Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border

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Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border 4 Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border By Joshua Marks Copyright The Small Arms Survey Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007 as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and First published in May 2007 as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activ- ists. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Depart- permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by ment of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Bel- law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- gium, Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project-spe- be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. cific support received from Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand. Further Small Arms Survey funding has been provided by the United Nations Development Programme, Graduate Institute of International Studies the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Geneva 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland International Academic Network, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. The Small Arms Survey collaborates with research Copyedited by Andy Mash institutes and NGOs in many countries, including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Cartography by MAPgrafix Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com) States. Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland Small Arms Survey ISBN 2-8288-0081-4 Graduate Institute of International Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Phone: +41 22 908 5777 Fax: +41 22 732 2738 Email: [email protected] Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org 2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 4 Marks A Border in Name Only 3 The Human Security Baseline Assessment Contents The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a two-year research Illustrations ............................................................................................................. 6 project (2005–07) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................... 7 in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international About the author .................................................................................................... 8 and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ 9 demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. Abstract .................................................................................................................. 10 The HSBA is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security, I. Summary ............................................................................................................ 11 and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence II. Background: geography, history, and recent conflict ............................... 14 throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity. HSBA Working Papers are timely and user-friendly reports on current research III. An overview of the cross-border small arms trade ................................ 18 activities in English and Arabic. Future papers will focus on a variety of issues, IV. Armed groups along the border .................................................................. 25 including victimization and perceptions of security, armed groups, and local security arrangements. The project also generates a series of Issue Briefs. V. Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 32 The HSBA project is supported by the Global Peace and Security Fund at Notes ....................................................................................................................... 33 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 36 For more information contact: Claire Mc Evoy HSBA Project Coordinator Small Arms Survey 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org (click on Sudan) 4 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 4 Marks A Border in Name Only 5 Illustrations Acronyms and abbreviations CAR Central African Republic Map CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DRC–Sudan border area ...................................................................................... 12 DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Table 1 DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo Selection of GoS weapons transfers to South Sudan ....................................... 19 FAPC Forces armées du peuple congolais FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo Table 2 GoS Government of Sudan Small arms identified in Dungu, DRC, GoSS Government of Southern Sudan and Yambio County, South Sudan ...................................................................... 20 HRW Human Rights Watch Table 3 ICC International Criminal Court Suspected arms markets along the DRC–Sudan border ................................. 21 LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MONUC Table 4 Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo PDF Popular Defence Forces The dynamics of demand in Dungu Territory, DRC ........................................ 23 PKM Pulemyot Kalashnikova Modernizirovanniy (gas-operated Russian general-purpose machine gun) RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie RPK Ruchnoy Pulemyot Kalashnikova (Russian light machine gun similar to an AK-47) SAF Sudan Armed Forces SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan UPDF Ugandan People’s Defence Force 6 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 4 Marks A Border in Name Only 7 About the author Acknowledgments Joshua Marks is an MA candidate at the School of Advanced International The author would like to thank those who offered their time and services to Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. He has worked in South Kivu, DRC, for bring this report to fruition, including UN personnel, humanitarian and reli- Oxfam-GB, the Carter Center, and a Congolese NGO. He has conducted field gious workers and, above all, the Sudanese and Congolese villagers inter- research and written reports for the Small Arms Survey and Oxfam, among viewed. The author is also grateful to Ken Menkhaus, Anders Haugland, and others, on human rights, security, rebel groups, and small arms in the Great Tom Rhodes for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. At the Small Arms Lakes Region. Previously, he worked as a faculty associate at the Africa Center Survey, Claire Mc Evoy, Emile LeBrun, and James Bevan provided construc- for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. He is a graduate of Yale University. tive advice and helped bring the report to completion. 8 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 4 Marks A Border in Name Only 9 Abstract I. Summary Small arms trafficking across the western half of the border between Sudan This study explores the unregulated small arms trade on the western portion and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has remained largely unex- of the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Su- amined. The legacy of armed conflict in both countries, the presence of armed dan, and the influence that armed conflict has had on this trade. This section groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) on both sides of the border, of the 628-km border between the two countries has rarely been examined by and poor border control would suggest the possibility of a robust trade in arms researchers, but several factors suggest that a robust trade in weapons small arms. This study finds that the trade is in fact modest, and overwhelm- might take place across it. Minimal border controls, inaccessible terrain, a ingly in one direction, from Sudan to DRC. Evidence reported here suggests common cross-border ethnicity and culture, and, crucially, protracted con- that South Sudanese communities remain saturated with small arms, while, flicts and militia-led violence in South Sudan and northern DRC are factors in northern DRC, rigorous civilian disarmament efforts by the army and a that lead to the assumption that arms trafficking might be robust in the area. lack of perceived need for arms among civilians have
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