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VU Research Portal Gambling with lives for political survival Kuijpers, D. 2018 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Kuijpers, D. (2018). Gambling with lives for political survival: How democratic governments respond to casualties during military interventions. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 08. Oct. 2021 VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Gambling with lives for political survival How democratic governments respond to casualties during military interventions ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor of Philosophy aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen op 5 oktober om 11:45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Dieuwertje Kuijpers geboren te Beverwijk promotor: prof.dr. Barbara Vis copromotoren: dr.Gijs Schumacher prof.dr.Wolfgang Wagner 2 To my irreplaceable friend Anja Krsmanović (1983 – 2008) 3 Content Acknowledgements (in Dutch)………………………………………………………………………7 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 9 Moving away from a US-centric approach ....................................................................... 14 Escalate to avoid losing: Diversionary use of force and Prospect Theory ........................ 20 Implications for future research........................................................................................ 23 CHAPTER ONE Diverting from Domains: Re-reading the Diversionary Use of Force Literature from a Prospect-Theoretical Perspective............................................................................. 26 Abstract............................................................................................................................... 26 I. Assessing Prospect Theory Outside the Laboratory ......................................................... 26 II. Diversionary Use of Force Literature as an Unintended Test of Prospect Theory ............ 28 III. Politically Insecure, Yet Not in a Domain of Losses: Imminent Elections and the Use of Force ............................................................................................................................... 31 IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 33 CHAPTER TWO: Politics pursued by military means: Presenting the Government Responses to Military Interventions Dataset, 1990-2014 ...................................................................... 34 I. Which puzzles can be solved? ................................................................................. 36 II. The Government Responses to Military Interventions Dataset ..................................... 41 Unit of analysis: the government response ................................................................... 41 Case selection: the extension of the IMI-dataset. ......................................................... 45 Description of the government response variable ......................................................... 48 (1) The number of troops ........................................................................................ 50 (2) Type of troops ................................................................................................... 54 (3) Duration ............................................................................................................ 55 (4) Military casualties .............................................................................................. 57 III. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 59 CHAPTER THREE: Rally around all the flags: The effect of military casualties on incumbent popularity in 10 countries 1990-2014 ................................................................................. 62 I. Testing casualty aversion ...................................................................................... 65 II. Rally ‘round all the flags? ........................................................................................ 67 III. Design and methods ............................................................................................. 70 Description of the dependent variable .......................................................................... 70 4 IV. Estimation method ................................................................................................ 77 V. Findings ..................................................................................................................... 78 V. Conclusion & discussion ........................................................................................... 86 CHAPTER FOUR: ............................................................................................................... 90 Don’t mention the war vs escalating commitment: political party responses to military casualties (co-authored with Gijs Schumacher) ................................................................... 90 I. Strategic options of government parties.................................................................... 93 II. Strategic options of opposition parties ...................................................................... 96 III. Ideology, 9/11, and commitment ........................................................................... 98 IV. Design and methods ........................................................................................... 100 Description of the dependent variable ........................................................................ 100 Description of the independent variables ................................................................... 102 Estimation method ..................................................................................................... 105 V. Do parties become more positive or more negative about the military? .................. 108 VI. Robustness checks ............................................................................................. 110 VII. Conclusion & discussion ..................................................................................... 111 CHAPTER FIVE “Well, that escalated quickly” .................................................................. 115 Testing changes in troop commitment during military interventions (1990-2014) .............. 115 I. When success matters ........................................................................................... 119 II. Strategic options for governments .......................................................................... 120 III. Domestic political indicators ................................................................................ 126 IV. Design and methods ........................................................................................... 127 Unit of analysis and Dependent variable .................................................................... 128 Independent variables ................................................................................................ 130 Estimation Technique ................................................................................................ 134 V. Do governments increase their commitment? ......................................................... 136 VI. Does a secure position in office matter? ............................................................. 142 VII. Robustness checks ............................................................................................. 144 VIII. Conclusion and discussion .................................................................................. 145 References ....................................................................................................................... 149 APPENDIX ONE: Codebook: Government Responses to Military Interventions Dataset 1990 – 2014 ............................................................................................................................... 173 I. Background and Definitions .................................................................................... 173 II. Variable list ............................................................................................................. 175 5 III. Additional variable information ............................................................................ 177 Troops ......................................................................................................................