DOCSLIB.ORG

PDF-Download

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PDF-Download Order of the 1st Chamber of the Second Senate of 1 March 2004 – 2 BvR 1570/03 – in the proceedings on the constitutional complaint of the Turkish national A. ... against a) the order of the Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) for the Land North Rhine-Westphalia of 19 August 2003 – 18 B 1503/03 –, b) the order of Düsseldorf Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) of 15 July 2003 – 24 L 1977/03 – and application to issue an injunction ... RULING: The constitutional complaint is not admitted for decision. The application to issue an injunction is therewith concluded. GROUNDS: I. 1. a) The applicant objects to his expulsion to Turkey. 1 He was born in Germany in 1983 and grew up here, where his parents and siblings 2 also live. He has had a permanent residence permit since December 1999. The applicant has come to the notice of the police several times since 2000. He was 3 sentenced most recently on 22 July 2002 in respect of joint robbery by blackmail in concurrence of offences with threat, robbery by blackmail in concurrence of offences with bodily harm, threat in concurrence of offences with deprivation of liberty and co- ercion, coercion in concurrence of offences with threat, threat in two cases in concur- rence of offences with theft resembling robbery, coercion and theft, as well as in re- spect of blackmail relating to the two latter convictions, to combined youth custody of three years and six months. In consequence of the latter conviction, the immigration authority expelled him by or- 4 der of 9 May 2003, ordered the immediate enforcement of this expulsion and an- nounced to him that he would be expelled from custody to Turkey. In accordance with § 47.3 sentence 3 of the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz – AuslG) a decision could al- legedly be taken here on expulsion solely on discretion. The expulsion had been nec- essary for special preventive reasons, also considering the family and other personal circumstances of the applicant. b) The administrative court rejected his application for interim legal protection. The 5 1/10 Higher Administrative Court rejected the complaint submitted against this. 2. The applicant is complaining of a violation of Art. 1, Art. 3 and Art. 6 of the Basic 6 Law (Grundgesetz – GG) in conjunction with Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the European Con- vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. He asserts that a person born and brought up in Germany having permanent legal residence must be treated as a de facto national in relation to whom criminal offences of a medi- um and grievous nature, in particular youth offences, must on principle be accepted and only sanctioned with the means available to criminal law, but not with expulsion and deportation. He – the applicant – also had no tenable connection with Turkey, where he had never lived, but had only been as a tourist every other year for about four weeks. Even if he had learned Turkish in his parents’ home, he spoke the lan- guage badly. He refers here to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Further, he refers to Article 14 of Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council, as well as to the fact that the European Commission has allegedly forwarded to Ger- many a "reasoned opinion" because of repeated violations of directive 64/221/EEC, and to the criticism contained therein of expulsion orders by German administrative authorities. II. The constitutional complaint is not to be admitted for decision because the admis- 7 sion preconditions of § 93a.2 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfas- sungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG) are not met. The constitutional complaint has no fundamental constitutional significance because the questions it poses have been clarified in the constitutional court case-law or can be easily resolved using the previ- ous case-law (see BVerfGE 74, 358 <370> on accommodation of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights; see Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE)76, 1 <49 et seqq.>; 80, 81 <93 et seqq.> on the protective effects under the law on residence provided by Art. 6.1 of the Basic Law). The acceptance of the constitutional complaint is also not required to implement the fundamental rights alleged to have been violated; it has no sufficient prospects for success (see BVerfGE 90, 22 <25 and 26>). 1. The reasoning of the constitutional complaint does not indicate a violation of 8 Art. 6.1 of the Basic Law. The value-defining fundamental provision contained in Art. 6.1 of the Basic Law, in accordance with which the State is to protect and pro- mote marriage and the family, obliges the immigration authority and courts when rul- ing on measures terminating residence to include in their considerations in line with their duties the family ties of the alien requesting residence with persons who are in Germany legally, i.e. in accordance with the weight of these ties (see BVerfGE 76, 1 <49 et seqq.>; 80, 81 <93>). The impugned rulings take adequate account of this. The administrative court has explicitly accommodated in its considerations that the 9 applicant’s parents and siblings live in Germany and that he lived with them until shortly prior to his incarceration. In accordance with the case-law of the Federal Con- 2/10 stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) it has distinguished in its weighing up concerning the co-habitation of parents with their adult children between a mere shared dwelling and a situation of assistance which gives rise to further protective effects under residence law (see BVerfGE 80, 81 <90 et seqq.>). There are no con- stitutional reservations here against the family ties having no decisive significance as against the interests of public safety with regard to protection against considerable criminal offences, despite the maintenance payments made to date by his family to the applicant. Adult children as a rule no longer need the assistance of their family, even if they still live with their parents for economic reasons; parents living in Ger- many can still provide simple economic support by transferring money. The applicant has not countered the abovementioned considerations of the administrative court, either with the complaint in the proceedings before the specialist court, or with the grounds contained in his constitutional complaint. 2. a) The core of the grounds contained in the application consists rather in it not be- 10 ing possible on principle to expel an alien who was born and brought up in Germany having a permanent residence permit who has committed criminal offences. It is questionable whether the applicant hence is also complaining of a violation of the pro- tection of marriage and the family guaranteed by Art. 6.1 of the Basic Law. This rea- soning is countered by the fact that his claims refers not to the weight of his family ties, but to other private ties in Germany, in other words his roots in the lifestyle in Germany. On the merits, it is likely rather to be a complaint of a violation of Art. 2.1, Art. 1.1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with the principle of proportionality (see Order of the 1st Chamber of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of 1 March 2000 – 2 BvR 2120/99 –, NVwZ 2001, pp. 67 <69>). This is ultimately irrele- vant in the instant case because nothing has changed as to the adjudication of the proportionality of the expulsion of the applicant as a result if this point of view were al- so to be accommodated in the framework of the examination of compatibility with Art. 6 of the Basic Law. Where the applicant with his submission is claiming a violation of Art. 8 of the Euro- 11 pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in accordance with the established case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court the con- stitutional complaint cannot be based on an alleged violation of the European Con- vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as such (see Art. 93.1 No. 4a of the Basic Law, § 90.1 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act). The Federal Constitutional Court examines the interpretation and application of the Euro- pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ini- tially only for breaches of the prohibition of arbitrariness of Art. 3.1 of the Basic Law (see BVerfGE 64, 135 <157>; 74, 102 <128>; Order of the 1st Chamber of the Sec- ond Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of 1 March 2000 – 2 BvR 2120/99 –, NVwZ 2001, p. 67; Order of the 3rd Chamber of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of 20 December 2000 – 2 BvR 591/00 –, NJW 2001, p. 2245). There is no indication of such a violation here. 3/10 b) Even if the human rights of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 12 Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are not a direct constitutional examination stan- dard in the German legal system, their interpretation by the European Court of Hu- man Rights nevertheless exerts an influence on the interpretation of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law. The Basic Law is intended to accommodate international law, promotes the exercise of state sovereignty by international contract law and interna- tional cooperation, and hence as a rule may not be interpreted in such a way to give rise to a conflict with obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany under interna- tional law. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated on this – with reference to the principle of the presumption of innocence rooted in the rule of law and its legal ex- pression in Art.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Crimes Act 2016
    REPUBLIC OF NAURU Crimes Act 2016 ______________________________ Act No. 18 of 2016 ______________________________ TABLE OF PROVISIONS PART 1 – PRELIMINARY ....................................................................................................... 1 1 Short title .................................................................................................... 1 2 Commencement ......................................................................................... 1 3 Application ................................................................................................. 1 4 Codification ................................................................................................ 1 5 Standard geographical jurisdiction ............................................................. 2 6 Extraterritorial jurisdiction—ship or aircraft outside Nauru ......................... 2 7 Extraterritorial jurisdiction—transnational crime ......................................... 4 PART 2 – INTERPRETATION ................................................................................................ 6 8 Definitions .................................................................................................. 6 9 Definition of consent ................................................................................ 13 PART 3 – PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ................................................. 14 DIVISION 3.1 – PURPOSE AND APPLICATION ................................................................. 14 10 Purpose
    [Show full text]
  • Competing Theories of Blackmail: an Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory
    Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory Paul H. Robinson,* Michael T. Cahill** & Daniel M. Bartels*** The crime of blackmail has risen to national media attention because of the David Letterman case, but this wonderfully curious offense has long been the favorite of clever criminal law theorists. It criminalizes the threat to do something that would not be criminal if one did it. There exists a rich liter- ature on the issue, with many prominent legal scholars offering their accounts. Each theorist has his own explanation as to why the blackmail offense exists. Most theories seek to justify the position that blackmail is a moral wrong and claim to offer an account that reflects widely shared moral intuitions. But the theories make widely varying assertions about what those shared intuitions are, while also lacking any evidence to support the assertions. This Article summarizes the results of an empirical study designed to test the competing theories of blackmail to see which best accords with pre- vailing sentiment. Using a variety of scenarios designed to isolate and test the various criteria different theorists have put forth as “the” key to blackmail, this study reveals which (if any) of the various theories of blackmail proposed to date truly reflects laypeople’s moral judgment. Blackmail is not only a common subject of scholarly theorizing but also a common object of criminal prohibition. Every American jurisdiction criminalizes blackmail, although there is considerable variation in its formulation. The Article reviews the American statutes and describes the three general approaches these provisions reflect.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial
    William & Mary Law Review Volume 37 (1995-1996) Issue 1 Article 10 October 1995 Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial Alan L. Adlestein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Criminal Law Commons Repository Citation Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1995), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/10 Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr CONFLICT OF THE CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WITH LESSER OFFENSES AT TRIAL ALAN L. ADLESTEIN I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 200 II. THE CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LESSER OFFENSES-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT ........ 206 A. Prelude: The Problem of JurisdictionalLabels ..... 206 B. The JurisdictionalLabel and the CriminalStatute of Limitations ................ 207 C. The JurisdictionalLabel and the Lesser Offense .... 209 D. Challenges to the Jurisdictional Label-In re Winship, Keeble v. United States, and United States v. Wild ..................... 211 E. Lesser Offenses and the Supreme Court's Capital Cases- Beck v. Alabama, Spaziano v. Florida, and Schad v. Arizona ........................... 217 1. Beck v. Alabama-LegislativePreclusion of Lesser Offenses ................................ 217 2. Spaziano v. Florida-Does the Due Process Clause Require Waivability? ....................... 222 3. Schad v. Arizona-The Single Non-Capital Option ....................... 228 F. The Conflict Illustrated in the Federal Circuits and the States ....................... 230 1. The Conflict in the Federal Circuits ........... 232 2. The Conflict in the States .................. 234 III.
    [Show full text]
  • Digital Blackmail As an Emerging Tactic 2016
    September 9 DIGITAL BLACKMAIL AS AN EMERGING TACTIC 2016 Digital Blackmail (DB) represents a severe and growing threat to individuals, small businesses, corporations, and government Examining entities. The rapid increase in the use of DB such as Strategies ransomware; the proliferation of variants and growth in their ease of use and acquisition by cybercriminals; weak defenses; Public and and the anonymous nature of the money trail will only increase Private Entities the scale of future attacks. Private sector, non-governmental organization (NGO), and government cybersecurity experts Can Pursue to were brought together by the Office of the Director of National Contain Such Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security to determine emerging tactics and countermeasures associated Attacks with the threat of DB. In this paper, DB is defined as illicitly acquiring or denying access to sensitive data for the purpose of affecting victims’ behaviors. Threats may be made of lost revenue, the release of intellectual property or sensitive personnel/client information, the destruction of critical data, or reputational damage. For clarity, this paper maps DB activities to traditional blackmail behaviors and explores methods and tools, exploits, protection measures, whether to pay or not pay the ransom, and law enforcement (LE) and government points of contact for incident response. The paper also examines the future of the DB threat. Digital Blackmail as an Emerging Tactic Team Members Name Organization Caitlin Bataillon FBI Lynn Choi-Brewer
    [Show full text]
  • Nebraska Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
    Nebraska Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Manual for Automated Agencies November, 2000 Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 301 Centennial Mall South, P.O. Box 94946 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-4946 (402) 471-2194 TABLE OF CONTENTS NEBRASKA INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (NIBRS) ........................ 1 Definition of "Incident” ...................................................... 4 DATA REQUIREMENTS .......................................................... 7 Requirements for each Group A Offense ......................................... 8 Requirements for Arrests for Group A and Group B Offenses ......................... 15 DEFINITIONS OF BASIC CORE, ADDITIONAL DATA ELEMENT AND ARRESTEE ELEMENTS Age .................................................................... 17 Aggravated Assault / Homicide Circumstances .................................... 17 Armed With . 18 Arrest Date . 19 Arrest (Transaction) Number ................................................. 19 Arrest Offense Code ........................................................ 19 Attempted / Completed ..................................................... 19 Criminal Activity Type ..................................................... 20 Date Recovered ........................................................... 20 Disposition of Arrestee Under Age 18 .......................................... 20 Drug Type / Type Criminal Activity (Arrestee) ................................... 21 Estimated Drug Quantity / Type Drug Measurement ..............................
    [Show full text]
  • Texas Law Review See Also
    Texas Law Review See Also Response Taking It to the Streets Stuart P. Green* For more than fifty years, some of the best minds in criminal law theory have applied some of the most sophisticated tools of analysis in an effort to solve the seemingly insolvable blackmail paradox.1 Whether any of these theorists has been successful is debatable. In Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, Paul Robinson, Michael Cahill, and Daniel Bartels advance the novel—dare I say, paradoxical—notion that one way to solve the problem is to ask a collection of laypersons, untutored in law or philosophy, what they think should count as blackmail.2 There is much about the article that is admirable: The way the authors derive concrete scenarios from abstract theories is ingenious; their summary of the various blackmail theories is a model of conciseness; the methodological techniques they use are exemplary. As is the norm for brief responses of this sort, however, I shall focus on what I perceive as the article’s shortcomings rather than its strengths. In so doing, I do not mean to minimize the authors’ achievement. * Professor of Law and Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers School of Law–Newark. 1. The seminal piece is Glanville Williams, Blackmail, CRIM. L. REV. 79 (1954). See also, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998); George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617 (1993); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading
    California Law Review VOL. 80 DECEMBER 1992 No.6 Copyright © 1992 by California Law Review, Inc. A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading James Boyle TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................... 1416 I. Four Puzzles ............................................ 1426 A. Copyright .......................................... 1426 B. Blackmail .......................................... 1428 C. Insider Trading ..................................... 1429 D. Spleens ............................................. 1429 II. Public and Private in the Liberal State ................... 1433 III. Information in the Liberal State ......................... 1437 IV. The Economics of Information .......................... 1443 V. Property in the Liberal State ............................ 1458 VI. Copyright .............................................. , 1461 VII. Blackmail ............................................... 1470 A. Economic Theories ................................. 1471 B. Libertarian Theories ................................ 1477 C. Third Party Theories ............................... 1481 D. Shared Problems ................................... 1483 VIII. Insider Trading ....................................' ..... 1488 A. Economic Analysis of Information Disparities ....... 1494 1. Baseline Errors. .. 1494 2. Ad Hoc Claims About Behavior ................. 1498 3. Ignoring Contradictions in the Theory ........... 1499 B. Insider Trading Law as a Puzzle ...................
    [Show full text]
  • Informational Blackmail: Survived by Technicality? Chen Yehudai
    Marquette Law Review Volume 92 Article 6 Issue 4 Summer 2009 Informational Blackmail: Survived by Technicality? Chen Yehudai Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Chen Yehudai, Informational Blackmail: Survived by Technicality?, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 779 (2009). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol92/iss4/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATIONAL BLACKMAIL: SURVIVED BY TECHNICALITY? CHEN YEHUDAI Blackmail constitutes one of the most intriguing puzzles in criminal law: How can two legal rights—i.e., a threat to disclose true but reputation-damaging information and, independently, a simple demand for money—make a legal wrong? The puzzle gets even more complicated when we take into account that it is not unlawful for one who holds embarrassing information to accept an offer of payment made by an unthreatened recipient in return for a promise not to disclose the information. In order to answer this question, this Article surveys and analyzes the development of the law of informational blackmail and criminal libel in English and American law and argues that the modern crime of blackmail is the result of an “historical accident” stemming from the historical classification of blackmail as a property offense instead of a reputation-protecting offense. The Article argues that when enacted, the prohibition on informational blackmail was meant to protect the interest of reputation as a supplement to the law of criminal libel.
    [Show full text]
  • Monroe Freedman's Solution to the Criminal Defense Lawyer's
    MONROE FREEDMAN’S SOLUTION TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER’S TRILEMMA IS WRONG AS A MATTER OF POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* Stephen Gillers** I. INTRODUCTION Monroe Freedman has argued, most recently in the third edition of Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics , co-authored with Abbe Smith, that criminal defense lawyers have a “trilemma” because the rules of their profession give them potentially contradictory instructions. 1 First, competence requires lawyers to seek all information that can aid a client’s matter. 2 Second, lawyers have a duty of confidentiality that generally forbids them to use a client’s information except for the client’s benefit. 3 Third, lawyers have a duty of candor to the court that may require them to reveal a client’s confidential information in order to prevent or correct fraud on the court (which perjury would be). 4 Freedman believes that these three obligations cannot always co-exist, 5 and that is certainly true. Sometimes, a lawyer will have to sacrifice one obligation to fulfill another obligation. This trilemma is not limited to criminal defense lawyers, but Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics addresses only the criminal defense lawyer. Freedman argues that where the lawyer is defending a person accused of a crime, the ethics rules should subordinate the third obligation, candor to the court, to the other two obligations. 6 The upshot is that if a defense lawyer cannot dissuade a client from giving false testimony and cannot avoid aiding the perjury by * But we are indebted to him for raising the issue and making us think hard about the answer.
    [Show full text]
  • First Draft of Report #43 – Blackmail
    First Draft of Report #43 – Blackmail SUBMITTED FOR ADVISORY GROUP REVIEW November 20, 2019 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL CODE REFORM COMMISSION 441 FOURTH STREET, NW, SUITE 1C001 SOUTH WASHINGTON, DC 20001 PHONE: (202) 442-8715 www.ccrc.dc.gov First Draft of Report #43 - Blackmail This Draft Report contains recommended reforms to District of Columbia criminal statutes for review by the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission’s statutorily designated Advisory Group. A copy of this document and a list of the current Advisory Group members may be viewed on the website of the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission at www.ccrc.dc.gov. This Draft Report has two parts: (1) draft statutory text for a new Title 22E of the D.C. Code; and (2) commentary on the draft statutory text. The commentary explains the meaning of each provision and considers whether existing District law would be changed by the provision (and if so, why this change is being recommended). Any Advisory Group member may submit written comments on any aspect of this Draft Report to the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission. The Commission will consider all written comments that are timely received from Advisory Group members. Additional versions of this Draft Report may be issued for Advisory Group review, depending on the nature and extent of the Advisory Group’s written comments. The D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission’s final recommendations to the Council and Mayor for comprehensive criminal code reform will be based on the Advisory Group’s timely written comments and approved by a majority of the Advisory Group’s voting members.
    [Show full text]
  • Blackmail: the Paradigmatic Crime
    BLACKMAIL: THE PARADIGMATIC CRIME GEORGE P. FLETCHER* The ongoing debate about the rationale for punishing blackmail assumes that there is something odd about the crime. Why, the question goes, should demanding money to conceal embarrassing information be criminalized when there is nothing wrong with the separate acts of keeping silent or requesting payment for services rendered? Why should an innocent end (silence) coupled with a generally respectable means (monetary payment) constitute a crime? This supposed paradox, however, is not peculiar to blackmail. Many good acts are corrupted by doing them for a price. There is nothing wrong with government officials showing kindness or doing favors for their constituents, but doing them for a negotiated price becomes bribery. Sex is often desirable and permissible by itself, but if done in exchange for money, the act becomes prostitution. Confessing to a crime may be praiseworthy in some circumstances, but if the police pay the suspect to confess, the confession will undoubtedly be labelled involuntary and inadmissible. If there is a paradox in the crime of blackmail, these other practices of criminal justice should also strike us as self-contradictory. Contrary to the popular view in the literature, I wish to argue that blackmail is not an anomalous crime but rather a paradigm for understanding both criminal wrongdoing and punishment. That is an ambitious claim, one that requires at least a clear plan of exposition. My project is to seek "reflective equilibrium"1 across ten cases that are pivotal in the debates about the rationale for criminalizing blackmail. Reflective equilibrium requires a convinc- ing fit between the agreed-upon outcomes in the ten cases and general principles that can account for these outcomes.
    [Show full text]
  • Offense File Class Mapping Chart
    APPENDIX F Offense File Class Mapping Chart File MICR Offense Group NIBRS Class Description (A or B) Class Description 01000 Sovereignty Group B 90Z All Other 02000 Military Group B 90Z All Other 03000 Immigration Group B 90Z All Other 09001 Murder/Non‐Negligent Manslaughter Group A 09A Murder/Non‐Negligent Manslaughter 09002 Negligent Homicide/Manslaughter Group A 09B Negligent Manslaughter 09003 Negligent Homicide Vehicle/Boat/ Snowmobile/ORV Group B 90Z All Other 09004 Justifiable Homicide Group A 09C Justifiable Homicide 10001 Kidnapping/Abduction Group A 100 Kidnapping/Abduction 10002 Parental Kidnapping Group A 100 Kidnapping/Abduction 11001 Sexual Penetration Penis/Vagina CSC1 Group A 11A Forcible Rape 11002 Sexual Penetration Penis/Vagina CSC3 Group A 11A Forcible Rape 11003 Sexual Penetration Oral/Anal CSC1 Group A 11B Forcible Sodomy 11004 Sexual Penetration Oral/Anal CSC3 Group A 11B Forcible Sodomy 11005 Sexual Penetration Object CSC1 Group A 11C Sexual Assault with an Object 11006 Sexual Penetration Object CSC3 Group A 11C Sexual Assault with an Object 11007 Sexual Contact Forcible CSC2 Group A 11D Forcible Fondling 11008 Sexual Contact Forcible CSC4 Group A 11D Forcible Fondling 12000 Robbery Group A 120 Robbery 13001 Non‐Aggravated Assault Group A 13B Simple Assault 13002 Aggravated/Felonious Assault Group A 13A Aggravated Assault 13003 Intimidation/Stalking Group A 13C Intimidation 14000 Abortion Group B 90Z All Other 20000 Arson Group A 200 Arson 21000 Extortion Group A 210 Extortion/Blackmail 22001 Burglary – Forced
    [Show full text]