The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Concluded Under a Russian Brokered Ceasefire on 10 Nov
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THE Maj Gen Harsha Kakar (Retd) was commissioned EMERGENCE into the Regt of Artillery in Jun 79 and superannuated in Mar 15. An alumnus of the NDA, he is a graduate of the OF DRONE DSSC, LDMC and the National Securities Studies Course WARFARE at the Canadian Forces College Toronto. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict concluded under a Russian brokered ceasefire on 10 Nov. This was the first conflict which witnessed mass employment of drones as force multipliers. Drones are being touted as the sole reason for the capitulation of Armenia. True impact of drone strikes on Armenian forces has not been confirmed, though unconfirmed reports mention loss of large number of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery guns and multiple rocket launchers. If inputs are to be believed, Armenian losses would imply that upto two divisions were rendered unfit for war. The end result of the conflict was degrading for Armenia. They lost vast territories and control over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Armenia would guarantee a safe corridor for Azerbaijan to the Nakchivan Exclave, which is a piece of Azerbaijan territory to the west of Armenia. This is in vast contrast to the previous war in 1994, when Armenia was the superior force. Over the years, with revenue from oil, Azerbaijan invested in enhancing capabilities of its armed forces, basically preparing for revenge for 1994. 2 Major investments of Azerbaijan were in procuring state of art weapon systems. Prior to the war, launched at a time and place of its choosing, Azerbaijan procured Turkish Bayraktar TB2, and the Israeli-made IAI Harop, kamikaze drones. They employed the Harop kamikaze drones to take out early warning and air defence radars of the Armenians. The Bayraktars were employed against Armenian tanks, artillery and missile systems. Armenia also possessed drones however, their fleet was much smaller and comprised of mostly home developed drones. In numbers, Azerbaijan possessed over 200 drones as compared to a few dozen by Armenia. The Armenians, rather than investing on defence, were satisfied with status quo and banked on their defence treaty with Russia. However, they failed to comprehend that Azerbaijan was the nodal point for movement of all oil pipelines from the Caspian to Europe and thus its geostrategic importance would never bring the Russians into the war. While Azerbaijan’s planned for revenging their 1994 defeat, Armenia was complacent. Thus, employment of drones was not the sole reason for the capitulation of Armenia, there were multiple other factors, which have been overlooked. In the Azerbaijan-Armenian war both nations employed limited airpower. Armenia is estimated to possess about 18-20 aircraft mainly of SU 25 and MIG 29 categories, apart from a few Mi 24 attack helicopters. Azerbaijan possesses approximately 30 aircraft of mostly Russian origin as also some Mi 24 attack helicopters. It is rumoured that the only Armenian SU 25 brought down during the conflict was by a Turkish F 16, as Turkey backed Azerbaijan and even had its personnel controlling the Bayraktar TB2 Drones. There were no reports of major air operations on either side. Had air operations been resorted to, it is unlikely that slow moving drones would have been as successful as being announced. Most drones, which existed on both sides were largely designed for reconnaissance and surveillance and subsequently adapted for suicide missions. Further, the battlefield in question was not vast and hence lent itself to kamikaze missions by drones. The failure of Armenia to down Azerbaijan drones despite possessing Russian S 300 air defence systems remains an unanswered question. 3 Since the conclusion of the conflict, many military thinkers have been pouting that this is the future of warfare and India needs to be prepared. Drones have also been employed by terrorists, like Yemen’s Houthi forces, backed by Iran, to target Saudi Arabian oil facilities. In some instances, they have employed drones in conjunction with missiles. Many Houthi drone strikes have failed, details of which are rarely brought out. Most failures are due to active air defence systems deployed by Saudi Arabia. Of those that hit their targets, few have resulted in casualties or major structural damage. A major success was the drone attack in Sept 2019 which impacted almost 5% of global oil production. Houthi rebels also claimed to have launched a drone attack on Abu Dhabi Airport back in July 2018 using three armed drones, which has been denied by the UAE. No inputs of success or failure is available. Turkey and Israel have effectively employed drones to target their adversaries in Syria and Lebanon, both of which possess no counter drone measures. Closer home, the US has employed drones for reconnaissance and eliminating specific targets. Its elimination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force in Baghdad in Jan this year, and the subsequent downing of the US’s RQ 4A Global Hawk drone, costing over a hundred million dollars, by the Iranians employing surface to air missiles are well established incidents. In most places, where drone strikes have succeeded, the opponent has either lacked viable air defence capabilities or effective air power. Where the adversary possesses either, drones have had limited to no success. Prior to 2011 only three countries possessed armed drones, US, UK and Israel. Subsequently, there has been a proliferation. China is the largest exporter of armed drones, having exported them to 18 countries. The effectiveness of drones and their availability across the globe indicates the arrival of a new force multiplier in modern warfare. There is no doubt that these weapons are cost effective however their devastation power remains a mute question. High flying drones like the Predator may be difficult to detect by radars and shoot down, others could be effectively engaged. Electronic warfare would 4 be effective in jamming most low flying drones. There is no doubt that drones would have a role in future conflicts involving India, however, would not be a game changer. Their major role would remain reconnaissance, surveillance and Post Strike Damage Assessment, with limited targeting. With artificial intelligence being the future, there could come a time when role of drones would increase dramatically, not currently. Within our neighbourhood China already employs a collection of drones. Recently, it conducted a test involving a swarm of loitering munitions, termed as suicide drones, deployed from vehicles and helicopters. Similar experiments are being conducted in other nations. In case of Indo-Pak hostilities, Pakistan would be in possession of Chinese and Turkish armed and unarmed drones. Recent reports state that Pakistan conducted trials of the S 250 mini UAVs, which are surveillance drones with a range of 150 Kms and an operating time of 3 hours. It is also considering S 350 with an operating limit of 4 hours. Simultaneously, it is in talks for procuring the Turkish ILTER drone detection and neutralization systems. These systems can detect drones and jam their surveillance devices. India recently tested the indigenous Rustom-2 drone, which flew for 8 hours at an altitude of 16,000 ft. By the end of the year it is expected to be tested again at an altitude of 20,000 ft and an endurance of 20 hours. It is expected to carry multiple payloads for different requirements. Simultaneously, the Aeronautical Development Agency is developing the ‘Ghatak’ drone, which is a large combat UAV, while HAL is working with an Indian start-up, New Space Research and Technologies on a kamikaze swarm drone nicknamed ‘ALFA-S.’ These small, battery-run drones would be 3-6 feet across and can be launched in dozens from aircrafts, including a ‘mother ship’ like the C-130 transport plane. Multiple similar projects are also in the pipeline. Bharat Electronics Limited is the lead agency for developing anti-drone systems for the armed forces. An indigenous anti-drone system is currently deployed at the residence of the PM and a portable one as part of his cavalcade. This system was also deployed during this year’s Republic and Independence Days. It has a range of 2-3 kms with radar capability to pick up drones and then employs frequencies to jam them. A similar system 5 developed by the private sector has been successfully tested on the LoC. These would soon be part of the inventory with forward troops. India is seeking to enhance its inventory of armed and unarmed drones. It already possesses Israeli loitering ammunition, similar to what was employed in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. The Indian navy has inducted two Sea Guardian drones on lease, while the army is in talks for induction of additional Heron drones from Israel and mini drones for battalion level employment from the US. LRDE (Electronics and Radar Development Establishment) has developed and is developing multiple radar systems which can detect drones and be linked to existing air defence weaponry to effectively engage them. The Indian Air Force is producing a drone policy and integrating anti-drone measures into its air defence plans. An effective air defence system can destroy or jam slow moving aerial platforms. The signing of BECA and Geo-spatial cooperation with the US would imply accurate inputs leading to pinpoint engagement of enemy targets by drones. India is facing asymmetric warfare on the western front and a belligerent China in the north. The nexus between China and Pakistan will ensure that Chinese and Turkish drones would be part of its inventory. Lessons learnt from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict are being studied. India has been preparing for drone threats for some time and building capabilities to counter them. Indian technology may not be very advanced, but is capable of handling threats as they emerge.