not able to skills at specific echelon – it is nec- quired their subordinates to submit mass effects at the decisive point. essary to consider how they best “Yellow 4” logistics reports to drive All this could have been prevented tie together into a complete train- their assessment and submission to if we had trained using simulation ing environment. In short, all TADSS the battalion or TF. Our logistics-status (Joint Land Component Construc- and training enablers need to be reports were taking on the role of in- tive Training Capability-Entity Res- brought in early to ensure success. forming the brigade estimate with olution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF)). The successes we did enjoy were, timely and accurate information. Once trained, a staff could use a in part, the result of early initial portion of the “ERF” called ALOTT Through all of this, and over the next planning among ourselves and to assist them in rehearsing and vi- month, we observed Soldiers and ju- with the MTC, assisted by the divi- sualizing over time and space the nior leaders owning the training. Each sion modeling and simulation offi- employment of the BCT’s capabili- organization is executing training a lit- cer. A few hours of thoughtful work ties. The conduct of an effective re- tle differently. The BCT is making great paid dividends for many months. hearsal is crucial to any plan. We progress. Our confidence grew every And, not only did it increase train- found ALOTT to be helpful in con- day as we achieved higher levels of ing throughput and quantity, it also ducting key-leader and functional mission-command proficiency during increased the quality of training rehearsals. every TF and battalion virtual, con- available over the span of the train- structive and live training exercise. up. • Units must conduct iterative, com- With many more common training ex- plex, multi-echelon training to As before, our gated-training strategy periences and a sense of shared under- achieve the level of proficiency re- and leader-certification programs en- standing, we left JBTR confident in our quired to obtain the requisite level sured that Soldiers and their leaders capabilities. of readiness to face and defeat a met the necessary performance pre- world-class OPFOR in a complex requisites prior to advancing to more ur performance at NTC OE. A single iteration of a TF/BCT complex tactical problems. would be best de- culminating exercise is not enough scribed as satisfacto- We issued task-organization early so to achieve proficiency, shared un- ry. We had some suc- units could train as TFs and teams, as derstanding and synergy among cess as a team, but we opposed to battalions and companies. the many teammates. Units must still seemed to be a In doing so, we maximized our TADSS leverage the blended and integrat- step behind the OPFOR and out of step utilization – maxing out all the CCTT ed training capabilities that allow asO a team as we fought through the de- man-modules for weeks at a time. commanders to begin conducting mands of the complex OE. It was de- Also, we incorporated AVCATT (four of multi-echelon training earlier in termined that our staffs had not four) with CCTT modules (28 of 28) to their training strategies to provide

27 October-December 2015 the iterations necessary to achieve Third dream thoughts with my modeling and simu- mission-command proficiency. lation officer, lessons from the preced- I am excited. It’s Feb. 3. I find new ing evening. That investment paid off meaning in my work and await the day Upon completion of the AAR, I sought nearly immediately. He began pulling with eager anticipation. Yesterday was the advice of our division modeling BCT units into the MCT for training and our last day on Red Cycle. This seems and simulation officer. As I walked into teaching junior leaders the capability familiar, whether prescience or the re- her office, Yogi Berra’s famous quote and value of the TADSS available at sult of events from the night before; inexplicably came to mind: “It’s déjà vu home station. with a troubled mind I count them as all over again.” With the recollection of blessings. I strike out with vigor. The our dialogue in the could-have-been, I The happy, chance meeting with our situation remains the same: the BCT modeling and simulation officer clued am intent in determining how we can Red Cycle tasking period is currently improve if I am required to repeat this me into the ITE, enabled by the live- “amber” but will be “green” next quar- virtual-constructive integrating archi- event again tomorrow … today … may- ter ahead of our NTC rotation. As be- tecture (LVC-IA). Enabled by the inte- be that’s today again tomorrow? We fore, I hurriedly place phone calls and grating architecture, the ITE provided reviewed the BCT training strategy, and gather the team in an attempt to affect me the means to not only conduct she instructed me on how the BCT our eventual outcome in light of my multi-echelon training, similar to the could increase proficiency by integrat- most recent reverie. previous night’s blended training, but ing training capabilities to expand the it also provided a comprehensive AAR training space and complexity of the By happenstance and without my pre- capability for review in two dimensions OE, beginning multi-echelon mission- vious knowledge, it turns out we have (or three dimensions). As a group, we command training earlier in our train- a modeling and simulation officer at determined this should be the corner- ing strategy. She provided me a great the brigade. He arrived a month ago stone of our train-up strategy. site, the ITE Webpage, https://milgam- from his qualification course. I decided ing.army.mil/Entrance/Product. to engage the MTC director and ask I adjusted the gated-training strategy aspx?productid=20, to learn more him for “jump TOC” office space for my for inclusion of the ITE. We stressed about ITE and to review and share best Functional Area 57 so that he could the utility of using the ITE as a mecha- practices. embed within the MTC. I shared a few nism for bringing entire battalions into

Figure 5. ITE scorecard – second dream.

28 October-December 2015 Figure 6. Brigade training strategy.

a single exercise. LVC-IA supports the we struggled to resource staff training We addressed this threefold: use of a common scenario with com- but not at the expense of subordinate • First, we increased emphasis on mon data for all the training domains organizations, I came to learn that var- the training and employment of (live, virtual constructive and gaming). ious components of the JLCCTC can be the Distributed Common Ground We had an entire TF instrumented with “tuned” to the training audience. Station-Army. HITS and MILES training in a common When the entire staff is involved and a scenario with combat-vehicle crews in high-fidelity training environment is re- • Second, we increased the S-2’s role CCTT and RVTT. The reconnaissance quired, the Joint Conflict and Tactical in our order drills and professional squadron designed a training strategy Simulation is used. If only a few people seminars. In these events, they that included CCTT, Dismounted Sol- are training and a low-overhead capa- were made to role-play the free- dier Training System (DSTS), CFFT and bility is more appropriate, ALOTT is thinking threat. Over time, the JLCCTC-ERF. I understand that when employed. “two-shop” began to progress combined, the technical control is un- from briefing the “what” – in other gainly, but in the end, they were able If CCTT was not available or was not words, providing historical reports to employ a workaround and gained the appropriate tool, leaders used – to providing the “so-what” and the capability to conduct observer/ gaming technologies to execute the “which-means” based on their sensor-shooter interactions in a com- same platoon battle drills and compa- analysis of the situation. This man- mon training environment while com- ny SOPs they had previously trained tra was circulated around the staff. bat vehicles maneuvered within the within CCTT. In many cases, the em- The commander required the rea- simulation. ployment of these training enablers ac- soned analysis of experts, not complished the same training objec- someone to read him the signifi- Better yet, when the battalion and tives but at a reduced cost in planning cant-activities log. squadron staffs were conducting staff time and coordination. In essence, we • Third, the commander demanded training using the JLCCTC-ERF, the LVC- would eventually enter the live train- IA integrated companies, teams and that the S-2 and his staff partici- ing environment at a much higher lev- pate in all BCT staff training. He troops into the same scenario, provid- el of proficiency at all levels. ing them the ability to continue train- even coordinated for folks from the ing in virtual systems while supporting Through all of this, we determined that division’s G-2 shop to provide the higher-headquarters’ training needs. a shortcoming as a staff was related to OPFOR commander during the Simply put, the staff and troops could our inability to provide the command- train-up to our CTE. train at the same time; it was no lon- er a complete, correlated intelligence It became apparent that repetition in- ger a one-or-the-other proposition. As picture and accurate staff estimates. creased professional introspection.

29 October-December 2015 Once they realized the training was ex- formal training are not constrained Medal with “V” device. pected to progress over a series of by layer upon layer of the previous events rather than evaluated at a sin- generation’s training strategies. COL David Cannon is the U.S. Army gle CPX, individuals began to take more That they have a unique under- Training and Doctrine Command (TRA- initiative during the training and standing is expected, but they rec- DOC) capability manager (TCM) for ITE. played a more active role in the AAR. ognize the specific needs of the in- Previous duty assignments include dep- By the conclusion of the brigade train- dividual as a critical part of the uty chief of operations, Operations up, battalions had conducted multiple team. This knowledge enables Group Delta, Mission Command Train- iterations of mission-command staff them to effectively address the ing Program (MCTP), Fort Leaven- rd training, as had the brigade. The staff unit’s training needs through a pro- worth; commander, 3 Army Special had formed into a competent whole, gressive and iterative process. Troops Battalion, Shaw AFB, SC; execu- and the commander was comfortable tive officer, MCTP, ; with the organization and his subordi- Pleased with the result, I settle back chief of training, Operations Group nate commanders. into my seat to enjoy a paunch cigar. Charlie, MCTP, Fort Leavenworth; and As languid smoke whirls around my TF senior observer/controller and TF sunburned head, I feel the familiar he NTC rotation was a suc- senior maneuver observer/controller, ephemeral effects begin to take hold. cess. Key to our success Fort Polk, LA. His military schooling in- cludes Infantry Officer Basic and Ad- was the ability to operate Maybe this is our story: technology is vanced courses, Scout Platoon Leader’s as a united whole with a an enabler, never meant to replace Course and CGSC. COL Cannon holds a common task and pur- training, but it is necessary to create bachelor’s of arts degree in general pose. That unity of pur- conditions that enable Soldiers and studies from Wichita State University, pose and action was achieved in part leaders and teams to succeed in uncer- a master’s of science degree in adult byT repetitive multi-echelon training en- tainty. The lesson from Kasserine is and continuing education from Kansas abled by ITE. Units could repetitively that preparation, combined-arms inte- State University and a graduate certif- train with one another at echelon. gration and individual initiative win in icate in occupational-health psycholo- What’s more, this complex training en- decisive operations. Training mission gy from Kansas State University. vironment – along with the iterative command develops agile and adaptive training methodology – enabled the leaders with initiative. The ITE gives LTC Christopher Hartline is the simula- BCT’s ability to train to proficiency on commanders the ability to conduct tion future-operations planner for all its KCTs within an environment in- progressive multiple repetitions of TCM-ITE, National Simulation Center, dicative of the one it would eventually tough, realistic training at echelon. Fort Leavenworth. Previous duty as- face at its CTE. This more pleasant This provides our formations training signments include modeling-and-sim- dream concluded with the following overmatch. Training overmatch pro- ulations systems engineer, Environ- lessons: duces an operating capability for in- ment Development Division, Deputy Di- • The complex training environment formed decision-making and decisive rector Joint Environment, Joint Staff provided by the ITE stresses mis- action as learned from an iterative and J-7; simulation and technical planner, sion command by providing the progressive training program. Environment Development Division, commander the ability to train mis- Deputy Director Joint Environment; stu- We must continue to train as if we are sion command at echelon. The ITE dent (modeling and simulation), Ad- at war, leveraging all our resources to provides commanders from com- vanced Civil Schooling, Old Dominion retain training overmatch. I finally pany team to BCT the ability to University, VA; battle staff and cavalry found peace of mind. train together within a single com- troop observer/controller/trainer, ar- plex OE that replicates the dilem- BG Joseph Martin commands NTC and mor battalion and cavalry squadron mas presented by the DATE during Fort Irwin, Fort Irwin, CA. Previous as- training team (Cobra), NTC Operations military operations in the contem- signments include deputy commanding Group, Fort Irwin; and commander, Al- porary environment. general for the Combined Arms Center- pha Company, 3-67 Armor Battalion, • Ingenuity and initiative are laud- Training, Fort Leavenworth, KS; deputy 4th Infantry Division, . His mil- able character traits in general, but commanding general (maneuver), 1st itary schooling includes Armor Officer they pay handsome dividends in Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; com- Basic and Advanced courses, Cavalry planning training. Many of our best mander, Army Operational Test Com- Leader’s Course, CGSC and Joint Forces ideas came from Soldiers and ju- mand, Fort Hood; III Corps chief of Staff College, Norfolk, VA. LTC Hartline nior leaders who are not only com- staff, Fort Hood; and commander, 2nd holds a master’s of arts degree in man- fortable with technology but have Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, agement and leadership from Webster a better grasp of their challenges KS, and Baghdad, Iraq. His military University, a master’s of military arts and an eye toward a technically en- schooling includes U.S. Military Acad- and science degree from CGSC and a abled solution. They are comfort- emy and CGSC. BG Martin holds a mas- master’s of science degree in modeling able with the technology because ter’s of arts degree in education from and simulation from Old Dominion Uni- they have never known a world the University of Louisville. His awards versity. He maintains a joint planner without a computer or the Inter- include the Defense Superior Service and strategist additional-skill identifi- net, and their notions of proper, Medal, Legion of Merit and Bronze Star er.

30 October-December 2015 Acronym Quick-Scan

AAR – after-action review DSTS – Dismounted Soldier MILES – Multiple Integrated ALOTT – Army Low-Overhead Training System Laser Engagement System Training Toolkit EST – Engagement Skills MTC – Mission Training Complex ART – Army tactical task Trainer NTC – National Training Center AVCATT – Aviation Combined FPoL – forward passage of lines OE – operational environment Arms Tactical Trainer FTX – field-training exercise OPFOR – opposing force BCT – brigade combat team GFT – Games for Training PAX – personnel BEB – brigade engineer HHC – headquarters and RVTT – Reconfigurable Vehicle battalion headquarters company Tactical Trainer BiLAT – Bilateral Negotiation HITS – Home-Station SOP – standard operating Trainer Instrumentation Training procedure BSB – brigade-support battalion System SPT – support CAB – combined-arms battalion ITE – Integrated Training STAFFEX – staff exercise CAM – combined-arms Environment TADSS – Training Aids, Devices, maneuver JBTR – Joint Base Trained and Simulators and Simulation CCTT – Close Combat Tactical Ready TCM-ITE – TRADOC Capability Trainer JLCCTC-ERF – Joint Land Manager-Integrated Training CFFT – Call-for-Fire Trainer Component Constructive Environment CGSC – Command and General Training Capability-Entity TF – task force Staff College Resolution Federation TOC – tactical-operations center COP – common operating KCT – key collective task TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training picture LVC-IA – live-virtual- and Doctrine Command CP – command post constructive integrating UTP – unit-training plan CPX – command-post exercise architecture VBS3 – Virtual Battlespace 3 CTE – culminating training MCTP – Mission Command VCTS – Virtual Clearance exercise Training Program Training Suite DATE – decisive-action training MI – military intelligence environment

31 October-December 2015 Unified Land Operations in the 2040 Timeframe — Autonomy- Enabled Platoon-Level Missions by retired COL Michael N. warfare. The fundamental principles of • Media interaction with civilians. Smith, retired COL R. Craig war remain the same: warfare has Effinger III and Dr. Paul D. been and remains a uniquely human Autonomous systems will enable for- Rogers endeavor. Autonomy-enabled systems mations and the Soldiers they operate (AS) are tools to enhance the human with throughout these environments This article provides ideas about the potential of our force across the spec- and in various regions of the world. future force by describing how current- trum of operations. These systems ly maturing autonomy-enabling solu- Regional environments. augment the operational dimensions AS must be tions might be employed for the Army of time and space. In a kinetic opera- capable of operating in virtually all en- in 2040 timeframe. We want to pro- tion they will find, fix, delay, divert or vironments and conditions. They pro- voke constructive dialogue that studies stress and help defeat an opponent, vide us the ability to enhance our op- our accepted understanding of what disrupting his actions, without commit- erations in areas such as in the high may seem possible in the coming de- ting Soldiers. Incorporating AS this way terrain of Afghanistan or the deserts of cades. allows our Soldiers to gain a time and North Africa, where they may not be space advantage. In non-kinetic opera- impacted by the lack of oxygen in a This is vital because the U.S. Army’s thin atmosphere or the temperature ability to achieve significant leaps in tions, Soldiers are required to engage with local populations and build trust. swings of a desert landscape. Opera- warfighting efficiency and effective- tions in some regions may be more or ness demands a healthy understanding In these stability operations, AS will enable efficiencies across intelligence, less conducive to AS. Combat opera- of the interaction of technology-en- tions in an urban environment may be abled capability with doctrine and tac- sustainment and mission-command functions that support the main effort. easily exploited by AS, which can oper- tics, techniques and procedures – and ate in subterranean environments the resultant impacts across doctrine, U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, without light or oxygen. Conversely, organization, training, materiel, lead- Development and Engineering Center conducting humanitarian-assistance or ership and education, personnel and (TARDEC) believes the U.S. Army must peace-support operations in the same facilities (DOTMLPF). Significant ad- focus its science and technology ef- locale may not be amenable to AS due vances in our ability to realize efficient, forts on concept-based requirements to the high degree of human interac- expeditionary ground warfare is de- while fostering innovation that em- tion with local non-hostile populations. pendent on our collective ability to ap- powers, unburdens and protects Sol- propriately embrace the benefits of diers. TARDEC is developing autonomy- Threat. Aerial ports of debarkation emerging operational capability and to enabling concepts to help shape and (APODs)/surface ports of debarkation mitigate the operational risks of the support the integration of these will be at risk from capabilities and hy- new capability while understanding emerging capabilities into our forma- brid threats; state actors with little the necessary doctrine and tactics that tions. money and hybrid capabilities; vast de- fully exploit its operational potential. ployment distances (as we will be a 2040 environment continental United States (CONUS)- Many historical examples are available First let’s review our understanding of based force); non-state actors with re- to reinforce this premise. Consider the the environment in the 2040 time- gional influence and access to niche advent of on the frame. technologies; terrorist groups; trans- battlefield, the evolution of tank war- national drug-trafficking operations; Operating environment. The operating fare during the interwar years and the and weapons of mass destruction. environment will be characterized by: significant impact on warfare during Equipment will be more sophisticated World War II. Armies around the world • Uncertainty; relative to both current capabilities who chose to dismiss the potential of • Complex and urban terrain; and our projected capabilities (we can that new capability found themselves • Extended distances for both no longer expect a significant over- quickly overmatched by those who em- employment and deployment; match in terms of technology for most braced it, studied it and optimized systems), and they will logically im- their doctrine around the newfound • Decentralized operations; prove with technologies such as night velocity. Today we must follow the lat- • Anti-access and area denial (A2AD); vision, signals intelligence or directed- er example and not fall prey to an in- • Hybrid threats; energy weapons. Threats will be com- stitution’s natural resistance to change. • Host-nation and allied forces; fortable with and operate routinely within civilian populations. This article does not propose drastic or • Non-governmental organizations; radical changes in how we conduct and Expeditionary capability. Given the

32 October-December 2015 fiscal reality of a CONUS-based Army, areas. Use of AS will allow unit leaders DOTMLPF framework. These are not we must seek to enhance our expedi- and Soldiers to regain a more detailed meant to be comprehensive but to tionary capability through the use of understanding of terrain they are op- help Soldiers and leaders visualize the AS. AS may be used to help set the con- erating in and through, perhaps pro- utility of AS in relevant operational ditions for successful A2AD operations viding that tactical edge that is the key contexts. by early insertion into areas to degrade to success on the battlefield. or eliminate enemy A2AD capabilities, Vignette 1: guard mission The requirement for continuous (24/7) allowing us greater options in forced- Task/purpose: Guard is a security task operations remains; AS provide the entry or early-entry operations. Also, to protect the main body by fighting to ability to maintain operational security at the tactical edge, if we are able to gain time while also observing and re- in continuous operations. AS may in remove Soldiers from combat plat- porting information, as well as prevent fact permit the Army to fully operate forms, we are able to deploy smaller/ enemy ground observation of and di- throughout the day-and-night cycle by lighter unmanned combat systems rect fire against the main body. Units overcoming the circadian rhythm that with initial forced-entry forces, en- conducting a guard mission cannot op- makes Soldiers less awake in the very hancing the force’s ability to more erate independently because they rely early hours of morning, or by provid- quickly gain and maintain momentum on the main body’s fires and function- ing the ability to conduct continuous and accomplish their mission. al/multifunctional support assets. A and sustained resupply through auto- guard is typically a mission assigned to The operational spectrum and range of mated convoys – or even individual ve- a combined-arms unit possessing the military operations remains the same. hicles. organic capability to provide early Warfare funda- Operations in and among the popula- warning and maneuver space to a larg- tion place increasing demands on for- er main body element. mentals same mations to maintain much higher lev- Doctrinally, the force performing the The principles of war remain un- els of situational awareness and situ- guard mission must be able to engage changed; however, autonomous sys- ational understanding of their environ- and defeat enemy reconnaissance forc- tems may allow their application in ment (in other words, no “free fire es; force the enemy unit to deploy into new and different ways. The warfight- zones”). As we operate within popula- either an attack or defensive posture; ing functions remain unchanged; how- tions, we must increasingly be able to and deceive the enemy as to the true ever, AS can help enable them and sup- discriminate between friendly, neutral, location of the friendly main body. port decisive action. non-hostile and hostile personnel, Since the elimination of the G-series which mean we must gain more de- We must avoid the temptation to be- cavalry platoon, generally a company- tailed information about the peoples lieve that autonomous systems some- team has been the lowest-level tactical with whom we are interacting. how change the underlying principles unit assigned this mission. However, under which the Army operates (refer- autonomy-enabled cavalry platoons ence “Principles of War in the Informa- Unified land can once again provide this capability tion Age” and the “Revolution in Mili- operations at the lowest tactical level. tary Affairs” mindset of the 1990s). The unified-land-operations concept Organization for combat: They can contribute to varying degrees frames how the Army will operate and when integrated into our formations remains valid regardless of the manner • Six light reconnaissance vehicles and enable them. in which the Army is manned, equipped (LRVs) (36 Soldiers); or organized. • Four unmanned reconnaissance Impetus for vehicles (URVs) (a section of two We need to view autonomous systems per scout section); autonomy as another tool within the inventory The inability of solely manned forma- that enhances the Army’s ability to • Four unmanned mobile protected tions to physically occupy and operate generate and apply combat power. We firepower (MPF) systems (two with the battlespace required at a for- must always look at autonomous sys- sections of two). mation level drives the need for auton- tems through the generation/applica- Operational narrative: For this mis- omous systems. tion of combat-power lens; if AS do not sion, the standard six-vehicle scout pla- As seen through history, we expect in- generate/apply combat power, they toon has been augmented by four creasingly lower and lower echelons of are not value-added. URVs, which are capable of autono- units to occupy greater and greater ar- mous tactical behaviors and equipped eas of terrain (World War I rifle com- Tactical examples with sensor suites that include electro- pany to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Following is a series of tactical vi- optical (EO)/infrared (IR), seismic and company). As we have moved from gnettes intended to generate thought acoustic capabilities. The platoon also “shoulder to shoulder” operational and discussion on how autonomous has four autonomous MPF systems, constructs to such things as wide-area systems might be useful to the Army, which operate in two-vehicle sections security (WAS), we have increased the including the general/broad consider- just like a tank platoon. Given these risk of knowing less and less about ev- ations that such application/employ- additional capabilities, which operate er-larger areas of our operational ment might engender across the for the most part without human

33 October-December 2015 Figure 1. Guard mission. interaction (beyond providing general primary surveillance platforms (from Task/purpose: A zone reconnaissance guidance on where to move, establish four to eight; two of the vehicles are is normally conducted over a large area surveillance locations and orient – the the platoon leader and platoon ser- to gain understanding of the complete same guidance a platoon leader would geant, who are not surveillance orient- situation within an area the larger ma- give to a vehicle or section command- ed but are command-and-control fo- neuver force will later occupy/move er), the platoon has the combined- cused), along with the ability to pack- through (depending on the higher arms capabilities and density of sur- age a greater number of sensors into unit’s mission: offense or defense). veillance assets (both manned and un- an unmanned platform (beyond the Forces must be able to gain an appre- manned, to include dismount capabili- traditional EO/IR systems) allows this ciation of the details of the terrain, in- ties) to perform a guard mission equiv- platoon to occupy a sector up to twice frastructure, populace and enemy dis- alent to a task-organized company- the traditional width for a platoon. positions. The limitation with the six- team. As the enemy force – whether a vehicle/36-Soldier scout platoon is that traditional “Soviet-style” advance Combined with the immediate lethal the risk of contact with the enemy re- guard/security element or something precision effects of the unmanned duces the pace of movement through less robust – moves into the sector, MPFs (whose “human in the loop” is the zone; the addition of autonomous this platoon has multiple assets avail- someone in the platoon-leader and systems that can maneuver (not just able to identify and then defeat threats platoon-sergeant vehicles), this pla- move) forward of the manned plat- up to main-battle-tank level. toon has now “returned” a maneuver forms significantly enhances speed and company-team to the task force/bat- reduces risk to the manned force. Also, with unmanned systems, greater talion commander, who no longer has risk can be taken in having assets re- to take one of his four maneuver com- Organization for combat: main in place to observe and report, panies to provide security for the for- reducing the need to displace in con- mation. • Six LRVs (36 Soldiers); tact as well as the potential for loss of • Eight unmanned autonomous contact or destruction of displacing el- Vignette 2: zone-reconnais- reconnaissance vehicles (UARVs) (a ements. The doubling of mounted sance mission section of two per scout squad

34 October-December 2015 Figure 2. Zone reconnaissance.

vehicle); now has extended surveillance assets ahead of the manned systems and de- • 16 miniature unmanned (from four primary scout vehicles to ploying the miniature unmanned re- autonomous sensor vehicles (two 28), allowing a single platoon to con- connaissance vehicles (MURVs) at lo- are carried within each UARV). duct a zone reconnaissance across a cations the scouts identify. width normally assigned to a troop • UARVs are deployed to maintain (three platoons) or a squadron (six pla- Upon reaching the limit of advance surveillance over areas as they are toons). (Platoon 2 in the example), the platoon cleared to maintain the integrity of would still have a full complement of the reconnaissance. Also, the single platoon now has a assets to establish a screen across the much greater ability to establish en- width of the zone if necessary. Combined-arms maneuver (CAM) op- during surveillance throughout the erational narrative: For this mission, zone, which is particularly important WAS operational narrative: In a WAS the standard six-vehicle scout platoon during WAS operations, where we environment, this combination of has been augmented by four URVs, want to maintain a high level of situa- manned and unmanned assets would which are capable of autonomous tac- tional awareness throughout an oper- allow a commander the ability to much tical behaviors and equipped with sen- ational area. This would allow each more quickly gain a basic appreciation sor suites that include EO/IR as well as battalion to use only its organic scout of the terrain and populace of the area seismic and acoustic capabilities. Each platoon to conduct the mission, allow- in which the unit is going to operate. URV also carries two small (less than ing the brigade combat team (BCT) Also, the AS allow the manned assets 50 pounds/2ft3) miniature URVs that commander the flexibility to focus his to be focused more on the population can be deployed to establish remote organic cavalry squadron farther for- to begin the engagement process while surveillance (albeit with limited sen- ward or to the flanks, or to conduct a the AS continue to execute the recon- sors). As in the previous example, the security mission (such as the guard naissance of the entire area. Given the systems operate for the most part outlined previously), conserving his nature of WAS, it is very important to without human interaction, providing forces. The platoon would deploy have at least a general understanding a force-multiplier effect. The platoon across the zone, with the URVs moving of the terrain (whether physical or

35 October-December 2015 human) of the area of operations, and mission only entails reporting on the engagement operations with the civil- the combination of manned and un- enemy forces and not the need for en- ian populations. The critical tactical manned assets significantly increases gagement to delay, destroy or defeat tasks within a WAS mission set revolve the pace and level of detail of opera- any enemy forces. The battalion/task around interaction with the local pop- tions such as this. force operations team can develop the ulations; the more Soldiers available to scheme of maneuver for the un- the commander, the more capable the Vignette 3: screen mission manned systems, and then they can unit is of accomplishing its mission. Task/purpose: The purpose of the self-deploy into the sector and estab- Also, given the ability of unmanned screen mission is to provide early lish the observation posts. The un- systems to execute persistent or near- warning to the main body and prevent manned systems are able to establish persistent surveillance, there is a sig- it from being surprised by an enemy surveillance, and the individual URVs nificant increase in capability through force. Unlike a guard, there is no ex- and MURVs can move to track/main- both the extension in time-on-station pectation of the screen force engaging tain contact with enemy assets if nec- and in the elimination of ‘’surveillance in extended combat with the enemy essary. Using only unmanned systems, gaps” that would occur as manned as- force; the critical task is to gain and which provide information directly to sets have to transition with replace- maintain contact with enemy forces so the tactical-operations center, allows ment forces. that the main body can react as neces- the commander to focus his manned sary. assets on areas where there is a great- Vignette 4: special reconnais- er likelihood of enemy presence or ac- Organization for combat: sance/surveillance mission tivity, or where he needs detailed re- Task/purpose: Special reconnaissance • Eight URVs; connaissance or interaction with local includes reconnaissance and surveil- • 16 MURVs. populations only Soldiers can provide. lance actions conducted as a special CAM operational narrative: For this WAS operational narrative: The use of operation in hostile, denied or politi- mission, the commander is able to em- only unmanned systems frees up cally sensitive environments to collect ploy only unmanned systems, as the manned systems to conduct the or verify information of strategic or

Figure 3. Screen.

36 October-December 2015 operational significance. At this level, enemy with intelligence on our likely whether they will choose to actually long-range surveillance units are often deployment areas and to prevent po- deploy forces into an area. tasked to conduct this mission, but tential national political issues (assum- with the rise of A2AD capabilities, au- ing a state of formal war does not yet Vignette 5: route reconnais- tonomous systems can provide a simi- exist). Such employment can provide sance/autonomous resupply lar capability without risk of Soldiers’ low-risk intelligence collection that can mission lives. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) help refine the operational planning Task/purpose: Route reconnaissance is or high-altitude high-opening (HAHO) for the employment of elements such a directed effort to obtain detailed in- parachute insertion can be used to de- as Pathfinder and Air Force combat- formation on a specified route and all liver URVs into the operational area. control teams that would be inserted terrain from which the enemy could in- to establish drop zones for convention- Organization for combat: fluence movement along that route. In al forced-entry units (generally an air- • Eight URVs; this case, we use a combination of borne-infantry BCT or battalion task manned/unmanned systems to com- • 16 MURVs. force). plete all the tasks inherent in a route- CAM operational narrative: For this WAS operational narrative: In many reconnaissance mission, which include mission, the commander employs only respects, the roles are similar in that securing the route. Once the route has unmanned systems, which are inserted the friendly force can establish un- been reconnoitered, autonomous sys- by UAS or HAHO to overcome the risk manned low-signature but long-endur- tems can transit it, providing as-need- posed by enemy A2AD capabilities. Us- ing surveillance before committing ed resupply at any time, either individ- ing UAS for deployment into the oper- manned assets – and before even let- ually or in convoys as required. ational area significantly reduces the ting the local population know we have Organization for combat: potential for detection and counter-ac- an interest in the area. This capability, tion by enemy forces; detection avoid- which emphasizes smaller, more static • Six LRVs (36 Soldiers); ance is critical during pre-deployment surveillance, may also set the condi- • Four URVs (a section of two per operations to avoid providing the tions for commanders to decide scout section);

Figure 4. Special reconnaissance/surveillance.

37 October-December 2015 Figure 5. Route reconnaissance/autonomous convoy.

• Four unmanned tanks (two built-up areas, culverts, defiles) where Enduring Freedom (OEF), there may be sections of two); there might be specific requirements longer-term situations where we are for human action, such as talking with • Eight MURVs; constrained to the repetitive use of the local populace or investigating a fixed lines of communication. Using AS • Four UARVs; suspicious item/activity that un- – probably with additional counter-im- • Two optionally manned cargo manned assets identified. provised explosive device/explosive vehicles. ordnance detachment capabilities to The use of the unmanned systems, par- conduct the actual route clearance – ticularly air assets, allows a faster and CAM operational narrative: For this significantly reduces the risks to our more comprehensive route reconnais- mission, the standard six-vehicle scout Soldiers. AS also provide the capacity sance. Also, the use of the MURVs al- platoon has been augmented by four for persistent surveillance so that, un- lows the maintenance of security over URVs with a mix of MURVs and UARVs. like OIF/OEF, we are not forced to use the route once the moving reconnais- Also, resupply of the company-team forces repetitively to “re-clear” routes; sance assets (manned or unmanned) position once the route reconnais- the persistent and overlapping AS sen- have moved forward. sance is complete is accomplished with sors can be used to monitor the route continuously and identify potential or optionally manned (in this case, un- As with the other vignettes, a platoon confirmed threats, and then guide manned) cargo vehicles. As part of the with augmentation by unmanned sys- manned reaction capabilities to the route-reconnaissance mission, the pla- tems is able to accomplish a task that target(s). toon and its attendant UARVs would would otherwise require a troop or conduct the normal tasks, with the un- company-team, again allowing the Vignette 6: movement-to-con- manned systems preceding and oper- higher commander to better manage ating to the flanks of the manned as- his combat power. tact sets. This would allow the manned sys- Task/purpose: Movement-to-contact is tems (scout squads) to deploy dis- WAS operational narrative: As we an offensive task to develop the situa- mounts at specific locations (i.e., have seen in OIF and Operation tion and establish or regain contact

38 October-December 2015 with the enemy. It is normally used squads (36 Soldiers); can use AS to gain and regain contact when the tactical or enemy situation is • Three UAVs; with a withdrawing insurgent force vague, when the enemy has broken while the manned assets perform re- • Four optionally manned AMPVs; contact, or when there is no time to re- covery and assistance operations. Then connoiter extensively to locate the en- • Six MURVs. we can use the unmanned assets to emy. Contact results in initiation of an- find and fix the enemy and have the other operation such as attack against CAM operational narrative: Autono- manned assets engage them. Through- a stationary or moving enemy force, mous-system placement extends the out WAS operations and in areas of defense, delay or withdrawal. observation and identification range of special interest, AS can also help main- the enemy force. This economy-of- tain local security. In this case, we in- The fundamentals and techniques dis- force operation enhances situational tegrate unmanned recon vehicles with cussed here also apply to the approach awareness while preserving flexibility other persistent stare assets and pair phase of a hasty or deliberate attack; and enabling options for fire and ma- them with small teams to find enemy the main difference is the amount of neuver. In this operation, six miniature forces under cover. enemy intelligence. In the approach unmanned ground-reconnaissance ve- phase of an attack, the enemy situa- hicles and three UAVs are teamed with Vignette 7: feint and demon- tion is clearer. Doctrinally, the force partially manned AMPVs. They move performing the movement-to-contact toward the objective while avoiding stration moves toward the objective in a way enemy detection. Upon contact, the Task/purpose: A feint is an offensive that avoids enemy detection and sup- commander uses his unmanned assets task used to deceive the enemy of the ports its deployment in the assault. to collect disposition information location or time of the actual decisive about the enemy and fix it while di- operations or main attack. Its purpose Organization for combat: recting his approach of follow-on forc- is to deceive the enemy and cause him • Six armored multipurpose es to the objective. to react in a particular way, such as re- (reconnaissance/surveillance) position his forces, commit his reserve vehicles (AMPVs) and four infantry WAS operational narrative: Here we or shift his fires. The feint seeks

Figure 6. Movement-to-contact (traveling formation).

39 October-December 2015 direct-fire contact with the enemy but supervision and allow the commander In these types of operations, AS can avoids decisive engagement. to weight the main effort with manned send multiple messages, but the intent formations. In this operation, four un- and object remains the same: to cause The demonstration is similar to a feint, manned tanks on the graphic’s left side the enemy to react. but the friendly force does not seek to are under the control of two supervi- make contact with the enemy. One sion vehicles. These unmanned tanks task would be to establish an attack- Vignette 8: deliberate or area occupy positions that permit enemy by-fire position beyond the enemy’s di- defense observation, support deception and rect-fire engagement range; the pur- Task/purpose: A deliberate or area de- cause the enemy to react. This enemy pose would be to cause the enemy to fense concentrates on denying enemy reaction allows the commander to ad- commit a specific element simply by forces access to designated terrain, just his main effort of six manned tanks virtue of the positioning of the demon- limiting their freedom of maneuver and four AMPVs accordingly and to at- stration force. and channeling them into killing areas. tack in the most effective way. This allows the defender to retain ter- Organization for combat: WAS operational narrative: The op- rain the attacker must control to ad- • Six AMPVs (two control vehicles for portunities for using these around an vance. The enemy force is drawn into unmanned tanks); enemy organization or high-value tar- a series of kill zones, where it is at- • Six manned tanks; get of interest are significant. Here we tacked from mutually supporting posi- • Four unmanned tanks. can use AS to either feint or demon- tions and destroyed, largely by fires. strate while friendly forces, as an ex- Commanders use the reserve to pre- CAM operational narrative: Autono- ample, are doing a snatch operation. In serve the integrity of the defense my-enabled systems and robotic de- this case, we would use AS to move through reinforcement or counterat- coys are well suited to deceive the en- into the area of nearby building com- tack. emy and support a deliberate attack. plexes to conduct the feint and defeat These systems serve in an economy-of- enemy surveillance and counter-sur- Organization for combat: force capacity, as they require little veillance systems. • Four AMPVs (one manned recon

Figure 7. Feint and demonstration.

40 October-December 2015 supervision vehicle teamed with withdraws across the battle-handover our Soldiers and formations while re- one optionally manned recon line (BHL). The manned platoon is for- ducing the risk to our deployed Sol- vehicle) (two platoon leader ward and heavily engaged while the diers and the resource cost to deploy, vehicles); manned-unmanned team draws the employ and sustain our forces. Auton- • Two UAVs; enemy into the engagement area. omously-enabled formations provide a feasible way to achieve what are tradi- • Eight manned tanks; WAS operational narrative: Put in the tionally the competing and contradic- context of establishing layered defens- • Four unmanned tanks; tory demands of increased capability es around forward operating bases at reduced cost (whether in terms of • Two tank supervision vehicles (one (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) si- Soldiers or dollars). with platoon leader). multaneously, we can use unmanned assets to establish and maintain secu- CAM operational narrative: Autono- The technical and the operational com- rity while manned forces are establish- my-enabled systems are well suited in munity operating collaboratively must ing and maintaining the FOB/COP. a deliberate defense to help draw the develop a cohesive and comprehensive Their ability to enhance detection of enemy into a kill zone. In this scenario, framework for working to the future to enemy forces helps free up manned as- the AS “delay in sector/draw enemy deliver greater capability per Soldier. sets to engage the enemy with respon- forces into” the engagement area, Also, that objective capability must be sive fires. where they will be met with fires and viewed as a strategic objective, and we a manned tank platoon in reserve if In all these vignettes, AS is a force mul- must determine how to move from the necessary. Initially, in the company se- tiplier. current construct (in DOTMLPF terms) curity area, a manned AMPV (supervi- to a future construct – and to what the sion vehicle) is teamed with an un- Conclusion intermediate constructs should or manned AMPV recon vehicle that is The operating and fiscal environments might be. Only through this collabora- outfitted with imagery, radar, acoustic the U.S. Army will have to navigate in tive, fully integrated approach can detection and signal sensors. The the future will place an ever larger pre- technology be focused well enough to manned AMPV is also teamed with two mium on our ability to increase the in- provide our Army and our Soldiers with imagery-recon UAVs. The security force dividual and collective capabilities of the capabilities needed to allow

Figure 8. Deliberate and area defense.

41 October-December 2015 Soldiers to focus on tasks only Soldiers clusters and Frederick M. Franks Award U.S. Army War College, a master’s of can do. in 2012. science degree in engineering-mechan- ical engineering from University of We can no longer hide behind bumper Retired COL R. Craig Effinger III is a pro- Michigan-Dearborn and a bachelor’s of stickers such as “dirty, dull or danger- gram manager for TARDEC. Previous science degree in mechanical engineer- ous” to describe what we want from assignments include training develop- ing from MTU. His military awards and autonomous systems. It requires the er, North American Defense Command- decorations include the Bronze Star, appropriate intellectual energy to be U.S. Northern Command, Joint Staff, J7, Meritorious Service Medal and Bronze expended in both U.S. Army Training Joint and Combined Warfighting Cen- Order of the de Fleury Medal. and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and ter, Suffolk, VA; chief, Science and Tech- Research Development and Engineer- nology Division, Army Capabilities In- ing Command to ensure we are achiev- tegration Center (TRADOC), Fort Mon- ing disruptive capabilities. Something roe, VA; chief, Leader Development Di- that is “disruptive” eventually becomes vision, Army G-3/5/7, Pentagon, Wash- “the norm” (for example, the iPod, ington, DC; instructor, Joint Forces Staff Acronym Quick-Scan which drove the MP3 player revolu- College, Norfolk, VA; and commander, tion), so timing is key. But we must be 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion (Aer- A2AD – anti-access/area denial able to deliver capabilities (whether in- ial Exploitation), Camp Humphreys, Re- AMPV – armored multipurpose crementally or in substantial tranches) public of Korea. His military schooling vehicle that present our adversaries with includes U.S. Army Engineer Officer Ba- APOD – aerial port of seemingly insolvable problems and debarkation sic Course, Army initial-entry rotary AS – autonomy-enabled system that reduce the physical and cognitive and fixed-wing courses, U.S. Army Avi- burden on our Soldiers. BCT – brigade combat team ation Officer Advanced Course, U.S. BHL – battle-handover line Army Command and General Staff Col- CAM – combined-arms Retired COL Michael Smith is a science lege and U.S. Army War College. COL maneuver and technology advocate for TARDEC Effinger holds a bachelor’s of aviation- CONUS – continental United to the Maneuver Center of Excellence, management degree from Auburn Uni- States Fort Benning, GA. He previously served COP – combat outpost versity, a master’s of science degree in DOTMLPF – doctrine, as director, Training Doctrine and Com- administration from Central Michigan organization, training, materiel, bat Developments, U.S. Army Armor University and a master’s of strategic- leadership and education, Center, Fort Knox, KY; chief, 3rd Iraqi studies degree from U.S. Army War Col- personnel and facilities Army Military Transition Team, Al-Ka- lege. His awards and decorations in- EO/IR – electro-optical/infrared sik, Iraq; director of training, U.S. Army clude the Defense Superior Service FOB – forward operating base Europe and , Grafenwoehr, Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star HAHO – high altitude high Germany; commander, 5-15 Cavalry, opening and Defense Meritorious Service Med- LD – line of departure U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox; and al. LRV – light reconnaissance brigade S-3, 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored vehicle Division and 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Di- Dr. Paul Rogers is TARDEC’s director MPF – mobile protected vision, Fort Hood, TX. His military and commands 177th Regiment, Re- firepower schooling includes a Senior Service Col- gional Training Institute, as a member MSR – main supply route lege Fellowship with Queen’s Universi- of the Michigan Army National Guard. MTU – Michigan Technological University ty in Kingston, Ontario, , plus Previous assignments include deputy MURV – miniature unmanned Naval College of Command and Staff, program executive officer for ground reconnaissance vehicle Army Strategy Course via correspon- combat systems; TARDEC’s executive NAI – named area of interest dence from the Army War College, U.S. director for research and technical in- OEF – Operation Enduring Army Command and General Staff Of- tegration; commander, 507th Engineer Freedom ficer’s Course (correspondence), Com- Battalion (Iraq), Michigan Army Na- OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom bined Arms Services Staff School, Ar- tional Guard; and National Guard bri- PL – platoon RES – reserve mor Officer basic and advanced cours- gade and battalion operations officer, TARDEC – (U.S. Army) Tank es and Basic Airborne Course. COL company commander and platoon Automotive Research, Smith holds a bachelor’s of arts degree leader. His military schooling includes Development and Engineering in history from the University of Mon- U.S. Army Engineer Officer Basic Center tana in history and a master’s of sci- Course, Engineer Officer Advanced TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training ence degree in national-security stud- Course, Combined Arms Services Staff and Doctrine Command ies from Naval War College. He is work- School, Army Command and General UARV – unmanned autonomous reconnaissance vehicle ing on a doctorate of education from Staff College and U.S. Army War Col- UAS – unmanned aerial system Grand Canyon University. His awards lege. Dr. Rogers’ doctorate is in me- UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle and decorations include the Defense chanical engineering-engineering me- URV – unmanned Superior Service Medal, Legion of Mer- chanics from Michigan Technological reconnaissance vehicle it with oak-leaf cluster, Meritorious University (MTU). He also holds a mas- WAS – wide-area security Service Medal with four oak-leaf ter’s degree in strategic studies from

42 October-December 2015 Mission Command on the Move by MAJ Adam R. Brady, to a successful training deployment. time for the battalion commander and LTC Tommy L. Cardone and However, the level of implementation S-3 to be present in the battalion com- CPT Edwin C. den Harder depends on the ability of commanders mand post (CP). In fact, during the 14- and their units to take a doctrinal con- day rotation, there were only three full “Commanders, assisted by their staffs, cept and implement it into operations. days when the battalion commander use the guiding principles of mission and operations officer (S-3) were pres- command to balance the art of com- During NTC Rotation 14-10, from Au- ent in the CP. Therefore, company com- mand with the science of control. They gust to October 2014, 1-77 Armor Reg- manders and battalion staff had to be use the art of command to exercise au- iment, 4th Armor Brigade Combat Team empowered in a way that allowed the thority, to provide leadership and to (ABCT), 1st Armor Division, set condi- battalion to function appropriately be- make timely decisions. [They] use the tions in garrison that resulted in the fore arrival at NTC. This required the science of control to regulate forces successful use of mission command. battalion to maximize every opportu- and direct the execution of operations nity in garrison to inculcate the philos- to conform to their commander’s in- Training objectives ophy of mission command into Task tent.” –Army Doctrine Reference Publi- One of the primary training objectives Force Steel Tigers. cation 6-0, Mission Command within a DA rotation at NTC is to stress every system and Soldier at each ech- Mission command is both a philosophy This was no small challenge. The bat- (art) and a warfighting function (sci- elon. This goes from the brigade level talion had a complete turnover of ence), according to Army doctrine. As all the way down to the team. One way field-grade officers between June and a philosophy, it is centered on a com- to do this is to create a fast operation- August 2014. The battalion command- mander’s ability to enable the execu- al tempo through the execution of bat- er took the colors in early June; the S-3 tion of “disciplined initiative within the talion operations every 48 hours for reported to the unit in the middle of commander’s intent to empower agile the first six days of the rotation and the division validation exercise in July; and adaptive leaders” through the cre- brigade-level operations every 48 and the battalion executive officer ar- ation of trust, shared understanding hours for the rest. This timeline en- rived three days before leaving for NTC and the acceptance of prudent risk.1 sures planning is continuous, including at the end of August. The continuity of Understanding and implementing mis- during execution of operations. the unit was found at the command sion command during the current de- When the operational timeline is over- sergeant major and captain level. Every cisive-action (DA) rotations at the Na- laid with the brigade planning timeline member of the staff had more time in tional Training Center (NTC) is essential and requirements, there is very little the battalion than the field grades.

Figure 1. Task Force Steel Tiger standard task organization.

43 October-December 2015 However, within the S-3 shop, there the mission-command philosophy by consisted of the commander’s was more turmoil. The previous assis- simplifying the orders process via us- M1A2SEPV2 or M998 humvee; the tant S-3 was assigned as the rear-de- ing standing operating procedures S-3’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle; an tachment commander; another mem- (SOP). Each company within the task M1068 CP vehicle with the assistant ber of the staff was medically non-de- force had a previously specified task S-2 and a battle captain; a fires vehicle ployable; and the task-force engineer organization and task/purpose based with the battalion FSO; and the at- and battalion fire-support officer (FSO) on mission type (Figure 1). The battal- tached Joint Terminal Attack Controller positions were unfilled. This resulted ion always moved in a diamond forma- element in its own vehicle. in the battalion plans officer assuming tion with our Charger Company (armor We attempted many configurations by the roles of assistant S-3 and plans of- company team) in the lead element as using different vehicles, alternate ca- ficer; the attached engineer-company an “advance guard”; Able and Baker pabilities and different personnel. commander filling a dual role as the companies (mechanized company However, given some constraints on task-force engineer; and a company teams) on the flanks; and our Dog communications capabilities, we set- FSO being pulled up to act as the bat- Company (armor company team) in the tled on the configuration previously talion FSO. rear as shown in Figure 2. This stan- described. The M1068 was fitted with dard formation was the basis for all our a mast antenna, allowing it to be raised This personnel shortage is not uncom- assembly area and maneuver opera- when the vehicle was stationary. The mon but can contribute to significant tions. Tactically, Baker would be the increased height of the antenna pro- functionality issues if mission com- support-by-fire (SBF) element; Charger vided significantly increased range for mand based on trust is not implement- was the breach element with habitu- frequency-modulation communica- ed in such a time-constrained environ- ally attached engineer assets; Able was ment. tions. This vehicle and personnel pack- the assault force; and Dog acted as the age facilitated the battalion command- reserve/exploitation force if not de- Sowing seeds er’s role in the operations process tached through brigade orders. while circulating around the battlefield The initial seeds of the mission-com- (Figure 3). This package also provided We created the battalion’s tactical CP mand philosophy were sown during the commander the ability to integrate (TAC) during the same division valida- the division validation exercise con- fires and maneuver the element. ducted just before our NTC rotation. tion exercise. According to Army Tac- The one task-force operation, a battal- tics, Techniques and Procedures Publi- The TAC also supported the command- ion attack with an in-stride combined- cation 5-0.1, a TAC contains “a tailored er’s ability to use mission command as arms breach, provided an opportunity portion of a unit headquarters de- a warfighting function for the battal- for the battalion commander, with the signed to control portions of an opera- ion. In Task Force 1-77 Armor Regi- support of staff, to set tion for a limited time.” Our TAC ment, the battalion commander em- powered the operations officer to ma- neuver the battalion based on shared understanding, commander’s intent and trust, which are key components within mission command. By removing the need to constantly talk on the ra- dio to maneuver subordinate ele- ments, the commander was able to monitor and digest the net traffic to “understand” the battlefield, maintain situational awareness through Blue Force Tracker and “visualize” by being at the front. This allowed the com- mander to better “direct” the battal- ion. This delineation of tasks created a form of mission command tailored for the team that had been built. The battalion CP included the opera- tions sergeant major, S-3 plans officer/ assistant S-3, S-2 and S-6, and the rest of the fires personnel. The battalion executive officer then could oversee planning for the next operation while also supporting current operations the battalion TAC was controlling. Due to Figure 2. Task-force diamond formation – the standard formation for all bat- communication constraints inherent in talion operations. operating across long distances, the

44 October-December 2015 opportunities, the O/C/T provided or- der shells that were about 50 percent to 60 percent complete. When com- bined with the tactical road-march or- der produced during the four-day re- ception, staging, onward movement and integration process, these battal- ion order shells ensured we had the opportunity to be successful and learn as a task force. The compressed timeline of the NTC required the orders brief for the task- force offensive lane be conducted on the morning of Training Day (TD) 1 to ensure companies had adequate time to conduct their TLPs before the start of patrol the morning of TD 2. To exe- cute the required dry runs for the task- force live fire on TD 3, the opord for the live fire was conducted the day be- fore execution of the offensive lane on TD 2. This allowed the task force to Figure 3. The commander’s role in the operations process. (From Army Doctri- nal Publication 6-0) conduct a combined-arms rehearsal about eight hours before line of depar- battalion CP was also prepared to pro- a cohesive team built on mutual trust ture (LD) for the live-fire dry run. vide relay support from the TAC to the and shared understanding” two levels Once complete with the combined 2 brigade CP. down. day/night dry run (attack and com- bined-arms breach during daylight, re- Leader training By creating a standard formation, lay- ing out basic tactical responsibilities pel counterattack during darkness), the The brigade conducted its leader train- and briefing a detailed modified com- companies prepared their LD for the ing program (LTP) without company bined-obstacle overlay, the battalion live run at 3 p.m. the following day (TD commanders because the rail load was commander created an environment 4). At 7 a.m., eight hours before LD for happening at the same time at home where mission orders could be effi- the live run, the opord for the follow- station. To compensate, the battalion ciently created based on a clear com- on operation was given. This operation conducted a very detailed brief to its mander’s intent and shared under- was planned with very little input from company command teams and staff to standing while current operations were the battalion commander or S-3 due to highlight the intelligence preparation being conducted. This ensured subor- the nearly continuous operations dur- of the battlefield and enemy best prac- dinate leaders had as much time as ing the 48 hours prior. In fact, the first tices. Also, the “situation” paragraph possible to conduct troop-leading pro- time the plan was briefed in its entire- of the base operations order described cedures (TLPs), resulting in a more ef- ty to either leader was during the the effects of terrain and enemy em- ficient orders process during NTC’s opord brief. Based on the shared un- ployment prior to deployment to NTC. time-constrained environment. derstanding created during the one task-force attack executed prior to The battalion commander also devel- NTC; briefings and classes conducted oped the team through map drills with Vignette with platoon leadership and above; company commanders that covered The first six days of NTC Rotation 14-10 and a clear intent provided early in the expected operations and movement involved battalion-level lanes consist- planning process, the battalion com- techniques through known enemy ar- ing of offense, defense and live-fire op- mander was able to influence the plan- eas. Then the battalion conducted erations. Operations were based on ning process while allowing the battal- classes specifically focused on opera- the battalion commander’s training ob- ion staff to adhere to the one-thirds/ tions at NTC. These classes, given to jectives and conversations with the ob- two-thirds planning rule for subordi- platoon leadership and above, focused server/controller/trainer (O/C/T) lead nate units. on taking away some of the mystery of and unit senior trainer. Our LTP did not an NTC rotation by providing the SOPs involve conducting any planning direct- There is no doubt the training objec- for conducting medical and casualty ly applicable to our rotation, so we had tive to stress every system within a evacuations, vehicle and personnel re- to produce four battalion orders with- unit was met during NTC Rotation 14- generation, and maximizing the Multi- in a five-day period. In the case of our 10. Every leader from team level ple Integrated Laser Engagement Sys- battalion, we executed task-force lanes through battalion level felt the impact tems. This created a robust under- in the following order: offense, live-fire of the time-constrained and complex standing and served as a way to “build and defense. To maximize our training environment created during the DA

45 October-December 2015 rotation. The methods used by Task ABCT, 1st Armored Division, , School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts Force Steel Tigers, and the opportuni- TX/Djibouti (deployed to Combined degree in military history from the U.S ties provided by the O/C/T team at Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa). His Military Academy. NTC, created a situation where the bat- past duty assignments include assis- talion was able to run continuous op- tant professor, Department of Geogra- Notes erations while providing an environ- phy and Environmental Engineering, 1 ADP 6-0. ment to empower agile and adaptive U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; 2 Ibid. subordinate leaders to exercise disci- troop commander, Company B, 3-4 plined initiative within the command- Cavalry, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat er’s Intent. By taking advantage of ev- Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield ery opportunity to implement mission Barracks, HI/Iraq; executive officer, Acronym Quick-Scan command prior to our deployment to Headquarters and Headquarters Com- NTC, Task Force Steel Tigers were pre- pany (HHC), 1st Battalion, 66th Armor ABCT – armor brigade combat pared for success during NTC Rotation st th team Regiment, 1 ABCT, 4 Infantry Divi- BOLC – basic officer leader’s 14-10. sion, Fort Hood/Iraq; and tank-platoon course leader, Company A, 1-66 Armor Regi- LTC Tommy Cardone commands 1-77 BSTB – brigade special troops ment, 1st ABCT. His military schooling battalion Armor Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX (de- includes Armor BOLC, Armor MCCC, CP – command post ployed for Combined Joint Task Force- Cavalry Leader’s Course and ILE dis- DA – decisive action Horn of Africa). His past duty assign- tance learning. MAJ Brady holds a EQP – equipment ments include commander of Warrior FSO – fire-support officer Transition Battalion, Fort Bliss; profes- bachelor’s of science degree in environ- FWD SPT – forward support sor of military science, Mississippi mental science from U.S. Military Acad- HHC – headquarters and State University, Starkville, MS; and emy and a master’s of science degree headquarters company in environmental science and engineer- ILE – intermediate-level battalion executive officer and battal- education th ing from Colorado School of Mines. ion S-3 of 3-509 (Airborne), Fort Rich- LD – line of departure ardson, AK. His military schooling in- LTP – leader training program CPT Edwin den Harder commands D/1- cludes Infantry Basic Officer Leaders MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s 77 Armor Regiment, 4/1 Armor Division, Course (BOLC), Infantry Maneuver Cap- Career Course Fort Bliss, TX. His past duty assign- tain’s Career Course (MCCC), Combined MED – medical ments include battalion assistant S-3 MTR – mortar Arms and Services Staff School and in- and plans officer for HHC 1-77 Armor NTC – National Training Center termediate-level (ILE) education dis- Regiment; squadron plans officer and O/C/T – observer/controller/ tance learning. LTC Cardone holds a squadron personnel officer, HHC, 4/2 trainer bachelor’s of science degree in biology SBF – support-by-fire Cavalry Regiment, Vilseck, Germany; from the University of Tennessee at SCT – scout surveillance troop executive officer, Martin and a master’s of arts degree in SOP – standard operating Troop N, 4/2 Cavalry; and reconnais- business and organizational security procedure sance-platoon leader, Troop L, 4-2 Cav- TD – training day management from Webster University. alry Regiment. His military schooling TLP – troop-leading procedures MAJ Adam Brady serves as the S-3 for includes Cavalry Leader’s Course, TAC – tactical command post 1-77 Armor Regiment, 4th MCCC, Armor BOLC and Airborne

46 October-December 2015 Mission-Command Culture: A Leader-Subordinate Contract by LTC Chad R. Foster exists in a unit or it does not. Leaders focusing on an individual’s personal “Culture is established by the people and those under their charge have spe- motivations and his way of thinking. While having the right mindset is es- who compose your team and is carried cific obligations to each other and to sential in facilitating mission com- on through those people. ... But you the unit. There are also significant mand, a direct link between what is in cannot merely expect culture to be a costs all parties must accept as the a leader’s mind and his external ac- natural occurrence; it has to be taught price of building a climate of trust tions is necessary. Designating mission and made a part of your everyday rou- where prudent risk-taking and experi- mentation is rewarded and decentral- command a warfighting function also tine.” -Mike Krzyzewski, Beyond Bas- ized execution is the norm. This makes falls short of the mark because, despite ketball (2006) for an often messy arrangement, but the nuanced language used in its defi- Mission command is much more than the contract is necessary for a unit to nition, it implies certain tasks lay with- a philosophy or a warfighting function. build and maintain a mission-com- in the scope of mission command It is a culture that permeates every as- mand culture. while others do not. What the Army re- pect of organizational activity, from ally hopes to achieve is the manifesta- routine staff meetings and field train- Army doctrine simultaneously refers to tion of mission-command principles in ing to actual combat operations. At its mission command as a philosophy and the beliefs and actions of individuals heart, this culture is built on a contract as its own separate warfighting func- and in the collective norms of organi- of mutual trust and respect between tion, but neither of these designations zational activity. In short, the Army’s leaders and subordinates. There is no is adequate alone. A philosophy con- true goal is a culture of mission com- middle ground – this contract either notes a primarily theoretical endeavor, mand.

Figure 1. Mission-command culture: a contract based on mutual trust and respect. (Based on the senior-subordinate contract concept articulated by William S. Lind in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook)

47 October-December 2015 Trust a must unwilling or unable to live up to these risk of subordinates making mistakes For such a culture to emerge, a bond obligations or to pay the associated that result in short-term setbacks. of mutual trust must exist between costs, leaders and their subordinates These setbacks might cost the leader leaders and subordinates. This trust will not be able to operate within (or (and possibly the unit) a bit of tempo- only develops over time when words contribute to) a mission-command cul- rary recognition, but the long-term combined with actions clearly and con- ture. payoffs are well worth it. These payoffs sistently demonstrate a commitment come in the form of empowered sub- The first part of this contract provides ordinates who trust their superiors and to the principles of mission command the long-term context by establishing in everything a unit does. If these prin- thrive in the types of conditions that how the parties involved are obligated demand disciplined initiative and de- ciples seem not to be applied in even to view themselves, other members of one category of organizational activity, centralized operations. Leaders who the team and their place within the or- are unwilling to accept this cost be- the leader’s commitment will be per- ganization. Leaders must consider ceived as incomplete and, therefore, cause of a zero-defect mentality or a themselves as merely the current care- desire for personal advancement are will limit the level of trust given by sub- takers of a unit that has a long and ordinates. In this way, mission com- unfit for their position because they proud history – one that existed before have not defined success as growing mand is an all-or-nothing proposition. their arrival and that will continue long For example, a leader who microman- the next generation of adaptive Sol- after their departure. Doing so encour- diers, noncommissioned officers ages the unit while in garrison cannot ages personal humility and a desire to realistically expect subordinates to (NCOs) and officers. Leaders must re- make a positive contribution to the sist the temptation to violate the con- suddenly exercise disciplined initiative unit’s history. That contribution comes in a field environment. Subordinates tract, even if they see a peer gaining by treating subordinates as “apprentic- more short-term success by centraliz- quickly sense half-measures and adjust es” for positions of increasing respon- their conduct accordingly. ing decisions and punishing those who sibility. It is not enough just to train experiment in the spirit of exploiting them for their current duties. Instead, However, zeal cannot override com- an opportunity. the leader must help develop each mon sense. A commitment to mission member of his team both profession- Results achieved through microman- command does not mean a refusal to ally and personally as a legacy for the agement or toxic-leadership practices give detailed directives when the situ- future. In turn, the subordinate’s obli- are invariably short-lived and detri- ation demands. The most effective gation is to make a commitment to his mental to the morale and long-term practitioner of decentralized opera- own self-development that matches health of the unit. They erode trust tions recognizes when conditions re- what the leader is investing in him. and fail to create a climate that will quire more specific instructions, and a foster the initiative needed to beat a good leader does not hesitate to issue Meeting the short-term obligations of thinking enemy at the point of contact. them. However, a leader committed to the mission-command contract is the Likewise, a subordinate who lacks the mission command recognizes these sit- immediate and tangible expression of courage to exercise initiative cannot uations are the exception rather than the long-term agreements previously earn the full trust of his superiors. the rule. Because of this, the leader described. Success hinges on the lead- Team members must accept that tem- takes the time to explain to subordi- er’s ability to provide clear and effec- porary failures will, in the long run, nates why they are deviating from mis- tive guidance that is useful to subordi- pave the way to greater success be- sion-command principles for the given nates when developing their own plans cause of the learning and professional situation. Such explanations – and a for mission accomplishment and in growth that take place because of quick return to normal practice – en- making on-the-spot decisions as the them. sure the bond of trust remains unbro- situation changes. Leaders must issue ken. only the minimum amount of direc- Determining exactly how to put this tives on exactly how to complete as- contract into practice is difficult. There To understand what mission-command signed tasks, demanding that subordi- is no single “right” answer when estab- culture is and what achieving it entails, nates exercise disciplined initiative and lishing a mission-command culture be- think in terms of a two-part contract creativity within the boundaries of the cause each situation is unique. Howev- between leaders and subordinates leader’s intent. Underwriting honest er, assessing progress is possible by fo- (Figure 1). William S. Lind, author of mistakes along the way is vital as long cusing on observable indicators (Figure the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, as individuals learn and grow because 2). Almost none of these indicators are first articulated this idea as a way to of them. Such top-cover does not ex- “inputs,” meaning that few are actions understand the specifics of mission or- tend to legal, moral and ethical lapses. or directives imposed by higher head- ders. However, his concept of a con- Errors made with the right intentions, quarters. Instead, they are descriptive tractual agreement between leaders in honest pursuit of the assigned ob- outcomes that are observable at all and subordinates has a greater utility levels by anyone with the inclination to jective, are the natural cost of building when expanded to apply to the entire look and listen. There are many tools and maintaining a mission-command organizational culture of a unit. Like at a leader’s disposal to help with as- culture. other contracts, this one is a voluntary sessments, but for most of these indi- arrangement that carries with it very Risk is inherent in this contractual cators, all that is required are a lead- specific obligations and costs. If agreement. Leaders must accept the er’s eyes and ears. Asking pointed

48 October-December 2015 Figure 2: Establishing a mission-command culture: indicators of success.

questions at the right time to the cor- leaders to make decisions at the low- 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st rect individual or group will reveal far est appropriate level. None of these Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; opera- more than the most detailed Power- ideas are new or ground-breaking. In tions staff officer/executive officer, 4-9 Point briefing. The only way to find out fact, most of the points articulated in Cavalry Regiment, 2-1 Cavalry Division, what is really happening inside subor- this article are quite simple and well- Fort Hood; course director, platoon op- dinate formations is to seek unfiltered known. erations MS300, Department of Mili- contact with the Soldiers, NCOs and ju- tary Instruction, U.S. Military Academy But as many have discovered, even the nior officers within those units. Un- (USMA), West Point, NY; and company simplest of things is often difficult. To scripted encounters and focused ob- commander, 1-66 Armored Regiment, help ensure a unit is “getting it right,” servation are the keys to determining 1/4 Infantry Division, Fort Hood. His leaders must observe their formations where a unit really stands when estab- military schooling includes the Armor closely and ask the tough questions of lishing a mission-command culture. Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon the right people within the organiza- Leader Course and Armor Captain’s Ad- tion, including themselves. Also, sub- Summary vanced Course. He holds a master’s of ordinates must have the courage to ac- Mission command is just the latest la- arts degree in national security and cept prudent risk and exercise disci- bel for a concept of empowered lead- strategic studies from the U.S. Naval plined initiative within the guidance of ership that has existed throughout the War College, Newport, RI, and a bach- the leader’s intent. Only when this lev- history of military operations. It is not elor’s of science degree in history from el of commitment from both leaders something that can be selectively ap- USMA. and subordinates is present does the plied. Mission command is a culture unit have a chance of achieving a mis- that binds the members of the organi- sion-command culture. zation together through a contract of mutual trust and respect. This contract LTC Chad Foster is the Armor colonels’ Acronym Quick-Scan provides purpose and a guide to action assignment officer, Senior Leader De- for all involved. More to the point, it velopment, Office of the Chief of Staff NCO – noncommissioned officer creates the conditions for adaptive of the Army, Alexandria, VA. His past USMA – U.S. Military Academy leadership to blossom by empowering assignments include executive officer,

49 October-December 2015 Mission Command and Mental Block: Why the Army Won’t Adopt a True Mission-Command Philosophy

by MAJ Thomas A. Rebuck This is not surprising given our bureau- philosophy requires the cultivation of cratic, managerial mindset, with its adaptive and flexible leaders, the de- “Just before I moved on, some staff of- pathological fear of uncertainty and velopment of which is undermined by ficer present said, ‘Why, your men are squeamish aversion to risk. Rather the demand for adherence to check- not loaded. Why do you not make them than cultivating the qualities and vir- the-block procedural methodologies load?’ I replied, ‘Because if we do not tues that enhance operational effec- and processes. Finally, in the fiscally do the business with the bayonet, with- tiveness, we focus on the quantifiable austere environment we currently face out firing, we shall not be able to do it aspects of scientific management, ob- (caused to a great extent by the TO&E at all, so I shall not load.’ I heard Lord sessing over administrative minutia bequeathed to us under modularity), Wellington, who was close by, say, ‘Let and check-the-block procedural meth- him alone; let him go his own way.’” it is our mounted “heavy” forces that nd odology. Without significant change to are first in line for the chop when Army -MAJ George Napier, 52 Foot (from this institutional perspective, the odds his account on the storming of Ciudad bureaucrats determine which units to 1 of us “transforming” the Army into a cut. Rodrigo, Jan. 19, 1812) truly “expeditionary” force – com- For two decades, the U.S. Army has at- manded by adaptive and flexible lead- This article will offer an alternate fram- tempted and failed to implement ef- ers who use mission command to exe- ing of both the problem and the requi- fective institutional reform. Although cute decisive action – are, frankly, dis- site solutions for resolving this dilem- its efforts have seemingly resulted in mal. ma. First, it will provide an alternate significant modifications to organiza- This has particular significance for the perspective of mission command. Sec- tion and doctrine, these changes have Armor/Cavalry Branch. The dispersion ond, it will discuss how scientific man- had minimal, if indeed any, positive im- and rapid tempo of mounted com- agement undermines the development pact. Besides the adoption of top- bined-arms warfare requires a high de- of leaders capable of using mission heavy and unsustainable tables of or- gree of initiative and independence by ganization and equipment (TO&E), it subordinates for its effective execution has done little to cultivate adaptive, – initiative and independence enabled flexible leaders or implement a true by a mission-command philosophy. mission-command philosophy. Conversely, a mission-command

50 October-December 2015 command. Third, it will explain why Army’s perception of “The task of regulations – besides our current modular, brigade-based transmitting basic information and structure does not support a mission- mission command points of view concerning command command philosophy. The U.S. Army has a different concep- and battle – is to educate. The main tion of mission command. According to goal of this education should be to in- Mission command Army Tactics, Techniques and Proce- culcate: dures (ATTP) publication 5-0.1, Com- Mission command is the practice of de- mander and Staff Officer Guide, mis- • A high degree of independence of centralizing decision-making and au- sion command is defined as “the exer- all grades of command; thority down to the lowest possible cise of authority and direction by the • The need for mission-oriented echelon, to include cultivating the ini- commander using mission orders to discipline — i.e., the inner duty tiative of the individual Soldier. It per- enable disciplined initiative within the always to handle in accordance mits the immediate execution of deci- commander’s intent to empower agile with the mission given [emphasis sive action in the event there is no and adaptive leaders. … It is command- added]; guidance from higher headquarters or er-led and blends the art of command • Free creativity; and that guidance no longer conforms to and the science of control [emphasis • Making ‘whole’ (i.e., clear and the situation. It is an outcomes-based added].”6 philosophy with little use for hard and unambiguous decisions) and fast principles or rules of war. “Soldiers While mission command is indeed carrying them out by concentrating 9 must be thoroughly conscious of the “commander led” and requires “agile all forces.” fact that only results matter,” writes and adaptive leaders” for its imple- Note that “mission-oriented discipline” 2 Martin Van Creveld. Rigid adherence mentation, the similarities end there. places no caveats on the exercise of to protocols, checklists and processes It is not a “blend” of art and science, initiative, nor does it promote external are anathema to mission command for it functions entirely within the supervisory control over the actions of since this stifles the initiative, creativ- realm of art. It has nothing to do with subordinates. It also unequivocally as- ity and innovation of subordinates. control since the entire concept of mis- serts that art, not science, is the essen- sion command is based on the premise tial element of mission command. The Mission command is also a philosoph- that control, under the dispersed and U.S. Army’s inability or refusal to make ical contract between the commander fast-paced conditions of modern war- similar explicit assertions makes its en- and his subordinates based on mutual fare, is problematic if not impossible. dorsement of mission command – and, trust, understanding and confidence. Finally, it places no caveats on the ex- by extension, the empowerment of This relationship requires that the ercise of initiative. “agile and adaptive leaders” – mean- commander provide clear and unam- ingless. biguous guidance while allowing Sol- The implications are obvious; subordi- diers the greatest possible latitude in nate leaders cannot be trusted to act Of all the Army’s assertions regarding accomplishing the assigned task(s). responsibly (disciplined initiative) out- mission command, “science of control” Notes Van Creveld, as part of this rela- side the direct supervision (control) of is the least applicable description. Mis- tionship, “[l]imits as to the method of higher headquarters. Conformance is sion command is a response to the dis- execution within the framework of the to be imposed upon subordinates rath- persed and fast-paced nature of mod- higher commander’s will are imposed er than relying on innate professional- ern warfare. This dispersion and speed only where essential for coordination ism and conscientiousness to guide makes it difficult, if not impossible, to with other commands.”3 In turn, the their actions. Such thinking is antithet- “control” subordinate units in the cha- subordinate exercises this latitude ical to a mission-command philosophy: os of combat. Even if control were fea- within the parameters of his assigned “It is no less important to educate the sible however, it is still not desirable: mission unless “it no longer suffices for soldier to think and act for himself. His “The emptiness of the battlefield re- the basis for action, or if it is overtaken self-reliance and sense of honor will quires soldiers who can think and act by events.”4 In this case, the subordi- then induce him to do his duty even independently, who can make calculat- nate who “changes a mission or does when he is no longer under the eye of ed, decisive and daring use of every sit- not carry it out must report his action his commanding officer [emphasis uation.”10 Only if events go excessively immediately and ... assumes responsi- added].”7 awry or circumstances change drasti- bility for the consequences.”5 cally will intervention by higher head- The compulsion to overmanage subor- quarters be justified. Mission command is not a doctrine in dinates reflects a tendency within the the sense that it can be codified in reg- U.S. Army to “try and foresee situa- The willingness to allow subordinates ulations. Neither should it be lumped tions and lay down modes of behavior the requisite level of freedom to attain together with technology or check-the- in great detail.”8 This was noted by for- decisive results – the essence of mis- block procedural methodologies and mer German officers convened in the sion command – is exemplified by the artificially categorized as a “warfight- 1950s to comment on a revised Field operations order written by Hans von ing function.” Mission command is a Manual 100-5. In contrast to the hesi- Seeckt for the Gorlice Offensive in May personal and organizational mindset tance exhibited by the U.S. Army to un- 1915. It provides eloquent testimony that must permeate every aspect of an leash its subordinate leaders, these to the difference between an opera- institution’s existence. gentlemen noted: tionally oriented army and a

51 October-December 2015 managerial, bureaucratically inclined leader to manager/administrator-in- conflict with it; no matter how versa- and risk-averse organization: “The at- chief. The cause of this is multifold, not tile the code. Talent and genius oper- tack … must be pushed forward at a the least of which is the Army’s latent ate outside the rules, and theory con- rapid pace. … Thus the Army cannot as- assumption that administrative exacti- flicts with practice.16 sign the attacking corps and divisions tude is the penultimate expression of objectives for each day, lest by fixing military virtue. It is also the result of Streamlining them the possibility of further progress “scientific” management methods and bureaucracy may be obstructed. … Any portion of planning processes – and the oversized While the Army acknowledges the ad- the attacking troops which is success- staffs that support them. vantages of operating within the deci- ful in pushing on will expose itself to sion cycle of our opponents, its current the danger of envelopment. Thus, the Commanders have primary responsibil- ity for operational planning, not the staff-centric doctrine inhibits rapid de- troops that least deserve it may meet cision-making by following check-the- with disaster as a result of their own staff! While delegating detailed plan- ning and supervision in specific func- block procedural planning methodolo- rapid advance. Consideration of this gies. Regardless of its concession that possibility makes it necessary for the tional areas, they must assume hands- on involvement in planning and refine- intuitive decision-making and abbrevi- Army to fix certain lines, which should ated MDMP are acceptable alterna- be reached by the force as a whole, ment of the scheme of maneuver. Sim- ply tossing “guidance” to the staff, tives to the full-blown process – albeit and if possible simultaneously. Any on a limited basis – the fact remains progress beyond these lines will be then picking and choosing a course of action based on their analysis and con- that the Army’s staff training, exercises thankfully welcomed by the Army and and evaluations are based on the abil- made use of.”11 clusions is not the proper exercise of leadership or command and is anath- ity to adhere to process and doctrine Note the contrast with the extremely ema to the concept of mission com- rather than attain rapid and decisive detailed orders typical of the U.S. mand. results. Army, which sets “maximum, not min- This approach not only marginalizes This has led to oversized staff sizes at imum, lines of advance and insists on the participation of commanders in the battalion level and above, a situation an exact alignment of advancing troops planning process, it encourages micro- exacerbated by the acquisition of Com- as well as strict timetables.”12 Von analysis, microplanning and microman- mand Post of the Future and the mas- Seeckt’s order is the embodiment of agement by the staff, thus suppressing sive infrastructure and plethora of mission command, encouraging subor- the exercise of genius at all echelons. technicians required to support the dinate leaders to exercise genius and It should be noted that by genius we system. Aside from the unsustainable “exploit each situation in a thoughtful, are not referring to an individual pos- expense this adds to the Army’s bud- determined and bold way.”13 sessing extraordinary abilities but to get, there is no evidence to indicate The compulsion to micromanage ex- the capacity for every Soldier to apply that larger staffs or technological infra- tends beyond the tight control of sub- creative and inspirational solutions to structure adds to efficiency – their size ordinates. It also encompasses the un- battlefield problems. Because MDMP and complexity actually impede the realistic desire to impose order on the (etc.) revolves around the accumula- planning and decision-making process. chaos of combat itself rather than ac- tion and analysis of quantifiable facts “There can be no doubt that there ex- cept the inevitability of its tumult, tur- and data rather than the intangible as- ists a point beyond which the expan- moil and confusion. Under these con- pects of combat, it is unlikely to pro- sion of headquarters no longer contrib- duce similar results since “[o]ften it is utes to efficiency and may indeed re- ditions, “[i]ncalculable elements often 17 have the decisive influence. One’s own precisely those factors that cannot be duce it,” notes Van Creveld. measured that are of the greatest im- will is pitted against the independent This is illustrated by contrasting cur- portance.”15 Staff-centric planning and will of the enemy. Friction and errors rent U.S. Army staff sizes with those of 14 MDMP produce “safe” plans; creative are daily occurrences.” The Army the German army during World War II. genius attains decisive results. would rather implement “scientific” For example, a panzer division’s com- management methods, procedures While effective leaders invite recom- mand staff contained seven officers and planning processes (in other mendations and incorporate good (three majors and four captains)18 with words, military decision-making pro- ideas from the staff, it is ultimately the the staff company as a whole totaling cess (MDMP), joint operation-planning commander’s ability to plan and act only 19 officers, 12 warrant officers, 29 process and operational design) than decisively that matters. No procedural noncommissioned officers and 67 en- develop leaders and cohesive organi- methodology or bureaucratically ori- listed personnel.19 This reflected at zations that thrive in and exploit these ented decision-making process can lower echelons as well. Panzer-regi- conditions. change this: “[I]t is simply not possible ment command staffs operated with to construct a model for the art of war five officers;20 panzer battalions func- MDMP and genius that can serve as a scaffolding on tioned with four.21 Even if we accept suppression which the commander can rely on for the notion that modern conflict is so The most troubling aspect of the Ar- support at any time. Whenever he has much more sophisticated that it re- my’s bureaucratic mindset is the rele- to fall back on his innate talent, he will quires considerably larger staffs (we gation of commanders from the role of find himself outside the model and in don’t), it is doubtful whether it

52 October-December 2015 justifies the massive expansion repre- organization to maintain unity of effort Referred to as “empire building” by sented by current U.S. Army headquar- and purpose despite the friction, cha- Leslie McNair, it reflected a desire to ters. os and stress of combat. The Germans organize units “so they could handle thought that “[u]nits that are only su- every contingency, not just the ones It is notable that “German staffs at all perficially held together … easily fail in most likely to occur.”26 There was also levels were operational and tactical or- moments of grave danger and under a tendency to burden units with “com- gans above all … devoting the mini- the pressure of unexpected events.”24 forts, conveniences, gadgets, techni- mum effort possible to all other On the other hand, the adoption of a cians, ‘experts,’ special services and tasks.”22 This emphasis on operations brigade system was intended to facili- complex command-control systems.”27 is reinforced by the manner in which tate task-organization by loosening the As in the case of the BCT, “once these the army as a whole viewed adminis- ties that existed within the regiment. additions got started, they multiplied tration: “[T]he General Staff was reluc- Not only was this counterproductive, exponentially.”28 tant to increase the burden of paper- it was unnecessary. work resting on the troops and to turn As the head of Army Ground Forces, them into collecting agencies for data The Germans, masters in the use of the McNair sought to counter these trends that would benefit the Army as a whole task-force concept, felt no compunc- by stripping modified TO&Es of any- but not them directly. … Thus, the or- tion to eliminate the regiment as an thing not directly contributing to an or- ganization department did not demand operational entity, using it as a core el- ganization’s core function. By stream- daily reports on actual strength, casu- ement in the formation of its “kampf- lining sustainment and headquarters alties and the need for replacements; gruppes” during World War II. Follow- elements and pooling special purpose instead, it used establishment strength ing experiments that led to the adop- and support assets at higher echelons, and losses, reported every [10] days, tion of the pentomic reorganization in McNair believed the Army could econ- to make its own calculations. … The the 1950s, MG George E. Lynch noted omize on resources and reduce ship- system consciously attempted to mini- that the regimental combat team was ping space for moving units overseas. mize the amount of paperwork and just as suitable for the formation of Yet he retained combat power by leav- was quite prepared to take the result- task forces as the armored divisions’ ing maneuver elements essentially un- ing inaccuracies in stride.”23 combat commands (i.e., brigades). touched by these economies. While this approach has been criticized Lynch concluded that the Army should While the Army rejected the concept for not placing enough emphasis on lo- return to the traditional division orga- of pooling after World War II, ostensi- gistics, such assertions are debatable nization with three regimental combat bly on the basis of improving cohesion, (although beyond our scope of our dis- teams, which, he believed, were as in the case of low-density MOS posi- cussion). Nevertheless, there is no rea- flexible as combat commands. Further- tions this approach is essential. Not son why an operationally focused or- more, Lynch thought regimental orga- only does it facilitate the equipping ganization cannot be proficient in the nization fostered morale; encouraged and training of these personnel by con- areas of supply and logistics as well. teamwork between subordinate and solidating them into special-purpose superior commanders, as well as their organizations, it avoids the expense of BCT and mission staffs; provided knowledge about ca- making them organic to every maneu- command pabilities and weaknesses of units and ver formation despite the fact that There are three problems with the Ar- their leaders; and stimulated coopera- their services do not contribute direct- my’s brigade-based structure and the tive working methods [emphasis add- ly to the conduct of combat opera- brigade combat team (BCT) concept it- ed].25 tions. Most of all, it frees maneuver self. One is the failure to recognize the units to focus on their core functions advantages of cohesion provided by a The brigade provides no such benefits, rather than managing a complex vari- regimental structure and how this fa- its amorphous organization failing to ety of non-combat-oriented compo- cilitates the exercise of mission com- provide the same sense of corporate nent elements. mand. Two is the BCT’s bloated organi- identity as the regiment. Further inval- zation and massive infrastructure – de- idating this system is the fact that bri- Conclusion gades have assumed the same level of signed more for static operations than The U.S. Army’s failure to institute tactical and operational maneuver. administrative and logistical responsi- bilities as the they replaced. comprehensive reform, specifically in Three is the dispersal of low-density the area of mission command, can be military-occupation specialty (MOS) The adoption of a combined-arms or- ganization below brigade-level (the attributed to its bureaucratic, manage- positions across the BCT, complicating rial culture. This culture, addicted to equipment fielding and training within combined-arms battalion) has also eliminated the need for the type of check-the-block procedural methodol- the brigade as well as distracting it ogy and processes, fosters a patholog- from its core function as a fighting or- task-organization envisioned by the brigade system. ical fear of uncertainty and a squea- ganization. mish aversion to risk, each of which is Unit cohesion is an essential element The BCT is also a product of the same anathema to a true mission-command of mission command because it fosters mindset, which threatened the devel- philosophy. It has also failed to intro- trust, faith and familiarity among the opment of a sustainable and expedi- duce streamlined, cohesive TO&Es that members of a unit. This allows an tionary Army during World War II. facilitate mission command and has

53 October-December 2015 offered little substantive support for Notes Garden: The 6th New Zealand Brigade in Operation Lightfoot (The Second Battle the cultivation of adaptive, flexible 1 Michael Glover, The Peninsula War, of El Alamein), , VA: Night Vi- leaders. Only by a massive reorienta- 1807-1814, London: Penguin Books, 2001. tion away from its preference for sci- sion and Electronic Sensors Directorate, 2 Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power, Countermine Division, January 2005. entific management and bureaucratic German and U.S. Army Performance, 19 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/ routine will it achieve its proclaimed 1939-1945, Westport: Greenwood Press, CARL/nafziger/942GFGU.pdf. goal of creating an expeditionary force 1982. 20 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/ led by adaptive, flexible leaders using 3 Ibid. mission command to execute decisive CARL/nafziger/944GQCT.pdf. 4 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, edi- action. 21 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/ tors, On the German Art of War: Trup- CARL/nafziger/944GQDA.pdf. rd penführung German Manual for Unit MAJ Thomas Rebuck is S-3 of 3 Bat- 22 Van Creveld. talion, 103rd Armored Regiment, 55th Command in World War II, Mechanics- burg: Stackpole Books, 2001. 23 Ibid. Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 5 24 28th Infantry Division. Previous assign- Ibid. Condell and Zabecki. ments include plans officer, 55th ABCT, 6 Department of the Army, ATTP 5-0.1, 25 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Fire- 28th Infantry Division; commander of Commander and Staff Officer Guide, power: The Evolution of Divisions and Camp Virginia, Kuwait; commander, Washington, DC: Government Printing Of- Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 103rd Ar- fice, September 2011. Washington DC: Center for Military Histo- 7 ry, 1998. mored Regiment, Wellsboro, PA; S-4, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tac- 26 3rd Battalion, 103rd Armored Regiment, tics: Innovation in the German Army John Sayen, U.S. Army Infantry Divi- Lewisburg, PA; Armor liaison officer, 1914-1918, Westport: Praeger, 1995. sions 1944-45, Oxford: Osprey Publishing 8 Ltd, 2007. 55th Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 28th Van Creveld. 27 Infantry Division, Scranton, PA; execu- 9 Ibid. Ibid. 28 tive officer, Company A, 3rd 10 Condell and Zabecki. Ibid. rd Battalion,103 Armor Regiment, Ar- 11 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitz- Ramadi, Iraq; and Armor platoon lead- krieg, Lawrence: University Press of Kan- er, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 103rd Ar- sas, 1992. Acronym Quick-Scan mor Regiment, Sunbury, PA. His mili- 12 Ibid. tary education includes the Intermedi- 13 Van Creveld. ATTP – Army tactics, ate Leader Education Course, Com- techniques and procedures 14 Condell and Zabecki. bined-Arms Exercise (formerly Cap- (publication) tain’s Career Course), Armor Officer 15 Van Creveld. BCT – brigade combat team Advanced Course-Reserve Component, 16 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited MDMP – military decision- Armor Officer Basic Course and Re- and translated by Michael Howard and making process MOS – military-occupation serve Component Accelerated Officer Peter Paret, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1993. specialty Candidate School. MAJ Rebuck holds a TO&E – table of organization 17 bachelor’s of arts degree in communi- Van Creveld. and equipment cations from Arcadia University. 18 William Schneck, Breaching the Devil’s

54 October-December 2015 Human-Performance Optimization: Social Considerations for Leadership and Team Cohesion

by Dr. Jessica Gallus and for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,3 MAJ Robert L. Green Strategic hosted a workshop to explore areas of research related to the social domain. To most Soldiers and Army civilian em- Studies Group The title of the workshop was “[HPO] ployees, many of the topics the Chief in the Social Domain: Hard Problems, of Staff of the Army (CSA)’s Strategic In 2012 the CSA directed the for- Fuzzy Constructs and Huge Potential.” Studies Group (SSG) is researching may mation of an SSG. The CSA’s SSG The workshop’s core was these topics: seem alien or difficult to relate to mil- “conducts independent, uncon- “self-compassion and trauma”;4 “lead- itary operations, yet the complexity of ventional and revolutionary re- ership and psychological resilience in future operations will require Soldiers, search and analysis” (quote from the military: an occupational-health teams and leaders to attain capability the CSA-SSG Website, http://csa- perspective”;5 “the functions and dys- in leveraging social competencies to strategic-studies-group.hqda. functions of teamwork”;6 “emotion, meet mission requirements. pentagon.mil/SSG_Index.html) to provide the CSA with unbiased regulation and performance dynam- Consider this from the Army’s human- recommendations for concerns ics”;7 “group emotion: how it works dimension concept: “How Soldiers and and opportunities at the strate- and why it matters”;8 and “afterwar: Army civilians interact with and are in- gic and operational level. moral injury and healing.”9 fluenced by others’ beliefs, behaviors, feelings and interpersonal interactions Each year a new cohort of fel- Self-compassion makes up the social component. Social lows comes together from across Self-compassion is “compassion direct- fitness consists of individual well-being the Army and includes Army of- ed inward, relating to ourselves as the through self-discipline, developing and ficers and senior-enlisted person- object of care and concern when faced maintaining trusted, valued relation- nel, Department of the Army ci- with difficult and painful experienc- ships and fostering good communica- vilians and representatives from es.”10 Essentially, self-compassion is a tion with others.”1 the Air Force and Navy. The cur- person’s ability to recognize and ac- rent cohort’s areas of study in knowledge problems vs. suppressing Of the five broad areas of strategic and addition to HPO are megacities, them, and then taking healthy steps to- operational importance to land forces talent management, persistent ward dealing with those problems. that the CSA directed the SSG to study, engagement and rapid delivery one is human-performance optimiza- of innovative solutions. In many instances people tend to be tion (HPO). This article describes the more judgmental and critical of them- HPO effort broadly, but it focuses pre- selves than they would be of others. dominantly on the social aspects of hu- recovery. The cognitive domain exam- Consider times when friends or co- workers were negative about their own man performance. Each topic is sum- ines areas such as intelligence and performance and you as an outsider marized from a layman’s perspective, memory. Resilience, trust, cohesion told them they were being too harsh then a brief description follows of how and emotion regulation are just a few or negative. If a person can offer in- the ideas are interrelated as well as ap- of the components of the social do- ward support and acceptance the same plicable to the military. main. as they might offer it to a friend, they are exercising self-compassion. HPO framework Recently the SSG, in conjunction with The HPO framework in its simplest the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) A lack of self-compassion can form can be described within the con- text of three key domains: physical, cognitive and social (Figure 1). Per the Army’s human-dimension concept, en- hancing these domains will provide the foundation for maximizing individual and team performance. The goal is to improve “performance through the identification, development and opti- mal integration of human capabili- ties.”2 Aspects of the physical domain include fitness, health, injury prevention and Figure 1. HPO research framework.

55 October-December 2015 contribute to a range of negative sleep by asking Soldiers about their unison by overlapping emotional expe- consequences, including numbing, own sleep, including it as an important riences with performance episodes. detachment and avoidance, while factor in planning operations and train- Consider, for example, the idea that greater self-compassion can have a ing, and by providing sleeping areas regulating emotion is taxing to a per- positive impact on overall health and conducive to good sleep (e.g., quiet, son. The more regulation required, the well-being. This does not imply that in dark, proper temperature) to the ex- fewer resources a person has for regu- the midst of a firefight a Soldier should tent possible based on available re- lating other important functions like stop and think about his or her sources and the environment. task attention or interpersonal behav- feelings. That probably isn’t the right iors. If too much regulation is required, time or place. But it is important for Teamwork a person can reach a burnout state, Soldiers to reflect on and make sense When we think of improving teams, it which can result in reduced self-con- of their experiences at some point vs. is not uncommon for organizations and trol, which in turn contributes to in- suppressing them indefinitely. The leaders to focus almost exclusively on creased attention difficulties like ex- presence of self-compassion shows areas for improvement, whether due cessive mind-wandering and uncivil promise in increasing resilience and to gaps in training, poor or inexperi- behavior. reducing some of the negative effects enced leadership and/or insufficient of trauma such as post-traumatic stress resources to meet the mission. The These negative behaviors can reduce disorder (PTSD). “functions and dysfunctions of team- performance in individuals and can work” research emphasizes the impor- negatively impact team performance. Occupational- tance of understanding teams from a Conversely, positive emotional states health perspective holistic perspective to optimize char- can contribute to improved resources, The key idea behind the “leadership acteristics that contribute to function- attention and performance. and psychological resilience in the mil- al team behaviors, processes and out- itary: an occupational-health perspec- comes, and to minimize dysfunctions Group emotion tive” presentation was the potential that detract or actively hurt the team. While it is generally well understood that individuals have emotions, what for increased effectiveness created While the research is ongoing, it is be- is somewhat less clear is the emotion- when good leaders take additional lieved that functional factors support al interplay among groups of people steps toward modeling or supporting higher effectiveness when present and leading to group emotion. Group emo- specific behaviors that contribute to contribute to ineffectiveness when ab- tions can arise from the “bottom-up,” improved physical and mental health. sent. Conversely, dysfunctional factors in which processes such as emotional create ineffectiveness but allow effec- The Army Operating Concept highlights contagion – the largely automatic shar- tiveness when they are reduced. the importance of effective leadership ing of emotions among group mem- given current and future environ- Both functional and dysfunctional fac- bers – can lead to group mood arising ments, which will require “cohesive tors consist of attitudes and motiva- in a group. The person the group pays teams that thrive in conditions of un- tions, cognition and behavioral ele- the most attention to, such as the lead- certainty, … [l]eaders [who] foster trust ments. Examples of each are shown in er, can be particularly powerful in among other leaders and Soldiers, … Figure 2. When teams are able to ex- changing the emotional state of the [l]eaders and Soldiers [who] are com- amine both their functional and dys- group. Further, most often the people mitted to each other and the Army functional aspects, they can identify in the group who are “catching” the professional ethic … [and leaders who] the steps necessary to achieve higher other person’s emotional state don’t remain resilient and preserve their levels of performance. realize it is happening. moral character while operating in en- vironments of persistent danger.”11 Performance An additional aspect of the “bottom- up” perspective vis a vis the “group Examples of leader behaviors that can dynamics emotion: how it works and why it mat- contribute to increased effectiveness The “emotion, regulation and perfor- ters” research relates to the diversity include sleep leadership, preventive- mance dynamics” research describes of emotional traits within a group. medicine leadership, combat-opera- some of the connections between Groups with members who have emo- tional-stress control leadership, emotion and performance by exploring tionally diverse emotional traits per- health-related leadership, resilience- emotion and performance episodes in form more poorly than groups with training leadership, emotion-regula- tion leadership and post-traumatic Attitude/ Cognition Behavioral growth leadership. Motivation Take sleep leadership, for example. Re- Functional Trust Accurate shared Conflict management search indicates that in units where Resilience mental models Cooperation Cohesion Shared situational awareness Leadership leaders place importance on quality Dysfunctional Distrust Groupthink Member ostracism sleep, unit climate and cohesion can Task conflict Polarization Aggression improve over and above the benefit Distress Shared-information bias Bullying they get from just generally being a good leader. Leaders can emphasize Figure 2. Function and dysfunction.

56 October-December 2015 homogenous emotional traits. This Connections cycle. If they are emotionally drained holds true even in groups with all neg- While the preceding paragraphs don’t and lacking the ability for self-regula- ative traits. do justice to the presentations or the tion, they will not likely model or en- courage healthy behaviors. Should From a “top down” perspective, group complexity of the research discussed, they set positive examples and create emotion can also be instituted “from one can see the connections among a climate conducive to healthy behav- the top” in the form of emotional cul- these subjects. How do the ideas de- ior, leaders can help to improve indi- ture (the deep underlying assump- scribed relate to leadership and team vidual and team performance. tions, values and norms regarding cohesion? This section will connect the what emotions are allowed to be ex- ideas in a context relevant and mean- The Army’s human-dimension concept pressed or suppressed in the group). A ingful to the Army. offers the following regarding stress study examining emotional culture in and performance: “The Army must ac- a civilian workforce indicated that Let’s begin with self-compassion. Ev- celerate its efforts to understand the emotional culture can influence em- eryone encounters stress and conflict effects of acute and chronic stress. Sol- ployee job satisfaction, teamwork, in their daily interactions and duties. diers and Army civilians who are phys- burnout and absenteeism and can rip- These can include an argument with a ically fit, cognitively ready and socially, ple out to the clients of the organiza- spouse or significant other; conflict emotionally, spiritually and morally fit tion as well. with a coworker, subordinate or super- maintain a strong commitment to the visor; getting bad news about a promo- In sum, group mood in all its forms has profession while being more resilient tion or assignment; or any number of to the effects of prolonged exposure to been shown to be a factor in group at- things that cause a negative emotional titudes, cognition and performance. stress. Thus, it is critical that individu- response. By acknowledging and deal- als and units understand how stress af- ing with negative emotions rather than Afterwar fects their performance and how to suppressing them, a person can reduce master techniques that optimize per- Moral injury results when individuals the drain on his or her emotional re- formance.”13 cannot make sense of their experience sources. Instead of beating yourself up within the context of his or her own over these stressors, be an “internal Figure 3 illustrates in a very basic and moral code. Moral injury isn’t a new ally”12 or advocate and support your- linear manner possible outcomes for idea; it can be found in classic Greek self as you would a coworker or fellow team performance based on how a tragedies. Soldier. By exercising self-compassion, person (the self) reacts to stresses, es- one can reduce loss of performance pecially if the person is the leader of Moral injury is not PTSD, which is – at the team. least in its narrowest sense – a fear- due to emotional drain. How does all of this relate to moral in- conditioned response to life threat. Emotional drain has a negative impact jury? One could argue that factors such And unlike PTSD, moral injury does not on performance through loss of atten- as a reduced capacity for self-control, yet carry stigma. The feelings associat- tion and self-control. Negative emo- reduced resources to cope with stress ed with moral injury are guilt, shame, tional states can spread across a group or negative emotions and a lack of self- resentment, indignation or a sense of through emotional contagion, thus re- compassion may contribute to moral betrayal. ducing an entire team’s effectiveness. injury through 1) either poor judgment Moral injury can result from one’s own These negative aspects can contribute or a diminished capacity to process actions, from the actions of others or to team dysfunction and undermine what has happened, or 2) a piling up of even from those one witnesses as a functional team dynamics, further de- bad luck and events which aren’t prop- close bystander. For example, a Soldier grading team performance. erly processed. Just as one can become could feel guilty for not being there to Leaders can play a key role in this more susceptible to disease with a save a buddy on the battlefield, or may feel resentment or shame after com- plying with an order that resulted in a tragic outcome that is seemingly un- warranted or avoidable.

Offsetting the negative aspects out- lined are positive emotions such as trust, gratitude, forgiveness and hope. Often what is required is a trusting re- lationship through which a Soldier comes to have hope in himself/herself because someone else has hope in them. Or a Soldier comes to feel trust when his or her chain of command shows support for his or her anxiety and acknowledges his or her sense of distress. Figure 3. Team performance conceptual model.

57 October-December 2015 weakened immune system, one may be psychologist, ARI, Fort Belvoir; senior 5 Presented by Dr. Amy Adler, WRAIR; for at greater risk for moral injury when consultant, Booz Allen Hamilton, more information, see the following Web- resources to withstand difficulties (re- McLean, VA; and leadership research site: http://wrair-www.army.mil/ReAnd- silience) is compromised from previous consultant, Leadership Research Insti- Develop_MilPsychiatryAndNeuroscien- stresses. tute, Middletown, CT. Dr. Gallus’ doc- ceResearch.aspx, or contact Adler at [email protected]. torate is in industrial/organizational Also, if leaders and fellow Soldiers are 6 psychology from the University of Con- Presented by Dr. Marissa Shuffler, Clem- experiencing reduced resources and necticut. She also holds a bachelor’s of son; for more information, contact Shuf- degraded resilience, a person experi- fler at [email protected]. arts degree in English and psychology encing moral injury may be without 7 from Manhattan College and Hertford Presented by Dr. Howard Weiss, Georgia support. Trusting relationships are key, College, Oxford University (study Institute of Technology; for more informa- and a sense of trust in the system al- tion, see the following Website: http:// abroad), plus a master’s of arts degree lows Soldiers with moral injury to psychology.gatech.edu/weisslab/index. in industrial/organizational psychology come forward and seek help. html, or email Weiss at hmweiss@gatech. from the University of Connecticut. edu. What are the implications for Army 8 MAJ Robert Green is a fellow in the Presented by Dr. Sigal Barsade, The leaders? From the tactical level to the Wharton School, University of Pennsylva- highest levels of the Army, each Soldier CSA’s SSG, Arlington, VA. Previous duty st nia; for more information, see the follow- is part of a team. Recognizing the im- assignments include squadron S-3, 1 nd ing Website: https://mgmt.wharton. pact individuals, especially leaders, can Squadron, 2 Cavalry Regiment, upenn.edu/profile/1304/, or contact have on team cohesion, emotional Vilseck, Germany/Panjwai, Afghani- Barsade via Joseph Frank Bernstein, pro- states and performance are important stan; planner, future-operations plans, fessor of management; The Wharton in maximizing effectiveness. Under- International Security Assistance Force School, University of Pennsylvania; Suite standing how the concepts described Joint Command Headquarters, Kabul, 2000, Steinberg-Dietrich Hall; Philadel- in this article impact effectiveness and Afghanistan; staff officer, current op- phia, PA 19104, (215) 898-1373 or bars- [email protected]. health are a critical first step in devel- erations, , Wiesbaden, Germa- 9 oping resilient and cohesive teams pre- ny; and concept writer, Joint and Army Presented by Dr. Nancy Sherman, pared to meet current and future chal- Concepts Division, Army Capabilities In- Georgetown University; for more informa- tion, see the following Website: www. lenges. tegration Center, Fort Monroe, VA. MAJ Green’s military schooling includes nancysherman.com; or email Sherman at While the HPO research ongoing for Command and General Staff College [email protected]. the CSA is far from complete, it is clear (Art of War Scholars Program) and the 10 Dahm, “Self-Compassion and Trauma: there are several areas of great poten- Armor Captain’s Career Course. He Research and Recommendations,” pre- tial for improving individual and team holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in his- sented March 18, 2015. performance. This article discussed tory from the University of Minnesota 11 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. only a few areas and dealt exclusively and a master’s of military arts and sci- Army Operating Concept, Oct. 31, 2014. with the social domain. Even with this ences in the art of war from Command 12 Dahm. fairly narrow focus, it seems clear the and General Staff College. 13 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7. Army can continue to improve individ- ual and team performance. Doing so Notes would enable the Army to become the 1 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7, The U.S. Acronym Quick-Scan world leader in HPO. Army Human-Dimension Concept, May 21, 2014. Dr. Jessica Gallus is a fellow in the CSA’s ARI – Army Research Institute 2 CSA – Chief of Staff of the SSG, Arlington, VA. She is a subject- Ibid. 3 Army matter expert (SME) in resilience, orga- Other organizations represented in the HPO – human-performance nizational culture/climate and counter- workshop include the Consortium for optimization productive workplace behaviors, in- Health and Military Performance, Walter PTSD – post-traumatic stress cluding sexual harassment, incivility Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) disorder and the Army Resiliency Directorate. and toxic leadership. Previous duty po- SME – subject-matter expert 4 Presented by Dr. Katherine Dahm, De- SSG – Strategic Studies Group sitions include team leader, ARI, Fort WRAIR – Walter Reed Army Belvoir, VA; senior research psycholo- partment of Veterans Affairs; for more in- formation, contact Dahm at katherine. Institute of Research gist, ARI, Fort Belvoir; research [email protected].

58 October-December 2015 French and U.S. service members overcome an obstacle at the 5th French Marines Desert Commando Course at Arta Beach, Djibouti. (Photo by SSG Dillon White)

by 1LT David G. Forney that is required to inspire improve- trainees. My experience in attending ment. In my case, it was participation the cadets’ Leadership Development Today’s modern operating environ- at the French Forces Desert Combat and Assessment Course (LDAC), Armor ment entails levels of complexity and Training Course that revealed (to me) Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC), transformation never before seen on a potential weakness in some of our Army and a number of the battlefield. Plain and simple, more U.S. training and doctrinal programs. other specialty training courses is being required of young military showed that each course has a specific leaders. There is a very tangible recon- The French Forces Desert Combat purpose, passing criteria and program figuration of our training directive as Training Course is held at the Centre of instruction (PoI). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- d’Entrainement au Combat et mand (TRADOC) courses are restruc- d’Aguerrissement de Djibouti (CECAD), LDAC was certainly a program designed tured to focus on a broad spectrum of located at Arta Plage (Arta Beach) in to evaluate and rank cadets. Ultimate- topics. Physical fitness, tactical compe- Djibouti. CECAD is a training center de- ly the cadets’ performance in the tence and technical aptitude alone are signed to teach combat units to oper- course plays a large role in determin- no longer enough to propel a Soldier ate in a harsh desert environment. For ing their branch as well as their eligi- to the higher ranks; modern leaders years the French Marine 5th Regiment bility for active duty. Since I attended must now exhibit a multitude of quali- has invited the United States and oth- the course as a cadet and subsequent- ties: patience, intelligence, empathy er Coalition partners who operate in ly served as an instructor, I can attest and organization, to name a few. the Horn of Africa to participate in that this is primarily an evaluation training. In our pursuit of the ideal Army leader, module, not a leadership-development however, have we deviated too far U.S. Army training program. The instructors must strictly from the foundation of leadership de- regiment the training due to the num- velopment: the ability to function as a approach ber of cadets who are cycled through team? Many TRADOC schools quantify Soldier the course each summer. This severely performance at the individual level.1 limits cadets’ ability to make actual The recognition of a weakness does There is certainly nothing wrong with leadership decisions. Therefore it is the not always necessitate failure; some- this approach. In fact, it is often the responsibility of the Reserve Officers times exposure to something new is all specific intent of the course to rank the Training Corps (ROTC) program

59 October-December 2015 to progressively groom cadets into improved my ability to direct squad- Team-building leadership with increasingly demand- and platoon-size elements under ing positions of responsibility. If ROTC immensely stressful and challenging tenets Arguably the greatest challenge of es- institutions fail to effectively imple- conditions. I still maintain contact with tablishing effective teams is the intrin- ment a leadership-development pro- my “Ranger buddy” and a number of sic inability to quantify their perfor- gram, there is the potential that cadets other close friends from our 61 days mance. Part of this is due to the con- will be commissioned into the U.S. together in purgatory. However, stant flux of personnel as well as the Army without the paramount skillsets retrospection can reveal that many of ever-changing mission assignments needed to make life-altering decisions these friendships and cooperative and operational tempos. Instead of fo- on America’s front lines. efforts were forged out of self- cusing on the valuation of a team’s cur- preservation and a desire to graduate, rent condition and quality, perhaps ABOLC at Fort Benning, GA, is another as opposed to a true team effort and TRADOC’s predominant focus should example of a TRADOC course intended drive toward a common endstate. be on setting the conditions for team- to groom future leaders. The intent of Again, there is nothing wrong with this building and let the raters and senior this course is to educate second lieu- type of applied stress and leadership raters conduct the evaluations. It is tenants about the tactical and techni- development, but it is certainly a paramount to recognize that teams are cal skillsets required to conduct unified different approach than the French fluid and will have to go through cyclic land operations in a combined-arms Marines have adopted. team. Similar to LDAC, ABOLC is a stan- phases of development. This is true dardized course that has a significant Unlike most TRADOC courses, the whether the team is an infantry ma- amount of throughput each year. French Desert Course focuses on team- chinegun team or a specialty counter- Throughout the course, officers rotate building as an integral part of its core intelligence cell. curriculum. Analogous to many TRA- through leadership positions and are When an individual is assigned to a DOC school requirements, the course quantitatively graded on a number of team, there is a natural progression begins with a physical-fitness test, individual and collective tasks. While through which they must advance. evaluating the muscular, cardiovascu- attending ABOLC, all students are by First, the individual has to feel accept- lar and comprehensive fitness of the definition “leaders,” making the refine- ed as a part of that team. Next, the Sol- course candidates. Following the phys- ment of a leadership style challenging. dier begins to learn the standard oper- ical gates, Soldiers receive classes on Although missions and training exer- ating procedures and the expectations desert-survival techniques, including cises are completed in platoons, the placed on team members. Once the re- wildlife familiarization, methods of wa- nature, tempo and leadership rota- sponsibilities are understood, a Soldier ter procurement and fire-starting tech- tions do not resemble those of U.S. must demonstrate competency to the niques. Up to this point, the PoI resem- Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) or- unit. After the individual exhibits value bles many U.S. Army schools, such as ganizations. to the team, the team can begin to the first days of Ranger School’s Swamp practice, build and refine as a unified Until this point in a young officer’s ca- Phase in Florida and the Mountain element. reer, he or she presumably has not had Warfare School. The differences in the any practical training in an environ- French PoI begins when the Soldiers These stages of team-building are for- ment where team-building was the pri- move to Arta Plage for the team-build- mally realized in ADRP 6-223: Army mary focus. Regardless, the officer is ing portion of the course. leadership as formation, enrichment considered institutionally ready for as- signment to a FORSCOM unit. LDAC and BOLC are intended to develop and refine leadership skills, but the empha- sis on individual assessment and rank- ing intrinsically disrupts the team- building climate. The same can be said of Army Ranger School. While the course is very physi- cally and mentally challenging, the team-building differs significantly from the stages of team-building outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22.2 You certainly have to be able to operate cohesively, execute battle drills and conduct military oper- ations with near-perfect precision. There is no denying that Ranger School is one of the premiere military schools in the world, and it undoubtedly Figure 1. Stages of team-building.

60 October-December 2015 and sustainment (Figure 1). When our physical training (PT). It is evident events, but they are far from physical- teams are forming, leaders will rarely from the first PT session that the ly demanding, and to state that they be afforded the opportunity to select French view the Desert Commando demand a cohesive team effort would the members of their team. Regard- Course as a team sport. Integrated into be a stretch. less, leaders are still held accountable every part of PT is a team-building task The French have created three very for all their team does or fails to do. – everything from one- and two-man distinctive but equally challenging ob- Therefore, leaders must bring new buddy carries to U.S. Navy SEAL-style stacle courses that truly push Soldiers members on board as quickly as pos- sit-ups with the platoon seated in a to the point of discomfort. The first is sible, setting the tone for the rest of row, arms linked. During these PT ses- an individual obstacle course built into the team-building process. sions, there is no announcement that the side of a mountain several hundred any Soldier who fails to complete the Equally important in the formation feet tall. One of the team courses con- run under a certain time standard will stage is the orientation component. sists of a series of land obstacles re- be dropped. Instructors do not threat- New members should be introduced quiring coordination and cooperation en to fail a Soldier who is incapable of and familiarized with members of the by the entire team. Another is an ob- performing the prescribed number of team, the typical schedule of the unit stacle course in the Red Sea requiring pull-ups. Instead, an endstate is calmly and the necessary information about Soldiers to remain calm and collected announced by the instructors, the the operating environment. Depending under turbulent conditions. French soldiers do their best to act out on the circumstances under which the the instructions with creative gesticu- Unlike its U.S. FLRC counterparts, the team is being formed (peacetime vs. lations, and the group proceeds to col- French course requires teamwork and wartime), alternate methods may be lectively execute. cooperation. Without it, the course employed such as sponsorship. cannot be successfully negotiated. On At one point during the course I at- Next is the enrichment stage, where the other hand, it is rare for the aver- tended, one of the U.S. Soldiers start- the team starts to function as a cohe- age U.S. Soldier to experience this type ed to fall behind on a particularly long sive element. Team members gradual- of adversity as a member of a team in stretch of fireman-carry drills. In re- ly build trust and understanding of our training courses. sponse, a number of French soldiers both fellow team members and the rushed back to assist the struggling collective unit. Quality training is es- Team first, Soldier. It was a remarkable sight from sential at this stage to continue the an American perspective. The esprit de individual second team-building effort and drive the uni- The necessary steps and leadership corps the French soldiers demonstrat- fied team toward a single objective. qualities required to build a successful ed along with their drive toward a team from the ground up were cited Last is the sustainment stage. At this common objective was remarkable. point, team members now identify previously. Now comes the challenge with the unit and are part of some- After each morning’s smoke session of teaching these skills to our young thing greater than themselves. This is was either , field classes or leaders and providing an opportunity a unit that rises to meet challenges. It obstacle courses. For each event, the to apply them in a standardized way. I is anxious to operate together and im- instructors would calmly explain the believe there are three ways to imple- prove on an already successful ele- task, conditions, standards and end- ment this proposed team-building ment. state. During none of this was pass or module: expand the basic require- fail criteria put out. Nonetheless, each ments to commission an officer, alter Now the question is: how do we indoc- French and U.S. Soldier strived to per- existing courses and create training op- trinate this process along with the form their very best during every task. portunities for FORSCOM units de- skills required to replicate team-build- Why? For me it was simply the desire signed specifically for small-unit im- ing into our young Army leaders? to be the most effective and impactful provement. A depiction of these im- member of the team I could be. provement plans is captured in Figures French perspective 2, 3 and 4. One of the other driving factors behind Upon arrival at Arta Plage for the tac- the team-building mantra and spirit of The three primary commissioning tical portion of the French Forces Des- the course was the nature of the ob- sources for Army officers are ROTC, the ert Combat Training Course, Soldiers stacles and tasks themselves. There U.S. Military Academy at West Point, are assigned to mixed French and Co- have been very few, if any, group chal- NY, and (OCS) alition forces platoons. Most French lenges in the Army that have pushed at Fort Benning, GA. Only a small mi- soldiers do not speak English, and the me to my physical or mental boundar- nority of the cadets from these pro- instructors have only a basic proficien- ies. Certainly, some aggregate missions grams will attend Army basic combat cy at best. Despite the enormity of the or periods of training were challenging, training. Most of this minority is non- language barrier, platoons are still ex- but few team events required more prior-military-service OCS cadets. A so- pected to complete a series of team than a short period of planning and ex- lution could be to require all commis- obstacles on land and sea before pro- ecution. One of these was the Field sioning sources to send cadets to Army gressing to the final phase. Leader’s Reaction Course (FLRC), a basic combat training, preferably infan- Each day begins with what the French popular training exercise for ROTC bat- try one-station unit training at Fort call a smoke session, synonymous to talions. Again, these are educational Benning. In my opinion, the Infantry

61 October-December 2015 Branch has better mastered small-unit more demanding tasks, obstacles and of the team pushing the slower mem- cohesion, and the infantry military-oc- missions to strain cadets to a point of bers to improve. This method can be cupation specialty (MOS) generating physical and mental discomfort would replicated in Army leadership training course is taught at Fort Benning. This further enhance leadership and team- but with an accelerated timeline. could be a similar module to U.S. Ma- building development. Another approach could be to estab- rine Corps officer progression, in which The same refinement should also be lish a small-unit training course at each some non-infantry officers complete made to basic officer courses for all of the major Army posts. The intent infantry training before learning skills MOSs. These adjustments do not have would be for platoon-size elements to associated with their assigned MOS. to be overly complex. Simply make the conduct challenging, decentralized This requirement could be accom- distances longer, raise the bar higher training. The courses should encom- plished between the cadets’ first and and design more difficult missions. It’s pass four essential elements: second year of education, regardless of important to include team incentives their commissioning source. • Cultivation of competitive team to foster effectiveness, efficiency and spirit; cohesion. Similar to the French Com- • Exertion of multifaceted mando Course, the TRADOC design challenges; should force the strong to push the weak across the finish line. Soldiers • Demand for long-term preparation would have two choices: persevere or and training; and quit. Either way helps the Army in the • Nullification of individualism in long run. The driving force of a unit is self-interested persons. comprised of those who choose to en- Similar to Best Ranger or Best Sapper dure. That is leadership progression, competitions, these courses should the overarching cycle that creates gen- test a unit’s endurance, communica- uine leaders. tion skills, physical-fitness level, men- This merit of this team-building meth- tal agility and resiliency. Using the in- od played out for me when I was in col- Figure 2. The expansion of commis- fantry model as an example, the cours- sioning requirements, incorporating lege. I was a member of a team that at- es could include a 26.2-mile ruck- the Infantry Basic Combat Course tended an annual competition com- march, team obstacle course, combat- into all three commissioning sources. prised of a series of physical and men- ives training, situational-training exer- tal challenges. Ruck-marching was one cises, a practical exam and even a Another way to improve team-building of the cornerstone events. I was the sporting event. The events would be would require minor adaptations to only freshman on the team and by far team-based and could only be con- current Army TRADOC courses. LDAC is the least experienced. Even after ducted at the pace of the least profi- on the right track with a reduction in weeks of training, I was still the slow- cient individual. the number of formal evaluations from est of 10 members. Regardless, I se- Clearly, such a series of events would six to four. The intent is to allow cadets lected the former of the two options require significant preparation and to experiment with different leader- cited previously and persevered. The training. By the time the team is pre- ship styles, alleviating their focus on next year I successfully completed the pared to negotiate the course, it would continuous assessments. Expanding competition with no issues. During my be in the enrichment, if not the sus- this direction to include additional third year, I was selected co-captain, tainment, phase of team-building. small-unit leadership challenges with- and I served as team captain my final From personal experience, I firmly be- out formal evaluations would benefit year. These leadership positions would lieve there is no greater gratification young leaders, similar to the methods have meant nothing had I not been than overcoming a series of challenges used in the French Commando Course. pushed to my physical and mental lim- with close friends and teammates. Furthermore, the addition of its that first year – the faster members Conclusion U.S. Soldiers deserve to be led by com- petent and professional leaders. With that in mind, it is expected that prior to the assumption of a leadership po- sition, new officers have a comprehen- sive understanding of the necessary balance between the art and science of leadership. Do we truly believe that Army TRADOC courses are accomplish- ing this standard? Most are designed to evaluate, teach and refine. They Figure 3. The adaptation of pre-existing TRADOC courses prior to an officers‘ aren’t designed to develop team-build- assignment to a FORSCOM unit. ing skills. This type of leadership is best

62 October-December 2015 Figure 4. Stepwise module for the establishment of a specialized training course designed to train team-, squad- and platoon-sized elements at Army installations.

created through the execution of in- 1LT David Forney is an M1A2 SEPv2 creasingly demanding collective tasks tank-platoon leader in Company D, 1st Acronym Quick-Scan that develop team-building skills. To Battalion, , 3rd Bri- st ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer that end, the French Desert Comman- gade, 1 Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Leader’s Course do Course is the epitome of team- TX. Previous assignments include assis- ADRP – Army doctrine building that could serve as an exam- tant battalion S-3 and plans officer, reference publication ple for us. Headquarters and Headquarters Com- CECAD – Centre d’Entrainement pany, 1-77 Armor Regiment, 4th Bri- au Combat et d’Aguerrissement We should indoctrinate the fundamen- gade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss. de Djibouti tals of team-building into all TRADOC FLRC – Field Leader’s Reaction His military schooling includes French courses. The competitive nature, rank- Course Desert Survival Course, Unit Movement ing system and pass/fail events can and FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Officer Course, ABOLC, Advanced Situ- should certainly persist, but there is no Forces Command ational Awareness training and Path- LDAC – Leadership reason these methods cannot coexist finder, Ranger, combatives and Air- Development and Assessment with quality team-building. With the borne schools. He holds a bachelor’s of Course required completion of basic combat science degree in biomedical engineer- MOS – military-occupation training by all new officers, minor specialty ing and a master’s of science degree in modification to Army TRADOC courses OCS – Officer Candidate School biomedical engineering, both from and added local training programs at PoI – program of instruction Drexel University. 1LT Forney’s awards major Army installations, we could be- PT – physical training include the Global War on Terrorism ROTC – Reserve Officers gin integrating fundamental team- Service Medal. Training Corps building skills into our nation’s youth. SEAL – Sea Air and Land teams As our Army focuses on promotions, (U.S. Navy) physical fitness and evaluation reports, Notes TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training 1 it is also imperative we focus on the TRADOC, Win in a Complex World, April and Doctrine Command foundation of our most lethal element 8, 2015. 2 – the small-unit team – to fight and ADRP 6-22, August 2012. win in a complex world. 3 Ibid.

63 October-December 2015 Advanced Situational Awareness:

A unique course that teaches Soldiers the art and science of observing humans and their surrounding environment

by retired MAJ Vern L. Tubbs human and environmental terrain in that teaches Soldiers the art and sci- which they conduct operations is a ence of observing humans and their Threats to individual security and or- critical aspect of operational security surrounding environment. The ASA ganizational effectiveness are prob- and effectiveness. Increased aware- course grew from the recognition that lems that persist in the complex oper- ness is the key to a Soldier’s capacity Soldiers needed more training to en- ating environments we face. The ques- to observe effectively, analyze thor- hance their awareness, sharpen their tion that must be answered is, “How oughly, predict accurately and act de- mindset and increase their ability to do we effectively prepare our force to cisively to avoid, mitigate or defeat po- secure themselves and their units in face these hybrid and insider threats in tential threats. the complex environments of Iraq, Af- today’s fiscally constrained environ- ghanistan and even on the home front. ment?” The U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Ex- cellence (MCoE) is addressing this Threats Training Soldiers to be aware by ob- need with a unique course called Ad- Hybrid or asymmetric threats are a di- serving, interpreting and analyzing the vanced Situational Awareness (ASA) verse, dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces and criminal el- ements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats will continue to exist no matter if our Sol- diers are participating in a counterin- surgency operation, a decisive-action operation or simply living their daily lives in the United States while facing threats from terrorist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Insider threats are defined in Army Regulation (AR) 381-12, Threat Aware- ness and Reporting Program, as “person(s) with placement and access (insider) who intentionally causes loss or degradation (threat) of resources or capabilities, or compromises (threat) the ability of an organization to accom- plish its mission through espionage, in- ternational terrorism or the unauthor- ized release or disclosure (threat) of in- formation about the plans and inten- tions of U.S. military forces.” Insider threats to our individual and unit security have come from within our ranks, as in the case of U.S. Army SGT Hasan K. Akbar, convicted of kill- Figure 1. Roleplayers interact with a Soldier as part of the Advanced Situation- ing two officers and wounding 14 fel- al Awareness Course at Fort Benning, GA. low Soldiers in a grenade-fragging

64 October-December 2015 ASA in its officer and leaders capable of meeting the and noncommis- challenges of operational adaptability sioned-officer in an era of persistent conflict. The (NCO) develop- course combines the ALM principles of ment courses for self- development, institutional in- our infantry, Cav- struction and operational experience alry and Armor to deliver an exciting, interactive, Soldiers, and “hands-on” course that educates and throughout the trains students in a classroom through training continu- practical exercises such as keep-in- um at MCoE. The memory games, observation exercises ASA training sup- and ground-sign awareness (GSA). It ports warrior tasks also uses a complex, interactive, “free- and battle drills, play” outcomes-based field-training the Maneuver exercise supported by trained threat Leader Develop- emulators. Figure 2. Green-on-blue insider attacks in Afghanistan. ment Strategy (MLDS) and ongo- The ASA course teaches Soldiers about incident on March 23, 2003, at Camp ing efforts to codify and integrate the the human sensory system (five senses Pennsylvania, Kuwait. Another exam- human dimension in all we do. The U.S. and the brain), the six domains of hu- ple is the case of U.S. Army MAJ Nidal Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) es- man behavior (heuristics, biometrics, Malik Hasan, who opened fire Nov. 5, tablished the requirement for ASA as kinesics, proxemics, geographics and 2009, killing 13 fellow Soldiers and ci- part of its solution to the insider threat atmospherics), principles of GSA (hu- vilians and wounding 32 others at Fort in Afghanistan through Fiscal Year (FY) man pace, sign recognition), enhanced Hood, TX. 14 and included ASA in its region-align- observation (why we see things, why we don’t see things, signatures and Insider threats have also appeared ment-of-forces (RAF) training guidance for FY15. cues), how to establish a baseline (an from within the ranks of our partner initial set of critical observations to forces during the last several years in confirm the norm of an area), critical both Iraq and Afghanistan. The most Adaptive leaders, sharpened mindset thinking (problem-solving, anomaly- recent tragedy is the killing of U.S. detection), decision-making (legal/ Army MG Harold Greene and the The ASA course has continued to moral/ethical, observe-orient-decide- wounding of more than a dozen oth- evolve and improve to meet the needs act loop, ASA algorithm), how to think ers, including a U.S. Army brigadier of the Soldier. This latest evolution be- like the enemy and how to employ this general and a German general officer. gan in May 2014 when the Army shift- knowledge and experience to be “left- This tragedy happened during a key- ed it to more closely align with the of-bang.” leader engagement Aug. 5, 2014, at Army Learning Model (ALM) described the Marshal Fahim National Defense in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Students are evaluated on their team- University, which is an Afghan training Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8- work, their participation and effort center in Kabul. 2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for through all the practical exercises, 2015. By decreasing the volume of lec- their ability to articulate observations Modern situational tures and slides, implementing more and reasoning behind their decisions, awareness practical exercises, enabling individual and their situational-awareness knowl- The roots of modern situational aware- learning opportunities through after- edge through a final written exam. ness training in the military began with class assignments U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) GEN James and broadening Mattis, who determined Marines need- the “scenario ap- ed a set of skills once embodied by the erture” beyond an “hunters-turned-Marines” of former Afghan-centric generations. Successful hunters are model to scenari- keenly aware of the details in their sur- os and looks from roundings and are alert to unusual en- different areas vironmental changes. Under Mattis’ around the globe, guidance, the Marine Corps imple- ASA continues to mented the combat-hunter program in improve its learn- August 2007. er-centric educa- tion and training Although there are similarities to the model. USMC combat-hunter program, the Army developed the 50-hour ASA basic The ASA course course and implemented it in late develops adaptive, 2011. The Army has institutionalized thinking Soldiers Figure 3. Students record observations.

65 October-December 2015 predict a threat References and act decisively. • AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and In the current un- Reporting Program. certain and unsta- ble security envi- • TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The ronment, and in a U.S. Army Learning Concept for time of fiscal con- 2015. straint, the afford- • MCoE’s MLDS. ability of ASA and • FORSCOM’s RAF training guidance the unparalleled for FY15. dividends it pays • http://www.army.mil/ in survivability and article/102060/Situational_ lethality make it a awareness_training_aims_to_ program that prevent_attacks/. should be proac- • http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ tively enhanced practical-guide-situational- Figure 4. An ASA instructor teaches the three key ele- and promulgated awareness#axzz3LSBXWEzg. ments of a footstep as part of ‘using critical thinking to in- throughout the terpret GSA’ training. force. • http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_ Measuring benefit Retired U.S. Army MAJ Vern L. Tubbs Jr. attack.php. is the ASA project manager, Reconnais- • http://www. to Soldiers sance and Surveillance Leader’s Course strategicstudiesinstitute.army. It is difficult to quantify the benefit (RSLC) (Company D, 3-16th Cavalry), mil/pubs/parameters/issues/ ASA training has had on the force, but Fort Benning, GA. Previous assign- Autumn_2013/5_Field.pdf. many mid- and post-deployment after- ments include operational adviser, action reviews indicate this training is Joint Expeditionary Team, Joint Impro- • http://www.tactical-life.com/ saving lives. One battalion interviewed vised Explosive Device Defeat Organi- magazines/tactical-weapons/ in Fall 2014, while deployed to Afghan- zation; commander, 75th Ranger Regi- usmcs-combat-hunter/; https:// istan, received ASA training in pre-de- mental Reconnaissance Company; www.mca-marines.org/ ployment, and its Soldiers insist they commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, gazette/2014/11/combat-hunter. used their newly acquired skills on a 15th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry tactical level in many situations. Sol- Division; deputy operations officer, 3rd diers at all levels (private first class Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division; opera- Acronym Quick-Scan through first lieutenant) had very pos- tions officer, Company D (RSLC), 4th itive remarks about the ASA course’s Ranger Training Brigade; platoon lead- ALM – Army Learning Model overall practical application and said er, Company B, 1/75th Ranger Regi- AR – Army regulation ASA better prepared their less-experi- ment; platoon leader, C and D/1-505th ASA – advanced situational awareness enced Soldiers to understand observa- Parachute Infantry Regiment; and pla- tion techniques when on patrol, in FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Forces toon sergeant, XVIII Airborne Corps Command guardian-angel roles and when con- Long Range Surveillance Company. His FY – fiscal year ducting entry-control-procedures op- military schooling includes Combined GSA – ground-sign awareness erations. Arms Services Staff School; Infantry MCoE – Maneuver Center of Captain’s Career Course; Infantry Offi- Excellence More senior leaders (staff sergeant MLDS – Maneuver Leader cer’s Basic Course; Officer Candidate Development Strategy through sergeant first class) said the School; International Terrorism Aware- training provided a systematic ap- NCO – noncommissioned officer ness Course; Survival, Resistance, Eva- RAF – regional alignment of proach to problem-solving. One pla- sion and Escape (SERE) 215; SERE Level forces toon sergeant said, “All Soldiers in the C; military freefall jumpmaster; mili- RSLC – Reconnaissance and Army should attend this course as ear- tary freefall parachutist; Long Range Surveillance Leader’s Course ly as possible.” Another NCO said, “One Surveillance Leader’s Course; and Path- SERE – survival, resistance, unintentional side effect of the ASA evasion and escape finder, Ranger and Jumpmaster TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training training was the way it professional- schools. MAJ Tubbs holds a master’s ized our younger Soldiers in a way we and Doctrine Command degree in public administration from USMC – U.S. Marine Corps didn’t expect.” Columbus State University. Summary The skills taught by the Army’s ASA course require no technology and are low-cost, perception-enhancing abili- ties that provide Soldiers the ability to

66 October-December 2015 The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Commander As Brigade Combat Team Chief of Reconnaissance

by CPT Michael L. Hefti interest (NAI) input during the BCT’s sense prior to the FSC’s integration. military decision-making process However, since the FTCP serves as the The “chief of reconnaissance” (CoR) is (MDMP). In addition, the cavalry primary direct-coordination element currently a non-doctrinal position, squadron is typically on a condensed between the cavalry squadron and the which is a characterization debated by MDMP timeline of its own while devel- brigade support area, the FSC com- maneuver leaders and the intelligence oping a plan off the first two warning mander is capable and better suited to community.1 There is minimal docu- orders from the BCT. Therefore, the provide this function, especially due to mentation on the CoR’s incorporation, cavalry squadron’s headquarters and the organic relationships established but the most common argument sug- headquarters troop (HHT) commander within the brigade support battalion. gests the cavalry squadron commander is recommended as the CoR to facili- This leaves the HHT commander as a – or the cavalry squadron as a whole – tate the proper amount of attention on minimized combat multiplier on the acts as the CoR similar to the manner reconnaissance and security (R&S) dur- battlefield.4 in which the fires-battalion command- ing the BCT’s MDMP and while assist- er serves the brigade combat team Professional on-line forums such as ing in the execution of the BCT’s R&S (BCT) as its fires-support coordinator.2 milSuite frequently discuss the frustra- fight. tion of how to employ the HHT com- As our transition returns to training Employing HHT mander.5 Rotations at the National skills such as combined-arms maneu- Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, ver, these two recommendations pose commander demonstrate a feasible solution: em- many challenges. Most importantly, In a Force XXI structure, the HHT com- ploying the HHT commander as the bri- the cavalry squadron is rarely co-locat- mander is located at the forward-trains gade CoR. The HHT commander by the ed with the BCT and is often unable to command post (FTCP), where the for- modified table of organization and take part in the BCT’s targeting work- ward-support company (FSC) com- equipment is an Armor Branch officer 3 group meetings; intelligence, surveil- mander is also located. This made and should have a firm grasp on caval- lance and reconnaissance (ISR) plan- ry tactics furthered through atten- ning; priority information require- dance at the Cavalry Leader’s Course. ments (PIR) input; and named areas of The HHT commander has a unique and current understanding of the unit, its capabilities, limitations and personali- ties because he/she is still in command and serves directly with the cavalry squadron. The HHT commander also has an understanding of the BCT’s ISR assets and most division assets.

67 October-December 2015 The CoR’s roles and responsibilities autonomy from serving solely as a staff execution, providing context to the have never been clearly defined within officer; that way he/she can still exe- BCT’s common operating picture U.S. Army doctrine. For that matter, cute the HHT command responsibili- (COP). The CoR continuously echelons the CoR’s role may never be clearly de- ties, such as property accountability, ISR assets to push reconnaissance as fined in Army doctrine to provide com- personnel and administrative require- far forward as possible while simulta- manders the necessary flexibility to ex- ments. neously giving the cavalry squadron a ecute mission command on how lead- COP of the area where it is fighting. ers are employed. Of note, old Soviet CoR relationships This reduces the squadron’s attrition in doctrine used the CoR at the regimen- If the CoR retains autonomy, he/she is the counter-reconnaissance fight. This tal level, and at higher echelons, to able to move fluidly between the intel- also enhances the cavalry squadron’s control all the intelligence and recon- ligence and operations sections during tempo during its R&S missions as ISR naissance assets within the regiment.6 the planning phase. This ensures atten- assets help confirm or deny IR/PIR at The Soviets’ CoR held tasking authority dance at various workgroups and re- various NAIs and refine the unit’s fo- and reported to the Chief of Staff while hearsals to address potential issues cus, helping neutralize enemy recon- also directly communicating with the prior to transitioning to current opera- naissance and disrupting enemy forces regimental or division commander. The tions and managing the BCT R&S fight before the BCT commits its main effort. Soviets’ CoR was not subordinate to within the tactical-operations center During the R&S fight, the CoR also en- the operations officer. (TOC). This allows the CoR to act as a sures ISR assets are executing the ap- subject-matter expert on R&S tasks for propriate NAIs and contrasting the in- CoR’s chain of various staff entities such as the BCT telligence analyst’s input against command intel collection manager, who is typi- ground maneuver experience and the Tasking authority is not critical to the cally a warrant officer with an excellent current COP. As the cavalry squadron position, which removes the argument grasp of the technical capabilities of transitions out of the night fight, the for having the BCT operations or cav- various assets but may lack the maneu- CoR communicates with the cavalry alry squadron commander serve as the ver experience to integrate those ca- squadron commander to confirm the CoR within the BCT. The following are, pabilities with cavalry ground opera- BCT COP and briefs the BCT command- however, key questions: To whom does tions. er on the prior night’s R&S fight. The the CoR report? Who provides the CoR then ensures the combined-arms While working with the S-2, the CoR battalions have a situational under- guidance? What are the CoR’s roles reviews NAI to ensure they are coordi- and responsibilities? standing of the battlefield based on nated and validates the information re- the cavalry squadron’s fight. Determining the chain of command for quirements (IR) associated with the the CoR is important to prevent con- BCT’s PIR. The NAI and PIR are critical The CoR is not just limited to opera- flicting guidance and duties. If the HHT to the BCT’s decision points. Therefore, tions and intelligence. The CoR also commander serves as the CoR, it is im- the CoR is critical to developing the IR supports sustainment, fires planning / portant that squadron and brigade that the scout within the cavalry execution and other areas on staff. leadership understand the CoR belongs squadron can answer, as well as for Having direct liaison with the BCT ex- to the brigade and is not the squadron other BCT ISR assets. This allows staffs ecutive officer helps the CoR facilitate CoR. Since the CoR does not have task- the ability to analyze the answered IRs, this integration with the staff. As the ing authority, qualifications for the identify which PIR they answer and cavalry squadron executes missions HHT commander to be the CoR are re- make recommendations to the com- ahead of the BCT, the CoR helps the duced as the commander has not at- mander. brigade staff understand and plan for tended Command and General Staff The CoR also plays a critical role within the drastic distances between the cav- College and has not held a field-grade- the BCT S-3 staff section. The CoR alry squadron and the BCT, the earlier officer key-developmental position. helps planning to ensure the cavalry timeline and how the cavalry squad- However, it does mean the CoR should mission is synchronized with the BCT’s ron’s operations at night affect combat act in the BCT’s interest when dealing main effort and can feasibly accom- service support. Whether coordinating with assets and enablers. By default, plish the mission within the squadron’s ambulance exchange points during this still benefits the squadron. The capabilities. The CoR also identifies is- night operations, modifying logistic CoR reports to the squadron and BCT sues and reviews the effects of various timelines or helping fires understand commander and directly liaisons with warfighting functions on the cavalry which targets the squadron can ob- the BCT executive officer to help the squadron. The CoR provides input to serve are all areas where the CoR can BCT in treating R&S as major phases of better focus the BCT’s R&S mission, help. This contribution is not solely the every operation. which is critical to overall mission suc- CoR’s; it is also based on the cavalry cess. squadron’s plan the CoR uses to help However, the HHT commander cannot refine the BCT’s plan. be a permanent staff officer. Although The CoR’s other important function is units can temporarily facilitate this role in the BCT TOC during the cavalry’s In addition to the input the CoR gives during a combat training center rota- fight. The CoR does not act as a battle to the BCT, he also owes input to the tion, it is not a sustainable solution. captain, but rather, he/she observes cavalry squadron. One of the challeng- The CoR needs to retain some and advises on R&S missions during es for the cavalry squadron is parallel

68 October-December 2015 planning with the BCT because the underemployed HHT commander fills “Targeting the Complex Threat: The Art squadron’s operations order comes out the void and adds a combat multiplier and Best Practices of Targeting during Re- of the BCT’s warning order, both one to the fight. connaissance Operations,” ARMOR, Sep- and two. The cavalry squadron already tember-October 2012. executes a hasty MDMP based on its CPT Michael Hefti is a small-group 3 Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnais- execution timelines in comparison to leader for the Maneuver Captain’s Ca- sance Squadron, Washington, DC: U.S. the other combined-arms battalions. reer Course, Maneuver Center of Excel- Government Printing Office, March 12, The CoR has an intimate experience lence, Fort Benning, GA. His previous 2010. with these challenges, so he/she can assignments include troop primary ob- 4 As observed by cavalry squadron train- help the cavalry squadron understand server/coach/trainer for Cobra Team, ers at NTC during decisive-action training the courses of action (CoA) the BCT is Operations Group, Fort Irwin, CA; bri- environment rotations. rd considering as part of its planning pro- gade plans officer, 3 Infantry Brigade 5 A search for HHT and headquarters and st cess, enabling the cavalry squadron’s Combat Team (IBCT), 1 Infantry Divi- headquarters company (HHC) parallel planning. The CoR facilitates sion, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Troop commanders on www.milSuite.mil will B, 3rd IBCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort result in many discussions on how to this by sharing unpublished drafts of employ HHT/HHC commanders, especially the BCT’s Annex L, the ISR Plan and un- Knox; plans officer, 6-4 Cavalry Squad- rd st since the HHT commander does not have published CoAs to assist the cavalry ron, 3 IBCT, 1 Infantry Division, Fort Knox; Headquarters and Headquarters any organic maneuver elements such as squadron with its MDMP. The key to mortars or scouts. Troop executive officer, 6-9 Cavalry, 3rd success is shared understanding be- 6 FM 200-2-1 (obsolete), The : tween CoR and cavalry squadron, and Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and Operations and Tactics, Washington, DC: between the BCT and cavalry squadron U.S. Government Printing Office, July 16, staff shops. With this in mind, the CoR Troop B executive officer and platoon rd st 1984. distributes the cavalry squadron’s plan leader, 6-9 Cavalry, 3 ABCT, 1 Caval- to the BCT to ensure future planning ry Division, Fort Hood. CPT Hefti’s de- ployments include tours to Afghanistan synchronization of the combined-arms Acronym Quick-Scan battalions. As such, the CoR becomes and northern Iraq. His military school- the catalyst for planning between the ing includes Maneuver Captain’s Ca- reer Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, ABCT – armored brigade BCT and cavalry squadron, ensuring combat team synchronization and shared under- Scout Leader’s Course, Ranger School, Armor Basic Officer Leader Course, Ba- BCT – brigade combat team standing. CoA – course of action sic Officer Leadership Course II, Com- COP – common operating While we may continue to profession- batives Level I and Officer Candidate picture ally debate about who should be the School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts CoR – chief of reconnaissance CoR, the HHT commander certainly degree in law enforcement from Min- FM – field manual serves as a feasible, suitable and ac- nesota State University-Mankato and FSC – forward-support company ceptable solution. It also helps squad- is working on a graduate degree from FTCP – forward-trains ron and brigade commanders practice American Military University in crimi- command post HHC – headquarters and talent management by forecasting the nal justice. His awards and honors in- headquarters company right leader for the HHT command. In- clude the Bronze Star with two oak-leaf HHT – headquarters and corporating the CoR role during home- clusters, Meritorious Service Medal, headquarters troop station training is crucial to success; it 2013 General Douglas MacArthur IBCT – infantry brigade combat affects clearly defined roles and re- Leadership Award, LTC Keith Antonia team sponsibilities, prevents the CoR from Officer Leadership Award and Draper IR – information requirement ISR – intelligence, surveillance becoming just a BCT staff officer, Leadership Award. and reconnaissance shares understanding between the BCT MDMP – military decision- and cavalry squadron commanders on Notes making process employment and establishes clear lines 1 The author’s observations and conversa- NAI – named area of interest of information flow for the CoR be- tions with many leaders is the basis for NTC – National Training Center tween the BCT and cavalry squadron. this statement. PIR – priority information requirement The mere debate about the CoR posi- 2 LTC Brian K. Flood, MAJ James A. Hayes R&S – reconnaissance and tion has identified the need for a focus and MAJ Forrest V. Cook, “IBCT’s Recon- security on R&S operations at the BCT level. naissance Squadron,” ARMOR, March- TOC – tactical-operations center With that in mind, the currently April 2011, and MAJ Morrie J. Fanto,

69 October-December 2015 Scouts In: Reimagining Reconnaissance

by CPT Eric Glocer armored, forceful reconnaissance for- security and, more notably, revive the mations to the modular brigade struc- capability of fighting for intelligence7 is The U.S. Army’s method of collecting ture that has fewer security capabili- now being reviewed. This idea ac- intelligence and conducting reconnais- ties.3 It compartmentalized tactical-col- counts for the need to fight for infor- sance from ground-based platforms is lection assets in reconnaissance orga- mation, but it lacks lighter reconnais- constantly evolving to match its oper- nizations and maintained fewer orga- sance elements required to observe ating environment. As we transition nizations capable of conducting secu- the environment without affecting it.8 from Iraq and Afghanistan to a more rity on a larger scale than brigade.4 dynamic environment, a more holistic, This makes sense because of the ex- The transition to build a security capa- less security-driven approach to tacti- tended duration of the war and how bility is warranted, but it does not ad- cal collection is as important as our the asymmetrical nature of our oppo- dress the Regular Army’s gap in light, current emphasis on fighting for infor- nents reduced our operational require- stealthy intelligence-collection capabil- mation. ment to conduct large-scale security ities. Only light brigades, as opposed missions. to heavy and Stryker brigades, are ca- Current paradigm pable of conducting reconnaissance Now that the United States has re- Since the end of World War II, the U.S. without eliciting a response from their moved forces in Iraq and is currently Army has gone back and forth trying to targets. Unfortunately, the motorized drawing down in Afghanistan, the answer the question of whether recon- aspects of the reconnaissance squad- Army must be prepared to fight both a naissance organizations should be light ron in light and airborne brigades make conventional and asymmetric foe.5 This or heavy. Heavy organizations are more them too much of a firepower and mo- differs from the earlier paradigm in capable of conducting security opera- bility asset to freely conduct detailed, that our conventional forces no longer tions and are capable of fighting for in- focused intelligence, surveillance and 1 primarily focus on an insurgent oppo- telligence. In contrast, light organiza- 6 reconnaissance (ISR) without making nent. As a result, the Army is deciding 9 tions are better suited to assess their contact. Reconnaissance require- how to reshape ground-based intelli- environment without changing the sit- ments go unfulfilled as a result. gence collection. With that in mind, uation or drawing in more troops.2 the concept of a heavy reconnaissance Another shortcoming in the current In recent years, the Army went from and security element that can provide model is more obvious when

70 October-December 2015 addressing an unconventional threat: optics, collectors can make visual and begin integration. For instance, if we intelligence and reconnaissance assets signal contact with the minimum force have a squadron to support a mission, have distinct reporting channels, which possible. Ideally they make contact we can deploy as small an element as degrades unity of effort. Intelligence with a force so small that its target a platoon of mixed collectors or an el- assets report through military-intelli- does not know it is in contact. This en- ement as large as the entire squadron, gence (MI) companies, while recon- ables the commander maximum flexi- depending on the size of the support- naissance assets report through the bility to develop the situation and ad- ed organization and the intelligence re- squadron. All reporting is combined dress the threat without forcing his quirement. with the assistant chief of staff/intelli- hand. It also maximizes security gence officer, but it could be optimized through standoff and stealth. Ground- Task-organizing the element to the op- if units had a single reporting chain. An based ISR in this manner provides add- erational-level headquarters with a example of how to curtail this problem ed capability over aerial ISR in that it is support relationship to the nearest tac- at the brigade level is to develop a ha- not weather dependent, and it can tical organization affords it the free- 13 bitual support relationship for an ex- have days of continuous station time dom to operate in the AoI. It offers peditionary MI brigade company with- vs. hours of station time. the tactical commander greater influ- in the squadron for missions. Such a ence over the AoI and provides better Multi-disciplined intelligence collec- relationship eliminates the training situational awareness inside the AO. tion is optimal; you achieve greater deficit current MI companies struggle Doing so closes the void between op- speed and efficiency and gather a with in maneuver brigades when they erational and tactical influence. It al- broader intelligence picture by mixing have to resource MI training without lows the intelligence to flow directly to reconnaissance with MI. It makes cu- the support of an MI battalion.10 the tactical unit, providing an im- ing much quicker, as assets are com- proved stream of reporting, while The final gap in our paradigm is that manded by the same entity. Reporting maintaining the operational command- brigades are directly affected by their to the same headquarters also sup- er’s oversight and control of the recon- area of interest (AoI) but do not have ports synthesizing intelligence at the naissance asset. This closes the void the means to influence things outside lowest level, streamlining reports and between operational and tactical influ- of their area of operations (AO). The making them more digestible to the ence. The effect is a more cohesive ef- AoI is influenced at the operational lev- commander they support. The result is fort between operational and tactical el but ties directly to the tactical level. a faster response with a more focused commanders. It can be influenced through tempo- situational understanding and com- rary support relationships under the plete unity of effort. Example contemporary model, but these rela- Creating a multi-disciplined collection A prime example of an organization tionships should be habitual and for- 11 organization also dramatically increas- that was able to bridge the current par- mal. es the individual capabilities of each adigm’s gap at the brigade level is a asset. Adding scouts to signals intelli- combined troop-level reconnaissance What’s missing? gence (SIGINT) and multi-function organization that tested at the Nation- As the Army reviews its reconnaissance teams (MFTs) allows them to survive al Training Center (NTC) during Rota- organizations, it should advocate that and operate close to the forward line- tion 14-08 in support of 2-2 Stryker Bri- the corps build and train light-recon- of-own-troops (FLOT) while providing gade Combat Team. It contained a light capability sets that can receive scalable ISR that typically cannot get as far for- reconnaissance troop, a long-range slices from MI and other enabling ward. MI assets being co-located with surveillance (LRS) detachment, an MFT, units. This would streamline reporting, scouts dramatically increases the a sustainment team and a robust liai- create unity of effort and increase each scouts’ situational awareness. Both can son element. While this example per- asset’s capabilities. These capability use each other for communications formed well, it is by no means the only sets should be rapidly deployable, light support and BLOS reporting through such capability. Capability sets can ISR organizations that work for an op- their distinct equipment sets. Best of range from a platoon-size element of erational commander with a support all, it makes mixing second nature, mixed tactical collectors to a battalion- relationship to the brigades operating greatly increasing overall capability. size element to support large-scale op- in the vicinity. Such an organization can erations. 12 correct our current model by filling the We need a scalable organization to be capability gap for light, stealthy recon- a “rapidly deployable force capable of In this case, the troop was able to ob- naissance that is not currently ad- living in austere environments,” which serve and influence most of the AO, dressed. is the current mandate from MG Terry and even beyond into division-level Ferrell, commander of 7th Infantry Di- battle space, while remaining unde- Most important, this organization must vision. To do so, we must be able to re- tected and providing multi-disciplined be capable of observing its environ- act quickly and provide similar intelli- situational awareness. In this example, ment without affecting it. By maintain- gence disciplines at each echelon. As the troop maintained a combined ing a low profile through the use of be- long as each element is rapidly deploy- headquarters for multiple forms of in- yond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communica- able, it can be tailored to match the telligence, synthesizing intelligence tions, detailed camouflage and in- size and needs of the supported unit from scouts, LRSs and MFTs. This en- creased standoff made possible by new and deployed as soon as possible to sured reports were properly routed

71 October-December 2015 and that all collectors operated in sup- logistics support to their sister organi- properly processed and routed and our port of one set of goals. zations. LRS was able to conduct recon- ISR assets were properly employed. It naissance pull to support the infiltra- helps to have a field-grade liaison offi- The troop avoided direct- and indirect- tion of the scouts, who in turn pulled cer to let the appropriate decision- fire contact while spread across the the MFT. maker know when priority intelligence battlefield. This resulted in continuous requirements (PIRs) are satisfied, espe- reporting before, during and after tra- By understanding each other’s objec- cially as a brigade headquarters deals ditional reconnaissance assets were tives and tasks, they were able to with the vast quantity of intelligence decisively engaged. Direct contact maintain continuous observation when that comes from having all battalions from the brigade’s organic squadron, their adjacent units had to break con- in contact simultaneously. This ensures paired with the troop’s observation tact or conduct resupply. When an LRS PIRs are not lost in the shuffle and de- and technical collection, created a team had to displace to avoid compro- cision-makers have all the information complete picture of the battlefield and mise, scouts were able to shift their they need. improved the commander’s situational observation to include the LRS team’s understanding. When they became de- named area of interest (NAI). The same On a side note, augmenting our head- cisively engaged, the redundancy with happened when a scout section had to quarters with a geospatial-intelligence the squadron provided clarity. It served displace. On the objective, SIGINT and cell enabled us to employ LRS opera- as a vetting function to compare the TSE could cue the attention of scouts tions with minimal headquarters sup- chaotic and conflicting reports typical and LRS to pinpoint targets within the port from the brigade. It also maxi- of direct contact. It was also able to re- NAI. mized our ability to employ rotary- port directly to the brigade through wing assets. BLOS communications equipment to We task-organized a scout section with answer specific requests for informa- the MFT to position the MFT further Mitigating the risk tion without having to interrupt forces forward than they were able to in the Creating a small multi-disciplined under fire. past, resulting in more rapid TSE and more responsive signal collection. It ground-based ISR asset that may oper- One of the ways the troop remained also provided a ground-based resupply ate outside the battlespace owner’s undetected was by staying light. The option for LRS and facilitated evasion AO comes with inherent risk that must LRS detachment, with assault climbers and recovery. Using the MFT’s BLOS be mitigated. It places regular units in and basic-mountaineering-qualified Global Rapid-Response Intelligence a vulnerable and isolated position that Soldiers, was able to traverse extreme- Package communications system, we makes direct-fire or indirect-fire com- ly restricted terrain to establish obser- were able to conduct a video-telecon- promise a potentially catastrophic 14 vation posts unlikely to make contact. ference debriefing with an LRS team event. It also relies heavily on the re- The scouts, by conducting an infiltra- that had broken contact without hav- sponsiveness of higher headquarters tion in restricted terrain, were able to ing to launch a recovery operation. Fi- for fire support and contingency man- camouflage their positions and main- nally, by sharing operational under- agement, and therefore requires risk 15 tain a smaller footprint than any other standing, front-line collectors had a to be underwritten at a high level. maneuver element on the battlefield. better understanding of their objective Just like employing a LRS detachment, The scouts then pulled the MFT for- and could quickly cue from TSE. the inherent risk in deploying a light el- ward as the scout section provided SI- ement into an environment where it is GINT collection. Scouts were also use- Our command post was robust enough likely to experience a relative combat- ful to the MFT when advising about to receive multiple types of reports power overmatch makes it important camouflage and site selection to in- and compile them into one cohesive to mitigate such risk with deliberate crease survivability. In positioning the common operating picture. That pic- mission planning. Operating in small MFT forward, the troops were able to ture being close to the brigade gave groups away from combat power in- reduce the lag time getting the MFT in- the staff and commander the option to creases the likelihood of destruction or volved in tactical-site exploitation (TSE) see and request refinement of all re- capture upon compromise and reduces and give them freedom of maneuver ports, to include full-motion video, pic- survivability in counter-reconnais- to support interrogations across the tures and MFT reports. It also enabled sance. To mitigate, leaders must con- battlefield. Overall, this humvee-based us to receive immediate intelligence duct very detailed planning with the organization was able to maneuver and keep our collectors updated on the adjacent unit and contingency coordi- across more restrictive terrain than the situation in their sector. nation. It must include, at a minimum, , maintain a smaller footprint Finally, by deploying with an augment- the evasion plan of action, deconflic- and thus avoid compromise. ed liaison element and co-locating our tion of insertion and extraction, plus The added benefit of having a multi- headquarters with the brigade head- direct- and indirect-fire deconfliction. disciplined ISR collection organization quarters, we were able to ensure re- This should also be briefed to the bat- is that assets were able to rely on each ports would reach their intended des- tlespace owner due to the catastroph- other to create a truly redundant com- tination. Our liaison element consisted ic nature of compromise.16 The bottom munication, cueing and security net- of a field-grade officer, a senior captain line is the commander can only employ work. Each element was able to com- and an S-3 Air noncommissioned offi- these forces when the operational municate with each other and provide cer to ensure our intelligence was tempo allows deliberate planning to

72 October-December 2015 offset the risk of the operation.17 and pair them with maneuver forces to Rotation 13-09 in support of 3/82 and collect at a higher level. NTC 14-08. As a whole, these risks may dramati- 10 Field Manual (FM) 3-55, Intelligence cally reduce the likelihood of tactically CPT Eric Glocer commands Troop A, 18 Collection, Washington, DC: Department employing such an organization. It is 3-38 Cavalry, Joint Base Lewis-Mc- of the Army, 2012. Pages 1-2 to 1-3 state not feasible that this form of light re- Chord (JBLM), WA. His past duty as- this, but the practical implementation re- connaissance be the only asset avail- signments include assistant operations sults in a compartmentalized technical re- able for intelligence collection due to officer, 3-38 Cavalry, JBLM; assistant porting structure. its tie to a deliberate tempo and in- operations officer, 201 Battlefield Sur- 11 FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps and Divi- creased risk. On the other hand, light veillance Brigade (BfSB), JBLM; and ex- sion Operations, Washington, DC: Depart- multi-disciplined ISR in conjunction ecutive officer, Headquarters and ment of the Army, 2014. th with heavier capabilities would fill this Headquarters Company, 4 Brigade 12 MG T.R. Ferrell, 7th Infantry Division st deficit. The rewards of being able to Combat Team, 1 Cavalry Division, Fort sensing session with company command- observe an opponent accurately with- Hood, TX. His military schooling in- ers, Aug. 27, 2014. out influencing his environment makes cludes the U.S. Military Academy at 13 FM 3-94. West Point, Airborne School, Basic Of- employing such a capability set com- 4 Curtis Taylor, “Trading Saber for Stealth: pelling. ficer Leader’s Course II, Armor Officer Can Surveillance Technology Replace Tra- Basic Course, Air Assault School and ditional Aggressive Reconnaissance?,” The Conclusion Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. Land Warfare Papers No. 53, September The nature of our new enemy requires CPT Glocer holds a bachelor’s of sci- 2005. us to maintain both security capabili- ence degree in political science from 5 FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance ties and light, mixed reconnaissance. the U.S. Military Academy. He is the re- Unit Operations, Washington, DC: De- Our shift to build heavier reconnais- cipient of the Bronze Star Medal. partment of the Army, 2013. This is writ- sance elements has come at the ex- ten specifically for LRS but still applies to pense of our light-reconnaissance ca- Notes all elements operating remotely from ad- jacent units. pability sets. In creating a light recon- 1 Gordon Sullivan, “Forward,” The Land 6 naissance element to conduct this role, Warfare Papers No. 53, September 2005. Ibid. 7 we have the opportunity to fill gaps in 2 John McGrath, Scouts Out: The Develop- Taylor. our capabilities. ment of Reconnaissance Units in Modern 8 Ibid. We can finally give commanders the Armies, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat ability to influence the AoI and push Studies Institute, 2008. 3 Sullivan. ISR assets toward the FLOT while Acronym Quick-Scan streamlining collaboration between 4 McGrath. combat-arms collectors and MI collec- 5 Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Unified AO – area of operations tors. Land Operations, Washington, DC: De- AoI – area of interest partment of the Army, 2011. BfSB – battlefield surveillance Such an organization structure can be 6 brigade easily developed at the corps level as This is based off personal experience while serving in 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry, BLOS – beyond-line-of-sight part of the reconnaissance and securi- and working with at least four other bri- FLOT – forward line-of-own ty construct of the future. However, gades. While doctrine states we were fo- troops FM – field manual there are several other ways com- cused on a full-spectrum opponent, the ISR – intelligence, surveillance manders can create an ad hoc capabil- operational Army was primarily focused ity. In the light-infantry brigades, com- and reconnaissance on security operations in Iraq and Afghan- JBLM – Joint Base Lewis- manders can task-organize their MI istan. McChord company into a reconnaissance squad- 7 BG Leopoldo Quintas, “From the Com- LRS – long-range surveillance ron. They can then shield a scout troop mander’s Hatch,” ARMOR, July-Septem- MFT – multi-function team from mobility and firepower require- ber 2015. This is also much discussed in MI – military intelligence ments to focus on low-profile ISR and 201st BfSB but without a specific external NAI – named area of interest pair MI collectors with maneuver as- source. NTC – National Training Center PIR – priority information 8 Firsthand experience derived from NTC sets. At the echelon above brigade, requirement they can simply pull limited assets 14-03 and NTC 14-08. SIGINT – signals intelligence from their subordinate units or request 9 McGrath, supported by firsthand experi- TSE – tactical-site exploitation support from the enhanced MI brigade ence in Joint Readiness Training Center

73 October-December 2015 Bridging the Gap — Outfitting Standard Scout Platoons with M113A3s by retired SFC David J. Neuzil perform all reconnaissance and secu- begin training in a six-vehicle configu- rity missions required against any op- ration to expedite the development of Armored brigade combat team (ABCT) ponent in the future operational envi- internal standard operating procedures Cavalry squadrons are setting the con- ronment.1 and contribute to doctrinal refine- ditions to implement the standard ments. However, this transition will take time scout platoon force-design update to complete and may not be imple- (FDU). The FDU fields Cavalry squad- The most significant advantage to us- mented across the total force. How rons with six Bradley Fighting Vehicles ing the M113A3 APC instead of the then can we provide the ABCT com- (BFV) and 36 Soldiers per scout pla- UAH is the increased troop-carrying ca- bined-arms brigades (CAB) the benefits toon. This configuration has proven to pacity and the flexibility it affords with- of the FDU in the meantime? meet operational demands of recon- out sacrificing protection, mobility or naissance and security missions more A short-term solution could be a scout- lethality. In the current 3x5 BFV and effectively than the current 3x5 BFV/ platoon design that features three UAH mix, a platoon leader has the abil- uparmored humvee (UAH) mix. A BFVs by three M113A3 armored per- ity to dismount 12 scouts or two squad leader is in charge of each of the sonnel carriers (APC). CAB leadership squads. The proposed short-term solu- six scout elements, and the configura- could reallocate the M113A3s already tion enables that same leader to dis- tion provides versatility, survivability, within their formations. This proposed mount 18 scouts or three squads to protection, mobility and firepower to solution would allow commanders to conduct reconnaissance maneuver via

Figure 1. Comparison of current 3x5 configuration to proposed 3x3 configuration.

74 October-December 2015 the substitution of three M113A3s for compared to the UAH. When it’s fitted officer, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Bat- the five UAHs. with a rocket-propelled-grenade , talion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd the squad has a much greater chance Airborne Division, , NC; pla- Also, leaders would have added flexi- to survive first contact in the APC. toon sergeant, Troop K, 3rd Squadron, bility to transport attached Soldiers 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort and conduct more effective casualty The M113A3 also provides more versa- Hood, TX; recruiter, Chico Recruiting evacuation thanks to the added space tile mobility than the UAH. An element Station, Chico, CA; section sergeant, inside the APCs, which enables treat- with all tracked armored vehicles al- Troop A, 1st Squadron, 2nd Armored ment of casualties enroute to the next lows enhanced cross-country maneu- Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, LA; level of medical care. Treating casual- ver not available in the current 3x5 and squad leader, Troop C, 1st Squad- ties enroute is not possible with the scout platoon configuration. In addi- ron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division, UAH. tion, the M113A3 still has capabilities Armstrong Kaserne, Buedingen, Ger- similar to the UAH on paved surfaces many. His deployments included Oper- Lethality or but with the added advantage of being ation Joint Endeavor Implementation able to navigate in close quarters. The increased recon? Force, Bosnia; Operation Joint Forge range of operation is another benefit Some argue that the loss of the UAHs Stabilization Force, Bosnia; two tours to the proposed solution because an decreases lethality of the formation for Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation APC can travel farther than an UAH on because there would only be six plat- Unified Response, Haiti; and Operation a single tank of fuel. forms on the battlefield rather than New Dawn, Iraq. SFC Neuzil’s military eight (with the current five UAHs). Also, the location of the fuel tanks for education included the BFV Transitions However, the counterargument is that both vehicles is another positive for Training Course, Pathfinder Course, Se- even with the eight vehicles of the cur- the proposed short-term solution. The nior Leader Course, Army Recruiting rent BFV and UAH mix, a platoon has APC has the advantage in this area due Course, Basic Instructor Training to dedicate at least six Soldiers to to its external tank that provides an Course, Basic Airborne Training, Air As- move the extra vehicles (without de- added safety benefit for the scouts sault School, Advanced Leaders Course grading a crew), which leaves fewer with respect to survivability while and Warrior Leader Course. He was Soldiers for dismounted maneuver. maintaining the internal area for cargo. also inducted into the Excellence in Ar- Therefore, fewer vehicles actually is a mor Program. He holds an associate’s positive for the proposed solution be- Summary degree in business administration from cause commanders can maximize re- Until the Army can outfit all scout pla- American Intercontinental University. connaissance elements forward with toons with six BFVs, a potential short- increased dismount capabilities. Argu- term solution could be to replace the Notes ably this enhances the ability to inform element’s current five UAH platforms 1 “Standard Scout Platoon Proof of Princi- decisive action and provide mission with three M113A3 APCs. With the re- ple,” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine command. organization of brigade combat teams Command Capability Manager-ABCT and Reconnaissance, Capabilities Develop- Also, the potential solution maintains across the force, M113A3 platforms are a feasible solution to bridge the ment and Integration Directorate, Maneu- the scout platoon’s Long-Range Acqui- ver Center of Excellence, April 16, 2014. sition System capabilities with only gap. The M113A3 provides command- slight modifications necessary to the ers the ability to adhere to the funda- M113A3. mentals of reconnaissance and securi- ty while maintaining troop flexibility, Acronym Quick-Scan Another advantage to the proposed so- mobility, survivability and lethality in a lution is the increased survivability for decisive-action environment. ABCT – armored brigade the scout platoon with the use of combat team SFC David Neuzil is now retired. When APC – armored personnel M113A3s. History demonstrates the carrier UAH has survivability shortcomings in he wrote this article, he was a career BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle a decisive-action environment against manager with Office of the Chief of Ar- CAB – combined-arms brigade a determined threat. However, the mor, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Ben- FDU – Force Design Update M113A3 provides superior survivabil- ning, GA. His previous assignments in- UAH – uparmored humvee ity and protection to the scout squad cluded operations noncommissioned

75 October-December 2015 2016 General Donn A. Starry Writing Competition The U.S. Army Armor School and Cav- Eastern Europe or the Middle East and Recognition of the winning author will alry and Armor Association have an- why? How would it be expeditionary occur May 6, 2016, during the Saint nounced the 2016 General Donn A. and sustainable? George Ball at Fort Benning, GA. He or Starry Writing Competition. she will receive a $1,000 check from Writers will be an Active Duty/Nation- the Cavalry and Armor Association, a The competition will evaluate and rec- al Guard/Reserve Soldier, Department 1911 commemorative pistol and pos- ognize outstanding writers from across of the Army civilian or retired/veteran. sible publication in ARMOR magazine. the Army who demonstrate clarity and The Soldier or civilian does not have to vision about the future of the mount- be in the Armor Branch. For more information and require- ed force. Articles for 2016 will address ments, see http://www.benning.army. the future armored cavalry regiment Participation confirmation is due no mil/armor/starry. and will answer the question: What later than March 18, 2016, with article would be the optimal design for a submission due no later than April 15, modern armored cavalry regiment in 2016.

Send Us Your Manuscripts ARMOR magazine’s manuscript suspenses for 2016 are (these are separate from the Starry suspenses): • April-June 2016 edition: Jan. 6 • July-September 2016 edition: April 6 • October-December 2016 edition: July 19 For planning purposes, ARMOR magazine suspenses are an average of 10-11 weeks before the first month of the publication cycle. The first month of a publication cycle is January for the January-March edition, for example. Manuscript suspense will therefore fall in the first or second week of October.

76 October-December 2015 The Army Reconnaissance Course

by MSG Jacob Stockdill Reconnaissance operations require not acuity up front, ARC has instituted a only the mental agility to think through physical-fitness test. Several years of combat have taught us a problem set and find solutions, but many things. Combat can be ambigu- Many argue that a functional course they also require great physical endur- ous; it is also a physically grueling en- should not require a physical standard. ance. ARC tests both through a series deavor. Also, our ability as both an However, I could not disagree more. of three- to five-day field-training ex- Army and a branch to conduct recon- We cannot allow our cavalrymen to be ercises. The student is placed in lead- naissance and security operations have any less than excellent as we move ership positions that require the ability been severely degraded. Army leaders closer and closer to the scout of 2020, to maintain cognitive abilities through should expect that any element con- where the expectation of junior lead- long, arduous hours in all types of ducting reconnaissance forward of the ers will be to fill information gaps at all weather. If students do not possess the main body should be physically fit, levels of reconnaissance, conduct op- physical ability to persevere, it quickly mentally agile and led by tough, capa- erations with indigenous reconnais- becomes clear, as their capacity to re- ble leaders in both the operational and sance elements and provide security to tain information or make critical deci- institutional force. a multitude of joint formations. How sions decreases by the minute. can we expect anything less from our The Army Reconnaissance Course Soldiers and leaders within our com- (ARC) embraces this philosophy and These two attributes, physical and munity? uses it to develop reconnaissance ex- mental, are symbiotic, especially when perts who are educated, doctrinally Soldiers conduct long-term reconnais- The greatest challenge academically in sound and capable of meeting that de- sance and security operations over ex- ARC is overcoming a fundamental lack mand. tended distances. To gauge physical of doctrinal knowledge from all

77 October-December 2015 students. ARC does not teach tactics, traditional Army instructor and placing Headquarters and Headquarters techniques and procedures; rather it him or her into a role of facilitator. Troop/Troop A, 1st Squadron (Airborne), reinforces these by demonstrating the Cadre members are then charged with 91st Cavalry, 173rd Armored Brigade places where they support doctrinal being the catalyst for critical thinking Combat Team (ABCT), Schweinfurt, solutions. in both the class and in the field while Germany; platoon sergeant, 1st Squad- reinforcing doctrine. ron, 4th Cavalry, Schweinfurt; squadron ARC was the first course taught in U.S. master gunner, 1st Squadron, 4th Caval- Army Training and Doctrine Command High standards are a hallmark of our ry, Schweinfurt; and scout-section lead- using Outcome-Based Training and Ed- Army; should we not strive to achieve er, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, ucation after senior leaders recognized them at all times? Cavalry squadrons, 3rd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Ben- the need for reconnaissance leaders to troops and scout platoons are at a crit- ning. His military education includes be mentally tough and agile. Today ARC ical junction, forcing us to evaluate Cavalry Leader’s Course, Red Team, In- uses the Adaptive Soldier and Leader how we would conduct our role as part spector General’s Course, Bradley Mas- Training and Education (ASLT-E) meth- of an expeditionary Army deployed to ter Gunner Course, Basic Noncommis- odology, maintaining its alignment an area that could be austere, contest- sioned Officer’s Course, Army Leader’s with 21st Century Soldier competencies ed, politically sensitive and at the lim- Course, Warrior Leader’s Course and as well as the Army Learning Model it of lines of communication. Those Pathfinder, Airborne, Ranger and Air 2015. who graduate from ARC excel both ac- Assault courses. MSG Stockdill holds an ademically and physically in the pursuit When students and cadre develop a associate’s of arts degree from the Uni- of achieving a “higher fundamental” peer-to-peer learning environment, versity of Maryland and is working to- understanding of reconnaissance and ASLT-E works and a fuller understand- ward completion of a bachelor’s of arts security operations. This course un- ing of doctrine begins. Once the stu- degree in homeland security from the equivocally develops tough, capable dent grasps doctrine in the classroom, University of Maryland. leaders who are physically fit and men- the course forces them to execute and tally agile. Simply put, ARC requires continue to learn in a field environ- graduates to be the best reconnais- ment, where the second part of this Acronym Quick-Scan sance Soldiers, ready to lead a scout process begins. By ensuring that each formation. student is assessed academically ABCT – armored brigade against six base outcomes and seven MSG Jacob Stockdill serves as opera- combat team th ARC – Army Reconnaissance leader attributes, ARC is able to clearly tions sergeant major for 5 Squadron, Course th identify those who perform with a 15 Cavalry, Fort Benning, GA. His past ASLT-E – Adaptive Soldier and higher fundamental skill set. The ASLT- duty assignments include teach chief Leader Training and Education E methodology develops adaptive for ARC, Fort Benning; first sergeant, thinking by primarily taking the

78 October-December 2015 Experiences in International Competition and Opportunities That Follow

by SFC Michael A. Deleon Army. The Marine Corps brought its Ti- from a bunker was conducted. ger Competition winners, and the Ca- As missions in theater-specific opera- Finally, the vehicle commanders were nadian Army brought two tank crews tions wind down, I believe leaders have individually evaluated with an all-arms from its armor units. As a result of identified that, as tank crewman, we call for fire mission. During this event, their participation, the Royal Canadian need to rebuild the proficiency level I was given the 10-digit grid to my lo- Armoured Corps School (RCACS) invit- that steadily began to decline due to cation, a map, a compass and binocu- ed two American tank crews and two lack of tank usage during nearly 14 lars. As soon as the target was raised Bradley crews to compete in its own years of combat action. With that in and I had eyes on it, I had one minute armored-fighting-vehicle (AFV) skills mind, development of an armor-crew to plot the target, give a 10-digit grid competition known as Worthington proficiency competition was deter- and bearing, and then provide all the Challenge, located in Gagetown, New mined to be a great way to build cama- elements of a call-for-fire mission. A Brunswick, Canada. raderie and esprit de corps, and to re- perfect score for this portion of the inforce training of critical crew skills. (Editor’s note: The next Sullivan Cup event was 15 points. A point was de- competition is currently scheduled May ducted for every 50 meters a vehicle International 2-6, 2016.) commander was off, in any direction, competition when the call-for-fire was placed. The invitation was forwarded to the From 1963 to 1991, the Canadian Army 2014 Sullivan Cup crew winners, which Day 2 kicked off with the drivers and hosted tank crews from the United were SFC James Grider and his tank maintenance challenge. During this States and various countries through- crew from Cobra Company, 2nd Battal- event, each crew lined up at a starting out Europe in a live-fire tank-gunnery ion, , 3rd Armored point with a lane walker equipped with competition known as the Canadian Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infan- a stop watch. On the command “go,” Army Trophy. Fast-forward to 2012: the try Division. The competition also our crew sprinted 200 meters to the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Ben- called for a tank section, and I was for- road-wheel challenge stand. At this ning, GA, hosted its first tank-crew pro- tunate enough to have my crew select- stand, event officials marked off a road ficiency competition known as the Sul- ed as “wingman” for the Sullivan Cup wheel we had to change in the fastest livan Cup. These type of competitions crew. The Bradley crews were chosen time possible. Upon completion, we force units throughout our Army to in- throughout our brigade by a Gunnery lined up and then ran a mile and a half crease their level of tank-gunnery Table Six shoot-off. At the end of the to the next event, a casualty-evacua- training to identify highly proficient qualification table, one crew from 3-1 tion stand, where we had to evacuate crews to represent their brigade at the Cavalry and another from 1-15 Infantry a casualty from an M113 vehicle, eval- Sullivan Cup. were chosen. uate the casualty, perform first-aid and move the casualty to a landing zone, Due to this international competition, all while being timed. a joint partnership began to open op- Worthington portunities to noncommissioned offi- Challenge Once we completed the casualty-evac- cers (NCOs) across the U.S. Army, The Worthington Challenge competi- uation stand, we lined up and ran al- which has helped challenge crews and tion spanned four days and was ar- most a mile to our final event for the strengthen relations with our region- ranged in four “stands.” Our U.S. tank day, the driver’s challenge. We mount- ally aligned forces. Through these com- team had the competition arranged in ed our tanks and negotiated a two-mile petitions and shared training methods, the following order: observation stand, driver’s course that had a variety of ob- our NCOs can further develop them- drivers and maintenance challenge, stacles and crossings. This was also a selves and their Soldiers while helping march-and-shoot event and platform- timed event. build a stronger relationship with our specific gunnery. international partners. During Day 3 of the competition, the Day 1 began with the observation march-and-shoot event tested our The Armor School’s first Sullivan Cup stand, at which our crews were individ- marksmanship and physical abilities. Competition in 2012 was only open to ually evaluated on a vehicle-identifica- This portion of the competition re- U.S. Army units. Two years later, the tion test. This was followed by a quired our crews to complete a confi- Armor School hosted another Sullivan mounted-crew vehicle-identification dence course for time, execute correct Cup, this time extending the invitation test from our tanks. Then a range esti- drills on the Canadians’ C16 Automatic to the Marine Corps and the Canadian mation of random targets observed Grenade Launcher System (the

79 October-December 2015 equivalent of our M240B), run four sion, took “top 25mm crew.” train gunnery in the Canadian Army. miles to the rifle range and conduct a The size of their armor force in com- (See ARMOR’s original article on Exer- stress shoot with our M4 rifles and M9 parison to ours affects the develop- cise Worthington Challenge, http:// pistols from various positions and ment of their training program. For ex- www.benning.army.mil/armor/eAR- ranges. This entire event was conduct- ample, in our brigade alone, we have MOR/content/issues/2015/JAN_MAR/ ed wearing a full modular lightweight 58 tanks, whereas their entire army Kennedy.html.) load-carrying equipment vest load, Ad- has about 80 tanks. This size difference vanced Combat Helmet and a protec- has an advantage, though, because it tive mask while carrying a “dummy” ri- Building allows our Canadian counterparts fle (training aid). partnership more control of their armor units’ training plans by their actual armor Next came the final day of the compe- The camaraderie and mutual respect school. tition. Our crews conducted day and shown by U.S. and Canadian crews en- evening tank-section battle runs at hanced the success of the entire chal- A good example of this is when a unit Canada’s gunnery range. Each battle lenge. It also opened a partnership be- prepares a gunnery-training plan. The run had three stationary and two of- tween the Canadian Army and our bri- plan they develop must be sent to their fensive live-fire challenges. We en- gade that resulted in another invite armor school for review and approval. gaged non-heated, scaled targets that from the Canadian Armor School to This added control allows them to cer- were painted black for the main gun send a tank master gunner and a Brad- tify all their tank-crew positions at the with a cluster of steel knock-down ley master gunner from our brigade to schoolhouse. In addition, I noticed the plates painted black for our machine- observe their Army Direct-Fire Special- Canadian training aids (such as simula- guns. Each tank section completed the ist Course (ADFS). When asked by my tors) are high quality. two battle runs while being evaluated brigade command sergeant major if I The result is that their tank crewmen for time and accuracy. would like to participate, I immediate- ly jumped on the opportunity to par- are certified on each individual posi- At the end of the event, our two ticipate in the once-in-a-lifetime expe- tion by the schoolhouse before con- Abrams tanks staged with two Leopard rience. ducting gunnery as a crew. The theory 2A4 tanks and loaded up the remain- behind this is that each individual ing main gun and machinegun ammo Three months after Worthington Chal- crewman is proficient and ready to to conduct platoon live-fire gunnery. lenge, I returned to Canada along with switch from their present crew to that This was a showcase of firepower and Doty, a Bradley master gunner, to ob- of any other tank; they are inter- the culminating event of the competi- serve the Canadian ADFS course. The changeable. Thus, there’s no need for tion. six-week advanced course reinforces a set gunner and tank-commander the quality of instructors Canada has combination like U.S. crews observe. Following this showcase, the results who teach gunnery in their units. It Once a Canadian crewman is certified were announced during an awards cer- also certifies these instructors to per- in a specific position, he is certified un- emony. Our tank section took 3rd place form duties equivalent to that of U.S. til he gets promoted to a higher posi- in the “top fire team” portion. In addi- master gunners on the range. tion. tion, one of our Bradley crews, com- manded by SSG Matthew K. Doty from This opportunity allowed me to ob- Tank crewman in the Leopard 2 tank 3-1 Cavalry, 3rd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Divi- serve the training methods used to begin at the driver position. After about a year (or two) in that position, they attend a gunner course to be cer- tified to operate the gunner station. The loader is the second in command of the tank in their army. Canadian sol- diers can attend a turret-operator course to be certified for the loader station when they attain the rank of corporal. Following that course, they can go to a crew-commander course to certify as a tank commander. At the unit level, gunnery training is planned and conducted by their in- structor of gunnery (IG), a position equivalent to U.S. unit master gunners. The Canadian unit’s IG conducts class- es that cover basic crew tasks very sim- Figure 1. Tank commander SFC Michael Deleon maneuvers his tank into the ilar to ours, but they teach their class- first firing position during the live-fire shoot-off during Worthington Challenge es very in-depth, starting with basic in September 2014. (Photo by CPL Nick Alonso, Canadian Army Public Affairs) engagement techniques and

80 October-December 2015 progressing all the way to advanced prepare and teach engagement scenarios. Experienced (using the seven- crew commanders teach classes using step training prin- the following seven-step training prin- ciple) before their ciple: evaluation. • Review the theory; Upon completion • Review the fire order (fire of the instructor commands); evaluations, elec- • Conduct blackboard (chair drills); trical and optical (EO) technicians • Conduct dry practice (dry practice taught the stu- on the tank); dents classes on • Conduct demonstrations boresighting, pull- (simulator demo); backs (recoil exer- • Practice on the simulator; and cise) and sight cal- • Debrief. ibration. The Leop- ard 2 tank requires Figure 2. CPL Taylor Smith (Canadian army direct-fire spe- cialist candidate, RCACS) and CPL Riley Cook (ADFS candi- These classes are designed to teach an advanced sup- date, RCACS) conduct blackboard shoots (chair drills) dur- gunners the basics in engagement port package for ing the instructor portion of the Army Direct-Fire Special- techniques. When all classes pertain- its intricate fire- ist Course in Gagetown, New Brunswick, Canada. (Photo ing to gunnery fundamentals are com- control system, so by SFC Michael Deleon) plete, the Canadian soldiers go to the the crews did not range and apply what they learned. boresight their own tanks. Instead, finished with a series of closeout tasks There is no qualification criteria during that was done by the EO techs. Then and an end-of-course review to help live-fire, but their IGs evaluate the the boresight was confirmed by the improve future courses. crews to ensure they apply the funda- students under the IGs’ supervision. mentals properly while engaging tar- Following this training, the class trav- Lasting benefits gets. This certifies the crews to move elled to the University of New Bruns- The opportunity to observe another to the next level of gunnery, and it al- wick, where a professor taught them country’s course first-hand while inte- lows them to shoot live-fire with their the principles of ballistics. grating with their students provided in- troop (platoon) and eventually to con- The next module of the class pertained sight for me to restructure my training duct a squadron (company) live-fire ex- program, in preparation for future live- ercise. to surface danger zones. During this training, the students had to template fire exercises, upon return to my unit. The first part of ADFS focused on the areas as safe-to-fire zones based on In addition, I learned that the Canadi- instructor portion, with a strict perfor- the weapons of specific vehicles, in- an Army’s armored force conducts a mance evaluation from the instructors cluding a single fire point, multiple fire very standardized style of instruction, on the students’ ability to teach, in- points and maneuver-box fire points. with emphasis on drilling the basics. struct, coach and conduct a valuable This instruction lasted a week and in- This provides a very structured and debriefing session. They were then cluded multiple practical exercises pri- strong basic foundation for their armor taught zeroing procedures, templating or to the test. crews, which is something I think we of ranges, elements of ballistics, AFV need to improve in our Army. designs and how to conduct a gunnery- The ballistics module was next; it fo- From my observations, a company’s training program, range operations and cused in-depth on the variety of am- success at gunnery is mainly deter- range safety. munition the Canadian Army uses. Stu- dents were taught the origin of each mined by the proficiency and compe- Just as in the U.S. Army, the individual type of ammunition, including devel- tence of that unit’s platoon sergeants. unit is responsible for the quality con- opment, purpose and effects on armor Our master gunners and commanders trol of the soldiers they send to this in relation to its terminal ballistics develop and resource the gunnery- course. (what the projectile does when it training plan for their unit. Therefore, strikes a target). Students were given it’s up to the platoon sergeant and sub- During the instructor portion, students a review and tested the following week ordinate NCOs to fill in gaps of time were separated by 120mm and 25mm on all the information covered. with meaningful training while ensur- classes. Then they were divided into ing the platoon is prepared before and small groups. The students came back In the final week of the course, small during gunnery. This is best accom- together later in the course to conduct groups were assigned vehicles, for plished by exposing our NCOs to mul- common-core training. I observed one which they had to conduct a 10-minute tiple types of training methods. I be- of the small tank groups as they were briefing on its survivability, firepower, lieve integration of some of the tech- taught how to instruct and then as- mobility and protection in relation to niques observed in Canada will help in- signed classes to teach for evaluation. their own vehicle platform. Just like crease proficiency levels throughout Each student received two classes to U.S. courses, the Canadian students our force. In the end, the interaction

81 October-December 2015 with another country’s army allows our understand each other’s tactics, tech- Senior Instructor Operator’s Course, NCOs to share training methods while niques and procedures. This in turn en- Joint Firepower/Controller Course, M1/ strengthening the bonds between our ables us to operate more efficiently M1A1 Abrams Master Gunner Course, Army and that of the other nation. when conducting multinational opera- Advanced Leader’s Course, Warrior tions in various regions of the world. Leader’s Course and the Army Recruit- As we move forward, our armor NCOs er Course. He is pursuing a bachelor’s have become smarter, more resilient SFC Michael Deleon is currently the of science degree in computer science and even more resourceful, thanks to U.S. Army Europe Schools NCO in at Troy University. Among his awards technology. This increase in their charge at Joint Multinational Training and decorations are the Order of St. knowledge pool results in more cre- th Command, 7 Army Training Center, George (black and bronze awards), ative training methods that improve Germany. His previous assignments in- Draper Armor Leadership Award and our NCO corps while helping develop st clude platoon sergeant with 1 Pla- member of the Excellence in Armor and groom more lethal Soldiers. nd toon, Cobra Company, 2 Battalion, Program. th rd rd In summary, the success of the U.S. 69 Armor Regiment, 3 ABCT, 3 In- Sullivan Cup and Canadian Worthing- fantry Division, Fort Benning, GA; bat- ton Challenge opened doors to further talion master gunner, 2-69 Armor Reg- improve U.S.-Canadian military-to-mil- iment, Fort Benning; company master Acronym Quick-Scan itary relations. Now 3rd ABCT, 3rd Infan- gunner, Dealer Company, 2-69 Armor try Division, offers slots to the Canadi- Regiment, Fort Benning; company mas- ABCT – armored brigade an Army to participate in the brigade’s ter gunner, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry combat team best-squad competition. Our brigade Regiment, Camp Casey, Republic of Ko- ADFS – (Canadian) Army also sent NCOs and officers to serve as rea; and tank commander, 2-9 Infantry, Direct-Fire Specialist Course observer-controllers, and we plan to Camp Casey. Deleon’s professional mil- AFV – armored fighting vehicle EO – electrical and optical send an infantry company from one of itary education includes the Master Fit- IG – instructor of gunnery the battalions to conduct joint training ness Trainer Course, Maneuver Senior NCO – noncommissioned officer with a unit from their army in Canada. Leader’s Course, Combatives Levels 1 RCACS – Royal Canadian Through such joint training and ex- and 2, Unit Movement Officer’s Course, Armoured Corps School change opportunities, we can better Advanced Gunnery Training System

Sullivan Cup 2016

The U.S. Army Armor School has an- • Each Active Component Army not “stack” crews. Teams will nounced the 2016 Sullivan Cup Preci- division is invited to send one tank consist of qualified battle-roster sion Gunnery Competition hosted by crew for every armored brigade tank crews currently holding tank the Maneuver Center of Excellence. combat team in its organization to commander, gunner, driver and This event is scheduled May 2-6, 2016, compete in the Sullivan Cup. The loader responsibilities within their at Fort Benning, GA. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is respective organizations. Drivers invited to send one crew. Also, the and loaders will be 19K10 The competition will be a physically Army National Guard is invited to personnel. Gunners will be 19K20 and mentally demanding world-class send up to four crews to compete. personnel. Tank commanders will event that rigorously tests U.S. Army The U.S. Marine Corps is invited to be either 19K30/40 or 19A Soldiers, U.S. Marines and internation- send one crew to compete. personnel. al partners in tank-crew maneuver, sus- tainment and gunnery skills. • Two crews from each selected • Soldiers selected to compete in the Sullivan Cup should arrive in peak Specific information regarding compet- international partner are also physical condition. Soldiers with itors and the rules of the competition invited to attend the competition. profiles or conditions that prohibit are: The selected international partners are Australia, Canada, Germany them from competing in physically • The competition will identify the and the . demanding events will not be top tank crew from a field of crews allowed to participate in the representing the U.S. Army, U.S. • Crews must consist of a four-man competition, resulting in the Marines Corps and select qualified tank crew. Crews must disqualification of their crew from international partners. The meet prerequisites for conducting participation. competition will evaluate crews on full-caliber live-fire training as physical fitness, problem-solving specified in Training Circular Visit the Sullivan Cup Website at www. and tactical and precision gunnery 3-20.31, Chapter 5, Paragraphs benning.army.mil/armor/sullivan for skills. 5-30 – 5-35. Participating units will more information.

82 October-December 2015 U.S. Army Observes 75th Anniversary of Armored Force

Part 2 of 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization of future MBTs among NATO’s major (NATO) assumed armored warfare to nations. Both the United States and Growing Soviet might and creation of be a dominant aspect of conventional Germany experimented with, but the Warsaw Pact posed new challeng- ground warfare in Europe, the light abandoned the missile-armed MBT-70. es to the Army in Europe post-World tank was largely discontinued and The M26 Pershing basic design of the War II. American military planners en- heavy tanks were also mostly aban- United States evolved until the M60 visioned a possible World War III open- doned. The medium-tank design, how- Patton MBT was replaced with the gas- ing with a rapid Soviet/Warsaw Pact in- ever, evolved into heavier models due turbine powered in the vasion of West Germany on a massive to an increase in armor. The larger- 1980s. scale. Stopping this mechanized ava- sized main weapon resulting in the lanche quickly became the U.S. Army’s main battle tank (MBT) came into exis- dominant concern. American armored tence, combining most of the different With the U.S. Army focused on Europe, forces were expected to play the prin- types of tanks during World War II. The North Korea invaded South Korea in cipal ground role in what was likely to MBT continued to evolve; by the 21st 1950, just days after the establishment be a fast-paced war of maneuver. Century, most advanced Western MBTs of the Armor Branch. North Korean col- Yet American armored formations con- were built around powerful engines, umns of tanks and infantry quickly overran the small U.S. contingents in tinued to field the same platforms large 120mm guns and composite ar- their path and routed South Korean used in World War II, while Soviet mor. forces. Within weeks, the remnants of tanks steadily improved in number and For the most part, NATO armored doc- the American military presence had capability. Similarly, the rapid demobi- trine remained defensive and dominat- been driven into the southeast corner lization that followed World War II left ed by use of nuclear weapons as deter- of the Korean peninsula, where they the Army with only 10 divisions on ac- rence. Although most NATO nations formed a final defensive position with tive service by 1948. Only one was an began the period with a large surviving South Korean soldiers (the armored division. Readiness also erod- number of U.S.-designed tanks in their Pusan Perimeter). ed, leaving the Army with limited fleets, there was a considerable degree means with which to confront Soviet of disagreement on the design There American and United Nations aggression. In the background of U.S. lack of read- iness was a significant breakthrough in Soviet tank design in 1964. The T-64 was produced, which for the first time used an automatic loader, reducing the crew of the tank to three crewmen. Subsequently this model, and the later T-72 and T-80 tanks, introduced further innovations that influenced armored warfare by introducing guided missiles into the tank-ammunition mix, allow- ing anti-tank guided weapon fire from standard tank guns. The most ad- vanced Soviet tank up until the end of the Cold War was the T-80U, which shared similar characteristics with the M1A1 (turbine engine, advanced fire- control systems, strong armor and fire- power). Also, infantry fighting vehicles were developed in the 1960s with the ’s BMP-1, for the first time allow- ing supporting infantry to accompany tanks on a battlefield when nuclear- Figure 1. A Pershing tank scrambles around the edge of a burning Korean vil- weapon use was expected. lage lately occupied by Communists to get at an enemy tank delaying the U.S. advance Sept. 4, 1950. (Photo by SGT Frank C. Kerr, http://www.dodmedia.osd. During the Cold War, as the mil)

83 October-December 2015 reinforcements began to arrive, rapid design and production of a new M48, using proven components and including several U.S. Marine Corps tank, the M48. Development began in technologies. The resultant M60 and Army tank battalions. These 1950, and by 1953 the new platform matched a 105mm gun and diesel en- mounted units initially performed was in full-rate production. The rapid gine with the M48’s turret and chassis. defensive actions, counterattacking pace of development resulted in many Combat units first received the M60 in North Korean breakthroughs and teething troubles, but the Army con- December 1960. Subsequent modifica- strengthening key positions. They then sidered it more important to quickly tions gave the M60 a distinctive look spearheaded a counteroffensive field a satisfactory tank rather than and resulted in the M60A1. The M60A1 synchronized with large-scale landings await perfection of the design. The proved popular and largely free of the at Inchon. The ensuring drive to the M48 featured a dome-shaped turret major teething troubles encountered 38th Parallel witnessed several tank-vs.- that improved ballistic protection, a with the early M48s. The M60-series tank actions that generally favored 90mm gun and an improved fire-con- reflected a steady qualitative increase American tank crews and resulted in trol system. Continuous improvements in component development and armor the destruction of much of the North based on engineering reviews and sol- protection that could be traced to Korean mounted force. dier feedback resolved early problems, World War II. The M60A3 became the resulting in a tank both reliable and final version of this series and consti- Reconnaissance elements gathered in- popular. tuted a major systems upgrade that in- formation regarding enemy disposi- corporated technologies also used on tions and intent, surveyed terrain, act- After the Korean War, American ar- the M1 Abrams tank. ed as a reserve and provided general mored development focused on build- security. Their ability to engage enemy ing tanks superior to Soviet designs. The evolutionary nature of American armor in the early stages of the conflict Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, So- tank designs resulted in increasingly remained sharply limited by their reli- viet tanks became more effective and reliable tanks generally popular with ance on M24 light tanks, which proved continued to outnumber their Ameri- their crews. However, several efforts no match for North Korean T34/85s. can and NATO counterparts. Hence, were made to build revolutionary de- the continuous evolution of Soviet signs incorporating leap-ahead tech- The war also marked the first opera- tank designs spurred the United States nology. In the 1950s, for example, the tional employment of the new com- to experiment with advanced technol- Army developed the T95 as a potential bined-arms reconnaissance platoons ogies and accelerate the pace of tank replacement for the M48. It featured a adopted as a result of analysis of the development. American armored units variety of new concepts, including the World War II experience. These pla- anticipated being outnumbered in any Optical Tracking, Acquisition and Rang- toons possessed great versatility, but conflict in Central Europe. Therefore ing System. This device measured the their mix of jeeps, light tanks and ar- tank systems that improved the ability time taken for a pulse of light to travel mored personnel carriers made com- to hit and kill a vehicle at long range to and from the target to provide an mand in rugged terrain difficult due to received priority development. This accurate range. It was the precursor to the differences in mobility among emphasis resulted in a fire-control sys- the laser rangefinder but suffered from these platforms. At times, the tanks of tem that included a rangefinder, ballis- being too fragile and prone to generat- different platoons were combined to tic computer, ballistic drive and gun- ing multiple returns. The MBT-70 de- form a more powerful armored strike ner’s periscope. Such fire-control sys- sign of the 1960s featured an auto- force. Similar actions with the mortar tems marked a major improvement loader, a dual gun/missile main arma- and infantry elements could provide a over the optical sights used in World ment, a three-man crew located in the concentration of fire support or an en- War II, where the gunner’s ability to turret and hydro-pneumatic suspen- hanced ability to operate in complex or gauge distance and mentally calculate sion. Both the T95 and the MBT-70, urban terrain. the impact of wind, cant and move- however, proved too expensive and Combat operations in Korea and linger- ment largely determined accuracy. complex. Although they never ad- ing fears of an outbreak of war in Eu- Fire-control systems underwent con- vanced beyond a developmental stage, rope triggered efforts to field new ma- tinuous improvement throughout the they did pioneer new technologies lat- teriel to armor and cavalry organiza- Cold War, thereby establishing the er brought to maturity in the Abrams tions. Initially, mounted units dis- technological basis for the fire control tank. patched to Korea entered combat with and stabilization of the later Abrams the same M4 and M26 tanks that had tank. Related developments focused Cavalry and reconnaissance organiza- fought in World War II. Indeed, the on improving guns and ammunition. tions benefited first from the fielding need for tanks in Summer 1950 be- American tanks also tended to be more of the M41 light tank, which carried a came so intense that vehicles only re- spacious and comfortable than Soviet 76mm gun and improved armor com- cently placed on display at Fort Knox as ones. Crew stations were designed to pared to the M24. Efforts to field a sat- monument vehicles were pressed back minimize fatigue and prevent the rapid isfactory armored car, however, failed. into service. erosion of combat ability through dis- Achieving the right combination of de- comfort. sired qualities proved elusive, as did An upgraded version of the M26 also parallel actions intended to generate a made its debut in Korea: the M46. The By the late 1950s, the Army had begun more survivable jeep that did not sac- Army, however, also undertook the design work upon a successor to the rifice the vehicle’s low silhouette and

84 October-December 2015 quietness. The M114 Armored Com- marginal role. The Army also consid- To disrupt ambush and sabotage of mand and Reconnaissance Vehicle of- ered difficult terrain and counterinsur- principal roads, armor units conducted fered armored protection and tracked gency (COIN) the domain of the rifle- “thunder runs.” In these operations, mobility, but it proved mechanically man, not the tanker. armored columns intentionally entered unreliable and never met expectations. areas known for ambush activity. They Hence the first mounted units to arrive deliberately sought contact with ene- Organizationally, armored cavalry as- in South Vietnam initially found them- my forces. Upon contact, the column signed to divisions and armored-caval- selves greatly restricted in their opera- dashed through the ambush area, re- ry regiments retained their combined- tions, often performing base security. grouped and assaulted the hostile arms nature, adding air-cavalry compo- Over time, these restraints disap- force. Throughout the operation, ar- nents equipped with helicopters. Ma- peared, and armored vehicles became mor relied on its firepower, armor and neuver battalions continued to include commonly used in many roles, fully ex- speed to obtain a rapid, decisive result. a scout platoon, but the configuration ploiting their combination of firepow- of this unit underwent continuous er, protection and mobility. More mundane but vitally important change in the years following World missions included convoy escort and War II, fluctuating between combined- Since doctrinal guidance remained ori- route security to sustain the flow of arms organizations and pure scouts in- ented on a European battlefield, basic supplies throughout South Vietnam. tended for information collection over principles of combined-arms opera- a broad frontage. tions had to be applied to the funda- Mounted units sought to force battle mentally different operational environ- upon elusive enemy forces. Armor and ment of Southeast Asia. Armor and cavalry units used a search pattern in Despite its focus on countering the So- cavalry organizations therefore devel- which platoons moved in a clover-leaf viet threat to Central Europe, in the oped through trial and error their own formation. Once hostile forces were 1960s the Army found itself embroiled tactics, techniques and procedures discovered, “pile-on” became the prin- in a war in Southeast Asia. In 1965, the suited to South Vietnam and COIN. In cipal tactic. All friendly units in the vi- United States committed to a major doing so, they stressed the use of fire- cinity of the target raced toward the deployment of ground troops to South power and mobility to counter Viet contact area, assaulting from multiple Vietnam to ensure that nation’s contin- Cong guerrilla tactics. Tanks often ac- directions and employing maximum ued independence from North Viet- companied infantry units, frequently firepower. To provide security during nam. Initial terrain assessments sug- leading their advance. They provided roadmarches, armored units adopted gested little role for armored units. fire support, created jungle paths, the herringbone formation when halt- Jungles, swamps, paddy fields and oth- cleared areas for helicopter landings, ed. This formation provided all-round er topographical features seemed to performed bunker-busting and carried security and minimized the chances of reduce vehicular operations to a supplies to forward units. being surprised. For tank and cavalry units, the M48A3 tank and the M113 armored personnel carrier represented the principal ar- mored fighting vehicles. The M48A3 benefited from several improvements over the original M48, including the in- corporation of features developed for the M60 series. Crews especially ap- preciated the M48A3’s survivability. Mines tended to throw tracks without destroying the vehicle, while rocket- propelled grenades (RPGs) needed to hit a vital area to destroy the tank. Crews regularly continued to fight their vehicle long after being immobilized or otherwise damaged. The M113 did not possess the same level of protection, but its superior mobility permitted it to operate throughout South Vietnam. It was of- ten used in a tank-like role, with its crew fighting from the vehicle rather Men of Troop B, 1st Battalion, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, and dismounting to attack on foot. After their M-48 Patton tank in a position in the jungles in the Central Highlands of initial engagements in which M113s Vietnam, June 1969. (Photo from U.S. Army Military History Institute, Vietnam suffered heavy crew losses while oper- Photos Miscellaneous Collection) ating the exposed .50-caliber

85 October-December 2015 machinegun, the vehicle underwent throughout the Vietnam War. From an American planners, it became clear modification in the field. Two more initial minimal presence, mounted that the next war would occur with lit- machineguns were mounted, and gun- combat elements increased until they tle warning, negating U.S. plans that shields were added to all positions. represented a significant percentage of assumed several months’ advance no- Thus reconfigured, the vehicle proved the Army’s ground-combat forces. Ar- tice in which to mobilize and deploy a more effective combat platform and mor capitalized on its own mobility and more forces overseas. The Army would became known as the Armored Cavalry firepower and the reconnaissance ca- enter combat with whatever forces Assault Vehicle (ACAV). Against enemy pabilities of the newly developed air were on hand. infantry, it relied upon its armor and cavalry to find and engage an elusive These realizations led to a series of mobility to attack at close range, opponent. The combined-arms nature sweeping military reforms intended to where its machineguns proved deadly. of division cavalry squadrons and 11th improve Army readiness and ensure its However, it remained vulnerable to Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) battlefield superiority. A revolution in mines and RPGs, resulting in a variety proved highly effective in a COIN envi- training began with the establishment of improvised measures intended to ronment, validating the organizational of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine boost survivability. More heavily and doctrinal principles embedded in Command in 1973. Training became armed infantry fighting vehicles such their design. more realistic and focused on meeting as the M2/ Fighting Vehicle high readiness standards, epitomized (BFV) would be based on experience Cold War to by the opening of the National Training with the M113. After the Vietnam War, the Army’s fo- Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, in 1980. The M551 (Sheridan) also made its cus returned to countering the Soviet combat debut in Vietnam as U.S. ar- threat in Central Europe. Lessons- A parallel shift in doctrine and organi- mored-cavalry units began exchanging learned in Vietnam tended to be lost zation generated more capable and their M48A3 Patton tanks for M551 or neglected as “special cases.” The combat-ready organizations collective- Sheridan Armored Airborne Reconnais- continued evolution of Soviet capabil- ly described as the Army of Excellence. sance Assault Vehicles in January 1969. ity encouraged this abandonment of On the battlefield, implementation of By 1970, more than 200 Sheridan tanks the Vietnam experience. In 1973, the AirLand Battle doctrine oriented com- were operating in Vietnam. The Sheri- outbreak of war between Israel and its bat units toward the destruction of en- dan evolved from efforts to build a Arab neighbors provided the U.S. Army emy forces throughout their depth light tank for air-assault operations an opportunity to study the capabili- through the integrated use of air and that could also engage armor. To ties of new Soviet weapons the Arab ground assets. Central to applying this achieve this goal, the vehicle carried armies used. The war included the doctrine at the tactical level lay the the Shillelagh gun/missile launcher. largest clashes of armor since World fielding of the M1 Abrams tank and the The missile promised the ability to de- War II and witnessed the combat em- M2/M3 BFV in the early 1980s. De- stroy any known tank, while the ployment of American M60 tanks in Is- signed to operate together in an envi- 152mm gun provided a powerful weap- raeli hands. ronment dominated by Soviet armor on against soft targets. The gun, how- and mechanized infantry, these new This tank did not prove invulnerable. ever, used caseless ammunition that platforms possessed much greater ar- Israeli tankers preferred the British often left smoldering debris in the gun mor protection, carried more powerful Centurion tank, since rupture of the tube, resulting in the premature deto- weapons and proved more mobile than M60 hydraulic lines tended to burn nation of subsequent rounds. It took their predecessors. crews and turret hits too often ignited several years to eliminate this prob- the ammunition stored there. More- The M1 Abrams was optimized to fight lem. The gun’s recoil also lifted the over, the high tank-loss rates on both in Central Europe against a Soviet-style front roadwheels off the ground and sides indicated that the battlefield had threat. Its design reflected the combi- damaged the delicate missile fire-con- become much more lethal, in part be- nation of lessons-learned in mounted trol system. cause of the widespread use of anti- combat since World War II and the Nevertheless, the M551 deployed to tank guided missiles and more power- most advanced technology available Vietnam in the expectation that it ful RPGs. for fielding. Consequently, the M1 rep- would provide a powerful weapon sys- resented a major advance in capabili- This war forced the Army to review tem to troops entering combat, even ties, particularly in the areas of lethal- critically its assumptions of superiority though it required further develop- ity and survivability. Armor protection over the Soviets. The emergence of the ment and testing. It proved a partial derived from the British development T62, boyeva mashina pekhoty (BMP) success. Its 152mm gun proved devas- of Chobham composite armor – layers (Russian infantry fighting vehicle) and tating to enemy personnel, but the ve- of armor separated by various materi- Sagger anti-tank missile suggested that hicle’s light aluminum chassis provided als whose precise composition has re- the U.S. Army might be losing its tech- only limited protection. Mine explo- mained classified. Its gas-turbine en- nical and qualitative edge. By the mid- sions tended to rip open the chassis, gine ensured sufficient power to 1970s, the Soviet Union was fielding a detonating the ammunition and de- achieve a high cross-country speed. new generation of armored vehicles, stroying the tank. The use of blow-off panels, an auto- capitalizing on technical and doctrinal matic fire-suppression system and the Armor played an important role developments since World War II. To provision of an armored bulkhead

86 October-December 2015 separating fighting compartment and optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) In 1990, the United States responded main-gun ammunition all served to en- missile launcher. The infantry version to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with a mas- sure the crew’s survival. The original carried an infantry squad, while the sive buildup of American and allied 105mm main gun was subsequently CFV carried a scout team and more forces in Saudi Arabia. In Operation upgraded to a 120mm weapon in the TOW missiles. The M3 CFV entered ser- Desert Storm, this force liberated Ku- M1A1. An array of sophisticated elec- vice in 1984. wait and advanced into Iraq, destroy- tronics provided much more effective Initially, every scout and cavalry pla- ing much of that nation’s conventional stabilization and permitted a true fire- toon was to be equipped with the M3 military arsenal. This military action on-the-move capability. Indeed, when CFV. However, concerns about the ve- provided the Army an opportunity to the M1 first participated in NATO ma- hicle’s size, noise and heavy firepower apply AirLand Battle concepts and neuvers, it received the nickname resulted in a desire for a smaller plat- measure the effectiveness of the train- “Whispering Death” because of its abil- form better suited to stealth and the ing reforms and materiel improve- ity to maneuver quietly and destroy avoidance of combat. A series of tests ments implemented in the 1980s. The targets consistently without stopping. at NTC during the 1980s finally encour- result proved a stunning success. The aged the Army to adopt the humvee Iraqi army was outmaneuvered, en- Development of the BFV began in re- for scout platoons. Initially designed as gaged throughout its depth and de- sponse to the M113’s and ACAV’s limi- a general utility vehicle and replace- stroyed in a series of rapid engage- tations. The appearance of the Soviet ment to the jeep, the humvee’s rela- ments. The application of powerful BMP further encouraged a vehicle with tively small size, quietness and ease of ground forces, spearheaded by ar- greater combat capabilities than the sustainment made it attractive as a mored units, proved decisive in achiev- earlier personnel carriers. Initially de- scout platform, although its lack of ar- ing victory. signed as an infantry fighting vehicle, mor protection raised concerns about a modified version was adopted for its survivability. Nevertheless, in 1990, The Gulf War demonstrated the effec- cavalry usage and designated the M3 Army leadership directed the fielding tiveness of the Abrams tank and CFV. Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV). Both of humvees to all scout platoons. Ar- Despite pessimistic forecasts of their versions carried a 25mm cannon, a ma- mored-cavalry platoons retained the ability to function in a desert environ- chinegun and a tube-launched, M3 CFV. ment, both vehicles proved popular

Figure 3. An M551 Sheridan outside the Apostolic Nunciature, the Vatican’s embassy, during negotiations for Panamani- an President Manuel Noriega’s surrender. (Photo courtesy of the Center of Military History)

87 October-December 2015 with their crews and generally reliable. checkpoint operations, escort duties money, the Army needed to increase Indeed, many potential problems were and weapons inspections. The heavier significantly the combat effectiveness identified during pre-war rotations in mounted forces possessed the fire- of its available forces. NTC’s desert conditions. The combat power and mobility to destroy those power and survivability of both plat- threats undaunted by the simple pres- The Army initiated a re-engineering of forms tended to surpass expectations. ence of American Soldiers. its institutional and operational forces. CFVs proved capable of engaging most Known as Force XXI, this process The reorientation of armor away from targets encountered, including Iraqi sought to exploit new technology – es- the Cold War’s Central-European focus tanks. The Abrams tank proved greatly pecially information technology – and started before the Gulf War. In 1989, superior to the Soviet-built T-72 in command concepts. In particular, it armor participated in Operation Just combat. It engaged Iraqi tanks in all sought to apply new information tech- Cause, which removed Panamanian weather conditions and at night, nology to increase the situational strongman Manuel Noriega from pow- thanks to the use of thermal sights. awareness of battlefield leaders. er and permitted the establishment of Abrams crews repeatedly began en- Through reliance upon global position- a more democratic government in Pan- gagements at longer ranges than ex- ing systems, a tactical Internet and dig- ama. Sheridans from 3-73 Armor pro- pected by Iraqi tank crews. Without ital communications, commanders vided fire support, using their 152mm having to stop to fire, Abrams tanks would receive more accurate and time- guns to blast Noriega supporters out of scored a high rate of first-round kills ly information regarding friendly and concrete buildings. They also eliminat- and simply drove through Iraqi posi- enemy forces. It would then be possi- ed roadblocks, evacuated wounded tions. Armored-cavalry organizations ble to conduct precision maneuver, and used their presence and firepower performed reconnaissance, security massing combat power on critical tar- to discourage escape and counterat- and economy-of-force operations. Bat- gets and weak points without neces- tack efforts. talion scouts still equipped with the sarily massing men and materiel. Con- M3 CFV proved robust, but those em- In 1994, American forces intervened in tinuous and near-real-time updates of ploying humvees operated under lead- Haiti to prevent widespread violence battlefield information would permit ership-imposed constraints. Concerns and ensure a peaceful transition to a operations to occur at a pace faster about the vehicle’s vulnerability led to democratic government. Subsequently, than the enemy’s ability to react. their use in roles that minimized their U.S. forces supported a multinational The inherent armor characteristics of exposure to hostile fire. force that remained to ensure peace. mobility and firepower lent themselves The 2nd ACR deployed to Haiti as part Armor in 1990s easily to this environment. Indeed, of this effort. Reorganized after the many early Force XXI initiatives fo- After the Gulf War, the Army’s struc- Gulf War into a light-cavalry force cused upon integrating digital technol- nd ture and mission set began to change. equipped primarily with humvees, 2 ogies into heavy-force organizations. No longer did defeat of the Warsaw ACR performed a variety of security Digitization possessed the dual poten- Pact dominate military thinking. The missions that included round-the-clock tial of improving overall combat effec- Soviet Union ceased to be a threat, and security patrols in the capital city of tiveness and reducing the danger of in fact ceased to exist, but the Army’s Port-au-Prince, convoy security and fratricide. deployment rates reached unprece- protection of key sites. Its activities re- dented levels for a nation at peace. Hu- quired a mix of mounted and dis- Force XXI concepts were tested during manitarian aid, peacekeeping and sta- mounted operations. It also main- a series of advanced warfighting exper- bility-and-support operations became tained quick-reaction forces possessing iments that occurred throughout the regular activities. The use of armor in more firepower and manpower ready 1990s. Collectively, these experiments such missions seemed unnecessary, to respond to a sudden eruption of vi- established the baseline for the cre- and in the absence of the Soviet threat, olence. ation of a digital force with an en- critics questioned the need for a heavy hanced ability to influence the bat- mounted force. In the wake of the Gulf War, the Army tlespace. faced a series of new challenges. With However, armor adapted to the the Cold War ended and military Force XXI concepts remained in a de- changed circumstances and deploy- threats to American national interests velopmental state throughout the ment patterns of the 1990s. The tacti- diminished, downsizing and budget re- 1990s, but tangible evidence of their cal agility and versatility that made ductions followed. The Army’s stance adoption could be found in the M1A2. mounted units effective on the battle- changed from forward-deployment This platform constituted the Army’s field proved readily applicable to mis- from bases overseas to force projec- first tank intended to fight in a digital sions other than high-intensity com- tion from the United States. Peacetime environment. Fielded in 1993, it out- bat. In peacekeeping roles, the com- deployments reached an unprecedent- wardly resembled the M1A1. However, mitment of heavy forces proved a pow- ed high as troops deployed to support the M1A2 proved unique in its internal erful demonstration of America’s na- peace and humanitarian actions world- electronics. Its automated architecture tional will. The presence of armor and wide. These commitments placed a comprised multiple linked subsystems cavalry units served to deter potential drain on the Army’s ability to respond associated with navigation, tactical op- attacks and provide support to lighter to a large-scale conventional conflict. erations and fire control. This informa- troops responsible for security, In the absence of more troops and tion was displayed automatically to the

88 October-December 2015 crew and to other electronically linked vehicles. The M1A2 also ran continu- ous self-diagnostic tests to determine mechanical or electronic failures. The commander’s independent thermal viewer permitted the gunner and com- mander to search separately for tar- gets, greatly increasing the speed at which targets could be identified and acquired. An upgraded version, the M1A2 Sys- tem Enhancement Program, appeared in 1999. It incorporated multiple im- provements over the original M1A2. Heavier armor improved survivability, while overall operability increased with a pulse-jet system. Lethality increased by upgrading the commander’s inde- pendent thermal viewer, including a second-generation forward-looking in- Figure 4. M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks of 3rd Armored Division move out on frared-imaging capability. Communica- a mission during Operation Desert Storm. An M2/M3 Bradley can be seen in tions also benefited from the addition background. (Photo by PHC D.W. Holmes II, U.S. Navy) of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). This device auto- resulted in its cancellation. The loss of Army Transformation matically shared information among el- both platforms eliminated armor sup- In 1999, Army Chief of Staff GEN Eric K. ements of a brigade combat team port for airborne/air-assault units alto- Shinseki unveiled a new vision for (BCT) and gave them an identical view gether, symbolized by the deactivation adapting the Army to the expected op- of the battle area. It dramatically im- of 3-73 Armor, which performed this erational environment of the 21st Cen- proved the ability to track battlefield role. Similarly, AGS cancellation ended tury. He was particularly concerned developments and share a wide range plans to modernize the humvee- about the Army’s ability to deploy forc- of data, including graphics. FBCB2 also equipped 2nd ACR. An uparmored ver- es into a real or potential crisis in a provided connectivity to a wide range sion of the humvee began to enter ser- timely fashion. He believed early inter- of digital communication systems used vice in 1996. It provided greater pro- vention in a crisis could prevent its es- by division and brigade components. tection for its crew and passengers, calation and reduce overall troop com- but it could not replace the capabilities The expense associated with procuring mitments. However, the heavy force associated with AGS. new vehicles ensured the Abrams tank possessed combat power but could not would remain in service for the fore- deploy rapidly. Light forces lacked sur- In addition to its support for Force XXI seeable future. Hence, sustaining its vivability, especially if faced with an ar- and platform upgrades, the Armor combat effectiveness became a prior- mored threat. Therefore work began Branch played a leading role in the de- ity focus. In 1999, the Abrams Integrat- on a medium force that merged rapid sign of a contingency reaction force. ed Management Program resulted. Un- deployability with lethality and surviv- The prevalence of stability and support der this program, tanks were rebuilt, ability. This force evolved into the operations in the 1990s often led to worn parts replaced and new compo- Stryker BCT (SBCT), named for the the creation of ad hoc task forces built nents inserted. At Anniston Army De- common platform the unit used. The from units taken from different divi- pot, AL, each tank was disassembled first Strykers were delivered to the sion and corps. This solution proved an and its turret shipped to Lima Army Army in 2002, and the first SBCT be- effective temporary measure, but it Tank Plant, OH. Both turret and hull came operational in 2003. were separately overhauled and then disrupted the training activities of the The SBCT did not replace heavy or light reassembled at Anniston. This process formations involved. The Army there- units. Optimized for contingency and returned tanks to near-brand-new con- fore sought to create a permanent low-intensity combat, the new organi- dition and greatly extended their ser- strike force to which units could be as- nd zation could not function in a high-in- vice life. signed for a given mission. Built on 2 ACR, the strike force incorporated the tensity combat environment without Light armored platforms did not fare as concepts and materiel emerging from significant augmentation. The SBCT well. The M551 Sheridan finally left ac- the Force XXI process and related ad- was designed to be self-sufficient for tive service, although it continued to vanced warfighting experiments. Plans 72 hours – enough time to shape its equip the opposing force at NTC. Its re- for this organization remained in devel- environment. It possessed a much-re- placement, the M8 Armored Gun Sys- opment when they were superseded duced logistical footprint, but it ex- tem (AGS), was ready for fielding in by Army Transformation. ploited digital communications and the 1996 when budgetary considerations tactical Internet to provide an

89 October-December 2015 unprecedented level of situational a reduced logistical support into a plat- conventional combat vehicles. Upgrade awareness. The bulk of its combat form capable of air deployment. programs previously in danger of power lay in infantry battalions. Armor cancellation were now restored. bore responsibility for developing the Armor played a central role in develop- Platform modifications based on the brigade’s communications architecture ing FCS. The importance attached to Iraq experience resulted, and a canister and the reconnaissance, surveillance Transformation, however, resulted in round for the Abrams main gun and target-acquisition (RSTA) squad- increased funding for the SBCT and FCS entered the theater in 2005. ron, a cavalry unit whose primary mis- at the expense of more conventional The Stryker also proved effective in sion lay in gathering information and forces. Planned upgrades to the Iraq. It began operations there in late intelligence. The RSTA squadron proved Abrams and Bradley fleets, for exam- 2003. Its speed and quietness of oper- unique among cavalry organizations. It ple, were either cancelled or scaled ation made it ideal for rapid raids on was not configured to perform tradi- back. This shift in emphasis also nar- terrorist safe havens at unexpected tional security and economy-of-force rowed the focus of digitization from times. To provide improved protection operations without support. the entire fleet of armored vehicles to those organizations in a single corps. against RPGs, Strykers in Iraq were fit- The wheeled Stryker vehicle made the In effect, digitized forces would be con- ted with slat armor, which caused the SBCT distinct from other mounted solidated in lieu of extending the full premature detonation of shaped combat units. It marked a break with range of digital capabilities to all plat- charge projectiles. Mine and suicide- the Army’s traditional reliance on forms. bomber attacks tended to damage tracked vehicles. Moreover, the Stryk- rather than destroy the Stryker, en- er did not carry the maximum ballistic Operation Iraqi hancing crew survivability. protection. Its survivability was em- Freedom The humvee, however, proved too vul- bedded in the combined-arms nature In 2004, several locations in Iraq con- nerable to terrorist attacks, particular- of the brigade and the latter’s ability sidered terrorist strongpoints became ly improvised explosive devices (IEDs). to secure accurate, timely information the target of major operations by Increased fielding of the uparmored on enemy dispositions. The bulk of American forces. Fallujah, An Najaf and version helped improve survivability of Stryker vehicles carried infantry, but Sadr City all witnessed significant fight- the crew, but the vehicle itself often armor combat developers also worked ing. In these instances, terrorists suffered extensive damage. The Army on the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and sought to use the urban landscape to sought a better-protected vehicle, es- a reconnaissance vehicle. The former offset the technological superiority of pecially for use in supply convoys, carried a 105mm gun on a Stryker American troops. The resultant battles which became frequent insurgent tar- chassis to support dismounted action. occurred at short range amid streets, gets. The mine-resistant ambush-pro- Its unique design, however, delayed houses and marketplaces. Terrorists tected platforms resulted. These vehi- the fielding of the first few MGS plat- sought to use mosques and holy sites cles were fielded in different configu- forms until 2007. The reconnaissance as shields. Such tactics failed when rations, but all shared much better bal- vehicle possessed a suite of sensors confronted with the intelligent use of listic protection and a unique shape and surveillance equipment to assist combined-arms tactics and aggressive that made them less vulnerable to IED information gathering. maneuver. attacks. However, these platforms were not intended for tactical opera- Simultaneous with SBCT development, In these battles, the Abrams and CFV tions. Armor sought a more effective the Army began work on a brigade-size team fared well. Tactics were devel- scout platform to replace the humvee. force that could be tailored to fit var- oped to exploit the superior armor In the interim, survivability was im- ied environments and designed to protection of both vehicles. Their fire- proved by integrating the humvee and close with and destroy enemy forces. power and survivability made them the M3 CFV in the same platoon. The projected use of unmanned weapon of choice to lead attacks into ground and air vehicles, unattended urban areas. They provided effective The Army’s continued focus on COIN sensors and smart munitions made it fire support to the Soldiers charged operations and the immediate needs possible to envision far fewer person- with clearing individual structures. In of Soldiers serving overseas led to FCS’ nel simultaneous with improvements locations where artillery and air sup- cancellation. Although many of the in combat effectiveness. The Future port could not be employed without technologies associated with this pro- Combat System (FCS) constituted the significant risk to civilians, Armor was gram continued to evolve, the family centerpiece of this futuristic BCT. The used to provide precision fires. of vehicles that constituted its back- FCS included 18 different systems all bone did not. Instead, the senior mili- connected through an advanced com- The proven value of these platforms, tary leadership sought a new ground- munications network. Robotic assets even in urban areas, resulted in combat vehicle with greater applicabil- and a variety of line-of-sight, non-line- renewed Army interest. Heavy-force ity to the types of conflicts in which of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight programs began to receive greater the Army was already engaged and weaponry completed the ensemble of attention and funding than they had would likely continue to be into the technologies. The FCS intended to before the war. Development work on foreseeable future. This decision un- package lethality equivalent to or bet- the FCS continued, but its pace slowed derscored the importance of the prov- ter than that of the Abrams tank with as funding shifted to support more en Abrams/BFV team, supplemented

90 October-December 2015 by the Stryker platform. These vehicles also reinforced armor training efforts intended to ensure that mounted Soldiers retained the ability to execute combined-arms maneuver even as they mastered COIN principles and applied them in Iraq and Afghani- stan. This balance found reflection in doctrinal developments and in organi- zational changes intended to ensure that armor retained its traditional ver- satility and decisiveness. Army Trans- formation efforts included the creation of standard BCTs intended either for independent action or as part of a larg- er formation. These modular organiza- tions made the BCT rather than the di- vision the Army’s principal maneuver unit. Armored BCTs included armor and mechanized infantry integrated into combined-arms battalions and supported by a reconnaissance squad- ron, while infantry and Stryker BCTs provided capabilities suited for light- force requirements. These new brigade elements shaped the nature of training programs and doctrinal developments and helped establish armor’s path of future development. Now and future This is a time of significant change in the Armored Force. Not since we trad- ed in our horses for tanks have we made such significant and far-reaching changes to our formations, training and leader development. However, re- gardless of ongoing changes, the en- during mission sets that have made ar- mor and cavalry forces the “combat arm of decision” will continue to make the Armor Branch an indispensable part of the combined-arms team. There are key and dynamic areas of Figure 5. Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat change that are impacting the Ar- Team, 1st Cavalry Division, scan for threats atop an M1A1 Abrams tank during mored Force: Army Transformation to Exercise Combined Resolve II at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in modular units, restructuring Active Hohenfels, Germany, May 19, 2014. Combined Resolve II is a multinational de- Component (AC) and Reserve Compo- cisive-action training environment exercise occurring at the Joint Multination- nent (RC) forces, and establishment of al Training Command’s Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr training areas that in- the Maneuver Center of Excellence volves more than 4,000 participants from 15 partner nations. The intent of the exercise is to train and prepare a U.S. led multinational brigade to interoper- (MCoE). ate with multiple partner nations and execute unified land operations against Army transformation to modular a complex threat while improving the combat readiness of all participants. units. The Armored Force is converting (U.S. Army photo by SPC Bryan Rankin) from a tank-heavy to a reconnaissance- heavy, 20 infantry and eight Stryker Guard (ARNG) is currently undergoing heavy branch, with the conversion to BCTs. In addition, there will be three combined-arms battalions and the in- a significant transformation concurrent AC reconnaissance and surveillance clusion of a reconnaissance squadron with the AC. This transformation will brigades. in all maneuver brigades. The project- result in a significant transition of ed Fiscal Year 2017 endstate is now 15 AC/RC force mix. The Army National maneuver formations. The ARNG

91 October-December 2015 structure will consist of 28 ARNG heritage page, http://www.benning. Armor insignia maneuver brigades. The current army.mil/armor/eARMOR/Heritage. proposed mix will be seven heavy, 20 html. The original triangular armor in- infantry and one Stryker BCT. The signia was designed in 1918 and transformation has eliminated the was worn by the World War I “enhanced brigade” concept of the Tank Corps and subsequent tank past. Acronym Quick-Scan units of the infantry. The colors of the shoulder patch were blue MCoE. Based on the 2005 Base Re- AC – Active Component for infantry, red for artillery and alignment and Closure decision, the ACAV – Armored Cavalry yellow for cavalry – the three ba- Armor School moved to Fort Benning Assault Vehicle sic components of armor. The in- to create the MCoE. This move ensures ACR – armored cavalry signia symbolized the union of that we train and develop Soldiers as regiment the three forces. The basic de- we fight: as a combined-arms team. AGS – Armored Gun System ARNG – Army National Guard sign and combination of colors Much of the development mission – BCT – brigade combat team remain in today’s armor insignia. doctrine, training, organization and BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle materiel systems – will be combined at BMP – boyeva mashina pekhoty In 1940, the superimposed fig- the MCoE level. CFV – Cavalry Fighting Vehicle ures, taken from the shoulder in- COIN – counterinsurgency An area that observers have said the signia of 7th Cavalry Brigade FBCB2 – Force XXI Battle United States needs to develop is in (Mechanized), were added to the Command Brigade and Below our lack of effective short-range, mo- FCS – Future Combat System triangular design. The tank track bile air-defense vehicles to accompany IED – improvised explosive stands for mobility and armor armored units. The United States’ reli- device protection, the gun represents ance on air supremacy is demonstrat- MBT – main battle tank firepower and the lightning bolt MCoE – Maneuver Center of ed in this area, but most other coun- denotes shock effect. These tri- Excellence tries accompany their armored forces ple characteristics of the tank are MGS – Mobile Gun System with highly mobile self-propelled anti- embodied in armor’s striking NATO – North Atlantic Treaty aircraft guns such as the German Ge- Organization power. pard or the Soviet 9K22 Tunguska; NTC – National Training Center short- and medium-range surface-to- RC – Reserve Component The armor shoulder-sleeve insig- RPG – rocket-propelled grenade nia was originally approved Oct. air missile (SAM) systems such as the RSTA – reconnaissance, 21, 1954. It was redesignated for SA-6, SA-8 and SA-11; or both on the surveillance and target the Armor School June 26, 1956. same vehicle combined (the Tunguska, acquisition The insignia was amended July for example, can also host SA-19 SAM SAM – surface-to-air missiles). The usage of anti-aircraft SBCT – Stryker brigade combat 16, 1957, to change the wording team in the tab’s description. On Dec. rounds fired from the main gun of a tank has been increasing over the TOW – tube-launched, optically 3, 1964, the insignia was redes- tracked, wire-guided ignated for the U.S. Army Armor years. An example is the HE-FRAG School. The shoulder-sleeve in- round from the T-90, which can be det- signia was amended Nov. 5, onated at a set distance as determined 1970, to revise the design to by its laser rangefinder. make the insignia and tab one Adapted from U.S. Army Armor School piece. Pamphlet 360-2, This is Armor, and other sources. Adapted from U.S. Army Armor School Pamphlet 360-2, This is Armor. Further reference U.S. Army Armor School Pamphlet 360-2, This is Armor. Armor Museum Director Len Dyer discusses tank development in “Tank Talk” on Fort Benning TV, https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=tSXR72MUruM. The Sheridan tank dedication on Eubanks Field July 10, 2015 is featured at https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=kZf3L_5pXfI. More historical articles can be found in the “Armor” section of eARMOR’s

92 October-December 2015 2015 Marks 2 Important Anniversaries This year marks the 50th anniversary of Nov. 15, 1965; this is the only medal of served almost nine months as execu- the Battle of Ia Drang and the 25th an- valor the Army awarded to a civilian tive officer for Company A 2/7 Cav – niversary of Operation Desert Shield, during the Vietnam War. serving under Sugdinis) disputed that the precursor to Operation Desert the Americans had been beaten at the Storm or the First Gulf War. ‘Battle that changed disastrous encounter at LZ Albany: “We everything’ killed more of them than they got us. Battle of Ia Drang Former leaders from 1/7 and 2/7 Cav- We got caught with our pants down The Maneuver Center of Excellence alry participated in leadership profes- but recovered enough to kick ass.” commemorated the 50th anniversary of sional-development sessions at Fort The Battle of Ia Drang was also one of the Vietnam War’s Battle of the Ia Benning Nov. 24. Leaders from 1/7 in- Drang Valley Nov. 23-24. The bloody the first battles to popularize the U.S. cluded retired COL Ramon “Tony” Nad- concept of the “body count” as a mea- fights at landing zones (LZs) X-Ray and al, retired CSM Southern “Buddy” Albany tested the air cavalry in its in- sure of success. American losses, espe- Hewitt, retired SFC Clyde “Ernie” Sav- 2 st th cially at LZ Albany, were severe. fancy. Veterans from 1 Battalion, 7 age, retired COL Walter “Joe” Marm Jr. nd Cavalry, and the newly created 2 Bat- and retired LTC William Franklin. Lead- Galloway later described Ia Drang as th talion, 7 Cavalry, were in fierce fire- ers from 2/7 who spoke were retired “[t]he battle that convinced [North fights with the North Vietnamese Army MAJ Joel E. Sugdinis, J.L. “Bud” Alley Vietnamese leader] Ho Chi Minh he (NVA) for the first time in the Vietnam Jr., James T. Lawrence and S. Lawrence could win.” Moore said, “[The] peasant War. Gwin. soldiers [of North Vietnam] had with- The initial North Vietnamese assault stood the terrible high-tech firestorm MG Scott Miller, commander of the delivered against them by a superpow- against 1/7 Cavalry’s landing at LZ X- Maneuver Center of Excellence, spoke Ray was repulsed after two days and er and had at least fought the Ameri- to the assembled leaders during the cans to a draw. By their yardstick, a nights of heavy fighting Nov. 14-16, sessions, explaining that the lessons 1965. The Americans inflicting major draw against such a powerful oppo- that came out of LZ X-Ray and LZ Alba- nent was the equivalent of a victory.” losses on North Vietnamese regulars ny were timeless. Some leadership and Viet Cong guerrillas.1 In a follow- points from the sessions follow. With this as the context, the speakers’ up surprise attack Nov. 17, the North overall theme was that training saved Vietnamese overran the marching col- The Battle of Ia Drang has been touted the day for U.S. Soldiers. The 2/7 umn of 2/7 Cavalry near LZ Albany in as “the battle that changed every- speakers emphasized that there were the most successful ambush against thing.” For Americans, it was the begin- three factors for them as they were U.S. forces of the war. Both sides suf- ning of a new kind of warfare using he- ambushed at LZ Albany: bad tactics for fered heavy casualties. licopters. The battle was also a histori- the terrain (they were strung out in a cal turning point because it changed The seminal work on Ia Drang remains line, with the company commanders American involvement from advisers the 1992 book We Were Soldiers Once called away from their units); the ter- and materiel support to full-scale com- … And Young by retired LTG Hal G. rain itself (the elephant grass cloaked bat. The battle was also seen as a blue- Moore and journalist Joseph L. Gallo- enemy fighters); and 2/7’s ragtag na- print for tactics by both sides: the way. Galloway was guest speaker at the ture (Alley said of his unit, “We’re not Americans used air mobility, artillery commemorative dinner Nov. 24 at the a company, we’re a gaggle” and point- fire and close air support to accom- National Infantry Museum, Fort Ben- ed out that 2/7 had never moved as a plish battlefield objectives, while the ning, GA. Galloway is a former United unit overland). Only training saved the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Press International reporter who Americans from an even bigger disas- Viet Cong forces learned they could served 16 months as a war correspon- ter. neutralize U.S. firepower by quickly en- dent in Vietnam beginning in April gaging American forces at very close Nadal – Nadal thought there was one 1965 – shortly after the first American range. In fact, North Vietnamese COL other factor: “The role of the leader in combat troops landed on China Beach Nguyen Huu An included his lessons a battle of this intensity [1/7 Cavalry at in Danang. Galloway returned to Viet- from the battle at LZ X-Ray in his orders LZ X-Ray] is essential,” he said. He cred- nam on three other tours in 1971, for LZ Albany: “Move inside the col- ited Moore with the unit’s survival. 1973 and 1975, when he covered the umn, grab them by the belt, and thus fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam. Nadal’s Vietnam service included com- avoid casualties from the artillery and On May 1, 1998, the Army belatedly mand of Detachment A and Camp Nam air.” awarded Galloway a Bronze Star with Dong in the jungles of northwest South V for rescuing a badly wounded soldier Both sides thought this battle to be a Vietnam. Leading a force of 400 South under heavy fire in the Ia Drang Valley success for them. In fact, Gwin (who Vietnamese and Nung soldiers, he

93 October-December 2015 conducted patrols along the Laotian FO. Savage said border and engaged in ambushes, re- that during the ex- connaissance and an intensive civic-ac- change of fire, the tion program. Upon returning from radio was shot up Vietnam, Nadal attended the Armor and jammed open Officer Career Course and Pathfinder in its frequency. School, then he volunteered to return Herrick, the pla- to Vietnam. Nadal commanded Com- toon sergeant, the pany A 1/7 Cav and served as S-3 of 2/7 artillery FO and Cav. During his Vietnam tour, Nadal, the mortar FO the only commander with experience were wounded or in Vietnam, was engaged in heavy in- dead. fantry combat in the Ia Drang Valley. “Artillery saved us He received the Silver Star for his ac- from annihilation, tions in the Battle of Ia Drang. but training put us Nadal credited training for Savage’s in position to be ability to command the “Lost Platoon.” able to use artil- “Moore’s philosophy was to train two lery,” Savage de- levels down,” Nadal recalled, “so when clared. Savage lost his platoon leader and pla- toon sergeant, he – as an assistant pla- Marm – Then-2LT toon sergeant – was able to assume Marm was platoon nd command.” leader of 2 Pla- toon, Company A, Savage – Savage began the Battle of Ia 1/7 Cav. During Drang leading a squad from 2nd Pla- the Battle of Ia toon, Company B, 1/7 Cav. After the Drang, he single- death of his platoon leader and most handedly attacked of his platoon, Savage found himself an enemy posi- outnumbered, surrounded and cut off tion. When shot in from the rest of his battalion. His swift the jaw, he mod- action and successful leadership of the estly summarized, “Lost Platoon” resulted in many enemy “That ended my Figure 1. The Chu Pong Massif and Ia Drang. casualties. He demonstrated personal day,” but his Med- bravery as he called for supporting ar- al of Honor (MoH) citation recounts the way to the next LZ, Sugdinis said tillery fire within 50 meters of his loca- several examples of conspicuous gal- 2/7’s mission was to check for/recover tion and fought back a number of at- lantry, some despite being severely a downed pilot,3 then go to LZ Albany. tacks throughout his platoon’s isola- wounded. The epitomy of a leader, Sugdinis said they didn’t have a mis- tion. For his actions that day, he re- “Marm’s selfless actions reduced the sion at LZ Albany; they were just told ceived the Distinguished Service Cross. fire on his platoon, broke the enemy to go. His leadership point here was assault and rallied his unit to continue that Soldiers should ask for more infor- Savage reflected on persistent criticism toward the accomplishment of this mation to ensure they are clear about of his platoon leader’s actions in pur- mission,” according to the MoH cita- their mission. suing the enemy, becoming separated tion. from the rest of his unit (which created Despite the lack of a clearly defined the Lost Platoon). “The lieutenant (LT This courageous soldier offered as a mission, Sugdinis calmly and effective- Henry Herrick) was technically and tac- leadership point that communication ly maneuvered Company A 2/7 as his tically proficient but did not have ex- was very important. company led 2nd Battalion in its move- perience,” Savage recalled. “The lieu- ment from LZ X-Ray to LZ Albany. As tenant’s mistake was that he did not Sugdinis – As one of the speakers for the spearhead, Alpha Company provid- analyze the consequences of his deci- 2/7 offering lessons-learned about the ed security for the battalion command sion.” battle at LZ Albany, Sugdinis criticized when the rest of the unit was cut off his leadership’s decision-making that by the North Vietnamese. Savage said his platoon moved as a day. Commanding Company A 2/7 dur- well-trained infantry platoon but spot- ing the Battle of Ia Drang, Sugdinis said Sugdinis also objected to the assertion ted the enemy moving down a dry that when the fighting ended at LZ X- by Moore and Galloway in their book creek bed; Herrick pressed forward to Ray Nov. 16, his unit was ordered to We Were Soldiers Once … and Young intercept them. Herrick’s platoon had clear out of that LZ, as B-52s were on that he had ordered the grass hut 27 people, but three did not belong to their way from Guam and there had to burned that likely had alerted the NVA the platoon: the medic, the artillery be at least two kilometers empty of to the Americans’ presence. “I did not forward observer (FO) and the mortar friendlies around the target area. On order that,” he declared. “We [my unit]

94 October-December 2015 left the hooch intact.” as the executive officer for Company D had not trained together; we didn’t 2/7 Cav at the Battle of Ia Drang. He know each other,” Alley said. As the B-52s were making their bomb- had been the recon-platoon leader 20 A battalion of 500 had shrunk to 300 ing runs on the Chu Pong Massif, LT D.P. days earlier. Wounded during the in- Soldiers by November 1965, as it was “Pat” Payne, the reconnaissance-pla- tense fighting at LZ Albany, Lawrence the monsoon season in Vietnam and toon leader, was walking around some was awarded a Bronze Star. His book, troops were getting malaria and termite hills when he came upon a Reflections on LZ Albany: The Agony trenchfoot. Many of the lieutenants resting North Vietnamese soldier. of Vietnam, is reviewed in this edition were beginning to get sick. By the end Payne jumped on the PAVN trooper of ARMOR. and took him prisoner. Simultaneously, of October 1965, 2/7 had a new battal- about 10 yards away, his platoon ser- Lawrence’s leadership point was “Trust ion commander; new S-3, S-2 and S-4 geant captured a second PAVN soldier. your gut” – his intuition had told him officers; plus two new company com- As word of these captures reached that the “Green Wall” alongside their manders. corridor of approach to LZ Albany was him, battalion commander LTC Robert As much as 2/7 Cav had a leadership perilous. The Green Wall referred to an McDade ordered a halt as he went for- vacuum, Alley saw a strong leader at area of small trees and elephant grass. ward from the rear of the column to 1/7 Cav. He said that after the battle The NVA had allowed the Americans to interrogate the prisoners personally, for LZ X-Ray, reporters came to see walk past them as they lay camou- accompanied by his command group. Moore. “This stern, stoic man, a man flaged in the grass and collapsed on The prisoners were policed up about a of men, teared up when talking about them from all sides as they were strung hundred yards from the southwestern the heroism of his Soldiers,” Alley said. out in the corridor and into LZ Albany edge of LZ Albany. “This taught me that you can love your itself. Payne and his sergeant had men.” McDade then called his company com- caught the two NVA soldiers, but three manders forward for a conference, had gotten away and reported to their As far as his own part in leading most of whom were accompanied by headquarters – Lawrence believed wounded soldiers to safety and escap- their radio operators, and this is where they were NVA recon. As the Ameri- ing LZ Albany, Alley said he crawled all Sugdinis said McDade erred. Alpha cans were vulnerable, the Green Wall the way to LZ Columbus. Since he and Company (Sugdinis’ company) moved “erupted” with an NVA ambush. the wounded men with him were out- forward to LZ Albany, accompanied by side the perimeter, he feared being McDade and his command group. Del- Another leadership point from Law- rence was to perform repetitious train- shot by friendly fire. “This was the lon- ta Company, which was next in the col- gest night of my life,” Alley said. umn following Company A, held in ing so that actions in combat are auto- place, as did Charlie Company, which matic. “There’s not too much training Gwin – Another author among the was next in line. Headquarters and that goes on in the U.S. Army,” he em- group, Gwin demonstrated valor in Headquarters Company (HHC) fol- phasized. personally closing with and killing en- lowed, and Company A, 1st Battalion, Lawrence also said that McDade had emy soldiers during the harrowing 5th Cavalry, brought up the rear of the called ceasefire because he thought his events at Ia Drang. As the executive of- column. The effect was that the Amer- battalion’s Company C was firing on ficer of Company A 2/7 Cav, he person- ican column was halted in open terrain them – he didn’t realize it was NVA – ally repelled a number of attacks on and strung out in 550-yard line of but Lawrence saw NVA coming at him the company’s command group once march. Most of the units had flank se- from the Green Wall, so he ignored his he arrived at LZ Albany. He was award- curity posted, but the men were worn battalion commander in battle. Law- ed the Silver Star for his valor at Ia out from almost 60 hours without rence wryly said he didn’t recommend Drang. He chronicled his experiences sleep and four hours of marching. The that, but he said he couldn’t follow in Baptism: A Vietnam Memoir. elephant grass was chest high, so visi- McDade’s ceasefire order. bility was limited. The column’s radios As Sugdinis summarized, the battle in- for air or artillery support were with Alley – As the platoon leader for HHC’s tensity was such that the most Purple the company commanders. It was at communications platoon, Alley led his Hearts were awarded for this “one day, this point the NVA ambushed them. men under fire from North Vietnamese one battle”: 250 Purple Hearts. troops at LZ Albany. After being sepa- Sugdinis was also critical of his com- rated from friendly lines, Alley guided Operation Desert mand’s denial of his request for recon- a group of mostly wounded soldiers to Shield/Storm naissance by fire. “If I was able to still the artillery position at LZ Columbus. Operation Desert Shield began after recon by fire [as they approached LZ For his valor, Alley received the Silver the Iraqi army occupied the small oil- Albany], this would have caused the Star. He is the author of The Ghosts of rich country of Kuwait Aug. 2, 1990. enemy to disperse and would have the Green Grass, also reviewed in this Kuwait appealed to the international killed many of them,” Sugdinis said. edition of ARMOR. “And the LZ Albany disaster would not community for help. President George have happened.” Alley emphasized that HHC consisted H.W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into of all noncombatants at that time and Saudi Arabia and urged other countries Lawrence – Promoted shortly before that 2/7 Cav was the “oh shucks battal- to send their own forces; an array of the battle, then-1LT Lawrence served ion.” “We were a green, green unit; we nations joined the coalition, the

95 October-December 2015 Airborne Division moved moved Division Airborne st (Map by Jeff Dahl; used under license) under used Dahl; Jeff (Map by security. provided Regiment Cavalry Armored rd Light Division and American 3 American and Division Light st

96 October-December 2015 Figure 2. Map of Operation Desert Storm ground operations Feb. 24-28, 1991. Shows allied and Iraqi forces. Special arrows indicate the American 101 American the indicate arrows Special forces. Iraqi and allied Shows 1991. 24-28, Feb. operations ground Storm Desert Operation of Map 2. Figure 6 French the where and air by largest military alliance since World ground offensive began. Several tank Kuwait. It took Iraqi forces by surprise. War II. Most of the coalition’s military battles took place, but apart from that, Simultaneously, the U.S. XVIII Airborne forces were from the United States, coalition troops encountered minimal Corps launched a sweeping “left-hook” with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom resistance, as most Iraqi troops surren- attack across southern Iraq’s largely and Egypt as other leading contribu- dered. First Kuwait was liberated, then undefended desert, led by U.S. 3rd ACR tors. coalition troops moved into Iraq. The and 24th Infantry Division (Mecha- war’s ground phase was officially des- nized). An aerial and naval bombardment be- ignated Operation Desert Saber. gan Jan. 17, 1991, continuing for five Battle of 73 Easting weeks. This was followed by a ground Elements of 2nd Brigade, 1st Battalion, assault Feb. 24. This was a decisive vic- 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, directly An example of the speed and surprise U.S. armored forces brought to the tory for coalition forces, who drove the attacked into Iraq Feb. 15, 1991, fol- battlefield was exemplified by the Bat- Iraqi military from Kuwait and ad- lowed by in-force attacks Feb. 20 that vanced into Iraqi territory. The coali- led through seven Iraqi divisions tle of 73 Easting. On Feb. 26, 1991, U.S. tion ceased its advance and declared a caught off guard. From Feb. 15-20, the armored forces from VII Corps squared ceasefire 100 hours after the ground off vs. the Iraqi Republican Guard’s Battle of Wadi Al-Batin took place in- th campaign started. Aerial and ground Tawakalna Division’s 18 Mechanized side Iraq; this was the first of two at- th combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait tacks by 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry. It was Brigade and 37 Armored Brigade. The and areas on Saudi Arabia’s border. a feint attack, designed to make the battle was later described in a docu- Iraqis think that a coalition invasion mentary of the battle as “the last great To be clear, Operation Desert Shield tank battle of the 20th Century.” was the U.S. operational name for the would take place from the south. The coalition buildup of forces and Saudi Iraqis fiercely resisted, and the Ameri- The Battle of 73 Easting refers to the Arabia’s defense from Aug. 2, 1990, to cans eventually withdrew as planned armored-combat action that took Jan. 16, 1991. Operation Desert Storm back into the Wadi Al-Batin. Three U.S. place in the final hours of 2nd ACR’s was the U.S. name of the conflict from soldiers were killed and nine wounded, covering-force operation. During the Jan. 17, 1991, through April 11, 1991. with one Infantry Fighting battle, four of 2nd ACR’s armored-cav- Operation Provide Comfort was the Vehicle turret destroyed – but they had alry troops – Troops E, G and I, with name for the Southwest Asia ceasefire taken 40 prisoners and destroyed five Troop K contributing to Troop I’s fight April 12, 1991, and follow-on actions tanks, and successfully deceived the (totaling about 36 M1A1 tanks) – de- through Nov. 30, 1995. Iraqis. This attack led the way for the feated two enemy brigades. (An “east- XVIII Airborne Corps to sweep around ing” is a north-south coordinate line st After diplomatic negotiations with Sad- behind 1 Cav and attack Iraqi forces measured in kilometers and readable dam Hussein failed, the United Nations to the west. on Global Positioning System receiv- Security Council passed Resolution 678 ers.) Nov. 29, 1990, which gave Iraq until On Feb. 22, 1991, Iraq agreed to a So- Jan. 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait viet-proposed ceasefire agreement. On the one hand was 2nd ACR, a 4,500 and empowered states to use “all nec- The agreement called for Iraq to with- man reconnaissance and security ele- essary means” to force Iraq out of Ku- draw troops to pre-invasion positions ment assigned to VII Corps. It consist- wait after the deadline. A coalition of within six weeks following a total ed of three ground squadrons, an avia- forces opposing Iraq’s aggression was ceasefire, and for monitoring of the tion (attack helicopter) squadron and formed, consisting of forces from Ar- ceasefire and withdrawal to be over- a support squadron. Each ground gentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangla- seen by the United Nations Security squadron was made up of three caval- desh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Council. ry troops, a tank company, a self-pro- Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, pelled howitzer battery and a head- The coalition rejected the proposal, Morocco, , New Zealand, quarters troop. Each troop comprised but said that retreating Iraqi forces Niger, Norway, Oman, , Portu- 120 soldiers, 12-13 M3 Bradley Fight- wouldn’t be attacked and gave 24 gal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, ing Vehicles and nine M1A1 Abrams hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, main battle tanks. The 2nd ACR’s three forces. On Feb. 23, fighting resulted in Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, squadrons consisted of about 4,000 the capture of 500 Iraqi soldiers. On the United Kingdom and the United soldiers. Feb. 24, British and American armored States. forces crossed the Iraq-Kuwait border Opposing them were the two Iraqi bri- Although they did not contribute any and entered Iraq in large numbers, tak- gades, each consisting of between forces, Japan and Germany made fi- ing hundreds of prisoners. Iraqi resis- 2,500 to 3,000 soldiers. nancial contributions totaling $10 bil- tance was light; only four Americans The 2nd ACR’s job was to advance east lion and $6.6 billion respectively. U.S. were killed. as a forward scouting element, led by troops represented 73 percent of the Shortly afterward, the U.S. VII Corps, cavalry scouts in M2A3 Bradleys coalition’s 956,600 troops in Iraq. in full strength and spearheaded by 2nd equipped with highly advanced ther- After the air campaign, which was Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), mals to detect enemy positions. Fol- dubbed “Shock and Awe” by U.S. lead- launched an armored attack into Iraq lowing closely behind were M1A1 ers and the news media, the main early Feb. 24, just to the west of Abrams tanks covering them from the

97 October-December 2015 rear, ready at a moment’s notice to tion, http://www.benning.army.mil/Li- the battle. The equivalent of an Iraqi move forward and engage the enemy. brary/content/McMasterHR%20CPT_ brigade was destroyed at 73 Easting; it The 2nd ACR’s mission was to strip away Battleof73Easting.pdf.) was the first ground defeat of the enemy security forces, clear the way of Republican Guard. Within 24 hours, significant defenses and locate the Re- The operation escalated into a full-out most of the other Iraqi brigades were publican Guard’s defensive positions so battle as Eagle Troop maneuvered to gone. they could be engaged by 1st Infantry 70 Easting. Heavy combat then spread The coalition’s advance was much Division armored forces and artillery. to the south as Troop I closed the gap between the two squadrons and joined swifter than U.S. generals had expect- On the night of Feb. 23-24, 1991, as the fight. Troop G’s attack to the north ed. On Feb. 26, Iraqi troops began re- described previously, VII Corps raced of Troop E made contact with defend- treating from Kuwait after they had set east from Saudi Arabia into Iraq in a ing units farther east, and combat its oil fields on fire (737 oil wells were maneuver later nicknamed the “Hail there became intense. Fighting contin- set on fire). American, British and Mary.” The corps had two goals: cut off ued into darkness as the Iraqi division French forces continued to pursue re- Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and destroy commander reinforced 18th Brigade treating Iraqi forces over the border five Republican Guard divisions near with his 9th Armored Brigade in the and back into Iraq, eventually moving the Iraq-Kuwait border that might at- Troop G zone. to within 150 miles of Baghdad before tack Arab and Marine units moving withdrawing back to Iraq’s border with into Kuwait to the south. Initial Iraqi The 12 M1A1 tanks of Eagle Troop de- Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. stroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, 16 personnel resistance was light and scattered, and One hundred hours after the ground nd carriers and 30 trucks in 23 minutes 2 ACR fought only minor engage- campaign started, on Feb. 28, Bush de- ments until Feb. 25. with no American losses. Then Eagle Troop crested a low rise and surprised clared a ceasefire, and he also declared However, moving through the Repub- an Iraqi tank company set up in a re- that Kuwait had been liberated. lican Guards’ security area along 70 verse slope defense. The Iraqi troops On March 10, 1991, 540,000 U.S. Easting the morning of Feb. 26, 2nd ACR mounted the first determined defense troops began moving out of the Per- encountered Iraq’s heavily armored 2nd ACR had encountered in its three sian Gulf. Tawakalna Division in the north and days of operations, but they were de- 12th Iraqi Armored Division in the cen- stroyed by the better-trained and bet- ter and south. All Iraqi units occupied ter-equipped American troops. Notes well-constructed defensive emplace- 1 “Viet Cong” was what Western sources ments and had prepared alternate po- The Battle of 73 Easting and the move- called the National Liberation Front, the sitions that enabled them to reorient ment-to-contact south of the battle political organization of the People’s Lib- nd to the west to face VII Corps’ attack. brought 2 ACR’s covering-force mis- eration Armed Forces of South Vietnam Despite extensive aerial and artillery sion for VII Corps to its conclusion. that fought the United States and South nd Vietnamese governments during the war. bombardment by U.S. forces, most de- During the operation, 2 ACR covered 2 fending Iraqi units remained effective. the advance of three U.S. divisions in U.S. estimates of American deaths at LZ Sandstorms slowed 2nd ACR’s move- turn, moved 120 miles in 82 hours and X-Ray were 79 killed and 121 wounded; LZ Albany: 155 killed, 124 wounded and four ment throughout the day, restricting fought elements of five Iraqi divisions. The Battle of 73 Easting fixed the missing; LZ Columbus: three killed and 13 visibility to as little as 400 meters wounded; four helicopters shot down, 55 (1,300 feet). southern forces of the Iraqi Republican Guard Corps and permitted the VII damaged. The NVA claimed that U.S. ca- sualties totaled somewhere between Near the east-west coordinate line 00 Corps commander to launch 1st Infan- nd 1,500 to 1,700 soldiers killed. On the oth- Northing, 2 ACR’s Eagle Troop re- try Division into the depths of the Iraqi er side of the body-count “ledger,” the ceived fire from an Iraqi dismounted defenses and on into Kuwait. United States reported the bodies of 634 outpost, a dug-in Iraqi ZSU-23-4 and nd NVA soldiers were found in the vicinity of several occupied buildings in an Iraqi The 2 ACR, which advanced between th LZ X-Ray and estimated that 1,215 NVA village. The American scouts returned the Iraqi 12 Armored Division and the were killed a distance away by artillery fire with their tanks and Bradleys, si- Tawakalna Division, was the only and airstrikes. Six North Vietnamese sol- lenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners American ground unit to find itself diers were captured. Six PAVN crew- and continued east three more kilome- significantly outnumbered and served weapons and 135 individual weap- nd ters. More enemy fire came in and was outgunned. Nonetheless, 2 ACR’s ons were captured, and an estimated 75- st immediately returned. three squadrons, along with 1 Infantry 100 weapons were destroyed. For LZ Al- Division’s two leading brigades, bany, between 403 (body count) and 503 (Editor’s note: Eagle Troop’s actions at destroyed two Iraqi brigades. In NVA soldiers were killed, and at LZ Colum- 73 Easting are the subject of a book re- moving to and through the Battle of 73 bus, at least 27 NVA soldiers were killed. view in this edition of ARMOR: Fires of Easting, 2nd ACR and 1st Infantry North Vietnamese figures for their own casualties were 559 killed and 669 by Mike Guardia. The perspec- Babylon Division’s lead brigades destroyed 160 wounded. Both sides’ estimates of their tive of Eagle Troop’s commander, then- tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 opponent’s casualties are likely inflated. CPT H.R. McMaster, is available in an artillery pieces and more than 80 Galloway thought the battle at LZ X-Ray e-paper, “Battle of 73 Easting,” posted wheeled vehicles – along with several claimed 80 men dead and 124 wounded, to Donovan Research Library’s collec- anti-aircraft artillery systems – during “many of them terribly,” and that the

98 October-December 2015 death toll for the entire battle was 234 helicopter but the canopy was open and Americans killed and perhaps as many as they did not find the pilot. He said the pi- Acronym Quick-Scan 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers. lot’s remains are unrecovered to this day. 3 Sugdinis’ unit found the downed ACR – armored-cavalry regiment FO – forward observer HHC – headquarters and headquarters company LZ – landing zone MoH – Medal of Honor NVA – North Vietnamese Army PAVN – People’s Army of Vietnam

For more resources on Operation Desert Shield / Storm, see the Donovan Research Library Website, under “Digital Collec- tions, Battles and Engagements after 1980, Student Paper Collection” and the archives of ARMOR magazine from 1990- 2015.

99 October-December 2015 Chief of Armor’s Solicitation for Doctrinal Feedback The Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Integrated Weapons Training School milBook site with the commu- Directorate of Training and Doctrine Strategy, June 2015; nity so we collectively have the ability (DOTD) had a busy 2015! To meet the • TC 3-20.31, Training and to shape the next iteration. demands of the environment outlined Qualification, Crew, March 2015; BG Scott McKean in the Army Operating Concept, we Chief of Armor/Commandant • TC 3-20.31-1, Gunnery Skills Test, must review and update our doctrine U.S. Army Armor School November 2015; and regularly. Doing so will provide the Armor School milBook: (www. framework on how the maneuver force • TC 3-20.31-4, Direct Fire milsuite.mil/book/Armored_Force) prevents conflict, shapes security en- Engagement Process, July 2015. Armor School Facebook: (www. vironments and wins wars while oper- Doctrine is the foundational launch facebook.com/usaarms) ating as part of the joint force and point from which units can design, working with multiple partners. build, develop and innovate the ways This year, DOTD published the follow- in which they conquer a constantly ing: changing and unknowable environ- Acronym Quick-Scan ment. I am certain that each of you as • Field Manual (FM) 3-96, Brigade leaders have taken an active role in re- Combat Team; DOTD – Directorate of Training viewing this year’s publications and and Doctrine • FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and have formed opinions, both positive FM – field manual Security Operations; and negative. I encourage everyone to TC – training circular • Training Circular (TC) 3-20.0, share these opinions on the Armor

100 October-December 2015 REVIEWS

observation on his encounter with a in a little rain, noise and wet feet, and Reflections On LZ Albany by James T. hotel clerk and waiter upon his return staying in one position for hours and Lawrence, Marietta, GA: Deeds Pub- from Vietnam: “And for the first time, you might be able to fathom dark.” lishing, 2014, 187 pages with photo- the young ex-officer realized that the graphs, maps and appendix, $19.95. people back home, with the exception His detailed description continues as of family and close friends, had no idea he takes us on the journey from LZ X- The Ghosts of the Green Grass by J.L. what was going on in Southeast Asia, Ray to LZ Albany. The PAVN lie in wait “Bud” Alley, Signal Mountain, TN: Codi and could care even less.” Lawrence for them after “some bright person” Publishing LLC, 2015, 394 pages with takes this phenomenon and writes an burns some huts along the line of photographs, maps and appendix, amazing narrative about fear, sacrifice march. Capturing two prisoners, LTC $29.99. and pain. Writing in the third person, Robert McDade – in command for the he relates that “for the first time, the past three weeks – called his company young lieutenant felt fear, the fear of commanders together to discuss fur- The dictionary defines fear as “a feel- combat, the fear of death; the fear that ther moves. The PAVN forces chose this ing of alarm or disquiet caused by the he had trained to overcome in Air- moment to attack the troops, many of expectation of danger, pain, disaster or borne School, in Ranger School, and whom were low on or out of water and the like.” How men master their fear is had thought about a hundred times on bone-tired in the heat. the focus of two recent publications on the ship coming over and back at base the often-overlooked November 1965 Recalls Alley: “I had no idea what to do camp; but he had no warning and no engagements at Landing Zone (LZ) Al- now, but I wasn’t ready to lie down and idea, no idea whatsoever that this fear bany. Written by participants, both die. Slumped into the ditch, wounded would be so all-consuming, that its books explore the battle from different [PVT] Jimmy Harrison asked me, ‘Sir, hold would be so paralyzing, so relent- perspectives. will you get us out of here?’” How they less, so unyielding.” These are power- eventually survive the ambush forms The action at LZ Albany came about as ful statements on the thoughts that the heart of this spellbinding portion a subset of the larger Battle of the Ia flash through the minds of people of the narrative. Drang. Fought over a four-day period caught in the sudden rush of combat. in November 1965, it was the first His writing will cause many to reflect It would be a simple matter to relate combat action involving Americans on their own experiences in combat. that with the battle over, the wounded st were evacuated, the dead mourned from the newly arrived 1 Cavalry Divi- Complementing Lawrence’s work is and the survivors left with their mem- sion and the People’s Army of Vietnam that of J.L. “Bud” Alley. Alley approach- ories. However, both Lawrence and Al- (PAVN). es the battle from a different perspec- ley provide us a sensitive discussion on tive. An infantry officer, Alley was the The initial PAVN assault against 1st Bat- the notification process, the reuniting battalion communications-platoon talion, 7th Cavalry, on LZ X-Ray took with loved ones and the deep respect leader. As such, he writes about the ac- place Nov. 14-16, 1965. Under the they have for their fallen comrades. tion from the perspective of the bat- command of then-LTC Hal Moore, the talion command group. He begins his Americans inflicted heavy losses upon These are two well-designed and su- narrative as the 2nd Infantry Division the PAVN. Following the action, the di- perbly written narratives on the Viet- transmutes into the airmobile 1st Cav- vision inserted 2nd Battalion, 5th Caval- nam War. nd th alry Division. ry, along with 2 Battalion, 7 Cavalry, The books, however, are not without Alley describes the organized chaos of into the area. shortfalls. In both works, there is an at- moving the division from Fort Benning, tempt to parallel the actions of 2nd Bat- Both books concern themselves with GA, to Vietnam in exacting detail. nd th talion with the battle of Little Big Horn. the actions of 2 Battalion, 7 Cavalry, Along with tactical employment as- At times, this is a tenuous linkage that as they moved from LZ X-Ray to LZ Al- pects, the author weaves into the nar- distracts from the narrative. Also, Al- bany for extraction. rative commentaries on housing, pay, ley’s work suffers from unnecessary staff actions, family life and preparing minutiae. For example, we are given a James T. Lawrence is the former recon- for the emotional trauma of departing detailed description of his hitchhiking naissance-platoon leader and execu- for combat. tive officer of Delta Company, 2nd Bat- from Columbus, GA, to his home; a de- talion, 7th Cavalry. His moving account Once in Vietnam, the narrative gains tailed explanation on the use of a fork- of his Vietnam experience with the momentum as Alley notes, “You can- lift to load supplies; and a tedious re- battalion during their action on LZ Al- not imagine dark until you are ten counting of shipboard life enroute to bany is not so much a battle narrative thousand miles from home in a jungle, Vietnam. This type of data detracted as a reflection on overcoming personal the likes of which you have never seen from the overall narrative. However, fear in the midst of the chaos of close before, in enemy territory, where peo- once Alley begins his battle narrative, combat. He begins his work with an ple will kill you if they find you. Throw the pace of the story gains a

101 October-December 2015 momentum that last until the final strongly factored in the destruction of Europe, and regional scholars. pages of the book. the German Empire. The Soviet Union DR. LESTER W. GRAU rose from the ashes of the Russian Em- Foreign Military Studies Office, These are two fine works on men in pire and factored heavily in the politi- Combined Arms Center, combat. As such, they are a notewor- cal and military interests of Europe and Fort Leavenworth, KS thy addition to our appreciation of the United States for 70 years. Now, how a valiant group of men overcame Russia is again a major political and fear during combat operations in Viet- military interest of Europe and the nam. United States. Lessons leap from the The Fires of Babylon by Mike Guardia, D.J. JUDGE pages of this book on Russia’s ability to Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, COL, U.S. Army (retired) endure, Russia’s bond with fellow Slav- 2015, 248 pages with photographs, ic peoples, Russia’s ability to mobilize $32.95 hardcover. the economy to outproduce more ad- Acronym Quick-Scan vanced industrial powers. The Fires of Babylon focuses on Eagle LZ – landing zone The first key point I take from the book Troop’s encounter with the Tawakalna PAVN – People’s Army of is that Russia was too faithful an ally. If Brigade of Iraq’s Republican Guard dur- Vietnam France was in a jam, Russia would ing the Battle of 73 Easting Feb. 26, launch a diversionary offensive, re- 1991. Commanded by then-CPT H.R. gardless of whether or not the Russia McMaster, Eagle Troop, 2nd Armored army was in a position to do so at that Cavalry Regiment, was the lead ele- time. The second key point is that Rus- ment of VII Corps’ advance into Iraq sia would launch an offensive when a during Operation Desert Storm. Eagle The Russian Army in the Great War: deliberate fighting withdrawal made Troop’s mission was to “find and fix the The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 by David much more operational sense. Republican Guard” as the ground R. Stone, Lawrence, KS: University phase of Operation Desert Storm be- Press of Kansas, 2015, 359 pages with Following the collapse of the Russian gan. maps, notes, index and photographs, Empire, the land was torn by a violent $34.95 hardcover. civil war, where maneuver dominated Tankers may remember that the mighty the fight. Horse cavalry, armored trains M1A1 Abrams main battle tank had not and foot-weary infantry fought across been combat-tested after coming on- The popular image of World War I is le- this vast open land. The experiences of line in the 1980s, nor had the Soviet thal stagnation: hundreds of miles of World War I and the Civil War greatly Union’s T-72, and the Cold War be- continuous trenchworks, where gains influenced the doctrine debates of the tween the superpowers had waned by are measured in yards and casualties 1930s, where the offensive deep battle 1990. As Iraqi dictator Saddam Husse- in thousands. Tanks are only intro- doctrine of Marshal Mikhail Tukachevs- in fielded Soviet-build T-72s in his inva- duced late in the war to break through kiy finally dominated. It influenced the sion of Kuwait Aug. 2, 1990, the tiny the interlocking fields of machinegun early love affair of the Soviet army with emirate collapsed. Saddam Hussein fire and provide an opportunity for ma- the tank and the melding of artillery massed his forces along the Saudi Ara- neuver. This is an accurate portrayal of and maneuver power into an opera- bian border and dared the world to the war in Western Europe. But World tional force that eventually crushed stop him from next invading the King- War I was also fought in the Alps, in the Third Reich. dom of Saud. In response, the United Southern Africa and on the Arabian States led the world community in a The writing and research are first rate. Peninsula, where maneuver was deci- coalition of nations to eject the Iraqis The maps are not. Unfortunately, there sive. Maneuver also dominated East- from Kuwait. ern Europe where the German and are too few maps, and they are printed Austro-Hungarian Empires battled the on a dark grey background, making it There was apprehension: the Iraqi Russian Empire, and hundreds of miles very difficult to see the rivers, the army, after its long war with Iran, had of territory changed hands in days or towns and the whereabouts of the more combat experience than the U.S. weeks. Tanks were not a factor, but Russian army. The seas are in white Army. Could the coalition beat the fast-moving horse cavalry played a and easy to find, but nothing is going world’s fourth-largest army on its dominant role. on there. Unless the reader has a 120- home ground? watt bulb in the bedside lamp, reading David R. Stone, a rising Russian/Soviet the maps is a chore. I solved this prob- Guardia sets the scene thus: “The Iraqi historian, has produced a remarkable lem by keeping a good detailed atlas version of the T-72 tank, known as ‘The work on a little-studied and less-under- beside the bed, but that is not an op- Lion of Babylon,’ had a 120mm main stood theater of a global war. Using tion during air travel. gun that could destroy targets at more Russian archives, Dr. Stone has pro- than 2,000 meters. Weighing in at [41] duced a clear, concise portrayal of Rus- Three cheers to Dr. Stone for a usable tons and covered in armor up to [12] sian participation in World War I – a history. I strongly recommend this inches thick, the Iraqi T-72 could reach fight that destroyed the Russian and book to students of military history, of- speeds in excess of [40] miles per hour. Austro-Hungarian Empires and ficials dealing with Russia and Central Despite the aggressive air campaign,

102 October-December 2015 Saddam still had more than 1,000 of writes. “The explosions around them serious tone of the close-combat are- these tanks sitting combat-ready along were happening so quickly that the na plus the often frustrating but good- the Iraqi defensive lines. These T-72s Iraqis thought they were under attack humored accounts and the intense de- were supported by hundreds of lighter from American aircraft. Yet, by the votion the troopers had for each other armored vehicles, including the Soviet- time they realized what was happen- and their troop commander, then-CPT made BMP. ing, it was too late – the speed and H.R. McMaster. He captures the family rapid fire of the oncoming tanks had dimension as well.” “Headed straight for them was VII overwhelmed them. The enemy simply Corps, with more than 1,000 of their couldn’t believe that a heavy armored “We surprised the enemy on [Feb. own tanks and hundreds of Bradley force could close on them so quickly.” 26],” McMaster summarized. “That Fighting Vehicles. Their M1 Abrams Within a minute of the opening shot, surprise and the bold action and team- tanks were more than [30] tons heavi- Eagle Troop had killed seven enemy work of the troop’s soldiers contribut- er than the T-72, but just as fast, and tanks. The Iraqis panicked; “most of ed to the rout that is now known as the with better armor protection. By sun- what remained were scattered dis- Battle of 73 Easting. In general, the rise on the morning of [Feb. 26, 1991], mounts, running helter-skelter trying Iraqis were unprepared for the [U.S.] these two opposing forces lay only to get a handle on the American jug- Army. Americans are better trained nine miles apart.” gernaut.” In a manner of minutes, Ea- and better equipped. The true decisive As Eagle Troop took the lead for [2nd gle Troop’s nine tanks had eliminated factor, however, was the American sol- ACR], “waiting for them were [39] all 39 tanks defending the Tawakalna dier. He is the best at what he does and tanks [T-72s and T-55s], [14] BMPs and Division’s sector. absolutely dedicated to serving his [40] assorted other armored vehicles country. Our soldiers were aggressive and trucks, together with [200] infan- “The Iraqis had set up a pretty sound in battle yet demonstrated great disci- trymen sitting in the defense,” recalled defense,” McMaster recalled. “It had a ple and compassion for their enemy.” Douglas Macgregor, then the squadron reserve; it had a counter-attack S-3. planned; it had a minefield to disrupt Since the book portrays individual men our movement. But the fatal flaw was at war, those who want to get right Fires is a day-by-day account of Eagle that we gained surprise over them.” into the tank action may find the per- Troop’s breakthrough of the Iraqi lines. sonal vignettes at the book’s beginning nd The 12 American tanks – which by any At around midnight Feb. 27, 1991, 2 a bit slowing, and that is the book’s st calculation didn’t stand a chance – de- ACR passed the battle on to 1 Infantry greatest flaw (if “flaw” is what it can stroyed more than 50 enemy vehicles Division. The Big Red One passed be called). A side note that should be nd within 23 minutes and plowed a hole through 2 ACR’s lines to destroy what of interest is Chris Hedenskog’s unset- through the Iraqi front. America’s ar- remained of the enemy’s defenses far- tling description of the rapid culture mored force more than proved itself ther east. change in West Germany when the able to overcome the T-72. Guardia This book is not a sweeping, through- East/West German border fell and characterizes the Battle of 73 Easting a-general’s-eyes book on strategy. Per- Americans on border duty were con- as “the largest tank battle in American haps retired GEN Fred Franks captures fronted by angry West German mobs history and [it] has since been regard- Fires’ value best in his foreword: “Im- – it is an aspect of the Cold War of ed as ‘the last great tank battle of the peccably researched by interviewing which many are unaware. [20th Century].’” those who were there in E Troop, and Overall, this book is a solid contributor Frankly, the Iraqis couldn’t fire accu- setting the actions in the context of the to the lore on Operation Desert Storm. rately, and after a number of American [2nd Squadron] (and indeed of the 2nd kills, “[a]t this point in the battle, most Armored Cavalry Regiment and VII LISA ALLEY of the Iraqis were confused,” Guardia Corps), [Guardia] captures the deadly Supervisory editor, ARMOR magazine

103 October-December 2015 LETTERS

Dear ARMOR, greatly from area to area. What this in the face of experience that the only The Russians are in Syria, committing view implies, very crucially, is that gov- “moderate” forces to do much against their forces to back up Bashar al- ernments reflect the prevailing tem- ISIS are the Kurds. Thus, in practice, Assad. America and the West recoils in perament of the people and not vice we are teaming up with unsavory protest at this support for an odious versa. groups such as Al-Qaeda affiliates. tyrant, without whose departure they In Putin’s view, the invasion of Iraq and see no hope of an end to the bloody Thus if people readily accept and re- Western support for the Arab Spring Syrian civil war. Putin takes the oppo- spect democratic, humane govern- has undermined brutal but stable gov- site view, seeing Assad as the only ments, governments tend to be demo- ernments and brought chaos and long-term hope for peace and stabili- cratic and humane. If, on the other bloodshed. It can hardly be denied ty. The question of who is right comes hand, they obey only brutal and au- that the suffering of the Syrian people down, in the end, to a matter of psy- thoritarian rulers, rulers tend to be during the civil war is incomparably chology. brutal and authoritarian. In this view if you remove a tyrant, then the result worse than anything suffered under The popular Western view is that peo- is likely to be not a peaceful democra- the Assad regime. ple everywhere are, at the most basic cy, but a new and equally brutal dicta- The same can be said of the situation level, the same. Everyone wants free- tor, or anarchy. in Iraq and Libya and elsewhere. Putin dom, democracy and the rule of law. believes the only real solution is a re- Thus, if a country is ruled by a brutal Recent scientific studies support this gime brutal enough to maintain order, dictator, which Assad certainly is, his last position in that they show liberals and yet not a threat to anyone else. regime reflects his behavior and that and conservatives to have deep-seat- Assad’s regime is about the best on of- of his henchmen. Logically speaking, ed emotional differences with physio- fer. therefore, if you remove the dictator- logical roots. For example, conserva- ship and provide a level of education tives tend to have a larger amygdala, a Science suggests that he is very likely and training, the result should be a portion of the brain involved with right. peaceful democracy. This is why the emotion and threat. These differences DR. JIM PENMAN West so enthusiastically supported the in turn seem to be epigenetic in origin, (Editor’s note: Penman is joint director Arab Spring. It is also, of course, a epigenetics being the new science of a research program into the physiol- large part of what drove the invasion showing how the activity of genes is ogy behind human social behavior. Ma- of Iraq. affected by our early life experiences – and even those of our ancestors. neuver leaders may be interested in his Then there is the other view, which book, Biohistory: Decline and Fall of sees people in different parts of the The West believes that “moderate” in- the West, published by Cambridge world as fundamentally different. Not surgents can defeat ISIS and Assad and Scholars. Penman’s degrees are in his- that everyone in each nation has the bring peace and democracy, if only tory: bachelor’s of arts degree from same disposition, of course, but that backed by enough firepower. This flies LaTrobe University, Melbourne, and the prevailing temperament varies doctorate, also from LaTrobe.)

104 October-December 2015 OR RE RM GIM H A E T N 8 T 6

The colors, blue and white, associate the organization with infantry. The lion symbolizes the power of a tank regiment. The motto trans- lates to “With Great Speed.” The distinctive unit insignia was origi- nally approved for 68th Infantry Regiment March 23, 1937. It was re- designated for 68th Armored Regiment Sept. 18, 1942. It was redes- ignated for 68th Tank Battalion Nov. 22, 1943. The insignia was re- designated for 68th Medium Tank Battalion Aug. 29,1952. It was re- designated for 68th Armor Regiment Nov. 15, 1957. It was amended to update the description Nov. 17, 2010. PB 17-15-4 Headquarters, Department of the Army. PIN 105621-000 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.