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Pakistan: The struggle for democracy historical perspective and future prospects, 1947—1980

Tirmazi, Shahid Hasan, M.A.

The American University, 1991

_ Copyright ©1990 by Tirmazi, Shahid Hasan. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

I . ______.,.____ ------··-----· PAKISTAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

1947 - 1989

by

Shahid Hasan Tirmazi

submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

Signatures of Committee: ___

Chair: 'l0V( ’

L Dean of School of International Service /; C IlLL Date

1990 The American University im Washington, D.C. 20016

frHE m m s i n ma m COPYRIGHT

BY

SHAHID HASAN TIRMAZI

1990

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED i i

PAKISTAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

1947 - 1989

BY

Shahid Hasan Tirmazi

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to understand why a stable political system has not developed in Pakistan. The aim of this study is to show that the problem lies in the state system itself. In other words the authority structure of the state, as inherited from British India, provides the focal point for the country's politics. While it is true that political parties, religious movements, ethnic violence and legislative activity seems to dominate the political scene, it is essentially to the structural dynamics of the state that one must ascribe the primary responsibility for shaping the political events after independence. For, this reason, in the framework of this study, the legal and constitutional authority, occupies central stage, and the political actors are seen as either trying to seek patronage from it or trying to limit its legitimizing potential.

This, it seems, is the best way to understand the number of crisis that have befallen Pakistan. i i i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Dr. Alan R. Taylor and Dr. Brady Tyson for their enthusiastic support and understanding. Their expert and

invaluable practical advice at each stage enriched my work

immensely, and enabled me to progress steadily towards a successful conclusion of my research.

I also thank all my other professors at the American

University who were always there when I needed help. Special thanks to Professor's A. Said, and William C . 01 son whoes he 1p I would never be able to repay.

I am very appreciative of the assistance provided by my friends and collegues. Special thanks goes to Andrea Irby,

Graduate Counseling Office, for all her help. I do not think I would have ever taken on this project if not for her help. In addition I would like to thank Sharon Abboud, Syed Tariq, and Tim

Seman for all their help.

My greatest thanks are to my mother and father, for thier undemanding support and forbearance. I am deeply grateful to them, and to my sister's and brother-in-law, for just being there.

I dedicate this work to my father and mother; Mahmud and

Nayeema Hasan Tirmazi.

I assume full responsibility for any errors which may exist in this study. Table of Contents r a S T R A C T ...... ii

ACKNOWLEEGEEENTS...... iii

INTRODUCTION ’ . 1

CHAPTER CTE : FOLMJATIONS CF P A K I S T A N ...... 10 Section One : The State ...... 13 Section Two : The Muslim Problem ...... 29

CHAPTER TWO : TEE BEGINNING AISD END OF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 1947-1950 41 Section One : Pakistan's Problems ...... 43 Section Two : The State ...... 59

CHAPTER THEE : TEE ERA OF GENERAL M0HAM1AD AYUB KHAN 1950-1969 . . . 66 Section One : The Daydream ...... 68 Section Two : Economic Strategy ...... 30 Section Three : The Nightmare ...... 86

CHAPTER FOLR : TEE SEEDS OF A fEW P A K I S T A N ...... 91 Section One : The Changing of the S y s t e m ...... 93 Section Two : East Pakistan Crisis : The Second Option ...... 102 • Section Three : The Reasons Why Democracy Failed ...... 106

CHAPTER FIVE : PEEPLES POWER VS. STATE POWER : TEE BHUTTO YEARS 1971-1977 ...... Ill Section One : The Pakistan Peoples Party Government ...... 114 Section Two : Reforms of the Pakistan Peoples PartyGovernment . 119 Section Three : The Downfall ...... 128 Section Four : The Second Failed Attempt at Establishing De m ocracy ...... 134

CHAPTER SIX : RULE OF FORCE : 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 0 B ...... 139 Section One : Consolidation of P o w e r ...... 140 Section Two : Islamization ...... 149 Section Three : Quasi-Civilian Regime ...... 156

CHAPTER SEVEN : TEE STATUS OLD FE-ESTAELISHED - TEEfEW DEAL .... 166 Section One : The Road to the Elections...... 167 Section Two : Pakistan People's Party Rule ...... 171

CONCLUSION ...... 176

BIBLIOGRAPHY INTRODUCTION

Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won 92 out of 204

National Assembly seats, when the second free general elections in Pakistan were held on November 18th 1988. The first free elections were held in 1971.

The election campaign of the PPP was based on the slogan that the only true representatives of Pakistan are the ones that are elected by the people. This slogan had carried them through the martial law period of 1977-1988, and also remained their password throughout the elections. The other agenda on the PPP manifesto included "civil rights for all", "land reforms", "governmental reforms", and "industrial reforms". The campaign slogans of the PPP, and the speeches by Mohtrama Benazir pointed to the fact that Pakistan was going to be a united nation over the next five years. The day of the Generals had passed, the day of the people had come, and therefore, a free and prosperous nation was going to be reborn.

Twelve months later, however, one does not yet see the promised changes.

Economic disarray, civil liberties' violations, government conflicts with opposition groups, continuing army presence in civil life, and ethnic violence still prevail on the political landscape. In other words nothing has changed.

The faces might have been replaced by new ones but the policies have not changed. As of today, a number of government officials as well as the general public seems to be losing hope in Benazir Bhutto's ability to rule.

During the previous regimes, whenever the ability to rule came in question, the result was always authoritarian repression. Firstly, there would occur a general crackdown on opponents and on the general public. The lack of legitimacy of those regimes was always covered-up by the use of slogans such as Islam, unity, and threat of international conspiracy. When - 2 -

these steps did not solve the problems, then martial law was enforced in major cities. Finally, when nothing helped, then the army with all its might would step in and enforce martial law in the whole country, and the regime in power would fade out of the picture.

Now, if history can be used as a guideline for the events of the present, we can visualize the following unfolding events. The current regime has filed charges against a number of opponents, the most talked about is the one filed against Fazle-ul-Haq, the last governor of the North-West Frontier

Province. Similarly, one of the provincial governments has filed criminal charges against a federal minister. The government of Benazir Bhutto has also tried to bypass the provincial governments of Punjab and Baluchistan through the introduction of programs such as the "Peoples Work Program". Added to the list is the conflict which was started by the government of Benazir against the governments of Punjab and Baluchistan and which is now being reciprocated by the provinces. Then, the intimidation of opponents in all the four provinces by the central government has also continued. The official stand of the government has always been that all these actions are necessary for the sake of safeguarding democracy. However, what we really see is the beginning of a situation which, if not checked, will lead to the introduction of a general crackdown of opponents and of the general public. One excess will lead to another, with an inexorable march towards the introduction of another martial law. The day of the generals will have come again.

This is a sad picture to see. It is also unfortunate, as, it is these types of activities which within the past forty-two years, have resulted in three martial laws, four civil governments, four different constitutions, and - 3 -

the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. Furthermore, it is these very activities which have not given time to the country to develop a stable political system. The past studies on Pakistan by Mohammad Waseem,

Manzooruddin Ahmed, and Agha Shahi, among others bear ample evidence of these events.

This lack of stability did not go unnoticed by the past leaders of

Pakistan and, from time to time, a number of reforms were introduced. The most talked about among these has been the one presented by the late

President, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, namely the introduction of "Basic

Democracy". In addition, the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced socialism as a means of presenting a new form of political system.

More recently, the late President and Army Chief of Staff General Mohammad

Zia-ul-Haq, introduced Islamization as yet another reform of the political system of Pakistan. None of these reforms helped in stemming the adverse tide of events.

The failure of these reforms could be ascribed to two main reasons.

Firstly, the reforms were designed to keep the supporters of the regimes as happy as possible. This class of people were the elite of the country.

Secondly, the ruling government, and the elites were unable to decide on the identity of Pakistan: Is it to be a religious state as stated by the religious leaders of the country; or, is it to be a secular state, as stated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah the founding father of the country? The conflict between these major forces has kept the past regimes unstable. These tensions have forced the regimes to compromise and take the middle of the road policies so that everyone would be happy; that is to say everyone that mattered. - 4 -

In spite of these problems and many others which will be dealt with in

this study, the nation of Pakistan has survived for a number of reasons.

Firstly, this is due to the ability of the power-holders of Pakistan to use

slogans such as Islam, international conspiracy, and national unity to keep

the people together. Secondly, the world's interest in Pakistan has helped;

mostly due to the occurrence of the Iranian Revolution, the Russian invasion

of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War. All these events have brought Pakistan

closer into the arms of the United States, which does not have a close friend

in the region. This new friendship has provided Pakistan with billions of

dollars in economic and military aid. International financial aid has also

helped the overall balance of the economy. Thirdly, in the 1970s, with the

oil boom, thousands of Pakistanis began going to the Gulf, and from there they

sent their earnings, which in turn added to the riches of the individuals and

the overall economic balance. Lastly, from 1947 onward Pakistan has been

influenced by propaganda from India and Russia, which is designed to undermine

the State of Pakistan. This has given a determination to the common people,

and the different regimes, to keep Pakistan together. The events of 1971, when Pakistan was divided were beyond their control, but now they would do

everything to keep it together.

Within these few paragraphs we have tried to demonstrate the

instabilities in the Pakistani state system. The State is influenced by outside and inside forces. It is functioning on thin ice and because of the burden of the system it has developed holes in it. There is not much leeway left for it to stay above water. Remedies have to be found which will enable - 5 -

the State to move on to a position from which it can bring stability to the

nation.

The aim of this study is to show that the problem lies in the state

system itself. The survey of the literature will also be carried out in the

study, to support this hypothesis. In other words the authority structure of

the state, as inherited from British India, provides the focal point for the

country's politics. While it is true that political parties, religious

movements, ethnic violence and legislative activity seems to dominate the

political scene, it is essentially to the structural dynamics of the state

that one must ascribe the primary responsibility for shaping the political

events after independence. There are a number of events in the history of

Pakistan that can only be understood when we view them by using the state as

our focal point. For this reason, in the framework of this study, the legal

and constitutional authority, occupies central stage, and the political actors

are seen as either trying to seek patronage from it or trying to limit its

legitimizing potential. This, it seems, is the best way to understand the

number of crisis that have befallen Pakistan.

To review the working of the system, the units of analysis will be the patterns of leadership from Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammad Ali Jinnah to

Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto, and the inputs that the affairs of the state provided

in shaping their ideas. In addition, we will look at the political parties

ranging from the Muslim League, the Awami League, Pakistan Peoples Party, to a variety of lesser parties which are either religious and regional, or urban

and rural. This will be done to see the impact that they had on the way the

system was shaped. Furthermore, we will see the institutional changes in the - 6 -

higher bureaucracy and the Judiciary, and the State's impact on these changes.

Finally, we will look at ideological syntheses which ranges from the "Two

Nation" theory to the program of Islamization under Zia-ul-Haq, and the impact

of the system in the development of these ideas.

The aim of this study, as stated above, is to present the origins and

then to discuss the development and locate the problems of the modern State of

Pakistan. The subject will be examined from two perspectives: first, we will

look at the State's development from colonial times as a structural

relationship between economic power and public authority; second, we will look

at the state as a focus of power between various groups and classes. Within

this framework, we shall try and find the evolution of the Pakistani State

from the times of British India, through the early post-independence period,

then to the rule of the Generals under Ayub and Yahya to Bhutto's populist government and the martial law and post martial law period of Zia's regime.

We will show that even if the faces changed the location of power within the

State system remained at the same place, mainly with the bureaucracy. At the same time we will show that when faces changed within the government, new class alignments also emerged as a result of industrial and agricultural development. These classes also had an impact not only on the different governments, but also on the power base of the bureaucracy, which kept on gaining more power as a result of the inter-class and inter-ethnic relations due to perceived transfer of resources from one class or ethnic group to another.

By using this approach we will show that the failure of Pakistan to develop an effective and durable political/constitutional arrangement can be - 7 -

attributed to the following five reasons. First, there is incompatibility between the concepts of authority which compete for dominance within the

system. Second, there is incongruity between the traditional and the modern demands of the state. Third, the political process has been accessible and responsive to certain groups and not to the masses, which has resulted in frustration and hostility. Fourth, there has been failure to evolve a political culture which would define the limits of political behavior and then lay down a framework in which political institutions would work. Finally, international events have conspired to frustrate developmental effects.^ In the following pages, the drama of Pakistani politics unfolds itself through different chapters, which are outlined below.

The first section of the first chapter will deal with the state in

British India. In the second section we will deal with the Pakistani movement. We will not describe the movement itself, as that has been done in a number of previous studies; however, we will show the role of the Indian state in the whole struggle for independence. It is a major premise that the then existing state had a great influence on the movement for an independent

Pakistan.

The second chapter, which will deal with the time period between 1947 and 1958, will examine the following. The first section will deal with the problems facing Pakistan, which included the issues relating to refugees, political parties, and leadership. The second section will deal with the reaction of the state which under all circumstances was determined to maintain

^Louis D. Hayes, Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), P. 2. - 8 -

the status quo. The second section will further attempt to illustrate how the state became more powerful and finally involved the army.

The third chapter will deal with the time period between 1958 and 1969.

In the first section we will deal with the issues and problems that led to the introduction of the first martial law in Pakistan, secondly, the goals of the martial law regime, and thirdly, the reaction of the political system to the perceived goals. The issues that need to be discussed are the inputs of the political system in examining the achievements of the martial law regime. The aim will be to show the relationship between the state and the events occurring during this particular period. The second section will deal with the economic policies of the regime and their results. Finally, the third section will deal with the events that led to the downfall of Ayub Khan’s regime. The aim of the study will remain unchanged i.e. to show the relationship between the state and the events of this period.

The fourth chapter will deal with the time period between 1969 and 1971.

In the first section we will discuss the workings of the martial law regime and will describe the first free and fair general elections in the history of

Pakistan. The second section will examine the events leading up to the

Pakistani Civil War and its catastrophic results. The aim again is to show the relationship between the actions of the state and the occurrence of these events. Finally, the third section will deal with the reasons why the first attempt to establish democracy failed.

The fifth chapter will deal with the time period between 1971 and 1977.

The first section will deal with the post-civil war Pakistan under Bhutto.

The second section will deal with the reforms of the PPP government. The - 9 -

third section will deal with the anti-Bhutto movement. Finally, the fourth

section will deal with the reasons why the second attempt to establish

democracy failed.

The sixth chapter will deal with the time period between 1977 and 1988.

The first section will deal with the issue of Bhutto's policy. The second

section will deal with the program of Islamization. Finally, the third

section will deal with the Quasi-Civilian regime.

The seventh chapter will deal with the first year of Bhutto's (Benazir)

government. The first section will deal with the movement towards the second

free elections in Pakistan. Finally, the second section will deal with the

first year of the PPP rule.

The concluding section will deal with the major problems that face

Pakistan. In the light of our understanding of the problems, that is tosay

the state system, we will attempt to devise a remedy which in thelong run can help Pakistan to achieve a stable political system. CHAPTER ONE : FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTAN

Introduction

The current chapter deals with an overview of the state system as it functioned in the time of British colonialism. In the first section we will look at the functions of the state, and how it projected itself onto the masses. Once having done this, we will describe in the second section, the muslim movement in relation to the state. The idea is that it was the state system that led to the creation of a Muslim movement, and also it was the system that led this movement from being social to one that demanded political independence. It will also be shown that as long as this movement remained a social organization it received the backing of the State. However, when it became a political organization then it lost that backing, and political independence became its logical objective.

The political state in India has been studied by a number of different authors in different time periods. From the survey of the literature a number of themes can be developed, however, these suffer from numerous constraints and handicaps.

The first approach that we want to look at is defined as the "elite approach".U This approach was developed right after the Second World War, and the authors that contributed to it stressed that the emergence of elite groups in the Indian society was the crucial ingredient for the organizing of an all encompassing nationalist struggle. This elite group wanted power in the society, and by staging mass demonstrations, by introducing charismatic leadership, by using ideology and organizations for political purposes, this

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 6. - 11 -

group was able to win this power. Later in the development of the movement this group was able to win independence for the masses.

While this approach looks interesting as a theory it is lacking for four reasons. Firstly, this approach portrays the idea that the leadership was presiding over a monolithic nationalism. In reality, however, each region in

India produced separate patterns of political behavior, and so they also produced different types of leaders. For this reason, all the leadership did not have all the backing. To suggest that the leadership was united, and that the masses were united behind them would amount to ignoring the differences that existed between different groups and classes.

Secondly, this approach suggests that all the political initiatives were in the hands of the elite groups, and that the masses just went along with the leadership without asking any questions. The whole approach undermines the role played by the masses of India in their struggle to win independence. The importance of the contribution by the masses in the struggle for independence can never be overstressed.

Thirdly, the elite approach does not take into account any political ideology. In this approach the "Two Nation Theory" has no role to play, even when the introduction of this theory turned the muslim movement from a social event to a political movement. It was the introduction of this theory that brought about the whole idea of Pakistan, and, therefore, it is very hard to consider Pakistan and not take into account the "Two Nation Theory".

Lastly, the elite approach does not take into account the function of the state in the whole affair. As stated earlier, the state as a unit of analysis is very important to the study of the political events in Pakistan. - 12 -

If one does not take into account the importance of the state then, at times, events do not make any sense at all.

In the 1960s this approach went through criticism, and new theories were developed. One new development was the study of the region using the regional approach. The idea was to study individual groups, their politics, their leaders so as to better understand the whole picture. However, the authors of this approach ended up by also studying the elites, with the result that the criticism was renewed. Nevertheless, studies done by David Washbrook on

Madras, Broomfield on Bengal, Ravinder Kumar on Maharashtra, and Pandey on

United Provinces,2/ still are worth reading as they at least try to explain the regions and their people.

Finally, parallel to the studies on regionalism were studies that looked at nationalism as a unit of analysis. This was done by over stressing the importance of nationalist leaders and organizations. Again the stress was on the elites. All acts or programs that the state converted into legislation were perceived as emerging as a result of the pressure put on the regime by the leaders. It is in this light that leaders such as Gandhi and Jinnah, and organizations such as the Indian Congress Party and the Muslim League have taken such important places in the minds and hearts of the people. While it is true that these were great men and great organizations, it is equally true that it was not the leaders and organizations that pulled all the strings, but that the state system had a lot to do with the way events unfolded.

As stated before, all these approaches have their shortcomings. With this background we propose that we look at the state as our focal point and

^Ibid., p. 8. - 13 -

consider regionalism, nationalism, and leadership from the viewpoint of the

state. It is also proposed that it is the state that determines the events,

all that the masses and the political leaders can do is to propose ideas.

SECTION ONE: THE STATE

The aim of the British government in India was to have a system by which

they could govern the colony in the most efficient manner. This would bring

about a stable government and a stable society, which are needed for a stable

economic and political growth. The aim was to invest as little as possible,

and to get out as much as possible. There is no doubt that the power of the

state increased, however, the corresponding economic and political growth

decreased as divisions between classes, sects, and institutions increased.

The British introduced a system of government which increased tensions rather

than decreasing them.

What we want to introduce in this section is the pre-colonial Indian

state. Secondly, we want to show the changes that the British brought about

in the state. Thirdly, we want to illustrate the results of these changes with the aim to show the result of colonialism on India.

Pre-Colonial Indian State

Before the arrival of the British, India was a feudalist society. The

Moghal Empire was built around this concept. While the state had unlimited power of action, it had no authority. The authority was with the local chieftain also known as Zamindar. The Zamindar was the collector of revenue; he was called to be the peacemaker when disputes resulted; and he was the - 14 -

person who waged war outside the empire when the central government called upon him to do so. A number of times the Zamindar would collect more revenue

then called for, and he got richer at the expense of the central government.

However, the central government looked the other way when this occurred as the

government needed the Zamindar more than the Zamindar needed the central government.

As a result of the feudalist society, the developmental, educational, and political processes occurred differently in different places. In the

Punjab where the land and the climate were good there developed a very advanced society, which began to dominate everyone else. On the other hand,

Bengal, with poor natural resources, did not develop at all till the British introduced modern technology.

In short, the political system in India prior to the advent of colonialism had the following five main features contributing to its instability. Firstly, the system had a localized power structure, in which the Zamindar enjoyed virtual sovereignty. The great Moghal India, in other words was the sum total of these sub-sovereignties. Secondly, the village unit was structured and maintained as a device by the people to survive the cycle of revenue extraction and political oppression by the urban-based political system. Thirdly, the towns in this setup acted as the consumption base of the local economy instead of the production base. The urban classes, as a result, became stronger than the rural classes, and therefore, while more benefits went into the towns less come out of them. "The prevalent revenue structure kept the rural economy subservient to the urban consumers' demand in a non-market basis, especially because the latter were generally the - 15 -

functionaries and retainers of the court."2/ Fourthly, this system kept the role of the traders severely constrained, primarily because of the role of the

Zamindar-based power structure. The Zamindar kept the system closed to the outsiders, and did not permit the traders within the system from expanding.

Lastly, because of the diverse nature of the system described above, there were no built in resources to maintain its security if attacked. The British realized these shortcomings, and took full advantage of the system.2/

Thus, the pre-colonial state in India lacked both in depth and in breadth. On the one hand, it had built more power than real authority and therefore had to resort to the use of force again and again, while its legitimacy remained dormant in the absence of elaborate legal machinery. On the other hand, it failed to penetrate into large areas under its nominal jurisdiction, and gradually abandoned them to Zamindars.2/

Colonial Indian State

Once the British began to take over the authority of the state they began to see the uneven location of resources. The British began their colonial expansion in India which lasted for almost two hundred years. It started from Bengal in the mid-18th century, and ended up in Punjab in the mid-19th century. In the process the British developed a fairly widely operative institutional set-up for administration of the colonial society.

2/Ibid, p. 20.

2/Ramsay Muir, The Making Of British India: 1756-1858 (Manchester: The University Press, 1915), pp. 1-17.

^Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1980), pp. 20-26. - 16 -

The aim of the British was to bring stability in the economic as well as the political spheres of India:

Thus, there were two significant position which defined the state's new role in British India: one as promoter, guarantor and protector of the expanding British capitalist interests in India; and the other as an organization relatively autonomous of their interests as well as of local economic and political forces, which at the same time tried to regulate their operations with increasing commitment.2/

The aim was to bring stability where there was none. The state, as far as the

British were concerned, was going to interfere in economic as well as political spheres of India.

Economic Sphere

The British economic policies in India can be divided into two phases.

The first phase was between 1757 to 1833. At this time the East Indian

Company had a monopoly on all trade. The second phase was between 1833 to

1922 when there was the policy of "Free Trade."

During the first phase the British devised policies which were designed to enhance a sense of security for the goods going from one place to another.

At this time the 'East India Company' standardized the currency of India so as to expand trade within and outside the country. Lastly, it was during this time that 'Agency Houses' were established to make sure that everything moved without any hinderance. These well known Agency Houses were established in the Presidencies of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.

As stated above, the British policies in the first phase were designed to enhance a measure of security for their goods. Given the differences

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 22. - 17 -

within the society, and also given the lack of law and order within the country, a policy of monopolization of the trade was adopted. The items that were affected by this policy were salt, betel-nuts, and tobacco, which were the very items that the Indian merchants used to trade to make a living before the arrival of the British. Starting from the time of Lord Robert Clive's rule upto 1833 the British used this method to promote their goods. Under the governship of Clive, the 60 shareholders of the company made huge amount of money. In the first year these shareholders invested 262,420 Pounds and earned a profit of 238,619 Pounds. This is to say that there was a 90 Pound profit on an investment of 100 Pounds. In the second year the investment was

260,000 Pounds and the profit was 199,875 Pounds. Over an extended period of time, the British became progressively rich at the cost of the native population. This monoplistic policy had the effect of rousing the conscience of a number of the members of the British Parliament, who started questioning its morality. In 1882, William Hunter, a member of the British Indian administration, told the British public that 40 million people of British

India lived without sufficient food. In 1882, E. Baring informed the parliament that the average income per head of the population in India was dismally low, being no more than Rs. 27 per year. In addition, in the same year, Dadabhai Nooroji calculated that the average annual income of a well to do Indian was only Rs. 20 and for a poor person it was far less.^

However, with the introduction of the landmark article by Adam Smith, and the lobbying done by Free Traders, the Parliament in London passed the

^Robert I Crane and N. Gerald Barrier, ed., British Imperial Policy in India and Sri Lanka 1858-1912: A Reassessment (Columbia: South Asian Books, 1981), pp. 1-16. - 18 -

famous "Free Trade Act" of 1833. It was followed by an organized flow of capital into India with the result that large financial institutions like banking and agency houses began to develop.

A very interesting after effect of this new policy was the introduction of new companies, who took control of the economic destiny of India. They began to build roads, canals, and railways, in the name of the people. These companies, which were Briish owned, had a profound effect on the Indian economy. Before the arrival of the British, India e.g. had no railways, and as a result all goods and materials required for their construction came from

England. These.imports were not paid by the exports, as is usually the case, but were financed by loans contracted with the British capitalists. The main reason was that the British did not want the exports to be channeled any other way except through the hands of the Government of India. What is interesting here is that the government did not pay the capitalists, and, India remained the debtor even when the transaction was between one group of Englishmen and another. As a result, it was the Indian people who lost the most.^ Another effect was the emergence of Indian commercial elites. To keep happy, this class and the new companies, the government followed a dual policy of imposition of tariff and duties on Indian exports, and a reduction of import duties on imports from England.

The result was a differential pattern of penetration of local society by capital on the one hand and the state on the other. For example, the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras commanded 75% to 80X of all Indian imports and exports, and nearly 70% of the total circulation of government currency

^Ibid. , pp. 16-22. - 19 -

notes.8/ The middle classes who saw their power declining united with the big landlord families of India to counter the urban interests. In all this the poor got the short end of the pole.

In other words, the state had became the promoter and helper of private enterprise. It began to enact laws which were designed for the preservation of private property over and above all other considerations like social, moral, and religious values. This type of policy was designed to promote stability, however, it gave rise to other retaliatory forces.

State Autonomy And Interventionism

As a result of this differential pattern of penetration, the official opinion largely favored state intervention as that promised to solve many of the continuing ills of the society. The First World War also brought home the fact that state intervention was needed to make Indian technology self- sufficient. This led to the establishment of an industrial policy which was committed to the promotion of self-sufficient industry on Indian soil. The

'Indian Fiscal Commission' (1921-22) recommended a policy of protection for selected industries and the establishment of boards to over-see them.

Finally, because of the strong currents of nationalism the state felt that it needed to follow an interventionist policy. This resulted in a huge out-flow of capital. Between 1931 and 1937 alone, Rs. 371 crores flew out of

India.12/ The flight of foreign capital in such huge quantities led to

2/M. A. Chaudhuri, Government And Politics In Pakistan (Dacca: Puthighar Ltd., 1968), pp. 1-8.

^Ibid. , p. 1-10. - 20 -

assumption of compensatory action in the public sector, which eventually set in a permanent tradition of government initiative in business and industry.

The above are two of the main reasons why the state began to intervene in the affairs of the local people. By doing this type of intervention the state gained power. This power can be seen in the administrative structure of the state.

Administrative Structure Of The State

The British India state was designed in such a manner that various structural components could and did influence the way policy was made at different levels. The state was also designed to function in terms of legality and to serve the interests of the mercantile colonialism. There was thus, a higher level of both structural differentiation and systematic integration between the ends and means of the new government via the rule of law.

The structural differentiation presented two very interesting problems.

Firstly, while the state was designed like a pyramid with power going downwards, the tensions between the classes, sects, and society were such that dissent would always occur at one level or another. The result was a constant dialogue between various areas of the government which gave the system the look of a personalized system.

Secondly, this differentiation presented problems between various institutions and officers of the government, which were both vertical and horizontal. For example, the higher officers did not like the way the lower officers did things without being asked or told. Furthermore, tensions existed between the provincial and central government. In the words of A. 0. - 21 -

Hume the Indian state was, "a great, cruel, blundering machine running on by its own weight...even the driver being incapable of directing its course."1^

So, what it came down to was that the government functioned on administrative wisdom gathered in years and generations, and on friendships or bribes. The elites got what they wanted while the poor were left to do what they could to live from day to day.

Rule Of Law

Let us now briefly mention the role of the "Rule Of Law." To begin with, when the state began to gain power in its own hands, it monopolized the dispensation of Justice and thereby robbed the local leadership of their dispute settling authority.

Because of the monopolization of justice, the state developed a fine system by which the country could be ruled. By the introduction of a uniform codified law in the country the state took it upon itself to extend the law.

A series of measures were taken like passing the "Specific Relief and Easement

Act" which permitted interference of the Civil Courts in the social and economic life of India in a form devised originally for 18th century English society.^ Now, the state was not going to sit around till a case came to it, instead it behaved like a plaintiff invoking the machinery of justice against public offenders.

This so called "Rule Of Law" contributed to self-legitimation and thus to assumption of an essentially autocentric attitude. It began to put all the

i^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 29.

^Ibid., p. 45. - 22 -

power in the hands of the bureaucracy. The law also defined the religious, caste, tribal and professional groups as permanent categories and thus created sociological anomalies. For example, the laws created separate provisions for

Muslim's and Hindu's. This type of law-giving could not but help contribute to Muslim separatism in the end.

Another example of the result of this power of the state is provided by the "Land Alienation Act" of 1900. By this act there emerged a dichotomy of urban-rural interests in the Punjab, which helped keep both the Muslim League and the Congress Party out of the Punjab politics till shortly before partition. All this helped the state first to revolutionize the existing relationships between tribal, ethnic, and religious groups, and then to solidify the new pattern by applying sanctions to those who violated it.^

In addition, we can say the following about the "Rule Of Law" and its impact on the British Indian state system. Firstly, it objectified the process of law making. Secondly, to bridge the gap between the "Rule Of Law" and the masses of India the role of lawyers became crucial. In time these lawyers affected the way the political activity was organized. Lastly, the core of the state, the bureaucracy, became a symbol of the "Rule Of Law" which defined the parameters of its links with individuals and groups in various localitiesIn order to impart a better understanding to the reader, it is necessary to describe the impact of the British System.

^Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics In Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 45.

^Ibid. , pp. 1-8. - 23 -

British India

The British system was designed, as pointed out above, in a way that would enable commerce to flourish and property of all types to be protected.

The main idea behind this was for the maximization of profits. It was the profits maximization policies that enabled the British Empire to function.

Without money the empire would not have lasted for as long as it did. While this policy did work to a degree, the impact of this was quite interesting.

In India, like all other parts of the empire, no survey was conducted which would have enabled the British to develop policies in line with the way the local system worked. In India, the system was largely structured by primordial loyalties of family, caste and village and was counter to the

British policy. The British did not care about the local set up to the degree in which they would have designed their own setup to be in line with the one in India. The British concern was profits, and the best way to achieve that was to bring their own system into India. The end result was a clash between the two systems. There is no doubt which system won. The British policy took the form of institutional penetration of the society by the state. Its most striking example is the land administration system, which can be divided into the "Permanent Settlement System", "The Kyotwari System", and the "Mahalwari

System". In a parallel process we see the management of agricultural development especially in the Punjab through expansion and administration of railways and irrigation canals, which radically changed the institutional framework of the agrarian society.^

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 30-33. - 24 -

The first experiment with land administration in India was with the

"Permanent Settlement System" of Bengal. THe aim of the policy was to give as

many people as possible un-used land. Percentage of the production revenue

would be given to the state and what is left would go to the owners. This in

other words, was a source of income for the state. However, the main problem

was the classification of the land, was it to be taxed or rented. If it was

tax then the local people would not have stood for it given the fact that they

already were paying high taxes. If it was rent, then the question was, why

was the state asking rent for land which it gave for free. Discussions began

on this question in and outside the government. When no right answer could be

found the whole policy was shelved. However, the land that was given could

not be taken back. This resulted in small farmers becoming overnight

landlords. This experience led to men, such as James Mill, to consider state

landlordism as a crucial factor in rural economy which had to be taxed.&

After a number of discussions, a new policy came about. Revenue, as

stated before, from land did not exist in India. However, given the over

night development of landlords, tax had to be levied on them. The new policy

now stated that all land belonged to the crown in the final analysis. The

development of the land and its protection required communication, which in

turn could only be established if the state had revenue. For this reason land

had to be taxed. Thus, from the late 18th to the late 19th centuries, the

state moved from a position of a passive spectator of the changing agrarian

relations to one of determining their general thrust. This new policy came to be known as the "Ryotwari System". The state's share of the revenue from the

^Ibid. - 25 -

land was fully safeguarded. Given the importance of revenue, the state could not just have the landlords give it its share. So, there developed a policy which called for a individual, who would be employed by the state, to collect the state's share. Therefore, in the ceded and conquered provinces, and later

Punjab, the "Mahalwari' (Village) 'System" was introduced under which either single individuals such as Taluqdars (fudual lords) or village brotherhoods were given responsibility for collection of revenue. This new system produced many problems for the British. Given the importance of Punjab in the British era and in Pakistan, we will look at Punjab as an example of what effect these policies had on India. ^

In Punjab the British rule produced two very negative results. The most important of the two results was the way the social structure was effected.

When Punjab was annexed the British found three different types of land rights prevalent in this province, namely, "Superior Proprietors", "Inferior

Proprietors", and "Occupancy Tenants". This system was abolished and under the "Land Revenue Act" of 1871 all land was brought under the protection of the state. The landless tenants did not have any rights in the new state, and only their duties were recognized in connection with their tenurial contracts and also whatever rights they earned in their capacity as lessers. "In other words, participation in the new state system, from whatever underprivileged position, was compulsory for survival in the new Indian society.

^Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle For Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi Press, 1987), pp. 17-40.

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 33. - 26 -

The second problem was the importance of the nature of land revenue.

The British policy on land, led to the introduction of a market in land which in turn effected a transfer of landed property form zamindars to moneylenders.

Land could now be sold for payment of debt. Credit was given protection by law, especially after the regular courts established in Punjab in 1874-75.

These courts, however, favored the relatively more articulate moneylenders against the illiterate peasants who needed cash to pay land revenue which remained outside their jurisdiction. In this manner, the rich got richer while the poor lost ground. This led to the "Deccan Riots" of 1835, which were designed to get the government to do something about the landlords and their moneylenders. The after effect of these riots was the introduction of the "Alienation of Land Act" of 1900, which was designed to prevent land from going to non-agriculturist classes. However, this law did not change the power base.-^

The aim of the British was stability, however, this policy was bringing instability. The legal and political policies of the Raj were therefore inherently contradictory in as much their aim of facilitating the penetration of capital run against the political requirements of keeping the agrarian relations intact. The British blamed the "middlemen" for creating these conditions. However, given the make up of the society, it was expected that this would be the outcome. The state in its part could not do anything, as if

^Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests And Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 32- 42. - 27 -

it did it could have gone counter to the reason for the state which was revenue .22/

Parallel to this, we see an ever-increasing process of resource input into various sectors of economy in Punjab which rendered economic and political initiatives in the hands of the state. All along we see a government which was busy in establishing "little republics" whose heads were the upper class, who had been given vast lands so that the state could have a stable support group. The main reason for this social organization of the

European type was to enable Punjab, among other provinces of British India, get in line with the way the rest of the world's agriculture system was set up. This way Punjab would be open to the world market. As a result, a large amount of capital began to come into Punjab, as in other parts of British

India, through various financial and administrative institutions. At the local level there emerged the local-dealer-cum-money-lender.

To cover the 'risk', money-lender bound the credit with his own choice of cash crops; the peasant, concerned with his family's subsistence and thus oriented more to security than to profit, was forced against his will to grow a crop commanded by his creditor, whose own dealings were then secured; this 'manipulated restriction' of peasantry from participating in a free market, despite being subsumed by it, gave it a subservient role vis-a- vis the world economy. 21/

This type of activity brought about in Punjab a new pattern of landholding which was based on cash economy, and high land prices. For the peasants to function meant large families which also increased the population of the

^Ibid.

21/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 39-40. - 28 -

province. While an acre cost Rs. 10 before colonization, now the price was almost Rs. 600. These observations point to the fact that the government initiative in canal irrigation and colonization of land in Punjab helped integrate its peasant society with the world economy at large, although at the wrong end of the spectrum.

As a result of this, the authority structure of the government was defined in line with the global perspective. Now, the people had to deal with the government directly which often could not do much given the fact of the highly powerful and complex bureaucratic machinery. The major problems that the people faced were with the irrigation water at the tail end of the canals; the overlapping authority of Irrigation and Revenue Departments; the retroactive legislation; the levying of huge fines if the percentage of profits were not given in time; and, sudden increases in the water charges.

In this manner the government had taken over the task of growth once and for all. In short, this shows the results of colonization in British India.

Overview

This in general terms was the state in India. The purpose was to unite the different people of India so that there would be an increase in economic and political stability. However, given the many differences that existed between the groups this could not be achieved. The state itself laid down the seeds, and also watered the seeds, that caused dissent, corruption, and every other evil that a society can produce.

The author is of the opinion that the major problem with this type of government was the importance that was placed on the bureaucracy. In every other political system, the parliament existed before the civil services were - 29 -

created. Once created the functions of these services was an instrument for carrying out the policies of the legislatures. In India the civil services were created before the parliament. This bureaucracy, as stated before, became so large that it became a hinderance to the very development that it was supposed to encourage. The legislative branch of government, if there was ever one, was designed to rubber stamp everything that the bureaucracy wanted.

When there was no legislative branch of government to look after the affairs of the different classes of people there developed a number of problems. One of the most important of these problem was the affairs of the

Muslims. This conflict taken to its limits produced such problems between people that the result was a separate state for the Muslims. Let us now turn and look at the Muslim problem.

SECTION TWO: THE MUSLIM PROBLEM

The Muslims first arrived in the Indian subcontinent in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries. Ever since then the Muslims had been a minority in

India. Nevertheless, the Muslims had ruled the subcontinent under the leadership of the Turks, Afghans, and the Persians. This rule ended when the

British began to make inroads in India in the eighteenth century.

The arrival of the British in the subcontinent and the loss of all power by the Muslims for the first time in centuries, had a profound effect on the minds of the Muslims. The Muslims for the first time saw the differences that existed between them and the Hindus. They also realized that they were a minority in India and for the first time they saw the evils of being ruled, - 30 -

rather then ruling. The Muslims also began to understand the distrust that existed between them and the Hindus. More importantly they saw for the first time that they were a nation within a nation.

There is no doubt that the tensions that existed between the Muslims and the Hindus were always there. However, during the time of the British they came out into the open. On the other hand, it is equally true that British involvement in Indiadid not affect the direction that the problem was taking, but the Indian statedid have an effect on this direction.

The survey of the literature on this subject has laid an unwarranted blame on the British. Authors such as Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, an authority on the subject, believes that the British policy of divide and rule had brought the subject of the division out in the open. The problems that may have existed before the British are treated as normal clashes that have, and always will, occur between two people. Other authors such as Khalid B. Sayeed, Dr.

M. A. Chaudhari, to name only two among many, have also come to the same conclusion.

While there might be some truth to this notion, it does not explain the whole problem. Tensions always existed, however, these tensions were taken to the limit from which the only road available was independence of one nation from the other. While it is true that the clashes prior to the British were not so violent, it is equally true that the clashes were social and economic.

Even while the British were in India these clashes were social and economic.

It was in the 1940s, after the approval of the Lahore Resolution by the Muslim

League, that the issue became political. So, the question is that why did it take two hundred years of British rule to convert a movement of economic and - 31 -

social uplift into one of political uplift? If the British are to blame then this should have occurred much before the time that it did. We believe that it was the state system introduced by the British that changed a movement of social and economic uplift, to became a political movement. As stated before, we do not want to describe the historical development of the movement, as that has been done by a number of good studies, but to show the movement in relation to the state. In other words we want to see the influence of the movement on the state, and vice-versa.

The Muslim Movement

The post 1857 period is the starting point from which the Muslims of

British India began to ask some of the questions we have outlined above. It was in 1857 that the Muslims tried to re-establish the Mughal Empire, and also tried to re-establish the grand authority of the empire. The effort failed, and thousands of people were killed.

Once the smoke rose, and reality began to dawn on the masses of India, it became clear that the Muslims had lost everything. The British on their part blamed the whole episode on the Muslims, even when it was known that a large number of Hindus were also involved for their own reasons. Anyhow, the fact was that the Muslims were blamed and were subjected to ruthless punishment and merciless vengeance. In every department of life where government patronage was essential, the doors were closed on the Muslims.

The Muslims were hounded out of employment and opportunities. The landed gentry was disinherited through large scale confiscations. Muslim education had been ruined through deliberate negligence on the part of the British. Persian had been ousted as the official language and replaced with English. The muslim qudis had lost employment when English law replaced muslim law. Every such subordinate - 32 -

government posts as were still open to Indians, and these were those that earned miserable salaries, went to the hindus.^

In other words, the Muslims had lost all hope of ever coming out of the hole that they had been left in. The whole Muslim culture was in danger of being wiped out. To counter this threat, Muslim leaders such as Syed Ahmad Khan began to preach that the muslims would not and could not get out of this position unless they began to educate themselves. Khan stated that western education, which had always been looked down upon by the Muslims, was needed if one was to understand and reason many of the problems facing the Muslims.

His crowning achievement in this sphere was the establishment in 1857, of the

"Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College" at Aligarh. This was probably the best institution of higher education that the subcontinent has produced.

The effect of Syed Ahmed Khan's teaching had begun to initiate the renaissance of the Muslims in India. Muslims were no longer going to sit around and wait for the gold plated cup to come to them, they were going to go and get it themselves.

The Partition Of Bengal

The first sign of the Muslim social uprise can be shown by the events of the partition of Bengal. The British in 1905 declared, under the leadership of Governor-General Lord Curzon, that the Bengal presidency was too large for one Governor to look after and, therefore, two provinces were to be created.

The scheme was sent to London in 1905, and the idea was sanctioned by the

Secretary of State for India, St. John Brodrick, in June. The proclamation of

^Ishtiaq Hasain Qureshi, The Struggle For Pakistan (Karachi: University Of Karachi Press, 1987), p. 18. - 33 -

the formation of the new province was issued in September. The two provinces of Bengal and Assam officially came into being on October 16, 1905.22/

While the Muslims did not have anything to do with the partition, it did show them that they could work with the British in gaining their rights. The

British on their part had realized the differences that did exist between the

Muslims and the Hindus, and for the government to work in the best manner possible, conditions had to be created for a harmonious life for all communities. For this reason the partition of Bengal was carried out. While the Muslims welcomed this helping hand of the British, the Hindus did not.2^

The Hindus on their part saw this act of the British as a device to create divisions between the Muslims and themselves, so that the British would always have the upper hand in the affairs of India.32/

The partition in other words had created a very interesting situation.

Firstly, the British had realized and approved the division between the

Muslims and the Hindus. The British had also realized that if the Indian government was to work well then divisions had to take place. The partition of Bengal made all this very legal. Secondly, the Muslims saw the division between the Hindus and themselves as a device for getting a larger say in the affairs that dealt with Muslims. The Muslims believed that the more out spoken they became about the division the better chance they would have in getting the upper hand in the affairs of the government. For this reason the

22/ibid. , pp 26-30.

2^S. M. Ikram, Muslim Civilization In India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 277-294.

^Ibid. , - 34 -

Muslim League was created in 1906. Lastly, the Hindus saw this move by the

British as a means to keep the Muslims and themselves divided, and fighting among themselves. This way the British would always have the upper hand in any situation.2^ This is the way things stood when the Khilafat Movement began.

The Khilafat Movement

The Khilafat Movement was the result of the British handling of the events during and after the First World War. The Muslims of India, and the rest of the world had been assured by the British, before the outbreak of war, that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, who was also the Caliph of Islam, would not be touched. However, once the Ottomans sided with the Germans in the war, the British called off all deals. The destruction of Germany, and the Ottoman

Empire, was the objective of the British and her allies. The Muslims of India sided with the British in the hope of saving the Caliph, and also winning a home for themselves. Nevertheless, the peace talks made it clear that the

Muslims of India were not going to get what they wanted.2/

The Muslims began a holy war against the British which ended when the

Muslims sent a Khilafat Deputation to London in 1920. The idea was to somehow obtain the help of the British in securing their demands. The British government gave them a cold shoulder. The result was that the Muslimsemerged from the movement with a feeling that they could not trust the British, and that they should look to their own strength for self-preservation.

2/Edward Mortimer, Faith And Power: The Politics Of Islam (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), pp. 191-200.

^Ibid. , - 35 -

The "Government Of India Act" 1919 and 1930

After the 1920, events in India began moving in a direction that would

lead to the Lahore Resolution of 1940. The Government in Britain announced

the reforms of 1919, which were designed to encourage the introduction of

limited self government in India. The official name of the act was the

"Government of India Act of 1919." This was revised after the results of the

Simon Report of May 1930.

Simon Report: Mav 1930

Under the "Reform Act of 1930", every province was to have full

responsible government. Provincial cabinets would not be formed entirely on

the British model, as the governors would choose the ministers who commanded a majority in the assemblies, and not merely appoint a Prime Minister who would then name the cabinet. The prime minister would be free from all control by the governor of the Central Government, expect in some stated matters like the safety of the provinces or the protection of minorities. As the ministers were to exercise greater authority, franchise was to be extended and provincial assemblies enlarged.^

At the center, the Federal Assembly would be elected by the provincial councils. The election and nomination of the Council of State would also be on a provincial basis. Each province was to have three members in the

Council.& No substantial change was recommended for the central executive.

The government would be fully official, without responsibility, without even

^Ibid. ,

^Pandav Nayak, ed., Pakistan: Society And Politics (Jaipur: University Of Rajasthan Press, 1984), pp. 13-22. - 36 -

dyarchy. A 'Council of Greater India' and the states would be set up to

discuss, in a consultative capacity, all matters of common concern to all

India. 22/

The Congress Party, which was founded in 1885, reacted to the reforms of

1930 by staging an "civil disobedience" movement under the leadership of

Mohandas K. Gandhi. The Muslims on the one hand denounced the Gandhi campaign

in no uncertain terms, and at the meeting of the "All India Muslim Conference"

at Bombay in April 1930, Mohammed Ali bluntly said that while Muslims were

opposed to British domination, they were equally opposed to Hindu domination.

On the other hand the Muslims as far as the Simon Report was concerned, stated

that they were willing to talk about it. All these moves and counter moves by

everyone resulted in the "The Government Of India Act 1935."21/

The Government Of India Act 1935

The most important feature of the Act was that, for the first time it

made the provinces separate legal entities. Three lists of subjects were

drawn up: the Federal List; the Provincial List; and the Concurrent List. The

division of financial resources was designed to strengthen independence. Sind was separated from Bombay and given the status of a separate province. The

North West Frontier Province was invested with full provincial powers.

Provincial franchise was enlarged by lowering property qualifications.^

22/Ibid. ,

21/Ibid. ,

^Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society: Islam. Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp 3-22. - 37 -

From the looks of these acts India was going to get a limited self

government. The division of powers, the independence of the provinces, were

all designed with due respect to the divisions that did exist in India.

The Election Of 1934 and 1937

The general elections were held in 1934. The result was that the

Congress won 44 seats and the League won none. It was clear that the Congress

was going to play a part in any central government. The elections of the

provincial governments were held in 1937. The results were that in all

provinces that were to became Pakistan, the congress won more seats than the

league. In Bengal the Congress won 54 seats, while the League won 40. In

Punjab the Congress won 18, and the League won 2. In Sind the Congress won 8

seats, while the League won none.22/ It was also clear from the provincial

election results that the Congress Party was going to play a big role in the

provincial governments.

Given the general feeling between the two peoples, and also the election

results, the Muslim League began to feel that the way things stood at that

point, they were not going to get anywhere. Something had to be done to show

the British and the Hindus that the League was the voice of the Muslims. It

is clear from the results that the Muslims in the Majority Provinces had not been influenced by the programs of the League, and so they were unsure of what

the League could or could not do. The leadership of the League, which came

from the United Provinces, which was not part of the majority provinces, had not done its job. More had to be done.

^Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Struggle For Pakistan (Karachi: The University Of Karachi Press, 1987), pp. 80-85. - 38 -

The Muslim League Enters The Majority Provinces

If we look at the conditions of the majority provinces we see a very

interesting picture. While 60% of the Muslims lived in the rural sectors in

Punjab, 75% of the Hindus lived in the cities. In this situation the

legislation against money-lenders prompted the Hindu community to accuse the

government of making common cause with the Muslims in order to weaken them.

The "Land Alienation Act" of 1900 was considered by the Hindus to be an act of

partiality towards the rival Muslim community, thereby sowing the seeds of

discord between the two communities. Then in education and government jobs

there was inter-communal disaffection. By the late 19th century, the Muslims

in Punjab constituted 56% of the population of the province, but their share

in English Arts colleges and English secondary schools was only 18% and 33%

respectively. Between 1902 and 1921 the average proportion of Punjab Muslims

among the educated stood at about 44%. This was reflected in the job market

where they only had 33% of all government jobs.24/

The Muslim League entered the majority provinces in two phases: first,

it sought an understanding with the local political forces, especially the

Unionist Party in Punjab, Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, and, unexpectedly,

Congress in Sind; secondly, it launched a movement for mass mobilization,

undercutting the respective popular parties in the provinces. The second

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 66-77. - 39 -

phase was carried out in the name of Islam, and the charismatic leadership of

Muhammad Ali Jinnah.25/

Under Jinnah the Muslim League became a new type of party, with one foot

in the country side, and the other in the cities. In this way the League was

converted from a aristocratic club into a mass organization. Once the League was turned into an all India party, Jinnah used such extra-constitutional methods of creating political pressures as direct action, in a desperate bid

to have a platform of his own to counter the one created by the British and

the Congress Party. This won a lot of important people in the majority provinces. Then came the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Independence was achieved in 1947 and as a result the State of Pakistan was established on

August 14, 1947.

Overview

In conclusion, we can observe the following. First, the pre-colonial system was a localized system. Second, once the British came into India they transformed this localized system into a state represented by capital, which in turn was represented by market forces. Third, because of the different type of political involvement in India, the state had no choice but to centralize the power base into its own hands. The "Rule of Law" was such a method. Thus, while the state apparatus enjoyed a relatively high institutional level, the non-bureaucratic organizations, especially the political parties, remained weak and underdeveloped. Finally, the Pakistan movement was a reaction to the inability of the state to help the Muslims

^Lawrence Ziring et al. ed., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 40-69. - 40 -

achieve something in a system which was dominated by the Hindus and the

British. By using political ideology in the form of "Two-Nation Theory", and the charismatic leadership of Jinnah, the Muslim League was able to convince the Muslims, as well as the British and the Hindus, that the only way out was to give the Muslims a homeland. So, on August 14, 1947 the state of Pakistan came into being. CHAPTER TWO : THE BEGINNING AND END OF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM (1947 - 1958)

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan was created on August 14 1947. The aim of the founding father,

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was to establish a state in which the ideology of the state would be Islam, however, the government of the state would be based on secular ideas. This was done to align the two groups, namely the religious leaders and the secular leaders, on the side of the Muslim League, whose aim was to establish a homeland for the Muslims. The Lahore Resolution of March

1940, also stated in its aims, that the religion of Pakistan would be Islam, and the government would be secular. The transformation from the idea to the actual functioning of the state was the real test that the leaders of Pakistan faced.

In the first eleven years of the history of Pakistan, the leaders of the country faced these very issues. If the issues and problems that Pakistan faced had been tackled with real resolve, then Pakistan may have been in a better position to establish a stable political system.

Nevertheless, the problems of state-craft were never solved. In relation to the state system, which is the theme of this study, the problem can be seen from the following position. On the one hand stood the all powerful state, and on the other the politicians, who had their own ideas about the type of political system they wanted. Given the political forces that existed in Pakistan, also given the social and economic forces at the time of independence, the achievement of the aims of the politicians was not going to be an easy task. On the other hand the aim of the state was to lay claim to the overall politics of Pakistan. So in sum, the game which was - 42 -

going to be played was to be between the state and the politicians. The winner was going to be the master of the political future of Pakistan.

In this light, the story that unfolds is a very interesting one. Before we move on, a word is in order about Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah was first and last a politician. The way he out-flanked everyone when fighting for independence, is enough reason to reach that conclusion. However, Jinnah's role in the political history of Pakistan is very absorbing. Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, is never shown in a bad light in any book written in Pakistan. Anyhow, his involvement in the political system of Pakistan shows us that the man, who loved democracy, in the end sided with the state after independence. As the first governor-general of Pakistan, Jinnah put himself in such a position that all constitutional and un-constitutional powers rested with him. In other words he became king if not in fact, then in deeds.

Now to move on with the story. As stated before, the game was to be played between the state and the political system. Starting from Muhammad Ali

Jinnah down to Iskander Mirza, the politicians were out-flanked by the state system. The idea of an all powerful state appealed to these men rather than the idea of democracy. The problems facing Pakistan were seen as unresolvable unless there was a strong and powerful state. Everyone of these men was weak, as he could not challenge the system. For this reason the state system won the day at the end. What followed was the Martial Law, which further increased the power of the state.

In the first section of this chapter we want to look at the problems that were facing Pakistan. The objective is to show the relationship between - 43 -

the problems and the increase power of the state. In.section two we want to look at the working of the state after independence. Again, the aim is to show the relationship between the dynamics of the system and the concept of a powerful state.

SECTION ONE : PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS

The Pakistan of 1947 was a country bare in resources and scarce in human skills. Pakistan was also a country where national ties were extremely frail, and where the small-scale social and economic units remained the foci of orientation. Added to the above were the problems of refugees; illiteracy; the rather rudimentary transportation and communication systems; and the lack of trained personnel. Each one of these problems was given equal weight, however, not all were dealt with in the same manner. The least examined, then and now, has been the problem of the refugees, who poured into Pakistan in their millions after partition. In recent times Shahid Javed Burki has looked at the problem of the refugees in the context of constitutional, economic, and administrative development of the country. According to Burki the different cultures of the refugees on the one hand and the locals on the other, had dire consequences for the future shape of events in Pakistan. Let us examine this issue.

Refugees From India

Before we examine the state vs. the refugees, let us look at the percentages of refugees that came into Pakistan. In Punjab, about 98X of the refugees came from East Punjab. Only 2X came from the United Provinces. The - 44 -

impact was not so large in Punjab given that the people who came had been shaped by the same broad social and administrative traditions, which the locals had experienced during the hundred years preceding independence. The same was true about the bulk of refugees who came to East Bengal from West

Bengal, thus sharing the broad features of political tradition. In Sind, however, we see that 27% of the refugees came from the United Provinces.

Their ratio was 13 times higher than in Punjab. This meant that the United

Provinces refugees' impact on the political, economic and cultural life of

Sind was bound to be substantial and almost a dozen times stronger in its influence than in Punjab. While Sind was to experience the most violent clash between cultures, all the other provinces also went through this transformation. These changes also had an impact on the state.^

State Vs. Refugees

It will be argued that the large influx of refugees not only contributed to a significant change in the demographic balance between the rural and urban sectors, but also strengthened bureaucratic hold over the society. The refugees that came into Pakistan settled in towns of Punjab and Sind. This group became the support base for the Muslim League, which was trying to build the country. The refugees were merely 10% of the total population of united

Pakistan, while they claimed almost 60% of seats in the recruitment for the highest stratum of the central services of Pakistan. Now, if elections were

i/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 110. - 45 -

held in the country then that would have meant the exit of not only the Muslim

League, but also the refugees from the political scene of Pakistan.2^

For the well being of the refugees, the government of Pakistan went out of its way to be responsive to the issue of their rehabilitation in moral and material terms. One of the first acts of the government was to form, in association with Punjab, "The Pakistan Punjab Refugee Council." The Central

Government gave grants of Rs 12.5 million to Punjab government, and also extended development loans worth Rs 80 million for the purpose of rehabilitation. In addition, 44 satellite towns were built in West Pakistan accommodating 80,000 refugee families. A new "Rehabilitation Tax" was set up, and various credit agencies were opened to help the refugees start business and build houses for themselves

This extension of financial help to the refugees by the central government was repaid by the refugees in their role in the affairs of the government. For example, the refugees' hatred for India provided a support base for the anti-Indian stance of the government's foreign and defence policies. Secondly, because they were a majority in the cities, they provided and wielded extra weight in public opinion. Lastly, their sense of rootlessness made them even more dependent on the ideological resources of the new country.^

2/Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics In Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 24-28.

^Stanley A Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 22-43.

^Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, New Direction (London: Quartet Books Limited, 1977), pp. 17-30. - 46 -

Because of this wide power that they had, the refugees considered that

they could not hold elections as they would lose all this power that they had.

The factional quibbling among landlords, and the movements for provincial

autonomy in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), East Bengal, Baluchistan

and Sind, were conditions that allowed the powerholders to call off elections

over and over again.^

These conditions that were cited by the powerholders were made by them

in the first place. When power is held by only 10Z of the population of a

country, conditions are going to be created by which the other 90X of the

population wants a part of the action. The Land Policies, the Business

Policies, the Water Policies were all developed and encouraged by the state to help the people who really did not need any help. As a result the state

gained more power. At this time the government was more concerned about

illusions of stability, and less on actual stability. This the refugees made

sure would happen. Let us now turn to the second major problem facing the

country.

Political Parties Vs. The State

The role of the parties is quite evident in a stable democratic system as it is the parties that provide the linkage between the masses and the

government. While parties did exist in Pakistan after independence, the most

important being the Muslim League, they never provided the linkage that was needed between the masses and the government. In this regard, one cannot blame the parties for not providing the linkage. The sole blame had to be attributed to the political system of Pakistan. For this reason, we will look

5/ibid. , - 47 -

at the parties from the point of view of the state system to show why the

parties failed to provide the badly needed linkage between the masses and the

government. As an example we will look at the Muslim League.

Political parties in the third world, as a distinct category, have been discussed by a number of writers, the most important among them being Hodgkin,

Huntington, and Lucian Pye. The analysis by these authors point out that, in

the third world, parties are either created within the parliament or outside

it. The point of creation is very important as the parties created outside

the political system have a better chance of providing linkage than the parties from within the system. The central reason is that parties within the system are created for the benefit of an individual or groups of individuals within the system. On the other hand, parties created outside the system are a result of the masses wanting things done on their behalf in the government.

In post-independence Pakistan the pattern that one sees shows us the emergence of internally created parties. In addition, the parties that were formed were usually based on provincial viewpoints. Soon after Jinnah's death, the Muslim

League divided into many splinter groups, usually clustered around a single personalities. By 1949, the ex-Muslim Leaguers had formed 9 out of 13 parties

Once the League began to divide, the result was that the organizational hold over party members was lost. Even if the party recommended a specific policy measure, it fell on deaf ears.

For example, when the Agrarian Reforms Committee of the Muslim League recommended abolition of hereditary jagirs and various

^Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups And Development: Business And Politics In Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 191-218. - 48 -

cesses, property rights for the occupancy tenants, provision of security of tenure and replacement of share-cropping by cash rental, the provincial and central working committees of the Muslim League as well as its provincial and central governments shelved these proposals on various excuses, in the end abandoning them altogether.1J

In addition, the continuous postponement of general elections in Pakistan

rendered the use of party cadres more and more irrelevant, because their

ideological and organizational skills were not needed outside the electoral

framework of politics.

In the absence of inner organizational strength of political parties,

the government could, and did, use them to further its own ends. For example,

the government threatened the members of the National Assembly by cutting

their bus-route permits because Khan Sahib was not being permitted to be the

leader of the House. The government wanted him to be the leader for its own

ends. Once this threat came forth, a number of members of the Muslim League

joined the Republican Party of Khan Sahib, so that the Khan could become the

leader .2/

While the Muslim League was loosing power along sectoral, regional, and

factional lines, other parties sprang up from within the Constituent Assembly

and the provincial assemblies. Most of the parties were geared around ex-

Leaguers such as Nawab Mamdot from Punjab, Suhrawardy from East Bengal, and

Pir Manki Sharif from N.W.F.P. The inter differences between the parties and

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989). p. 120.

^Ibid., 120-126. - 49 -

within the parties made them quite weak, and as the state had used the Muslim

League for its own benefit, it began to use other parties in the same manner.

If we look at the political map of Pakistan in this early stage, we see

that the marginalization of its urban wing accelerated the pace of disintegration of not only the Muslim League but also all other parties. The

fact that most parties were born and re-born within the confines of the

legislature kept them nervous about public response when elections were held.

Because of this, the parties played a second fiddle to the state which was permanently present in the field. As time went on, the parties began to leave the system altogether .8/

From the above it is clear, that in the early part of the political history of Pakistan the parties nevet gained enough strength to challenge the system. This was not only due to the parties themselves, but also due to the state system which had an attitude of intolerance towards the existence of any public organization outside itself. While the parties had no banners to raise, because of no elections, the state system used its own strength to get rid of the parties.

Politicians Vs. The State

The politicians that we want to look at are Muhammad Ali Jinnah and

Liaquat Ali Khan. In addition the overall role of the elites will also be descibred herein. These two individuals were the two men who influenced the political climate of Pakistan to the. extent that their actions influenced the course of future events. The power balance in the country was such that events could either go towards state stability or political stability. The

2/Ibid. - 50 -

role of these two Individuals, and the elites contributed to the events unfolding towards state stability.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

There is no doubt in anyone's mind in Pakistan, that Muhammad Ali Jinnah

is the greatest political mind produced by Pakistan. Under the leadership of

Jinnah the Muslims of India established the Muslim League. It was under his

leadership that the Muslims realized that theyr>too were a great people. It was because of Jinnah’s leadership that the Muslims had a say in the political system of India. Finally, it was because of Jinnah that the Muslims achieved

Pakistan. Only a great leader could have done,all this. However, the situation in Pakistan called for him to rise to the occasion, and establish a stable political system, which he did not. What Jinnah did was to create a situation in which only 10% of the population held the power in Pakistan.

With a few necessary adaptations, the "Indian Independence Act" of 1947, and the "Government of India Act" of 1935 wereadopted as the interim constitution of Pakistan. Under this act the governor-general's position was analogous to the position of the King in relation to the cabinet in Britain.

In other words, the governor-general was a figure head. In addition, the governor-general had under him a "Council of Ministers" which was constituted to aid and advise him in the exercise of his functions.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah on the other hand did not quite see the functions of the governor-general in the same light as the interim constitution. Given all the problems that did exist in the country in.1947, Jinnah believed he had no choice but to take on himself all the powers tjbet he could. No one was going to question him, given the position that he held in the eyes of the people. - 51 -

Jinnah selected the prime minister, when under the interim constitution the parliament was suppose to do this. Jinnah also selected: the members of the cabinet and distributed portfolios among them, when under the interim constitution only the prime minister could do that. The first Prime Minister

Liaquat Ali Khan had no say in the selection of his government. Jinnah not only created the cabinet, but also formulated the policies of the cabinet. He presided over all the meetings whenever the prime minister was not in the capital. The Ministries of States and Frontier Regions and of Evacuee and

Refugee Rehabilitation were created by him and were under his direct control.

Karachi was separated from Sind on his advice. Finally, the selection of Urdu as the official language of Pakistan was on his advice.12/ In other words,

Jinnah was the real leader of the government, until his death in 1948. We can even say that Jinnah was the government of Pakistan. In this situation, with

Jinnah overshadowing everyone, the normal conventions of the cabinet and of the government had no chance to develop. The cabinet never governed under

Jinnah. Every act or bill was never seen either by the cabinet or the parliament. The path of every act or bill was between th£ governor-general and the minister which was to take care of the matter, rln other words, the bureaucracy governed with the advice and consent of the;;governor-general of

Pakistan.il/ Muhammad Ali Jinnah passed away on September 11, 1948, thirteen months after the creation of Pakistan.

12/Ibid. ,

H/Ibid. , - 52 -

Llaouat All Khan

Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a strong personality, as compared to Liaquat Ali

Khan who was relatively weak. Liaquat was a skillful parliamentarian. Once

Jinnah had passed away, the chances of Liaquat taking the country on a path, where political institutions could develop, were quite good.

The new Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin did not believe that the governor-general was anything other than the constitutional head of the state.

More importantly , Khwaja was from East Pakistan. The problems of East

Pakistan Vs. West Pakistan had not really taken shape, however for the sake of unity the events had brought about a situation by which the two top posts of the country were held by those who represented all walks of life of the country.&

Besides these special qualifications of a parliamentarian, Liaquat had a firm control over the legislature. He worked as an effective Prime Minister.

Liaquat had a special share in the making of the foreign policy of the country. The major outlines of policies were discussed in the cabinet. He also sometimes took decisions without ever consulting his colleagues in the cabinet, and was able to maintain them in the cabinet and the legislature. He suspended the Mamdot Ministry in the Punjab in 1949 on his own initiative.^

From the above we can see that the separation of powers which were called for in the interim constitution were followed by the top two leaders of the country. So, in theory the political institutions should have worked as

^Lawrence Ziring et al, ed., Pakistan: The Lone View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 243-252.

^Ibid. , - 53 -

they should under a stable political system. However, reality was different

than theory. In spite of all the advantages, Liaquat was not able to build up

an effective political system in Pakistan. The rivalry between the Punjabi

and bengali politicians, though not powerful yet, manifested itself during

this time. Liaquat was not powerful enough to settle it. On the other hand,

Liaquat had to depend on the provincial support to sustain his government at

the center, and to enlist the support of the provincial governments for its

successful working. He compromised with Ayub Khuro, against whom "Public and

Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act" of 1949 proceedings were

stopped on technical grounds and not because of failure to establish the

charges. He alienated the Khan of Mamdot in the Punjab first by suspending

him, and later by campaigning for the victory of M. M. Daulatana in the Punjab

provincial elections of 1951. Finally, Liaquat compromised with the Nurul

Amin Ministry in East Bengal.-^ On October 16, 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan was

assassinated.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were the two men who set in

motion a precedent for the future. Under the leadership of these two men was

born the problem which would haunt Pakistan for the next forty-two years.

While one was too strong the other was too weak. While one wanted all the power, the other wanted to share power. Neither of the two really saw the middle of the road. While it is true that the problems of the 1940's and

1950's are different than the problems of the 1980's, it is equally true that

the cype leadership that the first two leaders gave Pakistan set in motion

the type of leadership that would came later down the road. When the problems

12/Ibid. , - 54 -

could have been solved the quality of leadership was very weak. As time went on the difference between leadership and problems became so wide that these were beyond the reach of any type of leadership, which finally, leads us to the elites of Pakistan.

The Pakistani Elite Group

According to the "Group" concept developed by Arthur F. Bentley, David

B. Truman, Eral Latham, among others, to locate the real source of power one has to go beyond the formal institutions. In addition, this concept states that the group that holds economic power also wields political power, as political and economic power generally tend to be co-terminous. In the case of Pakistan, the two groups that wielded the most economic power were the landlords and the business groups. As a result, political power also came to be concentrated in these two groups. As a result of this the political map of

Pakistan was bound to be dominated by these two groups, and which it was.^

In British India there had been a large concentration of landownership in a few hands. For example, in Punjab more than one-fifth of the cultivable land was owned by about one-half of one percent of the owners. In Sind thirty percent of the total occupied area was in the hands of a bare one percent of the total occupants. In the North Western Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) 0.1 percent owners were in possession of nearly one-eighth of the total area. So, in independent Pakistan about 0.1 percent of the total land-owners owned land to the extent of five hundred acres or more. This group wielded vast economic

^Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests And Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 51- 52. - 55 -

power. Once independence was achieved this group also wielded political power .^2/

In the provincial elections of 1951, in Punjab, about 80 percent of the members elected were from the landed class. In the Sind elections of 1953 about 90 percent of the members of the Sind Assembly came from large landowning families. In the provincial elections in N.W.F.P. of 1951 the landed classes had a majority in the House. Out of a total of 40 members from

West Pakistan in the second Constituent Assembly, the landlord group comprised of 28 members. The effect of this was the direction of some of the policies, adopted in line with the wishes of the landed classes, who wielded more and more power. As an example let us look at the land policies.^

In 1949 the "Muslim League Agrarian Reforms Committee", with Mian Mumtaz

Oaulatana as chairman, worked out the future land policies of the Government of Pakistan. The ceiling was fixed at 150 acres of irrigated land and 300 acres of non-irrigated lands, although it provided that adequate compensation would be paid to the Zamindars for acquiring their estates. However, in 1951,

Punjab election manifesto of the Muslim League, watered down the agrarian reform proposal by the Central Committee of the League. In addition, the

Punjab Legislative Assembly in the same year further watered down the reform.

In reaction, Daulatana stated that the assembly was giving new life to the landlords by passing such laws. With all the watering down that was going on, the landed classes still reacted to these measures of the League as well as of

i2/lbid.

i^M.A. Chaudhuri, Government And Politics In Pakistan (Dacca: Puthighar Ltd., 1968), pp. 253-274. - 56 -

the Punjab Assembly. The leader of the anti-reform movement, Syed Naubahar,

declared that like his cap his land belonged to him and no one was going to

take it away from him, including the Punjab Assembly. After a number of

sessions of the assembly the final proposal was produced and was passed in the

assembly

The final act kept the proportionate share of the landlords and tenants

in the produce of the land at 40:60, but the amount of land that could be kept

as personal possession was raised to 50 acres of irrigated and 100 acres of

non-irrigated land. Under the law each landlord was to declare which areas he

wanted to keep for his own use. However, the date of this declaration was

deferred again and again till everyone forgot about it. It was the landed

class that kept the date from being declared. Anyhow, no measures were taken

in any of the Provincial Assemblies nor the General Assembly, which would

break up the large land holdings of the landed c l a s s e s . ^ /

The landlords' role in politics was not only limited to mere

preservation of their land. For example, the West Pakistan one-unit

controversy was more the result of the desire of the landlords to retain their

dominance in politics then any major disagreement among the people of

Pakistan. The One-Unit controversy was the combined result of the bureaucratic and feudal mechanizations. Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, and

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali in alliance with some of the Punjabi and Sindhi

^Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests And Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 45- 47.

J2/Ibid. - 57 -

landlords forced the Unit into being. But when the landlords from the smaller provinces found that this would mean that power would reside with the big

Punjabi landlords, they turned against the measure. The Sindhi landlords M.

A. Khuhro, Mir Ghulam Fazlullah, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, G. M. Syed, the Pir of

Pagaro, and Makhdoom Sahib of Kala founded the anti-One-Unit Front to contest the general elections. It was also for these reasons, that landlords like

Bughti in Buluchistan and the Nawab of Hoti and Jaffar Shah in N.W.F.P. became hostile to the idea of One-Unit and the One-Unit became a pawn on the chessboard of power politics between the l a n d l o r d s .22/

At the time of independence Pakistan had only a few industries and about half of those were controlled by the Hindus, the government, or by the foreigners. The contribution of industry to the total national income was about one percent in 1947. For this reason, the Government of Pakistan from the start offered various concessions to persons who were willing to set up new industries. The government acquired land, through the "Land Acquisition

Act," at prices far below market rate and gave them to persons who were going to set up industries. In addition, the government gave tax concessions to new industrialists. Furthermore, the industrialists were guaranteed profits, as imports offered little competition, domestic production was inadequate and those who wanted to import machinery were subsidized by undervalued foreign exchange. In number of industries one could find one hundred percent profit.

Because of the above reasons a new group of powerholders came into being. By

1956 these Businessmen were powerful enough to influence government policies, and at times bring about the fall of a cabinet unresponsive to their

22/ibid., pp. 43-48. - 58 -

pressure. As a result of this growth, various trade and commerce associations developed, and by 1958, their number totaled 250. The most powerful of these association was the "Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries" with its head office at Karachi. This federation represented the whole of the business interests of West Pakistan which controlled 96 percent of Muslim owned private industries, and its managing committee became the most powerful pressure group in the Capital.21/

While both the Eastern and Western Wings of Pakistan had a fair share of industrialists, it was the Western Wing industrialists who got a large share of the foreign exchange earned through exports. This is even more amazing when one sees that East Pakistan's jute export earned almost 80X of Pakistan's foreign exchange. As a result, the commerce and trade organizations of East

Pakistan demanded parity in the allocation of foreign exchange and in export and import licenses. This demand was not heard until H. S. Suhrawardy became prime minister. When Suhrawardy's government did try to change the parity between the two wings he had to give up and resign under great pressure from the "Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries" and President Iskander

Mirza.S/

The I. I. Chundrigar's government (October 18 - December 15, 1957) quickly surrendered to the business interests by cancelling the import licenses and the "Shipping Corporation Plan." Malik Feroz Khan Noon's

^Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups And Development: Business And Politics In Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 87-104.

^Talukder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests And Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 48- 51. - 59 -

coalition government (December 16, 1957 - October 7, 1958) was also under pressure from the business groups. In spite of opposition from the landed interests, the Noon Cabinet, on February 20 1958, lifted price control on all commodities except food stuffs, cement, iron and steel, newsprint and mechanically propelled vehicles. When the prices went up, the Noon Cabinet under pressure from the public tried to change the policy but could not. "The

Pakistan Times" in an editorial summed up the situation:

The great influence that the captains of trade and industry enjoyed in the ruling circle of the day left little hope that they would ever be forced to show some consideration for larger national interests. The economy had been brought to the verge of ruin, and under the oppressive burden of high prices the common man could hardly breathe. His misery was intensified by the absence of any hope of relief in the near future.2^

From the above, it is clear that the economically powerful landlords and business groups of West Pakistan had a dominating influence in the Pakistani politics. As a result of this influence these groups wanted a systemin which they could get the most by investing in the least. The system that could do this was the one in existence in Pakistan at the time of independence. And so, Pakistan's longing for a stable political system was not in the cards because the powerful elites did not want it to be there.

SECTION TWO : THE STATE

In the first section we talked about the problems that were facing

Pakistan. In this section, we want to see the reaction of the state to these problems. By doing this we will show that the state by gaining strength

^Ibid. , pp. 51-52. - 60 -

reached a point in 1958, when the situation required the state to turn to an organization which would be in a better shape to handle its affairs. While the state was becoming stronger, the organization that it was using to further its ends was becoming weaker, and so leaks were developing within the system which were causing the state quite a number of problems. So, to counter this situation the state took it upon itself to call in an organization which would help the state to be more effective. This organization was the army of

Pakistan.

Constitutional Issues

The leadership of Pakistan was, as pointed out above, quite weak. The state's first dealings with this organization were in the domain of the constitution. The most interesting debate revolved around the role of Islam in the new state. The modernist lobby, which had under its banner every freedom loving politician, argued for bringing the Shariat Law in conformity with legal and moral codes of the contemporary world and did not insist on reproducing the medieval Islamic laws. The Islamic lobby, which had splinters of the Muslim League, and the newly formed Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam behind it, called for an Islamic Constitution.

Both sides pressed the newly formed Constituent Assembly to adopt their view all the way. However, the "Objectives Resolution" of March 2, 1949, and the "Basic Principles Committee" shows us that while the Assembly had able men in it, it could not work out sound and direct laws. Like all other policies, this was a watered down report which was designed to placate everyone, however it pleased no one. The 1956 Constitution stated that no law should be adopted which is not in line with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy - 61 -

Quran. Nevertheless, this law was both secular and Islamic, designed to please every one.2^

Other issues related to such dichotomous positions as federal vs. unitary system for Pakistan; inter-wing parity; presidential vs. parliamentary system; joint vs. separate electorates; and finally, the center vs. provinces.

From the looks of the 1956 Constitution the political system did not commit itself on any of these issues. For example, let us look at the Center vs. provinces issue.

The 1956 Constitution did not commit on this issue, however it provided for the parliament to ascertain the views of the provincial assemblies, and then also stated that an act had to be passed which would state whether the elections of the National Assembly and provincial assembly be held on joint or separate electorate. This issue was again a watered down compromise.

...the bureaucracy managed to co-opt what its British predecessors would have called 'constitution-wallas' along the margins of the state system of Pakistan, even while they were institutionally placed at the center of it in the form of the Constituent Assembly.2^

This political mis-management presented the legitimacy crisis of 1954. Let us turn to this crisis.

Legitimacy Crisis

The crisis occurred on October 27, 1954. At this time the Governor-

General Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly, because this

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 128-132.

^Ibid. , p. 172. - 62 -

Assembly had tried to amend Section 10 of the Indian Act, as amended in 1947,

which had empowered the governor-general to dismiss a prime minister, even

while he enjoyed the confidence of the Assembly. The dissolution of the

Assembly by Ghulam Mohammad amounted to a civilian coup d' etat against the

constitutional government. This brought the judiciary into action.

The president of the Constituent Assembly petitioned the Chief Court of

Sind against the decision and prayed for issuing a mandamus writ restricting

the government from implementing the proclamation and for determining the

legality of the new cabinet. The Sind Court gave its verdict against the

Governor-General, and then the case was taken on appeal to the Federal Court

of Pakistan by the Federation of Pakistan. The High Court upheld the decision

of the Governor-General.^

The question arises as to what is the significance of this episode for

the political system of Pakistan? We have shown the problems that were

confronting Pakistan. The state on its part did not do anything to change the

status quo. The events of 1954 brought into play a very interesting problem.

Till 1954, as shown, the power of the political system went in a checkered manner from the governor-general to the prime minister. While the political picture was poor, there existed a sense of status quo. In 1954, on the other hand, the bureaucracy tried to get the upper hand in the game by using the person of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad to do its biding. The coup took place, however, with the help of the judiciary, the status quo was returned, when the governor-general called for a new Constituent Assembly. Added to

^Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957), pp. 77-123. - 63 -

this, we can also state that the significance of this episode was that the military, which was asked to come and take over, remained outside for the time period. So, we can conclude that as long as the constitutional issues did not challenge the status quo, the bureaucratic core of the state in Pakistan would bear with the political system. In other words, they would live side by side.

Looking at events from this point of view the Constitution of 1956 can be seen from a new light. Let us turn to that constitution.

Constitution Of 1956

Up to the 1956 Constitution, the political events, while not making any headway, were keeping the status quo intact. However, when the constitution came into being on March 23, 1956, things began to look different. Under its

Article 222 the Constituent Assembly was converted into the National Assembly.

This Assembly, which had the power to elect the president under Article 222, elected Major General Iskandar Mirza, and H. S. Suhrawardy as the Prime

Minister

Mirza and Suhrawardy worked together in the beginning to bring some political stability to Pakistan. However, by December 1957 it was clear that

Mirza and Suhrawardy were not too happy together, so Suhrawardy was told to get out. Malik Firoz Khan took his place. Things were back to normal, the status quo was back in its place.

Nevertheless, the status quo could be broken. The clause that could do that was the one that called for the general elections to be held by February

15.1959. This election would probably have resulted in the dislodging of

^M. A. Chaudhuri, Government And Politics In Pakistan (Dacca: Puthighar Ltd., 1968), pp. 204-230. - 64 -

quite a few from their ivory towers. The balance that all the traditional powerholders had created would have been lost within hours of the elections.

The bureaucracy would have lost its position if the elections were held.

Something had to be done. The result was Martial Law of 1958, a year before the elections .22/

It is interesting to note that both President Iskandar Mirza, and the

Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General (Later Field Marshal) Mohammad

Ayub Khan, stated in their address that the reason for the martial law was the adverse political conditions in the country. If this argument was valid, then martial law should have been declared in 1954, when the crisis of legitimacy occurred. Another date could have been the 1954 language riots, when it looked as if the country would break apart. It did not happen then. On the other hand, martial law was declared when the political situation, given the conditions in Pakistan, were quite calm. Elections of 1959 would have resulted in the coming in power of men who were chosen by the people of

Pakistan. The bureaucracy, which had complete control over the affairs of

Pakistan, would have lost that power. By having the elections the status quo would have been broken. For this reason martial law was declared on October

7, 1958.^

Overview

The aim of the political leaders of Pakistan was to bring political stability to Pakistan. However, in 1957 two forces were at play in Pakistan.

22/Ibid. ,

22/Ibid. , - 65 -

The first force was the bureaucracy, and the second one was the political system. The aim of both these forces was to take over the affairs of the country. Events were to show that the bureaucracy won the day. This was not because it was strong, but because the political system of Pakistan was rather weak.

In the first section we pointed out the problems facing Pakistan in

1947. These were the refugees, political parties, and the leadership of

Pakistan. These problems led to the over-powering strength of the bureaucratic system, and the under-powering of the political system. The state, as described in the second section, did everything in its power to take on all this power when it realized the dire weakness of the political system.

Until the Constitution of 1956 the state had an upper hand over the political system. The constitution challenged the power of the state by calling for elections in 1959. When this occurred, the state fought back and achieved its objective with the Martial law of 1958. CHAPTER THREE : THE ERA OF GENERAL MOHAMMAD AYPB KHAN : 1958-1969: (THE YEARS OF POWER HUNGRY POLITICS)

Introduction

The Military takeover in 1958 by General (Later Field Marshal) Mohammad

Ayub Khan was an event that sealed the fate of the political system of

Pakistan. From this day onwards the bureaucracy became the supreme defender

and promoter of Pakistani politics. The old days of British India, with an

overpowering bureaucracy, had come back. From 1947 up to 1958 the political

and the bureaucratic systems of Pakistan had fought the battle of supremacy

for promoting Pakistani politics. Now however, the battle had ended and the

bureaucracy had won the day.

While the battle between the two systems was occurring, the ever present

problems of Pakistan were not being solved. Among these problems we can list

the following. First, there was the problem of capital. A large amount of

capital had been withdrawn in the inter-war years which needed to be

compensated from alternative sources. Second, the 1940 war years had created

a general consciousness among the elites that a strong technological base

needed to be established. Up to 1958 this base had not been created.

Finally, the partition holocaust had created problems for the government which

had to create jobs and build houses to settle the millions of refugees in

their new homeland. These ever present problems had not been solved.

As a result the state system of Pakistan was facing a situation in which

the very existence of the state was at stake. The elections which were to be held in 1959 convinced the bureaucracy that the future for Pakistan was not as hopeful as it could be. So, with the help of the army the bureaucracy

overthrew the political system. - 67 -

The armed forces of Pakistan were the defenders of the country. The army establishment was based on discipline, which was required if it was to be successful in defending the nation. This establishment did everything for the good of the state. This establishment had a system where the authority rested on top, where all the decisions were made. Once decisions were made the implementation of the decisions was given to the officers lower down, who carried them out. Supervising all this was a well oiled machine. As far as the bureaucracy of Pakistan was concerned, this was the type of system that was needed to convert the ills of Pakistan into benefits. The army would stay until everything was in order, at which point it would go back to its role of defending the country. At this point political minds of the country would reassemble to run its affairs.

The bureaucracy was not concerned about losing its power once the army took over. As army officers were not trained to run the political system, the bureaucracy would be in the position to do that for the army. In this manner the bureaucracy would, without even trying, get into a position where it would be the supreme power in the country. Even in a stable system the bureaucracy would be the most powerful institution. So, no matter who was in power the bureaucracy would always have the upper hand. It was for all the above reasons that on October 7, 1958 President Iskander Mirza declared Martial law in the country. However, the results of the martial law were such that neither the bureaucracy nor the military expected them. The only true result of the military rule was the domination of the bureaucracy in the affairs of the country. - 68 -

The aim of this chapter is to show the effects of the military rule over the political system of Pakistan, which was represented by the state. In section one of the chapter we will examine the Ayub system. Once having done this, section two will deal with the reforms of the Ayub government. In addition, we will look at some of the reasons why these reforms failed.

Finally in section three, we will look at the reaction to these failed reforms of the military regime. This will be studied by looking at the Anti-Ayub

Movement. In this section we will see the way the bureaucracy played one group against the other so that the military, which was not really doing any good, would fail. In the end the regime did fail, and the bureaucracy had a big hand in it.

SECTION ONE: THE DAYDREAM

The military takeover of Pakistan was completed in two phases. The first phase began on October 7, 1958. At this time President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution of 1956; dissolved the central and provincial assemblies; dismissed the central and provincial cabinets; banned all political parties; appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; and declared Martial Law throughout Pakistan. When imposing martial law, President Mirza, in his address to the nation, declared the following:

The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic interim situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot get men from the moon. The same group of people who have brought Pakistan on the verge of - 69 -

ruination will rig the elections for their own ends. They will come back more revengeful, because, I am sure, that the elections will be contested, mainly, on personal, regional and sectarian basis. When they return, they will use the same methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy and are the main cause of the present wide-spread frustration in the country. However much the administration may try, I am convinced, judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and unscrupulous scramble for office, that elections will neither be free nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties

General Mohammad Ayub Khan addressed the nation on October 8, 1958. In his

address he explained that the army entered politics, "with great reluctance but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except

disintegration and complete ruination of the country."^ He asked the people

of Pakistan to cooperate with the new government, so that things could be put

right again.

The second phase began twenty days later, when the army generals forced

President Mirza to resign the office of the President. It was clear by

October 27 that the real power was going to rest with the army. President

Mirza himself realized that he could not continue as the head of the state for a long period of time as his post had became meaningless, and he could not totally disassociate himself from the political turmoil of the past. Ayub and his generals also realized that for them to accomplish anything substantive they would have to delink themselves from a person who was closely connected with the conditions which led to the political confusion in the country. For

^Richard S. Wheeler, The Politics Of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 230-231.

^Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics In Pakistan: 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), p. 73. - 70 -

this reason, on October 27, 1958 three generals went to see the president on behalf of Ayub. They wanted him to resign. Mirza silently obliged. In this manner the country came under full control of the army.

In addition, on October 27, 1958 the Supreme Court of Pakistan put its stamp of approval on the military regime. In the judgement of the case "The

State V. Dosso and other" Chief Justice Muneer observed:

If the attempt to break the constitution fails, those who sponsor or organize it, are judged by the existing Constitution as guilty of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the person assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled constitution but by reference to its own success. Thus a victorious revolution or a successful coup d' etat is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a constitution.2/

The Supreme Court's decision thus gave legality to the military regime to run the affairs of Pakistan.

Ayub was convinced that the ills of Pakistan could be solved if these were properly investigated, and the right decisions were made and enforced.

This reflected his experience as the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the army.

Whenever there was a serious problem concerning the re-organization of the army, Ayub appointed an expert committee to study the problem. After the receipt of the report, necessary orders were issued in the light of the recommendations. He adopted the same methods to eradicate the evils of the political system of Pakistan. Twenty-three reform commissions, relating to a

2/Ibid., p. 72. - 71 -

variety of fields such as land-holdings, administration, eduction, food and agriculture, law, police, constitution and finance, were set up.

The Theory Of The Avub System

Although Marital Law remained in force for forty-four months (October

1958 to June 1962), the army was returned to the barracks earlier, and the administration was made the responsibility of the higher civil service. For this reason Ayub cabinet was composed of civilians with administrative, legal, financial, industrial and agricultural experience. The so-called men with experience were landlords, politically established leaders, and young men of promise and acknowledged loyalty. An example of the landlord's class in Ayub cabinet would be Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, who was known for his strong uncompromising reputation. Khan was governor of West Pakistan from April

1960 until September 1966. An example of a young man would be Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto, who was brought into the cabinet at the age of twenty-nine, and who proceeded to occupy eight different positions from October 1958 until July

1966.1/

President Ayub's decision to avoid any contact with the politicians and to turn only to the military and the government bureaucracy, and to only use powerful landed and entrepreneurial personalities was because of his dichotomous perception of Pakistani society. The President did not believe that Islam as an ideological battle cry was enough to hold the country together. In addition, the President did not believe that the politicians could rise above their local Constituencies long enough to reflect national

1/Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma Of Political Development (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1980), pp. 88-90. - 72 -

purpose and resolve. Furthermore, the President believed that the masses really did not know what they wanted. This was largely due to the retarded state of development; their lack of political consciousness; and above all their easy manipulation by regional headmen, tribal figures, religious teachers, and landlords.&

On the other hand President Ayub believed in the discipline and training of the armed forces, and the education and experience of the higher administrators. These two organizations believed in the same causes and pursued similar objectives. Both organizations were loyal, in thought and in action, to the country. They were familiar with modern, equipment and ideas, and had confidence in their ability to get the job done. Finally, their patriotism was unquestioned. For the above reasons the President was drawn towards the services that he knew and understood. With the above in mind let us look at the Ayub System.

The Avub System

The Ayub system was commonly called "Basic Democracies", which was announced by the President on May 1959. The system provided for the elections of 80,000 Basic Democrats, equally divided between East and West Pakistan.

The Basic Democracies, or B.D's as they were popularly referred to, were elected by direct adult franchise. These B.D's were to provide the four tired structure of the system. At the base of the system were the union councils in the rural areas and the union committees in the cities, which were headed by an elected chairman. The upper three tiers were composed of the

^Lawrence Ziring et al, ed., Pakistan: The Lone View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 252-258. - 73 -

representatives of the lower tiers and elected nominees. They were headed by officials who were their ex-officio chairmen.^

The idea behind the B.D's system was to gradually involve the people of

Pakistan into the democratic processes. The reliance on the bureaucracy was needed as this was the only organization which could provide the skills and expertise to energize the newly created bodies, and to bring about socio­ political transformation of the people unaffected by party-politics JU

The system of B.D's was supposed to provide training in democracy however, the approach to achieving this goal was never spelt out. Somehow these goals were deferred to the distant future. Ayub had convinced himself that this was the best method, and in the end would achieve the best system of government. Anyhow, what had been achieved up to then was only a controlled system of local-government, which would somehow produce, a rural elite, which in time would replace the distrusted urban elite. This rural elite was expected to be aligned with the government, affording help and assistant in the task of national reconstruction.^

During the years between 1958-1962 Pakistan's more fortunate segment of the society prospered. In addition, industries sprouted in and around major urban centers and foreign investments expanded. A new capital was built near

Rawalpindi called Islamabad. However, the rank-and-file revealed little in

S/Louis D. Hayes Politics In Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 67-72.

^Hamid Yusuf Pakistan In Search Of Democracy: 1947-1988 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), pp. 56-58.

2/Ibid. , - 74 -

the way of higher standards or other improvements. This uneven distribution of capital was over played by the politicians, especially after 1962 when the

Martial Law was withdrawn. The central theme of the politician was that the

Ayub system, with all its good intentions, only benefited the rich and the powerful at the expense of the poor and the weak. President Ayub was shown as a lustful, greedy dictator who was only concerned with family wealth and privilege, and with enriching the nobility, his loyal bureaucrats and faithful members of the Armed Forces. The politicians insisted that only they showed sympathy for the deprived masses and that only their return to power could terminate corruption and make justice a reality in Pakistan.^

Under pressure from different quarters within and out side Pakistan,

Ayub had to yield and give Pakistan a constitution. The most outstanding among the pressure groups were the politicians, the intellectuals, and the

United States of America. By 1962 thousands of Americans were working as advisors in the Pakistan Government; they developed and managed major construction projects; assisted in reforming and staffing educational institutions; helped finance industrial development; engineered agricultural programs; and cooperated in the updating of the military establishment. This

American involvement, and the stand taken by the politicians and the intellectuals acted as a control on Ayub's power and he could no longer postpone the return of constitutional government in Pakistan.^

^Herbert Feldman Revolution in Pakistan: A Study Of The Martial T.*w Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 103-124.

^Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1980), pp. 93-94. - 75 -

The Avub Constitutional Philosophy

President Ayub's basic theory of what was needed in Pakistan had not

changed even when he gave Pakistan the 1962 Constitution. The situation in

Pakistan had not changed to any where near what Ayub wanted it to be. The

divisions among the economic, political, and social levels were still large enough to cause problems, which could affect the very being of the state. The

so-called development, which we will talk about in section two, had so far only made the rich richer, while the poor were still waiting for something to happen.

The bureaucracy as well as the military establishment, the two strong

institutions on the side of Ayub, had begun to feel the strains of the activities being associated with the politicians and the intellectuals. The drop in capital, the rise of prices for basic goods, and so on down the line, was making the two institutions very uneasy. If these activities were left unchecked then the days of the Ayub regime were numbered. If Ayub went then the power of both the bureaucracy and the military establishment would be reduced to the point where they would became the servants. Overall there was too much at stake. The Ayub experiment required time while pressure was being applied on Ayub Khan to do something.

This something had to make sure that the upper hand was kept in the hands of the powerholders and Ayub. The masses had to be brought in favor of the system, and the politicians and the intellectuals had to be stopped from creating all this mischiefs. In addition, the United States had to be given the impression that Pakistan was a constitutional state. The United States was providing enormous aid, and if this impression was not given then the - 76 -

chances of this aid being cut off would be great. For all of the above

reasons, the Constitution of 1962 was given to the country.

The Constitution of Ayub Khan sought to reinforce his authority in the

absence of martial law. It reflected his philosophy of a strong executive who was free from the control of the legislature. The president as well as the

legislature were elected indirectly by the 80,000 B.D's, constituting as the

electoral college. This system was to work without political parties. This was to be an administrative state in which Ayub placed great faith. ^

Briefly, the 1962 Constitution provided for a government which was

comprised of a president and the central legislature called the "National

Assembly". The president's term of office was five years. The National

Assembly was made up of 156 members, divided equally between the two wings,

and in each case 3 seats were held for women members. Like the president, the

National Assembly was to sit for five years, unless the Assembly suffered

dissolution during that time period. Both the president and National Assembly members were to be elected by the B.D's, which functioned as the electoral

college during the time of the national elections. The president could if he

so pleased dissolve the Assembly, however, he too would then cease to hold office if no new Assembly was set up within the next 120 days. The president had the power to appoint the governors of the two wings. Finally, the president had powers to make and un-make laws with or without the consent of

the National Assembly. In this brief over-view of the president's constitutional powers one sees that the president was like a king who did not

^Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study Of The Martial Law Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 194-204. - 77 -

have to answer to any authority, and he did as he pleased. In other words, the president was above the law.^

The Workings Of The System

In this section we would like to give an overview of the set up of the government in the time of Ayub Khan. The mistrust of the politicians, coupled with the large unruly masses, had convinced the members of the bureaucracy that things could not go on the way they had. The state took it upon it's self to stabilize the situation by taking over. Like its British counterpart, the Pakistani state system monopolized all activities of governence.

Under Ayub Khan's regime, an attempt was made to create a social contract between the state and the society by the introduction of the "Basic

Democracies." The involvement of the people in the system was in line with the class structure of the Pakistani society. The B.D members in general represented the middle class farmers who owned less than 100 acres of land.

The Union Councils were more educated, owned more land, tended to be members of interest groups, and tended to have more political information. By keeping the running of political activity within 80,000 small constituencies, the government curtailed the current levels of mass participation in politics. As a result, the role of the politicians and political parties began to decline

In addition to the above measures, the government also used other means of controlling all forms of organized public activity. One of the most widely

^Ibid. ,

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 157-166. - 78 -

used methods was the imposition of section 144, and extensive use of

intelligence reports. While the Government of Pakistan thus scaled down the organizational input into the political life, it also monopolized representation of public interest on the output side.^

This output side was achieved by the state taking again its long- established guardian role in the society. The new state defined its goals in terms of fulfillment of the national destiny. This was done by establishing the "Bureau of National Reconstruction." The aim of this bureau was to unite all the divergent linguistic, sectarian, and social groups into a cohesive nation. While this really did not produce the right results, it showed the involvement of the state in the affairs of the society.^

Another method used by the state was the issue of religion. Religion was seen as a device to unite the people. "Under the Ayub government, Islam was increasingly sponsored as the national ideology, as principle of unity between the two wings of Pakistan, and as a flexible code of life befitting the modern age.-^ One of the most clear manifestation of such a thinking was the introduction of the "Family Law Ordinance" of 1961. The idea was to protect the women who were the most socially abused section of the society.

In this manner the Ayub regime used Islam to further its own ends.

^ibid.

^Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 166. - 79 -

Overview

The above shows that the regime of Ayub Khan was using the dis-unity

factor as a means of reestablishing the role of the state in the affairs of

Pakistan. The period between 1947-1958 had shown the powerholders that the

affairs of the State could not be run in the existing manner. The state had

to take the upper hand given the fact that the people of Pakistan were really

not sure what they wanted from themselves as well as from their government.

As a result, the measures passed by the Ayub regime were designed to increase

the power of the state at the expensive of everyone else. Once having done

this the regime used the developmental policies to get a better handle on the

society. Let us now turn to the much publicized developmental policies of

Ayub Khan's regime. - 80 -

SECTION TWO: ECONOMIC STRATEGY. THE CASE OP INDUSTRIALIZATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The aim of the military government, as pointed out above, was to

institute development at economic, political, and social levels. The military

government reasoned that before there could be political and social

development, there had to be economic development. The first eleven years of

the history of Pakistan had shown that there had been a negative economic

development. By negative development we mean that the state was depending

more and more on outside help. In so doing, there was a zero political and

social development. The new governments' first task was to achieve economic

development, which in turn would bring political and social development.

However, the story that is outlined below shows us that none of this really became a reality. What we see is that the development strategies which were

formulated and implemented by the planning machinery of the state only

increased the involvement of the state in the society. In other words no

ground was gained, if anything ground was lost as far as economic development

is concerned. The units of analysis will be the two most important sectors of

the economy, i.e., industry and agriculture.

Industrialization

When we look at industrial development in Pakistan during this time period (1958-1969) we see that the bureaucracy enjoyed a very high level of control over industrial and commercial policy-making. It is interesting to note that no major industrial legislation originated in the National Assembly.

All measures in this field were a result of either Presidential or Martial Law

Ordinances. The decision making process in this regard was in the hands of - 81 -

such agencies as the "Planning Commission", the "Department of Investment"

"Production and Supplies", the "Licensing Boards", the "Chief Controller of

Imports and Exports", and host of other government institutions. In addition,

no agencies outside the government were involved in the decision-making. For

example, the Business Community was consulted when policy was being

formulated, but when it came to the final decision no one was asked. The

story of Pakistan's industrial development, therefore, is one in which the

bureaucracy played a big part.^

For this reason the regulative and directive control of the government

emerged as a major determinant of the shape of national economy in Pakistan.

An example of this is the role of "Pakistan Industrial Development

Corporation" (PIDC). The PIDC was a link between private capital and

government projects. The organization was set up in 1952. This organization

helped private enterprise to penetrate into East Bengal, by first establishing

industry and then surrendering its assets to the private sector. Now, because

of the lack of a large consumer market, the first investors into large-scale manufacturing industry soon monopolized the market. Then, through

interlocking directorships of various projects managed to concentrate

industrial assets in a few hands. In this manner the government got projects,

the landlords and business men got the money and power.&

This concentration of wealth in a few hands, coupled with the poor not being able to get anywhere in this set up, led to the establishment of trade

^Ibid, pp. 192-196.

^Ibid. , - 82 -

unions. In organizational terms, Pakistani labor movements functioned in place of politics and economics. For example, "Pakistan Trade Union

Federation", founded under the leadership of Mirza Ibrahim in 1948, sought redress of labor's grievances through a larger struggle for system change.

The "Pakistan Confederation of Labor", on the other hand, operated along strictly professional lines. These two types of unions helped the poor classes. After Martial Law was lifted in 1962 the number of workers that went on strikes in 1963 was 109,142 involving a loss of 902,288 man-days. As time went no, these organizations became quite political and were involved in the anti-Ayub Movement.^

In conclusion, we can say that in the case of Pakistan the bureaucracy was the promoter of Industrialization. This being the case, the type of policies that were put into effect were designed to promote the ideas and desires of the big landlords, the military, and the refugees. As a result, the poor classes who saw no uplift in their style of living began to join the trade unions in large numbers. While before 1963 the trade unions were designed along social and economic lines, after 1963 they began to became quite political in their outlook.

Agricultural Development

The aim of the government in its agricultural policies was to balance the unbalanced distribution of land. In addition, the aim was to uplift the methods used for agriculture. The ever present problem of land distribution and agricultural uplift had created a number of problems. The most evident of

^Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 140-171. - 83 -

these problems was the uneven distribution of wealth between the classes. In other words, there was a very high level of differentiation in terms of agriculture. The aim of the military government was to balance the un­ balanced reality. The units of analysis in this section will be land reforms.

Land Reforms

The distribution of land in Pakistan was extremely skewed. For example in Punjab, 80% of owners held around 30X of the cultivable area, while 0.6X of them owned more than 20X land in holdings of 100 acres or more; in Sind IX owned 30X of the land. In the whole of West Pakistan 0.1X of the population owned more than 500 acres each. This uneven distribution resulted in peasant unrest. These unrests were led by organizations such as the "Punjab Kisan

Sabha", "Sarhad Kisan Jirga", and "Sind Hari Committee" .22/

For this reason in 1959, the land reforms were brought about, designed on the principle of promoting the productivity of land. Landless tenants numbering 145,825 out of 1,936,081 gained land as a result of the 1959 reforms. However, this policy really did not change anything as the percentage of landowners came down from 47.6X to only 44.IX.21/

While there were other policies that were brought about, the number of large landlords still kept all economic initiatives in their own hands, and did not let anyone influence their dominant position in the country-side.

Furthermore, the influence was expanded because of the high level of tenant turnover which created great insecurity for the tenants. As a result, these

22/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore:Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 212-218.

21/Ibid., p. 218. - 84 -

tenants had to be content with what they had. In addition, the landlord dominance of the village economy made the tenant grow only those crops that the landlords wanted them to grow. This was true even if the land was owned by a small fanner.2/

While the agricultural policies were designed to make a better use of land, and also to help the poor to advance in social standing, the reality of the situation showed that the divisions between the classes became much bigger because of these policies. The large scale reforms were neither rational nor sensible. At first, under the cover of Martial Law major reforms were promulgated by martial law regulations, and were subsequently provided with constitutional protection. At a later stage, after the enforcement of the

Constitution of 1962, the reforms were introduced either by hasty legislation or by presidential ordinance.

Result Of The Avub Policies

The state in Pakistan brought about such inter-sectoral and inter-class transfer of resources through its rural development strategy, that the whole power structure of the rural society underwent an attitude change. The direction of the change was towards a generalized pattern of dichotomous class interests. The rich farmers enjoyed the supply of agricultural inputs, like fertilizer and water, on favorable terms. On the other hand a poor fanner could not afford to go to credit unions or bribe a government official, so he did not get all the benefits that the rich got.

The rich farmers, landlords, and other influential classes began to take on too much power at the expense of the poor. It seems that 52 of the

S/Ibid. , - 85 -

population had under its wings the other 952 of the population. This uneven

distribution led to a large scale rural-urban migration. For example, 84.42

of the poor of Sind from the country side ended up in Karachi by 1967. In the

same year 56.42 of the poor of Punjab ended up In Faisalabad. By 1967 these

people had began small businesses in the towns, so they were becoming quite

concerned when they felt the bigger economic currents tightening the noose

around their activities. These new peasant-turned-petty bourgeoisie were one

of the groups which was quite vocal during the Anti-Ayub Movement.

Together, the industrial and agricultural development strategy of the

Pakistan government created such vast disparity between different strata, that

it began to cast un-stability on the so-called stable Ayub system in the late

I960's. The average income of Rs.201 was not reached by 68.72 of the households in 1963-1964; between 1967-1968, 772 of the households fell short

of the then average of Rs.271 per month. The income of the poorest 102 of the population declined from 2.62 in 1963 to 1.82 in 1968-1969. In the

countryside the population below the poverty line fell from 722 in 1963-1964

to 642 at the start of the Green Revolution in 1966-1967; from there it

increased to 682 in 1969-1970 and 742 in 1971-1972.S'

The increased impoverishment of the large masses as a result of 'development' was thus rooted in the economic changes where a) the economic surplus was concentrated in a few hands, b) the access to the organized capital market was strictly controlled by the state, c) the capital-intensive farming displaced labor from land, d) the capital continued flowing from rural to urban areas, and e) the public capital formation in the intra-structural sector, including

^Ibid., p. 230. - 86 -

irrigation, electricity and transport, largely helped private capital formation.2i/

Overview

In this section we have outlined the results of the policies that were made during the time of the government of President Mohammad Ayub Khan.

During this time the government with the help of the bureaucracy began a program of development. This program was to take an unstable economic system and transform it into one which was stable.

Everything that had gone wrong before 1958 was blamed on the politicians of Pakistan. Because of this perception, the bureaucracy was now going to be used to help in development. However, the results that occurred are given above. As a result of this large imbalance within the society a movement began which would only reach its end once the government of Ayub Khan was thrown out of office.

SECTION THREE: THE NIGHTMARE

Much has been written on the reasons for the fall of President Mohammad

Ayub Khan. According to some accounts, East Pakistan's call for autonomy was an important factor. According to some others, the problem was the 1962

Constitution. Still according to others, the problem was the 1965 war with

India. To some, the problem was the "Two Nation Theory" itself. The list is endless. However, while the above factors were important, the developmental

^Ibid., - 87 -

projects did more to displace a large number of people, who came out on the

streets to show how upset they were.

The official aim of the martial law regime was to engage in development.

The reality, on the other hand, showed that the aim was to somehow keep the

existing state system in Pakistan where it was, that is to say right on the

top. There was much at stake if an institution other than the bureaucracy was

to run the affairs of the country. The traditional powerholders had been in

the driver's seat for too long to just give up everything.

On the other hand, one could see the importance of the politicians and

the masses. It was because of their outcry that Pakistan got the 1962

Constitution and the government initiated the development projects. When the

government did not produce the right results then it was these same people who

came out on the streets to protest against the government policies.

The Movement

The movement to un-seat Ayub Khan began on October 27, 1968 at which

time a number of students were killed by the police. When the students were

killed the politicians and the masses realized that the government had lost

all nerve and if these anti-government groups could apply enough pressure then

the government would fall.

Added to this political unrest was the question of autonomy. East

Pakistani Awami League (AL), which had taken up the cry of the masses in both

wings to the streets, began to preach the old controversy of the Center vs.

provinces. The AL used the autonomy slogan in terms of the six points that it had developed. This helped the AL to became a representative provincial - 88 -

party, as people from both the cities and the county side of East Pakistan got involved.2/

With both the Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan up in arms against the government, the people realized that the situation had reached the point of no-return. To make political gains out of the situation a number of important people joined the band wagon. Among them were Z. A. Bhutto; Abdul

Wali Khan; Air Martial (Retd) Asghar Khan; General (Retd) Azam Khan; and

Justice (Retd) Mahboob Murshad. All these leaders except Bhutto, Mujibur-

Rehman, and Maulana Bhashani, joined together to form the "Democratic Action

Committee" (DAC). The DAC was formed in January 1969 and provided the anti-

Ayub movement with a theme, which called for parliamentary form of government, and elections on the basis of adult franchise .22/

The storm it seemed had taken on a life of its own. Ayub saw the end coming and in January 1969, offered to discuss constitutional changes with the

'responsible' opposition leaders, in which neither Bhutto nor Mujib were included. The reason these two were not included was that Ayub believed that both Bhutto and Mujib were up to no good. There was some truth to this as

Bhutto was trying to topple the government, and Mujib was sitting in Jail charged with 35 others for the so-called Agartala Conspiracy Case.22/

22/Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy: 1947-77 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980.

22/Ibid., pp. 86-92.

22/Ibid. , - 89 -

By the beginning of March Ayub asked the two men to join as the DAC would not talk unless they were included. Mujib joined once the case on him was dropped, however, Bhutto never joined the talks. The discussions went on till the middle of March 1969, at which point the two basic points of the politicians were met. However this was too little too late. Events had slipped out of the hands of the government by this time. In West Pakistan the radical student groups, the trade unions, and the militant shopfloor workers had began demonstrations, strikes, and killings. In East Pakistan, under the leadership of the AL, the student groups, and the party workers had started mass murders, arson, and attacks on the police stations. In all these disturbances the politicians had a big hand. In sum, the situation was such that there began a general breakdown of the state machinery.^

On March 25, 1969 Martial Law was declared again in Pakistan. By this date Pakistan had not achieved any stability. With the re-imposition of

Martial Law the state system of Pakistan had come back to square one. The big economic, political, and social questions that had influenced the army to take over in 1958 were still on everyone's mind. - The illusion that they still could be solved was a factor that influenced the traditional powerholders to call back the army.

Overview

In 1958 the political climate of Pakistan was such that the chances of the country being taken off the map of the world were quite great. The politicians, were engaged only in their own self interests, and were not doing

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 230-233. - 90 -

anything to bring stability to the country. The masses were beginning to question the whole idea of Pakistan. These people did not see any development that the founding father Mohammad All Jinnah had promised. As far as these masses were concerned the only way they would get any development would be if the whole political system of Pakistan was changed.

These two groups, the politicians and the general public, began to look for the general elections of 1959 as the time when they would introduce a new system. The bureaucracy, on the other hand did not believe that this was really the answer. The traditional powerholders also did not subscribe to the idea of general elections which threatened their position. Before things really got out of hand, the traditional powerholders gave the future of

Pakistan to the army, which they believed would maintain the status quo, and give the masses the illusion of development, which would help calm them down.

As the army had no idea of how to rule the country, it meant that the traditional powerholders would continue to rule. As a result, the power of these people grew, and in turn the power of the bureaucracy also grew.

However, to keep the masses in check, the government began its development projects.

By 1969, the results of the projects could be seen. The traditionals had grown much richer and powerful, and the general public had declined in standing. This uneven distribution of wealth sparked the anti-Ayub movement and in March of 1969 the Ayub government was over thrown. CHAPTER FOUR : THE SEEDS OF A NEW PAKISTAN

Introduction

On March 25 1969 martial law was re-Imposed in Pakistan. The political

climate had reached a point at which began a general breakdown of the state

machinery. This climate was a result of a number of crisis, and the

controversial policies of the Ayub government.

The crisis began with the end of the Indian-Pakistani war of 1966.

These crisis included the following: the anti-Tashkent Declaration Movement;

the worsening conditions of the industrial labor; the gathering storm against

the '22' rich families; the sugar shortage; the allegedly huge fortunes of the

Ayub family; Ayub Khan's severe illness in early 1968; the obsessive

glorification of the so-called 'Decade of Development*; the opposition to the

Family Laws Ordinance; and finally, the generalized resistance to the

population planning programme.

The controversial policies were as follows; the East Pakistan - West

Pakistan polices; the transfer of public sector projects to private hands at

cheap rates; the falling reserves of foreign exchange; the Muslim Family laws

and family planning; and finally, the loss of American arms supplies in the

aftermath of the 1965 war and the subsequent frustration among the top army

ranks.

The politicians and other moralistic members of the general public used

these crisis and controversial policies as a device to stir up the general public against the military regime and its counter part the bureaucracy. The politicization of the general public made the state again come to point where a decision on the future of Pakistan had to be made. The general question of who will rule Pakistan came up. Pakistan was back to square one of its - 92 -

political development. Was Pakistan to be a bureaucratic state or a political

institutional state?

The bureaucracy had no two minds about it. The bureaucracy was still

the strongest and the largest institution in Pakistan and the traditional

powerholders still had a hold on Pakistan. For the status quo to remain the

same, the army choose itself to run the affairs of the country.

However, in 1958 the general public had chosen to side with the

bureaucracy when the military took over. This was not the case in 1969. The

general public from 1965 to 1969 had been shown by the politicians the ills of

a military-bureaucratic government. The general public had became too

politically-minded by 1969 to just sit and not fight for what it wanted. They

had had enough and wanted their rights to be restored, as the founding father

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had promised.

The general public of both wings had shown by their involvement in the

anti-Ayub movement that they knew what they wanted, and they also knew how

they could get it. If martial law was declared without taking into account

the demands of the general public, then the threat of secession would not only become strong but also true. The stakes were as high as they were in 1958.

The unity of the country hung in the balance. This then was the situation when Martial Law was declared in 1969.

In section one of this chapter we will look at the events leading up to,

and including, the general elections of 1970, the first general elections to be held in the history of Pakistan. The aim would be to show that the events

leading up to the General Elections of 1970, and the elections themselves, were strictly contained within the old framework. By doing this we will also - 93 -

show the continuity of the state system of Pakistan. -In section two, we will

deal with the partition of Pakistan in 1971. This will be done by using as

units of analysis the constitutional, economic, social, and political spheres

as applied to interaction between the two wings. In the end we will explain

how all these points contributed to the events which led to partition after

the 1970 General Elections. Finally, in section three we will explain why the

first attempt at establishing democracy failed in Pakistan.

SECTION ONE : THE CHANGING OF THE SYSTEM

The military coup of 1969 occurred at a point at which the country was

going through a change. The change was one from bureaucratic politics to one

of mass participation in politics. The bureaucracy changed gears from

supporting the military to supporting the politicians. The anti-Ayub movement had convinced the bureaucracy that to remain as master they should join hands with the politicians. In reality, therefore, the change was only from one

support group to an another.

The survey of the literature of the time period tends to suggest that

the change was one in which the politicians were to become the masters and the bureaucracy the servants. From this point of view, the anti-Ayub movement is seen as a revolution, that changed the balance of power from the hands of the bureaucracy into the hands of the politicians. However, this analysis does not explain the underlying reasons for the elections; it does not explain the

East Pakistani movement right after the elections; finally, it does not explain the rise of Z. A. Bhutto to the position of Chief Martial Law - 94 -

Administrator. It will be shown that all these events had in them the hand of

the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy played its cards in such a manner that it

gave the impression of taking a back seat, when in reality it was influencing

events so as to be in the dominant position.

The bureaucracy never blamed itself for the situation that Pakistan

found itself in 1969. It blamed the military government of President Mohammad

Ayub Khan for all the problems. The anti-Ayub movement showed that Ayub Khan had to go; the military was no longer a good partner given the dimensions the movement had taken; the new partner had to be the politicians, given the fact of the support that the masses gave to them. Finally the situation had to be stabilized before the politicians took over, and for that the discipline of the military was used.

On the other hand if the bureaucracy had blamed itself for the ills of the country then the situation would have been a little different. In that hypothetical alternative an interim government would have been established, in line with the talks that were held between General Ayub and the opposition. A constitutional commission would have been established. A new constitution would have been worked out and put into effect. Finally, elections would have been held. This would have been a true revolution which would have brought constitutional law into the country.

We can conclude by stating that the political situation in Pakistan in

1969 called for a change in the way things were run. In line with this thinking the bureaucracy changed partners in the political game. There was no revolution which brought political change in the system, all that happened was that the bureaucracy changed partners. - 95 -

The Reform Movement

During the closing days of Ayub Khan's era negotiations were held between Ayub and the opposition leaders. The two demands that the opposition presented were agreed upon by Ayub's government. The two demands were a parliamentary system of government, and the elections to be held on a one- man-one-vote basis. A few days after Ayub agreed his government was overthrown. The incoming government of Genera Yahya Khan sensing the conditions in the country, and not having a program itself, decided that the promise for elections will be upheld. However, when Yahya took over he stated that before elections could be held calm conditions had to be created.

The calm conditions were to be achieved by undercutting the bureaucracy which was held in contempt, and also undercutting the role of the powerful elite in the decision-making process. However, the undercutting did not achieve the results that it was supposed to given the fact that the bureaucracy used its influence in undercutting the whole reform process.^

A good example of the above is in the educational reforms. The Yahya regime began to move fast in appeasing one of the most active groups of the anti-Ayub movement, namely the students. Within months of taking over, new education proposals were announced which were generally welcomed by the public. A few weeks later the new education policies were announced. An allocation of Rs. 170 million was made to cover various schemes related to technical education, higher education, agricultural education, and finally, training and higher emoluments for teachers and curriculum development. When

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 252-253. - 96 -

the time came for the policies to take effect problems developed. In the

first place, the "Planning Commission" and the "Ministry of Finance" in

Islamabad refused to give support to the policies which they had nothing to do

with. As for "The Manpower Commission" it was fed up with being neglected

during the whole planning process, and so it did not approve the idea. In the

second place, people like Nur Khan and Dr. I. H. Usmani who had high positions

in the bureaucracy did everything to make the whole policy unworkable. Over

time the whole idea of the education reforms melted away. In the end, the vast student body, in whose name all this policy making was taken up stood

even more alienated than before.^

Finally, the labor policy of the new Military Regime of Yayah Khan also

failed for the same reasons as those pertaining to education. Changes were planned in the realm of trade-union activity; settlement of disputes; wage

structure; and labor welfare measures. The running of the activities were

distributed among the newly created services, namely "The Registrar of Trade

Unions", and "The Conciliation and Mediation Service". However, these

services lacked the authority to do anything when disputes came up. As a

result the owners decided on the policy regarding the activities of the workers. The bureaucratic departments which had handled these tasks were never asked for their opinions, and as a result the whole labor reform movement came to a stand still.2/

2/Has an-Askar i Rizvi, The Military And Politics In Pakistan: 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), pp. 170-187.

2/Ibid. , - 97 -

The education reforms and the labor reforms were taken up as it was the students and the workers who were the real authority behind the anti-Ayub movement. The new regime, to gain the backing of these groups, began the reform movements. However, the reforms failed because they did not have the blessings of the bureaucracy. This showed that the idea of a reduced bureaucratic role in the decision-making process was not the path to follow if the leadership was weak. In this case Yahya Khan was a very weak leader.

Anyhow, being quite un-successful in bringing about better conditions in the country, the Yahya regime went ahead with the promised elections.

The Election Of 1970

By the s umme r of 1970 the Yahya Khan regime had come to the conclusion that the their reforms were not going to work. So, they decided that they were going to try their luck with the elections. However, before the elections were held, the regime introduced political reforms.

The Yahya Khan's political reform strategy revolved around two main objectives. One was to keep the political initiative in the regimes' own hands. The other objective was to follow the strategy agreed by the participants of the Round Table Conference in March 1969. On the question of the Parliamentary form of government, and the one-man-one-vote issue the Yahya regime had no problem. On the question of One Unit of West Pakistan the regime disagreed with the traditional power holders. The regime decided that it was going to dissolve the One Unit system. The reason was very simple: by dissolving the One Unit systetn the regime was going to take the wind out of the sails of the regionalist parties of West Pakistan and create a condition in which these parties could not side with East Pakistan and undermine the - 98 -

authority of Punjab. Finally, the regime installed a civilian cabinet which was made the scapegoat for decisions made by the "Military Council of

Administration". This way the regime kept an upper hand on things.

However, these reforms were not really reforms. They were structural changes which had to be made given the mounting pressures which were being applied from all sides. Anyhow, let us not forget that the so-called reforms did address the real problems of the state system of Pakistan. But because they were not put into effect they never really changed anything. The implementation depended on the existing institutional apparatus, however, this apparatus though under compulsion never really agreed to the changes.

Illusion was given that changes were taking place in the society. In this light the elections were going to be held.1/

The December 1970 General Elections were the first ever to be held in the history of Pakistan. The elections were fair and free based on one-man- one-vote principle. These elections were first to be held on October 5, 1970 but because of the law and order situation, and then the terrible cyclone which had hit East Pakistan in mid-November, the elections were postponed to

December .2/

The government of General Yahya Khan had done nothing to calm the situation in the country, so it was quite hard to predict whatthe outcome would be. The sudden induction of several million voters, mostly illiterate and an easy prey to emotion and prejudice, was full of peril. However, the

^Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy: 1947-77 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), pp. 98-100.

5/Ibid. , - 99 -

Yahya government, which did not want to be left out in the end, did make a prediction.

A number of people were given the task of finding out what was the most likely outcome of the elections. After a few months their predictions were given to Yahya. These stated that given the law and order situation; given the fact that there are no national parties in Pakistan; given the disorganization of the regional parties; and finally, given the fact that there were no national leaders, the most likely outcome would be that no party will win the majority. In this situation the control of the State would remain in the hands of the government. The government would have a hand in the choosing of the prime minister. The government would be able to make a deal with the prime minister that the president should be Yahya Khan. The constitution which would be worked out would look like the 1962 Constitution, given the fact that the army would have a big hand in its preparation. Given all these facts the power would remain in the hands of the military and the bureaucracy no matter who came into power. The status quo would remain the same. Once General Yahya Khan was informed about these developments he was quite happy.2/ The election campaign began in January 1970, and lasted till

December 1970. In the Eastern Wing the political scene was fully dominated by

Sheikh Mujub-ur-Rahman, the leader of the Awami League (AL). Mujib had been under detention for a long period, and had suffered a number of trials. With the halo of a martyr he now spearheaded the cause of East Pakistan. The AL

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp 255-266. - 100 -

election campaign ran on the theme of the six points announced by Mujub on

March 1966 in Lahore. Briefly they called for:

1) a Federal Pakistan on the basis of Lahore Resolution; a parliamentary form of government and adult franchise; 2) federal government to deal only with defence and foreign affairs; 3) two freely convertible currencies for East and West Pakistan, or in lieu, effective provisions to prevent the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. A separate Banking Reserve, and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for the eastern province; 4) provinces alone to have tax-levying powers, but the Center would be entitled to a share for its expenditure; 5) the two regions to establish trade links with foreign countries with separate accounts for foreign exchange earning so that the two wing can share equally the Center's expenses; 6) the establishment of a separate militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan.1J

The boycott of the elections by Maulana Bhashani and by the National

Progressive League and Krishak Saramik Party left the field open for the AL in

East Pakistan.

In West Pakistan the political scene began to be dominated by the

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the former protege

of Ayub Khan. The election campaign gave' him the chance to exercise his

political talents. The program of the PPP was designed for mass appeal. The

philosophy of the PPP ran along the following lines: Islam is our religion;

Socialism is our economy; Democracy is our politics and all power to the people. This summed up the PPP's electoral promise of roti, kapra, and makan

(lit. food, clothing, and shelter).2/ All these devices helped the PPP win

support throughout West Pakistan. No party could get the support that the PPP

^Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy: 1947-77 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), pp. 102-103.

2/ibid., pp. 103-104. - 101 -

was getting. Once the elections were held on December 10, 1970 the reality came out. In East Pakistan the AL had won a clear majority. In addition, the

AL also became the majority party in the National Assembly. In West Pakistan the PPP won in Sind and Punjab, the largest two provinces. The PPP came in second to AL in the National Assembly. The National Awami Party (NAP) and

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) won in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier

Province. These two parties came in third in the National Elections.2/

The AL won 160 seats out of 300 in the National Assembly. The PPP won

81 seats, the NAP won 7 seats, and the JUI won 6 seats. The reality of the situation was that one party was in the clear majority. This went counter to the predictions made by the top brass of the government

The important question to be answered was what to do next? There were three options open to the regime. The first option was to transfer power to the party that had a clear majority in the National Assembly, which would have been the AL. There was a major problem with this. By transferring power, the government would have became a party to the creation of a new political system in Pakistan. This would have meant the decline of the power of the traditional power holders in the country. In the end this would have meant the change of the status quo in Pakistan, which no one really wanted.

The second option was to hold power till things began to calm down, then clear heads would be able to work something out. The political forces working

^Manzooruddin Ahamed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy, and Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p. 13.

^Ibid. , - 102 -

within the country were too strong for this to really work. The result of

this would be an outright civil war.

Finally, the third option was to hold the elections again. The

political climate of Pakistan showed that the result of another election would

not have really changed anything. The only thing that would have changed

would have been that NAP and JUL would have won a few more seats. Overall,

however, the situation would have remained the same. A number of high

officials within the government had pointed out to Yahya Khan that the stands

taken by Mujab and Bhutto would be watered down if time was given to them.

These same officials had also stated that no one party would win the general

elections. Not having a very clever mind himself, Yahya Khan took these

officials at their word, and choose the second option.

Section Two : East Pakistan Crisis : The Second Option

It was a forgone conclusion that any option that did not have in it the

transfer of power to the AL was bound to fail. The failure of the Yahya

Khan's reforms were now going to show their results.

The differences between West and East Pakistan were known to even a

little Pakistani boy. There were certain factors responsible for this. At

the time of Independence West Pakistan was far more developed then the Eastern

Wing. For all practical purposes, East Pakistan lacked industry and means of communications, particularly metalled roads and railways. The geographic and climatic conditions of East Pakistan did not allow for industry to be - 103 -

established there. There was no pay back if they were established in the

Eastern Wing.^

Immediately after independence the greatest attention towards setting up

industry and business was given by those who migrated from India. These people wanted to settle in West Pakistan and set up their enterprises there.

Some of these people did go to East Pakistan, but they had to come to West

Pakistan, when the people of the Eastern Wing adopted an anti-West Pakistan posture in the mid-fifties. When Ayub Khan came to power private entrepreneurs again started increasing investments in East Pakistan, but they were again discouraged by the Six-Point Formula of the AL.12/

Economy was not the only issue. Ever since independence the political picture of Pakistan had been filled by the politicians of West Pakistan.

Majority of these were from the Punjab. The East Pakistani's felt that they were being subjugated by people who really did not like them. Only one East

Pakistani had been the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and that only for a few months. The bureaucracy was filled by the population of West Pakistan. Other issues were: the military service; the education system; the language issue, and, finally the Indian crises. In the case of the Armed Forces, these were dominated by the West Pakistani's as the Bangali's were never considered good fighters. The educational system and the language issue were one sided. The refugees decided in 1948 that the official language of Pakistan would be Urdu.

This was an alien language as none of the peoples of the majority provinces

l^Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics In Pakistan: 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), pp. 170-178.

^Ibid., pp. 178-179. - 104 -

spoke it. No one at the time noticed that the majority of the people of

Pakistan spoke Bengali, and either Bengali should be declared the official

language, or it should at least be the second official language. Over time

this became a big issue for the Eastern Wing.

These issues, with the economic issue leading the pack, were brought out

in the election campaign of 1970. Sheikh Mujib in a speech given months after

the elections summed up the situation in the following manner:

...Thus, over 80% of all foreign aid obtained had been utilized for the benefit of the vested interests of West Pakistan. Over two-thirds of all imports made over the last 23 years have been into West Pakistan. Foreign exchange earnings of Bangladesh to the extent of over Rs. 500 crores has been utilized in West Pakistan. Bangladesh has been used as a protected market of 70 million for the benefit of a handful of the industrialists of West Pakistan, who had been enabled to make gigantic profits. As a result of such a ruthless exploitation, the economy of Bangladesh is in a state of imminent collapse. Haunted by the specter of famine and denied of the bare means of subsistence, the people of Bangladesh have been reduced to a state of total starvation. We can, on no account, allow this state of affairs to continue.12/

This then was the thinking in East Pakistan. The issue of economics was high

in the Western Wing, however, the AL had taken this very issue to new heights.

If East Pakistan was ever going to get the benefits of its victory, then the question of exploitation of the Eastern Wing would also have to be resolved.

These events were not conducive to improving the conditions in any way.

The regime of Yahya Khan began its talks with the AL and PPP so that an agreement could be reached which would include softened AL demands. One set of talks led to another and the AL, as time went on, became even more vocal in

its demands to have its six points adopted. The situation then reached the

^Ibid., p. 182. - 105 -

point from where civil war appeared imminent. This civil war began at the end

of March 1971 and ended in December 1971 when 90,000 men of the Pakistani

Armed Forces surrendered at Dacca to the Eastern Indian Command.11/

The events of the Civil War have been covered a number of times in

different books, so there is no reason to cover these again. Instead, we will

say a few words about the bureaucracy and the East Pakistani crisis.

The bureaucracy since the establishment of Pakistan had dominated

politics. However, bureaucratic politics while it was a constant feature of

West Pakistan, it was only subsequently imposed on East Pakistan. The natural

political scene of East Pakistan was dominated by the politicians, as neither

the bureaucracy nor the elites had a chance to establish themselves given the

conditions in the Eastern Wing.

Once the bureaucracy had established itself in the Western Wing it also

tried to establish itself in the Eastern Wing. The result was continuous

instability. The imposition of Martial Law in 1952, 1956, 1958, and 1969 are

examples of this instability. The 1970 elections showed that the party

politics were quite evident in the Eastern Wing. Once the elections were over

the AL should normally have been given power, as it was the majority party in

the National Assembly.12/

However, conditions were not normal. The reforms of the regime of Yahya

Khan had not produced any stability and the un-sound policies had produced

conditions in which anything could have started a snowball effect. The state

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 267-273.

^Ibid., pp. 267-271. - 106 -

in Pakistan realized that if it did give power to the AL then its own power base would have been reduced. So the question of status quo was evident once

again. By March 1971 neither side was willing to give an inch, and the result was civil war.12/

Section Three: The Reasons Why Democracy Failed

The aim of this section is to link at some of the reasons why the first attempt at establishing democracy failed in Pakistan. To explain this, we need to go back to the number one question that needed to be resolved, namely the question of the state in Pakistani politics. If we look at the events leading up to the election of 1970, and the events after the elections, we see that it was the state that did not want to bend one inch. The state's un­ willingness to have any institution other than itself to run the affairs of

Pakistan was a factor that led to the failed attempt.

At the beginning of this chapter we pointed out that once Yahya Khan took over the affairs of Pakistan, he stated that the right conditions had to be created before elections could be held. The right conditions meant that calm conditions had to be established. The time table within which elections had to be held was 90 days. The regime at this point began the process of bringing stability. The method used was reforms.

The reforms were introduced in education and labor. Both the students and the business groups had been the most vocal in the anti-Ayub movement, and so the first thing the regime wanted to do was please them. Yahya Khan's

^Ibid. , - 107 -

displeasure with the bureaucracy meant that all reform laws would bypass the bureaucracy's ok. This was the main reason that the reform failed, as pointed out above. Because the reforms failed the students and workers began movements not only against the federal government but also the provincial governments. In sum, this created conditions in which the bottled up frustrations of the masses began to come out.

The conditions and there results in East Pakistan are enough reason to support the above. In East Pakistan, as in West Pakistan, the students and the labor community had been quite vocal during the anti-Ayub movement. Once people began to see that changes would not come as a result of the reforms, they came out on the streets. The Awami League (AL), which was the only outlet for the masses in the East, saw the writing on the wall and took the battle cry of the masses to the steps of the provincial assembly. The more the party leaders spoke against the government, the more the masses realized that they had found their spokesman. The party and its leader, Sheikh Mujab- ur-Rahman, became an over night success. At this point the differences between the two wings became very important to the AL leadership, and it was used when ever the chance came. In West Pakistan the most important party was the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the PPP, also saw the writing on the wall. Bhutto began crying out for the masses in every speech that he gave. It was in these conditions that the general elections were held.

Once the elections took place the AL, in the Eastern Wing, and the PPP, in the Western Wing, wanted power to be given to them as they won in their own wings. In addition, the AL wanted power to be given to it at the center, as - 108 -

it had won the majority in the National Assembly. At this point the Yahya

Khan's regime was caught in the middle and, the two parties and the government began the long process of coming to some understanding.

It was clear form the start that for the government to give power to the

AL was not going to be easy. However, when the AL leadership saw that not

only the PPP but also the army was against giving it the right to rule, the party began the movement to achieve power even if it meant civil war. As more

time passed all were convinced that the AL wanted all its demands to be met

including its "Six Points." Once the army saw that the situation was out of hand it went into East Pakistan to crush the so called uprising. This led to

the civil war and the third Indo-Pakistani war. At the end of the war the country lost its majority province, and also lost the chance to establish

democracy.

In all these events, the state was not willing to yield any concessions.

The state was concerned about unity, and it did everything in its power to maintain unity and peaceful conditions. The state refused to see that the masses, who had became very political minded during the anti-Ayub movement, wanted a say in their own affairs. To maintain order and unity the state allowed the conditions to deteriorate from bad to worse in a few months. In

the end Pakistan lost half of the country because the state would not give a

small percentage of its power to the politicians and the political parties.

For these few and very important reasons, Pakistan failed in establishing democracy. - 109 -

Overview

General Yahya Khan came to power in 1969, for one reason and one reason alone, which was to hold the general elections. The anti-Ayub movement had politicized the masses. The politicians, the lawyers, and the intellectuals had come out in force and carried out reforms in the political make up.

However, before elections could be held calm conditions had to be created.

Conditions in both wings were so disturbed that elections were not feasible.

For this reason the regime of Yahya Khan began its reform movement, which was designed to create better conditions for the elections. In its reform movement the regime kept the bureaucracy in the dark. All the projects were handled by the army itself, and these army generals were not quite sure what they were doing.

The result was that the reforms did not produce the benefits that the regime and the nation were looking for. In this chapter we listed the reforms in education, industry, and politics. The result was that none of the reforms in any of the above sections worked. When it was clear that the reforms were not working, and the condition in the country had not changed, the regime declared that the elections will still be held on time.

Under these conditions the first general elections in the history of

Pakistan were held on December 10, 1970. Everyone expected that the government would get involved in the whole process. The results of the elections surprised everyone when it was seen that AL in the Eastern Wing and the PPP in the Western Wing had won the elections. The AL had a clear majority in the National Assembly with the PPP coming in second, which was also a shocker to everyone. However, the reality was there. - 110 -

The regime tried to talk to the two majority parties and come to some understanding, however, the AL adhered to its six points, and the PPP would not give up on its opposition to these six points. The situation was at a stand still and at this point the regime used its power. The end result was a

Civil War, which overtime changed into the third Indo-Pakistani war. By

December 1971 the war was over, and East Pakistan had became an independent state. In the now abbreviated Pakistan Z. A. Bhutto took over the seat of power. CHAPTER FIVE ; PEOPLE'S POWER VS. STATE POWER : THE BHUTTO YEARS (1971-19771

Introduction

By December 1971 Pakistan had been in existence for almost 24 years.

Within these 24 years Pakistan had been subjected to three constitutions, two martial law regimes, and the break up of the country. If the past was any guide then the future was not much better. In 1972 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto himself stated that if the situation does not change than the military will come back into the political scene of Pakistan and any chance for stability will be lost.

As before, political stability was again the major question that was on the minds of everyone. People were talking about the reforms that the new government of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was going to bring about. Given the involvement of the masses in the political process, due to the anti-Ayub movement of 1968, everyone thought that the traditional powerholders of Pakistan, who had done more harm than good, were going to be cut to size, and the voices and demands of the people of Pakistan will be heard and met. Bhutto was of the people, by the people, and for the people. People thought that the dream that Muhammad Ali Jinnah

(the founding father) had for Pakistan, would be realized through the deeds of the young and strong Bhutto.

The dream of the people, and of Bhutto, was lost within five and half years of the PPP government. The economic, political, and social reforms undertaken by the government produced such negative results, that in July 5

1977 Martial Law had to be declared in Pakistan. Bhutto paid with his life for the results that the reforms had or might have produced.

Much has been written about Bhutto. He had been depicted from one extreme to another, depending on the allegiances of the writer. One can read - 112 -

about Bhutto and never find the real person. There is no doubt that Bhutto

was a great leader, why else would he be talked about after all these years.

In Pakistan every individual has an opinion about this man. However, our

purpose is not to find the real Bhutto. Enough people are doing that already.

Our purpose is to review the Bhutto years in light of the state system of

Pakistan.

Only days before Bhutto came to power Pakistan had gone through a nightmare. The country was split up due to the unrealistic policies of the military regime. The standing of Pakistan in the eyes of the Pakistani's and

the world were at its lowest. The talk of independence in the four provinces

of Pakistan were at their height. These were the prevailing conditions, and

Bhutto had to build the country from that point.

The policies of the PPP government were designed to bring back to the people of Pakistan their lost pride. The 1973 Constitution; the notion of democracy; the Islamic Conference of 1973; and finally, the nationalization of

industries were all designed to bring back pride in the People of Pakistan.

For the first two years, of the five and half years of the PPP rule, the traditional powerholders kept their hands off everything and Bhutto was left to do what he wanted. However, after 1973 Bhutto began to become a threat to these powerholders. The man was becoming larger than life.

By the end of 1976, Bhutto had became a real threat to the traditional powerholders. If he were left alone he would change the whole political balance. For this reason he had to be stopped. Bhutto himself, by 1976, was beginning to see the threat that the powerholders were beginning to display against him. For this reason, in January 1977 Bhutto called for elections by - 113 -

the coming March. He was going to go to the people and get a fresh mandate to

go on with his reforms.

The traditionalists saw these elections as a device to cut Bhutto to

size. The election campaign by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) during

and after the elections was designed to discredit Bhutto in every possible

way. Clashes between the pro-Bhutto and anti-Bhutto forces after the

elections reached a point that talks had to be called between the PPP and PNA.

However, the traditionalists, even before the talks began, had stated

that Bhutto's days were numbered. To please a few foreign powers, namely: the

Arab countries, the illusion was given that the talks would produce good

results. In the background the traditionalist were planning the over throw of

the government. The PNA went to the very end, when the chances of a deal were

good, and then its leadership stated that it would not agree with the deal.

On July 4-5 1977 Martial Law was declared in Pakistan.

The Bhutto years in reality were years of struggle on who would rule

Pakistan, would it be the traditionalists or the PPP? In the end the

traditionalist powerholders won the day. The politicians lost the battle for

the second time.

In section one we will look at the Bhutto system. In addition, we will

look at the Bhutto and PPP style of running the system. Having outlined the

institutional aspects of the state, we will turn to the reform movement under

the Bhutto years. The theme of the first two sections will be to show how

Bhutto became a threat to the traditionalists. Having done that, we will turn

to the anti-Bhutto movement in section three. Finally, in section four we will explain why the second attempt to establish democracy failed in Pakistan. - 114 -

SECTION ONE : THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY GOVERNMENT

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rise to power symbolized a breakthrough in the bureaucratic pattern of government in Pakistan. This new kind of government had a clear policy orientation which not only ran counter to the priorities of the permanent bureaucratic establishment but also aimed at bringing about a structural transformation of the system. So, what distinguished this government from its predecessors was its anti-establishment ideology. There is no other way of showing this anti-establishment stand, than to show the institutional set up of this government.

Party Rule : Institutional Set Up

The PPP rule had an effect at three different levels. The first level we can call the Center, in other words, at the level of the federal system.

The traditional method of policy-making was done by the bureaucracy, and its backers, namely: the landlords; and the businessman. The National Assembly, and the different secretariats were used for rubber stamp purposes. While in theory the National Assembly had more power than any other institution, in reality the bureaucracy had more power. With Bhutto coming into power all this changed. Now, the formal policy-making authority was assumed by the office of the prime minister, the secretariats, and the prime minister's cabinet. These arms of the Central Government were advised by the bureaucrats, mainly about things which could not be done easily. Even when the bureaucracy was on its way back, after 1973, the power to make policies was still left in the hands of the new powerholders. In other words, the - 115 -

government became the master and the bureaucracy the servant. The actors and the parts had, after 24 years, been taken on by the right people.1/

The second level was provincial. The traditional method of setting the affairs of the province right was always done by the landlords and the bureaucracy. This institution had opened up a number of offices which dealt with the problems. Even at the provincial level the policy-making was done by the bureaucracy. The provincial assembly was again a rubber stamp assembly.

The chief minister was chosen on his position vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and not on his political skills. The traditional powerholders of the provinces used their power to get the assemblies to pass laws that helped them. With the coming of the PPP government all this was also changed. Provincial offices were taken up by the politicians. While the party used the traditional channels of state authority, the people who were losing were the traditionalist. This did not please the civil bureaucracy, for whom public demands coming through un-authorized channels under political pressure were very dis-concerting.2/

The third level was at the district and sub-district level. The traditional method of authority was always in the hands of the landlords, the refugees, and the businessman. These powerholders nominated members of their own class to oversee the running of the district. These men had a lot of power. The officers of the government were for rubber stamp purposes. From

1972 onward the authority at this level shifted form the traditionalist to the

i/Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy, and Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1980), pp. 45-54.

^Ibid., - 116 -

government officials. All policy-making was done by the government officials.

However, over time the officials got corrupted when they began to establish

friendship ties bureaucrats, especially with the police, which helped them

rise in social status and accumulate discretionary powers.This in short was

the new institutional setup of the PPP government.

Reaction to Pakistan Peoples Party Rule

Bhutto inherited two fores of political opposition. One was from

political parties and groups that enjoyed tacit recognition from the state.

The other was from outside the legitimate political community. In this

opposition we can include the landed or commercial elites, the professionals,

and the loosely defined groups of refugees. Their territorial base was

limited to The Punjab and the urban sectors of Sind and the North West

Frontier Province.2/

At the start of the Bhutto rule the opposition was from the powerful

elite groups. These groups included the Civil Service of Pakistan;

businessmen and industrialists; landlords; and retired army and civil

officers. These groups had opposed Bhutto in the elections, and now they

tried to contain his radicalism from within the government, although with only

partial success.

Their opposition took on two forms. The first was condemning the

excesses of the PPP workers and cadres, and also blaming them for discrediting

their leader and party in official and non-official circles. The second form was the moral and later financial support of the statist parties. These

^Mohammad Wasseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 329-331. - 117 -

parties started building up a party-based opposition and playing on the ideological dichotomy of Islam versus socialism.5/

In reaction to this opposition, the Bhutto government's strategy revolved around keeping the opposition from forming an alliance among themselves. For this reason various cells were formed within the different ministries whose sole purpose was to keep eye on the non-party groups suchas the students; the ulema (clerical elite), the lawyers, and the workers.

The opposition from the non-statist parties was largely in response to

Bhutto's strong-handed tactics. For example, the governments in the Province of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were formed by

National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamat-e-Islami (JUI) party. In these two provinces the Center Government interfered in the workings of the government.

The Center Government constantly tried to undermine the NAP-JUI's ability to govern. When arms were found on there way to Baluchistan through the good offices of the Iraqi government, Bhutto decided to dissolve the Baluchistan government. It was followed by the resignation of the NWFP government in protest. Here was a step backward in the political development of Pakistan leading back to the previous practice of dismissal of provincial governments by the Center in the pre-Ayub period.5/

^Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy: 1947-77 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), pp. 128-132.

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 329-331. - 118 -

Overview

The Bhutto years were to be different in the sense that a new political system was introduced in Pakistan. The institutional setup by Bhutto was a big start. Political institutions replaced bureaucratic institutions. The channels that were created because of this change enabled the people of

Pakistan to have a say in the workings of their government. From the Center to the district level the system was designed to help the common man.

However, when it came to the functioning of the government, the things remained the same as they had always been. The old tactics of any pervious government were again used by the Bhutto government. We have already shown the treatment received by the political opposition from the government.

From these observations we can conclude that while the government wanted change it did not feel that change would come if there was such a strong opposition. Any disagreement from the opposition was seen as un-helpful.

This was a very negative stand of the government because the opposition stated that if they were not allowed to speak out then Pakistan did not have a true democracy. In short, it was around this policy that the battle was fought between the two sides.

As a result, any opposition was taken care of by force. This type of handling of the situation was something that the traditional powerholders could not observe and remain unaffected. The regimes' reform movement was the last straw, and the state system began to count the days when Bhutto would be out of power. Let us turn to the reform movement. - 119 -

SECTION TWO : REFORMS OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY GOVERNMENT

As we stated before, Bhutto's reason for being in power was to change the political set up of the country. As all governments before the PPP government, the reforms were designed to stabilize the Pakistani system so that growth could begin. PPP government reforms can be grouped into two types; political and economic. Let us look at each of these separately.

Political Reforms

The political reforms were designed to influence the military and the political institutional setup of the country. The military reforms were designed to make this institution non-political. The political institutional reforms were designed to bring stability.

Military Reforms

There is no doubt that Bhutto's rise to power was due to the military.

He had been part of the government of President Mohammad Ayub Khan from 1958-

1966. It was because of this tenure that he won popularity due to his anti- imperialist stand. In 1971 it was the military's mini-coup in Islamabad that led to Bhutto becoming the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of

Pakistan. The military, therefore, was a major factor in Bhutto's rise to power. This whole notion also made Bhutto realize that the military was in reality the strongest power in Pakistan. It was Bhutto's thinking that the military had to be cut to size so that the political institutions would have a chance to develop. From the very beginning Bhutto had a helping hand in the sense that the military was so demoralized, as a result of the war, that it let Bhutto do what he wanted. - 120 -

Three different events took place in the following months and years which made the civilian rule and the military an arm of the political institutions. The first one occurred on March 4 1972. On this date the powerful Chief of Staff of the Army, Lt. General Gul Hasan, and the Chief of

Staff of the Air Force, Air Marshal Rahim, were dismissed from their position and later sent abroad as ambassadors.2/

As a result of the dismissal of these two chiefs, Bhutto began to dilute the powers of the chiefs. Instead of Commander-in-Chief, the heads of the three services were to be called "Chief of Staff", and they were put under the chairman of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee". This Committee was to work directly under the prime minister's office, and they were to be in direct contact with the "Defence Committee" of the cabinet, and the "Defence

Council". In this way, the Bhutto government sought to overcome the first major challenge to its authority from the top military leadership. Later, the

1973 Constitution declared as high treason any act aiming at subverting constitutional rule, and in this way sought to stop the Pakistan military from interfering in politics in the future.2/

The second event, which occurred in late 1972, related to the Asma

Jilani Case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, under the chairmanship of Chief

Justice Hamoudurrehman, heard the criminal appeals relating to the orders of the Governments of Punjab and Sind to detain Messrs Ghualm Jilani and Altaf

Gauhar under Martial Law order of Pakistan no.78 of 1971. The Supreme Court

2/Ibid., pp. 332-333.

I/All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Lahore: All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1975), p. 3. - 121 -

not only considered the jurisdiction of the High Courts in this matter, but more importantly, investigated the doctrine of necessity which had provided the Supreme Court's decision on Martial Law in the Dosso case in 1958.. The

Chief Justice observed that the 1962 Constitution did not empower President

Mohammad Ayub Khan to hand over power to any one, and therefore the Martial

Law of General Mohammad Yahya Khan was unconstitutional.®/ The Chief Justice further observed:

The order which the usurper imposes will remain illegal and the Courts will not recognize its rule and act upon them as de jure. As soon as the first opportunity arises, when the coercive apparatus falls from the hands of the usurper, he should be tried for high treason and suitably punished. This alone will serve as deterrent to would be adventurers .2/

This act not only confirmed the principles of civilian supremacy but also threatened any further adventurers with dire consequences.

The last event took place in April 1973. When the interim Constitution came into force in 1972, after Martial Law was lifted, a section of the Army and the Air Force conspired to overthrow the PPP government. This resulted in court martials; imprisonment; retirement; and transfer of a number of officers. In addition, Bhutto developed differences with Air Force Chief of

Staff, Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary, who had to resign his post. By 1973, it was clear that the civilian government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was on top of the military establishment, and was going to rule the country. ^

2/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 309.

2/Ibid.,

^Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), pp. 17-20. - 122 -

Constitutional Reforms

The Constitution of 1973 is perhaps by far the most spectacular achievement of the Bhutto era. As far as Bhutto was concerned, the politics of Pakistan up to 1973 had been played in an atmosphere of distrust. Because

there was no law and order people had risen up on the power ladder to achieve what they could for themselves. This had created divisions within the society at economic, political, and social levels. To bring order a number of politicians and military officers had held the highest office in the land, but with very little success. The constitutions that these men produced were designed to help them and not the country as a whole. Bhutto had come to power to change this, and the 1973 Constitution was the end result.51/

The Constitution of 1973 was drawn through a 'Constitutional Accord' between the ruling and opposition parties. This constitution provided for

Islamic, parliamentary, and federal structures. Once the constitution took effect, Bhutto descended from the Presidency to became the Prime Minister of

Pakistan, and a senior PPP leader from Punjab, Mr. Chaudhry Fazl Elahi, took over as the Constitutional President. The one thing outstanding about the

Constitution was that it called for provincial autonomy. However, given what we talked about in the first section on how Bhutto saw the opposition, the

Constitution gave only lip service. Whenever political expediency required,

Bhutto used to amend the Constitution with his absolute majority in the

National Assembly. In addition, Bhutto never followed the provincial autonomy clause of the Constitution, as he always dealt with the provincial governments

^Victoria Schofield, Bhutto: Trial and Execution (London: Cassell Ltd., 1979), pp. 1-17. - 123 -

with highhandedness, as in the case of Baluchistan and the NWFP. This mis­ use of power was brought out in the anti-Bhutto movement of 1977, which we will talk about in the next section.12/

The political reforms were radical in the sense that they were designed to change the political system in Pakistan. The military reforms and the constitutional reforms point to the fact that the idea was to bring change in the political system of Pakistan. Let us now turn to the economic reforms.

Economic Reforms

The economic reforms can be grouped into Administration; Economy:

Industry; Agrarian Reforms; and Banking and Insurance.

Administration

In order to streamline public administration, the "Administrative

Reforms" were announced on August 20 1973. The traditional classification of civil servants was abolished, and a new unified grade structure offering equality of opportunity on the basis of professional and specialized competence was introduced. A "National Pay Commission" was set up to review the existing pay structure. However, these reforms were not implemented in spirit. The lateral system turned into a spoil system, opening a pandora's box for corruption, nepotism, and favoritism. These measures went a long way in demoralizing the bureaucracy and one could notice beneath the surface strong currents of resentment and discontent prevailing among the civil servants

^Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto. 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 79-108.

^Ibid. , - 124 -

Economy: Industry

The Bhutto government's labor policies were designed to meet the demands of industrial labor, urban intelligentsia, and students. Before the labor policies of the Bhutto government took effect labor unions tended to take it upon themselves to settle with the industrialist and resolve the managerial disputes in various manufacturing units. Bhutto's labor policies were designed on the same lines as of Nur Khan in 1969. It contained relatively liberal provisions for workers' involvement in factory management; workers' share in annual profits; speedy court hearings; social benefits; and extension of the principles of workers' organization to small-scale industrial units.

These reforms were soon followed by a second wave of policy measures in 1973 which focused on the net involvement of workers in the management of industry.15/

In addition, ten basic industries: vegetable oil; steel and basic metals; heavy engineering; heavy electrical goods; fertilizers; automobiles; trucks and tractors; petroleum refining; petro-chemicals; heavy and basic chemicals; cements and public utilities like gas and electricity were nationalized. This was done in response to popular demand, as it helped a large section of the under paid and overworked workers. This change in policy had its fallout in the form of alienation of employees. It generally antagonized commercial and industrial groups. It was natural for them to talk back on their traditional links with the official classes so as to, at least partially, offset the effects of what they considered to be a pro-working

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 310-313. - 125 -

class policy. The workers seeing the power they had, demanded more from the government. On the other hand the PPP government found it very hard to bring these groups into the new system. It finally chose to smash its organizational strength through harsh measures, which were to cost the ruling party dearly in terms of its mass credibility.12/

Through nationalization the Bhutto government did achieve its objective of clipping the wings of the large industrial families. The two most affected families were the Saigol and Habib. Perhaps more damaging than the loss of assets was the loss of respect for the families. This loss of respect made these families use their power to oppose the power of the government which was evident during the anti-Bhutto movement.12/

Agrarian Reforms

The Land Reforms of the Bhutto government can be seen as the second most important achievement. The idea behind the reforms was to accelerate agricultural production and stimulate modernization of cultivation. This was needed if improvements were to be brought about. For this reason genuine measures of land reforms were considered and adopted. The result that the government was looking for was to end feudalism in the shortest time possible.

Bhutto, in a number of speeches, stated that the differences between his land reforms, and the reforms that came before, were that while his were real the others were fake.12/

^Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-85 (London: Thetford Press Limited., 1988), pp. 77-101.

^Ibid. ,

^Ibid. , - 126 -

Bhutto Introduced the land reforms in two installments. The first

instalment land reforms were introduced in March 1972. The ceiling on individual land holdings was reduced from 500 acres of irrigated land or 1000 acres of un-irrigated land to 150 acres or 300 acres respectively. Land was given free to the tenants, and no compensation was given to the original owner. The second instalment was introduced on the eve of the general elections of 1977. Under these reforms the ceiling on individual land holdings was further reduced. The new ceiling under these reforms was 100 acres for irrigated land and 300 acres for un-irrigated land. In addition, the new land reform policy exempted land holders, who had 25 acres of irrigated and 50 acres of un-irrigated land, from paying agricultural tax.12/

The idea behind the land reforms was, as stated before, to bring stability to the country. Everyone who wanted to work had a chance to help the country and the economy. However, the land reforms had numerous loop holes in respect to land transfers, evasions, and other such problems. The rich landlords still seemed to have power over the small landholders, and so the products that the latter produced were in line with what the rich landholders wanted. While almost everyone got land only a few saw the benefits.1®/

Banking And Insurance

In 1972, in fulfillment of the PPP manifesto, life insurance was nationalized. Later, on January 1 1974, the government announced that all

^Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), pp. 22-23.

127Ibid. , - 127 -

Banks, expect foreign ones, would be nationalized. The nationalization policy

of the banks was carried out without consulting the State Bank Of Pakistan.

Thus, the whole fabric of banking system was brought under the control of the

government. This resulted in the interference of the federal ministers in

respect to advances, credits, and appointments. As a result, the government

set up "Pakistan Banking Council", which was designed to oversee the running

of the Banking system. Even this did not help. The whole idea did not

produce the results that it was suppose to.22/

Overview

In this second section we have talked about the reforms that were

introduced by the government of Zulfikar All Bhutto. The aim of these reforms was to change the way the system in Pakistan worked. Instead of having a

system working for only a few, as it always had, now the system was to work

for everyone.

However, the reforms did not achieve what Bhutto was looking for. While

it is true, that the reforms did help the people of Pakistan to a degree, they did not on the other hand go all the way. The lack of results only managed to stir up the anti-Bhutto elements in the country. On the other hand the backers of the government wanted more. By the beginning of 1977 Bhutto could see that he had to go to the people to get a fresh mandate, as the anti-

Bhutto element were getting too strong. Let us now turn to the third section of this chapter and talk about the downfall of Bhutto.

^Ibid. , - 128 -

SECTION THREE : THE DOWNFALL

When we talk about the downfall we have to be certain what we are

talking about. Are we talking about Bhutto's downfall, or are we talking

about the downfall of the PPP government headed by Z. A. Bhutto? There is a big difference between the two approaches. When we talk about the first

approach then all we are talking about are the deeds and mis-deeds of Bhutto.

The second approach on the other hand takes into account events created by the

PPP government which led to its downfall. The whole idea of this study has been to understand the political events in Pakistan in the light of the state

system. In this regard the second approach fits better, and given this we cannot but use the second approach to understand the events that led to the downfall of the PPP government.

Call For Elections And The Elections Of March 1977

By January 1977 the changes within the government and the reforms

introduced by the PPP government had begun to take their toll. The pro-

Bhutto forces were up in arms because the government was only paying lip service to the reforms. The anti-Bhutto forces were up in arms because the call for a new Pakistan had only made things worse. These people wanted things to be put back the way they were before, and wanted the status quo to be brought back. Taking these forces into account Bhutto decided to hold the elections in March so that he could get a fresh mandate from the people.

After this mandate his position would have been better to carry on with the reforms. - 129 -

At this time various factors seemed to go in favor of the government.

The rate of inflation had come down from 25X to 6Z by 1975; wheat production had shot up to 8.6 million tons by 1975; the GNP growth rate had doubled in the years of the PPP government; finally, the remittances of emigrant labor had reached the high annual figure of $500 million.21/

On the other hand, there were a number of imponderables. The PPP governments' economic goals were found to be lacking in the eyes of the World

Bank president, who came in late 1976; the public sector had not been able to generate capital, and in turn the government had resorted to deficit financing; the average income had declined by more than 2% in 1976-77; the impasses in Baluchistan still continued; and finally, by August of 1976 the economic life was plagued by rumors that the regime was not sure what it was doing, which was a great liability.®/

The government of Z. A. Bhutto held a number of meetings in which all things were looked into. The decision of the Prime Minister was that elections should be held so that he and his government could get a new mandate from the people, which would be needed if the problems that still faced the nation were to be s o l v e d . 3/ We should also add at this point, that the government had somehow convinced itself that there were no parties that could

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 340-341.

S/Ibid., pp. 341-342.

^/Benazir Bhutto, Daughter Of The East (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1988), pp. 70-71. - 130 -

win as many, or more, seats in the National Assembly than they could. In short, the PPP would not only win, but win big.

In line with the Constitution, the National Assembly was dissolved on

January 10, 1977, and after that, Bhutto announced that the elections will be held on March 7, 1977 for the National Assembly, and on March 10 for the provincial assemblies. Two months were assigned for the election campaign.

Once the elections were announced, all important parties such as: Tehrik-i-

Istiqlal (TI); Jamaat-i-Islami (JI); Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI); Pakistan

Muslim League (PML); National Democratic Party (NDP); and Pakistan Democratic

Party (PDP), among others, united together to form the Pakistan National

Alliance (PNA). This came as a shock to everyone, given the differences that existed between the parties. However, one thing the PNA showed was that the anti-Bhutto forces were going to do everything to get the PPP government out of office.&

The PNA dubbed the PPP government as an engine of oppression. The PPP came back and stated that the PNA was an engine of disruption. The PNA in the campaign stated that they would bring Islamic system to Pakistan, and that they would re-introduce civic rights which had been taken away by the PPP government. In addition, the PNA stated that all the changes in the government system or the reforms that the PPP started had not produced any results. The PNA added that Pakistan was worse off than it was in 1971. The only solution was the adoption of Islamic Codes, and they were the only ones who could bring that about. Not to be out done, the PPP stated that their party was for democracy, and for the first time in her history Pakistan had

^Ibid., p. 65. - 131 -

democracy. The PPP also added that the talk of Islam was a device of the PNA

to cover what they really wanted, which was to bring back bureaucratic rule in

Pakistan. All the changes and the reforms, according to the PPP, were done to bring democracy in Pakistan. Throughout the two months this type of campaign remained in play. A number of days before the elections the PNA began to lose ground, and, to keep going, the PNA announced that if they did not win then it would mean that the PPP had rigged the elections. The author of this anecdote is not known, however, one thing was certain, that Bhutto was not going to stay in power.2/

The results of the general elections of March 1977 were bewildering to almost everyone. The results gave PPP a landslide victory of 136 out of 173 seats under contest, plus another 19 uncontested seats. The PNA got 93 seats.

According to official results, a total of 17,494,749 votes were cast; 63X of these went to the PPP. It seems that the elections were rigged by the PPP.

For example, in 1970 there were 22,050,496 votes cast which gave the PPP 79.55 percent of the votes. Now in 1977, 17,494,749 votes were cast and the PPP got

63.0 percent of the votes. Something was wrong with the entire exercise, because, given the prevailing displeasure with Bhutto, the percentage of the vote was too high.28/

The Aftermath Of The Election

As pointed out before, the PNA had stated that if it did not win the elections then the elections were rigged. Once the results were out,

^Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p. 82.

^/Ibid. , p. 82. - 132 -

statements were made that the PNA might boycott the provincial elections, which were to be held on March 10 1977. That is exactly what the PNA did as

PNA was not ready to bestow on the PPP government the crown of victory. On

March 14 it began its agitation in all major cities. This resulted in demonstrations, incidents of confrontation with the police, and mass arrests of the PNA leadership. Bhutto on his part stated that before things get out of hand a dialogue should began between the PPP and PNA. This was rejected by the PNA because it demanded that Bhutto resign from the prime ministership, and that the elections should be held under the joint supervision of the army and the judiciary.&

A few weeks later Bhutto offered the PNA the following: 1) a judicial enquiry into the disputed cases; 2) go for provincial elections, and if the

PNA wins them then hold the elections for the National Assembly again. Later,

Bhutto offered to hold a referendum on the issue of his own continuation as

Prime Minister, and for that purpose got the 7th Amendment to the Constitution passed by the National Assembly. PNA again called for the Prime Minister to resign before anything could be done.In a parallel process the PNA turned the tempo of the agitation into a movement for the establishment of Nizam-e-

Mustafa (the Prophet's System) in the country.2/

Bhutto on his part, led by his minister of religious affairs, announced the introduction of Shariat in the country on 17 April, whereby drinking alcohol and gambling were prohibited. The government had lost its nerves.

^/Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto. 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 195-202.

^Ibid. , - 133 -

The PNA had the government by its neck and began to expand the movement. The country had gone into a shock. 22/

The whole movement by this time took on international dimensions. The

Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, Shiekh Riazul Khatib tried to mediate between the two sides, as did the visiting Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Tariki. On April

28 1977, Bhutto stated that this movement was designed by the United States government, because she did not want Bhutto to establish a nuclear reprocessing plant. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, wrote to Bhutto and stated that he should stop this type of talk as it could affect the relations between the two countries. When the movement could not be stopped, Bhutto declared Martial Law in Lahore, Karachi and Hyde r a b a d . 22/

On June 2 1977 the Lahore High Court declared the martial law unconstitutional. From thereon Bhutto knew that he would not use the army again. The whole idea of Martial Law, which went against the constitution, was seen by the public as a move which would only be made if the government had lost its nerves. From this day onwards the situation went from bad to worse with no end in sight. From June 3 to July 2 1977 the two sides progressed towards an agreement in an atmosphere of extreme mistrust. On July

2, 1977 the opposition negotiating team put the final manuscript of its accord with the government before the PNA Central Council. This was rejected by the

Council the same day. On the night of 4-5 July the Army came back in full force and declared Martial Law throughout the country. The era of Zulfikar

^Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), pp. 25-27.

22/Ibid. , - 134 -

All Bhutto was over. Bhutto would never come back to power again. The idea of a democratic Pakistan ended on July 5 1977.2*/

SECTION FOUR : THE SECOND FAILED ATTEMPT AT ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY

In this section we want to explain in detail the reasons why the second attempt at bringing democracy failed in Pakistan. The author believes that there are two factors responsible for this. The first factor has to do with the state in Pakistan. The second factor has to do with the personality of

Bhutto.

The state system of Pakistan had been subjected to the most profound setback during the Anti-Ayub movement, the 1970 elections, and the 1971 Civil

War. As a result, the state had to take a backseat while Bhutto went on with his philosphy of developing Pakistan. As we stated before, the state had been in the foreground upto 1968 by taking onto itself the task of promoting unity and development in Pakistan. With the above events, however, it lost this position. This loss was not for long and within five and a half years the state come back stronger than ever before.

Bhutto's land and development policies, as stated above, led to the decline of the power of the powerful elite. In time the advancement of the poor classes began as Bhutto's policies took hold of the society. The masses of Pakistan began to see and feel important as the government, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, became responsible to them and not the powerful. In a society where economic and political power rested with the

21/ibid. , - 135 -

elite upperclass, the strains of the peoples rule were bound to be felt.

After 1972 the power brokers began their slow and bitter fight to, once again, get the upper hand in the affairs of Pakistan. Their slow rise started with pressures on the government whenever the government's policies were not in line with their own. As a result of these pressures, the policies adopted after 1972, to help the poor, were so watered down that they never achieved their goals. This left the government in a no win situation, with both the poor and the rich unhappy with the government. This led to a number of uprisings in different parts of Pakistan, the most important being in

Baluchistan.

The quest for a new mandate from the people, led Bhutto to hold elections in 1977 so that the government could develop stronger and more effective policies. However, the people of Pakistan, at all levels, were unsure of Bhutto's ability to achieve results. The PNA e.g. interpretted these trends as a sign that the people wanted to get rid of Bhutto. In this atmosphere the election campaign got under way. Once the results of the elections came out, everyone was taken aback by the fact that Bhutto won so big. Given the fact that the majority of the people were not happy with

Bhutto the results showed that the Bhutto win had been planned before hand.

The PNA saw this as a sign of the people wanting Bhutto to be taken out of office. At this point the anti-Bhutto movement began in full swing. Four months later Bhutto was out of office, the state and its backers had won the day.

The second factor has to do with the man himself. There is no doubt that Bhutto was from the landlord class. As a result, Bhutto was unable to - 136 -

overcome some of the feudal habits that he had imbibed, from his upbringing.

For this reason, the goal for him was always to get as much power as he could.

His time as a minister in Ayub's government, and also as prime minister are

enough evidence to show that the power factor was very important. Bhutto's

desire for power was reinforced by two factors.

First, as the first Sindhi prime minister, he felt insecure because he was never sure whether the Punjabi's would continue to support him. Second, like his predecessor, General Ayub, he was convinced that, given the social and political heterogeneous conflicts of Pakistan, only a strong centralized government presided over by an unassailable president or prime minister could keep the country united. In spite of the denunciations that he often hurled against Ayub in his public speeches and statements, one found that having spent the formative years of his public and political life under the tutelage of and in the autocratic government of Ayub, the political style and system of Ayub continued to be his models.^/

The 1973 Constitution, while the most important achievement of the Bhutto years, shows the power factor in full light. This constitution, whether it concerned decision-making at the central level or related to matters vis-a- vis the provincial matters, was centered around the prime minister. The prime minister was even above the National Assembly. All actions of the prime minister did not have to, and at times did not, require the assent of the assembly. A number of laws and acts were enacted in this manner. In addition, the introduction of the Federal Security Force (FSS) in 1973 was a device to enable Bhutto to get anyone or anything he wanted. In addition, the

FSS was designed to reduce Bhutto's reliance on the army. Again, Bhutto was trying to increase his autonomy. Finally, the changes within the Civil

^Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics In Pakistan: The Nature And Direction Of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 104. - 137 -

Service of Pakistan (CSP) were also designed to enable Bhutto to gather more power to himself. By opening the doors of the CSP, Bhutto made people who

liked him to get into the service and molded the service to do his bidding.

The need for power was a factor that led to the downfall of Bhutto in

1977. During the 1977 election campaign and the anti-Bhutto movement, the

leaders of the PNA raised, again and again the question of power in all of

Bhutto's dealings. The PNA questioned the antecedents of someone who wanted power so badly and yet claimed to be a champion of the poor. The two claims never mixed, and eventually Bhutto was brought down from power.

The state system and Bhutto's personality were the two factors that led to the failure of the second attempt to introduce democracy in Pakistan. If

Bhutto had not been too power hungry, and the state more willing to introduce new methods then there might have been a chance for democracy to take roots in

Pakistan. However, this never came about.

Overview

In December 1971 the situation in Pakistan was the following: East

Pakistan had won its independence; there were 90,000 plus POW's in India; the internal situation in Pakistan was such that a civil war could start at any point; economic and political reforms introduced by General Mohammad Yahya

Khan had not produced the results that they were supposed to; the anti-Ayub movement had politicized the masses; and finally, the army as well as the civil bureaucracy were demoralized. This was the situation when Zulfikar Ali

Bh.utto took over as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.

During the election period Bhutto had stressed that if his party won then there were going to be great changes in the country. The PPP government - 138 -

changed the Institutional set up of the country. The politicians became the masters and the bureaucracy became the servants. In addition, the PPP government brought changes in the military. The decision-making of the military was brought into the hands of the civilians and not left in the hands of the power hungry generals. Furthermore, changes were brought in the economic sphere. The outstanding change in this regard was the land reforms.

Finally, the most important change was the 1973 Constitution which was brought about by an agreement between all the parties in Pakistan. This was the first time that this had happened in the history of Pakistan.

All these changes were designed to change the political setup of the country. Pakistan was run by law of the Constitution and not the whim of the civil bureaucracy. For a while the traditionalist stood by and let Bhutto do what he wanted. However, once Bhutto became too big, the traditionalist though of ways to get rid of the man.

In the beginning of 1977, under great pressure Bhutto decided to hold the general elections in March 1977. For his government to go on with its programs he needed a new mandate. So elections were held and the PPP, unsure of its strength, rigged the elections. The chance the traditionalist needed to get Bhutto out had come. With the PNA as the spearhead of the traditionalist, the movement to get Bhutto out had begun. This ended on 4-5

July 1977 when Martial Law was declared in Pakistan by General Mohammad Zia- ul-Haq. CHAPTER SIX : RULE OF FORCE : 1977-1988

Introduction

If one was to sum up the Martial Law period from 1977 to 1988, under the leadership of President, General, Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Zi-ul-Haq, one would have to say that Pakistan, during this period was governed by rule of force rather than law. All steps taken in this time period were reactions to some action, may this action be taken by Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP);

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; religious parties; or international pressures. This was a period in which much was said and little was done. The call for election is a good example of the above. This was a time period in which Pakistani’s were not sure what was going to happen next, given the fact that Zia himself did not know what he was doing. Finally* this was a time period in which

Islamization was going to solve all the problems of Pakistan. However, in reality Islam was never introduced and hence could not solve any problems.

The American aid on the other hand did help and assist. Overall Pakistan did not gain anything from this type of rule.

The method used to re-establish the status quo was force. Here lies the difference of this martial law and the other two that came before it. In the other two martial laws the aim was to promote development using the traditional methods, which meant bureaucratic rule. While, this did not solve anything, the idea of the use of the traditionalist methods showed us that the state was the promoter of development. In the 1970's due to the introduction of the masses to politics, the bureaucracy lost its number one place in

Pakistan. When Zia came to power in 1977, the aim was to restore the status quo again. However, the anti-status quo forces were not willing to give up their fight to bring democracy in Pakistan. Here lay the problem for the Zia regime. The answer to the problem was force. Force was to be used to - 140 -

maintain the status quo. In sum the aim of this chapter is to show the Zia

regime in respect to the maintenance of the status quo.

In the first section we will look at the first two years of the Zia

regime. The threat in these years was Bhutto and we will describe how it was

managed by the Zia regime. In the second section we will look at the issue of

Islamization. Again, we want to show the link between Islamization and the whole idea of threat to the Martial Law regime. Islamization was a response

to the threat the Islamic parties were giving to the maintenance of the status

quo. In the final section we will look at the agitation of the Movement for

Restoration of Democracy, which we call a threat, and a quasi-civilian regime, which we call the response. From here we will move on to the final days of

the Zia regime. The aim of this chapter is to show that at each stage the regime acted on the defensive, and the use of force was important to keep the upper hand.

SECTION ONE : CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

On the morning of July 5 1977, the military, under the leadership of

Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, declared martial law throughout Pakistan. This was in response to the anti-Bhutto movement which began right after the March 10 1977 general elections. General Zia became the

Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) at the time. In justifying his action,

Zia in his address to the nation, asserted:

When the political leaders failed to rescue the country out of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the armed forces to sit as - 141 -

silent spectators, it is primarily for this reason that the army had to intervene to save the country.!/

Further stating his limited objective of military intervention, General Zia said emphatically:

I want to make it absolutely clear that neither I have any political ambition nor does the army want to be detracted from its profession of soldiering. I was obliged to step in to fill in the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have accepted this challenge as a true soldier of Islam. My sole aim is to organize a free and fair election which would be held in October this year. 2/

The army had declared officially that they were going to hold elections in

October 1987. However, unofficially the aim was to maintain and promote the status quo. There was too much at stake if elections were held. For one thing, Martial Law, according to the constitution, was an act of treason even if it did work. In 1972, when acting on the Asma Jilani case, the Supreme

Court had reversed the Dosso Case Decision, and had stated that according to the 1962 Constitution the Act of Martial Law was unconstitutional. When the

1973 Constitution took effect, the decisions of the Supreme Court carried over to this constitution. The act of Martial Law of 1977, therefore, was quite unconstitutional, and was an act of treason.2/

Secondly, everyone knew that if the elections were held then Bhutto who was still very popular would come back into power. If Bhutto came back, then

i/Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p. 27.

2/Ibid. ,

2/R. G. Sawhney, Zla's Pakistan: Implications for India's Security (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1985), pp. 1-17. - 142 -

the heads of everyone involved in his ouster would have been cut off. The question was: who's head was going to roll Zia's or Bhutto's? As far as Zia was concerned the head was going to be Bhutto's.*/ Lastly, the traditional powerholders had lost too much during the time of the PPP government. They had not only lost land but also wealth. During the time of Bhutto's rule these people had became servants to the masses. The change had introduced many problems, which required to be checked. All this had to stop and Bhutto had to be eliminated permanently .2/

For these reasons the army leadership had come to the decision that no elections would be held. To keep everyone off balance, the regime went on claiming that the elections will be held on time. At this time the army regime began looking into the idea of eliminating Bhutto before the elections were held. The smoking gun, so to speak, was found in a police report which was filed on November 11 1974. According to this report a case was filed by

Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a member of the National Assembly, who stated that Prime

Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mian Mohammad Abbas, and Chulam Mustafa, had been involved in a conspiracy to assassinate him. The report further stated that an attempt was carried out on the night of November 10-11 1974 in Lahore, and that shots were fired at the Kasuri car killing his father. The report added that the case went to Court, and because of lack of evidence, Justice

Shafi-ur-Rahman closed it. However, the military regime in 1977 found the evidence that no one else could find and the case was re-opened. On September

*/lbid.,

^Ibid., - 143 -

3 1977 Bhutto was arrested. A few days later, Martial Law Regulation no. 21 was issued, which called for enquiry into the assets of the MNA's and MFA's under the PPP rule. Two days later, General Zia declared that elections will be postponed till the accountability of the PPP government was taken care of.

This began the period of accountability.®/

Accountability

The sole purpose for accountability was to discredit the PPP government, and to give the military regime time to establish itself. No one wanted to leave the seat of government. While all this was going on, Zia in a number of speeches stated that: the presidential system was in keeping with the Islamic principles; that the Islamic Ideology Council would be reconstituted; that the taking over of flour milling and rice growing units were to de-nationalized; and that ex-servicemen were to be arrested only by the military authorities, unless permitted otherwise. These measures meant that the contours of the

Martial Law regime were being shaped around Islamic Ideology as a source of legitimacy, with concentration of power in the hands of the state, small businessmen as a social support group and the military as the core constituency.*/

A few days later, Justice K. M. A. Samadani of the Lahore High Court released Bhutto on bail. A number of days later, the acting Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court reconstituted his bench, which excluded Justice

^Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law. 1977-1985 (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd., 1987), pp 1-10.

Z/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 367. - 144 -

Samadani. The bail of Bhutto was revoked, and on the next day Bhutto was re- arrested, and his trial began. The day Bhutto was re-arrested, General Zia passed Martial Law Regulation no. 12, which stated that any man could be put under detention if the circumstances required.2/

On the day after Bhutto was re-arrested, the regimes whole being was called into question. The regime it seems was so involved in getting Bhutto, that it had forgotten that it was illegal under the 1973 Constitution. Mrs.

Nusrat Bhutto filed a habeas corups petition against the arrest. This act brought into question the whole existence of the regime. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Yaqub Ali Khan, agreed to hear the petition. The next day the Law Minister, A. K. Broki, filed an application against hearing of the petition, and ordered that the Justices take a new oath, which did not mentioned allegiance to the constitution. However, the case had been filed, and it had to be heard. When the issue of the new oath reached the Chief Justice, he showed his displeasure, and as a result was relieved of his services. Then Justice Anwarul Haq, a pro-Zia man, became the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.2/

Issue Of Legitimacy

Once the petition had been filed by Mrs. Bhutto, the issue of legitimacy had come out into the open. In the meantime the trial of Bhutto had began.

Before we turn to the trial let us look at the issue of legitimacy. Mrs__

Bhutto's petition stated that the actions taken against Bhutto and other PPP

2/Ibid., p. 368.

2/Ibid., p. 369. - 145 -

leaders were Initiated to prevent the party from taking part in the elections.

This was in violation of fundamental rights under the 1973 Constitution which had not been abrogated. The petition also questioned the legal authority of the Army Chief of Staff to impose Martial Law, which according to the same

Constitution was an act of high treason. Lastly, the petition questioned the denial of bail to Bhutto, and stated that this amounted to violation of the detainee's fundamental rights. Mrs. Bhutto's council Yahya Bukhtiar, the former attorney general, claimed that the courts had the authority to adjudicate in the matter, as the constitution had not been abrogated. A. K.

Brohi, the Council for the Federation Of Pakistan, questioned the authority of the courts to consider the issue of Martial Law which had been promulgated to help bring law and order so that a government of the People could be reinstated. The act of Martial Law, therefore, stated Mr. Brohi, had been instituted, out of the law of necessity. The government in this case was trying to show that the country was facing a serious law and order problem during the PNA agitation due to widespread demonstrations and loss of life and property. On the other hand, Mrs. Bhutto's plea stated that as the constitution had not been abrogated, the act of the Army Chief of Staff was an act of treason. According to Mrs. Bhutto, the legality or otherwise, of the

Martial Law was a pre-determined fact, as the constitution had not been abrogated. According to Mrs. Bhutto the entire debate on this issue was a ploy to buy time. The verdict that came down from the court was in favor of - 146 -

the Federation of Pakistan. ^ The final verdict on the Begum Nusrat Bhutto

case, stated the following:

that the 1973 Constitution remained the supreme law of the land; that the president of Pakistan and the superior courts continued to function under the constitution; that the CMLA was entitled to take all legislative measures falling within the scope of the law of necessity; that the superior courts continued to have the power of judicial review as enshrined in Article 199 of the Constitution; and that the suspension of fundamental rights according to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution was valid. It was thus 'merely a case of constitutional deviation for a temporary period and for a specified and limited objective, namely, the restoration of law and order and normalcy in the country and the earliest possible holding of free and fair elections'

No definite timetable for elections was set by the court, and it was up to the

regime to establish a date. What was more important in the decision was the

fact that the regime had been given legal legitimacy. In addition, the rule

of necessity had been upheld, because the court said that due to the break

down of law and order a third party was required to come in to bring back normal conditions. In the meantime the trial of Bhutto was under way.

Federation Of Pakistan Vs. Zulflkar Ali Bhutto and others

This author's aim is not talk about the trial, but to bring out the Zia regime's peculiar handling of the case and its political, legal and judicial

implications. As stated before, Bhutto was re-arrested soon after his release on bail, which had subsequently been revoked by a re-constituted bench of the

Lahore High Court. The way the Lahore High Court was set up; the transfer of

•^Victoria Schofield, Bhutto: Trial And Execution (London: Cassell Ltd., 1979), pp. 28-57.

li/Mohammad Wasseen, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 370. - 147 -

the case to a higher than necessary court; the way the evidence was given; the treatment of Bhutto and his defence councils; all pointed to the fact that the

Zia regime wanted nothing less than a guilty verdict.12/

To keep the situation under control in the country during the trial and the verdict, the Zia regime began a reign of terror. As a policy, the regime resorted to harassment, detention, and flogging of the PPP workers as well as incarceration of the top party leadership including Bhutto's wife and daughter. While this terror was being inflicted, the regime began to lose support at the grassroot levels.

In these circumstances, it was natural for the regime to seek support from the PNA, which had been against the PPP from day one. The parties that made up the PNA had street power; elite following; and ideological strength which the regime needed. For its part, the PNA needed the CMLA to eliminate

Bhutto's rule from Pakistan. For example; "Wali Khan, soon after his release from jail in December 1977, held 'Bhuttoism' responsible for the current crisis and endorsed the government's plans to let accountability take precedence over elections".12/ On advice from the PNA, the regime registered five more cases against Bhutto. These included charges of rigging the elections; wrong declaration of assets; misuse of secret funds and public money; as well as abuse of power in general.^

^Ibid. ,

^Ibid., p. 313.

^Craig Baxter, ed., Zia's Pakistan: Politics And Stability In A Frontline State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 7-22. - 148 -

Just before the verdict was to be announced In Bhutto's case, there was

talk in the air that Zla's regime was in the process of forming a government

with PNA. All the above methods paid off. The country on the day of the

verdict was as calm as ever. On March 18 1978, the Lahore High Court found

Bhutto and others guilty on all charges. The Court sentenced Bhutto and

others to death. The case went to the Supreme Court on appeal. The Supreme

Court upheld the verdict of the High Court on February 6, 1979. Four judges

found the approver's evidence amply corroborated by contemporaneous documents.

Three judges, on the other hand, found the evidence unreliable and without

acceptable corroboration. This was followed by a review petition which was

rejected by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1979. Zia on his part stated that

if the Supreme Court set Bhutto free then he would be tried on the six other

cases, however, if the Court did not release him, then he would he hanged as no man is above the law. Zia by stating this had sealed the fate of the

former Prime Minister. On April 4, 1979 Zulifkar All Bhutto, the former

elected Prime Minister of Pakistan was executed. No one came out on the

streets; the rule of force had worked.&

Overview

The five and half years of Bhutto rule had disturbed the status quo.

Bhutto had stirred up the minds of the masses, who also were unaware of what was good for them. The situation created by Bhutto was something the traditionalist wanted to suppress. When Martial Law was declared in 1977, the status quo was brought back to its original position. However, given how

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 374-375. - 149 -

everyone had became politicized the regime had to use force to keep the people

in line. Anyhow, before this could be accomplished, Bhutto had to be

eliminated from the political scene. This was the main reason for Bhutto's

trial and execution.

SECTION TOO : ISLAMIZATION

The question of Islam and politics in Pakistan has always been the

central one. The only reason, as we have always been told, for the existence

of Pakistan was Islam and in this sense Pakistan and Islam have become

synonymous. However, the history of political development in Pakistan shows

us that the major issue was never the role of Islam in politics. It was

always seen as a given fact. The real issue was always development and

stability.

In the 1970's, however, three events took place by which Islam became

the central issue. The first of these events was the external situation, and

the other two were a result of internal events. Due to the third Arab-

Israeli war of 1973 there occurred a wave of Islamic revivalism, fueled by the

tremendous boom in oil revenues. Islamic revivalism, in turn, found a fertile

ground in Pakistan. As a result, the issue revolved around the political

expression of Islam and there developed four schools of thought in Pakistan.

The first school saw Pakistan as a sacred state which excluded human will; the

second school saw Pakistan as a sacred state which admitted the jurisdiction

of human will; the third school saw Pakistan as a secular state while

admitting divine will; and finally, the fourth school saw Pakistan as an - 150 -

exclusively secular state excluding the agency of divine will. By the late

70's the second and the third models had the greatest following. We can say here that the Zia regime followed the third school of thought.1S/

The second event took place during the 1970 general elections. At this time, due to the anti-Ayub movement, the Ulema became politicized. As a result, they also took part in the elections. While they lost the elections, they nevertheless became a pressure group which influenced the decision makers in the government. As a result of the Arab-Israeli war, a number of the Ulema developed the four schools of thought stated above. The most noted among the

Ulema were; Mohammad Asad; G. M. Pervaiz; Khalifa Abdul; Justice Javed Iqbal; and S. M. Zafar. As a result of the anti-Bhutto movement, the second and the third schools took a hold on the society, and the PNA used it as an ideology to influence the movement.**/

Finally, the third event was the PNA movement against Bhutto in 1977.

By the late 1977, as a result of the two above events, Islam had a hold on the society in Pakistan. The PNA election campaign revolved around the whole idea of bringing Islam into the political sphere. When Zia became the President, his power base was the PNA. The PNA's strength came from the third school, and, therefore, the regime also followed the third school. Having said this, let us look at the program of Islamization.12/

ZS/lbid. ,

ZZ/Omar Noman, The Political Economy Of Pakistan: 1947-85 (London: Thetford Press Limited., 1988), pp. 117-140.

^Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy. And Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), pp. 32-34. - 151 -

The Proeram Of Islamizatlon

Due to the three events recounted above, the Zia regime was bound to the promise that it had to introduce Islam as a means to rule. Secondly, the Zia

regime was suffering from the crisis of legitimacy, and if it was going to

rule it needed to win over the traditional powerholders. The PNA, which had all the traditional powerholders, was seen by the regime as a good partner.

The Zia regime, therefore, began its program to introduce Islam into Pakistan

in association with the PNA.

President Zia's program of Islamization can be divided into three categories. These are as follows: "(1) Punitive measures, (2) reconstruction of the economic system, and (3) general Islamization of morals, education, and science"

Punitive Measures

The measures under the first category began when Zia announced the

"Hadood Ordinance" in February 1979. The Ordinance contained punishment for

theft, adultery, and drinking, which were amputation of hands, stoning and flogging. Sharia Courts were established whose sole purpose was to try cases under the Ordinance. In return, the Ordinance attracted strong criticism not only from international media but also from the domestic sources. In Pakistan reaction was against the provisions affecting women and a number of educated women began to form action groups which were designed to mobilize public opinion. One of the most outspoken group was the Women's Action Forum (WAF), established in 1981. In the mean time there began a case that received the

^Mohammed Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 394. - 152 -

widest attention. According to different sources, Safia Bibi, an 18 year old blind girl, was raped by her employers, a father and a son. The father and the son were acquitted of all charges, but the girl was not only sentenced to

3 years imprisonment but also fined and lashed 15 times in public. The whole

Pakistani public was outraged at this event. Under great pressure the regime had to redefine the law.22/

The same kind of public reaction was also extended to the so-called "Law to Qisas (retribution) and Diyet (Blood Money)" which came into existence in

1980 and were also covered by the "Hadood Ordinance". The law provided that if a women was murdered then her family would receive only half the amount of money that a murdered man's family would get. After a lot of pressure from the public the case went to the Supreme Court, where it was declared in line with the constitution.21/

On April 26 1984, President Zia issued Ordinance No. 20, according to which any Qadiani who called his place of worship a Masjid; who called his call for pray an Azan; who passed himself as a muslim; and who called his religion Islam was liable to an imprisonment of three years and a very high fine. This was also followed by protests, mainly from various human right groups in Europe and the United States.3/

On 17 July 1986, the U. S. House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding that the Government of Pakistan should repeal

^Benazir Bhutto, Daughter Of The East (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1988), pp. 268-269.

^Ibid. ,

S/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 396. - 153 -

the Ordinance, that it should stop persecution of and discrimination against Ahmadis, and that it should restore internationally recognized human rights.3/

This was followed by the U. N. report which stated that the Government of

Pakistan was in violation of International Law, which guaranteed freedom of religion. In Pakistan a number of groups called for the withdrawal of the

Ordinance. This, however, was never done.

It is clear from these events that the whole idea behind the Islamic punitive laws was to cover up the crisis of legitimacy. It is also clear that these measures led to a heated controversy both at the national and the international levels.

Reconstruction Of the Economic System

The measures under the second categories were related to economic policies. The Zia regime began its project of Islamic economics without really doing any research on the matter. All at once Zakat was levied on all bank accounts except for current accounts at the rate of 2.5X. Under the law a Zakat Fund Office was to be formed at each village, province, and at the

Center. A Zakat Council was set up under a High Court Judge, or an equally qualified person. The funds were to be spent on deserving candidates from amongst the poor. While a small amount did go to the so-called "deserving candidates", a large amount ended up in the federal bureaucracy, which was always looking for funds. There were two problems with the whole system.

Firstly, Zakat was imposed only on Bank accounts. Secondly, nobody was quite

S/Ibid. , - 154 -

sure who were the beneficiaries, the so called "deserving candidates". Both these reasons made the whole idea of Zakat a bit out of place.3 /

In addition to Zakat, Ushr was implemented as an agricultural tax on crops at the rate of 10X in rain-fed areas and 5X on artificially irrigated areas. An interesting facet of this ordinance was that the tax was higher on an agricultural method which produced less than on an intensive production method that produced more. This placed a question on the whole reason behind the tax. A lot of money that the tax produced ended up with the civil bureaucracy, or in the hands of the powerful elite.3 /

Finally, the regime introduced its interest free banking policy. At the beginning only a few public corporations such as the "House Building

Finance Corporation" started interest free operations. Later on small farmers began receiving interest free loans. However, out of the $8-10 billion which were deposited for these loans, $3-4 billion were not used. In this light, the whole policy was criticized as a cosmetic measure. So, even in economic policies the regime never really produced any lasting effects.2®/

General Islamization of Morals. Education, and Science

In promoting morals, education and science, President Zia declared that scholars from this day onward should work with a spirit of Jihad in relation to science and religion. According to Zia there was no difference between religion and science. The scientists who were seeking the patronage of the

^/Ibid., pp. 397-398.

S/Ibid. ,

^/Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics In Pakistan: 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), p. 236-242. - 155 -

regime immediately began producing quite interesting theories. For example, one scientist claimed, after intensive study, that the heaven is running away from the earth at a speed of one centimeter per second less then the speed of light. Another scientist, in the process of not to be out done, stated that the services of genies as fiery beings, commanding vast energy, can be utilized to offset the energy crisis of Pakistan. In other words, good money was being spent to come up with these type of breathtaking theories. In addition, attempts were made to develop an Islamic theory of knowledge. More over, the whole history of Pakistan was re-written so that special reference could be inserted to the role of ideology and the Ulema in the whole struggle for Pakistan.2 /

Overview

Islam, as noted above, has been shown as the reason for the existence of

Pakistan. From the independence period upto the present, the issue of Islam versus politics was shown as the most important issue affecting the Pakistani state. On the resolution of this issue depended the satisfactory solution all other problems which were affecting the nation. All governments, from 1947 onward, used the issue of Islam as a means to win support and legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. When important problems could not be solved, then the lack of belief in Islam was used to justify the existence of the problem. In short, Islam became the means for power and legitimacy.

General Zia from 1977 onward also used Islam for reasons of power and legitimacy. In addition, Zia made Islamic ideology into an art form. This was not because Zia was the most religious man on earth, but because there was

s/ibid., - 156 -

no other way that he could stay In power. In other words, Islam, which incorporates some of the loftiest human and spiritual values was mis-used and became a means to an end.

SECTION THREE : OPASI-CIVILIAN REGIME

From the day it came into power, the aim of the Zia regime was to make sure that no serious bid for power came from any quarter. The situation within the country in 1977 was such that the regime could not use the methods that had been employed by the earlier governments. The Zia regime was hard pressed to gain legitimacy and power at all cost. The masses due to the anti-

Ayub movement and the anti-Bhutto movement had become politicized. Due to this politicization there had emerged many pressure groups, the most important being the political parties, the workers, and the students. To counter this threat, the Zia regime used terror. For a while this worked, as the "Get

Bhutto Policy" and the "Islamization Policy", has shown us. While the policy of Islamization was still under way, the regime encountered a new threat to its existence.

The Threat From The Parties

While it is true that the years of terror had achieved their objective, the regime, anyhow, encountered a new threat, which came from the political parties. It seemed that the policies of terror had given new life to the parties who were re-emerging from obscurity. - 157 -

The Regrouping Of The Parties

As pointed out above, the PNA had been debating the possibility of joining with the regime to form a new government. However, as time went on the PNA had differences and divisions on this very issue. Once Bhutto was executed, further divisions occurred within the PNA on the issue of proportional representation, registration of parties, and on the question of the postponement of elections. By the mid-80's the only party, within the

PNA, which was supporting the regime was the Jamat-e-Islam! (JI). All other parties were searching for a strategy to force the regime to hold the promised elections. The PPP on its part was also working towards the same objective, and it was natural that the remaining parties of the PNA join PPP in their fight for elections. Therefore, in February 1981 all these parties formed a new party called Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).3/

Setting aside the Bhutto factor, the MRD began to work towards pressing the regime to hold the promised elections. For the next two years, the alliance pooled all of its manpower resources, all of its shared set of political objectives, and formulated action groups at the local levels. The result of this effort was the four point program. This program demanded: "an end to martial law, restoration of the 1973 Constitution, parliamentary elections and transfer of power to public representatives."3 / By 1983, the

22/Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law: 1977-1985 (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd., 1987), pp. 22-27.

S/Mohammed Waseen, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 406. - 158 -

MRD began Its policy of forcing the regime to hold the elections by staging an anti-Martial Law movement.

Antl-Martlal Law Movement

The anti-Martial Law movement, like any other movement in Pakistan, began very slowly on August 14 1983, and soon gained momentum in the larger context of public activities. The WAF and other such organizations also got involved. Almost one hundred labor leaders endorsed the MRD's call at their meeting in Karachi on July 27 1983. Then followed the fights between the workers and the students on one side, and the police on the other. In addition, arson and armed attacks on trains, police stations, railways, treasuries, banks and various other government installations followed. The

Zia regime responded to this in two different manners. The first action was an announcement that by March 23, 1985 the regime would hold the elections for the national and provincial legislature, restore constitutional democracy, and would lift Martial Law. The second response was a call for a general crackdown. The regime used tear gas, lathi charges and arrests on the demonstrators which demoralized everyone. This was followed by the announcement of a new pay scale for the federal employees incorporating a minimum 10Z raise for all. Another pay revision for bank officers followed in quick succession. In addition, the regime pressed on with its preparations for local body elections, the aim of which was to attract people away from the agitations. All these methods of the regime worked as by December 1983 the movement had lost all of its steam.2®/

32/Ibid. , - 159 -

Referendum December 1984

While the movement may have slowed down, its after affects brought fear

into the heart of the always calm General. The General had fought many

battles to maintain the status quo and he was not about to give in and step

down from the seat of power. If he ever stepped down, the General knew that

he would probably pay with his life. To maintain power and also give

democracy to the country, Zia declared that he was going to hold a referendum

which would give him the constitutional right to hold power. In order to hold

this referendum, and not have any negative fall back, the courts were banned

from hearing any complaints about the way the referendum voting was held.

Only the Election Commission had the sole jurisdiction. In addition, any talk

of boycott of the referendum was to be seen as an offence with punishments

including fines and rigorous imprisonment. Again fear was instilled into the

minds of the people. No matter what happened, the General made sure that he

would win the referendum.21/

In December 1984 the referendum was voted on. The wording of the

referendum indicated a clear drive by General Zia for self preservation and

perpetuation. The referendum proposition read:

Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, to bring in laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of Ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process for the smooth

^Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law: 1977-1985 (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd., 1987), pp. 74-88. - 160 -

and orderly transfer of power to the elected representative of the people.3/

The turn over for the referendum was very low and some Interested groups were

known to have voted more than once. As a result, the Chief Election

Commissioner declared that 62Z of registered voters actually polled their

votes, out of which 97.71X voted yes. The general was there to stay for the

next five years. It is interesting to note that the turn out for the

referendum was higher than in any elections held so far in Pakistan. In

addition, the high turn out occurred in a period when more than 80X of the

people wanted Zia to be thrown out of office.3/

Conversion Of The Military Regime to Civilian Regime

Finally, a few days after the voting on the referendum the General

announced that the elections for the National and provincial assemblies would be held on 25 and 28 February 1985 on a partyless basis. This was a clear

sign that the General did not want the PPP to win seats, even after he had

fully secured his own position as the President.

The general public responded enthusiastically. When the elections came about 53X of the public voted, somewhat below the referendum percentage. The voting pattern showed that more people from the rural areas voted than from the urban areas. The people from the rural areas, generally impelled by the local power struggle amongst the landlords come out to vote for their respective candidates. On March 2, 1985 Zia announced the Revival of

^/Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics In Pakistan: 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), p. 247.

^/Ibid., pp. 247-248. - 161 -

Constitution Order (RCO). This was quite embarrassing- for the newly elected members to see that the Constitution was being changed right in front of their eyes

Under the new Presidential Order a new 11 member National Security

Council was set up. In order to elect future presidents, and to pass any constitutional amendments, the provincial assemblies were also to participate in the Vote, which made the whole process quite cumbersome. In addition, the top executive authority shifted from the prime minister to the president. The prime minister and his cabinet were to aid and advise the president in the exercise of his functions.2®/ Furthermore:

The president could now declare an emergency, abrogate parliament, suspend fundamental rights, restrict the jurisdiction of judiciary and appoint and dismiss the prime minister. Additionally, the president was to have wide powers of appointing the governors and cabinets in the provinces, thus making Pakistan a unitary system in all but name.22/

In this manner the stage was set for the Quasi-Civilian Regime.

Ouasl-Clvlllan Regime

On December 30 1985 martial law was lifted. Following that, Military

Courts were dismantled and the 20 year old state of emergency was also lifted.

In addition, fundamental rights were restored. Everyone who mattered was quite happy with the outcome. In this situation the rule of Muhammad Khan

Junejo began as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan.

^/Ibid. ,

^/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 412.

^Ibid., pp. 412-413. - 162 -

Economic And Social Performance

From the very start the Junejo government suffered from an identity crisis. The program that the government outlined for itself was supposed to achieve two things: the first was to develop a new identity for itself, which meant that it tried to distance itself from the Martial Law regime; secondly, it stressed the importance of welfare economics, which was designed to enhance the economic well being of the general public. Let us first turn to the economic program of the government, and then we will look at the relations between the government and the Martial Law regime.

The economic policy of the Junejo government was designed to go for short-term high-visibility economic objectives. The idea of the short-term objectives was to win over the PPP constituency. The Planning Commission adopted this concept of the government and transformed it into the Sixth Five

Year Plan. The plan was in line with Junejo's term of office which was to end in 1990. The plan was as follows:

increase in the literacy rate form 26X to 50X; electrification of 90X villages; development, and conferment of property rights on the residents of urban slums; distribution of 2.2 million 7-maria plots for houses; water supply for 26 million and sanitation for 7 million people; 1180 Basic Health Units and 151 Rural Health Centers; construction of 11712 km rural roads; saving 4.5 million acres of land from waterlogging and salinity, and creation of 700,000 new jobs.2 /

The overall economic growth, of 7X for 1986-87, under the Junejo government was quite impressive. The inflation rate during the same period was only 3-

2Z/Ibid., p. 418. - 163 -

42, the lowest since 1969-1970. The rate of production was higher than expected, even though the investment targets were never met.22

The only crisis in the economic sphere occurred when the budget for

1987-88 was introduced in the National Assembly. The aim of the budget was to collect additional taxes of Rs. 1,788 crors. Already the people were paying more taxes then they could. The result was that the people reacted by staging strikes and demonstrations against the budget. After an intensive dialogue between the public groups and the government, the latter withdrew the defense tax and other taxes within a week. Any backing that the government might have had was lost because of this crisis. From this day onward the government not only began to lose ground in the eyes of the regime, but also the general public.22

Martial Law Regime's Reaction

The Zia regime had established the civilian government under extreme pressure. Zia never wanted this government to out perform his regime.

However, as long as the government performed well the regime could not move.

The Ojheri Camp explosion was the event that sealed the fate of the Junejo government. The explosion took place in April 1988. The next day Junejo in a speech stated that his government would look into this event and who ever was to blame was going to pay. As an after thought he stated that from the looks of it a number of generals were involved. Zia saw this as a device by the

^Ibid., p. 419.

^Yaseen Rizvi, Pakistan Elections' 88 (Lahore: Shirkat Printing Press, 1988), pp. 23-32. - 164 -

government to under cut the authority of the regime. Zia sacked the government, thereby ending a three year civilian rule.®2

The End Of General Zia's Regime

When Muhammad Khan Junejo government was dissolved, the whole parliamentary system was also dispensed with. The military regime was back to square one. The military-bureaucratic state structure had bounced back once the parliamentary framework had begun to take the political initiative away from the president. With this bold move the people of Pakistan were shown who really ran the country.

On July 20, 1988 President Zia announced that the elections for the

National Assembly would be held on November 16, 1988 and a few days later the elections for the provincial assemblies would be held. However, he also stated that the elections would be held on partyless basis, as the people of

Pakistan wanted it that way. The general public and the politicians had a field day with this statement. The talk around Pakistan was that Zia was more than a man, as he knew what the people of Pakistan wanted even before they themselves knew what they wanted.®2

Although, the elections date fell beyond the stated 90 day limit, everyone though it would be better not to challenge the General, as he might not hold the elections at all. However, people were clearly not sure why Zia was holding the elections, and what would be his next move. One school of through promised that by announcing the date of the elections Zia was buying

®2/lbid.,

21/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), 429-433. - 165 -

time, so that he could build up his credibility in the eyes of the public.

Others were of the opinion that he was depending on the confusion during the election campaigns, which would give him the pretext to cancel the elections to maintain law and order. No one really found the answer, as on August 17,

1988 the President and 29 other people died in a plane crash near Bahawalpur, bringing the Zia regime to an end.

Overview

The whole purpose of the Martial Law in 1977 was to re-establish the status quo and to maintain it effectively. All the governments that came before the 1977 Martial Law regime functioned within the limits described by the state system of Pakistan. When Zia took over, the status quo was not in place, this was due to the anti-Ayub movement; the 1970 elections; the Bhutto rule; and the anti-Bhutto movement. Zia believed that the only way to maintain the status quo was to use force.

The employment of force was a reaction to those event that the regime wanted to use for its own best interest. The Bhutto movement; the case of

Islamization; and the Quasi-Civilian Regime were example of the reactions.

The regime was always off balance as it was constantly reacting to individual outside events. CHAPTER SEVEN : THE STATUS QUO RE-ESTABLISHED : THE NEW DEAL

INTRODUCTION

The eleven years of the Zia rule were marked by one crisis after another. To achieve any stability, the Zia regime used force or threat of force to gain the upper hand. As far as the Zia regime was concerned, the only reason they were there was to reestablish the status quo, and then to maintain it. However, instability kept the regime on the defensive, and compelled it to use force.

Once Zia was out of the picture the traditional powerholders came to the conclusion that the party system, that was introduced during the anti-Ayub movement, had became such a power base that to leave it outside the state system was not a practical approach. The party system only became a power base during the Martial Law period i.e. from 1977-1988. It was during this time that the state used all of its powers to dismantle the party system.

However, the repression of the regime gave it a new life and it kept growing stronger. All through the Martial Law period the biggest threat to the regime came from the parties. Once the Zia regime ended, the traditionalist realized that to maintain the status quo the parties had to be included in the system.

However, the past twelve months have shown since the elections that the system is not working and has not produced the economic, political, and social stability, which are needed for a strong Pakistan. Sufficient time has not elapsed for the system to have solved all of its problems.

In the first section of this chapter we will look at the factors that led to the party based elections of 1988, which brought the PPP and Benazir

Bhutto into power. In the second, and final, section we will look into the performance of the PPP government in the first twelve months, and demonstrate the workings of the system, and the reasons for the present instability. - 167 -

SECTION ONE : THE ROAD TO THE ELECTIONS

The elections of 1988 were held in line with the requirements of the

Constitution. However, there were some other important reasons why the elections were held on time. These are: 1) the Chairman of the Senate,

Ghulam Ishaq Khan, became President according to the Constitution, and in his first speech he declared that the elections for the National Assembly would be held on November 16, 1988 which would be followed a few days later by the elections for the provincial assemblies; 2) the new Chief of Army Staff,

General Aslam Beg, who under Zia was the Vice-Chief of Army Staff, declared in his first speech that the elections would be held on time, the army would stay out of politics, and would help maintain law and order, so that the elections could be held; and 3) the Emergency Council, which was set up by the new

President, declared that it would work towards holding the elections on time.

The Council included the President; the three Service Chiefs, the Chief

Minister's of Punjab, NWFP, Buluchistan, and the Governor of Sind; including five Federal Ministers. In reality the Council included all the leading members of the traditional powerholdersOnce the major issue of the elections was solved the caretaker government began to bring about conditions in which the elections could be held.

The major outstanding constitutional issues concerned the involvement of the parties in the elections, and the dismissal of the National and provincial

^John Kaniyalil et al., Pakistan After Zia (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1989), pp. 27-38. - 168 -

assemblies. In this regard the judiciary showed itself as the supreme interpreter of the constitution. The Lahore High Court, a few,days before

Zia's chehlum (40 days after demise), passed its judgement regarding the assemblies. The Court stated that the dissolution of the assemblies was un­ constitutional. In addition, using the power under Article 199 of the

Constitution, the Court stated that it will not permit the restoration of the assemblies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan followed with its own decision on the question of involvement of the parties in the elections. Immediately after the death of Zia, Benazir Bhutto had filed a petition on the issue of participation of the parties. The Supreme Court stated that partyless elections were un-constitutional. With these two decisions the judiciary had taken its place in the political system in Pakistan, and had brought the parties into the forum.2/

Once these issues had been taken care of, the election campaign started in real earnest. By October 2, 1988 two parties stood out as the leading contenders. The first was the Islami Jamhoori Itfehad (IJI), and the other was the PPP. The IJI was an umbrella for a number of parties which had played a big role in Zia's regime. The leaders of the party were Fida Mohammad Khan, and Mian Nawaz Sharif the Chief Minister of Punjab. The important components of the IJI were: Jamat-e-Islami (JI); Pakistan Muslim League (PML); Jamiat-

2/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 434-437. - 169 -

ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) (Darkhawsti Group); and, National Peoples Party (NPP).

The PPP was led by Mohtrama Benazir Bhutto.*/

The central question In the campaign was the selection of the the next

prime minister of Pakistan. While the PPP declared Benazir as their choice,

the IJI was not sure. After a long hard debate the IJI selected Ghulam

Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the NPP. However, Nawaz Sharif it seems was also

running for the top spot, thereby keeping the public guessing.

Both sides began by launching a negative Campaign, which went on to the very end. Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto used appellations such an All Baba and Forty

Thieves in reference to General Zia and his followers. Zia was referred to as an oppressor, human rights violator, and an un-constitutional ruler. The IJI not to be out done, stated that the PPP would sell the Kahuta nuclear plant in order to get into power. Nawaz Sharif stated that he and his followers would rather die then to give power to an un-Islamic party such as the PPP. Qazi

Hussain Ahmed further added that if the PPP came into power, it would sell

Kashmir to India, and Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. In addition, Ahmed stated that PPP was supported by the Jews. Throughout the campaign no one talked about the real issues, and therefore no one was sure on which side did the parties stand on the issue of economic well being. Obtaining power by any means appeared to be the principal concern of both the parties.*/

2/Zahid Hussain, "Parties In The Elections," Herald. November, 1988, pp. 22-34.

i/Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp. 441-442. - 170 -

Election Turnout

Given the importance of a free general election for the public, the turn out was only 40% as compared to 63X in 1970, 55X in 1977, and 52X in 1985.

The first reason for the low polling was the mandatory conditions of producing identity cards when voting. This would have kept 12.8X of the public at home.

Secondly, the lack of economic or ideological issues that mobilize the people were absent in the preceding debates. In the National Assembly the PPP won 92 seats, the IJI got only 54 seats, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) got 13 seats, the JUI was able to win 7 seats, and the Independents won another 27 seats .2/

The PPP emerged as the largest party in the Center as well as in Sind.

The IJI won the Provincial elections in the Punjab. In the NWFP and

Baluchistan the picture was somewhat different. In the NWFP the IJI won 28 seats, and the PPP won 20 seats. In Baluchistan the IJI won 11 seats, and the

Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA) won 10 seats. In the provinces the picture was clear on who was going to form the governments. However, in the

Center no one party had a clear majority, and both the parties tried to win over members of the smaller parties, so that they could muster enough support to form a Government. However, none of the two major parties could obtain sufficient support to form a majority and the issue came down to the

President. Under great international and domestic pressures the President

^Mohammad Waseem, "Pakistan at the Polls," Herald. December 1988, pp. 22-23. - 171 -

accepted the PPP as the front runner, and invited Benazir Bhutto to form the

government. After eleven long years the PPP was back in power.&

SECTION TWO : PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY RULE

In early December 1988, Benazir Bhutto took the oath of office, and as a

result became the youngest head of government anywhere in the world. In

addition, she became the only women in the history of Islam to lead an Islamic

country. The oath taking and all the events of the day were a great media

event not only in Pakistan, but also in the rest of the world. On that day people came out on the streets and danced the night away. One could see huge pictures of the new Prime Minister and her father all over the cities of

Pakistan. The daughter of Pakistan had finally taken her rightful seat., and

she sat in it with great pride.&

While the people played around no one realized what had really happened.

The traditional powerholders had in reality won the day, because the status quo had finally been established. The only thing different was that now the parties had also been given their place with the traditionalist. This then was the reason why Benazir had assumed the role of the Prime Minister. In reality Pakistan had come back to square one of its political development.

All the major players were in place and ready to play the game according to the rules. However, the Prime Minister had not yet played the game according

S/Yaseen Rizvi, Pakistan Elections' 88 (Lahore: Shirtat Printing Press, 1988), pp 85-88.

Z/Ibid. , - 172 -

to the rules as Pakistan still does not have the stability required for such progressions. This is best demonstrated by taking about the twelve months of the Bhutto government.

Benazir Bhutto Rule: The First Year

From day one the Prime Minister has done everything but stay in the limits of her power. The first act of the government was to release all political prisoners who had been sentenced to various lengths of rigorous imprisonment by the Zia's regime. Under the Constitution all acts or laws passed by the regime were not to be repealed. In reality, therefore, this very act was un-constitutional. However, the popularity train was still running at top speed, and so no one questioned this act. Anyhow, this act showed what type of face the new government was going to put on.*/

The second issue that the government has been deeply involved with is the relationship between the Center and Punjab. The PPP had not won a majority in the Punjab, however, it was bent on making life unpleasant for the

IJI. In her first press conference, the Prime Minister accused the IJI of committing selective rigging in Punjab. In return the IJI accused the Central government of selling out to India. In addition, the IJI accused the Central governments' cultural policies as un-Islamic. Furthermore, when Salman

Rushdie's book "Satanic Verses" came out there were great mass rallies all over Pakistan organized by the IJI and, in Islamabad, the American Cultural

Building was attacked. The PPP accused the IJI of starting the rallies so as to undermine the government. The IJI accused the PPP of instigating a labor

^Mohammad Waseem, Politics And The State In Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 453. - 173 -

revolt in Faisalabad against its government.8/ On November 1989, a non­

confidence motion moved in the National Assembly by the Combined Opposition

Parties (COP) was narrowly defeated by a margin of 12 votes. These moves and

counter-moves are still occurring.

The third issue is the one dealing with Baluchistan. On December 15

1988 the Governor of Baluchistan dissolved the Provincial Assembly on the

advice of the Chief Minister Zafarullah Jamali. This action was a stunning move and the general concern was that Jamali who had not received the vote of

confidence, had no legal right to tell the Governor to dissolve the Assembly.

The IJI accused the Federal Government of interfering in the affairs of

Baluchistan. In a counter move the Central Government denied any involvement.

The case went to court and the High Court of Baluchistan decided that the

action of the Chief Minister was un-constitutional. As a result the BNA-JUI-

IJI coalition government was installed in Quetta.^

Finally, the fourth issue we want to look at is the problem of the

Eighth Amendment. This Amendment became part of the 1973 Constitution once it was passed by the National Assembly in 1985. Some of the items covered by the

Eighth Amendment are as below:

It has indemnified the Martial Law Orders and Regulations, the 1984 Referendum Order, the 1985 RCO and all other laws promulgated from 5 July 1977 onwards. This amendment has shifted the balance of power in favor of the president as opposed to the prime minister. In general, the advice of the prime minister was no more binding on the president and the validity of the president's action was not to be challenged. The president could dissolve the National Assembly if, in his opinion a situation has arisen in

2/Ibid., pp. 454-458.

*2/lbid. - 174 -

which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provision of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.' Upto March-1990, it was the president's privilege to nominate a MNA as prime minister whom he found most likely to command the majority of the house. Also, according to the amendment, 'the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces shall vest in the president. '**/

The eighth amendment made the president more powerful than the prime minister and furthermore, divided the powers of all the players.

The government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto felt quite insecure in the presence of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment. Politically what this meant was that the president, who was not elected by the people could override the decisions of the Parliament, which was elected by the people. The way that the amendment can be repealed is to put it to vote in the Assembly, and subject to a 2/3 vote in favor of the move, to take it off the books. The

Senate too would have to endorse the repeal by a similar vote. However, the

Prime Minister does not have the 2/3 majority to carry out these actions and therefore some ultra-constitutional methods are being tried.*2/

Overview

All the issues that affect the Prime Minister from the day she assumed office are still affecting her performance and there is no end in sight. The way things look the Prime Minister is more concerned with subjugating all other parties, assuming maximum powers, and not to play the game in line with the rules. This situation does not help the development of a stable political

**/lbid., p. 457.

^Ibid. , - 175 -

system. It may, however, give another chance to the army to come back into

power.

Within the above few pages we have described the election process and

the first year of the Benazir Bhutto's rule. Once Zia had been taken out of

the picture, the traditional powerholders came to the conclusion that the political parties, which had their birth in the anti-Ayub movement, were too strong a force to be left out of the system. It was perceived that by keeping

the parties out of the system, stability for the system, had not been achieved and the obvious solution would be to involve the parties in power sharing.

The elections of November 1988 were held on a party basis as a result of the decisions of the traditional powerholders. After the election the

President asked Benazir, the leader of the majority party, to form the government. After eleven years the PPP has came back to power. Only time will tell if the Prime Minister is going to play the game by the rules set by the system, or by her own rules. The survival, or otherwise, of the state and democracy in Pakistan will depend on the future actions of the young and talented Prime Minister. nrun iRTff»i

When reading a standard book on the politics of Pakistan the

overwhelming feeling is that, in this country, politics is played out in a

vacuum, and as a result there is always political turmoil and instability.

This common thinking is not only reinforced by the political writers but also

by the politicians of Pakistan. Thus, both the writers as well as the

politicians contribute to the idea of a complete vacuum and instability and as

a result, the remedies for the instability are always viewed from the vacuum

angle. The reform movements introduced by the late President, Field Marshal

Mohammad Ayub Khan, the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the late

President, and Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, are the most

important among the many that have been talked about either by the politicians

or the principal political thinkers. This limited view of the political

development of Pakistan has not contributed significantly to the improvement

of the general conditions in Pakistan. The present objective, therefore, is

not to ascribe blame but to develop a framework in which one can explain why

these developments have occurred. The main purpose also is to demonstrate

that there is an alternate way to explain the politics of Pakistan which will

illustrate that political events did not occur in a vacuum and which,

furthermore, will point the way to ending political instability in the country.

This new angle of looking at the politics of Pakistan was the purpose of

this study. After the study of the relevant literature the most outstanding

finding was the importance of the state in the politics of Pakistan. While

political events occurred here and there, while politicians came and went, while political parties formed and died, and while the army entered and departed from the national political scene, the one power base that has - 177 -

remained constant throughout the history of Pakistan was, and Is, the state.

This new approach helped to resolve the philosophical problem of the events occurring in a vacuum. The study clearly shows that events occurred not in a vacuum but as a result of the interaction of past happenings and future expectations. Having arrived at a realistic solution of the intellectual approach, the problem of instability can now also can be solved.

As the reader knows, the purpose of this study was to show that the only way to look at the politics of Pakistan, and to arrive at a rational understanding, was to use the state as our framework, and to arrive at a rational understanding, was to use the state as our framework. Once this hypothesis had been established, it was relatively easier to understand the main reasons for the occurrence of different events in the political history of Pakistan. Throughout the study, the sole propose of the state was to keep and maintain power by introducing measures for stability and development.

These two devices were and still are, the key to economic well being. In a country where 80 to 90 percent of the population does not know how toread or write, the idea of economic well being was a way of retaining power in the hands of the state. Now and then Islam was also used by the state to help retain power. The principal objective of all governments from 1947 up to the present, was to devise a program which would promote stability and development. In the same time period the objectives of the state were also similar that is to bring stability and development, and, in addition, to keep the upper hand at all times. Once the government in power became too strong and threatened the state, the government was thrown out and a new government - 178 -

brought in. The political changes in 1958, 1968, 1971, 1977, and 1988 are examples of the above tendencies of the state to retain power.

In other words, the struggle for power has always been the important factor that has played a crucial part in bringing stability or instability to the country. The objective of the state, as stated above, has always been to keep the upper hand, and its power was used again and again to maintain the status-quo in its favor. However, the various governments, whose power base was not as strong as that of the state, used different methods to stay in power. The idea of the "Two Nation" theory, the philosophy of Islam, the introduction of Political parties, and political activities through the

National and provincial assembly’s, were methods which these governments used to stay in power. This is the reason why we notice the use of above slogans throughout the political history of Pakistan. At times they really were just slogans and nothing else, however, once the authority of the government began to increase at the expense of the state, the latter came back with full force and the government had to yield to it. As a result, the idea of stability was present only when the state was in control. Whenever the government in power got the upper hand then instability prevailed in the country. This seesaw effect in the political history of Pakistan was a direct result of the power struggle between the government and the state. To achieve political stability in Pakistan, therefore, it is necessary to devise a plan in which the struggle for power that has occurred again and again in the history of Pakistan, would end, once and for all, and there would occur stable economic, political, and social growth. The only solution to the problem is a sharing of power by all involved in the political process. - 179 -

In this study the question of stability has received major attention.

The key to Pakistan's future is the maintenance of stability as that is the key to all economic, political, and social development. Once this condition has been achieved, it is possible to see the rise of the nation/state of

Pakistan to the pre-eminent position that it was supposed to hold and as visualized in the statements of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of

Pakistan.

This study makes it clear that as a first factor the elites are a very important group and the future stability of Pakistan can come about only if their group is included in the system. From 1947 up to 1958 this group, while wielding power, was not in a position of having outright absolute power. The politicians were in every sense fighting this group for supremacy in ruling the country. It should be added that the state at this time was influenced and run by the elites. During this time, the language riots, the constitutional crisis, the question of Islam and politics, and the general instability in Pakistan were due to this in-fighting between the politicians and the elites. The 1956 Constitutional requirement, that elections be held by 1959, which if it had been carried out, would have meant the triumph of the politicians and a second place for the elites. Because of this threat to the status quo, for the first time in the short history of Pakistan, the state asked the army to take over power.

The second factor that becomes clear from this reading is the importance of. the army in the whole equation. Immediately after seizing power the military became a very important element in the power game of Pakistan. The military rule from 1958 to 1968, then from 1968 to 1971, and finally, from - 180 -

1977 to 1988 Is sufficient to suggest that in future, the role of the military in the whole question of stability would have to be taken into account. Just to keep track, so far the important power holders are the army and the politicians,

The third factor that becomes clear from the above reading is the role of the politicians and the political parties. From 1947 to 1958, from 1971 to

1977, and finally from 1988 to present, the politicians have ruled the country. While their success, and the success of the military rule, has been questionable, there is no doubt that they have played an important role in the whole political history of Pakistan. In the beginning the political parties did not have that much influence in Pakistani politics, as the elites and the politicians did not give them enough time to take roots. However, the anti-

Ayub movement, the anti-Yahya movement, the 1970 elections, the 1977 elections, the anti-Bhutto movements, the anti-Zia movements, and the 1988 elections were time periods in which the parties matured not only in political skills but also in style, and in the process politicized the masses. By the time of the 1988 elections the importance of the political parties was realized and the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared that the elimination of political parties from the election process was un-constitutional, contrary to what the Zia regime had kept saying from 1977 onwards. The role of the politicians in the years from 1947 to the 1988 elections is enough evidence to suggest that any system that calls itself stable would have to include the politicians and the political parties.

Finally, the fourth factor that becomes clear from the above reading is the role of the bureaucracy in the political games in Pakistan. The - 181 -

bureaucracy was, and still is, dominated by the elites. This arm of the state

has in one way or the other run the affairs of Pakistan from 1947 onwards.

The importance of the bureaucracy cannot be over stated in the politics of

Pakistan. As a result of the weak leadership between 1947 to 1958, the army's

lack of political skills from 1958 to 1971 and 1977 to 1988, the mistrust of

Bhutto from 1973 to 1977 and finally, because of the weaknesses of the

government of Benazir Bhutto, the bureaucracy has always found itself in a

position to run the affairs of the country. Page after page of this study

shows the methods which was used by the bureaucracy to run the affairs of

Pakistan.

All these four factors, in sum, make up the state in Pakistan. The

conflict that we have talked about earlier, came about as a result of the

state, with one of the above party's in power, fighting with one or more of

the other parties who were deprived of power. This study has also shown, that

instability prevailed when one of the above players tried to dominate the others by using the state as a power base, either when this player was part of

the state or when outside it.

The 1958 Military takeover of Pakistan was the result of the politicians trying to gain more power at the expense of the elites of the country. The

1956 Constitution, which required that election be held by 1959, was a device of the politicians to achieve the upper hand. If the politicians had been allowed to have their way, the status quo would have been disturbed. The elites could not allow such an eventuality to happen, and the military took over. The 1968 crisis was also a result of the attempted dis-equilibrium of the status quo. This time the army tried to seize power while the elites, and - 182 -

the politicians did not allow this to happen, and another martial law was declared. The 1977 crisis was the result of the politicians trying to obtain unlimited political power and the army, and the elites came back with the third martial law. While the above illustrations are only four among many other crises, they do show us the end results of the upsetting of the status quo.

By this analysis one can conclude that, the only way to maintain stability and development in Pakistan is to make sure that the status quo is never disturbed. The system in place in Pakistan right now is the one in which if the in-fighting stops, a stable system is clearly being bom. All four major players, i.e., the army, the bureaucracy, the elites, and the politicians are included in the system. However, because of the in-fighting occurring between the government and the rest of the players the system has not been able to stabilize yet. The call on government should be to help in eliminating the internal squabbles and to think of the greater good of the country. This may be wishful thinking, but that is the only way Pakistan is qoing to achieve stability. Pakistan has seen far too much upheaval and now is the time to achieve the stability that it has longed for and needs. It is now time for everyone to stop looking after themselves and for a change, to look out for the country that has given so much and received so little. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Hassain, Zahid. "Parties In The Elections," Herald. November, 1988.

Waseem, Mohammad. "Pakistan at the Polls," Herald. December, 1988.