CTC Sentinel 5

MARCH 2012 . VOL 5 . ISSUE 3 Contents The Evidence of Al-Qaìda’s FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Evidence of Al-Qaìda’s Role Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack in the 2004 Madrid Attack By Fernando Reinares By Fernando Reinares REPORTS 6 A Pre-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik By Jacob Aasland Ravndal 10 The Rabbani Assassination: Taliban Strategy to Weaken National Unity? By Michael Gabbay 14 Assessing Al-Qaìda’s Presence in the New Libya By Andrew Lebovich and Aaron Y. Zelin 18 U.S. Gang Alignment with Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations By Mark Schmidt, U.S. National Gang Intelligence Center 20 The Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist Coalition By Arif Rafiq 22 Attacking Drug Cartels Through Undercover Money Laundering Operations By Robert Mazur A policeman walks alongside a train that was bombed in Madrid on March 11, 2004. - Photo by Christophe Simon/AFP/Getty Images n march 11, 2004, a series (LIFG) and included members of the 25 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity of coordinated bombings Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts ripped through Madrid’s (GICM), as well as two former members commuter train system, of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and Okilling 191 people. Although the attacks 2 Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Although the have been described as the product of network also included common criminals an independent cell of self-radicalized who radicalized into jihadists, this cell individuals only inspired by al-Qaìda, component was only a late addition. the extensive criminal proceedings About the CTC Sentinel on the Madrid bombings refute this Eight years after the Madrid terrorist The Combating Terrorism Center is an hypothesis.1 The network responsible attacks, new intelligence collected independent educational and research for the Madrid attacks evolved from the since the main judicial sentence in institution based in the Department of Social remnants of an al-Qaìda cell formed in 2007 suggests that al-Qaìda’s senior Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Spain a decade earlier. It was initiated leadership not only approved the West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses following instructions from an operative operation, but likely helped facilitate the Center’s global network of scholars and of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and supervise it. The key connection practitioners to understand and confront between al-Qaìda’s central leadership contemporary threats posed by terrorism and and the Madrid bombing network was other forms of political violence. 1 In fact, the judicial sentence on the trial case refers to Amer Azizi, a Moroccan who lived in the militants convicted for the attacks as “members of terrorist cells and groups of jihadist type” and belonging The views expressed in this report are those of to a “terrorist group or groups of jihadist character.” The 2 Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaìda in June the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, sentence never alluded to an “independent” cell or similar 2001. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group disappeared the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. notion. See Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección after its offshoot, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Segunda, “Sentencia 65/2007,” pp. 172, 279. Combat, broke away in 1998. 1 MARCH 2012 . VOL 5. ISSUE 3 Madrid for a decade until November the bombing preparations. This detail for example, Abu Dahdah was close to 2001. Azizi was a prominent member and other crucial pieces of information Tarek Maaroufi, leader of the Tunisian of the “Abu Dahdah cell,” an al-Qai`da were acquired by at least three Western Combatant Group, who was living in cell established in Spain during the intelligence services between 2008 and Belgium. Abu Dahdah also traveled mid-1990s.3 By the time of the Madrid 2010 and shared with this author.6 to London regularly to bring money attacks, however, Azizi had become the to the jihadist ideologue Abu Qatada. adjunct to al-Qaìda’s head of external This article first recounts how Azizi operations, the Egyptian Hamza became a key member of the Abu Dahdah Rabia.4 cell, where he forged connections “The initial groundwork with the men who would later execute for the Madrid attacks This article argues that Azizi initiated the Madrid attacks. It then provides plans to conduct a major act of jihadist a chronological narrative of how the began with a meeting in terrorism in Spain during the second half decision to attack Spain was made, as Karachi in December 2001 of 2001. At the time, he was already a well as Azizi’s role in the formation of committed al-Qaìda activist, but not yet the bombing network. between Amer Azizi and a ranking member in the organization. Abdelatif Mourafik.” By 2002-2003, however, Azizi was From the Abu Dahdah Cell to Al-Qaìda serving as the key intermediary between Central al-Qaìda’s central leadership and the Amer Azizi was born in the Moroccan primary members of the Madrid bombing town of Hedami in 1968 and migrated to In the aftermath of 9/11, international network, including its local ringleader, Spain in the early 1990s.7 Once settled in security and intelligence investigations Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (known Madrid, he married a native Spaniard, revealed that Abu Dahdah had a as “The Tunisian”)—with whom Azizi Raquel Burgos, who converted to direct link to the Hamburg cell led by had ties dating back to the late 1990s.5 Islam. Azizi began to attend Tablighi Muhammad Àtta and whose members By all accounts, Azizi traveled from Jamaàt gatherings in the capital, were responsible for the attacks on Pakistan to Spain at the end of 2003, and by 1995 he had been radicalized the World Trade Center and Pentagon likely to convey the approval of al- and recruited into al-Qaìda’s Abu in 2001.10 Moreover, Abu Dahdah had Qaìda’s senior leadership for the Dahdah cell. Around this time, Abu previous knowledge of Àtta’s plans Madrid attack, as well as to finalize Dahdah dispatched Azizi to a jihadist to strike on U.S. soil and was informed military facility in Zenica, Bosnia. By about ongoing preparations.11 3 The cell was founded in or before 1994 by Mustafa Set- 2000, Azizi had also received military marian Nasar (also known as Abu Musàb al-Suri) and training in the Afghanistan camps, 10 Àtta himself traveled to Spain twice in 2001. During Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh. The Syrian-born Abu which were managed by al-Qaìda and its his second trip, between July 8-19, 2001, Àtta met with 8 Dahdah (whose real name is Imad Eddin Barakat Yar- North African affiliates. Azizi’s training al-Qaìda operative Ramzi bin al-Shibh—the so-called kas) became the cell leader in 1995 once Saleh moved to experience made him a respected “20th hijacker”—and one or two unidentified individu- Peshawar to help in al-Qaìda’s reception of recruited member of the Abu Dahdah cell, within als involved in the 9/11 attacks. The meeting took place 9 Arabs and their transfer to Afghanistan, and al-Suri to which he became a leading recruiter. in two municipalities in the Catalonian coastal province London to assist Abu Qatada in editing the GIA’s maga- of Tarragona. Based on detailed analysis of the physical zine, al-Ansar. The Abu Dahdah cell had important movement and phone exchanges in the area among Abu 4 Following the arrest of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in jihadist connections in several countries Dahdah cell members, Spanish security services are con- Rawalpindi in March 2003, Abu Faraj al-Libi took over- worldwide, from the Middle East to vinced that Abu Dahdah cell members, including Azizi, all charge of al-Qaìda’s operations and Hamza Rabia Southeast Asia. In Western Europe, facilitated the meeting between al-Shibh and Àtta—al- became commander for external operations, including though it cannot be established with certainty whether operations in the United States and Western Europe. On 6 Personal interviews, senior intelligence officers of two any of the Abu Dahdah cell members actually attended Azizi’s position as adjunct to Rabia and the intelligence Western governments, one of them European, in Decem- the gathering. For details, see Audiencia Nacional, Sala sources for this information, see Fernando Reinares, “11- ber 2011 and, for further documented confirmation, in de lo Penal, Sección Tercera, “Sentencia 36/2005,” pp. M: la conexión Al Qaeda,” El País, December 17, 2009; February 2012. 203-211; “Informe ampliatorio de las investigaciones Fernando Reinares, “The Madrid Bombings and Global 7 Amer Azizi was also known as Othman al-Andalusi, realizadas en torno a las visitas a España de Mohamed Jihadism,” Survival 52:2 (2010), pp. 91-95. Also see the Jaffar al-Maghrebi and, occasionally, Othman al-Faruq Atta y Ramzi Binalshibh (sic),” Dirección General de la following article on a jihadist website identifying Amer and Ilyas. Policía, Comisaría General de Información, Unidad Cen- Azizi’s position: www.alqimmah.net/showthread. 8 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción tral de Información Exterior, October 16, 2002; “Sumario php?t=9752, accessed June 11, 2010. no. 5, “Sumario 35/2001,” vol. 57, pp. 18, 322-418, 369; 35/2001,” vol. 6, pp. 1,823-1,869, vol. 53, pp. 16, 614-616, 5 Fakhet and six others blew themselves up in a flat in Audiencia of September 19, 2003. Also, Audiencia Na- 625, in particular the report “Informe sobre Mohamed the city of Leganés in Madrid’s metropolitan area sur- cional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción no.

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