Small Arms and Armed Violence in Sudan and South Sudan

HSBA Synthesis Report

An Assessment of Empirical Research Undertaken since 2005

By Emile LeBrun

HSBA HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Switzerland 1202 Geneva Chemin Eugène-Rigot2E Maison delaPaix Development Studies Graduate InstituteofInternationaland Survey Small Arms at theaddress below. be senttothePublicationsManager, Small Arms Survey, ing reproduction outsidethescopeofaboveshould reprographics rightsorganization. Enquiriesconcern- mitted bylaw, orundertermsagreed withtheappropriate in writingoftheSmall Arms Survey, orasexpressly per in anyformorbymeans,withoutpriorpermission reproduced, stored in aretrieval system,ortransmitted, All rightsreserved. Nopartofthispublicationmaybe First publishedinOctober2016 and DevelopmentStudies,Geneva2016 © Small Arms Survey, GraduateInstituteof International Published inSwitzerlandbytheSmall Arms Survey Copyright - 2 ISBN 978-2-940548-29-3 Printed bynbmediainGeneva,Switzerland ([email protected]) Typeset inInterstateandPalatinobyRickJones (www.mapgrafix.com) Cartography byMAPgrafix ([email protected]) Proofread byDonaldStrachan ([email protected]) Copy-edited byTania Inowlocki About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Grad- uate Institute of International and Development Studies. ABOUT THE SMALL ARMS SURVEY Small Arms Survey Maison de la Paix Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E 1202 Geneva I Switzerland II t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 III e [email protected] IV w www.smallarmssurvey.org V

3 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT The Small Arms Survey receives additionalsupport from for Democracy, andtheUnitedStatesInstitute ofPeace. Demining Group,theUS-based NationalEndowment Global ConflictPrevention Pool, as well astheDanish Ministry ofForeign Affairs, andtheUKgovernment’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs ofDenmark, theNetherlands Foreign Affairs andInternationalTradeCanada,the the pastfromGlobalPeace andSecurityFundat of Foreign Affairs. Theprojecthasreceived supportin US DepartmentofStateandtheNorwegian Ministry The HSBAreceives directfinancialsupportfromthe are available onlineatwww.smallarmssurveysudan.org. duces web-published Facts&Figures. All HSBA reports are publishedinEnglishand Arabic. Theprojectalsopro- mation inatimelyandreader-friendlyformat.Bothseries Issue Briefs,whichprovidesnapshotsofbaselineinfor Sudan andalongtheirborders.TheHSBAalsogenerates analysis ofsecurity-relatedissuesinSudanandSouth HSBA WorkingPapers aredesignedtoprovidein-depth on redressinginsecurity. Sudan. TheHSBAalsoofferspolicy-relevant guidance and armscontrolinterventions acrossSudanandSouth for civilianarmscollections,andsecuritysectorreform zation, andreintegrationprogrammes,incentive schemes reduction initiatives, includingdisarmament,demobili timely empiricalresearch,theprojectsupportsviolence Through theactive generationanddisseminationof opment Programme,andnon-governmental partners. Nations MissionintheSudan,UnitedDevel - in cooperationwiththeCanadiangovernment, theUnited administered bytheSmall Arms Survey. Itwas developed Sudan andSouthisamulti-year researchproject The HumanSecurityBaseline Assessment (HSBA) for The HumanSecurityBaselineAssessment -

- 4 w e Switzerland 1202 Geneva Chemin Eugène-Rigot2E Maison delaPaix Development Studies Graduate InstituteofInternationaland Survey Small Arms HSBA ProjectCoordinator Khristopher Carlson For moreinformation,pleasecontact: undertaken effectively. Switzerland, withoutwhichtheHSBAcouldnotbe http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org [email protected]

Online resources

Most Small Arms Survey publications are available Follow the Small Arms Survey for free download at www.smallarmssurvey.org/ www.facebook.com/SmallArmsSurvey RESOURCES ONLINE publications. www.twitter.com/SmallArmsSurvey Many Small Arms Survey publications are available in languages other than English at www.smallarms www.smallarmssurvey.org/podcasts survey.org/languages. Let us know what you think A range of online tools concerning small arms and armed violence—including weapons identification We are keen to receive feedback on how Small and tracing resources, data-rich maps, and inter Arms Survey research is used, and how we can active guides—can be accessed at www.smallarms improve our publications and other resources. survey.org/tools. Please fill out a short questionnaire at www.small armssurvey.org/feedback or email any comments To receive regular email updates on publications or suggestions to [email protected]. I and other news, sign up for eAlerts at www.small II armssurvey.org/eAlerts. III

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5 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT List ofabbreviations IV.violence Armed project’s survey in Lakes state in 2006 was the first such victimization survey ever conducted in South Sudan Throughout this report,relevant IssueBriefs (IBs)andWorkingPapers (WPs)appearbracketed inlightgreen,asin:‘The Note toreaders tables and maps, figures, boxes, of List Table ofcontents I. TheHSBA project Introduction VI. Lookingahead:futuregoalsandneeds III. Armed groups III. Armed List ofHSBApublications V. Securityprovision About theauthor II. Arms proliferation II. Arms Bibliography ...... 6 [IB1, WP2] 11 40 10 38 24 12 33 41 16 30 7 8 .’ List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables

Boxes 1 Donor support to the HSBA 12 2 Assessing the project 14 3 The Rum offensive: inside Kamal Loma’s militia 26

Figures 1 Firearm acquisition by county, Eastern Equatoria, 2009 17 BOXES, FIGURES,BOXES, MAPS, AND TABLES 2 Annual imports of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, and ‘conventional weapons’ reported by Khartoum to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), 2001–12 (USD million) 22

3 Weapons used in violent incidents, Lakes state, 2006 31 I

II Maps III 1 Chinese weapons among armed actors, Sudan and South Sudan, 2011–13 21 IV

Tables V 1 Estimated firearms inventories in Sudan, December 2009 18 VI 2 Armed elements in the Nuba Mountains area, 2009 25 3 South Sudanese militia commanders as of October 2013 28 4 Sudan’s state of demobilization as of 23 January 2011 36

7 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD Issue Brief IB (for SudanandSouthSudan) Human SecurityBaseline Assessment HSBA Government oftheRepublicSouthSudan GRSS Government ofSouthernSudan GoSS Government ofNationalUnity GNU Facts &Figures F&F Eastern SudanPeace Agreement ESPA Peace Agreement Darfur DPA Disarmament, demobilization,andreintegration DDR Central Reserve Police CRP PeaceComprehensive Agreement CPA Republic ofSouthSudan Agreement ontheResolutionofConflictin ARCSS List ofabbreviations

8 Sudan’s Liberation RevolutionaryForces SLRF Liberation Army Sudan SLA Strategic defenceandsecurity review SDSR Forces Sudan Armed SAF Pibor DefenceForces PDF National PoliceService NPS National Movement forReformandDevelopment NMRD National IntelligenceandSecurityService NISS Non-governmental organization NGO Military IndustryCorporation MIC Local securityarrangement LSA Lord’s Resistance Army LRA Joint IntegratedUnit JIU Justice andEqualityMovement JEM

SPLA–IO Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SPLM–N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North ABBREVIATIONS SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces SSDM/A South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army SSLM/A South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army SSNPS South Sudan National Police Service SSR Security sector reform I UN United Nations II UNAMID III African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation IV in Darfur V UNDP United Nations Development Programme VI UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Force WP Working Paper

9 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Edinburgh, Scotland. holds amasterinphilosophyfromtheUniversity of national smallarmsassessmentinSouthSudan.He and Timor-Leste.HeisprojectcoordinatoroftheSurvey’s armed violenceandsmallarmsinLebanon,Melanesia, (2008–15); andasacontributoronprojectsaddressing since 2005;asco-editoroftheannual serving aseditoroftheHSBApublicationsseries 2002, He hasconsultedfortheSmall Arms Survey since and lightweapons proliferation andcontrolissues. Emile LeBrunwritesandeditsresearchonsmallarms About theauthor Small Arms Survey Small Arms

10 Introduction INTRODUCTION The occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding to better link empirical research with national policy of the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) and programming frameworks and initiatives in the project, which coincides with the tenth anniversary of two countries. Each section therefore ends by identify- the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), offers the ing promising new priorities for the HSBA project and Small Arms Survey an important moment to take stock the wider research community. of its work in Sudan and South Sudan. This Synthesis This report does not review the entire body of empirical Report is one of three complementary efforts to do just research carried out since 2005, nor does it summarize that—the others being the project’s Symposium on the each of the many dozens of substantial HSBA research Future of Human Security in Sudan and South Sudan: outputs. Rather, it reflects the contributions of the HSBA Learning from a Decade of Empirical Research, held project within its wider context. Besides appraising in Nairobi on 23–24 March 2016, and a retrospective HSBA work on the substantive topics described above, project evaluation. Together, these efforts review what the report takes the opportunity to consider the project the HSBA has achieved, assess project impacts, identify I itself, its successes, challenges, and the experiences of knowledge gaps and new priorities, and lay down a path fielding a unique operation in a difficult setting. For II for future work to better understand and ultimately this reason, it opens with a review of the beginnings respond to small arms and light weapons proliferation III and evolution of the HSBA, its aims, and its objectives; and armed violence in the two countries. informed by the retrospective evaluation, it then pro- IV The present report provides a general overview of the vides an assessment of the project’s performance in project’s research findings in four broad focus areas: meeting its targets. V

arms proliferation (encompassing stockpiles and VI holdings as well as transfers); armed groups; armed violence; and security provision—in particular, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), civilian disarmament, and security sector reform (SSR).

In addition to appraising HSBA studies undertaken to date, this volume also looks ahead to pressing research questions in each of these spheres. Taking a cue from the HSBA Symposium, the report highlights opportunities

11 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT downloads fromtheHSBAwebsite exceeded1.3million. online. Bymid-2016,thenumberofuniquepublication has alsopostedmorethan100Facts&Figuresreports ing Papers and23IssueBriefsare available in Arabic. It Working Papers and24IssueBriefsinEnglish;37Work- Since 2006,theprojecthaspublished41peer-reviewed have supportedtheproject (seeBox1). eight governments andsemi-governmental agencies tions inthetwocountries.Over theHSBA’slifespan, organizations workingtohelpimprove securitycondi- tries aswell asbydiplomats,donors,andinternational highly valued bynationalauthoritiesinthetwocoun generated aconsiderablebodyofempiricalresearch, marked itstenthyear ofwork.Since2006theprojecthas Baseline Assessment projectforSudanandSouth In early2016theSmall Arms Survey’s HumanSecurity I. TheHSBAproject Semi without whichthe HSBAcouldnotbeundertakeneffectively. The Small Arms Survey receives additional support from Switzerland, Governments Box 1DonorsupporttotheHSBA

US Special Envoy’s Office for Sudan and South Sudan (since 2010) United StatesInstituteofPeace Danish DeminingGroup National EndowmentforDemocracy, UnitedStates Norwegian MinistryofForeignAffairs(2010–16) Netherlands MinistryofForeignAffairs(2008–11) UK GlobalConflictPreventionPool(2007–09) Foreign AffairsandInternationalTradeCanada(2005–07) - governmental andprivate - 12 The coreobjective oftheHSBAwas: last threeyears. ESPA of2006.Theprojectwas initiallyconceptualizedto during theCPA’s interimperiod, aswell astheDPA and of securityindicatorstoinformprogramming project thatwouldgeneratedataandanalysisonarange the UNDevelopment Programme(UNDP) toestablisha the UnitedNationsMissioninSudan(UNMIS),and joined inconsultationswiththeGovernment ofCanada, In thewake oftheCPA in2005,theSmall Arms Survey Origins countries affectedbyoremergingfromarmedconflict. ical research on armed violence and small arms in other model mayholdrelevance foreffortstoconductempir establishment, andevolutionoftheHSBA,whoseproject This sectionbrieflydescribestheoriginalconception, have kepttheneedforsuch datapressing. of theSouthSudanesecivilconflictinDecember2013 around thesecessionofSouthSudan,anderuption interim period,theresumptionofmultipleconflicts persistent insecuritythroughtheentiresix-year CPA Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). Butongoingconflictand subsequent Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Eastern to monitorandimplementtheCPA of2005,aswell asthe and analysisonarangeofindicatorsinsupportefforts original mission—whichwas toprovidebaseline data ing success in fillingavitalneed, its was notforeseenin The project’slongevity,whileatestamenttoitscontinu- of timely,policy-relevant, androbustdata.Specifically, DPA, andESPA environmentthrough theprovision to supportviolencereductionin Sudan inthepost-CPA, - the HSBA has been designed to develop an evidence employment, training, and material support for a base of the causes and distribution of armed violence range of Sudanese actors (e.g. researchers, survey in Sudan, with a particular focus on the contribution enumerators, non-governmental organization (NGO) of small arms and light weapons. The generation of a staff), as well as 23 research consultants and five ‘core’ comprehensive, reliable, and independently verified team members (HSBA, 2007, p. 5). baseline contributes to strategic policy-making and programming on civilian protection and the design, Intended beneficiaries of the project were the Sudanese implementation, and evaluation of regional and domes- government, the DDR commissions for northern and

tic arms control interventions (HSBA, 2007, p. 5). southern Sudan, the humanitarian aid community, THE PROJECT HSBA donors, arms embargo monitors, UNMIS, UNDP, and The HSBA was not designed to exert pressure on national the African Union Mission in Sudan. From the very institutions, to decry human rights and other violations, beginning of the project, a monitoring and evaluation or to ‘name and shame’, but rather to provide empirically programme was implemented. collected information and analysis for use in programming. The project established the following core thematic areas Project evolution of research, which have remained unchanged since 2006: Among the priorities identified in consultations leading review international, regional, and domestic flows of to the establishment of the HSBA was the need for baseline arms into, within, and outside of Sudan; data on injury mortality and morbidity as a result of armed violence carried out prior to and after the CPA, as well I assess stocks and inventories among different parties as qualitative data on changes in community perceptions and civilians; of security and security providers. As a result, the HSBA II map out armed groups operating within the area developed and fielded a series of household surveys in III under review; Lakes state (April 2006), Jonglei state (January 2007), and Eastern Equatoria state (December 2009) [IB1, WP2, WP11, appraise so-called local security arrangements (LSAs) IV WP13]. In parallel, the project generated Issue Briefs and and factors influencing demand for arms; and Working Papers on a range of topics, including armed V [IB2, IB11, WP1, WP3, measure the scale and distribution of arms-related group mapping and integration VI mortality, morbidity, and victimization in different WP4, WP5, WP6, WP8, WP9, WP10], civilian disarma- communities. ment [IB3], and the Darfur peace process [IB4]. Over the years that followed, the project’s approach to It was envisioned that the HSBA would work closely with its core thematic areas evolved, deepening our under- UN and Sudanese government authorities, especially standing of the distribution of small arms among state those involved in DDR, SSR, and weapons collection and and non-state actors [IB6, IB15], and of regional conflict destruction programmes, as well as with arms embargo dynamics involving elements in Chad, the Democratic monitors and peacekeepers throughout the country. Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Uganda [IB9, WP4, It was determined that a decentralized model and dis- WP12, WP14]. In 2010, the project launched its Arms tribution network, with a special focus on awareness and Ammunition Tracing Desk, pioneering the applica- raising and capacity building among Sudan’s national tion and adaptation of techniques used by UN panels of authorities, would help achieve these goals. Within this experts to identify arming patterns of non-state groups context, the HSBA was intended to provide: in Sudan and South Sudan [IB19, WP32].

13 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Box 2Assessingtheproject Source: Blomeyer&Sanz(2016) a numberoffindings: the project’s tenthanniversary.Together,thesetwosourcesyield Blomeyer &Sanztoconductanexternalevaluation ontheeveof project’s impacts.Inaddition,inlate2015,theHSBAcommissioned uptake, andotherinformationthatcanbeusedtomeasurethe publication downloads,mediacoverage,researchcommunity evaluation processhasbeencapturingstakeholderfeedback, Since itsinception,theHSBA’s internalmonthlymonitoringand

message uptake. tutions wouldenrichtheproject’s outputs,relationships,and Further effortstoengageandpartnerwithlocalresearchinsti- difficult tosourceelsewhere. and analysisofthequalityrelevance it produceswouldbe the projectceaseoperationsdueto fundingshortfalls,research priorities anditsyear-to-yearfunding arrangements.Should The sustainabilityoftheprojectis vulnerable toshiftingdonor on HSBAfindings. condensed publications,mightencouragepolicyuptakebased of briefingsandsmallworkshops Additional andmoresystematicoutreachefforts its stakeholdergroups. The HSBA’s core thematic focus areas remain highly relevant to tions intheregion,aswellondesignofNGOstrategies. implementation ofpolicyandcapacitydevelopmentinterven- HSBA researchhashadadirectinfluenceontheplanningand difficult toassess. research intosecurityprogramminginthetwocountriesis ernment officialshasbeenpositive,butthe‘uptake’ofHSBA Individual feedbackfromSudaneseandSouthgov- analysis, itsindependenceandoriginality,easeofaccess. core thematicfocusareas,thedepthofinsightandquality HSBA researchfillsanessentialinformationgapintermsofits — as wellshorter,more — in theform 14 Challenges areas forimprovement (seeBox2). specific added value andareaswherestakeholders see evaluation, hasidentifiedwheretheprojectprovides monitoring andevaluation effortsas well asanexternal Stakeholder feedback,collectedviaregularinternal recurring challengestheprojecthasfaced: uation hasalsoprovidedachancetoreflectonsome The projectevaluation andinternalmonitoringeval-

least threecases since2006,HSBAconsultants were als. Therisksof detentionandarrestarereal: inat published reportssoastoprevent future visarefus- tions requested thattheirnamesbewithheldfrom access toSudanthankspre-existing visaauthoriza- research reports. A fewconsultantswho hadobtained process onSudan,andtheHSBA begangenerating nationals aspartoftheInternationalCriminalCourt the government cameunderpressuretohandover increasingly difficulttoobtainasthe DPA unravelled, the countrytoconductresearch.Suchvisasbecame visas fromthenationalauthoritiesforanyentryinto HSBA teammembershave reliedonsingle-entry endorsement orapproval tooperate. As aresult, Congress Party never grantedtheprojectofficial Access toSudan.TheGovernment ofSudan/National and transportationassistance. UN missions and NGOs have provided crucial access on-the-ground supportfromtheSmall Arms Survey. reaching affectedcommunities,even withlimited researchers have beencreative andsuccessfulin as challengingmightbeexpected.Ingeneral, areas hassometimesbeendifficult,itnot Access toconflictareas.Whileaccessing hassometimesbeenconstrained. ticular) and fieldresearchersinsomeareas(Darfur,par on single-publicationcontracts,itsabilitytoidentify decentralized, employingexclusively consultants Researcher availability. Becausetheprojectis

held or arrested. (While in the project has enjoyed programming realms is an important goal for the generally good relations with the Government of HSBA’s next phase. South Sudan, access is never assured.) The project’s successes and challenges in each of the Limits on capacity building and promoting local HSBA’s core thematic focus areas inform Sections II–V. ownership. While the HSBA was able to engage These summaries rely heavily on the publications the and build capacities and promote local ownership project has produced, and each concludes with some reflec- as part of its household survey work early on, the tions on information gaps, specific areas for future research, project has almost exclusively contracted foreign

and emerging means to push the agendas forward. THE PROJECT HSBA (non-local) expert research consultants. As a result, the planned provision of ‘training [of Sudanese and South Sudanese partners and established NGOs], employment, local recruitment, and material support’ (HSBA, 2007, p. 11) has not been fully realized. Risks to local consultants. One of the most important reasons the project has not employed more Sudanese and South Sudanese nationals as researchers, writers, or collaborators as part of the HSBA’s inclusivity and capacity building mandates is the risk of retaliation against nationals and their families for publishing I findings that the governments may find objection- able. This is an ongoing problem. II

Unreceptiveness to programming support. At its III core, the HSBA was designed to support the development of effective, accountable, and evidence- IV based approaches to human security in Sudan and V South Sudan. A detailed discussion outside the scope of this report would be needed to explain the VI mixed track record of national authorities and their partners to enact and implement such approaches. The fact that the project has, by design, remained independent of the programming arena, acting pri- marily as an external monitor of small arms and armed violence indicators, has meant that its active participation in the conceptualization, design, and implementation of violence reduction programming has been limited to date. Yet, as of this writing (mid-2016), there were signs that the environment may be more conducive than before to bridging the evidence–programming gap. Increasing the uptake of the project’s research findings into the policy and

15 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT the pasttenyears. classified. Nevertheless, muchhasbeenlearnedover cies todiscussingissuestheyconsidersensitive and national authorities;andtheresistanceofsecurityagen- sources; poortransparencyintheimportpracticesof of reasons,includinginadequatein-countryinformation mandate hasproven challengingtofulfilforanumber inventories amongdifferent groupsandcivilians.This out ofSudanandSouthSudan—andstockpiles regional, anddomesticflowsofarmsinto,within, niques andmethodstogetabettersenseofinternational, Since itsinception,theHSBAhasusedarangeoftech tion inDarfur (UNAMID) norUNMISmilitary observers Neither the African Union/United NationsHybrid opera- about theirarmsacquisition anddistributionpractices. Army (SPLM/A) officialsinJuba, were notforthcoming Sudan, aswell asSudanPeople’s Liberation Movement/ ment inthepost-war period.Yet theGovernment of to beasignificantriskfactor forviolenceanddisplace small armsproliferationwas assumedfrom2005onwards Given thehistoryofgovernment-sponsored proxyarming, of armsthereparticularlypressing. state actors,madegettingahandleonthedistribution widespread dispersalofarmsandammunitiontonon- the secondcivilwar (1983–2005),whichinvolved the the contextofSouthSudan’sdevastation asaresultof equally unclearonbothsidesofthenorth–southborder, non-existent’ (HSBA,2006a,p.1).Whilethesituationwas session, andmisuseofsmallarms[inSudan]isvirtually able andverifiable informationontheacquisition,pos- As theHSBA’sfirstresearchoutputstatedstarkly,‘reli The context II. Armsproliferation

- - - 16 ex-combatants’ hands sibly imperceptibleeffectonthenumberof weapons in massive investment inDDRhadanunknownbutpos- [IB1, IB16,WP11,WP13,WP14] in areasofJonglei,Lakes,andEasternEquatoriastates tion thatfirearms were widespreadamonghouseholds hold surveys, whichprovidedevidencefortheassump- In 2006–09,theHSBAundertookthreestate-widehouse- Stockpiles andholdings HSBA researchfindings a significantlossoflife were sporadic,repressive, andsometimesassociatedwith Sudan, effortstoabsorb weapons throughdisarmament continued toflowintoandwithinSudanSouth while tribalandcommunalviolenceescalated. As arms Blue Nile),andSouthSudansimmeredthenexploded, Darfur, theThree Areas (Abyei, SouthKordofan,and In thesixyears thatfollowed, unresolved conflictsin gations wouldbeginwithamoreorlessblankslate. been distributedtociviliansmadeitclearthatinvesti- lack ofgovernment oversight over weapons thathad role envisionedforthem.Furthermore,thecomplete limited totheredeploymentofforces,despitewider SPLA stockpiles;instead,theirverification duties were were grantedaccesstoSudan Armed Forces(SAF)or the firearms from countytocounty,asdid thereportedsourceof reported havingfirearms,but therate varied significantly per centofallsurveyed householdsinEasternEquatoria self-reported ownership rateswere similar inLakes their weapons from theSPLA(seeFigure1). Previous more thanhalfofallrespondents reportedreceiving [IB16] . Inonecounty(Magwi),however, [IB3, IB8,WP16] [IB17, IB21] . Onaverage, some 38 (seeSectionV). . Ultimately, the . Ultimately,the

Figure 1 Firearm acquisition by county, Eastern Equatoria, 2009

Magwi Torit Ikotos

PERCENTAGE

70%

60%

50% ARMS PROLIFERATION

40%

30%

20%

10% I

0 II Was purchased Was given by Was given by Was given by a Found it a friend/family the SPLA militia group lying around member III MEANS OF ACQUISITION Source: IB16 IV

(35 per cent) [IB1]; in Jonglei, the reported rate was views and arms-to-force multipliers generated by Small VI just over 13 per cent, although this was considered an Arms Survey research in other African and non-African underestimate [WP11]. contexts. They were published in the expectation that national and local stakeholders would provide feedback These surveys were the first such estimates generated in to refine and update specific figures on an ongoing basis. post-war Sudan. But while the data was more detailed The HSBA estimated that, in aggregate, there were some than anecdotal evidence, and critical to establishing 2.6 million small arms among all holders in the north and baselines in those areas, they were time-consuming and south—with the majority (1.76 million) in civilian hands. difficult to field, and the findings were not generaliza- These estimates were revised in 2009, reflecting signifi- ble to all states.1 cant work to disaggregate the holdings of armed groups, Then, in April 2007, the HSBA published the first esti- some of which had recently emerged or fragmented mates of firearm inventories among state forces, non- [IB15]. The estimate was revised upwards slightly, to 2.7 state groups, and civilians in Sudan and South Sudan million, and the portion held by civilians rose to almost [IB6]. These figures were based on key informant inter- 2 million (see Table 1).

17 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Table 1Estimatedfirearmsinventories inSudan,December2009 SAF Eastern Front Armed groups GoSS WildlifeService GoSS PrisonService Southern SudanPoliceService SPLA JIUs SPLA (notincludingJIUs) Government ofSouthernSudan(GoSS)forces Service (NISS)(armedunits) National IntelligenceandSecurity National PoliceService(NPS) SAF JIUs Popular DefenceForces ‘Addis AbabaGroup’ Lord’s ResistanceArmy(LRA) Chadian groups Development (NMRD) National MovementforReformand Justice andEqualityMovement(JEM) Forces (SLRF) Sudan’s LiberationRevolutionary SLA Minni Minawi Sudan LiberationArmy(SLA) Ex Units (JIUs)) SAF (notincludingJointIntegrated Government ofNationalUnity(GNU)forces Category - SAF — - aligned Arabmilitias Abdul Wahid - aligned Arabmilitias 6 8 5 3 4 —

7 2,000 13,000 17,000 28,000 16,000 125,000 7,500 100,000 17,000 20,000 2,500 500 500 1,500 5,000 4,000 5,000 500 1,000 2,000 225,000 Strength 0.5/combatant 0.08/staff member 0.08/staff member 0.3/policeman 1.1/combatant 1.4/combatant 2.5/official Various 1.1/soldier 0.5/personnel 1.2/combatant 0.8/combatant 1.2/combatant 1.2/combatant 1.2/combatant 1.5/combatant 1.5/combatant 1.0/combatant 1.2/combatant 1.2/combatant Various to members Ratio ofweapons 2 1 1,000 1,000 1,300 8,400 17,500 175,000 19,000 19,000 10,000 310,000 110,000 3,000 400 600 1,800 6,000 6,000 7,500 500 1,200 2,400 small arms Estimated 18 into civilianlife. Roughly halfofestimated4,000ex Assume nobetterarmedthanPrisonService. Prison staffreportedtopossess1,300 AKMrifles. Budget includes5,000morepolice,butnoweapons. GNU payssalaries,SPLAprovidesarms. SPLA armsSouthernpolice. force toprotectoilfields. NISS armedpersonnelcomparativelywellequippedandstocked.Separate GNU payssalaries,SAFprovidesarms. Strength mayoncehavebeen100,000men. Defence Forcesnotincluded(seebelow). Infantry andreservesdonotseemtolackarms(mostlyKalashnikovs).Popular Central ReservePolicearewellarmed. Believed topossesssome40ToyotaLandCruisers. men/access toarms caches. ManyLRAnowinCentralAfrican Republic. People’sUganda with clashes Recent losing LRA in resulted have Force Defence NMRD believedtopossessaround30 ToyotaLandCruisers. 80 ToyotaLandCruisers. Weakening, butbenefitsfromsporadicSAFsupport.Believedtopossesssome Believed topossesssome250ToyotaLandCruisers. Believed topossesssome150ToyotaLand Cruisers. JEM believedtopossesssome325Toyota LandCruisers. field leadership’s AliMukhtar. SLRF believedtopossessperhaps5–10ToyotaLandCruisers,mostheldbySLA Alliance believedtopossess20–25ToyotaLandCruisers. Believed topossesssome120ToyotaLandCruisers. Notes - rebels havejoinedtheSAForreintegrated Category Strength Ratio of weapons Estimated Notes to members small arms

UN and foreign state forces

UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) 8,800 1.4/military 12,500 UNMIS police, military observers, and civilian staff are unarmed. No formed (military units) personnel (armed) police units.

AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 15,250 1.3/military and 20,000 UNAMID like UNMIS, except (1) higher percentage of troop contributors provid- (UNAMID) (military units and formed police personnel ed with fewer weapons than requested and (2) formed police units are armed. police units)

Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) 2,000 1.5/soldier 3,000 UPDF Battle Group operates in Southern Sudan to counter and pursue the LRA ARMS PROLIFERATION (sometimes outside Sudan).

Additional weapons held by civilians9

Among those residing in the north 31 million 4 per 100 1.24 million State security forces and urban settings suggest low ratio.

Among those residing in the south 9 million 8 per 100 720,000 Prevalence of armed violence among pastoralist groups and lack of law and order suggest ratio could be higher.

Total n/a n/a 2.7 million

Notes: All figures have been rounded. 1 Calculation assumes that SAF comprised 20,000 officers (ratio of 1 weapon per officer), 120,000 infantry (1.5/soldier), 70,000 ‘reserves’ (1.2/reservist), 10,000 air defence units (1.2/ I serviceman), 10,000 border guards (1.0/guard), and 1,200 navy and 3,500 air force personnel (0.5/serviceman). II 2 Calculation assumes the NPS has for many years consisted of the Central Reserve Police (CRP), Emergency Police, Immigration Police, Petroleum Police, and Popular Police. Recently, the prison, customs, and wildlife services have been incorporated into the NPS. The strengths and comparative levels of equipment among these various components are extremely III difficult to ascertain. It is understood that the CRP is the largest and best-armed force among these various units and that personnel possess light weapons and riot-control equipment in addition to their personal firearms. A ratio of 1.5:1 is used for the CRP, which is believed to represent perhaps 20 per cent of the 100,000-strong NPS. Members of the rest of the units are believed to receive one weapon each (which they may or may not have on their person, depending on the assignment). IV 3 The militias are frequently referred to as ‘janjaweed’, which is often defined as ‘devil on horseback’. The label was originally used to describe bandits. The international media has seized on this term to refer more generally to pro-Khartoum militias responsible for attacks on people in Darfur. While this is not a monolithic group with a unified command structure, V the term here is used to denote militias in Darfur, drawn mostly from nomadic Arab tribes, which were armed by Sudanese Military Intelligence and SAF in 2003–04. Many have since been given army IDs and salaries and remain by and large loyal to SAF. The militias mostly comprise nomadic camel herders (Abbala), including the Mahamid (for example, the Um Jalul tribe VI of Musa Hilal) and the Maharia of ‘Hemeti’. This said, three points need to be underscored: (1) many Arabs have remained outside the conflict; (2) some Arabs have sided with the rebels; and (3) ‘alignments’—even long-standing ones—can be fluid. 4 Many militias in Darfur, previously supported with arms from Khartoum, have since turned against the government. Some have joined pre-existing Darfur rebel movements or their offshoots. Many have formed armed groups of their own but have not generated significant popular support among Arab communities. 5 The Addis Ababa Group owes its genesis to the efforts of US envoy Scott Gration to unite the SLA. In the short term, Gration has united only one faction of SLA Unity with a handful of commanders briefly aligned with Abdul Wahid. 6 The SLRF was established in Tripoli, by Libyan diktat, in September 2009, as Libya challenged Qatar’s new central role in peacemaking in Darfur. It is an artificial construct designed as a political asset for Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Its membership is unclear. What seems clear is that its creation increased the fragmentation of the rebel movements, splitting, for example, SLA Unity. 7 This refers to the movement headed by Khalil Ibrahim, militarily the strongest and politically the most coherent in Darfur. There have been several offshoots of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) since it was established in 2003 (for example, the NMRD and Democratic JEM)—but JEM has remained relatively stable compared to the SLA. 8 The term ‘Chadian rebel groups’ refers to numerous Darfur-based Chadian armed insurgent groups. By some accounts there were as many as ten distinct groups as of September 2009. 9 In the absence of reliable data, the population figures used here are rough estimates. According to disputed 2008 census results, the population of the north is 30.89 million, while the south is home to 8.26 million. The GoSS rejected the results on the basis that various populations, including in the south and the west, were deliberately undercounted. The Central Bureau of Statistics refused to share raw data with the Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics, and Evaluation. Source: HSBA (2009, pp. 8–9)

19 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT to conflictzones global normson thesuppliesofconventional weapons lated end-useragreementsand, potentially,emerging of thearmstheyexported—and specificcasesthatvio ing statesandmanufacturers thefinaldestinationofsome arming forthefirsttime.Inaddition, itrevealed toexport - groups, butalsodemonstrated specificcasesofproxy tive notonlyshedlightonthefirepower ofactive armed arms andammunitionidentificationtracinginitia- weapons astheSudan Armed Forces(seeMap1).The pro-SPLM/A, orunaligned—heldthesametypesof almost allnon-stategroups—whetherpro-Khartoum, contradicted—widely heldassumptions.Forexample, The findingssometimesconfirmed—but and SouthSudan. were conductedacrossconflict-affectedareasinSudan Between April 2011andJuly2013,14fieldmissions state groupsbypatrons,whetherdomesticorforeign. sis onilluminatingpotentialarmingpatternsofnon- held bystateandnon-stateactors,withaspecialempha- fieldwork toidentifythetypesandnumbersof weapons violations ofarmsembargoes,theHSBAbeganfocused techniques usedbyUNpanelsofexpertstomonitor Desk initiative todojustthat. Applying andadapting the HSBAlaunchedits Arms and Ammunition Tracing however, othermethodsandtoolswere needed.In2010, tigations. Topushtheresearchenvelope meaningfully, not theendgoal,ofHSBA’sarmsproliferationinves - by differentcategoriesofactors was thestartingpoint, Estimating raw,macro-level numbersofweapons held tion have notbeenopentoindependentverification. stand-alone DDRprogramme,claimsofweapons reduc- While Sudanhasrepeatedlytoutedthesuccessofits efforts toprevent weapons fromreachingpartiesinDarfur. light weapons toKhartoumcontinued despiteinternational the meantime,state-to-statetransfersofsmallarmsand to continuerefinethemultimatelydidnotbearfruit.In the dialoguewithSudanesestakeholdersthatwas needed purpose inprovidingsomedefensibleempiricalfigures, While the2007and2009estimatesserved animportant [WP32] . -

20 period some instances,increasedduringtheCPA’s interim arms transferstoallpartsofSudancontinuedand,in agreement’s ‘ceasefirezone’.Despitethesemeasures, resupply ofmilitaryequipmenttoforceswithinthe In addition,theCPA establishedrestrictionsonthe South Sudan). on Sudan(updatedin2004,andlateramendedtocover Darfur, andthe1994EuropeanUnion(EU)armsembargo the 2004and2005UnitedNationsarmsembargoeson legal restrictionsonarmstransferstoSudan,including out Sudan,theinternationalcommunityestablished In anefforttoreduceinsecurityinDarfurandthrough- Arms imports [WP18] circulation ofweapons tonon-state armedgroups to stateforcesaswell astheonward distributionand since thesigningofCPA; ithighlighteddeliveries ics, andpatternsofarmsflowstowithinSudan ment ofwhatwas knownaboutthestructure, mechan- In 2009,theSmall Arms Survey publishedanassess- 2010–13 was confirmed byarmstracingworkconducted in thread thatrunsthroughmuch oftheresearchand variety ofsupplymechanisms. Thisfindingisared South Sudan,withtransfers intermediatedbya by non-statearmedgroups throughout Sudanand source ofsmallarmsandlight weapons obtained Sudanese government inventories astheprimary Survey researchsince2009hasconsistently identified and morediverse setofcountries. who facilitatedsuchtransferswere basedinawider vate armsbrokers,financiers,andtransportagents region andinternationally.By2009,however, thepri- mediated bywell-established statesponsorsinthe and thattheycontinuedtobedominatedbysupplies similar tothoseestablishedduringthesecondcivilwar, within Sudaninvolved patterns,actors, andmethods [WP18] . Theresearchshowed thatarmsflowstoand [WP32] . .

Map 1 Chinese weapons among armed actors, Sudan and South Sudan, 2011–13

North Kordofan White Sennar Nile

Central SUD A N Blue Darfur Nile CHAD South South Darfur East Kordofan Darfur

Upper ARMS PROLIFERATION Nile

Chinese weapons held by armed actors

Factory 71 5.56 x 45 mm Unity ammunition Factory 945 7.62 x 54R mm Northern ammunition Bahr al Ghazal Warrap Factory 11 and 41 Western 12.7 x 108 mm ammunition CENTRAL Bahr al AFRICAN Ghazal SOUTH SSUU D A N Type 56-1 assault riﬂe REPUBLIC Jonglei ETHIOPIA Lakes CQ assault riﬂe I

Type 80 machine gun Armed actors SSDM/A-Olony Conﬂict zone II QLZ 87 automatic SAF SSDM/A-Athor African Union- grenade launcher proposed border SPLM-N SSDM/A-Yau YWauestern III International Eastern Lou Nuer boundary Type 69 RPG ammunition SSLM/A Equatoria Equatoria (White Army) Abyei IV Red Arrow-8 anti-tank SSDF Murle militia State boundary guided missile Icons are not intended to specify precise locations of armed groups 0 km 200 V

VI Source: Leff and LeBrun (2014, p. 39)

Arms flows into Darfur have continued despite the UN no government with significant influence over the embargo, as documented in two separate investigations supply of weapons to Darfur currently has the political in 2009 and 2016 [IB20, IB24], which trace the evolu- will to prevent their provision [. . .] and the embargo’s tion of supplies to and in the region. By 2011, supplies persistent failure has made it irrelevant to all key from Chad and Libya had begun to diminish due to actors, removing any residual incentives to make it political factors unrelated to the embargo, and since work properly (HSBA, 2016, p. 1). then Sudanese-supplied arms have only increased their relative presence on all sides. The most recent analysis With regard to legal, authorized imports of small arms was pessimistic about the possibilities of increasing and light weapons to Sudan and South Sudan, reported enforcement of the embargo, noting that: figures must be treated as a starting point only, to be

21 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Figure 2) 2001–12, withsignificant year-to-year fluctuations(see weapons worthaboutUSD165millionover the period that Khartoumhadimportedsmallarmsandlight forms ofinvestigations. In2014,theHSBAestimated supplemented bycontinualfieldresearchandother interim period the CPA andcontinuedupto throughtheendof as 2008;thesetransferswere technicallyinviolationof Reports ofmajorarmstransferstoJubaemergedasearly imported fromChina. into thecivilconflict thateruptedinDecember 2013. and ammunition thatarrived inmid-2014,halfayear including asignificantshipment ofChinese weapons nevertheless, majorshipmentshave been confirmed, To date,theGRSShasreported noofficialimports; market—although itchosenot todosotransparently. able toconcludeimportagreements ontheinternational Government oftheRepublicSouthSudan (GRSS)was 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 USD MILLION Khartoum totheUNCommodityTradeStatisticsDatabase(Comtrade),2001–12(USDmillion) Figure 2Annualimportsofsmallarmsandlightweapons, theirammunition,and‘conventional weapons’ reportedby 2001 [WP32] [WP18] 2002 . Morethanhalf(58percent)were 2003 . After independencein2011,the 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

2009 22 2010 ucts to buyers abroad(LeBrunandLeff, 2015) MIC’s apparentupsurgeinefforts toshowcaseitsprod- ammunition inconflictzones across Africa,and the also documentedtheincreasing diffusionofSudanese manufacture anduseinSouth Sudan.TheHSBAhas actors, insomecaseswithfewer than12monthsbetween manufactured Sudaneseammunitionamongarangeof Tracing workhasincreasinglydocumentedvery recently of Sudanese-madeammunitiontonon-stateactors. new andunexpectedperspectives onthedistribution ammunition identificationandtracinghave provided facturing plants(HSBA,2014;2015).However, armsand Corporation (MIC),thestate-ownedcomplexofmanu and marketingmaterialfromSudan’sMilitaryIndustry the HSBAhastrackedpubliclyavailable information tion andweapons systemsremainsopaque,even though The scaleofSudan’sproductionsmallarmsammuni- Sudanese armsproduction capacity butmay seektoestablishoneinthe future. South Sudanhas noarmsandammunition production 2011 2012 Annualtotals Conventionalweapons Smallarmsandlightweaponsammunition Smallarmsandlightweaponstheirparts Source: LeffandLeBrun(2014,p.24) [WP32] -

. Future focus areas Fifth, it is imperative to continue to interrogate the motivations and demand factors that drive arms acqui- While much has been learned, the scale of arms prolifer- sition among civilians and non-state groups. This is best ation in Sudan and South Sudan, along with the distribu- accomplished by qualitative research among the full tion of new imports, remains hazy. Arms identification range of parties. and tracing techniques, which have been able to illumi- nate patterns of deliberate arming of non-state parties, have not revealed much about the specific actors involved Notes along the supply chain. Discussions within the HSBA 1 In 2016, with the support of the UN Development Programme, team and at the recent Symposium have identified a the Small Arms Survey launched a national small arms assessment in South Sudan, which is expected to generate the first ARMS PROLIFERATION number of avenues for future work in this area. national estimates of small arms ownership among civilians. First, the Survey should return to the efforts launched in 2007–09 to document civilian small arms access through household surveys and qualitative assessments in South Sudan. Those previous exercises demonstrated that, con- trary to some claims, civilians are willing to discuss their acquisition and ownership of small arms. Furthermore, a baseline of weapons holdings data is critical for security programme planning; at the moment, government authorities have little information on which to base efforts such I as disarmament and community education campaigns. II Second, stakeholders remain concerned about cross- III border flows of arms and ammunition—from outside Sudan into Darfur and from all surrounding countries IV into South Sudan. The so-called ‘ant trade’ has received V much less research attention than the documenting of large-scale state-to-state transfers and should be a future VI focus of research to refine current estimates and valuations. Third, while aggregate figures of arms held by civilians and non-state forces can provide an important sense of scale, it is equally important to explore weapon types, how these have evolved over time, and their different supply chains and impacts. Fourth, the Small Arms Survey has conducted long-term illicit arms and ammunition price monitoring at local markets in other contexts (Lebanon and Syria) and the relationship between price fluctuations and the out- break of violence. Such an investigation at arms markets in and around South Sudan may also be informative.

23 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT states) and theTwo Areas (SouthKordofanandBlueNile out investigations ofconflict dynamicsinDarfur, Abyei, of theSouthSudanDefenceForces(SSDF)—andthrough- project sinceitsvery firstWorking Paper—a 2006study in armedviolencehasbeenacentralfocusoftheHSBA decision-making ofnon-statearmedgroupsthatengage Understanding theproliferation,motivations, and sonal interestsofparticularcommanders. be stronglyinfluencedbylocaldynamicsandtheper- may actwithlessdirectionfromcentralauthorityand militias suchasparamilitaryforces,theseelements perspective toelementsofofficialstateforces,orallied reasons. Therearestrongreasonstoapplythesame or another,pittedagainsteachother,fora variety of find themselves inoppositiontostateforcesatonetime community defencegroups. Any ofthesegroupsmay from otherarmedactors,suchastribalmilitiasand combination ofmaterialgrievances andopportunism, distinguish rebelgroups,whosemotivations maybea When focusingonarmedgroups,itisimportantto ginalization, militarizedresponses tolocalgrievances, Contested state legitimacy,long-standingclaims ofmar- rarely enjoyed amonopolyover themeansofviolence. The governments ofSudanandSouthhave The context WP12, WP21] [WP8] III. Armedgroups WP10, WP22,WP26] South Sudan,suchastheLord’sResistance Army (LRA) try thathave engagedinviolentactivitiesSudanor has extendedtoarmedgroupsbasedoutsidethecoun [IB2, IB5,IB11,IB21,IB22,WP1,WP3,WP5, and Chad-basedgroupsactive inDarfur . . Coverage ofthisthematicarea [IB9,

- 24 the civilwar period Sudan, oneanother’s rebelforces—have continuedsince non-state groups—including,inthecaseofChadand and communitydefencegroups.Stateeffortstoexploit including anti-government rebelgroups,tribalmilitias, that have ledtotheproliferationofnon-stateforces, and competitionover resourcesareintertwiningfactors ing theiractivities. focus onunderstandingtheirmotivations anddocument Darfur, andtheTwo Areas, theHSBAwillcontinueto tion offorcesinvolved intheconflicts inSouthSudan, to sufferfromthemlater.Given theongoingprolifera- have attimesdrawnonnon-state forceshave oftencome those objectives areachieved, thecentresofpower that in-Opposition (SPLA–IO). Darfurian groups have actively fought againsttheSPLA- with thesouthernSPLM/A, even thoughsome ofthe with theunarmedpolitical opposition inSudan,or the armedrebelgroupsachieved arobustassociation more thanrhetoricalorpolitical cooperation.Norhave Revolutionary Front,theyhave notprovidedmuch North inSouthKordofanunderthebannerofSudan Darfurian rebelgroupshelpedtosupporttheSPLA– front againsttheSudanese government. Although some and failure,ofarmedgroupstobuildaunifiedmilitary mented sincetheCPA eraconcerns thecontinualattempts, Sudan. Oneofthenarratives thattheprojecthasdocu- armed groupsinDarfur,theTwo Areas, andeastern The HSBAhasproducedavariety ofoutputsonactive Sudan HSBA research [WP12] . Regardlessofwhether

Table 2 Armed elements in the Nuba Mountains area, 2009

Name Leaders Alignment Stated strength Areas of operation CPA Remarks

Sudan Armed – SAF 5th and 10th Divisions and Headquarters in Kadugli, To be downsized to The conflict around Abyei Forces (SAF) elements of the 14th Babanussa, and Dilling, peacetime levels after has brought new units with smaller units across formation of the JIUs into South Kordofan that the region refuse UN monitoring ARMED GROUPS Central Reserve – SAF 2,000 (SPLA estimate) Region-wide Not addressed in CPA Massively expanded in the Police (CRP) last two years

Popular Defence – SAF UN estimates range from Region-wide, with the To be absorbed into the Some dissatisfied Missiriya Forces 5,000 to 20,000, with exception of the SPLM- regular forces or members defected to the independent estimates at controlled ‘goose eggs’ dissolved SPLM/A in the last six the higher end months

Joint Integrated Brig. Jagod Troops remain 6,000 divided equally Kadugli, Heiban, Talodi, Envisaged as the core of The JIUs are funded Units (JIUs) Makwar, Nuba divided along between SAF and SPLA Buram, Julud, Um Sirdiba, a new national army should centrally, by the SAF / SPLA lines Dilling, and Arid near the 2011 referendum indi- Government of National Lawaga cate a desire for unity Unity, but still answer to separate military commands

Sudan People’s Brig. Izzat Kuku, SPLA SPLA claims 9,000 troops – All SPLA forces not in the Brig. Izzat has refused to I Liberation Army Nuba moved south of the 1956 JIUs to move south of the allow UNMIS monitoring (SPLA) border, to Lake Abiad 1956 border of Lake Abiad II and Bentiu (but this is disputed) III

Debab Forces Brig. Hassan SPLA 1,500 currently in the Debab, Kharasana, Unauthorized recruitment The Missiriya leadership IV Hamid Saleh, Pariang area, according Bajayea, Dandur, of new forces is in contra is widely thought to be Missiriya to the SPLA, pending full Abu Sofifa vention of the CPA keeping options open with V integration into the SPLA; other forces VI many others joined the SPLA police and other SPLM bodies

South Sudan Gen. Paulino SPLA One company in Kharasana Required to align with SAF Largely integrated into Defence Forces Matiep Kharasana, according or SPLA and integrate the SPLA following the (SSDF) to the SPLA January 2006 Juba Declaration

The Central Juma Wakil Self-styled The group claims to have The group’s two main Required to align with SAF Suspected pro-government Sudan People’s Hamad Angil independents widespread support, but leaders are both Kujuriya or SPLA and integrate spoiler group Liberation Army there is no evidence of this Nuba, from the Dilling area

Nuba Al Bulola Hamed Ostensibly Abdul Bagi claims to be Most activities to date in Required to align with SAF Suspected pro-government Mountains II Abdul Bagi pro-SPLA able to raise 40,000 men the Um Burumbita area or SPLA and integrate spoiler group

Source: HSBA (2008, p. 8)

25 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT 2003–04 andtheirsubsequentchangingroles inter-Arab conflict and whichhaddisbanded(see Table 2) were active andposedrisks, whichhadnotintegrated, for example,theHSBAwas ascertainingwhichforces prior totheresumptionofconflict inSouthKordofan, the sourcesandnumbersofarms.In2008,threeyears and characteristicsofthemenundertheircommand; their backgrounds,histories,andloyalties; thenumber ping—including theidentificationofkeycommanders, The earlyfocusoftheprojectonarmedgroupswas map- mentation oftherebelgroupsfollowingDPA in2006 With respecttoDarfur,theHSBAdocumentedfrag- Chad andSudan,whichplayed outinDarfur tended to apply qualitative tools there, including in-depth tended toapply qualitative toolsthere,includingin-depth conduct quantitative analysisin Sudan,theprojecthas Because ofthechallenges accessandauthorizationto area secession ofSouthSudanwas alsoanimportantresearch Sudan–South Sudanborderintheyears followingthe ular DefenceForces in bothstates2014–15 of conflict in South Kordofan (June 2011–July2012) of conflictinSouthKordofan non-state, atcriticalpointsintheconflicts:first year in-depth conflictanalysisofallthekeyforces,stateand With respecttotheTwo Areas, theprojecthasproduced [WP29] [WP25] [WP6] 2007–08 levels violence andpopulationdisplacementinDarfurto season fightingin2014,2015,andearly2016hasreturned from globalattention thantheSouthSudanconflict,dry- the conflictof2010–12 flict and the increasing role of pro-government forces in (September 2011–June2013) N’Djaména andtheendofproxyarminginregion the subsequentrapprochementbetween Khartoumand successes, andsubsequentstagnation development oftheSudanRevolutionaryFront,itsinitial [WP30, WP34] ; theoriginsandroleofpro-government Pop ; themobilizationof‘janjaweed’ militiasin ; thefirsttwo years offightinginBlueNile [IB24] [WP22] [WP10] . . [WP28] [WP38] ; theriseofinter-ethiccon- ; the proxy conflict between [WP31] ; andtheformation . Conflictalongthe ; andtheconflict [WP33] [IB12] [WP17] [WP12] . . Further ; ; -

26 Source: Gramizzi(2013,p.38) PKM from determiningtheirorigin.About15fightersalsoreceived been deliberatelyremovedfromtheweaponstopreventenemy militia reportedlyexplainedtothetroopsthatserialnumbershad among Khartoum-backedrebelsinSouthSudan.Theleadersofthe rifle withscratched-offserialnumbers,muchlikethoseobserved and tenadditionalroundsofammunition,anAK used byJointIntegratedUnits),anAK fighter wasprovidedwithauniform(similartothosepreviously South Sudan.Astheconvoypreparedtoleavecamp,each tary rewardiftheycoulddefeattheenemyandreachBunjin fight theSPLM–Nandpromisedthattheywouldreceiveamone- transferred, onfourUraltrucks,tothesamemilitaryfacility. individuals whohadbeenrecruitedinasimilarmannerwere attack theSPLM and shooting training being captured,hewentthroughthreedaysofbasicmilitary similar totheonesusedbyPopularDefenceForces.After abduction inBudlocalitybyarmedfighterswearinguniforms of KamalLoma’s militia.Theex-combatanthadbeenrecruitedby The followingaccountreliesonaninterviewwithaformermember Box 3 who hadpreviouslytrainedinfivedifferentSAFcamps provided bythegovernmentandtransferredfromKhartoum. Loma, whoinformedthetroopsthatequipmenthadbeen Weapons werepersonallydistributedtoeachrecruitbyKamal offloaded fromtenSAF-operatedLandCruisertechnicalvehicles. green andborewhiteinscriptionsintheLatinalphabet,were while ammunition,containedinwoodenboxes thathadbeenpainted were transferredfromedDamazinonsixdouble-platformtrucks, members ofArabtribes,including some fromDarfur. roughly equalnumbersofDinka,Fellata, andNuer,fewer the troopswereMabaan,whileremaining combatantscomprised and 1stLt.alHadiIbrahim,allMabaan tribesmen.Themajorityof Brig. Gen.KamalLomahimself,Lt.Col. AwadLoma(Kamal’s brother), camps), GozTebelab,Gule,andWadabok - Before theattack,recruitsweretoldtheyaboutto The offensive was launched with a contingent of 1,000 fighters The offensivewaslaunchedwithacontingentof1,000fighters Weapons providedtothetroopsgatheredinGozTebelabcamp type machineguns,RPGs,andhandgrenades. — The Rum offensive: inside Kamal Loma’s militia including physicalexercise, marching,weaponhandling, — in GozTebelabcamp,afterwhichhewassentto – N positioninRumApril2012.Severaldozen - type fullyloadedmagazine — under thecommandof - type assault — in Bud (two in Bud(two interviews with key informants and the combatants them- In fact, the possibility of a return to war was very real selves. This approach has provided detailed insights until the 2006 Juba Declaration, in which Salva Kiir’s into the roles and motivations of armed actors, and high- government agreed to integrate the forces of anti-SPLA lighted the sheer diversity of forces active in Sudan. An commanders into the SPLA [WP1]. But integration, which illustrative example is Box 3 from WP31, which describes soon became the post-war model for dealing with rebel the role of a foreign militia that was active against the groups, does not imply reconciliation, and old resentments SPLM–N in Blue Nile in mid-2012, and that was led by remained dormant for years. Following contested elec- ARMED GROUPS South Sudanese officers whose men were recruited in tions in 2010 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Blue Nile and Upper Nile. many wartime commanders who felt side-lined returned to rebellion, supported by Khartoum; a number of new The opposition groups of eastern Sudan, whose forces commanders with communal support bases (Nuer, Shilluk, accepted a peace agreement in 2006, have not been the Murle) followed suit [IB18, IB22]. In the aftermath of subject of as much attention given that the region has the massacre of Nuer in December 2013 at the hands of been calm in comparison to other areas of the country. government forces, intra-Southern grievances dating back But the neglect of eastern Sudan has helped to perpetuate to 1991 were brought to the surface and the ‘integrated’ a lack of understanding about whether the ESPA pro- SPLA broke apart once more. On the eve of the new con- vided any peace dividends to the region. In 2007, the flict, the HSBA assessed the status of the main rebel com- HSBA conducted an assessment of armed groups along manders and their force strengths (see Table 3) [IB22]. the eastern frontier of the country and their relations with Addis Ababa and Asmara, as well as analysis of Beyond commanders who turn to insurgency, the HSBA I opposition groups in the period following the peace has examined the role of tribal militias and community agreement [WP3, WP9]. In 2015 the project published defence groups under conditions of heightened insecu- II a thorough review of the impacts of the ESPA on the rity, in particular during the wave of inter-tribal violence region. It concluded that the government had not fully in 2009 and with reference to the so-called white armies III [WP5, WP20, WP41] fulfilled the wealth-sharing and development commit- in anti-government hostilities . IV ments of the agreement, and that the agreement had The latter groups, a formidable collective of armed Nuer not eliminated the political, economic, and social mar- youths who were mobilized following the massacre of V ginalization at the root of the conflict in the region; these their tribesmen in December 2013, is neither under the VI findings pointed to a likelihood of continued unrest, control of Riek Machar, nor necessarily wedded to the especially among youths [WP36]. SPLM-in-Opposition’s political demands. Until the HSBA’s qualitative assessment, published in mid-2016, the white South Sudan armies’ attitudes, concerns, and demands were largely overlooked in discussions of South Sudan’s conflict, The HSBA’s research on armed groups in South Sudan despite their centrality to the SPLA–IO’s rebellion [WP41]. was designed in response to the dynamics of the latter phases of the second civil war, during which fighting No survey of the impacts of armed groups in South Sudan largely took place between competing armed groups would be complete without a consideration of the LRA, with shifting allegiances and orientations to Khartoum. which was used by the Government of Sudan as a tool The research agenda was also influenced by the fact against the SPLA during the second civil war, in 1993–94; that the CPA did not adequately resolve the contested despite a concerted campaign assisted by international legitimacy of the SPLA among the many southern groups advisors, the LRA has yet to be decisively neutralized. that identified themselves as members of the SSDF. The HSBA began its coverage of the LRA in South Sudan

27 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Table 3SouthSudanesemilitiacommandersasofOctober2013 Commander David Yau Kong James Arezen Adoch Agul Torokon Gayin Ngarubin Longaben Wayah James Lopia Johnson Olony Alyuak OgotAkol Gordon Kong Abdallah Muntu Mutallah Mohamed CholAmir Kamal Loma James Bogo affiliation Force name/ (SSDM/A)-Cobra Movement/Army Democratic South Sudan SSDM/A-Cobra SSDM/A-Cobra SSDM/A-Cobra SSDM/A-Cobra SSDM/A-Cobra SSDM/A-Upper Nile SSDM/A-Upper Nile SSDF SSDF affiliate SSDF affiliate SSDF affiliate SSDF affiliate Location Pibor county,Jonglei Pibor county,Jonglei Pibor county,Jonglei Pibor county,Jonglei Pibor county,Jonglei Pibor county,Jonglei Fashoda county,UpperNile Umrawat, Hamra,AbuJepeah) (Kuek Magenes,Ruwat,Umjalala, Upper NileandSouthKordofan Some 360menspreadacross Tadamun county,BlueNile His troopsareinBwat, Co troops inBwat,BlueNile Co Abdallah inBwat,BlueNile Gordon KongandMuntu Co troops inBwat,BlueNile Bwat, BlueNile - - - located withGordonKong’s located withtroopsof located withGordonKong’s Status Active Active Active Active Active Active integration Negotiating amnesty Accepted then reneged amnesty, accepted Reportedly Active integration considering may be Active but recruiting Active and recruiting Active and 28 Notes Manyading inOctober2013. redefected inApril2012andwenttoKhartoum.Reportedlylocated Was fieldcommanderforAthor;acceptedamnestyinSeptember2011; then SPLA.ReportedlylocatedinFertaitOctober2013. 1st incommandunderYauYau;formerPiborDefenceForces(PDF)and in violentattackstheGumurukarea. YauinAugust2012;oneofhisdeputies, PeterBureti,participated join 2nd incommandunderYauYau;formerPDFandthenSAF;sentbySAFto Former PDF; integrated into SAF; sent by SAF to join Yau Yau in August 2012. Former PDF; integrated into SAF; sent by SAF to join Yau Yau in August 2012. around Fertait. Has about250armedsoldiers;inJuly2013hewasreportedtobe in Fashodacounty. Kaka town;negotiatingintegrationinJuba,mostofhis3,000menwait Was oneofRobertGwang’s deputies;blamedforaseriesofattackson themselves intotheSPLAManyocounty,UpperNile. allegedly linkedtoSPLM-DC.InOctober2013,250ofhismenturned Former commissionerofManyoCounty,dismissedin2008anddefected; dwindled; manycameinwithJohnDuit. His troopsmakefrequentforaysintoUpperNile;hismayhave 2010 elections. Ethnic Brun;formercommissionerofMaban;beganhisinsurgencyafter Ethnic Dinka;formercommissionerofRenk. Ethnic Maban; SPLA commanders in Upper Nile were not aware of this group. Ethnic Shilluk;working withKamalLoma.

Commander Force name/ Location Status Notes affiliation

Bapiny Monituel South Sudan Now in Juba negotiating Accepted Bul Nuer from Mayom; took over leadership of SSLA in September 2012. Liberation with SPLM/A amnesty His forces are awaiting integration in Mayom. Movement/Army (SSLM/A)

James Gai Yoach SSLM/A Now in Khartoum; some 300 of Arrested in A Jagei Nuer, he was leader of SSLM/A after Gadet’s surrender to SPLA, ARMED GROUPS his men are in South Kordofan/ Khartoum in with Bapiny Monituel as his deputy. Was active in South Kordofan, Unity, Unity border areas September and had forces in Upper Nile. 2012 with some of his men

Karlos Kuol SSLM/A Was in Khartoum, now in Juba Accepted A Bul Nuer from Mayom, he was Gadet’s 2nd in command; he stayed in negotiating with the SPLM/A amnesty Khartoum when Gadet joined the SPLA. Puljang commanded his forces in South Kordofan.

Matthew Puljang SSLM/A Was based in Kilo 23, Accepted A Bul Nuer from Mayom, now awaiting integration. now in Mayom amnesty

Bipen Machar SSLM/A Was based in Kilo 23, Accepted A Bul Nuer from Mayom, came into Mayom with 3,000 men awaiting now in Mayom amnesty integration.

Source: HSBA (2013, p. 2) I

II with a 2007 survey of the group’s terrorization of the research activities—the mapping of armed groups and III Equatorias region and the Juba-mediated peace process periodic in-depth studies of their roles in conflict dynam- between the group and the Government of Uganda ics—fill an important information niche. IV [WP8]. Subsequently, the project provided bi-monthly While informative and valuable, mapping exercises V Facts & Figures updates on the group’s activities in South have limits. The HSBA intends to expand its analysis Sudan and efforts to contain and ultimately crush it. As VI of the challenges inherent in the integration of armed of mid-2016 the LRA remained greatly diminished and groups into the SPLA; assess the extent to which the not the significant threat in South Sudan that it was even prospect of integration has served as an incentive to a few years ago, but the group has shown a talent for abandon rebellions in South Sudan; and identify path- resurfacing after long periods of dormancy. ways that may foster reconciliation between formerly bitter enemies. Incisive analysis in these areas could Future focus areas help national stakeholders and the international community support efforts to bring conflict parties together The precariousness of South Sudan’s peace process, the in a genuine spirit of peace. sidelining of Riek Machar, the lack of full coordination and common objectives among anti-government forces, In its monitoring of the vectors of armed violence, the and the ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas HSBA will continue to pay attention not only to non- indicate that armed groups must remain a focus of state rebel groups and tribal militias, but also to elements attention and research for the project. The HSBA’s main of the official armed forces of both countries.

29 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT ing datasets areonlyslightlybetterthan theirsources, sources (suchas thenewsmediaandNGOs), theresult- to aggregateinformationfrom avariety ofsecondary (such as10,000). Although organizationshave begun said todisplaceasuspiciously roundnumberofcivilians difficult tocomeby:each new battleinSouthSudanis almost 400,000. Accurate displacementfiguresarealso the period2003–05inDarfuralonerangefrom134,000to estimates vary greatly, however. Conflict death tallies for must beestimatedinthehundredsofthousands.The violence over thepast20years inSudanandSouth The scaleofdeathsdirectlyorindirectlyduetoarmed The context policy andprogrammingdiscussions. violence impactswouldbeanimportantcontributionto lence. Yet providingmoreaccurateestimatesofarmed scientifically valid estimatesofthetollarmedvio- funding, reach,mandate,ortechnicalskillstoprovide bodies, andinternationalorganizationslackthecapacity, tional. Similarly,peacekeepingforces,UnitedNations violent injuryandmortalitystatisticsremainsaspira- South Sudan,thenationalinfrastructureforcollecting of security,lawenforcement,andhealthauthorities.In mechanisms, suchasarenormallywithinthepurview whether agencieshave establishedviolencemonitoring these typesofviolence,norhave theybeenabletodiscern Sudan have notenjoyed accesstoofficialstatisticson Researchers whoarebasedoutsideSudanandSouth flicts, cattlerustling,andinterpersonalcriminalviolence. and theSouthSudancivilwar—as well asintribalcon- context ofarmedconflicts—asinDarfur,the Two Areas, Armed violencecomprisestheuseofweapons inthe IV. Armedviolence 30 data throughmonitoringontheground. secondary sourcestoprimaryones—thatis,generate gap. TheHSBA’sultimateaim,however, istoshiftfrom precise information,theynevertheless fillanimportant which areoftenweak. Inthe absenceofricher,more reduce insecurity andviolenceaspriorities. SSR—especially policetraining—aspolicy prioritiesto Respondents alsosaidthey viewed disarmamentand not improved intheyear sincetheendofcivilwar. of Lakesrespondentsreported thattheirsecurityhad having atleastoneguninthe household.Morethanhalf weapon ownedamongrespondentswhoacknowledged guns andrifles,whileassaultrifles werethemostcommon incidents, theweapons usedwere predominatelyhand- armed robbery,sexualassault,anddeathsfromviolent frequent (seeFigure3);italsorevealed thatincasesof [IB1, WP2] such victimizationsurvey ever conductedinSouthSudan The project’ssurvey inLakesstate2006was thefirst consider disarmamentcampaigns. rience ofvictimization,useguns,andwillingnessto areas affectedbydifferentformsofviolence,theirexpe- ings abouttheexperiencesandattitudesofciviliansin small samplesizes,theyhave generatedimportantfind- cally limited,notgeneralizable,andbasedonrelatively and location. Although thesestudieswere geographi- with datadisaggregatedbysex,agegroup,weapon type, ceptions ofsecurityamongcommunitiesinSouthSudan, surveys toestimatedirectviolent victimizationandper- In 2007–09,theHSBAconductedstate-level household HSBA research . Itfoundthatvictimizationwithgunswas Figure 3 Weapons used in violent incidents, Lakes state, 2006

50 ARMED VIOLENCE 40

20 Percentage of positive responses 10

0 Handgun or Stick Spear Knife/panga RPG or heavy Other No weapon rifle machine gun

Robbery Fight outside compound Fight inside compound Other attacks with weapon Sexual assault Death from injury or accident Source: HSBA (2006a, p. 5)

II When the HSBA repeated these exercises in Jonglei and source aggregation. Further, large aggregate numbers III Eastern Equatoria (and neighbouring Turkana North, of conflict deaths may be of limited policy relevance. The Kenya), they revealed a significant diversity in attitudes, collection of more detailed information through single IV pointing to the importance of local violence dynamics surveys is time-consuming and costly, and generates in shaping attitudes about security, security providers, only a single set of data points. V guns and gun carrying, and expectations for the future. The time may soon be ripe for an evolutionary leap, from VI In Eastern Equatoria, security dynamics included cattle one-off surveys to longer-term violence monitoring. By rustling, conflict over natural resources, weak govern- mid-2016, a number of small (non-HSBA) initiatives had ance, SPLA abuses, armed group activity, and land and been fielded to gather violence information directly from border disputes. community sources on a regular basis, yet such efforts remain nascent, coordination limited, and pay-offs for Future focus areas affected communities minimal. There is a great need to bring together multiple sources of data in a common pool While methodological advances have been made in the that observes minimum standards and uses open access study of small arms flows into Sudan and South Sudan, and dissemination methods. The HSBA is already con- particularly with regard to arms and ammunition iden- ducting a scoping exercise in South Sudan to assess what tification and tracing, research into the pervasiveness information is being gathered, the capacities of participat- and impacts of specific kinds of armed violence has not ing organizations, and technical and logistical gaps. In significantly evolved beyond local surveys and secondary line with the monitoring mandate of institutions created

31 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT to officialgovernment armedviolencedata. informal qualitative assessments,andtosecureaccess access toconflict-affectedareasthatwouldallowfor Sudanese stakeholders—stateandnon-state—togain more modest:tocontinuebuildrelationshipswith in SouthSudan,theexpectationsforHSBAare As thesituationinSudanremainslessdeveloped than but alsothepeaceprocessandtransitionalgovernment. not onlylocalsecurityprovision, would support itoring (IGAD)-mediated peaceagreement,armedviolencemon- by theIntergovernmental Authority onDevelopment

32 V. Security provision

As the project’s perception surveys have shown, state In South Sudan, the transformation of the army and the security provision is an important factor in shaping police, both highly militarized and drawn from the same

civilians’ attitudes about guns and community behav- pool of civil war-era fighters, will be a long-term process. SECURITY PROVISION iours, such as weapon carrying and informal security The descent into renewed conflict beginning in December arrangements. In South Sudan, law enforcement has 2013—and the conflict of July 2016—halted most trans- until very recently been dominated by the SPLA, and formation activities. The IGAD peace process offers new police presence continues to be weak in most areas. opportunities for revitalizing it—but also risks repeating Moreover, the scope of state security promotion exer- some old errors from the CPA interim period. cises has been extremely narrow, with disarmament as the primary intervention. The elephants in the room in HSBA research discussions of state security provision are the predatory behaviour of security actors against communities they HSBA research in the area of security provision has regard as enemies, and the lack of a culture of policing focused on the interrelated issues of civilian disarma- I focusing on civilian security promotion. Besides being ment, SPLA (and police) transformation, DDR, and a reflection of the contested legitimacy of state authori- local security arrangements [IB3, IB17, IB25, WP2, II ties (see Section III), this state of affairs is the legacy of WP11, WP16, WP21, WP23, WP24, WP27]. decades of conflict in which communities were pitted III Civilian disarmament against one another only to be somewhat artificially IV and superficially ‘reunited’ without reconciliation of Civilian disarmament, for which the CPA provided lim- any kind. ited guidance, is widely viewed inside the GRSS and V SPLA as a key step in bringing security to the region VI The context [IB3, WP11, WP16]. The HSBA has made numerous assessments of the campaigns undertaken to date. These Many communities in South Sudan provide their own have been driven by ad hoc security concerns, with little security because the state security apparatus is absent strategic planning or overarching methods, and no (in the case of the police) or antagonistic (in the case of connection to long-term security provision. As a result, the army). Anti-government commanders may nominally they have generally failed to disarm communities effec- respond to the latter concerns and take over the respon- tively, and have often been associated with community sibility of providing security in areas they control, but resistance and loss of life. UN agencies have provided whether these steps are effective in improving security assistance in such efforts, but taken criticism when the has much to do with the perceived legitimacy of the campaigns turned repressive and violent. rebel commanders and the loyalty of the communities they claim to control. Less formal community security After sporadic attempts to disarm areas where violence arrangements may also be a mixture of security provi- was pronounced, the government announced a six-month sion and collective vigilantism. national disarmament campaign in mid-2008. Yet, because

33 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT the monthsaftercampaign there was nodiscernibleimpactonsecuritylevels in these conditions,anddecliningconfidenceintheCPA, Juba, halfofthestatesdidnotimplementitatall.Given there was littleplanningandalmostnosupportfrom the SPLA’s ranks presented a major threat to the cohesion SPLA’srankspresented amajorthreattothecohesion the thousands offormer enemyarmedgroup members into reform planning.Furthermore, theintegrationoftens towards awar footingandputtingoffthenecessary with Sudan,drivingthearmy leadershipeven further ent thattheSPLAcontinued tofearrenewed conflict As theprojectprogressed,it became increasinglyappar- force’ (HSBA,2006b,p.7). transparency’ that‘eschew[s]rulebyexcessive military party’ orcoulddevelop ‘acultureofaccountabilityand into apoliticallyindependentarmyanddemocratic transform ‘fromahighlymilitarizedrebelmovement raising thequestionofextenttowhicharmycould In theearlyphasesofHSBA,researcherswere already Security sectortransformation campaigns lessons thathave beenlearnedfromanalysesofprevious campaign wouldbenecessary.Thesearesomeofthe members andNGOs,awidespreadsensitization of stakeholders,includingconsultationswithcommunity place. Planning shouldbesystematicandinvolve arange planning forthedisarmamentofciviliansnormallytake tested—and thatisamajorassumption;onlythencould This logicassumesthattheelectionswillnotbecon- instituting gunownershipregulationsforthefirsttime. office, andthelong-awaited FirearmsBill isimplemented, state electionsbringdemocraticallychosenofficialsto Most likely,itwillneedtowait untilafternationaland barely operating—shouldnotbeexpected(orpursued). atmosphere—in whichthetransitionalgovernment is A nationaldisarmamentcampaigninthecurrenttense lel to,oreven after,securitysectortransformation. This iswhydisarmamentshouldbecarriedoutinparal- security presencetoprotectthemoncetheyaredisarmed. are unlikelytogive uptheirweapons ifthereisnostate [IB3] . Another cruciallessonisthatcivilians [WP16] . 34 ment oftransformationeven moreattractive properly anticipatedormanaged,whichmadepostpone- and effectiveness ofthearmy;thatthreathadnotbeen undisciplined andunder-resourcedthanthearmy undisciplined essentially aparamilitaryforceandwas perceived asmore have beenfraught. As ofearly2016,theSSNPSremained rank andfileSPLA veterans andintegratedrebelmilitias (SSNPS), effortstocreateaviablepoliceforcefromthe by theinterimSouthSudanNationalPoliceService early successes,includingthe2011referendumoverseen ongoing. SuchisthecaseinSouthSudan.Despitesome policing andnearlyimpossiblewhenconflictisstill there isnohistoryorinstitutionalmemoryofcivilian always adifficulttask.Itis even morechallengingwhen Police transformationinpost-conflictenvironmentsis and control,alackoftraining rivalries, poorintegration of rival forces,weak command those unitswere markedbydeploymentdelays,ethnic the JIUs(2006–11)arenotwhollypositive, however, as as abasisforfutureunifiedforce.Thelessonsfrom eration duringapost-agreementtransitionalperiodand authority andbuildingrelationshipsoftrustcoop- forces aresupposedtocooperateasameansofsharing ofthearmedforces.Inbothcases,integrated (JIUs) of SouthSudanrecallstheCPA’s JointIntegratedUnits Police unitstoprovidesecurityinthemainurbanareas The provisionsofthe ARCSS thatcallforJointIntegrated parties andsporadicfightingpersist. slowly, whilekeydisagreementsbetween theconflict almost ayear aftertheagreement,thisprocessismoving have longadvocatedforguiding transformation.But and securityreview(SDSR),somethingthatanalysts forward inSouthSudan.Itcallsforastrategicdefence ture designedtomove securitysectortransformation Republic ofSouthSudan(ARCSS)setsupanarchitec The Agreement ontheResolutionofConflictin highly volatile environment. that theseissues notrecur,especiallyinthe current, civilians, asoccurredin2011 inMalakal.Itisimportant components brokeapartand foughtoneanotherand phases oftheCPA’s interimperiod,someoftheJIU [IB10] . Inthelatter [WP23] [IB25]

- . . DDR and others—about what DDR was supposed to achieve. The SPLA saw it as a means of providing benefits to Post-conflict DDR in Sudan and South Sudan was a mas- former soldiers, whereas the international community, sive operation, and the HSBA has provided numerous which was funding and guiding the operation, saw it as explorations of its nominal successes and significant a downsizing and security-building exercise. The SPLA limitations, which were evidenced by an outcome far never fully bought into the process. On the eve of south- below the expected 180,000 demobilized men (see Table 4) ern secession, DDR had had no discernible effect on the [IB17, WP21, WP24]. A central issue in South Sudan force size; in fact, new recruitment probably outpaced can be traced back to early disagreements between the the demobilization of fighters [WP23]. SPLA and its institutional partners—UNDP, UNMIS, SECURITY PROVISION There is no doubt that the government recognizes both the need to treat its former fighters with honour and dignity, and the importance of downsizing from its current unsustainable size, which is a crushing financial burden. Whatever process is identified will need to be fully owned by the GRSS and the SPLA, endorsed by the donors, and actively supported by communities. That is a particularly narrow needle to thread. HSBA research suggests that the previous programme’s focus on individual, rather than community-based, reintegration should be reconsidered; that the sequencing of planning and I

implementation should be clear; and that better linkages II are needed between DDR and other security-related areas, such as policing, SSR, and small arms control [WP21]. III

The future of DDR, like security sector transformation, IV now depends on the implementation of the ARCSS, which as of August 2016 was extremely fragile. Furthermore, V while the agreement makes explicit reference to the inte- VI gration of both the police and the armed forces, DDR is mentioned almost as an afterthought. The guidance provided in the SDSR will be of central importance. But it is hard to envision a genuine DDR process when there is still significant disagreement between the conflict parties on critical issues such as the cantonment of forces. Like civilian disarmament, DDR is probably best post- poned until confidence and trust can be built between the conflict parties.

Local security arrangements

An SPLA veteran visits the War Heroes office at the Yei army barracks, South Sudan, As already noted, many communities in South Sudan May 2010. © Trevor Snapp must provide their own security. Some do so with the

35 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT Source: Nichols(2011,p.28) Note: *Thetotalfigureofthose demobilizedatsitesinnorthernSudanalsoincludes someex-combatantsfromtheSPLA(suchasin JuludandKauda). Table 4Sudan’sstateofdemobilizationas23January2011 TOTAL (South) SUB-TOTAL Bor Malakal Bentiu Kwajok Wau Torit Aweil Rumbek Juba (phase2) Juba (Mangala) (North) SUB-TOTAL Abyei Khartoum Kadugli (phase3) Kadugli (phase2) Kadugli Kauda Julud Ed Damazin(phase2) Ed Damazin Demobilization site 89,270 36,641 6,308 4,276 2,926 5,450 3,600 2,613 2,844 3,752 2,756 2,116 52,629 2,000 6,500 9,970 7,217 9,900 4,705 3,047 3,500 5,790 Total anticipatedcaseload (43%) 38,440 11,022 0 0 0 0 1,310 1,077 2,844 3,675 0 2,116 27,418* 0 2,461 0 1,887 9,900 4,705 3,023 0 5,442 Total demobilizedtodate 36 (57%) 50,830 25,619 6,308 4,276 2,926 5,450 2,290 1,536 0 77 2,756 0 25,211 2,000 4,039 9,970 5,330 0 0 24 3,500 348 Balance remaining Planned Planned Planned Planned Ongoing Ongoing Completed Completed Planned Completed Planned Ongoing Planned Ongoing Completed Completed Completed Planned Completed demobilization operation Status ofdisarmamentand approval or even cooperation of state security providers, while others do so independently or unofficially. The HSBA has explored the extent to which so-called LSAs succeed, as well as their associated pitfalls. The need for communities and individuals to protect themselves is clearly one factor driving the demand for arms [IB23]. HSBA research on LSAs in Greater Upper Nile suggests that while they can provide protection to civilians, they have also contributed to cycles of violence and revenge; some have been cited in connection with human rights SECURITY PROVISION abuses, such as extrajudicial killings, and armed attacks on other communities. In general, more oversight of LSAs is needed by local government officials and traditional leaders to ensure that they operate effectively and within the law. In recent years, traditional authorities have clearly lost some legitimacy across the country, but they still enjoy a great deal of local support as non- violent negotiators between rival communities. LSAs are paradigmatic ‘bottom-up’ arrangements with the potential to fill the security vacuum, but they require I careful management and consensus. II

Future focus areas III

Given the persistent challenges to reforming and extend- IV ing the state security apparatus, the future of security in V South Sudan will probably continue to draw on some combination of state- and community-organized arrange- VI ments, and formal and informal mechanisms. How the mix is achieved, and how the security benefits can be maximized and the security risks minimized, is an important area for future study. Many of the same security issues that came to the fore following the CPA—DDR, security sector transformation, and civilian disarmament—are once again on the agenda in South Sudan following the ARCSS. The studies that the HSBA has generated on previous efforts in these areas contain important lessons for future endeavours. Institutional memories are poor, but lessons have been captured, and repeating the same mistakes would be a waste that South Sudan could ill afford.

37 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT is well positioned tostartassessandpull together sion. Inparticular, ashighlightedinSection IV, the HSBA nism andtheJointMonitoring andEvaluation Commis- Transitional Security Arrangements MonitoringMecha- process inSouthSudan—inparticular theCeasefireand of theinstitutionsestablished toimplementthepeace One importantareainwhich toforgeaheadisinsupport national bodies. on advisoryrolestorelevant national,regional,andinter - means supplementingourpublicationsstreambytaking lence andcurbtheillicitproliferationofsmallarms.That programmes, andinterventions toreduce armedvio- to makeuseofthemindesigningandplanningpolicies, its researchfindingsreachaudiencesthatarepositioned ject shouldtakeamoreproactive stancetoensurethat a retrospective projectevaluation, suggest thatthepro with ourstakeholders,throughthe2016Symposiumand This reportisonestepinthatdirection.Butconsultations on theground. continuing toenhanceourunderstandingofdynamics date andbuildonthoseevaluations inthefuture,while and shortfallsofpreviousefforts,itwillconsoli- made significantcontributionstoassessingthebenefits programmes, andsanctionstakeshape.TheHSBAhas and years ahead,asnewvariations ofthesepolicies, embargo onDarfurmustbeassimilatedinthemonths lessons ofDDR,SSR,civiliandisarmament,andanarms immediate aftermathoftheCPA. Theexperiencesand 2016—especially inSouthSudan—were presentinthe development challengesfacing thetwocountriesin and donorstoremember,too.Manyofthesecurity ories are long.Itisimportantforinstitutionalpartners In SudanandSouthSudan,thepastispresentmem- VI. Lookingahead:futuregoalsandneeds - 38 remains weak. Itwillbe importantinthenextphases of in manyareas, buttransparencyinsecurity programming ratus hasbeenadept atadaptingtochangingdynamics government andarmyofficials.TheSudanesestateappa- clear thatSmall Arms Survey researchiseagerlyreadby by externalexperts,although periodicfeedbackhasmade have generallyremainedimpervioustoempiricalresearch In Sudan,themechanismsofgovernance andsecurity such monitoringsystemscanbedeveloped. obligations, andspiritofthepeaceagreement,before willingness ofpowerful elitestofulfiltheconditions, toring efforts.InSouthSudan,muchdependsonthe single researchpublicationstomoresystematicmoni goal tobeachieved, itmaybenecessarytomove from flows, anddynamicscanbemeasured—elusive. Forthat point ofreferenceagainstwhichfutureviolence,arms tries have madelocatinga‘baseline’—inthesenseof Indeed, theshiftingconflictdynamicsintwocoun little signthattheseconflictswillendanytimesoon. lives anddisplacecivilians fromtheirhomes.Thereis skirmishes inSouthSudanandDarfurcontinuedtoclaim and lightweapons remainsurgent.Inmid-2016,armed all aspectsofarmedviolenceandtherolesmallarms the twocountries,needforempiricalresearchinto project’s founding,inviewoftheevolvingconflicts and cannotbelookedatinisolation.Ten years afterthe its analysis,asthematicareasaredeeplyintertwined The HSBAhasalways takenanintegratedapproachto the country. to significantlyboostarmedviolencesurveillance across ing additionalmonitoringassetsthatcouldbedeployed The Small Arms Survey isalreadyontheground,build- different sourcesofprimarydataonarmedviolence. - - the project to expand the opportunities to engage with Sudanese stakeholders, including not only officials but also research institutions that have significant value and perspective to add to the HSBA’s fieldwork-based investigations, as well as their uptake and dissemination. These reflections, which go beyond a discussion of

research priorities and approaches, are warranted LOOKING AHEAD because the ultimate aim of this work is to inform the development, implementation, and monitoring of programming and policy-making to improve human security in the two countries. Much work remains to be done if that objective is to be met—and whether we reach that goal depends on a wide range of actors. In consultation with its stakeholders and donors, the HSBA will evolve and innovate in the years ahead to ensure that its outputs, analysis, and findings are properly positioned to assist in enhancing security and encouraging development in Sudan and South Sudan.

III

39 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT 9 March. at the2015IDEX Convention.’ Facts&Figuresreport. —. 2015.‘Sudan’sMilitaryIndustry CorporationDisplay Facts &Figuresreport.2July. —. 2014.‘TheMilitaryIndustry Corporation(MIC).’ Small Arms Survey. November. Militias inSouthSudan.HSBAIssueBriefNo.22.Geneva: —. 2013.Pendulum Swings:TheRiseandFallofInsurgent December. Sudan. IssueBriefNo.15.Geneva: Small Arms Survey. —. 2009.SupplyandDemand: Arms FlowsandHoldingsin Survey. August.Small Arms tion intheNubaMountains.IssueBriefNo.12.Geneva: —. 2008.TheDriftBacktoWar: InsecurityandMilitariza report. —. 2007.HSBAFinalReportPhase2 October. HSBA IssueBriefNo.2.Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Defence Forcesinthe Aftermath oftheJubaDeclaration. —. 2006b.ArmedGroupsinSudan:TheSouthSudan September. ment. IssueBriefNo.1.Geneva: Small Arms Survey. State, SouthSudan,sincetheComprehensive Peace Agree- Persistent Threats:Widespread HumanInsecurityin Lakes HSBA (HumanSecurityBaseline Assessment). 2006a. Arms Survey. December. Blue Nile.HSBAWorkingPaper No.31.Geneva: Small Gramizzi, Claudio.2013.At anImpasse:TheConflictin and SouthSudan Survey’s HumanSecurityBaseline Assessment forSudan Blomeyer &Sanz.2016.Evaluation oftheSmall Arms Bibliography . May.Unpublishedreport. . July.Unpublished

- 40 Survey. February. HSBA WorkingPaper No.24.Geneva: Small Arms Nichols, Ryan. 2011.DDRinSudan:TooLittle,Late? Survey. May. HSBA WorkingPaper No.32.Geneva: Small Arms Arms and Ammunition TracinginSudanandSouth Leff, JonahandEmileLeBrun.2014.FollowingtheThread: Intelligence Review.January. Sudan’s Arms FootprintSpansConflictZones.’ LeBrun, EmileandJonahLeff.2015. ‘Arms Trajectory: Survey. July. since 2013.IssueBriefNo.24.Geneva: Small Arms —. 2016.BrokenPromises:The Arms EmbargoonDarfur Jane’s . List of HSBA publications

Issue Briefs Number 9, February 2008 Echo Effects: Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict HSBA PUBLICATIONS HSBA Available in English and Arabic from: Number 10, March 2008 http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/publications/ Neither ‘Joint’ nor ‘Integrated’: The Joint Integrated Units issue-briefs.html and the Future of the CPA Number 1, September 2006 Number 11, May 2008 Persistent Threats: Widespread Human Insecurity in Lakes Allies and Defectors: An Update on Armed Group Integration State, South Sudan, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Proxy Force Activity Number 2, October 2006 Number 12, August 2008 Armed Groups in Sudan: The South Sudan Defence Forces The Drift back to War: Insecurity and Militarization in the in the Aftermath of the Juba Declaration Nuba Mountains I Number 3 (2nd edn.), November 2006–February 2007 Number 13, September 2008 Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State: Recent II No Standing, Few Prospects: How Peace is Failing South Experiences and Implications III Sudanese Female Combatants and WAAFG Number 4, December 2006 Number 14, May 2009 IV No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur Conflicting Priorities: GoSS Security Challenges and V Recent Responses Number 5, January 2007 VI Number 15, December 2009 A Widening War around Sudan: The Proliferation of Armed Groups in the Central African Republic Supply and Demand: Arms Flows and Holdings in Sudan Number 6, April 2007 Number 16, April 2010 The Militarization of Sudan: A Preliminary Review of Arms Symptoms and Causes: Insecurity and Underdevelopment in Flows and Holdings Eastern Equatoria Number 7, July 2007 Number 17, May 2011 Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations between Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in China and Sudan South Sudan Number 8, September 2007 Number 18, November 2011 Responses to Pastoral Wars: A Review of Violence Reduction Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya Upper Nile

41 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT by JohnYoung The EasternFront andtheStruggleagainstMarginalization, Number 3,May2007 the Post-CPA Period, byRichardGarfield Violence andVictimization inSouthSudan:LakesState Number 2,February2007 Declaration, The SouthSudanDefenceForcesintheWake oftheJuba Number 1,November 2006 working-papers.html http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/publications/ Available inEnglishand Arabic from: Working Papers Priorities Policing inSouthSudan:TransformationChallengesand Number 25,Forthcoming* Broken Promises:The Arms EmbargoonDarfursince2013 Number 24,July2016* Upper Nile Protective Measures:LocalSecurity Arrangements inGreater Number 23,July2014 South Sudan PendulumMilitias Rise andFall in Swings:The of Insurgent Number 22,November 2013 My Neighbour,Enemy:Inter-tribalViolence inJonglei Number 21,October2012 Business asUsual: Arms FlowstoDarfur,2009–12 Number 20,September2012 South Sudan Reaching fortheGun: Arms FlowsandHoldingsin Number 19, April 2012 by JohnYoung 42 by ClaireMcEvoy andRyan Murray Violence inEasternEquatoria andTurkana North, Gauging FearandInsecurity:Perspectives on Armed Number 14,July2008 Equatoria Violent Legacies:InsecurityinSudan’s CentralandEastern Number 13,June2008 (also available inFrench) Myths andReality,byJérôme Tubiana The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Number 12, April 2008 The CaseofJonglei,byRichardGarfield Violence and Victimization afterCivilianDisarmament: Number 11,December2007 by JagoSalmon A Paramilitary Revolution:ThePopularDefenceForces, Number 10,December2007 and Analysis,byJohnYoung Armed Groups along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier: An Overview Number 9,November 2007 Overview, byMareikeSchomerus The Lord’sResistance Army inSudan: A Historyand Number 8,September2007 Return toWar, byJohnYoung Emerging North–SouthTensions andtheProspectsfora Number 7,July2007 Groups, byVictor Tanner andJérôme Tubiana Divided TheyFall:TheFragmentationofDarfur’s Rebel Number 6,July2007 by JohnYoung The ‘White Army’: An IntroductionandOverview, Number 5,June2007 at theDRC–SudanBorder,byJoshuaMarks Border inNameOnly: Arms Traffickingand ArmedGroups Number 4,May2007 , byMareikeSchomerus

HSBA PUBLICATIONS Number 15, September 2008 Number 26, June 2011 Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur’s Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict Dynamics in Abyei, IDP Camps, by Clea Kahn by Joshua Craze Number 16, January 2009 Number 27, June 2012 Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Campaign, by Adam O’Brien Sudan through February 2012, by John A. Snowden Number 17, June 2009 Number 28, July 2012

HSBA PUBLICATIONS HSBA Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur, Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players, PUBLICATIONS HSBA by Julie Flint by Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana Number 18, September 2009 Number 29, April 2013 Skirting the Law: Post-CPA Arms Flows to Sudan, New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan, by Mike Lewis by Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana Number 19, January 2010 Number 30, July 2013 Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict along the Sudan– Conflict,by Julie Flint South Sudan Border, by Joshua Craze

Number 20, April 2010 Number 31, December 2013 I Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan, At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile, II by Claire Mc Evoy and Emile LeBrun by Claudio Gramizzi Number 21, June 2010 Number 32, May 2014 III Unrealistic Expectations: Current Challenges to Reintegration Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in IV in Southern Sudan, by Julie Brethfeld Sudan and South Sudan, by Jonah Leff and Emile LeBrun V Number 22, October 2010 Number 33, September 2014 VI The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur, The Sudan Revolutionary Front: An Introduction and by Julie Flint Overview, by Andrew McCutcheon Number 23, November 2010 Number 34, November 2014 In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Contested Borders: Continuing Tensions over the Sudan– Beyond, by Richard Rands South Sudan Border, by Joshua Craze Number 24, February 2011 Number 35, March 2015 DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?, by Ryan Nichols Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area, Number 25, March 2011 by Claudio Todisco Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Number 36, May 2015 Chad–Sudan Rapprochement, by Jérôme Tubiana Development Deferred: Eastern Sudan after the ESPA, (also available in French) by the Small Arms Survey

43 HSBA SYNTHESIS REPORT * Notyet available in Arabic Army inSouthSudan’sCivilWar, byJohnYoung Popular StrugglesandEliteCo-optation:TheNuerWhite Number 41,July2016* Sudan, byLauraM.James Fields ofControl:Oiland(In)securityinSudanSouth Number 40,November 2015* A FractiousRebellion:InsidetheSPLM-IO Number 39,September2015* 2014–15, byBenedettaDe Alessi Two Fronts,OneWar: EvolutionoftheTwo Areas Conflict , Number 38, August 2015* 2002–14, byEricG.BermanandMihaelaRacovita Diversion fromPeackeepers inSudanandSouthSudan, Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Armsand Ammunition Number 37,July2015 , byJohnYoung 44

HSBA PUBLICATIONS