Shekhovtsov, Anton. "From Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-Right Party Svoboda." Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. Ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 249–264. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 27 Sep. 2021. <http:// dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544940.ch-017>. Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 27 September 2021, 20:06 UTC. Copyright © Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral and the contributors 2013. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence. 17 From Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-Right Party Svoboda1 Anton Shekhovtsov Introduction This chapter seeks to give an overview of the far-right scene in contemporary Ukraine, to consider the organizational and ideological nature of the Vseukrains’ke Ob’yednannya ‘Svoboda’ (All-Ukrainian ‘Freedom’ Union, Svoboda) and, most importantly, to highlight the determinants of the current rise of popular support for this party. Today, genuinely independent radical right-wing parties, which pursue an anti-democratic agenda, may function only in liberal countries that tend ‘to tolerate the intolerant’. Initially, far-right parties had electoral success in advanced industrial European countries, where such parties as the Front National (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austria), Fremskrittspartiet (Norway), Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark) and some others challenged the democratic order by their promotion of ethnocratic liberalism (Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1995, Ignazi 2003, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007). During the 1980s, when Western Europe saw the rise of the radical right, states on the other side of the ‘Iron Curtain’ experienced different political and social change, namely the spread of pro-democratic social movements that opposed socialist regimes. Although the pro-democratic trend in opposition to socialism was dominant at those times, in some Central and East European countries small far-right groups were already emerging. Socialist regimes tried to suppress all opposition, but eventually lost – in the majority of cases – to pro-democratic movements. However, the transition to democracy that followed a series of revolutions in the Warsaw Pact member states at the end of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet 1 This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Seventh Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine held at the University of Ottawa, 20–2 October 2011. 250 Right-Wing Populism in Europe Union and Yugoslavia opened the gate to the far right as well (Ramet 1999, Minkenberg 2010). The history of the far right in post-socialist Europe is wide-ranging: some radical right-wing parties, like Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (Poland), followed interwar fascist traditions, while others, like Partidul România Mare (Romania), involved former communists. Although radical right-wing parties did and do exist in post-1989 semi-authoritarian regimes, such as Serbia under Slobodan Milošević (e.g. Srpska radikalna stranka) and Vladimir Putin’s Russia (e.g. Liberal’no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii); they can be considered instruments of the ruling parties rather than independent political phenomena (Shekhovtsov & Umland 2011: 14–16). Thus, a democratic system of government seems to be a prerequisite for active participation of the far right in electoral politics today. Far-right parties pose a threat to established democratic societies, but it may be assumed that the radical right poses a greater threat to developing democracies, such as Ukraine. Hence the paradox: the presence of far-right parties is an indication of the largely – or still – democratic nature of Ukraine, but at the same time the far right impedes the country’s democratic development. Main actors on the Ukrainian far-right scene Contemporary far-right organizations and movements in Ukraine can be divided into two groups: Ukrainian and pro-Russian/Slavic ultra-nationalists. Each of these groups, in turn, can be divided into two subgroups: registered political parties and social movements. Basic information on registered radical right-wing parties that are more or less active in the current political and social life of Ukraine is given in Table 17.1, in accordance with the aforementioned ideological criteria.2 It should be noted that Ukrainian ultra-nationalists are principally based in Western and Central Ukraine, while the bulwark of pro-Russian/Slavic ultra-nationalists is in the Crimea, as well as Eastern and Southern Ukraine. In his study on anti-Semitism in contemporary Ukraine, Per Rudling offers a similar regional division and distinguishes two political traditions of anti-Semitism: the legacy of ‘anti-Russian, anti-Semitic and anti-Polish sentiments’ that ‘has its strongest support in Western Ukraine’ and ‘the xenophobic Eurasian nationalism, steeped in the Soviet “anti-Zionist” tradition’ that is ‘stronger in the southern and eastern parts of the country’ (2012: 198). As this chapter focuses, in particular, on the rise of Svoboda, pro-Russian/Slavic ultra-nationalists will not be discussed here, due to space restrictions. Indeed, they would require a separate analysis and will thus be mentioned only in passing in this chapter. Ideologically, all Ukrainian ultra-nationalist parties, except for the All-Ukrainian Political Party ‘Brotherhood’ (Bratstvo), promote Ukrainian ethnic nationalism, social conservatism, anti-communist and anti-immigrant sentiments. According to the 2 On the Ukrainian radical right in the 1990s, see: Kuzio 1997, Wilson 1997, Kubicek 1999, Solchanyk 1999. Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism 251 Table 17.1 Registered far-right parties in contemporary Ukraine. Party Founded Registered Current leader Ukrainian ultra-nationalists Ukrains’ka Natsional’na Asambleya (Ukrainian National Assembly, UNA) 1990 1994/19971 Yuriy Shukhevych Vseukrains’ke Ob’yednannya ‘Svoboda’ (All-Ukrainian ‘Freedom’ Union, Svoboda) 1991 1995 Oleh Tyahnybok Konhres Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, KUN) 1992 1993 Stepan Bratsyun Vseukrains’ka Partiya ‘Nova Syla’ (All-Ukrainian Party ‘New Force’, Nova Syla) 1999 1999 Yuriy Zbitnyev Vseukrains’ka Politychna Partiya ‘Bratstvo’ (All-Ukrainian Political Party ‘Brotherhood’, Bratstvo) 2002 2004 Dmytro Korchyns’ky Pro-Russian/Slavic ultra-nationalists Prohresyvna Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy (Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, PSPU)2 1996 1996 Nataliya Vitrenko Partiya ‘Rodyna’ (‘Motherland’ Party) 2008 19993 Ihor Markov 1 The party was banned in 1995 but managed to reregister in 1997. 2 Due to its socialist economic position, the party is sometimes considered left wing, but in political terms it is radical right wing. 3 The party was founded in 2008 on the basis of the Progressive Democratic Party of Ukraine which was registered in 1999. Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), ‘a nation is the highest form of organization of human community, organically bound by a common ethnic origin, language, territory, history, culture, historical mission and national idea’ (KUN 2011). The Ukrainian National Assembly’s (UNA) conception of a nation is similar, but the party also holds that a nation conforms to a hierarchical order and is a system comprising four ‘Varnas’ (in the terms of ‘our Aryan ancestors’, as UNA states): ‘Brahmins (people of spirit, wise men), Kshatriya (statesmen, warriors), businessmen (managers, economists) and specialists (professionals)’ (UNA-UNSO 2007). Ukrainian ultra-nationalists reject the idea of a political nation: as the ideologists of the KUN argue, they ‘stand against the attempts by liberal and cosmopolitan forces to create a “new” pseudo-Ukrainian idea of “a new political Ukrainian or Slavic nation”’ (KUN 2011). The UNA, KUN and Svoboda are also Russophobic and antisemitic. Moreover, ‘white racism’3 is overtly or covertly inherent in the doctrines of the UNA, Svoboda and All-Ukrainian Party ‘New Force’ (Nova Syla), and most evidently manifests itself 3 ‘White racism’ is a type of racism that glorifies the ‘white race’ and simultaneously justifies discrimi- nation towards other ‘races’. 252 Right-Wing Populism in Europe through the parties’ anti-immigrant positions. Thus, speculating on the degree of desirability of the various categories of migrants to Ukraine, Nova Syla’s Yuriy Zbitnyev distinguishes four types of migrants: 1) ethnic Ukrainians who are the most desirable migrants; 2) representatives of genetically and culturally close peoples (Slavs, Balts, Celts, Germans, Scandinavians) who are considered desirable migrants during the period of demographic crisis in Ukraine; 3) representatives of remote white peoples (Romans, Finno-Ugrians, Georgians) who are neither desirable nor undesirable migrants and 4) representatives of other racial groups (Semites, Mongoloids, Negroids) who are unwelcome in the country (Zbitnyev & Shcherbyna 2011: 196). It is worth mentioning that a number of Zbitnyev’s texts imply that Russians are Finno-Ugrians rather than Slavs. Although the KUN holds that Ukrainian nationalism is a revolutionary movement that will, under no circumstances, desist from achieving its primary objective (KUN 2011), this party is the most moderate far-right organization in the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist camp. The UNA, with its