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WEAPONS COMPASS Report Small Arms Survey Maison de la Paix Report Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E January 1202 Geneva 2019 Switzerland t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected] Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa Flows Arms Small Illicit Mapping Compass: Weapons About the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impar- tial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed WEAPONS COMPASS violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy- makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and govern- ments in more than 50 countries. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org. A joint publication of the Small Arms Survey and the African Union (AU) Commission, with financial support from the German Federal Foreign Office and AU Member States Small Arms Survey Maison de la Paix Report Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E January 1202 Geneva 2019 Switzerland t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected] Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa Flows Arms Small Illicit Mapping Compass: Weapons About the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impar- tial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed WEAPONS COMPASS violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy- makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and govern- ments in more than 50 countries. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org. A joint publication of the Small Arms Survey and the African Union (AU) Commission, with financial support from the German Federal Foreign Office and AU Member States WEAPONS COMPASS Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa A joint publication of the Small Arms Survey and the African Union (AU) Commission, with financial support from the German Federal Foreign Office and AU Member States Credits Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2019 First published in January 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprograph- ics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the publications coordinator, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland The Small Arms Survey takes no position regarding the status or name of countries or territories mentioned in this publication. Production coordinators: Emilia Dungel and Olivia Denonville Fact-checker: Natasia Kalajdziovski Copy-editor: Alex Potter ([email protected]) Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson ([email protected]) Design and layout: Rick Jones ([email protected]) Infographics: Daly Design ([email protected]) Cartography: Jillian Luff (www.mapgrafix.com) Printed by Gonnet in France ISBN 978-2-940548-64-4 Cover photo: A gendarme holds a seized craft-produced weapon in Banfora, Burkina Faso, near the border with Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Source: Matthias Nowak/Small Arms Survey 2 Report January 2019 Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa 3 About the authors Nicolas Florquin has worked for the Small Arms Survey for more than 12 years and is cur- rently a senior researcher and the organization’s research coordinator. He coordinates projects on armed actors and illicit flows of arms and ammunition in a variety of set- tings. He previously worked for Geneva Call, an organization specializing in engaging with non-state armed groups on humanitarian issues, and for the UN Group of Experts on Liberia. He holds a master’s in Public Administration from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Sigrid Lipott is an associate researcher at the Small Arms Survey, where she works on illicit arms proliferation and trafficking, arms embargoes, and peacekeeping. She holds two master’s degrees in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste and the Institute for Research on Negotiation (Italy), a doctorate in Transborder Policies from the International University Institute of European Studies, and a post- graduate degree in Border Studies from the University of Victoria (Canada). Previously, she has worked at the European Projects Association and at the European External Action Service in Brussels, where she contributed to European Neighbourhood Policy programming in the MENA region and the Eastern Partnership. She was also awarded the Swiss Government Excellence Post-doctoral Scholarship for Foreign Scholars in 2015. Francis Wairagu is a senior researcher at the Small Arms Survey. He previously worked as team leader, programmes and operations; and head of research and gender at the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) in Nairobi. He has published in the areas of small arms and light weapons, security sector reform, and ethics and conflicts in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region. He holds a master’s in Peace and Security Manage- ment from Addis Ababa University, an MPhil in Philosophy from Moi University in Kenya, and a diploma in Peace and Security in Africa from Uppsala University, Sweden. Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa 3 Contents List of tables, maps, and boxes ............................................................................................................ 6 List of abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................................................. 8 Foreword .................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Preface ....................................................................................................................................................................... 12 Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 14 Executive summary ........................................................................................................................................ 15 Key findings ......................................................................................................................................................... 16 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 17 Section 1. Assessing the scale and availability of illicit small arms in Africa .................................................................................................................. 21 1.1 Definition and indicators 24 1.2 Transparency and reporting 26 1.3 Estimating subregional distribution 30 1.4 Types of illicit weapons 33 Section 2. Main characteristics, supply patterns, and actors .............................. 37 2.1 Cross-border trafficking and the ant trade 38 2.2 Diversion of licit weapons 46 2.2.1 Transfer diversions 46 4 Report January 2019 Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa 5 2.2.2 Diversions from national stockpiles 50 2.2.3 Diversion of civilian holdings 53 2.3 Sources of already illicit weapons 55 2.3.1 Craft production 55 2.3.2 Illicit conversion of imitation firearms 58 Section 3. Good practices and recommendations ............................................................. 61 3.1 Generating assessments to address knowledge gaps 62 3.2 Developing practical guidance and tools 67 3.3 Supporting and coordinating implementation 71 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 75 Annexes ................................................................................................................................................................... 79 Annexe 1. UN statistical (‘M49’) subregions 80 Annexe 2. Good practices and recommendations for addressing illicit arms flows identified at the validation workshop,
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