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Veterinaria Italiana, 44 (4), 657‐669

Avian biosecurity: a key for and

human protection

Nikolas Charisis

Summary vaccinazione e isolamento delle aziende dell’area Modern biosecurity methods have provided circostante (centri abitati,, altre aziende, campi). I the best way of preventing the spread of a servizi veterinari operano in collaborazione con i communicable since people realised proprietari per mettere in atto la quarantena that human and animal contact can transmit nazionale e le misure di vaccinazione a beneficio exotic . The is degli allevatori, dell’industria e della salute readily transmitted through animal vectors pubblica. and inanimate matter and incurs heavy losses Parole chiave to the poultry industry. Biosecurity measures Animale, Biosicurezza, Controllo, Influenza include the prevention of vaccination of flocks aviare, Sanità pubblica, Zoonosi. in an endemic area and the isolation of farms from the surrounding world (villages, other farms, fields, etc.). Veterinary services work in Introduction liaison with owners to implement national and vaccination measures for the Avian influenza (AI), perhaps the most severe benefit of farmers and the industry and for viral disease of the 21st century, has been protection of public . proved to be of poultry origin. The disease is caused by the virus H5N1 (Fig. 1). In 1933, Keywords scientists discovered that AI caused Animal, Avian influenza, Biosecurity, Control, disease syndromes that ranged from mild to Poultry, , Zoonosis. severe signs in domestic poultry; they also related the poultry influenza to human flu. Biosicurezza e influenza aviare: Today we know that AI, or ‘bird flu’, is caused una chiave per la tutela degli by type A strains of the influenza virus family Orthomyxoviridae. A total of 15 subtypes of animali e dell’uomo influenza virus have been identified. All Riassunto highly pathogenic outbreaks have been caused I moderni metodi di biosicurezza costituiscono la by influenza A viruses subtypes H5 and H7. via migliore per prevenire la diffusione di una Influenza strain H5N1 has been transmitted malattia trasmissibile da quando si è compreso che from poultry to humans. The first human il contatto tra l’uomo e l’animale può essere fonte di victims of the AI virus were recorded in Hong trasmissione di malattie esotiche. Il virus Kong in 1997. dell’influenza aviaria si trasmette rapidamente Wild bird intestinal viruses perhaps date back attraverso animali vettori e materiali vari causando to long before Homo sapiens, the ancestor of pesanti perdite all’industria avicola. Le misure di modern humans, appeared on Earth. These biosicurezza comprendono la prevenzione mediante intestinal viruses have developed over the

Veterinary Officer, Mediterranean Zoonoses Control Centre of the World Health Organization, 24 Stournari Street, 10682 Athens, Greece [email protected]

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millennia of wild bird domestication, into birds, such as turkeys, ducks, geese and human viruses that caused relatively severe chickens. The disease is considered a threat to symptoms in their new hosts. During their the poultry industry and therefore all affected long‐lasting adjustment and adaptation to a domestic flocks should be culled immediately, new environment, they changed their habits as by incineration or deep burial, so as to contain they emigrated from the intestines of birds to its spread. Although breeders are compensated human lungs. Today, human flu viruses, for culling their birds with a basic amount of although cousins of the AI virus, are compensation, there is always reluctance, completely harmless to wild birds, as is the especially on behalf of the poor, backyard original AI virus of wild birds for humans. producers, who need to feed their families or However, the AI virus in wild birds is highly trade the eggs for a small income or for other contagious for poultry and threatens backyard goods. Other than backyard production, and commercial producers. This virus occurs targeted for family consumption, there are naturally in healthy wild birds, especially always large numbers of poultry movements ducks, but it is readily transmitted to domestic across the countryside as well as in cities and towns where bird markets are held. This basic need for the livelihoods of many peoples can facilitate the spread of the disease from backyard to backyard, as well as all the way from the market to the farm. Consequently, the number of people involved in the spread of the disease increases tenfold when the virus escapes from a farm. Therefore, all people working with poultry should exercise caution when in contact with birds and with other people who work with poultry. Other modes of transmission of the disease from one infected flock to another are infected birds that have been newly introduced onto a farm, visitors, merchants, workers or even equipment. Infected birds secrete virus through nasal secretions and faeces. Therefore, moving infected birds would naturally result in transferring the virus to the new location. Workers spread viruses in contaminated clothing, equipment, vehicles, etc. The AI virus can survive in manure for long periods of time depending on weather conditions, so it could easily be spread from one farm to another on soiled boots or on trucks. When on a farm, the virus spreads by ‘common’ equipment that is contaminated with infective faeces or nasal secretions that is then used again on other parts of the farm or by workers who move from one section of the farm to another; it can also be spread by feed, feeders, trucks, etc. Figure 1 The H5N1 avian influenza virus The virus is adapted to elude host defences Biosecurity Source: Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Image Library Biosecurity measures are used to prevent the introduction of a disease into a disease‐free

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premises or the escape of a disease from among the local poultry farms (large or small, contaminated premises to the surrounding including backyard poultry flocks). disease‐free area. Therefore, depending on the Poultry owners in an affected area should be circumstances, biosecurity might be defined as advised by the authorities, depending on the ‘’ which is the containment of circumstances, either to vaccinate or to cull the virus within the infected unit, i.e. in a their birds and disinfect all premises; this is hospital, on a farm, etc, or as ‘bioexclusion’ always the most effective action that can be which is the prevention of virus introduction taken, but small producers, especially farmers into a disease‐free unit (Fig. 2). of backyard flocks, often avoid culling flocks, especially when the disease is of the mild form and/or when compensation for the culled birds Aspects of biosecurity is minimal or inexistent.

(a) Biocontainment is the containment of virus inside the infected unit Role of veterinary services in (hospital, farm etc.) the event of an outbreak of (b) Bioexclusion is the the avoidance of the entrance of the virus into an influenza-free unit avian influenza Biosecurity concerns all stakeholders (flocks, hospitals, health care settings, The veterinary services are the prinipal laboratories, processing companies, authorities that are responsible for ensuring slaughterhouses, veterinary services, consumers etc.) that transmissible diseases are kept out of countries. They devote specific efforts to the country’s ports of entry, such as the sea ports, land borders and airports. However, in regard to AI, things have become more complicated because the disease is usually transferred from Figure 2 one country to another by migratory birds; Biocontainment versus bioexclusion therefore rendering efforts at border and entry points inadequate (Fig. 3). Similar historical activities can be compared However, authorities across the globe should with the ‘quarantine’ of ships in European not relax or despair, irrespective of the ports (first conducted in Venice), during difficulties encountered in combating AI. The or during the displacement of fight against exotic diseases starts at the ‘lepers’ from villages and cities during national airport where passengers should be Antiquity and the Middle Ages. clearly informed that the country of destination is infected by AI. A large poster In those early times, people recognised the might draw attention to the subject, ensuring sources of many hazards, but they were unable that passengers are fully informed (Fig. 4). In to identify and classify the pathogenic agents. this way, both the health of the passenger and This document deals mainly with the exclusion the economy of the country are protected. of the H5N1 AI virus from poultry establish‐ Having been provided with this kind of ments. However, neutralising the virus, or information, the traveller should necessarily be eliminating it, is, in itself, a very difficult task advised by a trained employee, just prior to which needs to be done by those who come entering the aircraft, of the simple rules that he into contact with birds, their litter, their or she should observe during the journey, such carcasses, their by‐products, equipment, feed, as: ‘don’t visit animal fairs or open poultry etc. markets, don’t bring back poultry meat or eggs When an AI virus enters a province, the or meat and egg products or live , etc.’. authorities should decide what should be done

to contain it and prevent it from spreading

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Steps to be taken by the authorities

• Conduct Laboratory test : laboratory investigation with reverse transcriptase- polymerase chain reaction (within 48 h after detection of cluster)

• Initiate epidemiological investigation • Characterise patients (by person, place and time) • Interview patients, relatives, health care workers, review medical records

• Undertake descriptive (possible exposure to ill people, contaminated environment, birds, animals) • Characterise the illness (morbidity, mortality) • Follow-up contacts (workplace, home, school)

• Report immediately to the World Health Organization

• Investigate the source or reservoir

• Undertake standard measures – Identify and treat patients – Identify all contacts of patient during the 14 days prior to appearance of symptoms and administer antiviral drugs (contacts should be ‘home quarantined’ for 7 days after contact with patient) • Undertake exceptional measures – Prophylactic administration of antivirals in doctors, community, village, school – Quarantine – Social distancing (close theatres, schools, borders)

Figure 3 Measures to be taken by the authorities

Irrespective of the measures taken at airports stressed during this interview, during which for people visiting an AI‐infected country, the traveller should be given the opportunity additional and very strict measures should be to reveal any possible contact with poultry, applied upon the return of these travellers without the fear of facing prosecution, punish‐ from the infected country. ment or quarantine measures, except where necessary. Don’t transport live or dead poultry, A very detailed investigation should be eggs or any raw or cooked food performed of all suitcases and luggage to ensure no live animals or animal products have been introduced. Veterinary services should always inspect large poultry farms to assess whether biosecurity measures are being correctly implemented and, in parallel, to educate small poultry raisers or backyard owners of the aspects of the disease. Industrial and commercial farms have access to high levels of biosecurity whilst, on the

contrary, small farmers or backyard producers Figure 4 do not. Sample poster for the information of the general public in ports, airports, bus and train Obviously, should an infectious agent enter a stations large poultry farm, the premises would be closed and the birds culled, otherwise the All travellers should be interviewed; their own economy of a country could be seriously health and that of their family should be threatened by an outbreak of AI. However, if

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the virus enters backyard chicken establish‐ Sources/reservoir of avian ments in a peri‐urban or urban area, with minimum or non‐existent biosecurity, the influenza virus impact on human health might be very severe. Sources or reservoirs for AI viruses are the Furthermore, the local veterinary services birds, their feed and contaminated water. should register all flocks in their area of Lakes crowded by wild birds can be infected jurisdiction and be ready to implement the with the virus and, if so, will transmit it to the necessary quarantine measures, such as next generation of birds or other aquatic sampling for tests, informing all stakeholders animals. who are economically involved in the bird Feed from contaminated pastures can carry the rearing business, closing poultry farms, culling infectious agents to adjacent farms or can be flocks and inspecting contaminated premises transported over long distances to contaminate to ensure they have been disinfected correctly. another area, region, prefecture or even an Such activities might lead to the loss of entire country. However, live bird markets farming jobs and cause further economic have been demonstrated to be the most disruptions in the affected area. On the other important mode of virus transmission (Fig. 5). hand, the general should be Vectors can be living or inanimate advised to follow the instructions given by the matter, which create pools of the virus. The authorities and to avoid panic which may lead virus is then disseminated in the environment to the collapse of the poultry industry. by vectors. Vectors can be people and their To implement a biosecurity programme, the clothes, shoes, cars, tools, cages, tyres, trucks, strain of the virus and its potential source etc. Among the most significant vectors are should be identified and access of the virus to insects and rodents and, to a lesser extent, all installations avoided. At the same time, domestic animals with the exception, perhaps, stockholders should always follow good of pigs; however the role of pigs in the agricultural and good animal rearing practices, transmission of communicable diseases of such i.e. the implementation of hygienic measures magnitude, such as AI, is still uncertain. to protect animal health, such as annual

vaccination programmes for endemic diseases, Avoid bringing unsold birds back control of pests and parasites, regular to the farm from the market disinfection of premises and equipment and, in If they have been contaminated at the market, they will general, all measures suggested by the local contaminate your stock veterinary services. In the event of an outbreak of AI, even of the low pathogenic form, all necessary measures should be implemented to isolate premises from neighbouring farms; this requires strict quarantine measures that do not necessarily need to be applied and supervised by the authorities but, more importantly, by the owner. Good farming practices should be practised throughout the year, not only in the event of outbreaks; otherwise the enterprise could become vulnerable to all kinds of communicable diseases. Figure 5 Transporting birds from contaminated farms to markets can spread the virus to other farms, provinces and regions of a country

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Vaccination of humans against ƒ other groups defined on the basis of national data and capacities, such as contacts of high‐ avian influenza risk people (e.g. poultry farmers, Vaccination is the most important biosecurity veterinarians, laboratory workers), pregnant measure against AI, in general, but presently women, health care workers and others with there is no vaccine available against H5N1 key functions in society, as well as children virus; only seasonal human influenza vaccines aged between 6 and 23 months. are available; these confer protection lasting between four and six months and an immunity Vaccination against common influenza is response ranging between 70% and 90% of suggested for the following groups:

healthy adults (Fig. 6). ¾ institutions for the elderly and disabled

¾ all individuals over six months of age with Presently there is no vaccine chronic heart or lung diseases, metabolic or available against avian flu renal disease, or immunodeficiencies virus. Only human seasonal influenza vaccines are ¾ elderly individuals above a nationally defined available; these influenza age limit, irrespective of other risk factors vaccines can protect people for 4-6 months with an Figure 7 immunity response ranging Population groups recommended for between 70% and 90% among vaccination against human influenza healthy adults

Vaccination of birds against avian influenza

Good quality inactivated vaccines have proved to be effective in reducing mortality, or preventing the disease in domestic poultry. Some vaccinated birds may nonetheless become infected and spread the virus to unvaccinated birds. Therefore, if vaccination is necessary, it should include all birds in the same establishment and those in close proximity (Fig. 8). Figure 6 Vaccines are produced only for the protection Vaccination of humans against avian flu of well‐known AI strains, because there is no cross‐protection among the haemagluttinin Vaccination against common influenza is (HA) subtypes (there are 15 HA subtypes). recommended for groups at risk as A recombinant virus vaccine containing the summarised below (Fig. 7): gene that codes for the production of the H5 ƒ residents of institutions for elderly people antigen is available and is being used in some and the disabled countries. Poultry are vaccinated with vaccines ƒ elderly, non‐institutionalised individuals from inactivated viruses which do not pose a with chronic heart or lung diseases, risk to the other birds or humans. metabolic or renal disease, or Vaccination ensures that infected but immunodeficiencies asymptomatic birds do not enter the human ƒ all individuals over six months of age with food chain and therefore they do not present a any of the conditions listed above public health risk. ƒ elderly individuals above a nationally defined age limit, irrespective of other risk factors

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Good inactivated vaccines can reduce mortality or prevent the disease but the should be used very carefully

Some vaccinated birds may be infected and spread the virus to unvaccinated birds. Therefore, if vaccination is necessary, it should be performed in all birds living in the same or adjacent establishments. Vaccination ensures that infected but asymptomatic birds do not enter the human food chain

Clean clothes placed in front of poultry unit

Figure 9 Observing hygiene methods to avoid disease spread

Biosecurity defence line

A biosecurity defence line can be established between the premises and the virus, as follows: ƒ build poultry houses in such a way as to prevent the entry of rodents, flies and insects Figure 8 ƒ do not raise multiple species of animals Vaccination of birds against avian influenza together – e.g. never raise chickens and ducks together because ducks are silent Hygiene carriers of the virus and can infect chickens ƒ do not raise pigs and poultry together The following are some of the activities that because pigs are ‘mixing vessels’ and should and should not be followed by farmers transmit the virus to humans of backyard flocks, industrial poultry workers, ƒ place baits and traps for rodents in and suppliers, supervisors and others. outside the poultry houses, always away The following measures are among those that from feed and live animals should be taken: ƒ control insects regularly ƒ use easily cleaned, washed and disinfected ƒ construct buildings so that they are easily equipment whenever possible cleaned and can be effectively disinfected ƒ clean, wash and disinfect equipment used in ƒ limit the entry of non‐essential visitors poultry buildings before leaving the farm ƒ provide all those involved in the day‐to‐day ƒ change clothes immediately before and after activities of the farm (service personnel, working in poultry buildings (Fig. 9). delivery personnel, utility personnel, veterinarians, state health personnel) with The following measures are among those that appropriate coveralls, boot covers, gloves should be avoided: and masks ƒ only enter poultry buildings when absolutely ƒ disinfectant footbaths should be placed at the necessary and only with the permission of entrance to poultry sheds (Fig. 10) the manager ƒ all vehicles should be disinfected before and ƒ only introduce materials and equipment that immediately after leaving the premises; they are absolutely necessary and do not should be parked as far away as possible introduce any that are not easily sanitised from the farm buildings (lunch bags, invoices, spare clothing and ƒ dirty garments should be left in designated other items) into poultry buildings ‘dirty areas’ for proper cleaning

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ƒ in the event of an outbreak of a communicable disease, clean the poultry houses completely and thoroughly disinfect them before restocking with new birds ƒ in the event of an outbreak of a communicable disease: ƒ clean and disinfect all equipment and garments (in consultation with the local veterinary services) ƒ clean all equipment regularly, especially feeders and water troughs Disinfectant footbath placed in ƒ front of poultry shed look out for abnormal signs among the birds and immediately report any suspect Prepare a solution (three parts bleach to two parts water) to clean boots and all equipment entering the farm cases to the local veterinary services ƒ remove all diseased and dead birds Figure 10 ƒ dispose of diseased and dead birds Use of footbaths at the entrance to poultry effectively so that they will not lead to sheds to prevent disease spread further spread of the disease ƒ remove litter and manure regularly and ƒ farm visitors should always wear ensure proper disposal thereof appropriate disposable clothing ƒ do not use untreated chicken faeces as ƒ disinfect all new equipment that is fertilizer or feed, because the virus introduced onto the premises can survive in faeces for a long period of ƒ do not borrow equipment from other farms time at low temperatures ƒ a visitor log system is advisable so the ƒ in the case of an outbreak, incinerate, bury manager knows where visitors come from; if deeply or compost any litter or manure in a problem does arise, someone’s footsteps order to kill pathogens and prevent the may be retraced to find the source of the spread of disease on the farm (Fig. 11) disease ƒ inform all staff working in all types of ƒ anyone working on a poultry farm should poultry raising facilities and especially avoid contact with wild birds, waterfowl, family members, of their role in preventing backyard flocks, game birds, ratites and live the introduction and dissemination of a bird markets communicable disease, and advise them on ƒ purchase replacements from disease‐free measures that should be taken to protect stock (areas, regions or, even better, their own health (it is imperative to convince countries) them to participate actively in creating this ƒ segregate new and young birds from the biosecurity ‘fortress’ otherwise all efforts will older ones and ensure the older birds are be in vain); if an outbreak does occur, ensure inspected last each day the full participation of all involved (prohibit ƒ purchase feed from suppliers in AI‐free the maintenance of backyard poultry by staff areas, regions or countries – visit their houses to ensure they do not ƒ ensure that the water source is reliable and tend to the flocks). has been chlorinated if necessary During outbreaks of communicable disease, ƒ keep domestic animals away from clean birds should be kept inside the hen house and poultry areas (dogs and cats are known to 1.27 cm (0.5˝) mesh hardware cloth should be carry , such as the Salmonella and placed over windows to ward off wild birds, Pasteurella species, which are infectious for rodents and insects. poultry) Since keeping all birds in the hen house is ƒ use fresh litter before new birds are absolutely necessary during an outbreak of AI, introduced an artificial light should be used that is

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beneficial for all types of poultry. Sunlight is setting, contact tracing and monitoring, use of also beneficial for undisturbed egg production antiviral drugs for the treatment of cases and but should be allowed on condition that targeted prophylaxis, intensified surveillance windows are protected with good wire mesh. and the real‐time reporting of data. The interventions at this phase aim to reduce

Incineration is the best way to dispose of carcasses and opportunities for further transmission to occur feathers, as burial might contaminate the subsoil and thus, ideally, prevent the virus from becoming well adapted to humans.

Bird enclosures, tools and equipment should be kept clean and disinfected

Figure 11 Incineration of carcasses

Removal of manure, debris and litter from the poultry A lack of hygiene and cleanliness often causes house with a broom poultry diseases that might seriously affect the health and production of the birds. Therefore, all chicken houses and equipment should be cleaned and disinfected regularly and the litter should be collected, kept dry and protected from vermin and rodents (Fig. 12). Manure and litter should never be spread or stored where poultry have access to them. In the case of an outbreak of AI, flocks should be isolated from any outside activity, such as Followed by thorough cleaning and disinfection other chickens, visitors, wild birds, domestic animals, etc. (Fig. 13).

Measures to reduce transmission Standard measures Activities in this phase are based on the assumption that an emerging virus will not immediately cause an explosive Figure 12 increase in the number of cases observed Cleaning and disinfection of enclosures during a full‐fledged pandemic. Assuming that the number of new cases is still Case management manageable, activities should concentrate on In the initial phase, when a manageable investigation and laboratory confirmation of number of cases is assumed, clinical cases cases, appropriate management of cases in a should be hospitalised and managed in single safe environment, implementation of measures rooms if possible. Once laboratory to control within the health care confirmation of infection is available and the

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number of cases exceeds the available number for doing so include the establishment of fever of single rooms, patients may be cohorted and clinics, home visits by medical staff, drive‐ managed in group isolation rooms. Depending through consultation services and other on local circumstances and feasibility, group methods of triage and diagnosis that limit isolation rooms could be adapted to have opportunities for exposure. negative pressure facilities. Antiviral treatment and targeted prophylaxis In the containment zone, antiviral drugs should be administered to cases of moderate‐

Visitors to‐severe respiratory illness to reduce morbidity and mortality, and to their contacts to reduce ongoing spread. Priority access to antiviral drugs and other medical interventions is expected to work as an incentive that increases the willingness of patients and their contacts to comply with recommended public health measures under what are likely to be stressful and demanding conditions. Local and national authorities, with support from the WHO, will jointly define (within the outbreak zone) the households, schools, workplaces, health facilities or other Ask questions: settings where the delivery of antiviral drugs, Ask questions: personal protective equipment and other • HavingHaving poultry poultry of their on own? their own ? • HavingHaving visited visited a poultry a poultry farm during farm during the last the last medical supplies should be targeted. Should 48 hours48 ?hours ? evidence of spread beyond the initial • HavingHaving visited visited a bird amarket bird market during during the last the last 48 hours48 hours ? containment zone emerge, the containment • HavingHaving visited visited a “Pet a shops “Pet ”shops during” duringthe last the last 48 hours48 ?hours ? areas designated for antiviral prophylaxis should be re‐defined. This decision will be Visitors should always park outside! made in collaboration with local and national Figure 13 authorities and the WHO. Visitors should be kept out of poultry sheds Exceptional measures, including use of the antiviral stockpile When the number of cases exceeds the capacity of existing health care facilities, sick Voluntary quarantine people should be isolated in other designated Experience during the severe acute respiratory areas or in individual homes, depending on syndrome (SARS) outbreak suggests that the severity of illness. National governments quarantine, applied on a voluntary basis, may should identify potential isolation facilities as be as effective as enforced quarantine. The use part of their preparedness and planning of voluntary quarantine is also consistent with during discussions with the World Health modelling studies that recommend the Organization (WHO). Patients should be application of quarantine and other transported to these facilities by trained staff community‐based measures as part of a wearing appropriate personal protective containment strategy. However, for voluntary equipment and using designated vehicles. To quarantine to succeed, the public will need to minimise the risk of nosocomial transmission, be informed and sensitised on benefits. people showing signs of mild, moderate or Governments should be prepared to enforce, severe respiratory illness must be assessed in legally and operationally, individual and premises separated from those in which community‐based containment measures if confirmed cases are being managed. Options warranted. This preparedness should include

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the examination of the ethical dimensions of elements of national pandemic preparedness enforced quarantine or compliance with other plans. These may include the following: recommended measures. Wherever possible, ƒ the closure of schools and workplaces, authorities should apply the principle of cancellation of mass gatherings and public proportionality, whereby the least restrictive transportation measures are applied first, followed by a ƒ border controls. graded application of more restrictive measures when evidence indicates their Conclusions and necessity. recommendations Local authorities should apply quarantine in It should be stressed here that it is much easier the following situations: to talk about biosecurity than to implement it, ƒ exposure has occurred in a defined group of especially in small flocks and backyard people as, for example, in a household poultry. Large industrial poultry farms are setting, at the workplace or school, or at a ‘supposed’ to implement at least the basic well‐defined and circumscribed public rules of biosecurity as part of their good gatherings agricultural and good farming practices. ƒ exposure has occurred in a defined site or However, it is worth mentioning that many are building (such as a hospital or an apartment still so overpopulated with birds that they building). overlook biosecurity in favour of increased Quarantine may involve confinement at home production and profit. or in a designed facility with appropriate Hen houses are often not properly washed and equipment. People in home quarantine may disinfected. Furthermore, cleaning and need to be provided with food, access to disinfection of hands, tools, clothes and the communications, psychosocial support and sanitisation of equipment are often neglected supplies of their usual , especially either because of a lack of education or the for chronic conditions. absence of guidance and inspection. Control of Social distancing incoming and outgoing vehicles and people is Modelling studies have indicated that certain almost unheard of on small‐ and medium‐scale ‘social distancing’ measures might increase the farms. However, it should be remembered that likelihood of successful containment. Such movement controls are one of the most measures aim to increase the social distance difficult aspects of maintaining an effective between people in an outbreak zone and thus biosecurity programme because it depends on reduce opportunities for transmission to occur. human compliance. It is easy to make mistakes Like quarantine, these measures are socially and very difficult to validate the disruptive and some may cause considerable implementation of biosecurity measures. distress or discomfort in the affected Therefore, it is very important to remember a population. Moreover, their actual impact on unique rule for both backyard poultry raisers transmission patterns has not been and industrial poultry farms is to create ‘clean documented fully in scientific studies. They zones’ (Fig. 14) in the establishments and to are, nonetheless, included here as some ensure they are always kept clean.

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Create clean zones on the farm

Clean inner area

Install a disinfectant footbath at the entrance of poultry sheds

Keep cleanclothes clothes clean before theentry Dirty outer area entranceinto the clean of the area clean area

Keep domestic and wild animals in the dirty area

Figure 14 ‘Biosecurity for the birds’ United States Department of campaign for education of the public

Further reading

1. Clauer P.J. 1997. Biosecurity for poultry (No. 408-310), Virginia Cooperative Extension. Virginia State University, Blacksbury, Virginia, 2 pp. 2. de Jong M.D.& Hien T.T. 2006. Avian influenza A (H5N1). J Clin Virol, 35, 2-13. 3. European Union (EU) 2006. Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 concerning certain protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry in the Community, notified under document number C(2006) 597 (Text with EEA relevance) (2006/135/EC). Off J, L 52, 23.2.2006, 41-53 (eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:052:0041:0053:en:pdf accessed on 23 September 2008). 4. Geering W.A., Forman A.J. & Nunn M.J. 1995. Exotic diseases of animals. A field guide for Australian veterinarians. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 6 pp. 5. Halvorson D.A. 1987. Avian influenza. A Minnesota cooperative control program. In Proc. 2nd International Symposium on avian influenza, 3-5 September 1986, Athens, Georgia. Animal Health Association, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 327-336. 6. Jeffrey J.S. 1997. Biosecurity for poultry flocks. University of California-Davis, 2 pp. 7. Marangon S. & Capua I. 2006. Control of avian influenza in Italy: from stamping out to emergency and prophylactic vaccination. Devel Biol (Basel), 124, 109-115. 8. Nelson T.M. & Mallinson E.T. 2001. Biosecurity for poultry. The University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. 9. Senne D.A., Panigrahy B. & Morgan R.L. 1994. Effect of composting poultry carcasses on survival of exotic avian viruses: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus and adenovirus of egg drop syndrome-76. Avian Dis, 38, 733-737. 10. Swayne D.E. 2006. Occupational and consumer risks from avian influenza viruses. Devel Biol (Basel), 124, 85-90.

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