PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING Beyon� Islamists & Autocrats non-Islamist divide, and autocratic or otherwise illiberal Post-Jasmine Tunisia tendencies could be found in Islamist and non-Islamist ■ SARAH FEUER circles alike.1 Consider the country’s dominant Islamist party: after emerging from the 2011 parliamentary elec- NE of the more dramatic Arab Spring plotlines has tion as a leading political force, Ennahda demonstrated Obeen the rapid turn of fortune for Islamist move- a commitment to key components of a democracy, in- ments throughout the region. If the tumult of 2011 ini- cluding the separation of powers and broad participa- tially paved the way for Islamist parties to assume power tion in elections and office holding; at the same time, the in places like Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, by 2014 party promoted policies that would have restricted free the pendulum had swung decidedly back and Islamists speech and undermined the country’s progressive statutes 2 were on the defensive, if not wholly defeated, in most on women’s rights. In the non-Islamist realm, parties like Ettakatol (Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties) and of the affected countries. Tunisia, the birthplace of the the Congress for the Republic—members of the transi- Arab uprisings, was no exception. There, the Islamists of tional government alongside Ennahda—had strong dem- the Ennahda Party who swept into power after the 2011 ocratic credentials, having opposed the regime of former parliamentary elections were, by late 2013, struggling to president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and advocated human negotiate a departure from the government that would and civil rights for decades before the country’s Jasmine preserve the party’s future political relevance. Ennahda’s uprising. Newer formations like the Nidaa Tounes (Tuni- stinging defeat in the parliamentary election of October sian Call) party brought together remnants of the former 2014, and the election of an avowedly anti-Islamist pres- regime with little affection for democratic governance and ident two months later, ostensibly spawned an Arab de- democratic leftists active in opposition politics throughout mocracy in which non-Islamists are the dominant actors. Ben Ali’s tenure. The simple dichotomy of Secular Auto- The resultant political landscape in Tunisia challenges a crat versus Islamist Democrat, therefore, does not offer prevailing narrative among analysts of the Arab uprisings, much insight into such configurations. Indeed, one rea- according to whom the region faced a choice between son Tunisia remains on a recognizable path away from non-Islamist autocrats and Islamist democrats. This binary authoritarianism is that reformist actors on both sides of framework captured some dynamics at play throughout the Islamist/non-Islamist divide have continued to exert the region, but it always obscured more than it enlight- pressure on political elites in both camps to abide by their ened the unfolding realities in Tunisia. There, democra- stated commitments to a successful democratic transition. cy-minded forces emerged on both sides of the Islamist/ Tunisia’s relative success over the past four years has ©2015 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats prompted observers to label the small country a “model” on the four leading non-Islamist parties. It then turns to for other Arab states still struggling to shed authoritarian non-Islamists in civil society, assessing the opportunities governance. But Tunisia has never really been a model. and challenges facing organized labor, women’s rights From the beginning of the uprisings, the country had cru- organizations, and groups promoting government trans- cial advantages over many of its Arab peers: a homo- parency. The concluding section summarizes the main geneous (majority Sunni Muslim) population, a relatively findings and considers policy implications. well-educated citizenry, and a small and accountable military establishment. Demographically, too, Tunisia THE TUNISIAN TRANSITION had an important edge over its Egyptian, Levantine, and Following the January 2011 ouster of Tunisia’s auto- Gulf counterparts: at the time of the uprising, scholars cratic president, Ben Ali, the formerly ruling Demo- noted that Tunisia’s median age of twenty-nine placed cratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party was dissolved it above the “youth bulge” bracket and in the same in- and a series of interim governments culminated in the termediate bracket as countries like Brazil, Indonesia, election of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) on Chile, and Taiwan—all of which had successfully tran- October 23, 2011. The NCA was charged with draft- sitioned to democracy within five to fifteen years’ time.3 ing a new constitution and preparing the country for the Even on the economic front, a 2014 World Bank report election of a permanent legislature within one year’s highlighting structural obstacles to growth acknowledged time. In a development that would become the region- that in terms of human capital and basic infrastructure, al trend, Tunisia’s formerly banned Islamist movement, “Tunisia has everything it needs to become the ‘Tiger of Ennahda (“Renaissance,” in Arabic), emerged from the the Mediterranean.’”4 October 2011 election in a dominant position, captur- Despite such advantages, the country’s democratic ing 41 percent of the popular vote and obtaining a transition came close to unraveling on several occa- plurality of seats in the transitional parliament. The re- sions, and today Tunisia is grappling with issues such maining 59 percent went to more than a dozen non-Is- as a severely crippled economy, an insurgency along its lamist parties and independents. Ennahda entered into border with Algeria, the threat of violence spilling over a governing coalition with two secular parties—Con- from neighboring Libya, and a security sector in need of gress for the Republic and Ettakatol—and this troika reform. How Tunisia’s political decisionmakers respond became Tunisia’s new government. to such challenges, and the degree to which allies such The NCA’s one-year mandate was unrealistic from the as the United States continue to lend constructive sup- outset, given that the elected body had to assume re- port, will determine whether the nascent democracy not sponsibility for day-to-day legislating alongside its work only survives but thrives in the coming years. The recent on the new constitution and electoral law. The coalition conclusion to the country’s transitional period presents ended up governing for roughly two and a half years, a valuable opportunity to identify and assess the emerg- during which time Tunisians enjoyed broadly expanded ing political landscape, with a view to assisting U.S. political rights; however, the country’s economy contin- policymakers seeking productive partnerships in post- ued to deteriorate and the security situation worsened. Spring Tunisia. Following the assassinations of two leftist politicians in This paper, the first in a series exploring non-Islamists February and July of 2013, massive protests that sum- throughout the Middle East and North Africa, focuses mer brought the NCA to a standstill and the Tunisian on the leading non-Islamists in Tunisia’s political system transition to the brink of collapse. A national dialogue and civil society, highlighting their strengths and weak- organized under the auspices of the Tunisian General nesses, and offering recommendations for U.S. policy- Labor Union, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, makers seeking to ensure the success of Tunisia’s experi- the Tunisian Union of Industry and Commerce, and the ment in democracy. The paper proceeds in four parts. National Bar Association facilitated a series of negotia- Following a recap of the Tunisian transition, the paper tions between the political factions throughout fall 2013. delves into non-Islamists in the political system, focusing That December, Ennahda yielded to public pressure and SARAH FEUER 2 POST-JASMINE TUNISIA Beyond Islamists & Autocrats agreed to step down, ceding power to an interim gov- The results of the 2014 parliamentary elections and ernment of technocrats. In January 2014, the NCA rati- the dominance of Nidaa Tounes, UPL, and Afek Tounes fied a new constitution enshrining freedoms of speech, suggest that while the Islamists of Ennahda will continue association, and press; gender equality between men to occupy an important space in Tunisian politics, they do and women; and checks and balances between the leg- not represent its principal force. Some have interpreted islative, executive, and judicial branches. Ennahda’s loss of twenty parliamentary seats as a severe From January to October 2014, the interim cabinet of blow to political Islam in Tunisia. For others, the fact that Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa governed to broadly posi- Ennahda retained one-third of the parliament is remark- tive reviews as the country’s precarious security situation able given the rapid descent of Islamists throughout the stabilized somewhat,5 and the NCA adopted the long- region, most glaringly in Egypt but elsewhere as well. awaited electoral law to govern future parliamentary and Both interpretations have merit, but either way, Tunisia’s presidential elections. On October 26, 2014, Tunisians Islamists face a sizable majority of non-Islamist forces went to the polls to elect a new 217-seat legislature, occupying the political landscape today. Some non-Is- which resulted in a parliament dominated by five blocs: lamist groups, including factions within Nidaa Tounes, the secularist Nidaa Tounes with 85 seats, the Islamist En- the Popular Front, and Afek Tounes, have strong demo- nahda with 69 seats, the anti-Islamist Free Patriotic Union cratic leanings; others, including pockets within Nidaa (UPL by its French acronym) with 16 seats, the leftist Pop- Tounes and Slim Riahi’s Free Patriotic Union, are either ular Front coalition with 15 seats, and the neoliberal Afek decidedly antidemocratic or have yet to demonstrate a Tounes with 8 seats.