Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden Torbjörn Bergman ^\ v £ <0 * O . V Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden AKADEMISK AVHANDLING Som med vederbörligt tillstånd av rektorsämbetet vid Umeå universitet för vinnande av filosofie doktorsexamen framlägges till offentlig granskning vid statsvetenskapliga institutionen Hörsal B, Samhällsvetarhuset Fredagen den 31 mars 1995, kl 13.15 av Torbjörn Bergman Fil kand Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation. An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden. Torbjörn Bergman, Department of Political Science, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden. ISSN 0349-0831, Research Report 1995:1 Distribution: Department of Political Science, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Abstract This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments? Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutionalism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal s eeking (micro-logic) of actors. Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangemen ts and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. Key words: Coalition theory, government formation, winning minority governments, support party, parliamentary democracy, constitutional rules, constitutional design, new institutionalism, multiple party goals, expected utility model, bargaining position. Constitutional Rules and Party G oals in Coalition Formation Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coali tion Formation. An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden. Torbjörn Bergman, Department of Political Science, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden. ISSN 0349-0831, Research Report 1995:1 Distribution: Department of Political Science, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Abstract This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments? Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutional ism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal seeking (micro-logic) of actors. Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangements and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. Key words: Coalition theory, government formation, winning minority governments, support party, parliamentary democracy, constitutional rules, constitutional design, new institutionalism, multiple party goals, expected utility model, bargaining position. Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation An Analysis of Winning Minority Governments in Sweden Torbjörn Bergman Department of Political Science Umeå University, Sweden Research Report 1995:1 ISSN 0349-0831 ISBN 91-7191-016-6 © Torbjörn Bergman Printed at the Umeå University Printing Office Contents Acknowledgements ix L Constitutional Rules and Party Goals 1 Introduction 1 My Research Questions 2 Party Goals and Rules In Coalition Theory 3 A Hypotheti cal Example 5 My Approach 9 New Institutionalism 10 The Outline of the Study 13 2. Potential Problems and Methodological Choices 22 Introduction 22 Two Fundamental Issues 22 Complementary Approaches 24 Definitions of Concepts and Terms 28 A Coalition and Related Terms 28 Institutions and Related Terms 30 Methods and Sources 31 3. Government Formation Rules and Minority Governments in a Comparative Perspective 40 Introduction 40 The Comparative Empirical Record 40 Government Formation Rules 41 The Empirical Record 46 Conclusion 51 4. Constitutional Arrangements and Coalition Theory: The Case of Sweden 56 Introduction 56 The History of Coalition and Government Formation 56 The History of Portfolio Allocation 58 Constitutional Arrangements 61 Parliamentary Procedures 61 V Electoral Laws 64 Administrative Institutions 65 Extra-Parliamentary Influences 65 Electoral Support and Voter Alignment 67 The Policy Dimension(s) 69 Party and Government Positions 71 Government Positions 76 Conclusion 80 5. A Model for the Study of Multiple Goals in Multiple Arenas 86 Introduction 86 The Model 87 A Rational Choice Explanation 88 Why this Particular Model? 90 Who is the Actor? 93 Party Goals 94 Multiple Arena s 95 Further Model Assumptions 100 Intrinsic and Instrumental Goals 100 Searching for Expected Utilities 102 Leaders, Activists and Voters 103 How I Intend to Use the Model 106 Preference Formation 106 Decision Theory and Game Theory 107 Strategy 108 Model Prerequisites 110 6. Multiple Goals and Multiple Arenas in Constitutional Design: Why the Speaker Proposes the New Prime Minister 117 Introduction 117 Political and Institutional Background 120 The Compromise in Torekov 123 The Social Democratic Proposal 124 The Center and Liberal Parties 129 The Conservative Decision 131 Conclusion 138 7. The Design of the Voting Rule 146 Introduction 146 The Two Commissions 147 The Second Comm ission 150 vi Why Vote? 151 A Negative Vote 152 An Absolute Vote 153 From a Compromise to a Constitution 154 The Recent Debate and the Rule in Practice 156 Conclusion 161 8. The Bargaining Position of Support Parties 166 Introduction 166 Support Parties and Bargaining Position 167 A Support Party: The Communist Party 169 A Support Party: The Social Democratic Party 181 Discussion 186 9. The Main Results and a Future Research Agenda 191 Introduction 191 The Main Results 191 An Invitation to a Research Agenda 194 The Swedish Case 194 A Comparative Study of Germany and Sweden 197 The European Arena 200 References 203 Appendices: Appendix I The Quantitative Content Analysis 222 Appendix II Electoral Results 1944-1968, Votes and Seats 230 Appendix III An Example of a Prisoners Dilemma Game 232 vii Acknowledgements Much of the enjoyment I got from working on this study came from the intellectual puzzles that guided my work. First I was struck by the peculiar voting rule assumed in coalition theory. Later I realized the usefulness of trying to model multiple party goals. Since then my work has been about trying to study rules and party goals from the perspective of "new institutionalism". By now, I owe a lot of thanks to a lot of people. Let me mention at least a few. At the Department of Political Science in Umeå, where the dissertation was finally completed, a small advising group composed of Svante Ersson, Bertil Hanson and Kjell Lundmark suggested significant improvements in the manuscript. I also got numerous helpful suggestions from Johan Eriksson, Rolf Hugoson, Anders Lidström, Sten Markgren, Håkan Myrlund, Lars Ricknell, Per Viklund and other participants of the department's weekly seminars. A special thanks to Professor Gunnel Gustafsson