Lessons and Preventing Global Recommendations from a Tabletop Catastrophic Exercise Held at the 2020 Munich Security Biological Risks Conference

BETH CAMERON, PH.D. • JAIME YASSIF, PH.D. • JACOB JORDAN, PH.D. • JACOB ECKLES, M.P.H. We are grateful to the Open Philanthropy Project. The exercise would not have been possible without their generous support.

This tabletop exercise was held under Chatham House Rule. Quotes from the tabletop exercise participants are included throughout the report but remain unattributed in keeping with this rule.

Photo Credits: MSC / Thomas Niedermueller

© 2020 Nuclear Threat Initiative

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the NTI Board of Directors or the institutions with which they are associated. Contents

Acknowledgments...... 2

Foreword...... 3

Executive Summary...... 5

About the Exercise...... 9

Overview of Exercise Discussion...... 13

Recommendations...... 19

Appendix A. Expert Contributors to Scenario Development...... 23

Appendix B. December 2019 Washington, DC Tabletop Exercise Participants...... 24

Appendix C. Epidemiological Model Summary...... 25

About the Authors...... 28 Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of those who were instrumen- tal in the development and execution of this senior-level tabletop exercise. At the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), we would like to thank Vice President for Communi- cations Carmen MacDougall, Senior Director for Content Mimi Hall, and Director for Communications Rachel Staley Grant for their support in developing the scenario and this report. Cassidy Nelson, Research Scholar at the Oxford University Future of Humanity Institute, provided expert input to create a realistic epidemiological model of spread for the scenario. Kevin O’Prey, Managing Partner of the Palisades Group, LLC, also provided expert assistance to develop the scenario and served as the facilitator for the exercise. We are also grateful to the Open Philanthropy Project for its support for this project, part of its ongoing support of our work to reduce global catastrophic biological risks.

Finally, the authors would like to acknowledge and thank the participants in the February tabletop exercise at the Munich Security Conference—as well as the participants in our December 2019 exercise and the experts who contributed to scenario development. We are grateful for their involvement, which was crucial to the success of this project. The exercise was held under the Chatham House Rule, and individuals participated as subject matter experts, not necessarily as official representatives of their respective organizations. The authors would also like to emphasize that the recommendations in this report were developed by NTI subsequent to the tabletop exercise discussion in February. Exercise participants are not responsible for, nor do they necessarily endorse, these recommendations.

Beth Cameron, Ph.D. Vice President, Global Biological Policy and Programs, NTI

Jaime Yassif, Ph.D. Senior Fellow, Global Biological Policy and Programs, NTI

Jacob Jordan, Ph.D. Former Senior Director, Global Biological Policy and Programs, NTI

Jacob Eckles, M.P.H. Program Officer, Global Biological Policy and Programs, NTI

2 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Foreword

ERNEST J. MONIZ, Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative

he COVID-19 has infected for preventing and responding to globally millions, left one million dead, catastrophic biological events. The meet- T shattered global economies, and ing highlighted the need for trusted and exposed governments and international non-politicized mechanisms for scientists organization as ill-prepared and ill-equipped and public experts to collaborate to manage the kind of catastrophic biologi- during a biological crisis, rapidly identify cal event that and global secu- the responsible , and discern its rity officials have warned of for years. In our origin. Allegations about the source of the interconnected world, biological threats are COVID-19 pandemic have demonstrated only increasing. The risk landscape is also that the world needs an internationally cred- changing, with recent technology advances ible, swift, transparent, and science-based enabling easier, cheaper, and faster tools to approach for promptly investigating these produce and modify pandemic agents that issues. In its absence, fear, mistrust, and could pose an even greater threat lack of clarity are inevitable—as we have to humanity. observed in recent months. To avoid these pitfalls for the long term, it is also vital to In mid-February 2020, during the Munich build a more robust underlying system for Security Conference, and just after the maintaining transparency and building World Health Organization declared confidence among nations about bioscience COVID-19 to be a Public Health Emergency research and development. Ongoing trans- of International Concern, the Nuclear Threat parency efforts are critical for reducing the Initiative (NTI) convened senior leaders from risk of dangerous misperceptions and suspi- around the world for a scenario-based exer- cions about the capabilities and intentions cise focused on high-consequence biolog- of national governments. ical threats. Although the event had been planned for months, the fictional disease in In addition, we must also remain cognizant of the scenario swept the globe in a way eerily other emerging risks already at our doorstep. similar to COVID-19 and foreshadowed the A future high-consequence biological event widespread impact and paralyzing knock-on could be caused by the accidental or delib- effects that the world is now experiencing. erate release of a synthesized or engineered While the real-life novel agent—SARS- . Developing biotechnolo- CoV-2—emerged from nature, the next gies have an inherent dichotomy: they are pandemic threat could be caused by a labo- essential for reducing pandemic threats and ratory accident or deliberate misuse, arising supporting , but at any time. they also carry risks that have the potential to undermine progress toward achieving these A key goal of NTI’s exercise in Munich was same health and economic goals. to identify the most effective approaches

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 3 NTI is taking a number of steps in coopera- that international capacity to address the tion with key partners to address these risks: kinds of infectious disease outbreaks that can lead to or is  To help plan a future where it is possible sorely lacking. It has also revealed insuf- to advance new while ficient financing for preparedness and a simultaneously reducing the risks asso- dearth of reliable regional approaches to ciated with them, NTI is collaborating securing the supply chain for materials with the World Economic Forum (WEF) essential for an effective response— and experts from around the world to including testing reagents, personal strengthen measures for protective gear, and lifesaving medical benchtop DNA synthesis. Benchtop equipment. DNA synthesis devices are an important new tool for biological research, but they It is clear now that heads of state must can also be used to synthesize a wide prioritize pandemic preparedness as an range of , such as the 1918 international security imperative and that pandemic , SARS-CoV-2, the should be in a stron- or a novel virus that is more transmis- ger position to help coordinate a global sible and virulent. In January at Davos, response—including through the addition of NTI and WEF jointly called for a new a dedicated facilitator for high-consequence common global mechanism to screen biological events housed within the Office DNA orders—to ensure that the building of the UN Secretary-General. Global lead- blocks of dangerous pathogens don’t fall ers also must commit to strengthening the into the hands of malicious actors—and World Health Organization, and a 2021 we described the potential to establish heads-of-state summit on biological threats a new international entity to identify and could build political will, advance sustain- reduce emerging biological risks to able financing, and kick-start global action prevent catastrophe. to fill gaps.

 Just a few months before COVID-19 As NTI learned at the February exercise in made headlines, NTI and the Johns Munich and as COVID-19 has demonstrated, Hopkins Center for the world’s extreme lack of preparedness released the Security sheds light on the critical importance of Index, in partnership with The Econo- national leadership and effective interna- mist Intelligence Unit, identifying pre- tionally coordinated efforts to marshal an paredness gaps across 195 countries effective response to this global crisis. We and calling for greater international have a responsibility to take action now to coordination to manage prevention and reduce emerging biological risks—before response. COVID-19 has demonstrated the next pandemic strikes.

4 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Executive Summary

n mid-February, during the Munich Secu- rity Conference, as news reports began I to emerge that people in the Chinese city of Wuhan were becoming gravely ill as a result of the initial COVID-19 outbreak, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) convened a group of senior leaders from around the world for a scenario-based tabletop exercise on high-consequence biological threats. Similar to NTI’s previous exercise, conducted during the 2019 Munich Secu- rity Conference, the event was designed to identify gaps in global capabilities to prevent and respond to a high-consequence biological event.1 bioweapons research, and an accidental release from one of its laboratories is the By the summer of 2020, the whole world source of the outbreak, which eventually kills understood the devastating impact of a more than 50 million people worldwide. naturally occurring, rapidly spreading virus. Governments and international organiza- Designed in the fall of 2019 in consulta- tions struggled to respond to the COVID-19 tion with technical and policy experts, the pandemic as the global toll climbed exercise was not intended to address the well into the hundreds of thousands, and emergence and spread of the COVID-19 millions of people remained out of work, pandemic. Instead, it was focused on two with businesses shuttered and corporations key goals: (1) highlighting emerging biolog- going bankrupt. ical risks associated with rapid technology advances and discussing governance mea- In this exercise, participants were presented sures to reduce these risks; and (2) examin- with a fictional scenario in which the world ing current and proposed new mechanisms is confronting a disease outbreak from a for preventing, deterring, and responding dangerous, apparently human-engineered to development of biological by pathogen, which is suspected to have sophisticated actors, such as states. originated in a country with biotechnology development ambitions. Ultimately, an The exercise also uncovered some key gaps international investigation reveals that the in the international system, as well as prior- suspect country has been conducting illicit ities for future international collaboration

1 “NTI Tabletop Exercise for Senior Global Leaders on International Response to Deliberate Biological Events” (February 2019), available at www.nti.org/about/projects/global-biosecurity-dialogue/tabletop-exercise-senior-global-leaders-international-response -deliberate-biological-events/.

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 5 1. Reduce Biotechnology Risks and Implement Global Norms for Life Science Research

Exercise participants noted the lack of national or global norms and systems for identifying emerging biological risks asso- ciated with technology advances and for effectively reducing those risks through governance of life science research. At the most fundamental level, the international community lacks a shared perspective—or norms—about how to determine whether dual-use bioscience research and develop- ment activities should move forward and how to weigh the perceived benefits of the work against the potential safety or security risks that it poses. National governments, that are relevant to the ongoing COVID-19 academia, and the private sector also lack pandemic and important for reducing the the means to act on these norms; they lack significant public health, economic, and clear and effective governance mechanisms security risks posed by potential future to oversee dual-use bioscience work from catastrophic biological events of any origin. early-stage design and funding decisions, In particular, the exercise was designed through project implementation, and on to highlight the growing biological risks to publication. as a function of the increasingly intercon- To address these problems, the organizers nected world, and the possibility that future recommend: pandemics—particularly those caused • A United Nations (UN) agency or credible by engineered or synthesized biological non-governmental institution should agents—could have even more devastat- partner with experts from the scientific, ing consequences for human philanthropic, security, and public health around the world. Participants determined sectors to create an international entity that even as global leaders urgently respond dedicated to identifying and reducing to COVID-19, they must consider bold emerging biological risks associated with changes to the international biosecurity technology advances and reducing global architecture to prevent an even graver risk variations in oversight for dual-use life to the future of humanity. science research. After the exercise, the organizers devel- • Research organizations should require oped a set of recommendations based and provide incentives to those whom on findings from the discussion among they fund to identify and reduce the risk exercise participants: of accidental or deliberate misuse in

6 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS the design, conduct, and sharing of life “We have accepted that we cannot science research and biotechnology. verify if a country is pursuing 2. Enhance Transparency to Build Trust and Reduce Uncertainty biological weapons, and that Participants discussed the lack of robust precludes constructive discussion international transparency measures that could reduce mistrust and clarify the inten- around verification. How can we tions and capabilities of bioscience and bio- defense research being conducted across build trust and confidence? How can the globe. The exercise was designed to draw attention to the dangerous misper- we cooperate and build confidence ceptions among nations about suspected biological-weapons-related activities between sovereign countries without resulting from insufficient transparency and confidence-building measures. Political divi- too much interference? The race sions and technical disagreements among national governments about the feasibility between cooperation and catastrophe of establishing a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have applies here.” continued to stymie progress on bolstering — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT international transparency measures, and recent voluntary peer review efforts have reports, scientific exchanges, site visits, not filled this gap. To help meet this need, and research exchanges. participants noted that the private sector can play an important leadership role in 3. Develop Capacity to Rapidly shaping new voluntary efforts to enhance Investigate Biological Events of transparency for life science research and Unknown Origin commercial applications. Participants highlighted the lack of an To address this challenge, the organizers international approach for conducting recommend: investigations to determine the source of • International organizations, national any high-consequence biological event of governments, academia, and the private unknown origin. While the World Health sector should develop and implement Organization (WHO) has a mandate to a variety of enhanced transparency lead the public health response and inves- measures to reduce the risk of tigate the origin of naturally emerging misperceptions about the capabilities infectious disease outbreaks, and the UN and intentions of any nation’s bioscience Secretary-General’s Mechanism has the research and development activities. authority to investigate an alleged deliber- These measures could include written ate biological attack by a state, there is no

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 7 To bridge this gap, the organizers recommend:

• The international community should develop a Joint Assessment Mechanism to enable a multinational team to investigate the origin of a high- consequence biological event. This mechanism would address cases where there is ambiguity about the source of a biological event—specifically, whether it emerged naturally or was deliberately or accidentally released from an academic, commercial, or government laboratory.

• The Office of the UN Secretary-General should designate a permanent facilitator or unit to develop the capacity for and lead a coordinated, multi-sectoral intermediate mechanism for investigating response to high-consequence biological biological events that may fall between events of unknown origin. these two ends of the spectrum. Full findings and recommendations begin on page 19.

8 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS About the Exercise

he February 2020 Tabletop revealed priorities for future international Exercise on High-Consequence collaboration that are both relevant to the T Biological Threats—designed ongoing pandemic and important to reduc- and conducted before the emergence of ing the significant health, economic, and SARS-CoV-2 and the resulting COVID-19 security risks posed by future catastrophic pandemic—examined current and pro- biological events of any origin. posed new mechanisms for preventing, deterring, and responding to accidental or PARTICIPANTS deliberate high-consequence biological The February tabletop exercise convened events, including those associated with the an international group of current and former development of engineered agents and/or senior leaders with decades of combined biological weapons. Like naturally occurring experience leading public health responses, , these threats pose an increasing peacekeeping missions, and law enforce- catastrophic risk to the global community ment and security investigations, and and require new approaches to bolster providing financing for health emergen- existing, effective risk-reduction methods cies. Participants were asked to consider and to develop novel ideas that have the the scenario and candidly discuss gaps in potential to dramatically reduce risks. mechanisms, coordination, and information The scenario was developed in 2019 in sharing to reduce biological risks asso- consultation with technical and policy ciated with advances in technology and experts (see Appendix A). In advance of the high-consequence biological events. See exercise, which was conducted in Germany page 11 for a complete list of participants. during the Munich Security Conference, NTI conducted a daylong exercise in Washington, DC, in December 2019 (see “A crisis of this magnitude will make the Appendix B for participant list). This ver- world look different, and we wouldn’t sion of the exercise included a deeper dive into deterrence and prevention of cata- be looking back. We’d be looking strophic biological risks posed by potential state-sponsored bioweapons research, to forward with opportunity for change.” include accidental and deliberate release of — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT biological weapons.

While the exercise in Munich was not EXERCISE SCENARIO intended to address the emergence and The events in this fictitious scenario begin in spread of SARS-CoV-2 or the response late summer 2020 as a deadly, unexplained carried out by the international commu- influenza virus kills a number of international nity, organizers and participants found that travelers from Aplea, a middle-income the exercise exposed important gaps and

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 9 VEZU • Small, middle-income country • Strong regional and APLEA international ties • 40 million • Middle-income country with national investment in growing biotechnology sector Vezu • Hybrid regime with powerful national leader Aplea

Map of the fictional country of Aplea, the epicenter of the outbreak, and neighboring Vezu.

country with a burgeoning bioscience and biopreparedness program. The scenario biotechnology economy. Research teams concludes with additional intelligence from two World Health Organization col- sources—including former laboratory work- laborating centers quickly sequence the ers—providing irrefutable evidence that responsible strain and identify it as an engi- the state-run laboratory in Aplea is in fact a neered version of H2N2 influenza, which bioweapons facility and that the spread of is related to a strain that circulated among the deadly virus resulted from an acciden- humans several decades ago. This assess- tal release. By the end of the exercise, the ment is based on the inclusion of muta- global case count is more than two billion, tions known to reduce the effectiveness of and more than 50 million lives have been antiviral and the insertion of a lost as a result of the virus’s spread. series of changes that have previously been The case counts and fatality counts for this associated with a severe immune system exercise were based on an epidemiological overreaction, increasing the likelihood of model—specifically a Susceptible–Exposed– death. Despite an emerging international Asymptomatic–Infectious–Recovered (SEAIR) consensus that this is a laboratory-created compartmental, deterministic model, which virus, the intent and identity of the creator is commonly used in the public health remain unknown. community. In this scenario, it is assumed As the scenario progresses, global research- that the outbreak was initiated by four initial ers conducting viral-strain analysis and index cases in the fictional capital of Aplea epidemiological modeling identify a and that it spread internationally over the state-run laboratory in Aplea as the likely following few weeks via passenger air flights. source of the outbreak, but Aplea asserts NTI based the pathogen epidemiological that this laboratory is part of an ongoing parameters on H2N2 influenza literature

10 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS February 2020 Munich Security Conference Tabletop Exercise Participants

Keynote Dr. Robert Nass Senior Vice President, Quality & Regulatory Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland Management Life Science, Merck KGaA, Co-Chair, Global Preparedness Darmstadt, Germany Monitoring Board Senator Former Prime Minister of Norway Co-Chair, NTI Former Director-General of the World Health Organization Former U.S. Senator Dr. James Revill Participants Researcher, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Dr. Tang Bei Assistant Director, Center for Global Joan Rohlfing Governance Studies, School of International President and Chief Operating Officer, NTI Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall Distinguished Professor of the Practice, Nunn Ambassador Smaïl Chergui School, Georgia Institute of Technology Commissioner for Peace and Security, Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer African Union Center for Science and International Affairs Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Avril Haines Former White House Coordinator for Deputy Director of Columbia World Projects Defense Policy, Countering Weapons of Lecturer in Law at Mass Destruction, and Arms Control Senior Research Scholar, Senior Fellow at the Elhadj As Sy Applied Physics Laboratory Co-Chair, Global Preparedness Former Deputy Advisor to Monitoring Board President Chair, Kofi Annan Foundation Former Secretary General, International Dr. Richard Hatchett Federation of Red Cross and Red Chief Executive Officer, Coalition for Crescent Societies Preparedness Innovations Dr. Adrian Thomas Dr. Orin Levine Vice President, Global Public Health, Director, Vaccine Delivery, Global Johnson & Johnson Development Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Facilitator Ottilia Anna Maunganidze Head of Special Projects, Institute for Security Dr. Kevin P. O’Prey Studies, Pretoria, South Africa Managing Partner, Palisades Group, LLC Munich Young Leader 2017

Dr. Ernest J. Moniz Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, NTI Former U.S. Secretary of Energy

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 11 weapons by states and other sophisticated actors, and to develop specific actions to address the root cause of states’ decisions to pursue these weapons.

To this end, participants were asked to respond to specific questions throughout the exercise, including:

• What governance measures could meaningfully reduce biological risks associated with advances in technology?

• What global norms govern research and technology in the life sciences, including research involving pathogens with pandemic potential?

“Technology is becoming so ubiquitous. • What international capabilities and Companies would want to know about mechanisms are needed to deter or otherwise prevent the development of abuse, but in the absence of regulation, biological weapons by powerful actors, it becomes challenging.” such as states? • What international capabilities and — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT mechanisms might be developed to attribute and effectively hold perpetrators and assumed that the main public health accountable for the development, intervention deployed by governments prior accidental release, or use of a to vaccine development was case . biological ? (For further information on the epidemio- logical model, including underlying data REPORT ORGANIZATION sources and assumptions, see Appendix C.) The remainder of this report is organized into two parts: a summary of the discussions QUESTIONS FOR EXPLORATION that took place during the exercise and a The first goal of the exercise was to set of recommendations developed by the highlight the emerging biological risks organizers to address the gaps and require- associated with advances in science and ments identified through discussion among technology and have participants discuss participants. NTI developed these recom- governance measures that can meaning- mendations after the event concluded; par- fully reduce these risks. The second goal ticipants were not involved, and they have was to examine current and possible new not endorsed them. mechanisms for preventing, deterring, and responding to development of biological

12 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Overview of Exercise Discussion

lthough the exercise was organized norms or governance mechanisms for life around a specific fictional scenario, science research and biotechnology devel- A the resulting discussion addressed opment, which would reduce emerging a wide range of current, real-world chal- risks associated with this work. All partici- lenges and their potential solutions. Most pants agreed that continued biotechnology significantly, participants reached consensus advances are vital for sustainable develop- regarding three major shortfalls in the global ment, yet they also noted that the current approach to biotechnology, biological environment poses significant risks of weapons, and related risks: deliberate misuse and accidents.

1. The accelerating development, Many life science researchers, for example, global spread, and accessibility are unaware of the potential ways in which of bioscience and biotechnology their research could be exploited for malign have not been matched with purposes, and the current international the development of norms and research-funding paradigm fails to promote governance mechanisms to manage risk reduction or prioritize the rigorous eval- associated risks of deliberate misuse uation of potential biosecurity risks before or accidental release. funding and conducting research.

2. The international community lacks Participants agreed that while existing legal robust transparency measures—and frameworks provide clear guidance for related systems of trust—to clarify responding to deliberate misuse of biosci- the intentions and capabilities ence, there is a normative and governance of bioscience research and gap for well-intentioned research; this gap development being conducted could either lead to an accidental release across the globe. with potentially catastrophic global conse- quences or inadvertently enable malicious 3. Internationally, there is a critical gap actors seeking to exploit this work for in capacity to rapidly investigate weapons development. high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. The underlying problem, as characterized by several participants, is that the international These shortfalls are discussed in community lacks a shared view—or set of greater depth below, followed by some norms—about how to determine whether additional considerations. dual-use bioscience research and develop- ment activities should move forward, how 1. Rapidly Developing, Globally to weigh the perceived benefits against Distributed Life Science Research and Biotechnology potential safety or security risks, and how to mitigate risks if the work does proceed. Tabletop exercise participants broadly For example, there is no international con- agreed that there is a lack of international sensus about the boundaries that should

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 13 “…we do not have regulatory requirements across facilities, countries, and regions. frameworks or any sort of governance Several private-sector participants expressed at the global level. The only thing surprise at the lack of international oversight and regulation of commercial technologies, that’s close is the World Health such as DNA synthesis, as well as academic Organization Advisory Committee on dual-use life science research,2 including research that could enhance pathogen Variola Virus Research, but we don’t transmissibility, virulence, and/or resistance to medical countermeasures.3 For example, have anything like that at the global in the area of DNA synthesis, it is increas- level for gain-of-function research.” ingly difficult to evaluate the intended end use of commercially provided biological — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT building blocks. As the discussion pivoted to identifying solutions for these challenges, be applied to certain dual-use life science participants suggested that policies that research that enhances pathogen transmissi- have been developed for the commercial bility, virulence, and/or resistance to medical sale of dual-use biomanufacturing equip- countermeasures, but may offer benefits for ment, such as fermenters and centrifuges, development of medical countermeasures may serve as a model for future policies on and other valuable tools. commercial DNA synthesis or benchtop Even if there were international norms, DNA synthesis devices. national governments, academia, and the The broader solutions to these challenges, private sector currently lack the means to several participants argued, is the devel- codify or operationalize them. They lack opment of norms at the international level. clear and effective processes—or gover- Others suggested that any solution must nance mechanisms—to oversee dual-use be underpinned by oversight and gov- bioscience work from early-stage design ernance systems put in place by national and funding decisions, through project governments, academia, and the private implementation, and on to publication. sector. The experts noted that this is a Although some national governments, challenging task because the role of pro- academic institutions, and private organiza- viding normative guidance and oversight tions have set up governance mechanisms, for life science research and biotechnology variations in oversight for dual-use research development does not align well with the currently create an uneven patchwork of current mandate or capabilities of existing biosecurity and practices and international organizations.

2 For example, only 5 percent of countries demonstrate that they practice oversight for dual-use research, including research with especially dangerous pathogens and . Additionally, no government requires providers of synthetic DNA to screen their orders or prevent sharing of materials with questionable parties. 3 The following sources provide additional context and background on dual-use life science research: https://easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Function/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/gain-of-function-research/ https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/GainOfFunction.aspx

14 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Participants emphasized that the private sector must play a central role in addressing Current International Efforts these challenges. Recognizing the grow- ing leadership role of the private sector in At present, the main international advancing life science research and bio- transparency mechanism for bioscience technology development, participants cited research and development is the the lack of specific guidance to govern their Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) work. They agreed that although those who system under the auspices of the Biological fund and conduct life science research out- Weapons Convention (BWC). Many BWC side of government typically do not focus on States Parties have called for renewed efforts biosecurity, all of these organizations have a to develop a comprehensive and legally vested interest in safe and secure practices binding BWC verification regime, while other for such research around the world. States Parties have argued that verification is not technically feasible and that such Given the private sector’s leadership role a regime would not provide an effective in biotechnology development, partici- means of assuring compliance or improve pants suggested that this sector should national or global security. The concept of also assume a greater leadership role in verification is currently locked in a political developing biosecurity measures and new stalemate among BWC States Parties. governance approaches for their work, and recommended incentivizing them to do so. BWC CBMs consist of written reports about biological research and 2. Need for Transparency and activities, which are submitted on an annual Trust to Clarify Intentions basis. Of the 183 BWC States Parties, 54 and Capabilities percent have not submitted a CBM in the past three years. BWC CBMs have remained Rapid advances in biotechnology have also largely unchanged for the past three increased the need to enhance clarity and decades. At the same time, a number of reduce the risk of misperceptions among BWC States Parties have made suggestions states about the intent and capabilities of to enhance CBMs. Previous attempts bioscience and biodefense research enter- at establishing a more comprehensive prises. Exercise participants emphasized transparency regime within the BWC have that it is crucial to find new and concrete faced significant political and technical ways to build trust among nations and obstacles. The most recent serious attempt increase confidence that research intended at developing a verification protocol began to strengthen protections against deadly in the 1990s and ended in 2001. pathogens is not being misused or crossing the line into offensive work.

Without trust and stronger, more effective bioweapons development in the future. In confidence-building measures, the inter- recent years, several governments have pub- national community continues to face the licly expressed suspicion about the capabil- risk that misperceptions and suspicions ities and intentions driving the bioscience could fuel state interest in the pursuit of and biodefense activities in other nations.

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 15 “The nuclear industry understands subsequently becomes legally binding. This agreement grants the International that an accident anywhere impacts the Atomic Energy Agency authority to conduct short-notice site inspections and to visit a entire industry. The same should go for broad range of facilities associated with the the biotech industry. Is this a place for full life cycle of nuclear materials in peace- ful use. The goal of these “complementary industry to lead, create transparency, access” visits is to ensure that nuclear mate- and feed international mechanisms?” rials are not being diverted for weapons pur- poses, in keeping with national obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT Through the BWC or even regional security Participants acknowledged the significant arrangements, several participants argued, political and technical obstacles that have this model might provide a means to move undermined previous international efforts beyond a purely voluntary set of transpar- in this area, but several stressed the impor- ency measures. While not all aspects of the tance of finding ways to make progress in Additional Protocol are salient in the con- this area. text of transparency for bioscience research and development, some elements of this Participants observed that govern- regime could serve as a model for develop- ments, academia, and the private sec- ing more robust international tools that do tor have an opportunity to take a fresh not depend on full multilateral consensus look at this set of issues and build a set as a starting point. For example, a group of transparency-enhancing activities that of states played an early leadership role by the international community agrees are voluntarily adopting the Additional Protocol productive, which would enable these beginning in 1997 and subsequently advo- groups to transcend politically deadlocked cating for more countries to join the regime. conversations about verification. Over time, the Additional Protocol has While recognizing that there are clear, funda- evolved into a new de facto international mental differences between biosecurity and norm in the nuclear arms-control arena, cre- other arms-control fields, several participants ating political pressure on the few countries argued that lessons from nuclear security that have remained outside the regime— regimes might inform the development of including those suspected of noncompli- new measures to increase transparency for ance with their international obligations. In bioscience research and development— principle, it may be possible for a group of especially dual-use research. Several partic- countries to launch an analogous initiative ipants pointed to the Additional Protocol to bolster transparency and confidence in for the Application of Safeguards,4 which bioscience research and development. countries join on a voluntary basis and

4 See www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf.

16 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS 3. Managing the Interface between Public Health and Security During an Outbreak Investigation

Participants engaged in an in-depth conver- sation about ways to investigate suspected deliberate misuse or accidental release—as opposed to natural emergence—as the cause of a biological event of unknown origin. They discussed how a security inves- tigation would interface with public health response efforts, as well as whether and how information would be shared between these two sectors. Exercise participants observed that a prompt determination of the origin of an outbreak during a public health crisis is extremely important for understanding the the crisis by supporting an effective pub- potential for re-emergence, gaining infor- lic health response, overseeing a prompt mation about disease spread, and determin- scientific investigation into the origin of the ing the availability of data that could assist pathogen responsible for the event, and with the development of medical counter- gathering information to objectively investi- measures. However, they also acknowl- gate suspicions of deliberate misuse or acci- edged that tensions could arise between dental release. Participants noted that tech- the need to collect public health data and nical missions would be critical for obtaining save lives on the one hand and the need to information about the source agent—includ- collect information necessary for a secu- ing samples and testing records—especially rity-focused investigation of a potentially unwilling suspect on the other. In a crisis, you cannot wait. You The group discussed various approaches for compelling—or at least coaxing—a have to send people in to secure the state that is suspected of such a violation facility and see what is in the freezer. to comply with ongoing investigations, cease any bioweapons-related activities, You many not learn more about the and share information that might be helpful for the public health response. Participants current outbreak, but you need to emphasized that the principal focus of any know if they just have poor laboratory investigation would be to mitigate the loss of human life; however, they also noted that practices or if they have malicious some sort of mechanism or body within the intent that is a threat to the world. UN would be necessary to bring together disparate parties at senior levels to manage — EXERCISE PARTICIPANT

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 17 the gap between the respective mandates of the WHO and the UN Office for Disar- mament Affairs, and there is no centralized UN node to coordinate an effective inter- national response and rapid investigation for high-consequence biological events of unknown origin.

Additional Considerations: The Importance of Robust Systems for Effectively Responding to Public Health Emergencies

By design, the exercise discussion was focused on emerging biological risks asso- ciated with rapid technology advances and if preliminary work had been conducted to on governance measures to meaningfully develop medical countermeasures. Access reduce these risks, as well as mechanisms to facilities and records would also serve for preventing, deterring, and responding as a means of building confidence that the to development of biological weapons by source of an accidentally or deliberately sophisticated actors, such as states. Yet released biological event would not be used the severe consequences in the fictional for “reload.” scenario drove many participants to also To meet these needs, participants discussed highlight the importance of strong health the importance of establishing an effective, systems for an effective public health internationally recognized mechanism for response. Participants repeatedly empha- gathering security-relevant information in sized the role of systems and institutional the early stages of a biological event that mechanisms in mitigating and responding is suspected to have resulted from illicit to biological events. Specifically, partic- biological weapons development and/or an ipants highlighted the need to invest in accidental release. Participants noted that health systems early on to prevent the no existing international institution has the spread of disease during an outbreak.5 authority to play this role; it currently falls in

5 Although the critical importance of strong health security systems to mount an effective public health response was outside the scope of this exercise, NTI is focused on this issue and is working to bolster these systems through its work on the Global Health Security Index (www.ghsindex.org) and in calling for the establishment of a GHS Challenge Fund.

18 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Recommendations

he NTI Tabletop Exercise on international entity dedicated to identi- High-Consequence Biological fying and reducing emerging biological T Threats identified major gaps in risks associated with technology advances norms and governance structures guiding and reducing global variations in oversight biological research, international mecha- for dual-use life science research. nisms to promote transparency and build • The new entity would have two responsi- trust around legitimate biological research, bilities: developing norms regarding the and international capabilities to investigate conduct of dual-use bioscience research the source of a high-consequence biological and providing guidelines for the develop- event of unknown origin. ment of national, academic, and pri- The bottom line: participants found that vate-sector policies for governance of life bioscience researchers lack norms to science research and development, and guide their work, especially when it ven- associated commercial applications. tures into risky territory. Moreover, there is • The entity could be incubated and no effective system to maintain trust and housed within an existing international confidence among the international com- organization or established as a new munity that suspect governments—and independent body with ties to existing parties in their countries—are not engaged international organizations. in the development of offensive biological capabilities. Nor is there currently a viable, • The WHO should consider expanding internationally respected mechanism to the purview of its Advisory Committee promptly investigate a suspicious outbreak on Variola Virus Research to include of unknown origin during a global public research that enhances transmissibility health crisis. and/or virulence of pathogens that have pandemic potential. NTI examined these three gaps and devel- oped recommendations for each. The fol- lowing recommendations reflect the views of the authors and should not be attributed to the participants in the exercise.

1. Reduce Biotechnology Risks and Implement Global Norms for Life Science Research

A UN agency or credible non-governmental institution should partner with experts from the scientific, philanthropic, security, and public health sectors to create an

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 19 2. Enhance Transparency to Build Trust and Reduce Uncertainty

International organizations, national governments, academia, and the private sector should develop and test a variety of enhanced transparency measures to reduce the risk of misperceptions about the capabilities and intentions of any nation’s bioscience research and develop- ment activities.

• These measures should aim to reduce uncertainty about other states’ capabil- ities and intentions regarding develop- ment of biological weapons and increase clarity about compliance with the BWC.

• In some cases, enhanced transparency Life science funders should require and measures might create opportunities for incentivize supported researchers to iden- identifying potential problems with BWC tify and reduce the risk of accidental or compliance. However, an absence of deliberate misuse in the design, conduct, evidence would not necessarily support and sharing of life science research and high-confidence conclusions about com- biotechnology. pliance—that is, these measures cannot perform the full function of verification. • All life science research funders— including investors, philanthropies, • Industry and academic research laborato- companies, and governments—should ries play a key role in innovative bioscience embrace a Biotechnology Funders research and the engineering of biological Compact that includes a commitment systems and should take an active role in to conduct thorough biosecurity and developing, testing, and implementing biosafety reviews as part of their funding enhanced transparency measures. decision-making processes, as well as New enhanced transparency measures specific incentives to fund biosecurity could include written reports, scientific and biosafety. exchanges, site visits, research exchanges, • Global commercial DNA synthesis and the and the creation of an informal venue sale of DNA synthesis machines should be for discussions about inconsistencies and governed by policies modeled after those ambiguities in the actions of others. in place for other dual-use technologies, • As a concrete next step to advance this such as fermenters and centrifuges. work, leaders in industry and academia

20 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS should develop a set of proposed 3. Develop Capacity to Rapidly enhanced transparency measures to pilot Investigate Biological Events of and iteratively refine. They could share Unknown Origin their pilot project designs and experi- The international community should ences with each other to start to develop develop a new Joint Assessment Mecha- new best practices in this area. nism to enable a rapid-reaction multi- • At the next BWC Review Conference in national team to determine the source of 2021, States Parties should advance this a high-consequence biological event of goal by including an agenda item about unknown origin. This mechanism would the development of Enhanced Transpar- address cases where there is ambiguity ency Measures in the work plan for the about the source of a biological event— 2022–2026 Intersessional Process. specifically, whether it emerged natu- rally or was deliberately or accidentally • The exercise organizers recognize that a released from an academic, commercial, number of national governments6 have or government laboratory. undertaken valuable work to advance these goals, including hosting voluntary • A Joint Assessment Mechanism would peer review visits. Robust enhanced trans- have an internationally diverse roster of parency measures should entail a much technical experts and the operational larger-scale effort that incorporates work capability to rapidly launch an investi- led by a broader range of stakehold- gation in response to a biological event ers, including industry, academia, and of unknown origin—within 48 hours of non-governmental organizations. authorization by the UN system.

• Non-governmental organizations and • It would be more expansive and intensive other members of civil society focused than a standard WHO public health mis- on reducing biological threats posed sion, and the bar for triggering it would by states and other sophisticated actors be lower than that for a UN Secretary- should conduct research and initiate con- General’s Mechanism investigation. sultations with a diverse group of interna- • The process requirements for this trigger tional experts to explore the possibility of should be carefully calibrated. Trigger- adapting salient aspects of the Additional ing the Joint Assessment Mechanism Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agree- should be rapidly achievable during a ments (or other potentially applicable global public health emergency, and it arms-control measures) as a model for should not be weighed down by oner- bolstering international transparency ous coordination requirements that lead in the context of dual-use bioscience to gridlock and inaction. That being research and development. said, the bar should be set high enough to preclude easy launch of frivolous

6 Countries that have played an important leadership role in developing and advancing voluntary peer review in the BWC context include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, France, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the .

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 21 investigations that undermine the integrity roster of experts to be part of a fly-away of the mechanism. team should be designated in advance of an event. • Architects of this mechanism should consider relevant financial, scientific, and • The mere existence of this facilitator or human resources available within the UN unit would serve as a deterrent. system and among national governments. • The position should reinforce the role of regional organizations, non- The Office of the UN Secretary-General governmental entities, and multi-national should designate a permanent facilita- corporations in seeking transparency tor or unit to develop the capacity for by neighboring states. and lead a coordinated, multi-sectoral response to high-consequence biological • The position should oversee annual table- events of unknown origin. top exercises to stay abreast of emerging biological risks and iteratively test and • A designated facilitator or unit should strengthen UN and WHO capacity to be given the resources and oversight to marshal an effective, integrated response execute the Joint Assessment Mechanism to high-consequence biological events described above. from a range of sources. • Because the facilitator or unit would need to be perceived as objective, a

22 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Appendix A. Expert Contributors to Scenario Development

Dr. Bradley Dickerson Sandia National Laboratories Dr. Jessica Dymond Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Dr. Melissa Flagg Center for Security and Emerging Technology Dr. Dylan George In-Q-Tel Dr. John Glass J. Craig Venter Institute Dr. Matt Hepburn U.S. Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Ambassador (Retired) Robert Mikulak U.S. Department of State Christopher Park U.S. Department of State Dr. David Rakestraw Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Mallory Stewart Sandia National Laboratories Dr. Renee Wegrzyn U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 23 Appendix B. December 2019 Washington, DC Tabletop Exercise Participants

Dr. Peter A. Carr Dr. George Korch Senior Staff Scientist, Massachusetts Director, National Biodefense Analysis Institute of Technology Lincoln and Countermeasures Center Laboratory President, Battelle National Biodefense Dr. Richard Danzig Former U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University of Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Applied Physics Laboratory Department of Health and Human Services Former U.S. Secretary of the Navy Dr. Dimitri Kusnezov Dr. Amanda Dion-Schultz Deputy Under Secretary for A.I. Biotechnology Advisor, National and Technology, U.S. Department Counterproliferation Center of Energy Avril Haines Dr. Piers Millet Deputy Director of Columbia World Projects Senior Research Fellow, Future of Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law School Humanity Institute Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University Dr. Jayne Morrow Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University Assistant Vice President of Research Applied Physics Laboratory and Economic Development, Montana State University Former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama Joan Rohlfing Dr. Hiski Haukkala President and Chief Operating Officer, NTI Professor of International Relations, Deborah Rosenblum Tampere University, Finland Executive Vice President, NTI Dr. Norm Kahn Senior Consultant, Counter-Bio LLC

24 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS Appendix C. Epidemiological Model Summary Developed by Dr. Cassidy Nelson

he exercise scenario was modeled data.7 This meant that globally, 10.6% of the using Susceptible–Exposed– population was fully immune to the virus at T Asymptomatic–Infectious– scenario beginning. Recovered (SEAIR) compartments based on In the model, spread within ordinary differential equations. Four index and between cities and regions through cases in the fictional capital of Aplea started the movement of infected individuals, the outbreak. Following local domestic trans- with daily migration rates ( ) based on mission, the disease spreads internationally UNWTO 2019 statistics.8 By Day 45 in the via passenger airline flights, with infected scenario, countries had begun deploying cities around the world acting as seeders for non-pharmaceutical interventions. Hospital their respective regions. All modeling was isolation of symptomatic individuals had completed in the R software package. the effect of moderately reducing their The disease parameters for the scenario infectivity and chance of death through were derived using empirical data from non-specific supportive medical treatment. H2N2 influenza viral outbreaks. The basic The overall fatality was 3% in the scenario, reproductive number (R ) of 1.7 was chosen 0 which is much higher than typical influenza based on the 1957 H2N2 pandemic and outbreaks (<0.1%) but significantly lower used to calculate the transmission rate (ß) than the estimated 10%–20% case fatality for the scenario pathogen.1 The incubation rate of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic period was 1.9 days and the infectious (50-100 million of approximately 500 period length was 2.49 days, based on million global cases).9 Vaccination began on published influenza studies.2,3 Day 240, with more than 8 million people Within the norm for influenza outbreaks, immunized in the first month and 36 million two-thirds of cases showed symptoms.4 individuals immunized within four months of The remaining cases were asymptomatic the vaccine release. and had a 50% relative reduction in their By the end of the scenario, more than 30% infectivity.5 The background immunity in of the world had been diagnosed with the the population to the virus was based on virus, comparable to the spread of the 1918 published data on global H2 viral immunity Spanish influenza pandemic, in which it in different age groups (62% of people are was estimated that one-third of the global immune if born before 1957, 21% immune population had been infected.9 More than if born between 1957 and 1968, and 0% 50 million people had died. are immune if born after 1968)6 and com- bined with UN 2020 global demographic

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 25 Table 1. Scenario model parameters and their values, with data sources specified

Parameter Definition Value Source

β Transmission rate 0·85 Calculated from H2N2 1957 Data1

ϵ Relative infectivity of asymptomatic cases 0·50 5 χ Relative infectivity of isolated symptomatic cases 0.75 Scenario α Rate of progression from exposed class 0.52 2 (median incubation period 1.9 days)-1

γ Rate of progression to recovered class 0.40 3 (mean infectious period 2.49 days)-1

ζ Case fatality rate 0.03 Scenario ω Proportion of exposed cases that become symptomatic 0.67 4 δ Rate of progression to death among symptomatic 0·018 Calculated infectious class

θ Isolation rate (after Day 45, prior to that it is 0) 0.02 Scenario μ Treatment effectiveness 0.90 Scenario (1-relative reduction in mortality due to treatment)

υ Global vaccination rate per day 0.01% Scenario (after Day 240, prior to that it is 0)

η Migration rate between cities and regions Various UNWTO (location dependent)

Figure 1. Base compartmental model used for all cities and regions. Compartments are represented as: Susceptible (S), Exposed (E), Asymptomatic (A),

Infectious (I), Recovered (Ri and Ra), Isolated (Is), Deceased (D), Vaccinated (Va) and

Immune (Im). The force of infection (λ) is shown in the lower right corner, with N representing the population size. Remaining parameters are described in the table.

D δI μδIs θI Im I Is ωαE γIs λS γI S E Ri vC ŋE (1 – ω)αE γA Va ŋE A Ra ŋA ŋA (1 + ϵA + χIs) Other cities/regions λ = β N

26 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS References 1. Matthew Biggerstaff, Simon Cauchemez, Carrie Reed, Manoj Gambhir, and Lyn Finelli, “Estimates of the Reproduction Number for Seasonal, Pandemic, and Zoonotic Influenza: A Systematic Review of the Literature,” BMC Infectious Diseases 14 no. 1 (September 2014): 480. 2. Victor Virlogeux, Juan Yang, Vicky J. Fang, Luzhao Feng, Tim K. Tsang, Hui Jiang, Wu Peng, et al., “Association between the Severity of Influenza A (H7N9) Virus and Length of the Incubation Period,” PLoS ONE 11 no. 2 (February 2016). 3 A. Flahault, S. Letrait, P. Blin, S. Hazout, J. Ménarés, and A.J. Valleron, “Modelling the 1985 Influenza Epidemic in France,” Statistics in Medicine 7 no. 11 (November 1988): 1147–55. 4 Fabrice Carrat, Elisabeta Vergu, Neil M. Ferguson, Magali Lemaitre, Simon Cauchemez, Steve Leach, and Alain-Jacques Valleron, “Time Lines of Infection and Disease in Human Influenza: A Review of Volunteer Challenge Studies,” American Journal of 167 no. 7 (January 2008): 775–85. 5. Tao Chen, Tianmu Chen, Ruchun Liu, Cuiling Xu, Dayan Wang, Faming Chen, Wenfei Zhu, et al. “Transmissibility of the Influenza Virus during Influenza Outbreaks and Related Asymptomatic Infection in Mainland China, 20052013,” PloS ONE 11 no. 11 (November 2016). 6. Tara M. Babu, Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera, Joseph T. Wu, Theresa Fitzgerald, Carolyn Nolan, Benjamin J. Cowling, Scott Krauss, John J. Treanor, and Malik Peiris, “Population Serologic Immunity to Human and Avian H2N2 in the United States and Hong Kong for Pandemic Risk Assessment” The Journal of Infectious Diseases 218 no. 7 (August 2018):1054–60. 7. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019), “ Prospects 2019,” available at population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/. 8. United Nations Wold Tourism Organization, “World Tourism Barometer and Statistical Annex, September 2019,” AM Newsletter 17 no. 3, available at www.unwto.org/publication/unwto-world-tourism-barometer -and-statistical-annex-september-2019. 9. Jeffery K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” Revista Biomedica 17 no. 1 (January–March 2006) 69–79.

PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS • 27 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Beth Cameron, Ph.D. Jacob Jordan, Ph.D. Vice President, Global Biological Policy Former Senior Director, Global Biological and Programs, NTI Policy and Programs, NTI

Dr. Beth Cameron is Vice President for Dr. Jacob Jordan was the Senior Director for Global Biological Policy and Programs at Global Biological Policy and Programs at NTI. NTI. Cameron previously served as the senior In April 2020, Jordan returned to Booz Allen director for global health security and biode- Hamilton to oversee projects and technical fense on the White House National Security staff supporting Department of Defense Council (NSC) staff, where she was instrumen- research and development programs. Jordan tal in developing and launching the Global previously served as a chief scientist at Booz Health Security Agenda and addressed home- Allen Hamilton, where he worked as the senior land and national security threats surrounding science and technology advisor to the Office biosecurity and biosafety, biodefense, emerg- Director and Deputy Director of the Defense ing infectious disease threats, biological Advanced Research Projects Agency Biolog- select agents and toxins, dual-use research, ical Technologies Office. There he assisted and . strategy, planning, and external briefing creation for a research and development port- Jaime Yassif, Ph.D. folio of emerging biotechnologies impacting Senior Fellow, Global Biological Policy national security, including infectious disease and Programs, NTI and , as well as and gene editing. Dr. Jaime Yassif is Senior Fellow for Global Biological Policy and Programs at NTI. Yassif Jacob Eckles, M.P.H. previously served as a Program Officer at the Program Officer, Global Biological Policy Open Philanthropy Project, where she led and Programs, NTI the Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness initiative. In this role, she recommended Jacob Eckles is a Program Officer for Global and managed approximately $40 million in Biological Policy and Programs at NTI. Eckles biosecurity grants, which rebuilt the field and previously served as a global health officer in supported work in several key areas, including: the Office of Global Affairs at the U.S. Depart- developing new biosecurity programming ment of Health and Human Services, where he at several leading think tanks; establishing coordinated U.S. policy related to the Interna- the Global Health Security Index; initiating tional Health Regulations (2005) and worked new biosecurity work in China and India; and with the World Health Organization and other framing a new public discourse about global partners on issues related to global health catastrophic biological risks. Prior to this, Yassif security, including the Joint External Evaluation served as a Science and Technology Policy and Global Health Security Agenda. Advisor at the U.S. Department of Defense and worked on the Global Health Security Agenda at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

28 • PREVENTING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS About the Nuclear Threat Initiative

NTI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity. Founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner, who continue to serve as co-chairs, NTI is guided by a prestigious inter- national board of directors. Ernest J. Moniz serves as co-chair and chief executive officer; Joan Rohlfing is president and chief operating officer. www.nti.org/bio Nuclear Threat Initiative 1776 Eye Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 www.nti.org

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