PB 80–91–1 Winter 1991 Vol. 4, No. 1

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Civil Affairs

PB 80Ð91Ð1 Winter 1991 Vol. 4, No. 1 From the Commandant Special Warfare

In contemporary military activities, one of the pri- and reserve, under the Army Civil Affairs and mary considerations for commanders and their sol- PSYOP Command. diers is the importance of the civilian population to In 1992, new tables of organization and equipment the success of their operations. for Civil Affairs foreign-internal-defense and uncon- This is true whether we are trying to mobilize ventional-warfare battalions will provide detach- local public support for operations in low-intensity ments more precisely tailored for the various CA conflict or minimizing civilian interference in con- missions in LIC. These FID/UW battalions will be ventional operations. reserve component; the one active battalion will The awareness of the role of the civilian populace remain a general-support battalion, and we will has brought increased emphasis and much-deserved need to harmonize AC and RC capabilities into our recognition to the military forces organized and doctrine as well as our organizational and opera- trained to work in civil-military matters — Civil tional concepts. Affairs. In addition to its reserve Civil Affairs Branch, the CA is invaluable at all levels of conflict, whether Army two years ago added Functional Area 39 to assisting special-operations or conventional forces. give active-duty CA and PSYOP officers specific CA civic-assessment teams can assist operations training, career management and repetitive assign- planning by providing a picture of the cultural envi- ments. Now the Army has approved a separate ronment in a particular area and identifying sources enlisted career management field for reserve-compo- of host-nation logistics and services. Through CA nent Civil Affairs specialists. MOS 38A will offer sol- activities of humanitarian and civic assistance and diers opportunities for training and career progres- population and resource control in LIC, we can often sion within their MOS while allowing the Army to remove the causes of unrest and deny mobility and identify their skills for repetitive assignments. We supplies to insurgents, thereby defeating upheaval are already at work to develop resident and non-resi- by more peaceful means and at a much lower cost. In dent instruction, training literature, basic and conventional operations, CA objectives are to bring a advanced NCO courses and skill-qualification tests normal life back to the inhabitants of a country — by for this new MOS. providing shelter to dislocated civilians and rebuild- We have also developed a new doctrinal manual on ing or restarting civilian government and services. Civil Affairs, FM 41-10, which is now being put into Although history provides many examples of the final-draft form. A second CA manual in progress, need to care for and deal with civilians in war zones, FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Functions, will provide how- it was not until World War II that the U.S. began to instruction in the 20 mission areas of Civil using forces designed for that purpose. In that war Affairs. and in Vietnam, Civil Affairs operations proved the As we move toward a future dominated by low- value of protecting and winning the support of the intensity conflict, and as reduced military budgets civilian populace. dictate waging war by integrated military and diplo- In recent operations in Grenada and Panama, CA matic activities, Civil Affairs, along with other SOF, units demonstrated their ability to care for civilians will play an increasingly important role in keeping in the combat area and to restore civil government the peace, projecting U.S. influence and protecting and services as quickly as possible so that govern- our national-security interests. ment could resume its responsibilities. CA personnel are currently active in Kuwait, assisting to rebuild the government in the wake of Iraqi occupation. As the role of Civil Affairs has become more prominent and the need for CA forces greater, our doctrine, training and force structure have changed Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto to keep pace. Recent realignment of the Army Spe- cial Operations Command has placed all Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces, active PB 80Ð91Ð1 Contents Winter 1991 Special Warfare Vol. 4, No. 1

Features Commander & Commandant Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto 4 Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors in Contemporary Conflict Editor by Col. Rudolph Barnes Jr. Jerry D. Steelman 12 The Civil Affairs FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for Graphic Art Director SOF in LIC Operations Bruce S. Barfield by Maj. Robert G. Brady

18 Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENTCOM by Col. Ronald M. Smith

28 Civil Affairs in Operation Just Cause

VE AS R I RT T A E S LI B 38 Seal the Victory: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs E T by Stanley Sandler

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Cen- ter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is 42 Converting from H- to L-Series TOE: An Impossible Task for to promote the professional development of special opera- Civil Affairs? tions forces by providing a forum for the examination of both established doctrine and new ideas. by Lt. Col. Larry Wayne Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 44 The Truth About Promotion to Major: A No-nonsense Guide Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and for Officers Facing the Major’s Promotion Board should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK- SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: AUTOVON by Lt. Col. (P) Thomas Davis III 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copy- righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the 47 Military Qualification Standards System: Army Framework author. for Leader Development Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special operations units. Individuals desiring a private subscription should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 48 SOLLMIS: New Data Base Preserves SOF Lessons-Learned ton, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Carl E. Vuono Departments General, United States Army Chief of Staff 2 Letters 50 Opinion Official: Patricia P. Hickerson 52 Enlisted Career Notes Colonel, United States Army 54 Officer Career Notes The Adjutant General 56 Update Headquarters, Department of the Army 62 Book Reviews Letters Special Warfare

tion in El Salvador might have been in 1948 as a small group of military ‘The Jesuits’ re-viewed averted. observers assigned to assist Count I took exception to the review of Decker seems to have adopted Folke Bernadotte in his attempt to the book, The Jesuits: The Society of the view that “liberation theology” arrange a cease fire between Jesus and the Betrayal of the is an intrinsic evil. Nowhere in the fledgling Israel and five Arab coun- Roman Catholic Church. The Scriptures does Christ enjoin His tries intent on “driving the Jews review by Lt. Col. David Decker in disciples to go forth and defend the into the sea.” There have been the Winter 1990 issue not only indi- nobility, the landowners and mili- many wars, truces, cease fires and cated an inadequate knowledge of tary cliques. If the Marxists have only one peace accord. Through it the Jesuits, but also a superficial manipulated liberation theology, it all, UN military observers from view of revolutionary warfare. is only because we have, as Colonel many nations have tried to assist in In the latest issue of the Jesuit Decker’s review so well illustrates, the effort to bring genuine peace to periodical, America (29 September allowed them full rein as we set a troubled region. Some of them 90), the Superior General of the ourselves against their agendas. have died in the performance of Jesuit order, Peter-Hans Kolven- Once again we seem to be aligning their duties. bach, discussed the Martin book: ourselves with the privileged Environmentally, the Middle East I think he (Martin) has a novel- against the disenfranchised. Moral is not what you might think; ist’s fertile imagination and that his issues aside, it is a sure recipe for extremes from blistering desert to book is first and foremost a novel another counterrevolutionary fail- snow-capped mountains can be from which the obligatory dis- ure. Instead of looking for Marxist found. Some areas like those along claimer has been omitted: ‘Any priests, we should be learning from the Nile and Jordan Rivers are lush resemblance to actual people or the Jesuits and liberation theology. with vegetation. Egypt’s Sinai events is purely accidental.’ Finally, rather than be worried Peninsula contains some of the most “Martin represents me, for exam- about Soviet penetration of the Soci- forbidding and beautifully rugged ple, as talking to people whom I ety of Jesus, I am concerned that so terrain anywhere on the globe and have never met in my life.” little has been learned from the has a history that spans millenni- The Jesuits, celebrating their annals of revolutionary war by those ums. The entire area provides oppor- 450th year of existence, do indeed charged with teaching it at the Com- tunities for the study of survival infuriate and antagonize people like mand and General Staff College. techniques in wide varieties of ter- me with a rather conservative view- rain and climatic conditions. point, as do the Maryknoll Fathers. Norvell B. De Atkine If one is interested in military I stopped my subscription to the Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) history, it is in abundance there Maryknoll periodical some years Fayetteville, N.C. and has been written on in great ago because of their slavish adula- detail, particularly the subject of tion of Fidel Castro. Nevertheless, UN duty has advantages the various Arab-Israeli wars. The the Jesuits and the Maryknoll Special Forces officers are always opportunity to examine, at first Fathers often represent the only looking to go to strange places, hand, the battlefields near the defender of the poor, the oppressed, meet interesting people and ply Giddi and Mitla passes in the Sinai the landless; they represent the their linguistic skills. This is partic- Desert is a once-in-a-lifetime “Church of the Poor.” To whom else ularly true if they hold a functional chance. can the peasant turn? In my opin- area of either Foreign Area Officer By mission, Special Forces offi- ion, had the entire Church bureau- or Psychological Operations/Civil cers must possess the ability to cracy followed the lead of the rela- Affairs. There may be no better work closely with soldiers of other tively few Jesuits and represented opportunity to do this than a years’ nations. No assignment provides the people instead of the state, the tour of duty with the United more challenges in this regard than likes of Ortega and Castro would Nations Truce Supervision Organi- the UN. Cross-cultural communica- have not come to power in the first zation in the Middle East. tion is an everyday affair. Officers place, and the death and destruc- The organization was established from 15 other countries serve as

2 Special Warfare UN observers (many don’t use UN assignment are many and var- Special Forces Command), have English as their first language). ied. It is without question a unique exchanged their maroon berets for Additionally, observers deal daily tour of duty which is only limited green ones and sewn on their own with the native populations in by the imagination of the officer. flash and unit crest. whatever region they are assigned. The quality of soldiers that are There is a plethora of cultural, Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr. wearing a green beret in these sup- ethnic and religious diversity Maj. Leonard Blevins porting units, male or female, while throughout the region. Although Cmd. and Gen. Staff College good enough to be in that unit Arabic is spoken most commonly, it Fort Leavenworth, Kan. doing his or her job, hardly quali- is spoken in different dialects from fies them to be Special Forces. Morocco to Iraq. (Maj. Blevins completed a UN My suggestion for a solution to This is a joint tour of one year’s tour as senior UN military observer the problem of putting all soldiers duration, although some officers are in the Sinai desert in November of such a diversified command in permitted to extend. With the 1989. Maj. Adolph spent six months common headgear would be to exception of the Chief of the U.S. serving with the UN Military retire the green beret to the JFK Military Observer Group in Observer Group Egypt and six Special Warfare Museum, while it Jerusalem, all billets are designated months assigned to Observation still represents that which it has for either captains or majors. Those Group - Lebanon. Both are SF offi- symbolized, and put all the soldiers who serve here normally receive the cers currently attending CGSC. — under the BDU cap. I wonder how Joint Services Commendation and Editor) many would stay if this were to United Nations Peace Keeping happen? Medals. The environment is one Send beret to museum I need to mention that this is my which is not only joint but combined I would like to use your forum to personal opinion, and while shared and foreign as well. This adds to the get something off my chest that has by many, does not necessarily complexity of the assignment and always been aggravating but reflect the opinion of my command also makes it one of the most fasci- recently became even more so. or the U.S. Army. nating tours available to officers of The late President John F. any branch or service. Kennedy awarded the green beret SFC William A. Easterling Since observation duties are not to Special Forces soldiers, a small, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group time-intensive, a tour with the UN elite unit of highly dedicated profes- Fort Bragg, N.C. is a perfect time to complete CGSC sionals with specialized training in by correspondence or pursue other the art of unconventional warfare. (For uniformity, the 1st Special educational opportunities. The UN The green beret, a mark of excel- Operations Command [now Army also provides 18 days of leave which lence and a symbol of distinction, Special Forces Command] put all can be used for regional travel. was sought after by America’s best its soldiers in the green beret in For the most part American offi- soldiers. Once earned, it was proud- April 1990, according to Maj. Craig cers who serve there are volunteers. ly worn by those who proved them- Barta, USAFC public affairs officer. They come from many branches selves worthy. When the command became the and all services. Although the U.S. I understand that Department of Army Special Forces Command, it does not pay to bring families to the the Army started awarding the adopted the arrowhead shoulder region, many officers do pay out-of- Special Forces tab to be a visual patch formerly worn only by the SF pocket to have their families with designator of that select group of groups, and that, too, is now worn them during the tour. UN per diem men who have earned the title by all members of the command, is generous and helps to cushion “Special Forces.” I also understand including headquarters and support the impact of expenses incurred that non-Special Forces soldiers personnel, Barta said. Only the SF with a family move. Potentially an assigned to one of the SF groups tab and the SF branch insignia officer can be assigned in Syria, would want a green beret to look remain what President Kennedy Egypt, Israel, Jordan and other like the other soldiers in the unit. called, “a mark of distinction.” For countries where peacekeeping is However, many supporting units more on the SF tab and the new required. Currently Americans are not actually assigned to an SF Army SF command, see this issue’s not permitted to serve in Lebanon. group, but assigned to 1st Special “Update” section. — Editor) The challenges and rewards of a Operations Command (now Army

Because of production delays, this is the first issue of Special Warfare since Vol. 3, No. 1, which appeared in August 1990. We regret any confusion which the jump in issue numbers may cause among those who catalog or collect our publication. — Editor

Winter 1991 3 Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors In Contemporary Conflict

by Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.

The end of the Cold War has ush- They owe their strength, ironically Shield/Storm is likely to be the ered in a new world order, and with enough, to the U.S., which has pro- exception that proves the rule for it a need for new military strate- vided their defense needs since most future military operations. gies. The national strategy of con- World War II. As a result of this That rule is that U.S. combat forces tainment has served its purpose; largess, U.S. national strategy is should not be committed in peace- new national-security objectives now constrained by mounting trade time unless the following conditions will require new military strategies and internal budget deficits — this are met: vital national interests are with military capabilities to match. at a time when economic strength at stake; political and military objec- The virtual insolvency of the is as important an index of world tives are clearly defined; the size of Soviet Union and the relative power as military strength. the force is related to those objec- decline of U.S. economic dominance The threat environment has tives; and there is public and con- can be attributed in large part to changed dramatically. There is no gressional support for the commit- the over-extensive military commit- longer an “evil empire” to justify ment. Even if these conditions are ments of these superpowers during U.S. military intervention. The met, the commitment of U.S. forces the Cold War. One or the other was familiar bipolar hegemony of to combat should be a last resort.2 destined to fall, not because of infe- nations has given way to a new Unlike its predecessors Urgent rior military forces or political ide- nationalism, creating a multipolar Fury (Grenada 1983) and Just ology, but by spending beyond its free-for-all for world power. In this Cause (Panama 1989), Desert means. Such “overstretch” is not uncertain geopolitical environment, Shield/Storm, because of its large new; it has been the underlying economic policy and diplomacy will scope, extensive collateral damage, cause of the fall of great powers likely be the primary means of and its purpose to protect national- since the 16th century.1 power projection — but they have security objectives of debatable pri- With the Soviets now relegated to their limits. The military instru- ority, is likely to be the exceptional a lesser role, the dominance of the ment of national power will remain case. U.S. is being challenged by the relevant, but it will have to be close- There are few other peacetime growing economic strength of ly integrated with political and eco- scenarios that would justify such a Japan, the European Common Mar- nomic instruments to be effective. massive deployment of combat ket and a newly unified Germany. In spite of its success, Desert forces to such a distant and deso-

4 Special Warfare late region. Likewise, there are few war’s outcome — but almost without political objectives, and that priori- other places on this earth where exception in modern wars, the peo- ty varies according to the intensity 500,000 U.S. forces could be effec- ple play an integral part. … Popular of conflict. During medium- and tively isolated from local civilians will forms the center of gravity of a high-intensity conflict, military with whom culture clashes would nation’s ability to wage war.”3 objectives at the tactical level pre- otherwise be inevitable. There are two dimensions of the dominate to the exclusion of politi- Large-scale conventional deploy- popular will or public support cal objectives. Enemy forces repre- ments, other than temporary shows required for military operations: one sent the center of gravity, and mis- of force, are economically burden- in the area of operations and the sion success depends upon the some and have a politically limiting other back home. Col. Harry Sum- application of overwhelming mili- effect on U.S. national-security poli- mers has described the vital role of tary force to take and hold strategic cy. Not only are such deployments U.S. public support and its relation- ground and ultimately destroy the expensive, but maintaining the ship to national strategy in the Viet- enemy (or its will to resist). In this force overseas indefinitely is even nam War,4 and Col. A. J. Bacevich is environment civilians are obstacles more so, creating strong political among the visionary military lead- to combat operations, and their and economic pressures on policy ers who have recognized the impor- support is secondary to military makers to initiate offensive action tance of civilian support to U.S. mili- objectives. Minimizing civilian when other less expensive options tary and political objectives in the interference with combat opera- (in both lives and money) could area of operations.5 tions is the primary CA mission achieve U.S. objectives. Political Civil Affairs personnel are the during wartime and is only a sec- pressures such as economic sanc- interface between U.S. military ondary, combat-support role. tions and embargoes take time to forces and local civilians. The pri- In peacetime low-intensity con- work, but time can be the enemy mary CA peacetime mission is to flict, mission objectives are more when maintaining 500,000 troops mobilize public support in the area political than military, requiring a in a hostile environment overseas. of operations in support of U.S. mil- role reversal for CA and combat There are other options available itary and political objectives.6 The forces. In the ambiguous and often to policy makers that are less Army’s CA personnel are front-line violent peacetime environment of expensive, less dangerous and more diplomat-warriors, serving as an LIC, the center of gravity is politi- compatible with peacetime diplo- extension of both the U.S. military cal legitimacy for the supported macy. Clandestine or covert special and diplomatic corps.7 government or group. Achieving operations are limited in size and The importance of CA support at that legitimacy requires mobilizing scope by their nature and can the tactical level varies with the and maintaining civilian support address specific targets more effec- relative priority of military and for military and political objectives, tively than conventional combat operations. Most other non-contingency peacetime military operations are joint ventures between the Departments of Defense and State which contemplate a limited number of regionally oriented U.S. military personnel having extensive contact with civilians in the area of operations. In any contemporary scenario requiring a sustained U.S. military presence overseas, even contingency combat operations, public support is critical to mission success: “Of the lessons that demand attention, the foremost concerns the role of the people in warfare. … (C)ivilians … may be the medium within which the conflict occurs; they may sustain the combatants or double as fighters themselves; or Photo courtesy Terry Henry they may constitute a strategic Members of the 96th CA Battalion discuss problems with members of the objective whose support determines village of Tocumen, Panama, following Operation Just Cause.

Winter 1991 5 a primary CA mission. Mobilizing the attainment of both short-term property, the acquisition of civilian public support in LIC requires that and long-term goals.”10 property and labor, and property- the force that is determinative in Not only is the restricted use of and resources-control measures. combat be restricted to prevent col- force imperative for public support, Because of the overlap of CA and lateral damage. but the public perception of legiti- legal issues, a command or staff LIC describes a violent competi- macy is essential for sustained U.S. judge advocate with CA and operation for political power, usually in military operations overseas. Since tional-law expertise can provide CA autocratic (or superficially demo- the Vietnam debacle, the U.S. pub- as well as legal-staff support.14 cratic) regimes which lack effective lic has been especially sensitive to mechanisms for the peaceful transi- issues involving the legitimacy of History tion of political power. Even where U.S. military operations overseas, Since its inception, military his- the means to political authority are and Desert Shield/Storm is no tory has provided illustrations of violent, however, the legitimacy of exception. The public mood is the importance of public support political authority ultimately reflected by Congress, and congres- and legitimacy to military opera- depends upon public support: “The sional support is essential for any tions,15 but it was not until World struggle between the insurgent and sustained U.S. military commit- War II that CA was officially born. the incumbent is over political ment overseas.11 As the Allies drove into Germany in legitimacy — who should govern To achieve legitimacy, CA support World War II, newly liberated areas and how they should govern. emphasizes command compliance required the establishment of tem- (Accordingly,) one of the principal with legal and moral standards porary governments to provide elements in this struggle is the affecting civilians.12 Advising the essential public services to civil- effort to mobilize public support. command on legal obligations to ians. Combat leaders were quick to Whoever succeeds at this will ulti- civilians is an operational-law recognize CA diplomat-warriors as mately prevail.”8 responsibility of the command force multipliers, relieving their Evolving joint defense doctrine judge advocate, so that there should combat troops for battlefront duty.16 recognizes the dominance of the be close coordination between CA Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower ini- political instrument in LIC, and and legal-staff elements.13 Some tially requested 960 CA officers, that political legitimacy is an operational-law issues shared by and that request was later imperative for military operations CA and legal-staff elements are: the increased to thousands of person- in LIC. Legitimacy is described as limitations of military necessity nel. Of these, approximately 200 “the central concern of all parties and proportionality in the use of were highly qualified lawyers, most directly involved in a conflict,” and force which threatens civilian life or of whom were assigned to military- is derived “from the (public) perception that authority is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes.”9 The legitimacy of military operations (operational legitimacy) is both a cause and effect of the public support required for political legitimacy. Public support is necessary for the legitimacy of sustained military operations, and operational legitimacy is necessary for public support. Collateral damage caused by the excessive use of military force can under- mine the public support necessary for political legitimacy. For that reason, the restricted use of force is a LIC imperative which “refers to the judicious, prudent, and thoughtful selection and employment of forces most suitable to the Courtesy Special Warfare Museum mission. Excessive violence can Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, allied commander-in-chief during World War adversely affect efforts to gain or II (left), requested thousands of Civil Affairs officers to serve in Europe. maintain legitimacy and impede Here he leaves a briefing with Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, commander, 5th Army.

6 Special Warfare government duties. In addition to CA lawyers serving in military government, there were instances in which commanders cognizant of the close relationship between operational law and CA support had SSgt. Thomas their staff judge advocates perform McNiff, an SF CA staff functions as well.17 medic, coaxes a During World War II, CA was Vietnamese considered synonymous with mili- child to open tary government. Early doctrine her mouth dur- distinguished the two terms by ing sick call at operational environment: opera- Duc Co, Vietnam tions in friendly countries were con- in December sidered to be CA, while those in 1965. SF adviso- occupied enemy territory were mili- ry and medical- tary government. During World assistance mis- War II, CA operations (now known sions waned in as civil administration) were con- Vietnam as U.S. ducted in North Africa, France, emphasis shifted Holland, Belgium and the Philip- to direct-action pines, while military-government missions. operations were conducted in Sicily, Austria, Germany, Okinawa, Japan and Korea.18 Even though early doctrine distinguished CA and military government, it was not until 1959 that military government became a sub- Photo by Richard R. Johnson ordinate function of CA. That year U.S. combat forces, the emphasis sidered essential to mission success the Joint Chiefs of Staff made CA shifted to direct-action operations became obstacles to combat opera- an all-inclusive term, with military that were not as dependent upon tions, or in the dense fog of that government one of its mission local civilian support. war, the enemy.23 areas. That definition has remained Before the escalation to conven- Even then, CA was not forgotten. essentially unchanged.19 tional conflict distorted LIC con- When the U.S. Marines arrived in In contrast to joint doctrine, Army cepts in Vietnam, U.S. military 1965, their Combined Action Pla- doctrine was slower to distinguish advisers successfully employed CA toon Program successfully CA from military government.20 It techniques. In fact, their success in employed CA techniques to achieve was not until December 1985 that motivating indigenous forces civilian support of their combat the Army recognized significant against the Viet Cong may have operations. Unfortunately the peacetime mission areas for CA and caused the escalation of conflict by extensive collateral damage caused military government as only part of the North Vietnamese, which in by combat operations in an ambigu- the wartime CA mission.21 turn precipitated the deployment of ous environment, coupled with In spite of the Army’s doctrinal U.S. combat forces. The Civilian widespread corruption in the South lag, CA was recognized as a major Irregular Defense Group forces Vietnamese government, neutral- element of counterinsurgency sup- trained by SF units were effective ized any civilian support gained by port during U.S. involvement in in guerrilla warfare against the CA operations. Vietnam. As the conflict in Vietnam Viet Cong, but they were no match It was not until 1967 that Army escalated, however, the role and for the North Vietnamese regular CA units began supporting combat priority of CA changed. The evolv- forces.22 forces in Vietnam. They met with ing role of Special Forces in Viet- With the introduction of major limited success, with their activities nam illustrated the contrast U.S. maneuver commands in Viet- primarily in support of general-pur- between peacetime and wartime CA nam, the measure of success at the pose conventional operations rather support. Initially the focus of SF operational and tactical levels shift- than special operations directed at was advisory, with an emphasis on ed from political legitimacy to a political legitimacy. Also, in 1967, civilian support. After 1965, howev- more quantitative measurement: Ambassador Robert W. Komer took er, when the conflict escalated with the body count. Civilians once con- charge of the Civil Operations and

Winter 1991 7 Revolutionary Development Sup- not until the early 1980s that there multipliers; they were involved port program, called CORDS, and was renewed interest in CA as a from the initial airborne assault through it managed for the first component of peacetime military and performed extensive combat- time to coordinate all military and operations, and U.S. military inter- support roles before assuming post- civilian agencies in pacification and ventions, first in Grenada in 1983 combat civil-administration support nation-building in Vietnam. By (Urgent Fury) and later in Panama functions.27 then, however, it was too late to sal- in 1989 (Just Cause) gave CA per- The verdict on the Panama inter- vage the legitimacy of the South sonnel an opportunity to prove vention is not yet in. While there Vietnamese government or prevent their relevance. Unlike the Vietnam has been little criticism of military the erosion of public support for the experience, these combat operations operations per se, there has been war in the U.S.24 enjoyed wide public support in the criticism of the decision to use such Despite failures in Vietnam, in U.S. and the areas of operations a large combat force to accomplish other LIC environments of that era, because of their surgical nature, limited U.S. political objectives. Col- U.S. forces successfully conducted clear military success, and quick lateral damage to civilian persons CA activities. Special-action forces withdrawal of combat forces once and property was not excessive for (now referred to as security-assis- military objectives were achieved. the size force deployed, but if a tance forces) composed of SF, CA, Following brief combat operations smaller force could have accom- Psychological Operations and other in Grenada and Panama, CA per- plished the same objectives, then elements tailored to the needs of sonnel helped make the transition collateral damage was excessive to the area, quietly but effectively from military to civilian control. the extent it could have been avoid- supported counterinsurgency opera- They contributed to the legitimacy ed. Whether the amount of force tions in Southeast Asia, Latin of the fledgling governments by used in Panama was legitimate and America, Africa and the Middle helping them provide essential ser- appropriate will ultimately be East. That there were few success- vices to civilians dislocated by com- decided by the Panamanian people, ful insurgencies in the regions bat operations. who will determine the political where these unique units func- In Grenada, CA personnel future of their country and its rela- tioned from the 1960s to the early worked with the Grenadian govern- tionship with the U.S. 1970s is the best evidence of their ment and the United States Agency Unfortunately, anti-U.S. senti- effectiveness.25 for International Development to ment seems to be growing in Pana- In the wake of the “Vietnam syn- re-establish essential services and ma. A recent poll by the Panamani- drome” of the 1970s, all of the spe- helped with a longer-term project to an newspaper La Prensa indicated cial-action forces were dismantled, improve school facilities.26 that Panamanians believe that the and with them all but one of the In Panama, CA personnel once problems left over from the inter- active-component CA units. It was again proved their value as force vention outweigh the benefits. The president of the Panama Bar Asso- ciation, Jose Alberto Alverez, has stated: “Of Bush’s objectives, only one was really achieved — getting rid of Manuel Noriega … (and) they could’ve captured him without an invasion, without destroying the country.”28 A Panamanian senator critical of the U.S. military intervention had some advice for U.S. policy makers concerning Desert Shield/Storm: “They better do everything differ- ently in Iraq. Here, they found an army that didn’t fight and people who applauded them in the streets. Over there, they’ll find an army that fights and people who hate Americans. This time the Ameri- cans won’t win over hearts by giv- Photo by Stephen Kopels ing out C-rations and chocolate.”29 Montagnard villagers work on a dam near Thuy Tu, Vietnam in 1968. Although coming from a former Materials were supplied by CORDS, supervision by Civil Affairs personnel. Noriega cabinet member, this

8 Special Warfare ant evacuation operations; and providing command liaison with civilian authorities.32 The second CA mission area, support for special operations, includes support for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. Togeth- er they represent the competing forces in LIC: UW supports insurgency (resistance force) activities, while FID supports counterinsurgency (internal defense and development) activities. UW is distinguished from insurgency only by its strategic objectives; unlike an insurgency, UW has international objectives. Aside from providing support to opposite sides in LIC, UW and FID differ in another respect: FID Photo by Vince Warner activities are usually overt, while U. S. soldiers distribute emergency food supplies to Panamanians during UW activities are usually covert. Operation Just Cause in December 1989. Both UW and FID share the same objective, however: to mobilize the advice should give U.S. policy mak- doctrine at the JFK Special War- civilian support necessary for politi- ers pause. Achieving political objec- fare Center and School at Fort cal legitimacy, and to deny that sup- tives that require public support in Bragg, N.C.30 port to the opposition.33 a hostile environment will be diffi- Evolving CA doctrine reflects a The third mission area of CA, cult, no matter how decisive the priority for peacetime military civil administration, also has appli- military victory. operations, the most likely envi- cability in LIC. Civil administration Whether the population is friend- ronment for protecting U.S. securi- assists friendly governments in pro- ly or hostile, however, mobilizing ty interests in the near term. The viding essential public services dur- public support for military and four CA mission areas listed in ing peace or war; in occupied terri- political objectives will continue to draft joint CA doctrine are not tory during wartime, civil adminis- be the CA mission. Performing this new, but they are adapted to sup- tration is referred to as military mission in contemporary threat port peacetime military activities government. Civil administration environments such as Southwest and operations.31 relies heavily upon the 20 function- Asia and Latin America without The first CA mission area, sup- al areas of CA which represent the familiar Soviet threat to drive port for general-purpose and con- essential government services.34 U.S. security policy will require new ventional operations, includes CA As demonstrated in Grenada and national strategies, doctrine and wartime support missions previous- Panama, civil administration has force structure. ly known as command support, but obvious application following com- these functions have application in bat in peacetime contingency opera- Doctrine and force structure peacetime LIC as well. They tions, and CA personnel assisted in With the creation of the U.S. include the preparation of CA the restoration of government ser- Special Operations Command in assessments, estimates and annex- vices in Kuwait after its liberation 1986 and its subordinate comes which provide a picture of the from Iraqi occupation. Civil admin- mands in 1989, there are new force cultural environment in which istration has an important role in structures to provide CA in con- operations are anticipated; identify- FID and UW as well: the provision temporary military operations. ing and acquiring civil resources, of essential services is a prerequi- Unfortunately, there is no national human and material, to support site for the legitimacy sought by the strategy to guide military planners military operations; assisting com- competing forces in LIC.35 in preparing CA doctrine. In spite manders to comply with lawful and The fourth CA mission area is of this lack of direction, however, humanitarian obligations to civil- support for the domestic civil sector, doctrine is being developed for ians; minimizing civilian involve- which includes emergency and dis- joint CA operations at the U.S. ment in combat; assisting with aster relief within the U.S.36 A1- Special Operations Command, and humanitarian and disaster-relief though similar to CA activities con- the Army is developing its own activities; supporting noncombat- ducted overseas, the issues of legiti-

Winter 1991 9 strategy, public support in both the U.S. and the area of operations will continue to be an essential ingredi- ent for the legitimacy of U.S. military operations. The CA diplomat-warrior can assist the commander to mobilize public support in the area of operations, but is not a substitute for the conventional combat soldier. There will always be a need for military force to protect vital U.S. security interests. When civilians are involved, however, CA personnel are a valuable force multiplier. As citizen-soldiers, CA personnel can relate to civilian and military concerns both in the area of operations and back home, helping their commanders achieve the legitimacy Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum required for mission success. Philippine flood victims await delivery of U.S. emergency food supplies. Achieving U.S. security objectives in a transitional geopolitical envi- macy and public support for domes- table of organization and equip- ronment will require more military tic CA activities are not as complex. ment is being phased in which will options than the direct application Legal constraints, however, can be provide CA FID/UW battalions tai- of overwhelming military force. The even more involved for domestic CA lored to meet the special require- military instrument of national pol- activities, such as disaster relief, ments of LIC.39 icy must complement and often be than for the same activities con- One major problem remains: 97 integrated with the diplomatic ducted overseas.37 percent of CA personnel are in the instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In Civic action, humanitarian and Army Reserve, as are the new CA helping to achieve U.S. security civic assistance, and disaster relief FID/UW units, and they must be objectives in war and peace, the CA are CA activities which are not lim- mobilized to become operational. diplomat-warrior can be a vital ited to any one CA mission area. Since mobilization is not likely dur- defense asset, serving as an exten- These activities are similar to caring peacetime (Desert Shield/ sion of both the U.S. military and ing for civilians that have been dis- Storm considered the exception), diplomatic corps. located by the ravages of war, and these CA units may not become beyond meeting legal obligations operational until the law is have the same objective: to meet changed. Meanwhile, the 96th CA Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., essential human needs and mobi- Battalion at Fort Bragg, the only USAR, is an attorney with offices lize public support for U.S. military active-component CA unit, will con- in Prosperity, S.C. Currently and political objectives. These activ- tinue to be tasked to provide CA assigned as the staff judge advo- ities have been the mainstay of U S. support for FID/UW and quick- cate for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs nation-building activities since the reaction CA support for peacetime and Psychological Operations 1960s, complementing diplomatic contingency military operations. Command at Fort Bragg, he served and economic assistance during as the assistant staff judge advo- peacetime.38 Summary cate for the JFK Center for Special The force structure for CA is Dramatic changes in the geopolit- Warfare in 1968 and later as the being modernized to provide a capa- ical environment will undoubtedly judge advocate and civil affairs bility that can perform these CA change the focus if not substance of legal officer for Special Action mission requirements. For the first current U.S. military strategies. Force-Asia. He holds a BA from time, all active and reserve CA Given the changing world order and the Citadel, an MPA and a JD units have been consolidated in a U.S. economic restraints, new from the University of South Car- single command: the U.S. Army national strategies will emphasize olina, and is a graduate of the Civil Affairs and Psychological the integration of military opera- Army Command and General Staff Operations Command at Fort tions with U.S. diplomatic and for- College. Bragg. In addition, a new “L” series eign-policy activities. Whatever the

10 Special Warfare Notes: 15 See Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory,” in this issue of Special 1 For an extensive and well-documented history of the relationship Warfare. between economic and military power since 1500, see Paul Kennedy, 16 Ralph R. Young, “Snapshots of Civil Affairs: A Historical Per- The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, spective and Views,” unpublished paper presented at the 39th Annu- 1987). al Conference of the Civil Affairs Association, San Antonio, Texas, 5 2 These criteria were prepared by former Secretary of Defense June 1986. Casper W. Weinberger in 1984; see David T. Twining, “Vietnam and 17 Col. Ted B. Borek, “Legal Services During War,” 120 Military the Six Criteria for the Use of Military Force,” Parameters, Winter Law Review 1988, pp. 35-40. 1985, p. 10. 18 Gen. William Richardson, commanding general, Army Training 3 A.J. Bacevich, “New Rules: Modern War and Military Profession- and Doctrine Command, Draft Memorandum to Gen. John Wickham, alism,” Parameters, December 1990, p. 19. Army chief of staff (Subject: Civil Affairs Modernization), dated June 4 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context 1986, p. 4. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 19 Ibid., pp. 3-15. College, 1989), chap. 1. 20 Ibid. 5 Bacevich, p. 19; see also William S. Lind, et al., “The Changing 21 FM 41-10. Face of War Into the Fourth Generation,” Military Review, October 22 Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thir- 1989, pp. 5-11. ty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military Presidio Press, 1983), chaps. 10 and 13; Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing and Fall of an American Army (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., Office, 1989), defines Civil Affairs as “Those phases of the activities of 1988), chaps. 1 and 2. a commander which embrace the relationship between the military 23 Ibid. forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or 24 William R. Berkman, “Civil Affairs in Vietnam,” a paper written occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil for the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 28 December affairs include, inter alia: a. matters concerning the relationship 1973. between military forces located in a country or area and the civil 25 Simpson, chap. 18. authorities and people of that country or area usually involving per- 26 See Delbert L. Spurlock, “Grenada Provides Classic Case,” The formance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of Officer, August 1984, p. 17; also, Barnes, “Grenada Revisited: Civil certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. Affairs Operates in Paradise,” The Officer, July 1985, p. 14. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to mili- 27 See article, “Civil Affairs in Just Cause,” in this issue of Special tary action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally Warfare. covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; and b. 28 See David L. Marcus, “Panama: Still in Turmoil,” feature article military government: the form of administration by which an occupy- from Dallas Morning News published in The State, Columbia, S.C., ing power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over 16 December 1990, p. D-1. occupied territory.” 29 Ibid. 7 For a discussion of the “diplomat-warrior,” see Barnes, “The 30 The initial draft of JCS Pub. 3-57 was published in May 1990; a Diplomat Warrior,” Military Review, May 1990, p. 55. preliminary draft of FM 41-10 was published in June 1990. 8 See Michael T. Klare, “The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military 31 See JCS Pub. 3-07, chap. II. Doctrine for Low Intensity Warfare,” in Peter Kornbluh’s Low Intensi- 32 JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, pp. II-2 - II-4; also FM 41-10, chap. 2. ty Warfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). For a discussion of the 33 JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II p. II-4; also FM 41-10, chaps. 3 and 4. concept of legitimacy in LIC and its relationship to civilian support, 34 The 20 CA functional specialties are: civil defense, labor, legal, see Barry Crane, et al., “Between Peace and War: Comprehending public administration, public education, public finance, public Low Intensity Conflict,” Special Warfare, Summer 1989, p. 9. health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, economics and 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Opera- commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public communications in Low Intensity Conflict (final draft, January 1990), chap. I, p. tions, transportation, public works and utilities, arts, monuments I-26. and archives, civil information, cultural affairs, and dislocated civil- 10 JCS Pub. 3-07, chap. I, p. I-28. ians. FM 41-10, Appendix A. 11 Summers, chap. 2. 35 JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, p. II-5; also FM 41-10, chap. 5. 12 U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Decem- 36 JCS Pub. 3-57, chap. II, p. II-6. ber 1985, p. 1-1. 37 See generally, Army Regulation 500-60, Disaster Relief. 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil 38 See Col. Ronald Smith, “Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Affairs (initial draft, May 1990), chap. I, p. I-6. Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENTCOM,” in this issue 14 See U.S. Army Special Operations Command Circular 27-90-1, of Special Warfare; also, Barnes, “Civic Action, Humanitarian and Special Operations Forces Law of War Program Deskbook (23 April Civic Assistance, and Disaster Relief: Military Priorities in LIC,” 1990), chap. 4, app. B, for a summary of those laws applicable to Special Warfare, Fall 1989, p. 34. civilians in time of war; for a discussion of the interrelationship of 39 See Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, “Converting from H to L Series TOE: legitimacy and public support, and the overlap between the functions An Impossible Task for CA?”; also, Maj. Robert Brady, “The CA of the SJA and G-5, see Barnes, “Legitimacy and the Lawyer in LIC: FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations,” Civil Affairs Legal Support,” The Army Lawyer, October 1988, p. 5. both in this issue of Special Warfare.

Winter 1991 11 The Civil Affairs FID/UW Battalion and Its Implications for SOF in LIC Operations

by Maj. Robert G. Brady

While the Army considers Civil forces in FID and UW. mobilizing U.S. military assets and Affairs units to be special-opera- U.S. Southern Command, U.S. units under his control to assist tions forces, these units were origi- Central Command, U.S. Pacific nation-building efforts. nally organized and have remained Command and U.S. European Com- In unconventional-warfare opera- primarily dedicated to the support mand are each scheduled to be tions, FID/UW battalions will proof conventional forces in wartime. apportioned one reserve-component vide training, advice and assistance Although support to Special FID/UW battalion. The only active- to Special Forces elements and to Forces and Ranger units has been component CA unit, the 96th Civil indigenous resistance movements. task-organized on an ad-hoc basis Affairs Battalion, will remain a They will plan and help conduct for years, primarily by the 96th Civil general-support battalion which population-and-resource-control Affairs Battalion at Fort Bragg, can also conduct CA support of FID programs and the organization of N.C., there are no Civil Affairs units and UW. Modifications to the table auxiliaries, the internal support designed specifically to support of organization and equipment will elements of resistance movements. other SOF or to perform indepen- be necessary because the 96th will They will also assist in the develop- dent missions at the lower end of the remain apportioned to all five the- ment of civic-action programs and strategic continuum — in peacetime aters and will retain its two mis- in the execution of political warfare. competition and conflict. This situa- sions of supporting conventional Political warfare is the term for tion will change with the scheduled contingency operations and sup- activities which help U.S.-sponsored activation in FY 92 of Civil Affairs porting SOF in LIC. resistance movements extend their foreign-internal-defense/unconven- political influence. It includes tional-warfare battalions. Mission actions such as assisting the move- Civil Affairs FID/UW battalions In foreign-internal-defense opera- ment to establish a government will be specialized units capable of tions, the FID/UW battalion will pro- structure in areas which it controls. planning and conducting special vide Civil Affairs technical advice It also includes helping the resis- civil-military operations in support and assistance to the theater special- tance to select, train and operate of national-security objectives. They operations command and to Special political-agitation teams in enemy- will provide the National Command Forces groups, battalions and detach- held territory. Authority and the theater comman- ments. The battalion will also advise By assisting in political warfare, ders-in-chief, the CINCs, to whom and assist indigenous military forces the U.S. can support a mass-strate- they will be apportioned, with the and national governmental agencies gy insurgency, versus a predomi- capability to employ specialized, in population and resource control nantly military strategy. The mass regionally oriented and linguistical- and in the development of civic- strategy combines military power ly qualified Civil Affairs teams to action and civil-assistance programs. with political and social organiza- train, advise or assist indigenous It will be able to assist the CINC in tion to supplant the government in

12 Special Warfare insurgent-controlled regions of the population and resource control and engineering and medical support, country. Through their own political political warfare. They consist of a including disease prevention. organs, the insurgents organize the detachment headquarters, seven In FID these teams will be population to raise and support direct-support teams and a civic- employed independently as mobile larger guerrilla units, eventually action team. training teams to indigenous bat- becoming strong enough to over- Each of the seven direct-support talion- or company-level organiza- throw the government through teams consists of a Civil Affairs- tions or to augment SF elements. force of arms. qualified captain and three NCOs. There they will assist in developing In the reserves, these NCOs will be local civic-action projects, popula- Organization specially trained Civil Affairs tion and resource controls and pub- The Civil Affairs FID/UW battal- sergeants of the new MOS 38A, lic-education programs. ion consists of 216 soldiers. Com- now under development. In the In UW they will assist in the manded by a lieutenant colonel, it active battalion, these NCOs will be selection, training and operations of has 23 majors, 42 captains and 118 SF operations-and-intelligence political-agitation teams; develop- NCOs. The rank structure is neces- NCOs (18F), medics (18D) and engi- ment of auxiliaries; and the estab- sary because of the sensitivity and neers (18C). They will advise and lishment of population and resource complexity of its missions. The assist both indigenous forces and controls. They will provide advice FID/UW battalions will be com- SF operational detachments. and assistance to indigenous resis- posed of a battalion headquarters The civic-action team consists of a tance movements and U.S. Special detachment, a general-support Civil Affairs officer, an engineer, a Forces detachments on the estab- detachment and three direct-sup- veterinarian, a physician’s assistant lishment and operations of resis- port detachments. and an environmental-sciences offi- tance government at the local level. The active general-support bat- cer. It will help indigenous forces talion will have four direct-support develop and implement civic-action GS detachments companies, one per theater, with programs by providing skill in the The RC battalions’ general-sup- one company dual-tasked to sup- technical areas of light-construction port detachment will contain many port EUCOM and LANTCOM. At the time of this writing, the Army Special Operations Command had established a requirement for a fifth DS company to alleviate the double tasking. Both AC and RC battalions can operate as single units, as separate detachments, or as task-organized teams or specialists deployed for U.S. soldiers specific missions. FID/UW battal- perform veteri- ions will include experts such as nary medicine entomologists, dentists, veterinari- in a Central ans, physician’s assistants, preven- American vil- tive-medicine specialists and engi- lage. Medical neers, as well as members of the and veterinary Judge Advocate General, Medical civic-action pro- Service Corps and Civil Affairs jects will be part branches. The AC battalion will not of the mission of have entomologists or dentists, but the new Civil it will have a heavy representation Affairs FID/UW of Special Forces. battalions. DS detachments The direct-support detachments provide training, assistance and technical advice to Special Forces detachments, indigenous military forces, civilian government agencies and resistance movements in planning and conducting civic action, U.S. Army photo

Winter 1991 13 of the unit’s specialized skills. It The public-health/dental team tional control of USAID. will consist of a detachment head- consists of preventive-medicine spe- The dislocated-civilian team con- quarters, a civil-assistance team, a cialists, Medical Service Corps offi- sists of Civil Affairs and Military public-health team and a dislocat- cers, dentists and veterinarians. Police officers and NCOs. In FID this ed-civilian team. The team assists in determining team will plan and coordinate The civil-assistance team consists the medical requirements of civilian humanitarian support for dislocated of 11 Civil Affairs officers and a JAG populations in designated regions persons such as refugees and evac- officer. Its primary mission will be to and can also give limited medical uees. For UW operations it will con- assist in planning and developing support and training to indigenous tinue to perform this mission but will U.S. support for nation-building personnel. Civil-assistance and also have a critical role in assisting activities. Specifically, it can assist public-health teams will closely to consolidate and organize refugees in developing public-transportation coordinate their operations with the to aid recruiting and auxiliary devel- systems and in planning and imple- United States Agency for Interna- opment for UW campaigns. menting public-safety activities, tional Development and any other public-education programs, and pop- U.S. relief organizations. For cer- Concept of employment ulation and resource controls at tain peacetime missions, the teams In the past, Civil Affairs units province and district levels. may be placed under the opera- focused their efforts in FID on

14 Special Warfare assisting the host-nation military auxiliaries and the guerrillas and nation government agencies estab- improve its relationship with the identify the political cadres. The lish and operate resource controls population through civic action. level of assistance is determined by to deny the enemy vital materials. This was often expressed as “win- the U.S. ambassador, based on Economic vulnerabilities are also ning the hearts and minds of the requests for assistance by the sup- exploited by pacification programs people.” CA units had no target or ported government, and is closely that emphasize civic action and objective expressed in military coordinated with the U.S. Informa- developmental-assistance projects terms and therefore had consider- tion Agency. in zones adjacent to areas under able difficulty in explaining their — In UW, political vulnerabilities enemy control. role to military commanders. This are attacked by providing advice — In UW, the enemy govern- lack of understanding hampered and assistance in the selection, ment’s economic vulnerabilities are CA-unit efforts, and their priorities training and operations of resis- attacked by coordinating military and concerns were often the first tance political-agitation teams. operations with strikes, boycotts sacrificed in any conflict with con- When required, CA FID/UW ele- and sabotage by front organiza- ventional military objectives. ments will exploit the enemy’s lack tions. The goal is to sever the In order to focus the efforts of CA of political control over regions of resources of the countryside from units, their primary objective need- territory or elements of the popula- population centers under enemy ed to be expressed in military control. Attacks on critical econom- terms. Therefore, the objective of “... the objective of the ic targets must be carefully man- the CA FID/UW battalions was aged to avoid impoverishment of defined as the disruption or CA FID/UW battal- the rural community under guerril- destruction of the vital supporting ions was defined la control. By the same token, the link between the civilian population as the disruption or value of destroying the overall econ- and the enemy. This basic principle omy must be carefully weighed for remains the same whether the unit destruction of the its political value in terms of its is engaged in FID or UW. Specific vital supporting link effect on the movement’s claims of targets which the FID/UW battal- between the civilian legitimacy. CA elements will assist ions will attack at the grass-roots the auxiliary in developing plans to level are the enemy’s non-military population and the redirect economic activity to sup- vulnerabilities: political, economic, enemy. This basic port the guerrillas and the civilian social-cultural and ideological. principle remains population under resistance control. This can be done by establish- Vulnerabilities the same whether the ing war-production facilities and by Political vulnerabilities are of two unit is engaged in developing alternative markets for types. The first is internal contra- FID or UW.” civilian-produced goods. diction in the enemy’s political plat- Social-cultural vulnerabilities are form and conflict between that plat- ethnic, religious or class disparities form and the legitimate goals and tion by assisting the movement to between the hierarchy or member- aspirations of the local population. establish an overt resistance gov- ship of enemy organizations and The second is loss of control or ernment. When the enemy main- the population they are attempting influence over segments of the pop- tains partial control, CA elements to control. ulation, either because of the mili- may assist in the establishment of a During FID operations, these vul- tary situation or because of physi- local covert shadow government. nerabilities are exploited by advis- cal remoteness of the population Economic vulnerabilities are ing and assisting indigenous mili- segment. defined as shortages of important tary or civilian agencies to establish — In FID, enemy political vulner- consumer goods and services population-control measures which abilities are attacked by assisting required by the population under will identify and isolate the enemy’s host-nation military forces or gov- enemy control and shortages in raw infrastructure. They can also be ernment agencies to establish com- and finished materials required by exploited by establishing command- mand-information and public-edu- the enemy for the prosecution of its information programs and passive cation programs to counter the war effort. Included in this category civilian surveillance organizations. enemy’s political message and to are vulnerabilities associated with In UW, social-cultural vulnerabil- publicize any government reforms. an enemy’s dependence on one or ities are attacked through the oper- Political vulnerabilities are also two critical products for foreign- ations of political-agitation teams, attacked by helping the govern- exchange earnings. and through population-control ment establish strong population- — In FID, economic vulnerabili- measures and the establishment of control measures to help isolate the ties are attacked by assisting host- overt resistance government in

Winter 1991 15 areas controlled by the guerrillas. Ideological vulnerabilities often LIC Fundamentals for CA appear as contradictions between political theory and doctrine and When the first draft of FM 100-25, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, was the reality of their implementation. being developed, its writers put a considerable amount of thought into producing a Marxist governments and insur- set of rules to guide the employment of SOF units. Operational guidance from the gent organizations are particularly U.S. Special Operations Command included tenets for LIC, and these were put in vulnerable in this area, but rural the frame of reference of the FID/UW battalion. These fundamentals are dis- populations are often unaware of cussed below as they apply to Civil Affairs units engaged in LIC operations. the convulsions the communist Primacy of political objectives — This is probably the most important of the LIC world is undergoing today. Commu- fundamentals. Virtually all Civil Affairs operations within the context of FID and UW are conducted to advance critical political objectives. CA specialists must be nist propagandists exploit this lack trained to recognize the significance of all SOF and conventional military opera- of understanding with a barrage of tions within the context of the larger political struggle. The senior CA specialists perversions of history and distor- attached to the theater special-operations command, Special Forces units, or con- tions of current events. The Ameri- ventional units should serve as political advisers for their supported commanders. can adviser, accustomed to avoiding Their primary role should be to ensure that national and combined political objec- political questions, is often ham- tives are transmitted to and carried out at the very lowest level of operation. strung by his inability to place mili- Legitimacy — In LIC, legitimacy is the crucial element for the development and tary operations in the context of maintenance of local popular and international support. Without this support it will ideology. In the political struggle of be impossible to maintain U.S. assistance for a government in FID or a resistance LIC, soldiers must be able to dis- movement in UW. The concept of legitimacy in LIC includes, but goes beyond cuss basic political theory intelli- strict legal definitions contained in international law. For a government or a resistance movement, legitimacy is determined by the people of the contested nation gently with their counterparts and and by the international community, based on their collective perception of the represent well the position of the rightness or wrongness of the cause and methods of the movement. U.S. government. SOF in particular There are three types of legitimacy which a supported government or resis- must understand the nature of the tance movement must either possess or achieve: moral, political and legal. The competing ideologies and be pre- cause and the methods of the movement or government affect each of these pared to assist indigenous forces in three aspects of legitimacy. In LIC the majority of all operations are conducted to exploiting their enemy’s ideological win popular support, or at least acquiescence. All LIC operations are either coer- vulnerabilities. Elements of CA cive or persuasive. The goal of legitimacy dictates that coercive efforts be precise- FID/UW battalions will assist other ly targeted and that persuasive efforts be wide-ranging. SOF to understand the nature of Unity of effort — LIC operations are conducted by the Departments of State as the ideological struggle by giving well as DoD. Often, the Army may play only a supporting role in the total effort. In FID in particular, USAID and USIA may have the leading role. CA elements pre-mission briefings and training should ensure that all operations support the objectives of these agencies. At the as well as advice and assistance same time, during all contacts with the supported nation’s military, CA elements during the conduct of operations. must stress the importance of unity of effort with their civilian counterparts. Working with PSYOP elements, Adaptability — LIC is characterized by a wide range of conflict conditions: from they will advise indigenous forces assisting peaceful internal development to advising indigenous military forces in on weaknesses of the enemy’s ideo- major counterinsurgency operations. The conditions of conflict can change based logical arguments and help them to on military success or defeat, a change in enemy tactics or fluctuating levels of devise ways to exploit these weak- U.S. support. CA units remain prepared to adapt their operations to changing real- nesses while advancing arguments ities and to assist indigenous military forces in adjusting their tactics as well. for democracy. Persistence — Conflict is a common condition among developing nations. U.S. response to threats to its lesser-developed allies will vary from case to case, as A pitfall to avoid will resourcing. CA planning must recognize the requirement for patience and con- tinuity of effort. Programs that remain dependent upon U.S. funds can be self- In FID, when combatting an defeating if the population becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. CA insurgency in its beginning or early- operations should not initiate development programs that are beyond the econom- middle phases, CA assets and sup- ic or technological capacity of the host nation to maintain without U.S. assistance. porting resources must be concen- Discriminate Use of Force — Of all the tenets of LIC, one of the most crucial is trated in key areas rather than that deadly force be applied in a judicious and precise manner. All U.S. advisers employed piecemeal throughout the must emphasize the consequences of gratuitous violence and its negative impact nation. Often, the senior comman- on perceived legitimacy and progress toward political objectives. While good troop der has no centralized control over behavior and discipline are vital, equally important is the controlled use of firepow- his limited Civil Affairs assets and er. CA advisers must be prepared to address this issue with both host-nation offi- allows them to be employed super- cers and other U.S. advisers who may turn too quickly to massed indirect fire or air power. vising give-away programs planned by maneuver commanders with no

16 Special Warfare training in Civil Affairs. standing of the dynamics of the soci- Cross-training, however, should not Civil Affairs units usually conduct eties in which they operate. For the be limited only to other SOF ele- decentralized operations under the active component, Civil Affairs and ments. Because their operations operational control of a multitude of Psychological Operations officers are must be closely coordinated with, units, both SOF and conventional. now part of the Army’s newest func- and at times support, operations But the battalion headquarters, tional area, FA 39. The four-part and programs instituted by USAID while it possesses no capability to training strategy for this functional and USIA, members of CA units conduct independent operations area will approximate that of the should train, if possible, with those itself, can play a key role in orches- foreign-area officer. agencies as well. trating ongoing Civil Affairs opera- The training, which does not tions by augmenting the special- have to be completed in any partic- Conclusion operations command or the security- ular sequence, consists of language Rather than filling the tradition- assistance organization of the coun- training, either at the Defense Lan- al Civil Affairs role of minimizing try team. These organizations, guage Institute or at Fort Bragg civilian interference, the FID/UW whether augmented by the battalion through a contract program taught battalion can provide the SOF com- headquarters or not, must be respon- to DLI standards; the 15-week mander and his indigenous coun- sible for developing a plan for the Regional Studies Course; either the terpart with the ability to motivate employment of Civil Affairs assets PSYOP or Civil Affairs Officer and mobilize crucial segments of and coordinating it with embassy Course; and graduate schooling. the population. USAID and USIA representatives. Each student in the RSC, taught at CA organizations are dependent, Fort Bragg, will participate in five more than any other military force, Peacetime roles seminars: Africa, Europe, Latin on clear-cut political guidance. With In spite of the FID/UW battal- America, Asia and the Middle East, that guidance, and with proper ion’s vital role in conflict, its most with concentration in one. Both the training and resources, the CA important mission may be in nor- PSYOP and CA officer courses con- FID/UW battalions, though few in mal peacetime competition. When sist of six weeks of intensive studies number, will be force multipliers there are no “enemy vulnerabili- with several written examinations whose impact will be reflected not ties” to target, the mission will be and graded practical exercises and by the traditional measure of mili- to support an ally’s internal-devel- written requirements. tary power, but by the conflicts they opment programs. Graduate schooling is a one-year help to prevent and the lives they Helping to eliminate the causes cooperative degree program taught help to save. of unrest or assisting in the recon- under contract at Fort Bragg and struction of a rural economic sys- results in a master’s degree in tem formerly based on the produc- international relations. Thirty stu- Maj. Robert G. Brady is current- tion and export of narcotics may be dents per year will be fully funded ly attending the Command and the biggest contribution to national by the Army. All other officers must General Staff College at Fort Leav- security these battalions can make. obtain a graduate degree on their enworth, Kan. He formerly served Individual specialists and direct- own, concentrating in a discipline as the Branch 18 manager in the support teams can perform specific related to the functional area as Special Operations Proponency missions for the theater comman- approved in DA Pamphlet 600-3. Office of the JFK Special Warfare der, the country team or the spe- While individual training is cru- Center and School. A Special cial-operations command. The CA cial, unit training will be vital to Forces officer, he has served in a FID/UW battalion’s mission in the successful interaction between variety of command and staff internal development will be to these Civil Affairs units and other assignments with the 10th SF advise and assist host-nation forces SOF elements. Both reserve and Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Bat- to plan and conduct military civic- active-duty units must regularly talion and the 82nd Airborne Divi- action programs. They will also be train and operate with other the- sion. Maj. Brady has been a con- able to coordinate U.S. military ater-apportioned SOF, particularly tributor to the writing of FM 100- civic assistance, in the form of engi- Special Forces and PSYOP groups 25, U.S. Army Special Operations neer and medical elements, with and battalions. A habitual training Forces, and FM 41-10, Civil Affairs host-nation and USAID develop- relationship will build trust and a Operations. ment plans. mutual understanding of each other’s mission. Without mutual Training support between all U.S. elements If CA FID/UW battalions are to be engaged in an advisory relationship effective, they must be characterized with indigenous forces, successful by their members’ depth of under- interaction will never be possible.

Winter 1991 17 Civil Affairs in Support of the Unified Combatant Command: A Proposal for USCENTCOM

by Col. Ronald M. Smith

The ambiguous environment of This article proposes a proactive quered lands. From ancient times low-intensity conflict presents a program of humanitarian and civic to this country’s more recent subju- number of challenges to U.S. strate- assistance within the USCENT- gation of the American Indian, mili- gic interests — challenges that can COM area of responsibility which tary units have carried out policies and are being met by using Civil would improve the training and and actions similar to modern Civil Affairs assets. In some regions of readiness of Civil Affairs units and Affairs, establishing relations the world, however, these assets are personnel, and would contribute to between the military and the civil- not being used as fully as they the elimination of the causes of ian authorities and populace. These might to deter the causes of LIC. unrest and insurgency in a volatile relations were mainly conducted in In the region assigned to the U.S. portion of the Third World. terms of conqueror and conquered, Central Command, CA units have the apparent idea being to insure a important missions under current Historical perspective pacific populace under the rule of CENTCOM operational plans but Like the U.S. policy on dealing the conqueror. extremely limited opportunity to with LIC, doctrine for Army Civil With World War II and its after- gain first-hand experience and Affairs units is currently evolving. math, Civil Affairs in its modern training in their assigned region. Until recently, many soldiers asso- form emerged. During the war, par- ciated with Civil Affairs have ticularly in Europe, the U.S. Army This article is an updated version thought of themselves as part of the established military governments of a paper originally prepared in Civil Affairs community only — a to administer territory wrested 1989 while the author was attend- community which traces its origins from enemy control. These tempo- ing the Army War College. The back to Alexander the Great. rary governments were intended to views expressed are those of the Alexander tended to assimilate provide essential public services in author and do not necessarily desirable customs of conquered peo- liberated areas. Actions by Civil reflect the policies of the Depart- ples and permitted the continuance Affairs personnel relieved combat ment of Defense or its agencies. of other cultural customs in con- troops for battle-front duty and con-

18 Special Warfare tributed to the conclusion that Civil be relied on for operational plan- batant command could use some or Affairs was a “force multiplier.” ning purposes until it has been vali- all of the Civil Affairs’ 20 functional Doctrine at that time distin- dated through on-site surveys by specialties to assist a friendly civil- guished Civil Affairs and military Civil Affairs personnel. But many ian government to provide services government by operational environ- of the countries in the USCENT- to its people.4 ment. Operations in friendly coun- COM AOR allow little or no oppor- In sum, Civil Affairs units, both tries were considered civil affairs, tunity for CA personnel to visit and Army and Marine, have contingen- and those in enemy territory were validate the area assessment, pre- cy and current missions in support considered military government.1 senting a problem for effective Civil of USCENTCOM, but little or no Doctrine now has evolved to the Affairs operations. opportunity to accomplish on-the- point that military government, During Exercises Bright Star 85 ground training necessary to make currently incorporated under the and 87, major USCENTCOM exercis- them true force multipliers for umbrella term “civil administra- es held within the AOR, a small USCENTCOM. tion,” is subordinated to Civil number of Civil Affairs personnel Affairs as just one of the missions taking part were given a limited Regional considerations within Civil Affairs’ capabilities.2 opportunity to interact with host- The USCENTCOM area of nation nationals in a few countries. responsibility includes the Arabian Current perspective Although such participation was Peninsula and extends to Egypt in Of the capabilities that Civil valuable in training those few Civil the west, Kenya in the south and Affairs can offer the commander, Affairs personnel allowed on the ex- Pakistan in the east. Per-capita probably none is of more critical ercise, it did not afford a structured, income within the region ranges importance to USCENTCOM than long-term training opportunity. from more than $27,000 in Qatar to direct support to U.S. forces in the In addition to using Civil Affairs approximately $600 for Egypt and form of host-nation support.3 As a assets to validate HNS or to oper- $300 for Somalia.5 Between 1974 part of their operational planning, ate military governments, a com- and 1987, the United States provid- Civil Affairs personnel perform area mander-in-chief of a unified com- ed $23 billion in economic and mili- assessments which identify from open sources the logistics-and-services capabilities of each of the host nations in the AOR. The acquisition of logistics and necessary services, to the extent that it is possible through HNS, frees critical air and sea transport resources which would otherwise be needed to move that support from CONUS to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, a distance of A Panamanian more than 7,000 miles. boy watches However, unqualified acceptance while Army PFC of the area assessment can lead to Walter Jasnieski an over reliance on HNS being avail- of the 536th able and the creation of “hollow” Engineer Battal- logistics support based on the simple ion lays bricks belief that “HNS will be there.” This for a school in could have a serious impact on mili- Panama’s tary operations. For example, an Air Darien Province. Force wing might not take the heavy equipment and materials necessary for runway repair because of pre- sumed HNS support. If the support turns out not to be present in the quantity or condition needed, air operations could be severely affected or curtailed because damaged run- ways cannot be repaired in a timely manner. The area assessment should not Photo by Eric Vetesy

Winter 1991 19 tary aid to Egypt. As demonstrated by the Bright Star exercises, there now is clearly a closer military relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. Somalia, too, is of significant military interest to the U.S. because of its strategic location on the Horn of Africa. Afghanistan is on the threshold of transformation now that Soviet troops have been withdrawn. Its entire infrastructure suffered significant damage during nine years of Soviet occupation and the Mujahed- din response to it. Its strategic location, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Pak- istan and Iran, means that Afghanistan is of more than casual interest to the United States. Clear- ly, Afghanistan needs assistance in Photo by Eric Vetesy rebuilding. There are other exam- U.S. troops of the 536th Engineer Battalion construct a school in the Darien ples within the USCENTCOM AOR, Province of Panama. e.g., Somalia and Sudan, of countries’ need for assistance in their the military can have a role in this referred to, in part, as foreign inter- efforts toward internal development. environment, particularly in terms nal defense when viewed from the of countering insurgency in LIC U.S. perspective.9 Host nations tak- Low-intensity conflict situations. ing similar measures to counteract LIC has recently attained internal instability are said to be enhanced visibility, if not greater FID/IDAD involved in internal defense and clarity, as to what it is and as to A review of the definitions for LIC development.10 Thus, the objective its scope of impact as a concept. indicates a common theme of the of internal development is common The term is defined, with slight existence of an identifiable, ongoing to both terms, the only difference variations, by the Secretary of confrontation. Thus, much has been being in whether the matter is Defense, the Deputy Secretary of written about how to react to con- acted on from a U.S. perspective Defense, the Assistant Secretary frontation (active or violent insur- (FID), or from that of the host of Defense for Special Operations gency) within LIC. However, this nation (IDAD).11 and Low-Intensity Conflict, the view seems to accept the notion that FM 41-10 states that, “In FID, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. the initiative to act is in the hands of military civic action consists of Army.6 those mounting an insurgency and operations that involve military These definitions — all of which that the U.S. response in those forces in short-term projects useful are useful descriptions — range in instances may be only reactive in to the local population. … Projects substance from active terms such nature — even though it recognizes should fit into current or pro- as “terrorism, subversion, and that those reactive measures may grammed internal development insurgency” involving “military contain proactive elements. programs.”12 But just as conditions action below the level of sustained If Barnes is correct that the real exist within a country which pro- combat,” to the more benign “politi- LIC environment is one of political vide at least part of the impetus for cal-military confrontation … below transition, then there should be an active insurgency, most, if not conventional war and above the proactive measures which can be all, of the same conditions are pre- routine competition of states.” taken to arrest, or avoid, the devel- sent prior to the initiation of active Col. Rudolph Barnes Jr. comes opment of active confrontation. In insurgency. Because it involves no closer to the heart of the matter any event, U.S. application of major outbreak of violence or active when he describes LIC as “an envi- proactive measures would place the insurgent activity, this phase of ronment of political transition.”7 initiative in U.S. hands. insurgency is referred to as latent He has further noted that LIC Nation building or internal devel- or incipient insurgency.13 “reverses traditional priorities, opment is already recognized as a Absent internal development and subordinating military force to means of countering active insur- civic action, the risk remains that political objectives.”8 Nevertheless, gency. This approach has been conditions of latent or incipient in-

20 Special Warfare surgency will lead to active insur- The draft DoD directive, designat- personnel with the technical exper- gency or the destabilization of the ed 2000.xx, which implements the tise to provide advisory assistance country. humanitarian-assistance authority in all of these areas. contained in Title 10, U.S. Code, The above-referenced DoD direc- Program proposal Chapter 20, Section 401, et seq., tive sets out the procedures to be The conceptual basis then for the and which verifies the ASD/ISA as followed by the unified commanders proposed program is that the U.S. the DoD single point of contact, con- in long-range planning and budget- can take the initiative in countries firms DoD policy that H/CA activi- ing for H/CA activities. Under the within the USCENTCOM AOR ties must promote the security proposed program, USCENTCOM with latent or incipient LIC envi- interests of both the U.S. and the would assign priorities to the coun- ronments and establish a proactive country in which the activities are tries to be assisted and coordinate program of humanitarian and civic carried out. projects with the country team assistance. The program’s objective The directive also confirms the before submitting them to Joint would be to contribute to the assist- specific operational readiness skills Chiefs of Staff and ASD/ISA. The ed nation’s internal development, of the forces participating. The country team would be in the best thereby arresting or eliminating activities also must complement, position to identify projects which conditions conducive to an active or not duplicate, any other social or would benefit from Civil Affairs violent insurgency. economic assistance that may be advisers. In this regard, the U.S. would do provided by any other U.S. depart- To be consistent with U.S. objec- well to adopt the Arab philosophy ment or agency and should serve tives, this program should not be that “the enemy of my enemy is my subject to the criticism that it is friend.” In other words, the U.S. just another program in which should be sophisticated enough to “(T)his program Americans tell the locals how to run understand that U.S. interests are should not be subject their country. Rather, it must be served in the long run whether the to the criticism that it seen by the host nation as a gen- assisted country acts consistent uine offer of assistance to its man- with U.S. interests or simply does is just another pro- agers and leaders in the develop- not act in concert with those gram in which Amer- ment of their country. Accordingly, against the U.S. icans tell the locals the Civil Affairs functional special- The underlying concept of the pro- ist would act more as a personal gram proposal is that most of the how to run their staff adviser to the responsible local countries within the AOR are in country. ... It must be manager or official. Not only would need — some more than others — of seen by the host this contribute to the maintenance internal development. USCENT- of personal dignity and local pres- COM should expand its participation nation as a genuine tige of the advisees, but this in humanitarian-and-civic assistance offer of assistance to approach should result in the devel- activities, including employment of its managers and opment of personal relationships Civil Affairs assets, whose personnel, which would be invaluable to U.S. acting in an advisory capacity, can leaders ...” forces should they ever have to contribute significantly to a country’s enter the country. internal development. the basic economic and social needs In November 1985 the Deputy of the people of the country. Manpower Secretary of Defense advised the Humanitarian and civic assis- The bulk of Civil Affairs assets commanders-in-chief of the unified tance, in conjunction with autho- are within the reserve components combatant commands that in plan- rized military operations, is defined and are assigned to USSOCOM for ning and executing cooperative pro- as: medical, dental, and veterinary commitment in support of U.S. grams with friendly nations, “con- care provided in rural areas of a commands and U.S. national objec- sideration should be given to the country; construction of rudimenta- tives throughout the spectrum of utilization of Reserve Components ry surface-transportation systems; conflict. There are three Army to the maximum extent possible.”14 well-drilling and construction of Civil Affairs commands. The (Emphasis added.) basic sanitation facilities; and rudi- Marine Corps Reserve currently The Assistant Secretary of mentary construction and repair of has two Civil Affairs groups,18 but Defense/International Security public facilities.16 It is the sense of these Marine CAGs have not been Affairs, abbreviated ASD/ISA, has the Congress that such assistance assigned to USSOCOM.19 been designated to serve as the sin- to developing countries facing the The staff of USCENTCOM is gle point of contact within DoD and potential of LIC is a valid military extremely limited (1-2 personnel) in with other executive agencies.15 mission.17 Civil Affairs units have Civil Affairs expertise. The Army

Winter 1991 21 element of USCENTCOM, USAR- useful for the Department of State Affairs as a non-lethal means of CENT (Third U.S. Army, or TUSA), to designate a single point of con- advancing U.S. interests in the has been delegated authority for tact (possibly the regional bureau, USCENTCOM AOR. As a part of Civil Affairs matters. One Civil the Office of Politico-military the country team, Civil Affairs Affairs command (Army Reserve), Affairs, the Agency for Internation- assets committed to H/CA missions commanded by a brigadier general, al Development, or the Undersecre- can contribute to the success of the is assigned to USCENTCOM, and tary of State for Security Assis- embassy, while gaining professional its commander is dual-hatted as the tance), to be responsible for encour- training and development which TUSA assistant chief of staff for civil aging U.S. embassies and their could well be invaluable to affairs (G-5) upon mobilization. The country teams in the USCENT- USCENTCOM should conditions USCENTCOM staff would delegate COM AOR to identify H/CA needs advance to the stage of active insur- to the TUSA G-5, augmented by CA- which could be addressed through gency or worse. command personnel, the task of the program. Clearly, each embassy translating general requirements will have to be committed to the ASD/ISA identified by the country team into program as a means of furthering The ASD/ISA, as the single point specific requirements. U.S. interests within that country. of contact with other executive Specific requirements for Civil The office of the ASD/ISA should be agencies, should affect coordination Affairs assets would be passed to staffed to provide professional and liaison with the State Depart- the Army Special Operations Com- ment to obtain support for the pro- mand as the Army component of posed form of H/CA. Given the USSOCOM, which, similar to U.S. “As a part of the responsibility of the Assistant Sec- Forces Command in the case of country team, Civil retary of Defense for Special Opera- requests for other reserve-compo- Affairs assets com- tions/Low-Intensity Conflict to nent units, would determine the establish policy guidance for spe- forces available to meet the require- mitted to H/CA mis- cial-operations forces, the ASD/ISA ments. Funding aspects of the pro- sions can contribute should also coordinate with gram will be addressed below. to the success of the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that Civil At this point in the process, with Affairs participation in H/CA is requirements known and the forces embassy, while gain- properly prepared and monitored. necessary to meet those require- ing professional Further, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in ments identified, scheduling for and training and develop- the best position to assure the implementation of the H/CA mis- appropriate level of visibility and sion(s) would be the next logical ment which could support within USSOCOM and its steps. These responsibilities should well be invaluable to Army component, USASOC. Close fall to the staff of the Civil Affairs USCENTCOM coordination and cooperation command, since the missions would between the active and reserve provide the command with invalu- should conditions components is also critical to the able training in the deployment and advance to the stage viability of this proposal and, there- employment of Civil Affairs assets of active insurgency fore, should be of particular interest over a wide geographic area. Civil to ASD(SO/LIC) in its oversight Affairs personnel and units then or worse.” role, as well as to the ASD/ISA. would be deployed to meet the identified H/CA mission requirements. advice to DoS as to the Civil Affairs USCENTCOM In addition to the responsibilities functional specialties and their use As the unified combatant com- associated with implementing the in LIC. mand with the regional responsibil- proposed HICA program, there are If an embassy cannot identify ity for U.S. military interests in the several bureaucratic factors which viable H/CA missions or is located Middle East, USCENTCOM recog- could seriously affect or impede the in a country which does not want or nizes that preserving the peace has process. need the skills of Civil Affairs func- equal importance with preparing tional specialists, the embassy for wartime contingencies. In this Bureaucratic factors could take advantage of these skills regard, using Civil Affairs assets in to assist its embassy staff, e.g., to H/CA activities in the region could Department of State prepare studies within the func- represent a relatively inexpensive State Department participation, tional task areas.20 Regardless, if way, in terms of personnel and particularly by the country teams, the proposed program is to succeed, attendant costs, to advance U.S. will be critical to the success of this the State Department must appre- interests while enhancing proposal. Therefore, it would be ciate and support the utility of Civil USCENTCOM wartime capabili-

22 Special Warfare ties. With such a commitment, Pursuant to the DoD directive on U.S. International Development and USCENTCOM also stands to bene- H/CA activities and using the statu- Cooperation Agency, to obtain appro- fit from a closer working relation- tory authority of 10 U.S.C. 401, et priations to pay for reimbursement. ship with the regional country seq., USCENTCOM would submit A third method of funding would teams.21 its five-year plan for H/CA, to address the limitations of the two include Civil Affairs participation, methods discussed above. Under 22 Funding with associated costs to the Office U.S.C. 2392(c), DoD, the “owning” In this time of scarce fiscal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and agency, may enter into an agree- resources, the central question is who ASD/ISA. Obligations or expendi- ment with DoS which states that pays the costs of providing the Civil tures under this authority are cur- DoD does not require reimburse- Affairs functional specialists to their rently limited to $16,400,000 for ment for the services of its person- overseas locations? A good part of the fiscal year 1991. nel in a given civic or humanitarian Civil Affairs personnel costs are If requirements for this and other project. This approach is based on already funded — pay and al- H/CA activities exceed this amount, recognition that DoS and DoD lowances for these Reservists can be DoD could either seek expanded objectives in undertaking similar met with annual-training funds. obligation and expenditure authori- activities may complement each These monies also cover the costs of ty or alternative financing. In the other, but that DoD can achieve a moving the Reservists from home latter event, another source of fund- substantial training benefit while station to the overseas embarkation ing could be through reimburse- aiding DoS efforts in conducting point and back. However, the costs ment to DoD by the U.S. Agency for assistance programs under its of transportation overseas and back, International Development, pur- authority. and subsistence and housing while suant to the Foreign Assistance The predominant DoD interest overseas, are currently borne by the Act, 22 U.S.C. 2392(c). This section under the proposal would be to overseas command receiving the over- and the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. improve Civil Affairs training for seas-deployment-training assets — 1535) require reimbursement which mobilization missions within the in this case, USCENTCOM. is fair to both agencies for direct AOR and to validate the availabili- There is a limit on the length of and indirect costs of the performing ty of projected HNS in support of annual training for Reservists, nor- agency, which are attributable to USCENTCOM operation plans. mally 17 days (travel inclusive), but accomplishing the requesting agen- Under this approach, assuming with DA approval the period can be cy’s work.23 funds were not available under extended to 22 days. This does not The obvious limitation to this H/CA funding authority or through mean that the commitment of Civil funding authority is the ability of reimbursement, USSOCOM con- Affairs assets would be limited USAID and its parent agency, the ceivably could fill the void.24 strictly to these periods. Reservists can also be activated, with their consent, for periods of active-duty- for-training of up to 179 days without a DA exception to policy. Each day of ADT is referred to as a man- day space and must be budgeted to include travel and per-diem costs. If USCENTCOM wished to increase the availability of manpower, budgeting for additional man-day spaces could be a means of accomplishing this objective. In addition, with Department of Army approval, a number of active-guard- and-reserve positions could be created, which would allow for full- time support to the administration of the proposed H/CA program by selected Reservists.22 The limited funding problem can be solved in at least three ways by Photo by Mike Edrington USCENTCOM, by Department of Modern heavy equipment of the Army’s 20th Engineer Brigade stands in State (USAID), or by USSOCOM. sharp contrast to nearby Honduran ox carts.

Winter 1991 23 fit derived from internal-development activities accomplished by the host nations. If the program were fully successful, active insurgency would not begin, much less flourish. A successful Civil Affairs H/CA program will mean that Civil Civil Affairs Affairs personnel will spend consid- activities during erable time in several of the coun- Operation Just tries within the USCENTCOM Cause included AOR. Debriefing of these personnel making cost esti- by psychological-operations and mates for pro- military-intelligence personnel jects necessary to could prove highly valuable, and it rebuild Pana- would be naive not to recognize this manian govern- potential. However, this program ment facilities, would not be for the purpose of mil- such as this itary intelligence or solely political Panamanian considerations, but rather for the prison. purpose of providing meaningful training to CA personnel and to afford them the opportunity to obtain on-the-ground validation of their unclassified area assessments in those countries of greatest HNS interest. Host-nation support, as a means of supporting USCENTCOM forces, has taken on a substantive and critical role in the successful imple- Photo by Kirk Wyckoff mentation of USCENTCOM opera- In any event, the funding issue is those whom they are advising. tion plans. USCENTCOM cannot solvable. The relatively minor cost of The primary benefit of this pro- permit itself to rely on unvalidated the proposed program — even if the posal to the U.S. is that it repre- area assessments of the availability additional funds needed (over those sents a practical means of imple- of needed HNS — it must be provided as a part of annual train- menting the Civil Affairs Master assured that the support will be ing) were provided by DoD — is real- Plan proposal that there should be there, as validated by Civil Affairs ly minimal in contrast to the poten- a “cohesive and coordinated intera- personnel. Given the fact that tial benefits of the program, if it is gency structure for CA activities to many of the countries in the AOR successful in reducing or eliminating achieve U.S. strategic interests.”25 are otherwise sensitive to the pres- threats of an active insurgency. As discussed above, the State ence of U.S. forces within their bor- Department and ASD/ISA, at a ders, it would seem prudent to use Benefits minimum, must be involved in the Civil Affairs H/CA activities as a Many of the Civil Affairs func- program. A close working relation- vehicle for gaining access to vali- tional specialists do the same type ship between the various embassy date the HNS estimates. of work in civilian life as in their country teams and USCENTCOM For the program to be successful, military duties and can contribute would necessarily develop under a or even accepted, the perception substantive, practical experience, successful Civil Affairs H/CA pro- and the reality must be that the as well as advice to civilian gram. Such a relationship would be purpose of the H/CA mission is to authorities. The national or local most beneficial should a crisis arise help and assist the host nation. Ac- governments of the host nation which requires military assistance cordingly, in no circumstance should would be the beneficiaries of or intervention in any of the coun- Civil Affairs personnel be tasked to expert advice, at no expense, which tries affected by this program. carry out a PSYOP or intelligence- they could use to develop their Certainly equal to the benefit of gathering mission, either overtly or country. CA soldiers are also cul- H/CA activities to Civil Affairs covertly. Any perceived short-term turally sensitized to assist in a training and professional develop- benefit which might be gained by way that maintains the dignity of ment would be the long-term bene- using Civil Affairs personnel for

24 Special Warfare these missions would surely be Third World and urged new efforts reacting to active insurgencies. The negated by the potential long-term to address those problems. He pro- proposed Civil Affairs H/CA pro- impact of the targeted country can- posed that this be done in partner- gram takes one step back from celing the program. ship with the United Nations. active insurgency and represents Adverse reactions to such activi- Given the fact that a majority of an attempt to address the problems ties could spread to other countries the member nations do not have and conditions associated with LIC in the region, resulting in the can- representative democracies as their in a proactive way while they are cellation of H/CA, regardless of form of government, it is not yet still “in transition,” with the objec- whether such activities were pur- clear what is the true meaning of tive of forestalling active insurgen- sued in those countries. PSYOP Gorbachev’s statements, particu- cy. Done successfully, this proposal could, however, render valuable larly in terms of addressing the will require far less of the national assistance to Civil Affairs personnel conditions which are conducive to treasure than dealing with the in the effective “selling” of the proactive insurgency. The United potential impact of an active or, gram to the host nation. States can ill afford to wait. As worse, successful insurgency. In the final analysis, the success stated by Dr. William J. Olson, At the very least, this program of this form of H/CA activities will director of the Low-Intensity Con- would directly affect the warfight- depend, in large part, on the trust flict Organization, ASD(SO/LIC): ing capabilities of USCENTCOM established between USCENTCOM “There are no shortcuts in deal- because of the significant reliance (through Civil Affairs personnel) on the availability of host-nation and host-nation personnel.26 A “The main thrust of support. At the same time, it would betrayal of that trust could have a provide USCENTCOM, and other significant adverse impact on this doctrine in the LIC regional unified combatant com- program. arena is oriented mands, with an initiative which If accepted, and properly coordi- toward reacting to could be a significant tool in pre- nated, the proposed Civil Affairs serving the peace and in support- H/CA program could be of signifi- active insurgencies. ing U.S. policy interests in the cant benefit to the State Depart- The proposed Civil Third World. ment and to the U.S. embassies in Affairs H/CA pro- It is in the vital national- the USCENTCOM AOR. The pro- strategic interest of the United gram would provide a reservoir of gram ... represents an States to encourage the develop- highly trained, culturally acclimat- attempt to address ment of stable, representative ed manpower to assist the host the problems and democracies in the Third World nation at minimal cost to the Unit- and to encourage that developed States. If there is no need for conditions associated ment by assisting host-nation gov- direct Civil Affairs assistance to the with LIC in a proac- ernments in meeting the internal- host nation, the same skills could tive way ...” development needs of their peo- benefit the embassy by providing ples. Civil Affairs possesses capa- assistance to its staff — again at bilities which can be a practical minimal or no cost to the State ing with the riddle of LIC; but if means of achieving that goal. Department. this country is ever to effect a The fact that the bulk of coherent and sustained effort, if it resources would come from the Conclusion is not to painfully relearn anew all reserve components does present As the term is defined to include the hard lessons and if it is to substantive problems. However, conditions short of armed or hos- address the LIC challenge to its they are problems which can be tile insurgency, a LIC environment long-term interests, then it must addressed and solved if there is a exists in most, if not all, of the face up to the need to develop and commitment by the Departments countries within the USCENT- sustain the institutional elements, of State and Defense to actively COM AOR. To be sure, there are the concepts and the ongoing edu- support the program. pockets of wealth and affluence; cational programs required to The program proposed here can but, on balance, there is make LIC a serious component in provide a practical means to meet, widespread poverty, disease and our strategy. There is no guaran- and perhaps best, the challenges joblessness in these so-called tee of success even if all these presented by the problems of inter- Third World countries. things are done perfectly, but fail- nal development to nations in the In his speech of Dec. 7, 1988 to ure is a certainty if nothing is Third World. If the United States the United Nations, Soviet Presi- done.”27 does not respond to these chal- dent Mikhail Gorbachev recog- The main thrust of doctrine in lenges, others, who do not neces- nized the conditions present in the the LIC arena is oriented toward sarily support the development

Winter 1991 25 of representative democracies, advising local authorities on vari- am more convinced that a peace- most surely will. ous projects funded by USAID, as time relationship between the CA suggested in my article, they did community and the Department of Postscript: provide to USAID assessments of State should be established along needs, including cost estimates, the lines suggested in my article. From Jan. 1-Feb. 19,1990, necessary to rebuild the country of Colonel Smith served with the Panama. These assessments were Civil Affairs Task Force as J- then assigned priorities by CA per- 5/ Deputy Operations Officer in sonnel and were used by USAID to Col. Ronald M. Smith, currently support of Operation Just Cause determine the obligation of funds assigned to the 352nd Civil and Operation Promote Liberty in as they become available. Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md., Panama. Based on that experi- Secondly, CA personnel worked graduated from the U.S. Army ence, he offers the following closely with the U.S. Embassy in War College Resident Program in postscript to his article: Panama as the interface between June 1989. He has served in Viet- My experience in Panama con- both the military and the embassy nam as a Quartermaster officer vinced me that at least two con- and the various Panamanian min- and in Germany as a Judge Advo- cepts outlined in my article have istries. CA personnel were also cate. He has held various positions been validated. First, although integrated into the staff of the from platoon level through battery Civil Affairs personnel did not embassy, to include, for example, commander to staff at the corps work with the U.S. Agency for acting as the air attache to civil and theater-army level. International Development in aviation for the embassy. Thus, I

Notes: (LIC): Civil Affairs Legal Support,” The Army Lawyer, October 1988, 1 Col. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., “Civil Affairs, A LIC Priority,” Mili- p. 5. tary Review, September 1988, p. 43. 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1, Dictio- 2 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs nary of Military and Associated Terms (hereinafter referred to as Operations, pp. 1-4 to 1-5 and 5-1 thru 54 (hereinafter referred to as “JCS Pub 1”). JCS Pub 1 defines foreign internal defense as “Partici- “FM 41-10”). pation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of 3 Ibid, see pp. 2-9 to 2-12 for a discussion of the role of Civil Affairs the action programs taken by another government to free or protect in HNS. its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” 4 Ibid, Appendix A. The 20 functional specialties are civil defense, 10 U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, labor, legal, public administration, public education, public finance, Field Manual 100-20, Low-intensity Conflict (Final Draft), pp. 2-14 public health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, economics thru 2-25 (hereinafter referred to as “FM 100-20”). and commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public commu- 11 From the author’s perspective, there is an inconsistency nications, public transportation, public works and utilities, arts, between FM 100-20 and FM 41-10. For example, FM 100-20 includes monuments and archives, civil information, cultural affairs, and dis- FID in its glossary of terms, but discusses only IDAD in the text of located civilians. See also Field Manual 100-16, pp. 11-4 thru 11-11, the manual. While it is important to recognize IDAD for what it is, for another discussion of what tasks each of these functional special- because FM 100-20 is written for use by U.S. forces, it would appear ties includes. However, it should be noted that the term “displaced that FID also should be discussed in conjunction with IDAD and that persons, refugees, and evacuees” (DPRE) has been supplanted by the cross reference should be made to Chapter 3, FM 41-10. current term, “dislocated civilians” (DC). 12 FM 41-10, p. 3-6. 5 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, November 1987 13 Ibid, pp. 3-2 to 3-3. (Qatar), December 1987 (Egypt), November 1986 (Somalia). 14 William H. Taft IV, U.S. Department of Defense, Memorandum 6 The Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., Subject: “Unified the Congress for Fiscal Year 1989, 11 February 1988, p. 58.) has Commanders’ Conduct of Cooperative Programs with Friendly noted that “LIC involves indirect, or ambiguous, aggression such as Nations,” 20 November 1985. terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.” The Deputy Secretary of 15 Casper W. Weinberger, U.S. Department of Defense, Memoran- Defense (U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive No. 513B.4, 4 dum for Secretaries of Military Departments, et al., Subject: “DoD January 1988, p. 1.), in addressing the authority and responsibilities Implementation of the Provisions in the Department of Defense of the ASD(SO/LIC), defines LIC as “political-military confrontation Authorization Act, 1986, Relating to Humanitarian Relief,” 20 between contending states or groups below conventional war and December 1985. above the routine, peaceful competition of states.” The Army various- 16 Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 20, Section 405. ly describes LIC in the same words as the DoD Directive, i.e., FM 17 The legislative history for Public Law 99-661 (10 U.S.C. 401, et 100-20 (Final Draft), p. 1-1, and as involving “military action below seq.) states that “(t)he committee believes that the provision of the level of sustained combat between regular forces,” FM 1001, p. humanitarian and civic assistance activities to the civilian populace 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1 provides yet another slightly dis- of developing foreign countries potentially confronted with low inten- tinguishable view by defining LIC in terms of a “limited political-mil- sity conflict should be explicitly recognized as a valid military mis- itary struggle” ranging from “diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial sion.” (Emphasis added.) U.S. Code and Congressional News, 99th pressures through terrorism and insurgency,” which is “generally Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6482. confined to a geographic area” and is “often characterized by con- 18 U.S. Department of Defense, Civil Affairs Master Plan Coordi- straints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.” nating Draft, undated, p. ES-4, and Final Draft, Joint Manual for 7 Barnes, p. 39. Civil Affairs, FM 41-5, Chapter 3. 8 Barnes, “Legitimacy and the Lawyer in Low-Intensity Conflict 19 Apparently after some interservice disagreement, it has been

26 Special Warfare determined that the reserve-component Marine CAGs are a part of command could be formed out of existing assets of the 352nd Civil the two “embarked” Marine Expeditionary Forces. However, 10 Affairs Command and the Marine CAG. Such a command would not U.S.C. 167(b), Assignment of Forces (to SOCOM), provides that only assure full Marine participation in H/CA activities, but would “(u)nless otherwise directed by the Secretary Of Defense, all active provide for better wartime planning for the employment of Army and and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in Marine Civil Affairs units. the United States shall be assigned to the special operations com- 22 The obvious concern with the use of Reservists in H/CA activi- mand.” (Emphasis added.) The author is not aware that the Secre- ties is their limited time on-station. However, there simply are no tary has so excepted the Marine CAGs. In any event, the facts indi- active-component assets available because of the heavy commitment cate that the particular USCENTCOM designated Marine Reserve of the one AC Civil Affairs battalion to other real-world missions. CAG in question is stationed in Los Angeles, Calif. Its personnel are Secondly, with forethought and planning, the author believes that trained by the Army. When mobilized, it will have an Army Civil viable missions could be identified which would lend themselves to Affairs company (soon to be battalion) attached to it to help provide the incremental commitment of Civil Affairs Reservists. support to the MEF. Further, such separateness has the potential for 23 Guidance in this area can be found in various Comptroller Gen- promoting competition for scarce resources within the AOR because eral opinions including 57 Comp. Gen. 674 (1978), 63 Comp. Gen. the Marine and Army Civil Affairs units have not worked and coordi- 422 (1984), and 63 Comp. Gen. at 22-26, among others. nated together in peacetime. Secondly, the splitting of this single 24 Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 167(e), CINCSOCOM, among other func- function of Civil Affairs along service lines does not promote joint- tions, has responsibility for “(B) Training assigned forces … (F) ness. Accordingly, in the author’s opinion, this decision should be Ensuring combat readiness … (and) (H) Ensuring the interoperabili- revisited. ty of … forces” by monitoring the preparedness of SOF assigned to If the Marine CAGs were assigned to USSOCOM, this would facil- other unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions. itate the CINCCENTCOM, pursuant to authority under Paragraph The author believes that a strong case has been made that probably 3-26d, JCS Pub 2, establishing a “functional component command” the only way Civil Affairs personnel can be fully trained and pre- under the 352nd Civil Affairs Command to address Civil Affairs mat- pared to perform wartime missions is for them to get in-country and ters for USCENTCOM. The criteria for establishing a functional to practice their skills with host-country nationals during peacetime. component command are found in Paragraph 39a. In a message Assuming this interpretation is accepted as valid, the CINCSOCOM change to JCS Pub 1 [JCS Msg, Subj: JCS Pub 2, Unified Action has authority to propose funding of “selected operations” pursuant to Armed Forces (UNAAF)- Terminology, dated 291626Z Oct 87], the 10 U.S.C. 167(f) and 166(b)(4). These budget proposals are submitted term “functional component command” is defined as a “command as Program 11 funding. In the author’s view, this approach appears normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more ser- most viable in terms of visibility, prioritization and as a counter to vices which may be established in peacetime or war to perform par- generalized budgetary objections ant constraints. ticular operational missions that may be of short duration or may 25 CA Master Plan, p. 5-1. extend over a period of time.” 26 Critics may charge that a “bond of trust” will be an unlikely 20 Interview with Col. Wesley A. Groesbeck, Assistant Chief of development over a short 2-3 week period. In the short term and Staff, G-5, Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Ga., 10 November with no follow-up, this probably is so. However, the proposal 1988. assumes a long-term relationship through an incremental infusion of 21 As the responsible command, USCENTCOM should consider Civil Affairs personnel. forming a functional component command, as referenced in Note 19 27 Dr. William J. Olson, “Organizational Requirements for LIC,” above, with the mission of conducting the proposed program. This Military Review, LXVIII, January 1988, p. 16.

Winter 1991 27 Civil Affairs in Operation Just Cause

U.S. military activities in Pana- Panama and the United States con- for the invasion of Panama. ma during Operation Just Cause tinued to deteriorate. Although the In Panama, Noriega became included a variety of special opera- status of the Panama Canal had increasingly unstable, and when tions, and no SOF were more been addressed in part by the forces murdered an American involved than Army Civil Affairs. treaty of 1977, and the Canal Marine and arrested and beat a Civil Affairs involvement in the scheduled to come under Panama- naval officer and threatened his operation actually preceded the call nian control by the end of the cen- wife with rape, President Bush had to arms in December 1989. In the tury, the rise of General Noriega in had enough. On Dec. 17, he ordered summer of 1988, senior officers 1983 had brought new tensions. that Operation Just Cause be from the 361st Civil Affairs Noriega ruled through a combina- implemented. Brigade, an Army Reserve unit tion of electoral fraud, brute force headquartered in Pensacola, Fla., and intimidation. In early 1988, he Just Cause and oriented toward Latin America, was indicted as a drug trafficker by The night of Dec. 20, 1989 saw were tasked by the U.S. Southern a grand jury in Miami. thousands of American paratroop- Command’s director of plans and Despite his overwhelming loss of ers descending into Panama, and policy to provide assistance in plan- the May 1989 elections, Noriega some of the first soldiers to see ning the Civil Affairs role in a con- seemed determined to hang on. By action were members of the 96th tingency plan. The contingency summer, sentiment in the Bush Civil Affairs Battalion from Fort operation would overthrow Manuel administration had hardened Bragg, N.C. Noriega’s Panama dictatorship and against Noriega, and Adm. William Soldiers from the 96th, the assist the Panamanians in estab- J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Army’s only active-duty Civil Af- lishing a democratically elected Chiefs of Staff, ordered Gen. fairs battalion, accompanied mem- government. Maxwell Thurmond, commander-in- bers of the 75th Ranger Regiment During the next 18 months, rela- chief of the U.S. Southern Com- who jumped in at H-hour at the tions between the governments of mand, or SOUTHCOM, to prepare Torrijos-Tocumen airport. As the

28 Special Warfare Rangers seized the airfield and Barbosa-Figueroa, from Co. A of the not have the people to accomplish cleared the air terminal and nearby 96th discovered that eight Depart- what was to be a major CA mission. barracks of the Panamanian ment of National Investigations The original CA plan, named “Blind Defense Force, soldiers from the agents were still hiding in their Logic,” had foreseen this problem 96th ran collection points for pris- office. Barbosa-Figueroa and anoth- and called for the commitment of oners, wounded and civilians. They er soldier captured them and recov- the 361st. But when the National later advised conventional brigades ered 12 weapons. Command Authority decided not to on civil-military operations, as well, “We also helped figure out which call up any Army Reserve units, the but their primary job was to re- prisoners were really innocent Army had to fall back on individual start the country. bystanders, and which people in the volunteers. The U.S. Army Reserve Maj. Harold E. Williams, com- civilian crowd actually should be Special Operations Command mander of Company A, 96th CA prisoners,” Williams said. began to identify CA specialists and Battalion, was one of seven soldiers Company A immediately began to structure the force that SOUTH- from the 96th who jumped in with deal with problems that emerged COM needed. the Rangers. “Our mission was to with the detained civilians. Within 24 hours of the initial help the Panamanians get their “The problems we encountered insertion of U.S. forces into Pana- country running again,” Williams included feeding them, giving medi- ma, USAR SOC had informally said. “To do that we had to be on cal care for the shocked elderly, notified its major subordinate head- the ground during the initial inva- allowing people with diplomatic quarters throughout the United sion to coordinate with the military passports to leave, allowing firemen States to begin soliciting volunteers intelligence, military police and access to work on fires in the build- for a CA staff for Panama. More ground-forces commanders. We con- ing, recording civilian names and than 600 Reserve soldiers answered tinued activities during ongoing surveying civilians who had critical the call, and this number would operations to render humanitarian skills we could use,” Williams said. grow to thousands before the opera- assistance.” “As the 82nd Airborne Division sol- tion was completed. By Dec. 23, “Four other 96th CA soldiers air- diers arrived, we directed them to USAR SOC had selected 25 individ- landed at H+46 minutes with the various locations where we had ual reservists, from various CA Rangers at Rio Hato,” Williams prisoners and civilians so they could units, who had the necessary mili- said. “They controlled non-combat- start handling and processing them.” tary experience and who were will- ant civilians in and around the air ing to spend 139 days on active field. They guarded the civilians’ Call for volunteers duty. safety and ensured their non-inter- Despite the effectiveness of their Numerous civilian and military ference with the ground tactical early actions, the 96th simply did personnel at Fort Bragg worked to operations.” “After we parachuted onto Tocu- men Airport, half of us went with the Rangers while they cleared the Panamanian Defense Force infantry barracks, and the other half went with Rangers while they cleared the international air terminal,” Williams said. At the PDF barracks, Cpl. Ricar- do Barros performed the first civil- affairs action of processing detainees during the invasion, according to Williams. At the air terminal the Rangers detained about 400 civilians and many PDF soldiers, Williams said. “Our role with the detainees was to do a field interrogation and search for information of immediate tactical value, and to safeguard them pending disposition.” Photo by Gerry Grey “For example,” Williams said, CA reservists bound for home following Operation Just Cause. The diverse “Through questioning, Sgt. Miguel nature of the group mirrors the makeup of the volunteer reserve CA force.

Winter 1991 29 get these soldiers, and those who would follow, to Fort Bragg and processed for overseas deployment. They had the initial 25 CA soldiers, 96th CA Soldier Earns led by Col. William H. Stone, Combat Experience deputy commander of the 361st, in Panama by Dec. 26. Cpl. Ricardo Barros of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion performed Meanwhile, USAR SOC was the first combat civil affairs action during Operation Just Cause. arranging for the deployment of the Barros, 25, from Company A, parachuted in with the Rangers at next increment. In contrast to the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport at H-Hour, Dec. 20 and went with them to selection process for the CA staff, clear the nearby Panamanian Defense Force barracks. Noticing a USAR SOC was now primarily wounded civilian fireman near the runway, he tried to escort him to a interested in reservists’ civilian medical station. skills. Information on the volun- “But when I got to him he said he wanted to go to his room in the teers, as well as the demands from barracks to get his identification card,” Barros said. “The barracks Panama, was fed into a computer were already cleared by the Rangers so I notified my team leader that data base to identify the necessary I would escort him to his room. experts in health, public works and “On the way to his room I was talking to him in Spanish, trying to utilities, public safety, dislocated get information from him,” Barros said. “When we got to his room it civilians, public communications, was very dark. Suddenly I heard two other men yelling in Spanish transportation, and administrative from another room. and communications skills. “I found myself in a very difficult situation,” Barros said. “I was Col. Bruce Bingham of the 353rd alone with my prisoner in a secure building. The first thing I did was CA Command’s staff in New York to safeguard my prisoner by telling him to lie on the floor and not was enjoying the holidays when the move.” news came. “It was Christmas Eve After tying his prisoner’s hands with flexible plastic handcuffs, Bar- day, and I was home watching the ros went to check the other room. “I went into their room weapon-first. Giants play football when the But it was pitch dark. I saw nothing. I would be lying if I said I wasn’t phone rang,” said Bingham. “The scared — I was dead scared.” Army wanted my management Deciding not to use a grenade because of possible shrapnel injury to skills.” Specifically, the Army want- other soldiers outside, Barros entered the room with his rifle and a ed Bingham to research companies flashlight. “I found a Panamanian hiding under a bed, so I knelt down it suspected of having strong ties to and instructed him to come out with his hands where I could see Noriega and to do research for a them. He lay on the floor spread-eagled and I told him not to move or number of U.S. companies who did I’d shoot.” Another man then came out of a wall locker yelling, “Don’t not know how and where to pay kill me please!” Social Security benefits, “an impor- Barros took time to identify the two and saw that they were civil- tant source of cash for the country,” ians. “They came out peacefully and I processed them as prisoners,” Bingham said. He was given two Barros said, “But it was an experience that I will never forget.” and a half days to get ready to go to Panama. —SSgt. Kirk Wyckoff, PAO, USAJFKSWCS Along with other reservists, he was transported to Fort Bragg, processed and shipped to Panama. By January 1990, the second increment, engineer staff, immigration umen to relieve the pressure of ment of more than 80 personnel and customs, labor boss for locally civilian visits to our military clinic was in-country. hired civilians, diplomatic protocol, in the airport lobby. And we super- and community relations,” Williams vised the return to work of Pana- Stabilization said. “Panamanian civilians literal- manian airport employees.” In Panama, once the airport and ly couldn’t get onto the airport Company A soldiers also helped air terminal were secure, the next grounds without written permission evacuate third-country nationals priority for the 96th was to stabilize from one of us.” leaving Panama for their home the airport and get it functioning “We selected 154 civilian workers countries, coordinating with foreign again. Company A stayed at the which the 82nd hired to clean up embassies, consulates, the Interna- airport for the next two weeks, get- the airport and negotiated their tional Red Cross, Panamanian air- ting things back to normal. wage,” Williams said. “We re-estab- port officials, U.S. Customs and the “We served as airport manage- lished the local health clinic in Toc- Air Force.

30 Special Warfare “We helped evacuate more than the people get paint and lumber so As U.S. humanitarian-assistance 5,000 civilians in a five-day period,” they could start rebuilding their efforts began, members of the 96th said Capt. Victor M. Feliciano, from homes. All the medical clinics had also monitored shipments of food Company A. Civilians were evacu- been looted, so we organized tempo- and medicine which arrived from ated to 12 different countries in rary medical clinics and assisted the U.S., making sure they were Europe, South and Central America churches.” delivered to the proper destinations. and the Caribbean. In Colon, on the Atlantic side of As reserve-component units Panama, the 96th CA soldiers dealt Government arrived, they began the task of with another difficult situation. One of the primary missions for rebuilding the airport, which had “Colon is a city that has a very the Reserve CA soldiers, now orga- been severely damaged during the low standard of living,” said Capt. nized into the Civil Military Opera- fighting. Kenneth R. Carter Jr. from Compa- tions Task Force, or CMOTF, and “The airport was a shambles,” ny A. “It has high unemployment under the command of Colonel said Capt. William Dyson of the and a large criminal element. Colon Stone, was to get the Panamanian 450th CA Company. “Everything wasn’t assaulted until D+3. By that government functioning. President was shot up, torn out and in pieces. time the PDF had released all 380 Endara’s fledgling administration It had to be almost totally rebuilt prisoners from jail, and they fled had requested the assignment of from the bottom up.” The project into the countryside. There they American military personnel to act was so extensive that Dyson moved joined approximately 1,000 more as advisers to each of his min- his cot and duffel bag to one of the criminals and members of the Dig- istries. Stone organized a number hangars and lived at the job site for nity Battalions. of his personnel into ministry about a month, until the project “We helped seal off the city and teams and placed them under the became more manageable. During went on police actions with Special operational control of Brig. Gen. this time he filled roles from air Forces soldiers,” Carter said. “And Bernard W. Gann, director of plans traffic controller to operations offi- we drove with the MPs on patrols, and policy for SOUTHCOM. Teams cer to customs reorganizer. but we only recaptured 25 criminals. were organized for finance, public After their job at the airport was finished, members of the 96th CA continued to perform a variety of missions. Members of Company A went with the Rangers on a stability mission near the town of Alcalde Diaz. There they performed law-and- order functions with Rangers, Spe- cial Forces and MPs that included setting up roadblocks, making identification checks, hunting for arms caches and suspected criminals, A U.S. soldier and working with the local govern- distributes ment to restore public services. emergency sup- “In two towns in the area we plies of food to served as the interim sheriff until two Panamani- local officials could be appointed,” an women dur- Williams said. “We mediated among ing Operation political parties to seat a slate of Just Cause. political officials.” The Civil Affairs soldiers helped the Panamanians bring their resources together so they could help themselves, according to 1st Sgt. Rudy Segura, of Company A. “We began surveying the people to find out what their needs were,” Segura said. “First we identified and assisted local civic leaders such as mayors and legislators. We helped Photo by Mark Williams

Winter 1991 31 works, health, justice, and the addresses and telephone numbers until members of the 96th CA could office of the President, to name a of points of contact. be freed from other duties on D+4. few. In all cases, Gann gave strong Under the control of Company D, and specific instruction that U.S. Dislocated civilians commanded by Maj. Michael Lewis, soldiers were to act as advisers, Of a priority second only to the the DC camp rapidly took shape at not managers. functioning of the Panamanian gov- Balboa High School. An embassy team coordinated ernment was that of assessing the The CMOTF role began with the with the American embassy, as the damage to El Chorrillo, a poor sec- establishment of a 14-person DC ambassador had full authority tion in the heart of Panama City team supervised by Col. William W. when it came to relations with the where several thousand civilians Graham, a civil engineer and indus- Endara government. Unfortunate- were left homeless. This district trial hygienist. The DC officer for ly, the classification of Blind Logic was where the Comandancia, the the 361st CA Brigade, he had run had made prior coordination with headquarters of the Panamanian one of the DC areas at Indiantown the embassy impossible. Further, Defense Forces, had been located, Gap, Pa., during the Mariel boat lift the reduction of embassy person- and although the district had taken in 1980. nel had left the embassy short- some damage from American fire- “The operation had all the char- handed, with no one specifically power, it took considerably more acteristics of a logistical night- charged to coordinate with when fleeing members of the PDF mare,” recalled Maj. Vincent SOUTHCOM. deliberately set fire to the area. Thomas, a member of the 354th In the end, the embassy official “The people of El Chorrillo had CA Command who was involved in designated as liaison officer to the no place to live and nothing to eat,” the resettlement operation. “Civil- military, Frank Foulger, found the Williams said. “So they went to the ians slept in the gymnasium, in CA embassy team a tremendous Balboa High School stadium where tents outside the school, under- resource and credited the Civil they had received assistance in pre- neath parachutes, and anywhere Affairs personnel with getting vious catastrophes.” else they could find a place.” The many Panamanian governmental “Blind Logic,” the CA operations civilians received one hot meal and functions up and running. plan, had assumed that the two meals-ready-to-eat each day. Lt. Col. James Carr, a member of CMOTF would take control of the Medical and other volunteer sup- the 354th CA Command, was dislocated-civilian camp, but the port largely came from Panamani- assigned to work in the palace delay in the commitment of an physicians, nurses, church orga- alongside the Panamanian equiva- reservists made this impossible ini- nizations, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts lent of the White House chief of tially. Therefore, an ad hoc arrange- and other volunteer civic associa- staff. Qualified as a foreign-area- ment took care of some 5,000 people tions. Graham and his team acted officer and fluent in Spanish, Carr had worked for numerous federal agencies and local governments, had served an internship at the United Nations, and had worked with Vietnamese and Cuban refugees. One of Carr’s most critical duties was insuring the proper routing, processing and action on requests between U.S. agencies and Panama- nian ministries. When Julio Harris, a Panamanian official from the Ministry of the Presidency, needed to learn more about U.S. government agencies, Carr bor- rowed a copy of the U.S. Govern- ment Manual from a U.S. employee at the Panama Canal Commission to get Harris started in the right direction. The manual gave the Panamanians the structure for the Photo by Mark Williams various departments, as well as This aerial view of Panama City shows the damage to the Comandancia wiring diagrams and names, (center), Manuel Noriega’s headquarters.

32 Special Warfare as support to the 96th until the DC camp moved. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army and Panamanian Ministry of Trans- portation had all agreed to house the dislocated civilians in a hangar at Albrook Air Force Station so that Balboa High School could resume normal operations. At Albrook, a large aircraft hangar was designated to be refurbished as the DC facility, with a small building nearby to be the health clinic. The DC team had a major role in this conversion. Graham requested and received construction experts from the CMOTF. A representative of the American Office of Federal Disaster Assistance established standards of construction and provided materials for construction of Photo by Vince Warner cubicles inside the hangar, and Air Temporary shelters set up on the ball field of Balboa High school house dis- Force engineers provided construc- located Panamanian civilians. tion support. Graham also had access to a data American Red Cross and the Pana- the Panamanian health system was base on all residents of the camp, manian Red Cross. In all, more the split of authority between two which enabled him to call on Pana- than 11,000 DCs were, at one time ministries. The Ministry of Social manian workmen for assistance. or another, residents of the camps Services had responsibility for the The CA team compiled demograph- at Balboa and Albrook. two major hospitals in Panama City ic information about the DC camp Urban planners assigned to the and was funded directly from with- and selected civilians with the nec- CMOTF surveyed the El Chorrillo holding taxes on salaries. The Min- essary skills to help build the more area and determined the number istry of Health was a welfare pro- permanent facility. Laborers were and square footage of public and pri- gram whose funding was erratic, paid for their work. vate structures, identified known but it had responsibility for some During all this time the CA plan- historical, religious and cultural 23 clinics in Panama City. The two ners worked with the local leader of buildings, and developed informa- agencies had joint responsibility for El Chorillo, getting his input on tion on the commercial and business some 36 hospitals and 24 rural policies and rules. “A lot of these facilities in the district. The infor- health facilities. Coordination people were neighbors,” said Sgt. mation was turned over to the Agen- between the two agencies was poor. Maj. Ramon Gonzalez, 353rd CA cy for International Development for Huggins wanted to interest the Command, who had worked with possible assistance projects. Minister of Social Services, who Cuban refugees at Indiantown Gap. controlled the vast bulk of funds, in “They knew one another, they got Public health the problems of non-Panama City along well and they had an elected Assistance to Panamanian health hospitals. He took the minister on a district leader. He wasn’t allowed to authorities involved two officers, tour of the hospital in Colon to assume his position under Manuel assigned to the Ministry of Social show him garbage piled outside and Noriega.” The CA team began to Services and the Ministry of sewage flowing through the prepare the hangar a few weeks Health, respectively, and a public- kitchen. Improvements followed. after opening Balboa, and the labor- health team working under the The Ministry of Social Services ers built 509 cubicles in the hangar operational control of the SOUTH- also had two warehouses, one full of to house the homeless civilians. COM surgeon. In charge of coordi- food and one full of medical sup- On Jan. 19, the entire DC popu- nation was Col. Jerry D. Huggins, a plies donated by the United States lation, now approximately 2,500, Reservist and health-care specialist and other countries. Citizens and moved to Albrook. Graham took employed by the U. S. government organizations made their needs command of this camp for a week, in Panama and called up for Just known to local clubs or the Catholic after which he turned it over to the Cause. Church who, in turn, forwarded International Red Cross, the The major difficulty in improving requests to the warehouses, but the

Winter 1991 33 essential to get a police presence back on the streets in the mean- time, and many of the Reserve Civil Affairs personnel brought into Panama after the initial insertion were experienced police officers. The Endara government accepted the fact that initially, the members of the new police force would have to be drawn from the ranks of the old PDF. They were the only source of semi-trained and experienced manpower available, and the government considered it better to have them where they could be controlled and co-opted rather than leave them without a stake in the new regime. However, Civil Affairs personnel were to help inculcate in the new policemen a responsiveness to law Photo by John Sell and civilian authority and to ensure An elderly Panamanian woman is vaccinated by a nurse during a joint exer- that they had at least minimal cise between U.S. troops and the Panamanian Ministry of Health. training in basic police techniques. The first task was to identify system needed transportation, courts back into operation. police who were still loyal to Norie- which Huggins was able to arrange. The corrections team assessed ga. Panamanians assisted by iden- the major prisons. American forces tifying those who had committed Law and order had broken into many facilities to abuses. Civil Affairs soldiers inter- Of particular importance to the search for and free jailed opponents viewed citizens to get the informa- future of Panama was the adminis- of the Noriega regime, and, in some tion, which was relayed to the State tration of justice. Col. Kenneth D. cases, the damages had made the Department. Any evidence of abus- Strong, designated by Stone as prisons unusable. Repairs had to be es or loyalty to Noriega, or a known chief of the Civil-military Opera- organized, food provided to the criminal background, meant imme- tions Center, organized a public- inmates, and guards hired. diate removal from the police force security section. Its leader, Lt. Col. The mission of the law-enforce- and possible detention. Richard C. Harris, sorted out the ment section, and of the entire CA The CA law-enforcement team specialties of its members, who effort once the Panamanian govern- trained the new police force, the were lawyers, judges, police officers ment was functioning, was the Fuerzas Publicas de Panama, or and corrections officials, and orga- establishment of a loyal, civilian FPP, beginning with redefining the nized them into three teams: law- police force. Prior to the American concept of what police were. “The enforcement, corrections and judi- invasion, Noriega’s Panamanian PDF didn’t know how to do police cial liaison. Defense Force had functioned as work,” said SFC William Helmick, of The judicial liaison team’s first the police force and was widely the 450th CA Company. “They were mission was to review the records of known for its abuses. With Noriega infantry soldiers, not public ser- the 5,000-6,000 Panamanians out of power and the PDF eliminat- vants.” The team’s goal was to train detained by American forces. ed, both legally and as an organized a cadre of Panamanian policemen Detainees included looters, mem- force, there were no police available who would, in turn, train others. bers of the PDF, members of Norie- to maintain law and order. One of the most elementary and ga’s paramilitary “Dignity Battal- President Endara was deter- important things that CA soldiers ions,” and others who had somehow mined that the only organized force taught the new police force was fallen into the American net. Work- in the country would be a civilian basic patrolling. The old PDF ing with the Panamanian govern- police. Although U.S. national patrols were done hastily and with ment, the team completed the police agencies and civilian contrac- the intent of restraining the citi- review, and most of the detainees tors began assisting in the estab- zens. New patrol techniques were released by Jan. 20. The judi- lishment of police academies, emphasized the idea of protecting cial team also assisted the Panama- national laboratories and other the citizens. Team members also nian government in getting its facilities for the long term, it was taught basic police reporting, and

34 Special Warfare Helmick instituted a system for reporting crimes, which had not Standing-Up a Law Enforcement System existed before The old PDF, as a military unit, was armed with rifles, most of Operation Just Cause gave Portland, Ore., police sergeant Robert which were later collected in a cash- Kauffman ample opportunity to draw from his 15 years of police experi- for-weapons program. As police, the ence in ways he couldn’t even imagine when he volunteered for duty in FPP had to learn to carry and use December 1989. sidearms, and CA soldiers helped Kauffman volunteered for 139 days to support Civil Affairs missions in give firearms training. Just Cause. He was one of six members from the 364th Civil Affairs Despite the intensive screening Brigade in Portland, deployed to Panama Dec. 29, 1989. and training, many Panamanians “Our first look at Panama was eerie,” Kauffman said. “We stayed in recently vacated dependent housing. There were still tricycles in the yard, still associated the uniformed police Christmas decorations up, and soldiers roaming around during the dawn- with the old PDF, and uniforms for to-dusk curfew.” the new FPP turned out to be a “After an initial briefing from the SOUTHCOM J-5, our data sheets major issue. “The Endara govern- were used to sort our civilian skills and to assign us with various min- ment wanted to eradicate any identi- istries and projects,” Kauffman said. “I went with the Ministry of Govern- fication of the civilian police force as ment and Justice.” paramilitary,” said Capt. David Elmo Kauffman’s team’s main mission was to “stand-up” the new police force, of the 353rd CA Command, who was the Fuerzas Publicas de Panama. “Our problems in standing-up a working involved in rebuilding the police police force were overwhelming,” he said. “For instance, where do you find force. “The U.S. tried to help. They 13,000 note pads and pens? How do you reproduce any paperwork? Forms provided surplus green fatigues. The were nonexistent. Everything started from scratch with no budget.” only problem was that the PDF had One major challenge was changing a military defense force into a work- also worn green fatigues, and the ing police department “We knew a number of former PDF members were people saw no difference.” nothing more than gangsters, guilty of murder, torture and extortion,” “To gain public confidence in this Kauffman said. “In addition to regaining law and order through the cre- new police force which we had ation of a Panamanian police force, we had to weed out the undesirables.” established, it was imperative that After the FPP was reconstituted, and a number of undesirables purged, we outfit them with different uni- the next major task was to transform the 13,000 infantry troops to police forms,” Helmick said. officers. “A team of us developed the ‘20-Hour Quick Fix,’ “ Kauffman said. Law-enforcement-team members “We trained them in police patrolling, arrest procedures, as well as researched different catalogs from statute and constitutional law. We added a healthy dose of police ethics, the U.S. and helped evaluate a sam- from our perspective as well as that of the new Panamanian government. ple uniform which was found unsat- We translated it into Spanish and developed a ‘train the trainer’ isfactory because of its color and approach, creating a cadre to spread the message.” thickness. In the end, funds set Kauffman’s experience convinced him of four areas of concern for future aside for the uniforms were put into Civil Affairs operations: “First, we were in desperate need of up-to-date, the local economy by having Pana- detailed area assessments. There is a need for area assessments which manians make the new uniforms. are living documents with current maps, for example. Second, we could To further emphasize the distinc- have saved time if we had an inkling of what to bring. We won’t always be tion between military forces and fortunate to have a PX down the street, or a well-stocked Army supply public servants, many of the CA sol- system. Third, even with the significant number of Spanish-speaking soldiers “civilianized” themselves as diers in CA, and the commendable English skills of many Panamanians, well, working in civilian clothes and our lack of language training and proficiency created problems when com- driving civilian vehicles, according municating. We were setting up national policy and dealing with compli- to SFC Daniel Svrcek of the 353rd cated issues. Survival, or tourist, language doesn’t cut it. Language profi- CA Command. “We worked for a ciency in units must be stressed. And finally, we discovered first-hand the long time in civilian clothes. They incredible number of skills needed to re-establish a government. These wanted to play down the military. skills aren’t found the active component. It reaffirmed my belief that more The emphasis was on putting civil- accurate pinpointing of a spectrum of skills is needed so we can step in as ian skills to use.” we did and make a difference.” By the end of January, more than — Lt. Col. Susan Schenk, Civil Information Officer 200 members of the new Panamani- 364th CA Brigade, Portland, Ore. an police force, and an equal number of judicial police, had received a 20-hour basic police-training course.

Winter 1991 35 Despite the brevity of the course, it a diesel-powered generator was the he got 25 headquarters personnel did get a police presence back on the only source of electricity. The sup- at D+6. Further, he had planned on streets of Panama with some con- ply of fuel had been cut off as a the CMOTF working for the combat cept of proper police procedures and result of the invasion, but fuel was headquarters, Joint Task Force respect for civilian rights. waiting at the ports. Citizens were South, but General Thurmond, the shutting off non-essential electric SOUTHCOM commander, directed Area assessments equipment, but such things as hos- that the CMOTF work directly for Members of the CMOTF also par- pital operations were being affect- his headquarters. ticipated in area assessments to ed. A CA team arranged for ship- Unfortunately, this chain of com- determine the extent of collateral ment of diesel fuel. mand was not clear to all of the damage to outlying areas during In Union Sentenia, a remote vil- headquarters involved, and the the invasion. Teams assessed roads, lage with no electricity, villagers had CMOTF initially received taskings generators, utilities, schools, a 3,000-pound surplus of slaugh- from the American Embassy, churches, hospitals, and the avail- tered beef. Without refrigeration, SOUTHCOM staff, Stone’s own per- ability of food, water and medical the meat would spoil and become a sonnel assigned to Panamanian and other supplies. They met with major health hazard, and the lead- ministries, JTF-South and U.S. local leaders to determine the prob- ers of the village asked that the sur- Army-South. lems and passed the information to plus be taken to feed the dislocated Another problem caused by lack SOUTHCOM headquarters in citizens of El Chorrillo. The CA of a unit call-up was that the Panama City. team arranged for a Blackhawk heli- Reserve CA personnel did not really While collateral damage was copter to transport the meat. make up an Army unit. They had minimal outside of Panama City, been sent to Panama as individuals effects of the invasion were felt Problems assigned to U.S. Army-South. The throughout the country because of The Civil Affairs mission during CMOTF had no existence so far as disruption to supply routes and the Just Cause was not without its Army systems were concerned. consequent imbalance between problems. The decision not to call Without a unit identification code, areas of supply and areas of up a Reserve CA unit required funding sites, and all the other demand. Many Civil Affairs mis- some changes in plans. General ways into the Army system, the sions helped alleviate the effects of Gann, director of plans and policy CMOTF found great difficulty this imbalance by arranging to for SOUTHCOM, had planned on accomplishing many standard unit transport the supplies to where CA personnel arriving ready to functions. For example, equipment they were needed. work within D+2. Because of the and supplies could not be requisi- On San Blas Island, for example, time required to solicit volunteers, tioned, nor could orders be cut to put personnel on temporary duty. Both the G-1, Lt. Col. Allen D. Mills, and the G-4, Lt. Col. Lilia Vannett, found themselves unable to access the system. Vannett got furniture from an old Panamanian Defense Force facility and office space from the Panama Canal Com- mission. Necessary vehicles had to be leased, creating an enormous amount of paperwork. Within the CMOTF, the fact that it was composed of individuals from across the country instead of from a single unit meant that soldiers required a few days to adjust to working with each other. Based on their involvement in Just Cause, members of Civil Affairs units brought back a number of lessons learned: Photo by Paul Sweeney • CA did numerous area assess- Spec. Frank Wallace, U.S. Army-South Law Enforcement Activity, watches ments, which implied to civilians as his PNP counterpart questions a suspected mugger in Panama City. that the needed work and repairs

36 Special Warfare Just Cause were an exemplary effort of active and reserve-component soldiers working together. Captains Williams and Carter of the 96th’s A Company summed up CA activities during the operation: “We were instrumental in assisting the local government in all areas,” Carter said, “including developing, equipping and training the police force; developing the public health and sanitation programs and coordinating the new government’s initiatives with our plans for developmental assistance.” Williams points out that the U.S. normally uses civic action such as road building, well drilling and medical treatment to help a foreign government gain the allegiance of Photo by Gerry Grey its population. But in Panama, the Villagers of Union Sentenia crowd around a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter traditional concept of civic action which has come to pick up surplus slaughtered beef. The village donated didn’t apply — the people were 3,000 pounds of meat to feed displaced civilians in Panama City. nearly 100-percent behind their government already. Instead, the would be done. When the assess- active duty, not the originals. In- U.S. strategy was one not of giving ments went through channels, they processing at Fort Bragg began supplies and services, but of teach- were ranked in importance and with all finance and personnel ing the Panamanians to acquire implemented depending upon avail- records being sent back to home them through their own efforts. able funds. Only a small number of stations. Soldiers then completed “In Panama we needed to route the recommendations were actually the forms to create new records. all our efforts through the Panama- funded. The overall planning must • Personnel should be familiar nians to reinvigorate the systems address a way to fund and perform with sidearms as well as M-16s that atrophied under Noriega,” the work that the assessments indi- before deploying. There was no time Williams said. “And to allow the cate must be done. to train in-country. new government to show its citi- • Greater tactical CA is needed, • There should be an interface zens that it can deliver the goods.” with more CA assets at the battal- between Reserve CA units and the ions. The battalions were the ideal 96th CA Battalion for intel mis- place for CA to do its job of prevent- sions, etc. The overall OPLAN did ing problems before they occur. Most not write many of the CA assets This article was compiled by the of the preventable damage hap- into the flow of communication staff of Special Warfare from the pened during the invasion, when CA from the 96th. Reservists some- work of several authors: Lt. Col. Jef- assets were least available. times got information either by frey Greenhut; Capt. Gerry Grey, • Knowledge of language and cul- accident or by electing to sit in on PAO, 354th CA Brigade; Capt. Cyn- ture is essential. Translators and 96th CA briefings. thia Crosson, PAO, 353rd CA Com- interpreters on hand were some- • Personnel must be prepared for mand; Capt. Robert N. Gable, 486th times overburdened, and many CA a fluid, rapidly changing environ- CA Company; Lt. Col. Susan actions are best accomplished when ment in which the exact mission for Schenk, 364th CA Brigade; Capt. soldiers speak the language of the each team may not always be clear Terry Henry, 96th CA Brigade; and host country. or have specific tasks. SSgt. Kirk Wyckoff, PAO, JFK Spe- • An area study is critical before • Personnel absolutely must be cial Warfare Center and School. going in-country. physically fit. Special thanks for photos from the • “Smart book” and FM 41-10 Directorate of Training Support must be available. These references Conclusions Center, Fort Clayton, Panama; and were both used constantly. Despite the complications caused PAO, U.S. Army-South. • Reservists should take only by lack of a Reserve-unit call-up, photocopies of personnel records to the Civil Affairs activities during

Winter 1991 37 was no such official organization, and most of today’s CA duties were carried out by provost-marshal troops until World War II. Unfortunately, the Scott-Taylor lesson wasn’t always taken to heart. During the U.S. Civil War, Seal the Victory: the Union “political” general, Ben- jamin F. Butler, commanding the occupation of New Orleans, hanged A History of U.S. a Confederate agitator who had hauled down the U.S. flag. But Army Civil Affairs worse was to follow: Certain wom- enfolk of the Crescent City took it upon themselves to harass Union troops, denouncing, hissing or jostling the “bluebellies.” The enraged Butler issued GO No. 28, a very different article by Stanley Sandler indeed from Scott’s GO No. 20: “It is ordered that henceforth when any female shall in word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the Unit- ed States, she shall be regarded as The delegation of prominent Mex- ders. Scott forthrightly proclaimed a woman of the street plying her ican merchants, local civic leaders that, in exchange for their docility, avocation.” and church officials exchanged ner- civilians were to be protected in A howl of rage reverberated vous glances as they were ushered their persons and property, any req- through the Confederacy: “South- by an unsmiling U.S. Army orderly uisitions would be paid for in cash, ern womanhood in danger!” A price into the presence of the American and all priests and magistrates was put on Butler’s head of general. After all, here was the were to be saluted by U.S. troops. $10,000, dead or alive. But the commander of an army of foreign Scott meant every word of it; a ladies of New Orleans had their invaders now deep inside their civilian Army employee who had own, more private response, paint- chaotic nation. violated a Mexican woman was, on ing Butler’s truly ugly mug on the After they sorted themselves out, Scott’s order, publicly hanged. bottoms of their chamberpots! the delegation’s leader cleared his But Scott was, after all, in Mexico Butler’s besmirched historical throat and came out with it: Would to wage war, and the military reputation as an Army Civil Affairs the distinguished and humane results of GO No. 20 were equally officer could be redeemed by his generale graciously accept the dic- impressive. Mexico’s second city, conduct toward the escaped slaves tatorship of the Federal Mexican Puebla, fell to him without a shot, in his jurisdiction. A New England Republic? and Scott’s military progress to abolitionist in civil life, Butler, for With some difficulty Gen. Winfield Mexico City was speeded by an all his bungling insensitivities, gen- (Old Fuss and Feathers) Scott con- almost total absence of guerrilla uinely wanted to help the wretched cealed his astonishment as he cour- activity against his long and vul- runaways. teously responded that as an officer nerable supply lines. When pressed by slave owners for in the United States Army he had Gen. Zachary (Old Rough and the return of their property as pro- no political ambitions, although he Ready) Taylor, on the other hand, vided for in the Fugitive Slave Act, was flattered by the offer. wasn’t about to bother about such the lawyerly Butler blandly This rather bizarre episode was details as Civil Affairs. Conse- responded that the act applied only the direct result of Scott’s General quently, his raw and undisciplined to the United States, not to the Order No. 20, promulgated at troops were harassed by Mexican Confederate States of America, Tampico, Mexico, on Feb. 19, 1847, guerrillas. which had seceded from the Union. declaring martial law over those Today’s U.S. Army Civil Affairs Petitioners couldn’t have it both areas under Scott’s control. But GO rightly considers General Scott the ways. Butler went further, putting No. 20 went well beyond the usual “Father of Civil Affairs,” even the able-bodied to work, and estab- behave-yourself-or-else type of or- though at the time, of course, there lishing an early form of social secu-

38 Special Warfare rity — those blacks unable to work of civilian supremacy, and it was He seemed to know his stuff, and received a small stipend, financed not until March 1943 that Secre- anyway, with whom would we by a levy on the wages of those who tary of War Henry Stimson was replace him? Then there are those could. able to convince the President that gangs of armed teenagers swagger- Three decades later, in the wake the historical record and wartime ing about. They claimed to be parti- of the Spanish-American War, exigencies demanded the modifica- sans who had been fighting the American soldiers found them- tion of that tradition. “fascist swine” since before America selves in places that most of them On March 1, 1943, the U.S. Army even came into the war, but they couldn’t even find on a map. Civil Affairs Division, CAD, was acti- may actually have been just ban- Nonetheless, order had to be vated under Maj. Gen. John dits, or communists with their own restored, public health established Hildring. CAD personnel soon found fish to fry. and the way paved for eventual themselves encountering problems Despite these and many other self-government. In Cuba, Gen. in the field unimagined in their problems, the 10,000-plus person- Leonard Wood put the island nation classrooms at the University of Vir- nel of CAD took charge of more on its feet, cleaned up the cities and ginia’s School of Military Govern- than 80 million allied, co-belliger- encouraged Cubans to elect their ment. The Italian town of Adano des- ent, enemy, refugee and partisan own leaders and draw up a liberal perately needed a bell for its church, civilians, without one documented constitution, smoothing the way for the center of town life — the local example of violent opposition. Cuban independence. Civil Affairs major finally scrounged One of the most sophisticated The process was much more diffi- one from a U.S. Navy destroyer. On a and gratifying of the CAD’s accom- cult in the Philippines. There the broader scale, the Italian fishing plishments in WWII’s European Filipino patriot Emilio Aguinaldo fleet was in fairly good shape, and Theater of Operations was the res- raised insurrection against the supplied an important slice of the cue and restoration of thousands of Americans. Eventually the U.S. food needs of the liberated areas. But works of European art and culture Army defeated Aguinaldo in the it needed fuel to put to sea. Could looted by the Nazis. Scores of civil- field, but it concurrently estab- CAD justify the diversion of valuable ian and military CAD personnel lished local self-government and petroleum to help civilian fishing located and meticulously identified police forces, public health services, boats put to sea? treasures ranging from statues to schools and a Philippine defense Then there were the political musical scores. Soon after V-E day, force. This civil-military velvet- conundrums. Granted, the mayor of trains headed for Poland, Italy, glove policy, with a Krag rifle in one a particular town was a fascist, but France, Belgium, etc., with the res- hand and a schoolbook in the other, hadn’t everyone had to be a fascist cued cultural heritage of Europe. broke not only the military power of to hold any kind of government job? Contrast this record with that of the rebels, but by 1902, their hold over the population as well. In the aftermath of World War I, the U.S. Army administered its first major military government of an enemy population. It was all unplanned until nearly the last hour, even though Germany’s military defeat was hardly an unfore- seen fortune of war. Still, the Ger- man Rhineland occupation lived up to Gen. John J. Pershing’s mandate of a “just, humane and disinterest- ed” administration. World War II saw many changes in U.S. Civil Affairs policy. For more than a year after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt insisted that Civil Affairs be removed from the Provost Marshal Corps and put under some civilian agency, such as the State or Trea- National Archives sury Department. FDR was acting Gen. Zachary Taylor (right center) giving orders to charge the Mexican bat- in the hallowed American tradition teries at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma, May 9, 1846.

Winter 1991 39 the Germans in the same war. One fighter” and “government exile” Operations and Revolutionary contemporary German writer, with against “Quisling” that so plagued Development Support Program was unconscious irony, illustrated the their WWII predecessors from St. taken over by Military Assistance bankruptcy of the Wehrmacht’s “civil Lô to Manila. In Korea, U.S. Army Command-Vietnam. Three regular affairs” policies: “To lock men, Civil Affairs enjoyed the satisfac- Army Civil Affairs companies, the women, and children into barns and tion, however brief, of governing the 2nd, 29th and 41st, carried the bur- set fire to these, does not appear to only communist capital, den throughout the U.S. involve- be a suitable method of combating Pyongyang, to fall to the forces of ment in the war, and according to bands, even if it is desired to exter- freedom to date. the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff at the minate the population.”1 During the Vietnam conflict Civil time, they were “worth their weight Army Civil Affairs emerged from Affairs was before the U.S. public as in gold.” the war and took up the military never before in the well-worn This was war-in-peace with an governments of Germany, Japan, phrase “winning the hearts and enemy who was everywhere and Austria and Korea. The Army’s minds of the people.” Here was nowhere, and with no foreseeable rehabilitation of the first two coun- another subsistence agrarian econo- end to it all. CA’s work had to be tries was so effective that within my, the cockpit of an ideological effective and lasting. Its programs one decade after the end of the struggle, and a U.S. military victory in the central highlands of well- most destructive war in history, would prove hollow without a broad drilling, market roads and bridges, those countries had emerged as base of civil support. Civil Affairs’ public health clinics, school build- global economic competitors. greatest success came in South Viet- ing and public education were Why was guerrilla warfare nam’s central highlands, where CA undoubtedly successful because unheard of against American occu- troops worked closely with U.S. Spe- they were tailored to the local econ- pation troops in the aftermath of cial Forces in securing large areas of omy, which was not skewed, as else- WWII? Was it simply a matter of difficult terrain by winning the con- where in South Vietnam, by large the totality of the defeat of the fas- fidence of local tribes. numbers of free-spending GIs. cist powers? If so, why were the By 1966, each Special Forces A- But all Special Forces protection Soviets fighting to completely sub- Detachment in the highlands was duties were turned over to the due occupied territories well into augmented by a CAPO — a Civil Army of the Republic of Vietnam by the 1950s? Enlightened American Affairs-Psychological Warfare offi- 1971, and the final collapse came policy, established by the national cer. The Army, however, did not four years later in the face of a command authority and senior mili- make pacification a high-priority massive armored, conventional tary commanders and implemented concern until May of 1967, when campaign by the regular army of by Civil Affairs officers, made allies the civilian-controlled Civilian North Vietnam. out of enemies and probably saved thousands of American lives. The Korean story was not so happy. The Korean people resented both U.S. and Soviet military government, arguing, logically enough, that they had been among the first victims of Japanese aggression. In 1948 the last U.S. troops were withdrawn, but they would soon be back. The Korean conflict, erupting in 1950, was fought amid a subsistence agrarian economy, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel soon found that fertilizers and draft ani- mals were more important than electrical-power systems or rail- roads. Their duties were simplified in this war by the fact that there was only one functioning, legal government of the Republic of Korea throughout the conflict. CA officers Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum were thus spared the vexing defini- A Civil Affairs mobile training team assists Vietnamese civilians with well- tions of “collaborator” vs. “freedom drilling operations in An-Phu hamlet, Binh-Duong Province, in the 1960s.

40 Special Warfare After Vietnam, U.S. Army Civil Affairs kept its skills honed with numerous civic-action projects, primarily in Central America in the face of renewed Marxist guerrilla activity. Useful projects were also carried out in such Asian nations as Indonesia and Thailand. And when the call came for Oper- ation Urgent Fury, the rescue of the Dislocated Pana- tiny island nation of Grenada, manian civilians Army Civil Affairs was early on the set up temporary scene. One CA spearheader from shelters on the Company A, 96th CA Battalion, ballfield at Bal- was on board the second C-130 to boa High School touch down, and other members of during Opera- Company A landed with the 82nd tion Just Cause Airborne Division headquarters. in 1989. Their most pressing job was to care for civilians evacuated from combat areas. During the next two days, often using commandeered Cuban material, they fed, sheltered and returned to their homes about 20,000 Grenadians. By mid-November, U.S. Army Civil Affairs was concentrating upon post-hostilities reconstruction. CA officers worked closely with the interim Grenadian government and Photo by Harry Hargett the U.S. Agency for International Tocumen International Airport, for ry and the history of technology in Development to identify and correct example. Another first-time task the 19th and 20th centuries, he life-threatening problems in water for Army Civil Affairs in Panama holds a master’s degree from supplies, sewage, electricity and was the tracking down and restora- Columbia University and a doctor- public health. tion to their owners of dozens of ate from London University’s Individual CA Reserve specialists automobiles that had been used by Department of War Studies. He has on 45-day active-duty tours were U.S. troops during Just Cause. published a book and numerous called in for road construction, Even in Third World countries, articles, some of which have water-plant operations, telephone such amenities as airports and appeared in Military Review and repair, finance, education and automobiles are now vital to restor- Military Affairs. tourism. The overwhelming popu- ing normal civil life. CA troops also larity of the U.S. intervention eased established a large displaced-civil- Notes: the task of the CA troops; still, ian camp in Panama City. 1 Paul Blackstone, “German Psychological Warfare Against the Soviet Union,” in Army CA had its work cut out in a In all its wars the U.S. Army has William E. Daugherty and Morris M. nation run down by four years of rediscovered the basic principle Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook erratic and sometimes brutal Marx- that civilian populations cannot be (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Univer- ist control. ignored. Military victory is not sity Press, Office of Operational Research, As in past wars, Civil Affairs sol- enough. Civil Affairs’ proud legacy 1958), p. 270. diers, active and reserve, in Pana- of caring for defenseless people ma’s Operations Just Cause and caught up in war has fulfilled its Promote Liberty found themselves motto: “Seal the Victory.” faced with a multitude of tasks, many simply unimagined before hostilities. Troops of the 96th Civil Stanley Sandler is the command Affairs Battalion jumped in during historian for the JFK Special War- the initial assault and quickly fare Center and School. A special- assumed the operation of Torrijos- ist in military history, naval histo-

Winter 1991 41 Converting from H- to L-Series TOE: An Impossible Task for Civil Affairs?

by Lt. Col. Larry Wayne

Force reductions in the active TOE are necessary. The Civil component, reductions in paid drill Affairs L-TOE is programmed for strength for the Reserve, plans to modification sometime during the reduce the number of forward-based second or third quarter of fiscal units, and the implementation of year 1991. Conversion to new force structures all point to one Upon implementation, the L- thing — the Army is changing! MTOE will dictate major changes the new Civil All of these changes will have for units. The unit strength that is some impact on Civil Affairs units. affected the greatest by these Affairs force The most significant is the conver- changes is the Civil Affairs group sion from the H-series table of orga- converting to the brigade structure. structure in nization and equipment, or TOE, to Under the H-MTOE the group is 1992 will be the L-series TOE. authorized 152 personnel. The L- The effective date, or E-date, for TOE, converting at an Authoriza- smoother if conversion is Sept. 16, 1992, but tion Level of Organization - 2, or transition from the H-TOE to the L, ALO 2, calls for a loss of 32 person- commanders TOE can start as early as Septem- nel upon conversion — leaving 120 ber 1991. Transition is the period personnel. and units plan given to allow units to initiate need- Other major changes in the L- ed personnel and equipment requi- TOE are the elimination of lieu- ahead sitions under the new force struc- tenant positions, except for general- ture. This period also gives the per- officer aides; a greater number of sonnel and supply systems time to Civil Affairs branch-specific officer react to such requisitions. positions; and a Civil Affairs enlist- The TOE is not an authorization ed military occupational skill. The document; it serves only as a base enlisted MOS will replace the “D” from which to develop the modified suffix used in the H-MTOE to iden- table of organization and equip- tify Civil Affairs enlisted positions. ment, the MTOE. In some cases The bulk of the D-suffix-coded H- only minor modifications to the MTOE positions are in MOS 71L.

42 Special Warfare How can the commander and his and specialist levels in the L- level. This is significant when senior noncommissioned officers MTOE. Also, schedule officers to viewed within the context of the make this transition easier? Is it complete the Civil Affairs Officer total force, realizing that a great an impossible task when viewed Advanced Course and then request percentage of the sergeant-first- within the context of so many per- branch transfer to the Civil Affairs class slots are in the foreign inter- sonnel changes? Not if comman- branch. Review personnel records nal defense/unconventional warfare ders keep their units informed and for officers who have already com- battalions. involve their key officer and enlist- pleted the CAOAC and have been Also affecting the assignment of ed leaders. awarded the additional-skill identi- unit personnel, at the senior NCO Planning is the first step. “Don’t fier 5W. These officers are qualified level, is the number of full-time wait for the L-MTOE,” said Brig. to transfer to the Civil Affairs manning position requirements. Gen. Joseph Hurteau, commander branch and fill the Civil Affairs The Special Warfare Center and of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and branch-specific positions in the L- School is currently conducting an Psychological Operations Command MTOE. extensive review of the enlisted at Fort Bragg. “Take the H-MTOE Commanders should reorganize grade structure to determine and accomplish a line-by-line com- their units, before the transition whether the imbalances can be parison with the L-TOE.” date, using the L-TOE as a guide. adjusted prior to, or during, the Remember, only minor modifica- As long as the commander does not modification process of the L-TOE. tions may occur to the LTOE, and exceed the personnel requirements, Equipment changes from the H- the impact of waiting is more grade structures or equipment MTOE to the L-TOE are not expect- adverse than the minor adjustments authorizations detailed in the H- ed to cause any major problems, that may occur from the modifica- MTOE, he should reorganize his except in the area of storage. Unfor- tion process. During the next 12 unit to meet the demands of his tunately, unit storage is not some- months, carefully scrutinize each mission. Some units have already thing that the L-TOE can fix. personnel action. reorganized, and many other units Many hours will go into planning Should a unit experience a are in the process of reorganization. for conversion from the H-MTOE to turnover in a position that will dis- In the L-TOE, there is an increase the L-MTOE. This effort will be appear under the L-TOE, it should in the number of Skill Level 1 per- rewarded upon implementation of give careful consideration to leaving sonnel. This increase was the result the new force structure through the that position vacant. Look at junior of having to conform to the Army’s reduced number of problems the officers and enlisted who are quali- standards-of-grade-authorization unit commander and his personnel fied to move into the next higher- model for MOS 38A. Units have will face. There is no way to avoid graded position under the L-TOE. expressed concern over the number personnel turbulence created by Review L-TOE positions to deter- of E-3 and E-4 enlisted personnel. major structure changes. The earlier mine where reclassification training However, the Civil Affairs enlisted a unit starts aligning its personnel can benefit a soldier by offering MOS entrance requirements are to the new structure, the less the upward career progression. This designed to provide the field with transition will affect the soldier. will have a positive impact upon the requisite quality of personnel to transition, since the soldier can be perform tasks at Skill Level 1. assigned to the new position at that An analysis early in the MOS- Lt. Col. Larry Wayne is currently time. This planning also provides development cycle revealed that in the Civil Affairs Integrator for the the soldier time to tackle the reclas- order to have an accession MOS, JFK Special Warfare Center and sification training and will improve which would accept lower-enlisted School. Before assuming his cur- overall unit readiness on the L- soldiers before they are trained in rent position, he served at the series E-date. another MOS, a trade-off was neces- SWCS as the Civil Affairs Propo- Between now and the E-date, sary at the lower-graded positions. nent in the Special Operations Pro- schedule as many privates, privates A non-accession MOS would present ponency Office and as the director first class and specialists for the D- severe recruiting difficulties for of training, doctrine and literature suffix course. The Special Warfare units, resulting in constant strength in the Civil Affairs Department. A Center and School has resident D- problems. The accession MOS also graduate of the Army Command suffix classes and plans to conduct provides the units with the versatil- and General Staff College, he has mobile-training-team classes during ity to train their future senior served as the S-3, 489th Civil fiscal years 1991 and 1992. enlisted soldiers. Affairs Company, Knoxville, Tenn., On E-date, personnel trained in The Civil Affairs enlisted MOS and as chief of both the Civil these classes can transition to MOS standards of grade authorization Affairs and Military Intelligence 38A, the new enlisted MOS, and fill present some restrictions at the Branches at the U.S. Army Reserve many of the positions at the PFC senior-noncommissioned-officer Personnel Center, St. Louis, Mo.

Winter 1991 43 The Truth About Promotion To Major:

A No-nonsense guide for officers facing the major’s promotion board

by Lt. Col. (P) Thomas H. Davis III

For the month of September and minutes on your file. The bad news either way. most of October last year, I sat at a is that this equates to less than two • A vote of 5 or 6 is a “definitely desk and looked into a microfiche minutes per board member. promote” vote. reader for eight hours a day. During Each member assigns a numeri- Incidentally, no one knows where that time I attempted to place a cal value to the file from 1-6. Every the cut line will be until after the numerical value on the careers of number has three possible values, board has voted on all the files and several thousand Army captains. e.g., 4-, 4, 4+. Once all three panels has tabulated the results. The The purpose of this marathon was have voted the files of all officers result of this is a pretty fair assess- to select officers for promotion to above, in, and below the promotion ment of how well an officer has the rank of major. It was not fun. zone, the board totals the scores done relative to his or her peers. What I’m about to discuss applies and forms an order-of-merit list. Having gone through the process, I only to the board I sat on. Other Each officer has a number on the believe that it’s about as fair a sys- selection boards consider different list from one to whatever. The tem as can be devised. criteria in determining their lists. board then draws a “cut line.” Gen- The hard truth is that if all your It’s important that you keep this in erally speaking, those above this officer evaluation reports place you mind while reading this article. line are promoted; those below it “with the pack” (center of mass), are not. There are certain floors set you probably won’t get promoted. If Methodology for shortage branches, gender and you are a combat-arms officer and The board consists of three pan- race. If these floors are not met by have a below-center-of-mass report els of six-seven members each. The the above-, in-, and below-the-zone in command, you are in serious total number of individuals on my officers, they can have an impact on trouble — I don’t care if the general board was 20. The good news is who gets promoted. does love you. that the board spends about 40 Each board member has a different philosophy on how he or she Procedure The views expressed in this arti- votes a file, but generally speaking, Remember, each board member cle are solely those of the author, it goes something like this: has less than two minutes to look based on his experience on a recent • A vote of 1 is a vote for “show at a file. Here’s what happens: promotion board. While they con- cause.” 1. Open the file and look at the cern Special Forces officers in par- • A vote of 2 or 3 is a “do not pro- picture. (More about this later.) ticular, the information can be of mote” vote. 2. Check the officer record brief benefit to officers of all branches. • A vote of 4 is one that could go to see if the officer has had a

44 Special Warfare branch-qualifying assignment, e.g., fact that you’ve had a problem, representative on each board will for combat arms, a company/bat- which will cause them to look for reinforce the fact. tery/troop/ODA. other problems you may have had. • It is absolutely essential that 3. The first panel member to vote • Unless you really have a killer you successfully command an ODA on the file looks at the C&D data. If OER, think carefully before you try for 18 months, plus or minus six there are any really bad (Article to appeal it. If the OER wasn’t months, to get promoted to major. If 15s, general-officer letters or repri- referred to you and your appeal isn’t promotion is your primary concern, mands) or really good (Legion of successful, you’ll only highlight that then additional commands as a cap- Merit, Soldier’s Medal) items there, report for the board. tain are counterproductive. No mat- they are noted on a separate sheet • Don’t let your records go before ter how good you were in previous of paper and included with the file. a board without a DA photo! commands, if you have one screwup This ensures that all panel mem- Branch will screen your file to in your present command, your bers are aware of the information. ensure that your photo is up-to- promotion will be at risk. 4. Scan the OERs (mainly those date. You might also want to check • When you review your ORB the officer has had as a captain) to make sure that your records are prior to consideration for major, and look in priority at: in order several months before the make changes as neatly as possible. • Job title and number of months. board is due to convene. Do not use a magic marker to high- • Senior rater’s profile. • If your rater or senior rater light items on the ORB that you • Where the rater has placed the fails to mention promotion on your think should be noticed. This tends “X.” report, ask them if this omission to insult the board members and • The numbers on the front. was done intentionally or if it was makes you look self-centered. • The first and last sentences in the an oversight. It’s OK if it was inten- senior rater’s narrative and what tionally left out, but it would be a Advice for raters the rater said in the potential shame if it had just been forgotten. There’s really very little raters block (to identify the really “fast • Make sure that your ORB is can do to help push their captains burners” or to aid the board mem- up-to-date, especially the entries for ahead. About the best they can do bers in making a decision if there your command positions. is to key in on potential within that is a close call on promotion). • Every job you do counts, but the portion of the report. Keep the My friends, that’s it. If I led you ones that count the most are those words to a minimum. Comments to believe that anything more was in your branch. like “must command a battalion,” done on your reports after about • When your DA photo is taken, “promote below the zone,” and the first week, it would be a lie. make sure that you wear your SF “select now for C&GSC” will help. If Notice I qualified that statement tab. If you are branched Special you fail to mention promotion or with, “after about the first week.” Forces and do not wear your tab, schooling, place your X’s to the In the beginning, most folks really you will cause some folks to wonder right of the left-hand side of the try to read some of the files. Unfor- about your commitment to the report or give less than 1’s on the tunately, they get so far behind that branch. If you’re authorized a front, it will hurt but not necessari- they realize this will not work and Ranger tab, by all means wear it, ly kill. If you want to help, convince revert to the method I’ve described. too. the senior rater to place the officer • Don’t have your DA photo taken above his center of mass. In the Advice for officers wearing hair under your nose. Of duty title of the report, put “Com- So what can you do or not do to the 20 board members, there are mander” or “ODA Commander.” increase your chances for promotion? bound to be a few who just don’t like The first sentence of the duty • Do the very best you can in officers who wear a mustache. Most description should read something every job you get. members know that the word is out like, “Serving in an O3 command • If you slip in one job, such as about not having your DA photo position within Special Forces.” ODA command, try to get another taken with a mustache. They If an OER is due on one of your one, and don’t screw it up! assume that anyone who insists on officers and the senior rater has not • Don’t write a letter to the board having his picture taken with one is been in the rating chain long explaining why you got some 2s or just thumbing his nose at the board. enough to comment and you really were below center of mass on an • Don’t worry about commanding want to help the officer, select your OER. If you were below the mark a company. ODA command is words for the potential block very on only one OER, chances are most looked on as equivalent to company carefully. Consider the following: of the board members won’t let this command for SF officers. I had my “Promote below the zone to influence their decision. If you doubts about this before I sat on MAJ.” “Must select first time con- write a letter, you’re only calling this board, but I am now convinced sidered for C&GSC.” “A future bat- the board members’ attention to the that this is the case, and your SF talion commander.”

Winter 1991 45 If you have an officer who has to they might not make it that far, more into the rating period. For all be taped or is close to the weight given the promotion rates we are other rated officers, senior-rater op- limit according to AR 600-9, and he dealing with now and will be deal- tions should be strongly considered is in good physical condition, make ing with in the future. upon the departure of the senior sure you comment on this, e.g., For the Special Forces battalion rater after 180 days or more into “Can bench press in excess of 300 commander, a profile built up from the rating period. pounds,” “Runs 10Ks in under 45 the fourth or fifth block, with a few The “one to grow on” philosophy minutes,” “Completes 12-mile ruck- below center of mass, a medium- may help your profile, but it doesn’t sack march with 65 pounds in sized center of mass, and an above- always help the rated officer. On under three hours,” etc. Additional- center-of-mass which is almost as our board, this was done so often by ly, if the officer has to be taped, you large as the center of mass, is what senior raters that some of the board must mention that he meets the we need to have. This profile, with members interpreted it to be an body-fat standard according to AR the proper last sentence, will also overall center-of-mass performance. 600-9. Place these remarks on the identify the really fast burners. The Finally, any senior rater who front of the report. group commanders are going to be (after having read this paragraph) When you recommend an officer the ones who pick officers for bat- gives an officer below-center-of-mass for the Command and General Staff talion command when they senior- and then writes, “He is ready for College, use the capital abbrevia- rate them as majors. If you restart promotion now,” “One of the very tion “C&GSC” as opposed to writing your profile and are building a new best,” “select for C&GSC,” “unlimit- it out. Likewise, when you mention one from the bottom up, state in ed potential,” “a future battalion promotion, use “promote to MAJ” or your first sentence, “I have restart- commander,” or other such laudatory “promote to O4,” instead of “promote ed and am in the process of build- comments is a gutless wonder! to major” or “promote to next high- ing my profile.” Y’all can quote me on that one. er grade.” It will be more likely to When you write your portion of catch the eye of the board member the report, key in only on potential. in this form, and it’s not considered The most important sentence in Lt. Col. (P) Thomas H. Davis III a gimmick. your narrative is the last one. The is currently the J-3 for the Special next most important is the first Operations Command - Korea. He Advice for senior raters one. Write more than one or two has spent 17 of his 22 commis- The school solution for a senior- sentences, but don’t fill up the sioned years in Special Forces and rater profile is to have a few indi- space completely. Fill in your por- has commanded five ODAs that viduals below the center of mass, tion from one-half to no more than specialized in HALO, scuba or the majority in the center of mass three-fourths of the space allocated, mountain operations. Additionally, and a very few above the center of and use regular-size type. he has commanded two companies, mass. Such a profile is easy to read The earlier advice concerning a TO&E battalion (3/5th SFG), and definitely lets the board know abbreviating C&GSC and MAJ/04 and a training battalion (2nd Bn., who you want passed over and who also applies to senior raters. Also, 1st Special Warfare Training you want to attend C&GSC and you should not allow reports to be Group). He has served as a 41 (per- command battalions. This is OK if typed on a dot-matrix printer; they sonnel manager) at a battalion, you are senior-rating majors or cap- are very hard to read in that form. group, mechanized infantry divi- tains-promotable. If you are senior- Reports that do not have input sion and the 1st SOCOM head- rating junior- to mid-grade cap- from a senior tend to have a nega- quarters. He holds a BA degree tains, there will be several that you tive connotation. A senior-rater from the University of Georgia and have placed in the center of mass option should be strongly considered a master’s degree from the Univer- who would be great majors and if the rated officer is in a command sity of Southern California. lieutenant colonels. Unfortunately, position and will have 90 days or

46 Special Warfare accomplished through officer basic on company-grade-officer critical and advanced courses, the Combined tasks. Arms and Services Staff School, known as CAS3, and operational as- SF branch manual signments. MQS III applies to field- Designed to support and comple- grade officers and is currently being ment resident instruction received Military formulated by the Combined Arms in the OAC and the SFQC, the Spe- Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. cial Forces Branch manual describes Qualification Leader development under MQS tasks critical for Special Forces cap- Standards System: is a product of three factors: institu- tains. SF officers must be capable of tional training, operational assign- planning and executing the five SF Army Framework ments and self-development. missions: unconventional warfare, • Institutional — School comman- foreign internal defense, direct for Leader dants are most directly involved with action, special reconnaissance and institutional training. Schools identi- counterterrorism. Development fy officer-performance requirements Since they may also support con- at particular levels and train them to ventional forces, SF officers must perform those duties. also understand their role in the Air- • Operational — Unit comman- Land Battle and retain the company- ders have the flexibility to establish level conventional skills from their officer leader-development programs accession branch. Because SF units which complement unit training pro- are area-oriented to various theaters, grams based on the mission-essen- their battle focus may vary, and the tial task list. MQS does not require specific SF-group METL will require commanders to train tasks which do knowledge of a variety of common not support their unit METLs. Com- and special-operations tasks. manders must tailor both their MQS The SF manual contains Infantry task-training program and the pro- branch tasks — these may also need To develop its officers as leaders, fessional reading program to support to be tailored to fit individual needs, the Army has established a system METL-based unit training plans. but proficiency in these tasks is which gives officers, school com- • Self-development — Self-develop- essential. It also contains SF branch mandants and unit commanders a ment involves the individual officer — tasks which are organized in the bat- common framework for leader the one ultimately responsible for per- tlefield operating systems. development. sonal development as a leader. Appendices to the SF manual The Military Qualification Stan- include an SF branch reading list, a dards System identifies common and MQS II training site matrix which cross-ref- branch-specific training require- MQS II applies to company-grade erences individual tasks to major ments for officers. It has two compo- officers in the active and reserve training locations, a list of references nents: the military-task-and-knowl- components. Its goal is to prepare required in training of all tasks and edge component identifies critical company-grade officers to accom- a glossary of key terms. battle-focused tasks, skills and plish the wartime tasks, to provide MQS II common and branch man- knowledge, and the professional-mil- the basis for promotion to major and uals have been fielded to officers and itary-education component estab- attendance at Command and Staff unit commanders through pinpoint lishes responsibilities and standards College-level schooling, and to pre- distribution. SF officers receive both for professional development and pare officers for positions of greater Special Forces and Infantry branch education. responsibility. manuals. After the initial distribu- MQS covers officer training from The military-task-and-knowledge tion, newly commissioned officers precommissioning to promotion to component consists of company- will receive the manuals in their offi- colonel and is organized into three grade officer common and branch- cer basic courses. stages. MQS I is taught at the com- specific tasks. The professional-mili- missioning sources: the U.S. Military tary-education component consists of Academy, Reserve Officers Training a reading program and, for selected Information for this article was Corps and Officer Candidate School. officers, advanced civil schooling. furnished by the SWCS Directorate It establishes minimum military Common and branch manuals of Training and Doctrine and by the skills on which to build a branch support MQS II training. Branch Army Command and General Staff qualification. MQS II covers compa- manuals focus on branch qualifica- College. ny-grade officer training and is tion; common manuals concentrate

Winter 1991 47 Users will make selections from a SOLLMIS, Harris said. These are succession of menus in order to find already being used to brief security- or enter data, according to Lt. Col. assistance teams whom the SWCS Michael R. Harris, chief of the Security Assistance Training Man- SWCS Directorate of Evaluation agement Office has sent to coun- and Standardization, which devel- tries throughout the world. oped SOLLMIS. They will need to The U.S. Army Special Opera- type data into the program only tions Command has begun fielding when they are recording observa- the Special Operations Command tions, lessons learned or recommen- Information Management System, SOLLMIS: dations. Since there are no codes or called SOFCIMS. This system will commands to memorize other than provide standard hardware and New data base a password, users will not need software for all active-component extensive training or experience to Special Forces groups and the preserves SOF use the data base. headquarters of USASOC and the SOLLMIS categorizes data U.S. Special Operations Command. lessons-learned according to a number of factors, The SOLLMIS data base and pro- including climate, terrain, geo- gram will be loaded on designated graphic region, mission and SOF SOFCIMS hardware. SF detach- elements involved. The extensive ments which already have laptop categories give the program more computers will load the SOLLMIS “search” capability, Harris said. In program onto their laptops. Using addition, the data will include the system, detachments will points of contact so users can follow upload and download SOLLMIS up on recommendations. records by modem or diskette at the The idea of capturing experience SF group operational centers. onto a data base is not new — the While in preparation for deploy- Center for Army Lessons Learned ment, detachments will be able to A computer data base now makes at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has a download pertinent lessons-learned it possible for special-operations system known as CALL, and the from SOFCIMS, and upon return to soldiers to share their lessons- Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint home station, they will be able to learned and to profit from the his- Universal Lessons Learned System, upload new lessons-learned into the torical and contemporary experi- or JULLS. However, these systems system. Periodically, lessons-learned ences of other SOF units. currently contain very little in the compiled at the SF-group level will The Special Operations Lessons nature of SOF-unique data, Harris be forwarded to U.S. Army Special Learned Management Information said. Forces Command for evaluation and System provides a single library of Each of the other systems has transfer to SWCS to update the lessons-learned to aid special-oper- been searched for SOF-related master SOLLMIS data base. ations units in planning their train- observations, and those found have Eventually, SOLLMIS will be ing and operational missions. been placed into the SOLLMIS data available to SOF units through a Developed at the JFK Special War- base, Harris said. The main sources computer network as well as by fare Center and School, the system, of SOLLMIS data will be special- telephone modem. The system called SOLLMIS, also provides operations active and reserve-com- should be completed during FY 91, SWCS training developers a source ponent units, military groups, secu- Harris said, but he emphasizes that of information to assist them in rity-assistance organizations, soldiers do not have to wait. Units developing SOF doctrine, training, mobile training teams and histori- with specific needs — to get more organization and materiel. cal analysis. information about any of the sys- Developed by the SWCS Direc- CALL and JULLS will also be tems or to submit lessons-learned, torate of Evaluation and Standard- continuously searched for SOF- for example — can contact Lt. Col. ization and programmed by Spec. related information. This elimi- Michael R. Harris or Carlee Cum- Michael Foster of the SWCS Infor- nates the need for SOF soldiers to mings; Directorate of Evaluation mation Management Office, search other systems for SOF data, and Standardization; USAJFK- SOLLMIS is a user-friendly, fully and makes SOLLMIS the single- SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. automated library containing obser- source, official data base for SOF Phone AV 239-4114/3538, commer- vations and experiences of soldiers observations, Harris said. cial (919) 432-4114/3538. assigned to special-operations and Currently, there are approxi- security-assistance missions. mately 230 lessons-learned in

48 Special Warfare Special Operations Lessons Learned Page Management Information System Record Number 001

Classification: Unclassified Mission Area: Special Operations SO Mission Activity: Direct Action SO Element: Special Forces Operational Detachment A SO Spt Elem: Theater Special Operations Command Mission Support Event: CAS Battlefield Ops: Maneuver (includes direct fire, movement, close combat) Environment: Terrain: D = Desert Elevation: M = Midlands (3000 - 7000 ft ASL) Climate: A1 = Hot Dry (90-120f/32-49C) (3-8% humidity) Operations Area by Theater/Country: CENTCOM: PACOM: EUCOM: SY = Syria LANTCOM: SOUTHCOM: CONUS: Observation Type: Historical Analysis Distribution System: SOLLMIS Functional Area: Doctrine; Joint; Training Observation/Issue: On the morning of 12 October 1973 the Israeli Defense Force commander on the Golan front received intelligence that a large Iraqi troop and equipment convoy would move that night from Baghdad to Damascus. At 1000 hours on 12 October, the decision was made to execute a contingency plan to interdict the Iraqi convoy by helicopter-transported paratroopers. At approximately 2300 hours, a lone IDF CH-53 lifted off from Israel with 12 paratroopers and an internally loaded, jeep-mounted, 106mm recoilless rifle. To avoid detection by Syrian radar and the air defense sites, the helicopter flew low- level north along the coast of Lebanon and inland to the ambush site, which was located 100 kilometers northeast of the Golan front on the Baghdad-Damascus Highway. The landing zone was reached by 2400 hours. After the paratroopers off- loaded, the helicopter was parked several hundred meters from the highway in a covered position. Demolitions were emplaced on the bridge, and mines were employed forward of the Israeli ambush position. Shortly after 0100 hours on 13 October, the Iraqi convoy arrived. Expecting no threat at night over 100 kilometers behind the battle lines, the Iraqis had their tracked vehicles on carriers and their troops in buses. The attack was initiated when the bridge was blown and the convoy was further blocked front and rear by the 106mm recoilless rifle. The Israelis withdrew under the cover of an air strike on the immobilized convoy. Lesson Learned: 1. Closing the intelligence, targeting, mission tasking, preparation, and launch cycle is a major achievement. Turning intelligence into action is the first challenge. 2. The attack was on a column in march order far enough in the rear to feel safe. This increased the probability of success and the psychological impact on the enemy. 3. Mines and stand-off weapons were used to enhance the effectiveness of the demolition attacks. 4. The demolition created an obstacle to the front of the column while the 106mm recoilless rifle knocked out the rear vehicles, trapping the target for the follow-up air strike. 5. The coordination and integration of the Special Operations and Battlefield Interdiction is the critical lesson to be learned. Without the follow-up air strike, the damage would have only been minor and the SO units' breaking contact much more difficult. Without the SO team, the aircraft would have had to fly a dangerous and inefficient flight profile (search and attack targets of opportunity). Instead, the SO team fixed the target location and time, allowing the aircraft to plan and fly the safest penetration route. Recommendations: SO and USAF doctrine for interdiction be integrated to provide the intell flow, targeting and coordination procedures to support joint deep interdiction. Exercise/Nickname: 73 Arab-Israeli War Date: 10/10/90 Organization: DOES, JFKSWCS POC: LTC Harris Phone: (000)-239-1207 AV: yes References: John F. Sullivan; John S. Wood, Edward Cezell, Desert Warfare Lessons Learned Study, DARCOM, Alexandria, VA, March 1984, p. 79-80.

Sample SOLLMIS entry

Winter 1991 49 Opinion Special Warfare

LIC, Counternarcotics and We must first understand the Using this system, a father of eight Small-Scale Agriculture problems facing the small farmer. and a father of seven in Portoviejo, According to one source, “About 60 Ecuador, were able to feed their fam- by Capt. Michael Ligon percent of the world’s farmers own ilies nutritionally and still raise their The U.S. “War on Drugs” is a polit- less than 11 acres of land and 35 per- average annual income from $169 to ical misnomer. The fight against the cent less than 2.5 acres. This means $1,135 — almost an 800-percent drug problem is actually an example approximately one billion farmers in increase. Ecuador’s President Leon of low-intensity conflict.1 the world must support their fami- Febres Cordero was sufficiently The U.S. has a three-pronged lies with what they can produce on impressed with the program to approach to counternarcotics: plots of 2.5 acres or less.”8 request that it be implemented on a CONUS education and treatment; Traditionally, these farmers dedi- national scale.12 border interdiction; and OCONUS cate their land to growing a cash Start-up costs for each farmer source disruption.2 We have social crop which they sell in order to buy average $50-$150 — easily repaid agencies to provide drug education food. This is just the opposite of how the first year. The next problem is to and treatment and military means it should be — farmers should be find the money at an interest rate to interdict the drug flow into the able to feed themselves first. Being the farmer can afford. The Founda- U.S. The weak link lies in not having unable to provide for his family cre- tion for the Promotion and Develop- a viable economic alternative to offer ates the farmer’s dissatisfaction with ment of Microenterprise, or Prodem, drug-producing nations. the government. This can induce him a private organization based in Cam- Clauseswitz stated that there is to join a “war for national liberation” bridge, Mass., has been disbursing no such thing as a purely military or supplement his income by growing low-interest loans to market vendors strategy to war,3 and U.S. doctrine the coca leaf or the heroin poppy. in the “informal sector” of La Paz, on internal defense and develop- Although Peru and Bolivia have Bolivia, for more than two years. ment states that the military in and been especially vocal in pushing the Vendors in the informal sector, of itself is not a nation-builder.4 In U.S. for a crop “substitution” pro- that segment of the city’s economy the war on drugs, a purely military gram, such a program would not considered outside the mainstream, approach is not the answer. Indeed, meet their goals.9 are normally trapped by having to Peruvian and Colombian leaders Crop-substitution programs spon- buy produce on credit (for as much view the U.S. military approach as sored by the United Nations in Thai- as 10 percent a day!) from truckers “politically volatile, sparking fears of land have met with mixed success — who haul the produce from the coun- escalating the violence and eventual efforts to replace opium with rice, tryside. Prodem has found that with direct U.S. involvement leading to a coffee or kidney beans have not an initial loan of as little as $50 at ‘South American Vietnam.’ ”5 eliminated the need for the farmers three-percent interest, vendors’ Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian to barter for basic necessities nor incomes increase 50-100 percent.13 revolutionary, described the peasants provided a nutritional diet.10 Nor A program combining the Benson as the core of a rural guerrilla move- have they reduced farmers’ depen- Institute’s small-scale agriculture ment since they know the country, dence on a narrow range of export program and Prodem’s financing can act as couriers and guides, and crops subject to foreign tariffs and techniques could reduce the drug can provide hiding places, informa- world market prices.11 crop and eliminate the small tion and food supplies.6 The Benson Institute for Small- farmer’s economic dependency on The small farmer who raises the Scale Agriculture, a nonprofit organi- the drug trafficker. In the long-term, coca or poppy crop shares many of zation headquartered in Provo, it would also improve the quality of these characteristics and is the core Utah, has a program that suggests a life for a major portion of the popula- of drug production. Until we remove solution to the dilemma. Since 1976, tion in most Third World countries. the logistical support base for the the Benson Institute has taught Institution of such a program drug cartels — the small farmer — small farmers to allocate certain would meet with resistance from in- we will be on the defensive in the amounts of their land to crops need- surgents, drug-traffickers and bu- drug war.7 ed to provide a well-balanced diet. reaucrats protecting their turf, and

50 Special Warfare coordinated political emphasis and Plugging in the Benson/Prodem and family stability versus working military support would be required.14 strategy at this level would involve in the acid pits of the drug laborato- Without political resolve the pro- either of two approaches: govern- ries, PSYOP could be a great influ- gram would go nowhere. With it, the ment grants, either U.S. or bilateral ence in turning the perceptual tide of host-nation government would be U.S. and host-nation agreements, the farmers toward the government. perceived by the farmers as being which would enable Prodem and Indicators of effectiveness would be responsive to their problems. With the Benson Institute to expand to the number of farmers who opt for this perception, the political, econom- meet the need worldwide; or train- the new technique and the amount of ic and political tide turns in favor of ing of Civil Affairs specialists in the intelligence they provide against the the government, and ground-level agriculture process at the Benson insurgents/traffickers.18 intelligence sources will surface and Institute and soliciting funding for The military services augment become a combat-multiplier. Army farmers through the U.S. Agency other U.S. government agencies by Special Forces introduced this for International Development or supporting the State Department’s approach as the “hearts and minds” other governmental lending institu- cultural exchange program of U.S. theory in South Vietnam. tions. Once Civil Affairs specialists and foreign military personnel. They According to Col. Wesley Groes- learn the small-scale concept, they also support USAID “by administer- beck, “The ‘hearts and minds’ theory can use in-country USAID sources ing military aspects of security assis- affirms that if support can be gained, for technical advice. tance affecting Civil-Military action people will withhold information and Because of the political sensitivity and through Humanitarian and material support from the insurgents of deploying conventional U.S. units Civic Assistance.”19 (and drug-traffickers), refuse to do OCONUS for source interdiction, By including the small-scale agri- their bidding, give information about units trained in low-level diplomacy culture program in the cultural ex- insurgents to government func- should be used to apply the Benson/ change program, the U.S. could offer tionaries, support public programs Prodem solution. Three are required: an effective economic alternative in and volunteer assistance so that the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psy- the drug war. As Congress looks for war will be won.”15 chological Operations. SF detach- ways to do more with less, these pro- The final draft of FM 100-20, Mili- ments deployed as advisers could grams are not only exponentially tary Operations in Low-Intensity train counternarcotics forces to pro- cost-effective but can prevent the Conflict, articulates the integrated vide security for the farmers and put need for greater assistance at a later organizational approach necessary the cartel on the tactical defensive.17 date.20 for counterinsurgency and coun- The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion is ternarcotics. The most important ideally suited to implement the pro- unit in that approach is the regional gram. By managing a program simi- Capt. Michael R. Ligon is an SF- area control center, a sort of forward lar to the SOFHAT (special-opera- qualified MI officer currently serv- operating base consisting of political, tions forces humanitarian assistance ing as an intelligence officer in the economic and military representa- teams) approach of the late 1980s, Special Operations Command-Ko- tives concentrating on one region of the 96th could play a critical role in rea. His previous assignments in- the country. It is the lowest level of the counternarcotics effort. The third clude enlisted service with the 5th administration able to coordinate all leg of the triad would be the 4th SF Group and commissioned service counterinsurgency (and counternar- PSYOP Group. By disseminating with the 7th SF Group and the 96th cotics) programs.16 themes of self-sustenance, health Civil Affairs Battalion.

Notes: 10 John McBeth, “The Opium Laws,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 “The Army and CounterNarcotics,” Unclassified DoD policy brief- 29 March 1984, pp. 40, 42-43. ing to the President dated 2 July 1990. 11 Linda Robinson with Ana Arana, “Columbia’s President Wants 2 Ibid. A Gentler Drug War,” U.S. News and World Report, 30 July 1990, p. 3 Harry G Summers Jr, On Strategy (New York: Dell Publishing 27. Co., Inc., 1982), p. 169. 12 Ibid., p. 30. 4 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low- 13 “Hope Amid Poverty,” Insight on the News, 28 May 1990, pp. 8- Intensity Conflict (final draft — 4 August 1989), p. 2-16. (Final ver- 16. sion of FM 100-20 published in December 1989 — Editor) 14 FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-19. 5 “Peru spurns cash for troops in drug war,” Pacific Stars and 15 Col. Wesley A Groesbeck, “Training to Win the Hearts and Stripes, 17 September 1990, p. 5. Minds,” Army Magazine, April 1988, p. 60. 6 Carlos Marighella, “The Urban Guerrilla,” published in Havana 16 Ibid. in Tricontinental Magazine, January/February 1970, p. 32. 17 FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-27. 7 Summers, p. 177. 18 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Low-intensity Conflict, (Jan- 8 Carri P. Jenkins, “Small-Scale Agriculture,” BYU Today (alumni uary 1981), p. 72. magazine for Brigham Young University), June 1985, p. 33. 19 FM 100-20 (draft), p. 2-44. 9 “Peru spurns cash for troops,” p. 5. 20 Ibid.

Winter 1991 51 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

E-8 selection rate for CMF 18 The calendar year 1990 E-8 selection rate for soldiers in CMF 18 was one reflects promotion restraints of the highest in the Army, with an overall selection rate of 27.6 percent. Only two career management fields, CMF 67, with 37.4 percent, and CMF 74, with 51.9 percent, had a better selection rate, according to MSgt. Thomas Rupert, senior enlisted career adviser in the Special Forces Branch. Those E-7s not selected should realize that times are tight, Rupert said, and that not being selected doesn’t mean there was any problem with their qualifications. “It does mean that promotion restraints and budget restrictions are hitting home and the select-objective line had to be drawn somewhere,” Rupert said. The profile analysis below compares CMF 11 and CMF 18 and may give soldiers a better idea of where they stand: CMF Avg Avg Avg 11 edu age TIS TIG SQT Cons Sel % Pri 13.0 yr 36.6 16.5 yr 6.2 yr 85.2 2021 106 5.2 Sec 12.9 yr 33.8 14.7 yr 3.8 yr 87.9 649 11 1.7 Total...... 2670 117 4.4

CMF Avg Avg Avg 18 edu age TIS TIG SQT Cons Sel % Pri 13.0 yr 35.5 15.3 yr 5.8 yr 78.4 57 42 73.7 Sec 13.4 yr 33.0 13.8 yr 4.4 yr 89.6 164 19 11.6 Total...... 221 61 27.6

Reserve Civil Affairs The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has approved the estab- MOS approved lishment of Career Management Field 38 and Military Occupational Specialty 38A for reserve-component Civil Affairs soldiers. The new CMF was approved Nov. 16, 1990. Memorandum of Approved Change E-9104- 14 was published the same date, providing the basis for initial implementation and setting transition dates for personnel and position changes. Guidance for these changes has been published in the April 1991 DA Circular 611 series. Changes to tables of organization and equipment will be included in Consolidated TOE Update 9104. Position reclassification, including revision of duty-position titles, grades and identifiers, will be accomplished during the July-September 1991 management-of-change window in all MTOEs and TDAs in effect on and after Oct. 1, 1991. All reserve-component positions requiring a soldier trained in Civil Affairs will be coded MOS 38A. Personnel reclassification, including any required revision of personnel records, publication of orders or submis- sion of SIDPERS transactions, will be accomplished by the affected soldiers’ personnel service center between Nov. 1 and Dec. 31, 1991. All RC soldiers currently classified as civil-affairs specialists by special-qualification identifier “D” will be reclassified to MOS 38A in their current grade and skill. SQI “D” will continue to be a designator for active-component CA soldiers only.

52 Special Warfare Sergeants Major Academy A new course at the Army Sergeants Major Academy is designed to train develops new Battle Staff battalion and brigade staff NCOs to serve as integral members of the bat- NCO Course tle staff. Designed at the Academy, the Battle Staff NCO Course inte- grates the former Operations and Intelligence and Personnel and Logistics Courses, but its developers stress that it is a completely new course. NCOs were already learning their specific duties in the two existing courses, according to Sgt. Maj. Phillip Cantrell, one of the course’s developers. What was lacking was an effort to train battle-staff NCOs to function and fight as an effective team. “Activities of the battle staff must be coordinated and directed toward a common goal,” Cantrell said. “You can’t make a decision in the personnel area without affecting the logistics, operations or intelligence areas, and vice versa. Without a knowledge of how the staff is interconnected, each section operates independently and perhaps at cross-purposes with each other.” Combining the 10-week Operations and Intelligence Course and the two-week Personnel and Logistics Course into one six-week course means that NCOs will need to complete some of the material before they arrive, according to Sgt. Maj. Bill Smolak, chief of battle-staff course development. Students will be selected 6-8 months before course attendance and enrolled in the Army Correspondence Course program. Students will present their ACCP completion certificate to an academy faculty adviser when they report for the resident phase. All resident training will be performance-oriented, based on the ARTEPs for heavy battalion, heavy brigade and light infantry battalion. “One of the main reasons why we’ve combined the two courses into the Battle Staff NCO Course is that TOCs and admin-log centers fight as a team,” Smolak said. “If we’re going to fight that way, then we need to train that way now.” — SFC Jack D’Amato, PAO, USASMA

Soldiers may need to The SF Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command reports that some reclassify to 18F involuntary reclassification of SF soldiers was necessary in order to get the 18F MOS into its maintenance stage. If commanders find themselves in need of 18Fs, Branch suggests that they search for them within their command. O&I-qualified 18Bs and 18Cs who are holding the assistant- intell-sergeant slot should be encouraged to reclassify to 18F. Applicants should submit a DA Form 4187, a copy of their Forms 2A and 2-1, and a copy of their O&I completion certificate.

DA Forms 4187 take six The Special Forces Branch at PERSCOM encourages soldiers to be patient weeks to process once they have submitted DA Forms 4187. The 4187 normally takes about five weeks to reach the SF Branch, and another week to process through the Branch, making it a six-week process from start to finish.

Call enlisted assignments Questions pertaining to SF enlisted assignments should be addressed to manager for information the specific assignment manager at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate: Ms. Velaquez — 18B, 18C and 18D; and Ms. Holmann — 18E, 18F, 18Z and ROTC. Professional-development questions should be addressed to MSgt. Thomas Rupert. The branch chief is Capt. (P) Jeffrey Waddell. Phone AV 221-8340, commercial (202) 325-8340.

Winter 1991 53 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

FA 39 captains should begin The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office offers the following career planning career-planning advice for captains in Functional Area 39, CA and PSYOP: • All captains designated as FA 39 should contact the FA 39 assignments officer at PERSCOM, Maj. Kevin Murphy, at AV 221-3115 or commercial (703) 325-3115, as soon as they begin their final branch- qualifying assignment. This way they can be programmed to begin FA 39 training immediately upon completion of that assignment. They should also arrange to take the Graduate Record Examination as soon as possible after functional-area designation and complete at least the nonresident phase of CAS3 before the end of their final branch-qualifying assignment. If not completed earlier, resident CAS3 can be scheduled in conjunction with functional-area training. • FA 39 training should normally begin no later than the seventh year of commissioned service. An officer may be PCS’d early because of the length of the training program, which can be as much as 2 1/2 years. • FA 39 officers will not normally be considered for nominative assignments as captains because of the length of their training and the need to work in the functional area at the captain level. After training, a senior captain will usually be assigned to a PSYOP or CA unit or to another position where a field-grade FA 39 officer will be available as a mentor.

SF participation in The SF Branch reports that a decision is currently pending at the De- Acquisition Corps pending partment of the Army concerning continued SF participation in the Army Acquisition Corps. All Army Acquisition Corps actions pending on SF officers are temporarily suspended. Once a final decision is made, all affected officers will be notified as appropriate. The Army Acquisition Corps Program was created in October 1989 to encompass the joint military and civilian management of acquisition specialists. AACP officers are screened and selected by PERSCOM and will receive repetitive assignments to prepare them to serve as systems managers, product managers and project managers.

Statistics for 1990 O-5 Listed below are statistics on the FY 90 lieutenant-colonel promotion list promotion list for the Army as a whole and for selected branches: Branch Above zone Primary zone Below zone or FA cons sel % cons sel % cons sel % AV 161 2 1.2 199 112 56.2 187 5 2.6 IN 205 4 1.9 202 137 67.8 271 30 11.0 MI 115 1 .8 120 71 59.1 146 9 6.1 SF 25 2 8.0 39 29 74.3 47 1 2.1 FA39 13 1 7.6 15 10 66.6 21 1 4.7 Army 117 95 81.2 361 117 32.4 478 212 44.4

54 Special Warfare Civilian education important Civilian education is often an important discriminator on warrant-officer for WO promotion promotion boards, according to the PERSCOM Warrant Officer Division. To be competitive, warrant officers need two years of college credit (60 semester hours) by their eighth year of warrant-officer service. As the Army becomes smaller and promotions become tighter, boards will be even more selective. The Warrant Officer Division stresses that while it encourages warrant officers to apply for full-time civilian education, they should face the fact that the majority will have to earn college credit on their own in order to be competitive for promotion.

Army releases figures on The Army’s 1990 senior-service-college selection board has selected 319 of- 1990 senior service college ficers from a field of 5,333. Listed below are selected statistics: selection Branch or FA code eligible selected % 11 716 46 6.4 18 127 6 4.7 FA39 30 1 3.3

Warrant Officer Division The Warrant Officer Division at PERSCOM offers the following lessons offers lessons-learned learned from the FY 90 warrant officer selection board for promotion to from promotion board grades CWO3 and CWO4: • Officer Efficiency Reports – Professional Attributes. Raters need to be honest with the rated officer. Professional attributes, good or bad, should be explained. – “Promote with Contemporaries” - or less. This block may rapidly move an officer below the pack. Check only if the officer deserves such. – “Usually meets Requirements” - or less. This box should be checked only if it is valid. Anything other than the “max” is adverse. – “Do not Promote” block - The board takes such an evaluation very seriously and in most instances will support the chain of command. – Senior Rater Profile. This is the most important portion of the OER Senior raters who place all officers in the top block are not assisting the rated officer or the board. This identifies to the board that the officer is not the “best of the best,” but rather is with the pack and center of mass. – OERs are the most critical part of a file. Board members may spend only a few moments on each file. Raters and senior raters should make sure their comments are to-the-point. • Referred Reports — Rated officers receiving a referred report should re- ply accurately. They should not make excuses or blame the rating board. Officers who fail to respond imply that they do not care. By signing the OER, the officer is acknowledging that the administrative data is correct, not that he agrees with the comments of those in the rating chain. In refusing to sign, the officer projects a hostile, unprofessional attitude. • Photographs — Photographs are critical. The uniform should be meticu- lous, and awards worn should be identified on the Officer Record Brief. • Officer Record Brief — The ORB must be updated and accurate, including height and weight. Education should reflect current degrees. • Letters of Commendation, Orders for Awards — These should be verified as being in the officer’s official file. • Letters to the board — Letters should be short and to-the-point, limited to adding information of importance for consideration by the board.

Winter 1991 55 Update Special Warfare

3rd, at Fort Bragg, 5th, at Fort 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Army realigns active, RC Campbell, Ky.; 7th, at Fort Bragg; Bronx, N.Y.; 2nd PSYOP Group, SOF along functional lines and 10th, at Fort Devens, Mass. Cleveland, Ohio; 5th PSYOP The U.S. Army Special Opera- Two other Fort Bragg-based active Group, Washington, D.C.; and 7th tions Command has recently units, the 112th Special Operations PSYOP Group, Presidio of San realigned into a new structure Signal Battalion and the 528th Spe- Francisco, Calif. which affects the majority of the cial Operations Support Battalion, Unaffected by the realignment active-duty and reserve-component are also assigned to USASFC. are the 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort units in its subordinate commands. Army Reserve Special Forces Benning, Ga.; and the 160th Spe- Announcing the realignment, Lt. groups operationally controlled by cial Operations Aviation Regiment, Gen. Michael F. Spigelmire, USASFC are the 11th, headquar- Fort Campbell, Ky., which continue USASOC commander, said his com- to report directly to USASOC head- mand is now aligned along func- quarters. The realignment has not tional rather than component lines. increased the number of Army spe- The new structure was effective cial-operations troops; however, the November 27. 3rd SF Group, activated last June, Before the realignment, all is scheduled to activate its second

active-duty Army special-opera- battalion in 1991 and its third

B tions forces were assigned to the 1st Y battalion in 1992.

Special Operations Command, and

D S

3rd/7th SFG returns

all Army Reserve SOF to the U.S. P W to Fort Bragg Army Reserve Special Operations O O Command. P W The 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group

D D Now all Special Forces units are AN returned to Fort Bragg in August as aligned under the U.S. Army Spe- DEED part of a general reduction of U.S. cial Forces Command, headed by forces in Panama. Maj. Gen. James A Guest. Active- The return of the battalion is in duty SF units are assigned to concert with the 1977 Panama USASFC, Army Reserve SF are Canal Treaty, according to Lt. Col. under USASFC’s operational con- Don Gersh, public affairs officer for trol, and National Guard SF units the U.S. Army Special Operations will continue their training rela- USACAPOC crest Command. The move is part of a tionship with active forces. phased reduction of U.S. forces in All Army Civil Affairs and Psy- tered at Fort Meade, Md.; and the Panama through the year 2000. chological Operations units are 12th, headquartered at Arlington Approximately 100 soldiers from aligned under the U.S. Army Civil Heights, Ill. Army National Guard the 3rd Battalion’s Company C Affairs and Psychological Opera- SF groups are the 19th, headquar- remain in Panama as a planning tions Command, headed by Brig. tered at Salt Lake City, Utah; and and support cell for special-opera- Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau. Army the 20th, headquartered at Birm- tions missions with the U.S. South- Reserve CA and PSYOP units are ingham, Ala. ern Command, Gersh said. assigned to USACAPOC, and USACAPOC active forces include Special Forces first came to Latin active-duty CA and PSYOP units the 4th Psychological Operations America in the early 1960s as are under its operational control. Group and the 96th Civil Affairs mobile training teams from the 7th Both USASFC and USACAPOC are Battalion, both located at Fort SF Group. Company D of the 7th headquartered at Fort Bragg. Bragg. Its Army Reserve units are set up its headquarters at Fort Active Army Special Forces the 351st Civil Affairs Command, Gulick, Panama in 1962 and groups now assigned to USASFC Mountain View, Calif.; 352nd Civil formed the nucleus for the 8th SF are the 1st, at Fort Lewis, Wash; Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md.; Group, activated at Fort Gulick in

56 Special Warfare April 1963 for missions in Latin acquaint commanders with the or reserve Army unit or selected America. When the 8th was inacti- course so that they can program DoD personnel, or on orders to a vated in June 1972, its troops were training for their units. It can also SOF unit; pass the Army Physical redesignated the 3rd Battalion, 7th show prospective students what to Fitness Test with a minimum score SF Group. expect during the course. of 60 points in each event and an The six-week Waterborne Infil- overall score of 206 or more (scored SF, Ranger tabs can now tration Course, conducted three for the 17-25 age group, regardless be worn together times a year at the SWCS water- of age); pass a 50-meter swim test Soldiers eligible to wear the Spe- borne training facility at Key West, with boots and fatigues; complete a cial Forces and Ranger tabs may Fla., focuses on surface waterborne 300-meter surface swim using any now wear both simultaneously. operations, including long-distance stroke; complete a 25-meter under- AR 670-1 was changed in over-the-horizon surface water swim on a single breath of September to permit soldiers to infiltrations and exfiltrations, plan- air; tread water for two minutes wear both special skill tabs at the ning considerations, surface swim- with hands out of the water; and same time, on an optional basis, ming, and rubber-boat and kayak pass a Type-A medical examina- instead of having to chose between operations. tion. Because of the physical them. The change has also affected Training for SOF waterborne demands of the course, students the location in which the tabs will should report for training in excel- be worn on some uniforms. lent condition. When both tabs are worn on the The second tape, Drake said, will Army green service uniform, utility help SOF units to establish and uniforms or the cold-weather cam- conduct a two-week pre-scuba ouflage jacket, the Special Forces course for their members who will tab will now be centered on the left attend the four-week Combat Diver shoulder sleeve, 1/2 inch from the Qualification Course, also taught shoulder seam. The Ranger tab will at Key West. be centered 1/8 inch below the SF The pre-scuba tape explains safe- tab. The unit shoulder sleeve ty and training standards and was insignia will be centered 1/8 inch filmed at Key West, using instruc- below the Ranger tab. tors to demonstrate various tech- Simultaneous wear of the tabs niques and training methods. It is also extends to the full-size metal part of a package including a pro- tab replicas on blue and white dress gram of instruction and lesson uniforms and to miniature metal plans, Drake said, and should help tab replicas on blue and white mess to standardize unit pre-scuba and evening mess uniforms. Wear training and to lower the attrition of the metal tab replicas is covered rate of the CDQC. in Paragraph 29-17 of AR 670-1. SWCS has distributed the WIC missions has traditionally been and pre-scuba videotapes to all WIC videotape being done by the units, Drake said, with Ranger and Special Forces units, distributed to SOF units the result being different active and reserve-component, The Special Warfare Center and approaches to training and differ- down to the battalion level. For fur- School has produced two videotapes ent training techniques. The ther information on either video- designed to acquaint SOF units Waterborne Infiltration Course tape, contact David Clark, 2nd Bat- with its training courses in water- standardizes training and saves talion, 1st Special Warfare Training borne and underwater operations. units’ time and money — they no Group, at AV 236-6629/8639, com- An 11-minute tape on the SWCS longer need to develop and conduct mercial (919) 396-6629. Waterborne Infiltration Course their own training, and they pay explains course content and bene- only the cost of sending students to Bibliography now available fits of the training. It includes the course. Once personnel have on Soviet ‘special forces’ scenes from a course in progress been trained, their entry-level The Soviet Army Studies Office and interviews with students, waterborne skill can serve as a at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has according to Maj. Richard Drake, basis for development of unit mis- assembled an extensive bibliogra- commander of Company C, 2nd sion-specific training. phy on Soviet special-purpose Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Prerequisites for the Waterborne forces. Training Group, which conducts Infiltration Course are that an “Soviet Special Purpose Forces” the course. The tape is designed to applicant be a member of an active is an annotated bibliography of

Winter 1991 57 Soviet-published books, articles specific aircraft equipment. U.S. Army Special Operations and documents pertaining to spe- AFSOC is composed of active- Command. cial-purpose forces of the Soviet duty and reserve Air Force special- In-place consecutive tours, army and navy from 1918 to the operations forces. It will also be the consecutive overseas tours and present. focal point for Air National Guard inter/intra-theater transfers will The list is intended for use by SOF readiness, coordinating with be denied under the new policy. The specialists in the field, according to the National Guard Bureau and change applies equally to SF com- Maj. James F. Gebhardt, who appropriate state governors. missioned and warrant officers and assembled the bibliography. Since Subordinate units of AFSOC are enlisted soldiers in CMF 18. few of the materials have been the 1st Special Operations Wing, The new policy will give more SF translated into English, users need headquartered at Hurlburt Field, soldiers the opportunity to train to be able to read Russian and Ger- which includes the 8th, 16th, 20th, and to improve language and man to get the fullest use out of the 9th and 55th Special Operations regional orientation skills by serv- bibliography. Squadrons; the 39th Special Opera- ing with forward-deployed SF units The bibliography will be updated tions Wing in Europe, which in their respective theaters, Chavez every 4-6 months, Gebhardt said. includes the 67th, 21st and 7th said. SF soldiers returning from Single copies can be obtained by Special Operations Squadrons; and overseas will also be able to train request from the Soviet Army CONUS-based parent groups Studies Office; Attn: ATZL-SAS; through their experiences, skills, Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027-5015. cultural and political perspectives. For more information, contact the For more information, contact Soviet Army Studies Office at AV Maj. Mariano or MSgt. Wiggins, 552-4434/ 4333, commercial (913) USASOC DCSPER Plans, Programs 684-443414333. and Policy Division, at AV 236-6029, commercial (919) 396-6029. AFSOC new Air Force special ops command Writing for publication The Air Force has recently estab- Besides Special Warfare, there lished the Air Force Special Opera- are a number of publication outlets tions Command as the organization for writers who wish to write on responsible for the combat readi- special-operations topics. ness of Air Force special-operations Special Warfare is targeted forces. toward a special-operations audi- Called AFSOC, the new com- ence, but Brig. Gen. David J. Barat- mand was formed from the 23rd Air to, commander of the SWCS, stress- Force and began operation May 22. es the need for special-ops writers It is headquartered at Hurlburt to reach other audiences in the Field, Fla., as was the 23rd. A AFSOC crest Army, as well. By publishing in major command, AFSOC reports other branch and Armywide publi- directly to the Air Force chief of the 353rd Special Operations Wing cations, he said, SOF writers can staff and is the Air Force compo- in the Pacific, which includes the help to inform other branches and nent of the U.S. Special Operations 1st, 31st and 17th Special Opera- specialties about the capabilities Command, headquartered at tions Squadrons. and missions of SOF. MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Listed below are some of those The 23rd Air Force was part of Policy change limits other publications: the Air Force’s Military Airlift foreign-tour extension Parameters; U.S. Army War Col- Command. MAC will continue to Department of the Army person- lege; Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. support the new special-opera- nel policy changes now limit Special Military Review; Funston Hall, tions command by operating bases Forces soldiers’ foreign-service-tour Bldg. 314; Fort Leavenworth, KS at Hurlburt Field and Kirtland extensions. 66027. AFB, N.M., and by providing The change was approved by the Armor; U.S. Army Armor Center logistical support, transportation Assistant Secretary of the Army for and Fort Knox; Attn: ATSB-DOTD- and communications-control sys- Manpower and Reserve Affairs on MAG; Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. tems. MAC will also support Nov. 12, 1990 and limits extensions U.S. Army Aviation Digest; PO acquisition of common aircraft to a maximum of 12 months, Box 699; Fort Rucker, AL 36362- systems, but AFSOC will be according to Col. Juan Chavez, 5000. responsible for acquiring SOF- deputy chief of staff for personnel, Infantry; PO Box 2005; Fort Ben-

58 Special Warfare ning, GA 31905-0605. SOF soldiers who get injured dur- pockets on the legs which will hold Military Police Journal; U.S. ing an actual mission may have no lowering lines. These lines can be Army Military Police School; Fort way of getting help or medical hooked to the suit and used by the McClellan, AL 36205-5030. attention. jumper to lower himself from the Military Intelligence; U.S. Army “Our soldiers can’t afford to get tree. The length of the lowering line Intelligence Center and School; injured,” said Capt. Samuel Young, will be determined during mission Attn: ATSI-TD-DPB; Fort Huachu- chief of the Infil/Exfil Branch of the planning and will vary, Young said, ca, AZ 85613-7000. SWCS Directorate of Combat according to the height of the trees Engineer; U.S. Army Engineer Developments. “The PRTS will in the area of the drop zone. “If School; Attn: ATSE-TDM-P; Fort increase the probability that they jumpers were going into an area Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. will be able to overcome the haz- with 50-foot trees,” he said, “a 90- Air Defense Artillery; U.S. Army ards of airborne infiltration and foot line would be plenty. If they Air Defense Artillery School; Attn: carry on with their missions.” were jumping into redwoods, the ATSA-ADA; Fort Bliss, TX 79916- The PRTS will consist of a helmet line would obviously have to be a 7001. with face mask and a two-piece lot longer.” Army Communicator; Bldg. padded suit weighing 12 pounds. The system will be a subdued 25701, U.S. Army Signal Center The suit will be made of an 8-ounce color, olive drab for the suit and and Fort Gordon; Fort Gordon, GA flat black for the helmet, Young 30905. said. The suit will be available in a Field Artillery Professional Bul- limited range of sizes to fit various letin; PO Box 33311; Fort Sill, OK body sizes and builds. It is over- 73503-0311. sized to allow it to fit over all types Army Chemical Review; Room of clothing; adjustable leg straps 2029, Sibert Hall; U.S. Army and suspenders allow the wearer to Chemical School; Fort McClellan, adjust the pants for a better fit. AL 36205. The two-piece design not only Ordnance Bulletin; U.S. Army allows greater upper-body move- Ordnance Center and School; Attn: ment, but also allows cross-sizing ATSL-O-B; Aberdeen Proving to better accommodate the jumper. Ground, MD 21005-5201. Having two pieces also makes it Quartermaster Professional Bul- possible to replace one piece of the letin; U.S. Army Quartermaster suit at a time, should it become School; Attn: ATSM-ACZ-PB; Fort worn or damaged, lowering the Lee, VA 23801-5032. suit’s life-cycle cost. Transportation Corps Profession- Prototypes of the PRTS have al Bulletin; Director, Office of the been tested and evaluated by Chief of Transportation; Attn: members of the U.S. Forest Ser- ATZF-OCT-E; Fort Eustis, VA Prototype of the Parachutist Rough vice, Young said. Developers esti- 23604-5407. Terrain System mate the cost of each system — Kevlar fabric which is puncture- pants, coat, helmet, mask and chin Rough-terrain suit offers resistant and will be padded in strap — will be $627. The systems jumpers protection vital areas — elbows, knees, hips, could be fielded by late FY 91 and A new suit developed for special- back, crotch, spine, neck, kidneys are scheduled to be distributed at operations forces will allow them to and underarms — which are sub- a rate of 144 per Ranger battalion jump more safely into areas of ject to injury on landing. The foam or SF group. rough terrain. padding is either sewn in place or The Parachutist Rough Terrain held in specially designed pockets SWCS working to produce System has been developed by the to keep it from shifting during air- new CA field manuals Army’s Natick Laboratories, which borne operations. A rigid spine-pro- Work is under way at the Spe- modified smoke-jumper suits cur- tector plate will protect the jum- cial Warfare Center and School to rently being used by the U.S. For- per’s spine from injury. A special produce a revised Field Manual est Service. Like the smoke jum- strap sewn between the legs of the 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. pers, special-operations soldiers pants near the crotch will further The new manual, written to must often parachute into remote protect the jumper from limbs dur- replace one published in 1985, areas, using drop zones in moun- ing tree landings. will include a new appendix on tainous, rocky or forested areas. Should the jumper get caught in foreign-nation support and exten- Unlike smoke jumpers, however, a tree, the suit has large cargo sive rewriting of chapters dealing

Winter 1991 59 with Civil Affairs in the opera- more than 60,000 square feet of tional continuum and civil-mili- space, according to Fort Campbell SWCS preparing SF how-to tary operations, according to Maj. facility engineers. It was complet- manuals Mark Zamperini, commander of ed in March 1990 at a cost of The JFK Special Warfare Cen- Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st approximately $5 million. ter and School is preparing a Special Warfare Training Group. Captured as a SF adviser in series of how-to field manuals cov- Zamperini’s company is responsi- Vietnam in 1963, Rowe endured ering Special Forces tactics, tech- ble for revising the manual, in more than five years of captivity niques and procedures. conjunction with the SWCS Direc- in South Vietnam. He later drew Prepared by the SWCS Direc- torate of Training and Doctrine. on his POW experience to organize torate of Training and Doctrine, Preparation of the new manual and run the Army’s Survival, Eva- the manuals will be oriented began when members of Civil sion, Resistance and Escape toward operational personnel Affairs units met at the SWCS in Course, taught at the Special War- from team through battalion level May and November 1989 to assist fare Center and School at Fort and will cover all SF mission in planning the preliminary draft; Bragg. Rowe was killed in an areas, according to Maj. William the coordinating draft was dis- ambush in Manila April 21, 1989, Council, project officer in the tributed to field units for com- while serving as the ground forces DOTD Doctrine Development ment in January 1991. Following Branch. a review of unit comments and Production of the manuals will further revision, SWCS will dis- proceed through three draft tribute the final draft this sum- stages: preliminary, coordinating mer. Publication of the finished and final. Average time for com- manual is scheduled for 1992. pletion, from concept to distribu- Involvement of field units in the tion of the final DA-approved revision process is critical, accord- copy, will be 18 months to two ing to Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, Civil years, Council said. Operational Affairs integrator at the SWCS, units will routinely review the because the doctrine formulated manuals’ coordinating drafts, and in the new manual will form the in some cases, may receive review basis for future Civil Affairs copies of the preliminary drafts. training and force structure. Listed below are the manuals, Another manual in progress, their status and point of contact: FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Func- • FM 31-20-1, Special Forces tions, will be a tactics, techniques Tactics, Techniques and Proce- and procedures manual, accord- dures. Contains tactics, tech- ing to Maj. Povl Wise, project offi- niques and procedures that are cer for the manual. The how-to basic and common to all or most manual will be comprehensive, Photo by Jason Brady SF missions. Includes command Then-Maj. Nick Rowe while assigned to the and control, mission planning, covering all 20 Civil Affairs spe- JFK Special Warfare Center and School cialty areas, and will include a deployment, infiltration and chapter on noncombatant-evacua- director for the Joint U.S. Military extraction, foot movement, mount- tion operations. FM 41-11 is Advisory Group — Philippines. ed operations, basic communica- scheduled for completion in late Despite a post policy that train- tions and post-mission activities. FY 1993. ing facilities be named for Medal Preliminary draft to be completed of Honor winners, the Fort Camp- in May 1991. Contact Maj. Fort Campbell facility named bell memorialization board unani- William Council. for Colonel Rowe mously decided to make an excep- • FM 31-20-2, Unconventional Soldiers of the 5th SF Group at tion in Rowe’s case, according to Warfare Tactics, Techniques and Fort Campbell, Ky., now train in a Rex Boggs, curator of Fort Camp- Procedures for Special Forces. Con- facility named for a Special Forces bell’s Pratt Museum and a mem- tains organizational concepts, pre- officer known for his contributions ber of the memorialization board. infiltration training, guerrilla to training. “Even though Colonel Rowe was operations, demobilization and The Colonel James N. Rowe not a Medal of Honor winner, it exfiltration. Preliminary draft to Consolidated Training Facility is was recommended that the facili- be completed in late June 1991. used by members of the 5th Group ty be named for him because of Contact SFC Gary Wertz. for a variety of training activities. his strong commitment to train- • FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal The two-story facility contains ing,” Boggs said. Defense Tactics, Techniques and

60 Special Warfare Procedures for Special Forces. the DOTD Doctrine Development their equipment,” said SFC Walt Includes command and control, Branch, AV 239-6305/8689, com- Minton of the Special Warfare Cen- intelligence, training, adviser mercial (919) 432-6305/8689. ter and School’s Directorate of Com- techniques, civil defense, pacifica- bat Developments, Materiel and tion operations, hand-off proce- Army needs feedback Logistics Systems Division. Equip- dures and other operational tech- on M-24 sniper weapon ment specialists in DCD worked niques. Preliminary draft to be The Army wants to hear from sol- with instructors in the SWCS Spe- completed in early May 1991. diers who have comments or sug- cial Operations Target Interdiction Contact SFC Melchor L. Becena. gestions about the M-24 Sniper Course to develop the sniper • FM 31-20-4, Direct Action Weapons System. weapons system, which was later Tactics, Techniques and Proce- “The users are the only ones who adopted for use Armywide. dures for Special Forces. Includes can tell us what they don’t like Army users can report their com- direct assault, raid, ambush, about the design or performance of plaints on Standard Form 368, standoff attack, terminal guid- Quality Deficiency Report, called a ance, mining/demolition, indepen- QDR. Soldiers should mail the QDR dent sabotage and incendiarism. to Commander, U.S. Army Arma- Preliminary draft to be completed ment, Munitions and Chemical by July 1991. Contact SFC James Command; Attn: AMSMC-QAG; C. McGill. Rock Island, IL 61299-6000 and • FM 31-20-5, Special Recon- send a copy to the SWCS. Copies naissance Tactics, Techniques should be mailed to Commander, and Procedures for Special Forces. USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-CD- Covers personnel, training, Spe- ML; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, cial Forces intelligence function, Minton said. The SWCS will follow basic reconnaissance/surveillance, up on the QDR and assist in provid- target acquisition, area assessing an answer to the user. ment, hydrographic reconnais- For more information, contact sance, post-strike reconnaissance, SFC Walt Minton, AV 239-1816, technical appreciation, NBC commercial (919) 432-1816. reconnaissance and post-mission activities. Coordinating draft to be completed in late April 1991. Contact Maj. William Council. To reach points of contact, call The M-24 Sniper Weapons System

Winter 1991 61 Book Reviews Special Warfare

deny the enemy (VC and NVA) The Marine participants per- access to local intelligence, man- formed with high dedication and power and logistical resources. morale, shown in a 60-percent vol- Another CAP aim was to conduct untary extension rate. Though civic action and community devel- CAPs produced combat results dis- opment at rice-roots level. By 1969 proportionate to their relatively the program reached a maximum of small numbers, the author raises 114 CAPs in the Marine tactical some disturbing questions about area of responsibility. their ultimate effectiveness. The author of this succinct All CAPs were not equally good. account of the CAP program, Though they were supposedly Michael Peterson, himself a former filled with screened volunteers CAP commander, presents valu- who underwent specialized train- able insights and some problemat- ing at a two-week school, not all ic issues that endure today. their Marine participants were Extremely relevant for SOF, this suited for effective people-to-peo- brief readable book is based on ple interaction in a foreign envi- oral interviews with former CAP ronment. Vietnamese language members and senior Marine offi- deficiency was the most serious cers and on research into official obstacle, and problems of cultural documents and secondary sources. sensitivity persisted due to igno- As Peterson states, “The CAP rance about local customs. Marines waged war in the ham- CAP civic-action initiatives The Combined Action Pla- lets; the mainforce Army and achieved more in terms of physical toons: the U.S. Marines’ Other Marine units all too often waged projects (wells dug, buildings con- War in Vietnam. By Michael E. war on the hamlets.” Despite U.S. structed, food distributed) than in Peterson. New York: Praeger Pub- espousal of “winning hearts and lasting “empowerment” projects lishers, 1989. ISBN 0-275-93258- minds,” the CAPs represented one intended to give the hamlet control 3. 160 pages. $39.95. of the few instances (the Special over its own affairs. Insufficient Forces CIDG program was anoth- guidance, lack of interagency coor- Many regard the Marine Corps er) where U.S. troops got their dination, and time expiration (i.e., Combined Action Platoon program hands dirty side-by-side with the U.S. troop withdrawal) impeded as one of our more innovative and Vietnamese villagers. Marines from accomplishing the successful initiatives in the Viet- The CAP program encountered latter. nam War. resistance from some Marine line We in SOF may overrate our abil- A CAP combined a 14-man commanders who denigrated it in ity to influence our allied counter- Marine rifle squad with a Viet- favor of Army-style large-unit parts. When the U.S. intervenes namese village militia platoon of maneuver warfare. Nor was it fully heavily in a foreign nation, the CAP Popular Forces, often the lowest- embraced by the commander of the experience points to possible limita- regarded element in Vietnam’s mili- Military Assistance Command – tions, inherent and external, that tary pecking order. The Marines Vietnam, who saw the program U.S. advisers and trainers intent on ate, slept, trained and operated in reflecting a USMC beachhead- promoting military and social the hamlets with their PF counter- security mentality. Yet the CAP change at village level may parts. The Marine squad leader concept was partially imitated in encounter again. commanded the combined force. the Army’s Mobile Advisory Team Conceived in 1965, the CAP mis- concept, designed to upgrade the Lt. Col. James K. Bruton sion sought to provide security for proficiency of the provincial militia 4156th USARF School selected hamlet populations and to companies, the Regional Forces. Tulsa, Okla.

62 Special Warfare The Lessons of Modern War, artillery and surface-to-air mis- Volume I: The Arab-Israeli siles; air combat; naval systems Conflicts, 1973-1989; Volume and combat; close air support; II: The Iran-Iraq Conflict; Vol- interdiction and long-range ume III: The Afghan and Falk- attack; air reconnaissance; heli- lands Conflicts. By Anthony S. copters; combined operations; Cordesman and Abraham R. logistics; and chemical, biological, Wagner. Boulder, Colo.: Westview and nuclear weapons. Press, 1990. Vol. I: ISBN 0-8133- The research is quite detailed, 0954-9; 394 pages; $47.50. Vol. and the analysis is very good. The II: ISBN 0-8133-0955-7; 647 volumes are long, tedious and pages, $54.95. Vol. III: ISBN 0- somewhat disjointed, however. 8133-0956-5; 470 pages; $49.95. Although this is partially due to the immense breadth of informa- Authors Cordesman and Wagn- tion covered, it is largely due to er have made a significant intel- an unsatisfactory organization of lectual contribution to the analy- subjects. It would have made sis of modern conflict with this more sense and been more read- trilogy. able, for instance, if the material They analyze five major con- had been organized according to flicts and assess lessons in a battlefield operating system. The Petsamo-Kirkenes Opera- number of categories. The cate- Another criticism is that the work tion: Soviet Breakthrough and gories include: combatants; ter- focuses heavily on advanced tech- Pursuit in the Arctic, October rain; history of the conflict; casu- nology, general-purpose forces and 1944 (Leavenworth Papers alties and losses; threat-assess- high-intensity violence. There is Number 17). By Maj. James F: ment technologies; command, only minor mention and scant anal- Gebhardt, U.S. Army. Fort Leaven- control and communications; com- ysis of low-intensity conflict, spe- worth, Kan.: U.S. Army Combat bined arms; infantry; tanks and cial-operations forces, and mission Studies Institute, 1989. 182 pages. armored vehicles; precision-guid- areas such as unconventional war- Softcover. ed and specialized munitions; fare, direct action, special recon- tube artillery and multiple rocket naissance and counterterrorism. This book should be required launchers; surface-to-surface mis- In the case of the volume devot- reading for every officer in the U.S. siles; mines and barriers; all- ed to the Iran-Iraq War, this is Army’s 6th Infantry Division weather and night-target-acquisi- especially lacking, despite the (Light), the Canadian Army, the tion systems; anti-aircraft fact that what is called the Iran- armies of Norway, Sweden and Fin- Iraq War is merely the overt land, and U.S. Marine Corps units phase of a struggle that the two with duties in the Far North. nations have been waging at Maj. James Gebhardt’s account of lower intensities and by less the Soviet operation that swept the direct means for more than 30 Germans from the approaches to years. Murmansk and ended with the lib- Their price is prohibitive for eration of northern Norway is by most personal bookshelves, yet far the best, most lucid exposition these volumes have a place in ever prepared of the one operation academic libraries. They provide from which all modern Soviet far- good starting points for detailed north warfighting doctrine flows. analyses of a wide variety of With the continued buildup of Sovi- 20th-century conventional mili- et forces in the Kola Peninsula, tary issues. Their relevance to glasnost notwithstanding, The Pet- SOF and intelligence soldiers, samo-Kirkenes Operation is rele- however, is not very great, given vant today and bears close reading. their limited attention to such Gebhardt, an Armor Branch offi- topics. cer formerly assigned to the Soviet Army Studies Office at Fort Leav- Maj. William H. Burgess III enworth, writes in a clear and crisp 3rd SF Group style. He also has something for Fort Bragg, N. C. everyone, with balanced accounts of

Winter 1991 63 the roles of combat, combat-sup- try. More importantly, De Soto pro- port, and combat-service-support vides evidence of the reasons for arms. He has a particularly fasci- this phenomenon, mainly the mer- nating chapter on the role of Soviet cantile nature of the economy and spetsnaz and other special-purpose the government’s reluctance or troops in the operation. inability to change it. The book is concise, objective and De Soto sees mercantilism as the accurate. Gebhardt has gone to culprit in Peru’s (and by his exten- great lengths on the latter score, sion, most of the Third World coun- including a visit to the Norwegian tries’) inability to make any eco- side of the battlefield and the corre- nomic progress during the last 50 lation of German and Soviet years. De Soto’s description of mer- sources for each major (and several cantilism — a highly regulated minor) events. economy dependent on elite groups What further makes this book sustained by state-granted privi- stand out from the crowd is that leges — and its historical parallels Gebhardt has made extensive use with the European mercantile of Soviet sources (he is fluent in states of the 15th-19th centuries is Russian) where heretofore, filled with invaluable insights. The accounts of World War II in the far rise and fall of mercantilism in north have relied almost exclusive- Europe is very clearly described, as ly on one-sided German records. are its inevitable by-products. Petsamo-Kirkenes is also well- and Democracy), as director of sev- De Soto sees the consequences of illustrated, with ample maps and eral private companies in Peru, mercantilism as economic ineffi- photographs. It is well-edited, with and as a member of the United ciency, impoverishment of the vast none of the fluff or meandering that Nations Committee for Develop- majority of the people, and the often characterizes works using for- ment Planning undermining of social structures. eign sources. The Other Path is an economic These conditions, not surprising to The book also has many insights study of Peru’s informal economy, students of low-intensity conflict, into operational art as practiced by what many would call the black can lead to conflict, violence and the Soviets and seldom understood market. But De Soto tells us much revolution. England, France and by Westerners. Petsamo-Kirkenes is more — through his facts, figures Russia — all mercantile countries good reading for intelligence and and accompanying anecdotes, we in De Soto’s view prior to the 20th special-operations soldiers, military see and feel what the people of Peru century — addressed the conse- buffs and anyone interested in the see and feel. We experience their quences of mercantilism in differ- Soviet Union’s history and capabili- frustration when they try to build a ent ways, one (England) peacefully ties in the far north. house, establish a market stall or and the others through revolution. license a business. We learn about The Other Path is not just an Maj. William H. Burgess III the government and its bureaucra- analysis; it recommends solutions 3rd SF Group cy in real terms — the bribes to the problems described. Basical- Fort Bragg, N.C. required, the overwhelming disin- ly, De Soto advocates a free-market terest — how government really economy, one that would grant The Other Path: The Invisible affects the people on a day-to-day economic and personal freedom to Revolution in the Third World. basis. its citizens. De Soto urges that the By Hernando De Soto. New York: De Soto takes us from the begin- transformation be made soon, in Harper and Row, 1989. ISBN 0-06- ning of the influx of peasants from order to avoid the violent alterna- 016020-9. 271 pp. $22.95. the countryside to present-day tive offered by subversive groups, Lima, Peru’s capital and largest such as the Shining Path insur- This is a must-read book for all city. Three economic areas are cov- gents now active within Peru. professionals in the area of low- ered in detail: housing, trade and De Soto is hopeful and proposes intensity conflict, nation-building, transport. Proof of the magnitude of concrete solutions. However, he Civil Affairs, or related areas. De the informal economy is amply warns us that “the poorest and Soto is a Peruvian economist who given — an estimated 60 percent of most discontented members of the has served as managing director of Peru’s national product is repre- population are not prepared to Peru’s Central Reserve Bank, as sented by the output of the infor- accept a society in which opportuni- director of the Instituto Libertad y mals, as the black market enter- ties, property, and power are dis- Democracia (Institute for Liberty prises are known within the coun- tributed arbitrarily.” With our eyes

64 Special Warfare focused on eastern Europe, The trooper who attempted to track relations seems complete without Other Path reminds us of the mag- down a hostile Indian band “would its tale of bad faith. One of the nitude of the problems existing be outwitted, exhausted, circum- darkest chapters in Western Ameri- within Latin America, and the criti- vented, possibly ambushed and can history was the exiling of the cal choices facing Latin govern- destroyed.” Obviously the U.S. Chiricahua and Warm Springs ments and ours. Army needed something on the Apache tribes to Florida — along frontier beside its regular troopers. with more than 60 Indian Scouts Col. Wayne D. Zajac The duties of the U.S. Army Indi- who had rendered faithful service, Senior Intelligence Officer an Scouts were fourfold: to serve as and who were actually held as pris- Army National Guard guides and intelligence-gatherers, oners of war. (One remarked with to keep order on the reservations, to touching restraint, “It seemed a bit The Red-Bluecoats: The Indian reinforce military government — unjust.”) Scouts. By Fairfax Downey and and to fight. All this was rewarded Although the frontier was closed Jacques Noel Jacobsen Jr. Fort with the regular Army private’s pay by the turn of the century, the Collins, Colo.: The Old Army Press, of $13 per month. Scouts soldiered on, keeping order 1973. The first to be enlisted were on the reservations, until the last Pawnee tribesmen, but over the minuscule unit was finally disband- Fairfax Downey, a well-known years Crow, Shoshones, Apache and ed in 1943. But the heritage lived popular historian of the Old West Black-Seminole, even the implaca- on, and not only in fireside memo- and the American Civil War, has bly hostile Sioux and Cheyenne, ries. The Indian Scouts’ crossed- cooperated with Jacques Noel added to their ranks of honor. arrow insignia was taken up by the Jacobsen Jr. to produce a workman- The Indian Scouts brought into Canadian-American First Special like account of the U.S. Army Indi- the Army their traditions and Service Force in World War II and an Scouts. Though based on sec- skills in battle, tracking, fieldcraft later incorporated into the Special ondary sources and somewhat and physical hardiness. In more Forces collar insignia and distinc- pedestrian in its writing, the book than one account, it was noted by tive unit insignia. (The authors tells the story of the scouts who dis- officers that Indian Scouts on foot commit one howler when they claim tinguished themselves through could keep up with mounted white that the crossed arrows “live on in hard campaigning on the Great troopers. the U.S. Army as the insignia of the Plains between the Civil War and The loyalty of the Indian Scouts, Special Forces, adopted in 1942.”) the Spanish-American War. even when they had on occasion to Unfortunately, this work is now Gen. George Crook, perhaps the attack members of their own tribes, out of print, although a copy is on best friend the American Indian was marred by only one case of file at the Special Warfare Museum. ever had, asserted that any white defection throughout all the frontier wars. Sixteen of these faithful Stanley Sandler warriors earned Medals of Honor. Command Historian The Army for its part played fair USAJFKSWCS with its Indian Scouts and with the Great Plains Indians as a whole. It was white civilians who sold the Indians firewater, who coveted and swindled them out of their lands, Book reviews from readers are who cut up their hunting ranges welcome and should address sub- with railroad track, and who shot jects of interest to special-opera- their buffalo from speeding trains tions forces. Reviews should be for “sport.” about 400-500 words long (approxi- But it was the Army which, even mately two double-spaced typewrit- when rounding up the Indians for ten pages). Include your full name, exile to harsh reservations, was rank, daytime phone number merely doing a distasteful job, and (preferably Autovon) and your usually performed it with more mailing address. Send review to: than a modicum of humanity. No Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK- wonder that even old Apache chief SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307- Geronimo demanded and received 5000. permission to enlist as an Army Indian scout. Yet no account of white-Indian

Winter 1991 65 Special Warfare

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