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The Defence of Norway Capability and Readiness The defence of Norway Capability and readiness LONG TERM DEFENCE PLAN 2020 INTRODUCTION Exercise Flotex outside of Bodø in 2017. → Introduction Norway and our allies face a new and deteri­ dependent on a modern Total Defence framework, orating security situation. Norwegian security which enables relevant civilian assets to support 1 and defence policy must take into account an the national and allied defence efforts during international environment characterised by more peacetime, crisis and armed conflict. overt and covert competition and rivalry. Ongoing changes in our strategic surroundings will have direct and indirect effects across all sectors of Increasing threats, society. challenges and vulnerabilities must be Norway is currently better suited to address emerging threats and challenges, due to decisions met by active policies, made in the previous Long Term Plan. However, priorities and measures. the threats are more serious and the deterioration Investment in defence of the security environment is happening faster and security remains than previously assumed. Further investment in defence and security is needed to safeguard our a key priority for the freedom, way of life, values and interests. Norwegian Government. Increasing threats, challenges and vulnerabili­ ties must be met by active policies, priorities and The development of the Armed Forces is an on­ measures. Investment in defence and security going and long­term undertaking. In 2016, the remains a key priority for the Norwegian Govern­ government set out the course towards a more ment. The Norwegian Armed Forces contribute capable and sustainable defence force, better to national and regional deterrence and reas­ able to face the changing security environment. surance. Challenges must be met by a strong This Long Term Plan builds on that foundation national joint force, in a NATO framework, to­ and further increases the development of the gether with close allies. Norwegian Armed Forces as a more joint, robust, interoperable, resilient and ready force. The complexity of threats and risks requires stronger and more flexible civil-military coope- ration. We will continue to build resilience and civil prepared ness in order to strengthen the ability of the nation to withstand and recover from attacks and incidents. The defence of Norway is CAPABILITY AND READINESS 2 3 LONG TERM DEFENCE PLAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY Security and defence policy Defending the country and safeguarding the population are some of the most important tasks 2 of any state. The overall objective for Norwegian Tasks of the Norwegian security and defence policy is to protect and Armed Forces defend Norwegian sovereignty, territorial integrity, The Armed Forces are Norway’s primary instrument of power to protect and defend democratic institutions and freedom of action Norwegian sovereignty, territorial integrity, against political, military and other pressure. democratic standards and freedom of action. The tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces Four key objectives support the overall objective: define the role of the Armed Forces in the defence of Norway: › Protection of the Norwegian population, terri­ tory, core societal functions and infrastructure Ensure credible deterrence based on against threats, assaults and attacks from both 1 NATO's collective defence state and non­state actors. › Prevention of armed conflict and the emergence Defend Norway and allies against threats, aggression and attacks, with­ of threats against Norwegian and allied security. 2 in the framework of NATO's collective › Promotion of peace, stability and further devel­ defence opment of the international legal order. › Defence of Norway and our allies against threats, Prevent and manage incidents and assaults and attacks in an allied framework. 3 security crises, including facilitating allied support NORWAY'S DEFENCE CONCEPT Ensure national situational awareness The changing strategic environment emphasises 4 in support of decision­making through the need to clarify and reinforce the mutually de­ surveillance and intelligence pendent factors that constitute the foundation Safeguard Norwegian sovereignty and of Norwegian security. The government has de­ 5 sovereign rights cided to update Norway's defence concept. The defence of Norway has three main lines of effort; Exercise Norwegian authority in national defence, the collective defence within the 6 designated areas framework of NATO, and bilateral support and Participate in multinational crisis reinforcement arrangements with close allies. Re­ 7 manage ment, including peace inforcing these lines of effort through investing in operations our Armed Forces, supports our overall defence policy goals. The defence of Norway also relies Contribute to international security and defence cooperation on a modern and well­prepared Total Defence 8 concept that supports the three lines of effort, Contribute to societal security and as well as builds national resilience and reduces 9 other key societal tasks vulnerabilities when faced with hybrid threats. CAPABILITY AND READINESS 4 F-35 at the Keflavik international airport during Iceland Air Policing 2020. Combat divers from NORSOF. 5 LONG TERM DEFENCE PLAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY The comprehensive approach to Norwegian Bilateral support and reinforcement security is detailed as follows: Norway is dependent on bilateral reinforcement 2 agreements and cooperation with close allies National defence in crisis and armed conflict. Building security Due to our geostrategic location, Norway has con­ with allies requires close cooperation throughout siderable responsibility at the northern flank of peacetime, crisis and armed conflict. the Alliance. To meet this responsibility, Norway must maintain a present national military force, as well as significant surveillance and intelli­ Due to our geostrategic gence resources. There is an increased demand location, Norway for national forces and capabilities to conduct has considerable operations both at home and abroad. The activity and presence of our forces contributes to deter­ responsibility at the rence and reassurance, ensures national influ­ northern flank of the ence in our surrounding areas, and contributes Alliance. to Norway remaining a relevant partner to allies and partners. NATO's collective defence NATO and the transatlantic security community remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security and defence policy. Collective security through deterrence and defence is the most important task of the Alliance. NATO defence and reinforce­ ment plans have been updated in recent years and their credibility require strong and lasting commitment from allies through relevant capa­ bilities, training and political support. All allies must increase their efforts in order to strengthen both national and collective security. CAPABILITY AND READINESS 6 NATO's collective Invest in Armed Forces National security and defence defence Increase societal awareness and resilience THE DEFENCE OF NORWAY Modernise Total Defence Bilateral support and reinforce- ment 7 LONG TERM DEFENCE PLAN KEY CHALLENGES AND TRENDS Key challenges and trends Norwegian defence and security policy aims to ing years, global stability will largely depend on safeguard the security of our nation and is con­ the development of the relationship between 3 tinuously adapted to meet current and future western countries and China. Both China and changes to the strategic environment. Russia possess significant capabilities and share an interest in diminishing the influence A NEW SECURITY SITUATION of the USA and Europe. Increasing power rivalry The strategic environment is characterised by rapid and confrontation places smaller states in a change, increased unpredictability and uncertainty. vulnerable position. The challenges to our national security are becom­ › The rule­based world order is under pressure ing more complex. The negative security outlook both from within and externally. Our principles presented in the previous Long Term Plan in 2016 and values are challenged. China and Russia has not only prevailed, it has accelerated and tak­ seek to challenge the status quo to promote their en an even more serious turn. If we fail to address own interests. In Europe and in the USA, there it, the new security situation has the potential to are growing nationalist movements opposed to affect and limit our freedom of action, our ability globalisation, free trade, immigration and multi­ to protect national interests and to maintain in­ lateralism. An erosion of the rule­based world fluence in our areas of interest. order will decrease the ability of small states to promote their interests. In a world where power Great power competition and the increased stra­ is more prominent and short­term interests are tegic importance of the High North has impli­ given greater significance, there is a higher risk cations for Norwegian security. An increasingly of confrontation and conflict. demanding and unstable strategic landscape, › Substantial and accelerated technological where the rule­based order is challenged and the change affects all policy areas and sectors. use of instruments of power is more prevalent, The implications of this change are complex threatens to marginalise the security of smaller and difficult to predict. There is a convergence states such as Norway. of exponential technological growth in many niche fields. Proliferation of knowledge and Five key drivers characterise the commercial development provides rivals
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