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Gao-21-322, Firearms Trafficking United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters February 2021 FIREARMS TRAFFICKING U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis GAO-21-322 February 2021 FIREARMS TRAFFICKING U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis Highlights of GAO-21-322, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The U.S. Southwest Border Trafficking of U.S.-sourced firearms into Mexico is a national security threat, as it Counternarcotics Strategy: 2020 facilitates the illegal drug trade and has been linked to organized crime. The identified the trafficking of firearms Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives from the U.S. into Mexico as a threat to (ATF) found that 70 percent of firearms reported to have been recovered in the safety and security of both Mexico from 2014 through 2018 and submitted for tracing were U.S. sourced. countries. The Mexican government However, ATF does not receive complete data about thousands of firearms, such has estimated that 200,000 firearms as those recovered by Mexican states, because only Mexico’s federal Attorney are smuggled from the United States General’s office submits trace requests to ATF. In addition, the Department of each year. Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) GAO was asked to report on U.S. has identified smuggling trends by analyzing DHS data on 1,012 firearms seized efforts to counter firearms trafficking to in the U.S. by DHS agencies. However, ICE has not analyzed ATF data on Mexico. This report examines (1) the 56,000 U.S. firearms recovered in Mexico. Additional data and analysis could extent of U.S. agencies’ knowledge enhance U.S. efforts to understand firearms sources and smuggling routes. about firearms trafficking to Mexico and (2) U.S. agencies’ efforts to disrupt Examples of Firearms Recovered in Mexico this trafficking and the extent to which they have assessed those efforts. GAO reviewed firearms tracing data, related analysis, and program information for fiscal years 2014 through 2020. GAO also interviewed U.S. and Mexican officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December U.S. agencies have undertaken a number of efforts to disrupt firearms trafficking 2020. to Mexico—including several recently established efforts as well as prior and ongoing ones—but are unable to assess progress toward this goal. What GAO Recommends • In April 2020, ATF established Operation Southbound to coordinate with GAO is making eight other agencies to disrupt firearms trafficking to Mexico. ATF also conducts recommendations, including investigations related to Mexico. recommending that ATF and ICE • In fiscal year 2020, ICE and DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection analyze additional information about the trafficking of U.S.-sourced firearms (CBP) established a joint operation to intercept firearms being smuggled to to Mexico and that ATF, ICE, CBP, and Mexico. ICE and CBP also conduct other efforts related to this issue. For State develop performance measures example, in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, ICE-led taskforces seized 1,104 to assess the results of their efforts to firearms along the southwest border. In fiscal years 2014 through 2019, CBP disrupt this trafficking. The agencies seized an annual average of 115 firearms at the border, and in the first 10 concurred with GAO’s months of fiscal year 2020, CBP increased outbound inspection at some recommendations. ports of entry and seized 321 firearms. • The Department of State (State) helps lead a working group to coordinate these and other U.S. efforts with the government of Mexico. State also provided $54 million in fiscal years 2015 through 2019 to help build Mexico’s capacity to disrupt trafficking through, for example, forensics training, inspection equipment, and canines trained for weapons detection. However, none of the agencies have fully developed performance measures for View GAO-21-322. For more information, their efforts to disrupt firearms trafficking to Mexico, and thus they have limited contact Chelsa Kenney at (202) 512-2964 or ability to assess progress. Identifying performance measures—including goals, [email protected]. indicators, targets, and time frames—would enhance their ability to optimize the use of U.S. government resources to address this threat to U.S. national security. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 3 ATF Traced Most Firearms Reported Recovered in Mexico to the U.S., but ATF’s and ICE’s Knowledge of Sources and Trends Has Gaps 12 U.S. Agencies Have Recently Initiated Efforts to Disrupt Firearms Trafficking to Mexico but Lack Performance Measures to Assess Results 24 Conclusions 36 Recommendations for Executive Action 37 Agency Comments 38 Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40 Appendix II Logic Models 43 Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 44 Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 48 Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50 Tables Table 1: State Assistance Provided to Build Mexican Government Capacity to Combat Firearms Trafficking, Fiscal Years 2015–2019 31 Table 2: Extent to Which U.S. Agencies Have Developed Performance Measures for Recent Initiatives Focused on Disrupting U.S.-Sourced Firearms Trafficking to Mexico 34 Table 3: Summary of Logic Model Example from Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 43 Page i GAO-21-322 Firearms Trafficking Figures Figure 1: ATF’s Process for Tracing a Firearm Recovered in Mexico to an Initial Purchaser 7 Figure 2: HSI BEST Locations on the U.S.–Mexican Border as of September 2020 8 Figure 3: Locations of Official U.S. Land Ports of Entry on the U.S.–Mexican Border 10 Figure 4: Origins of Firearms Recovered in Mexico and Traced by ATF, 2014–2018 13 Figure 5: Types of U.S.-Sourced Firearms Recovered in Mexico and Traced by ATF, 2014–2018 14 Figure 6: Example of a Firearm Recovered in Mexico and Held by a Mexican State Attorney General’s Office 16 Figure 7: Locations of Initial Purchasers of U.S.-Sourced Firearms Recovered in Mexico and Traced by ATF, 2014–2018 18 Figure 8: Obliterated Serial Number on a Firearm Recovered in Mexico 20 Figure 9: Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) Firearm and Ammunition Seizures along the U.S.–Mexican Border, Fiscal Years 2015–2017 28 Figure 10: Examples of State Assistance Provided to Build Mexican Government Capacity to Combat Firearms Trafficking 31 Figure 11: Mexican Laboratories with Ballistics Accreditation as of July 2020 32 Figure 12: Locations of Mexican Federal and State Participants in U.S.-Provided Firearms Identification Training as of July 2020 33 Page ii GAO-21-322 Firearms Trafficking Abbreviations ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives BEST Border Enforcement Security Taskforce CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection DHS Department of Homeland Security DOJ Department of Justice HSI Homeland Security Investigations ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs State Department of State TCIU transnational criminal investigative unit TCO transnational criminal organization This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page iii GAO-21-322 Firearms Trafficking Letter 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 February 22, 2021 The Honorable Dick Durbin Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Violent crime perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) continue to raise security concerns on both sides of the U.S.–Mexican border. A 2020 Congressional Research Service report estimated that more than 150,000 people had been killed in Mexico as a result of organized crime since 2006.1 U.S.-sourced firearms trafficked into Mexico—an estimated 200,000 each year, according to the Mexican government—are contributing to this violence by facilitating the illicit drug trade.2 The U.S. and Mexican governments have each acknowledged the threat posed by the trafficking of firearms from the United States to TCOs in Mexico.3 The Mexican government has emphasized that combating firearms trafficking is among its top priorities with respect to the United States, according to Mexican officials. In February 2020, the U.S. government’s Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy: 2020 identified the smuggling, trafficking, and illegal export of weapons from 1Congressional Research Service, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2020). In our report, all years cited are calendar years (January–December) unless denoted as fiscal years (October–September). 2According to officials of the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State, the Mexican government’s estimate of the number of firearms trafficked from the United States to Mexico annually is the best estimate available. 3“Firearms trafficking” refers to the diversion of guns from lawful commerce to the illegal market. Page 1 GAO-21-322 Firearms Trafficking the United States to Mexico as a threat to the safety and security of both countries.4 You asked us to report on U.S. efforts to counter firearms trafficking to Mexico.5 This report examines (1) the extent of U.S. agencies’ knowledge of firearms trafficking to Mexico and (2) U.S. agencies’ efforts to disrupt firearms trafficking to Mexico and the extent to which they have assessed those efforts.
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