4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

T16P04 - The Framing of War against in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Interplay Game of Security Ideas between Global and Regional Actors

Session 1 The fight against terrorism through rhetoric and instruments

Understanding Presidential Rhetoric in the Fight against Terrorism: Do they work? Evidence from .

Tom Ogwang, Mbarara University of Science and Technology [email protected] and Justine Edwards Parliament of Uganda [email protected]

Date of presentation June 27, 2019

4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

Abstract

In 2010, 74 people were killed in Uganda by al-Shabab. Uganda's President has said he will crush Somalia's al-Shabab over Sunday's deadly blasts which killed 74 people. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the twin attacks on people watching the World Cup final because Ugandan troops are supporting the Somali government. Uganda sent around 6400 peacekeepers to the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, to “eliminate’ what they president termed as terrorists. “I am optimistic that these numbers will be raised now - especially now - because these people have provoked the world more than before. And I can assure you they have invited a lot of problems for themselves". The president wrote an article where he claimed that “AL-SHABAAB ALREADY DEFEATED”. He further argued that the most atrocious, criminal, cowardly and monstrous attacks by Al-Shabaab against soft and innocent targets such as shoppers in a Shopping Mall, young students in a University or football fans watching the World Cup matches at the Rugby Club in Kampala may look very frightening to those that are not used to war or that are not well informed. However, those attacks, in fact, prove three things. They prove that Al-Shabaab is sectarian which is obvious because it only targets Non- Moslems. Secondly, it proves that Al-Shabaab is bankrupt both morally and ideologically. Why attack non-combatants? Why not attack soldiers if you want to fight? Why attack only Non-Moslems? Thirdly, however, it also proves that Al-Shabaab is already defeated. The president has made several claims how the terrorist group would be eliminated soon. The group keeps causing havoc in the region. This paper will examine how “Presidential Rhetorics” are used in framing terrorism and its implications on the fight against terrorism in Uganda and in general.

Key words : Uganda, Al-Shabaab, Terrorism, AMISOM

Acknowledgement : We are grateful to Eliode Bakole for providing research assistance. 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

Introduction Framing terrorism in Uganda in particular, the Horn of Africa and all the East Africa in general in one of the hardest tasks of governments through their armies. Efforts are being put together to eradicate terrorism and extremisms in the entire region but deadly attacks and bombing are still observed in different parts of Africa. Heads of states but also the African Union are fighting and putting efforts together but sometimes unsuccessful. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a recognized peace support operation initiated and led by African states and international organisations with apparent incapacity to succeed where more powerful western actors had failed to restore peace and security, repulsing al-Shabaab from their strongholds had also failed. But some efforts of pacification of Somalia could be seen. These efforts allowed Somali leaders to engage different stakeholders over the conflict. AMISOM forces sustained a military presence and undertook counter radicalisation programmes1.

What is terrorism? According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, terrorism is the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal. Reilly defines terrorism as the use of intentional violence against non-combatants for political ends. Finally Richardson comes up with a clear definition of terrorism. For him, terrorism is a politically motivated violence directed against non-combatant or symbolic targets which is designed to communicate a message to a broader audience. The critical feature of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of innocents in an effort to convey a message to another party.

Brief History of the al-shabaab2 Al-Shabaab is a movement that merged four Somali groups and has been supported from its early days by foreign Islamists, including those linked to al-Qâ’idah. The four trends were a radical faction of the Salafi Islamist group al-I’tisaam (a heir of al-Itihaad), some Islamists who wanted the Islamic Courts to be militarily more efficient, Takfiir wa Hijra and a cluster of Somali militants who had had an international experience of Jihad either in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Arab world (maybe also in Chechnya). Already active in 2005, the group became public early 2006 when the war against clan factions started in Mogadishu. From that period on, this movement has always acted in an autonomous manner and built itself faster than other contending groups within the Islamic Courts because it was better organized, had financial support and an ambition. Al-Shabaab was nearly eradicated by the Ethiopian armed intervention in December 2006. The Somali population considered it responsible for numerous targeted killings of military officers, civil society leaders and aid workers but also

1 AU. (2014). Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), Addis Ababa: AU 2 Roland Marchal, March 2011: The rise of a Jihadi movement in a country at war: Harakat al -shabaab al mujaheddin in Somalia. Senior Research Fellow at CNRS SciencesPo Paris. 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

for the death of hundreds of their supporters due to irresponsible military tactics in December 2006.

Yet, al-Shabaab succeeded to reinvent itself in 2007 as the most determined and uncompromising Somali movement opposed to Ethiopia, Western States and their local ally, the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab can be described as a decentralized organisation as opposed to a fragmented one. Its formal structures are supposed to provide the movement with an institutionalized leadership and predictable pattern of decision making.

The recruitment in Al-Shabaab varies over time and regions since it is decentralized and fluctuates according to the balance of forces in Mogadishu and the countryside. At the beginning, the concept was to recruit youth people (e.g. the name of the organisation) and use mostly religious discourses to convince them joining Jihad. The war situation and the Ethiopian/US/AMISOM presence enlarged the possibility of recruiting disenfranchised and frustrated youth who could be indoctrinated ideologically thank to a strong cadre of committed fighters and commanders. In certain areas also, al-Shabaab was able to use conflicts to obtain the sympathy of some clans or sub-clans that were cornered at one point in the civil war and were eager to revenge (or so was the option proposed by al-Shabaab). The most concerning aspect is that al-Shabaab has taken root both in Somalia and the extended region. It has achieved so using different tactics of promoting Jihad in religious circles, eliminating potential opponents (either secular or religious) and providing a living for those who joined the organisation. The strength of al-Shabaab is to interact with the population mostly through religious duties: Shari’a, zakaah , sadaqa and the call for Jihad. Al- Shabaab fighters do not mix with the population, they create fear but also bring about predictable patterns of social and political behaviour that never existed for the last generation: people know what is prohibited and why so. Their media policy deserves attention especially at a moment the AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have developed a less notional information policy (?) through the media they control. AlShabaab may be more credible outside the country than thought, because its opponents are not always subtle in the way they sell their own propaganda. Defectors are nowadays more numerous (this phenomenon started after the offensive launched in May 2009 against the Transitional Federal Government) but recruitment has also intensified throughout the same period. No political gain has been made because the AMISOM and the TFG lack a decent policy to show that reintegration within a normal society is possible.

Al-Shabaab has been smart to develop its own sources of funding and not depend of only a sole one. Outside the country, they benefit from the fame provided to them thanks to certain Western policies and videos of their achievements to get donations. To transfer those funds in Somalia, they use the customary methods as well as “white” commercial operations. Inside Somalia, they can get support from a large stratum of the business people that may sympathise with al-Shabaab; the veiled threat on many economic operators pushes them to pay their Islamic tax ( zakaah ), offer donations ( sadaqa ) and pay for services ( qitma ) offered by al-Shabaab. This latter also promotes certain economic activities and since security 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

has improved dramatically in areas it controls, services have developed and employment increased.

Short background of the AMISOM In March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed to Somalia in the aftermath of the Ethiopian military campaign that had installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in December 2006. The AMISOM was at the beginning mandated by the African Union (AU) in January 2007 but was endorsed shortly afterwards by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. It had an initial authorized strength of 8,000 and was mandated to protect transitional government personnel and institutions, conduct military enforcement operations against anti-government actors, principally al-Shabaab, and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations. The mission’s small police component was mandated to help train, mentor and advise the Somali Police Force, although very few of them deployed to Mogadishu before 2011 because of the dire security situation on the ground. AMISOM’s initial deployed strength consisted of approximately 1,600 Ugandan soldiers. They were joined from December 2007 by a battalion of Burundi troops. After that, the mission grew in size incrementally and evolved, reflecting the changing context in Somalia and international responses to the country’s many problems. Until the last Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu in early 2009, AMISOM protected key members of the TFG and a number of strategic locations in the city from armed opposition. These included the air and sea ports, the presidential palace at Villa Somalia, and the K4 junction linking them. The AU originally envisaged that after six months a UN peacekeeping operation would take over from AMISOM. This did not happen for a variety of reasons.

Instead, AMISOM was supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and from 2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided a logistical support package to AMISOM forces in Mogadishu. Following the Ethiopian withdrawal, the Ugandan and Burundian troops who made up the AU force became the principal barrier preventing the TFG from being overrun by al-Shabaab fighters – and AMISOM itself came under increased attack. During 2009 and 2010, bloody battles raged across the city but they resulted only in stalemate: neither AMISOM nor al-Shabaab could decisively defeat the other. Probably in an attempt to weaken Uganda’s resolve, al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010. These did not have the desired effect: instead of pulling out, Uganda responded by deploying additional troops to Mogadishu. Faced with a growing enemy, al- Shabaab launched a major offensive against the TFG and AMISOM during Ramadan of 2010 but the insurgents were repelled and sustained heavy losses. AMISOM then went on the offensive and engaged in many months of bloody street fighting across Mogadishu in order to expand its areas of control. The result was the withdrawal of al-Shabaab’s core fighters from the centre of the city in early August 2011, although fighting continued in the suburbs and outskirts for another nine months.

In October 2011, Kenyan forces launched a unilateral military intervention into southern Somalia, ostensibly in retaliation for al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory (and the group’s 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

alleged involvement in the kidnapping of foreigners), but also reflecting parochial Kenyan politics and interests. Shortly thereafter, Ethiopian forces once again entered Somalia and advanced on al-Shabaab positions across Bay, Bakool, and Hiraan regions. In December 2011, the AU, the UN, and their various partners developed new strategic and military concepts of operations for AMISOM to take account of these major developments.

Joint efforts to eradicate Al-Shabaab and AMISOM’s failure Despite of efforts that had been put together by government such as Ugandan and Burundian, the AMISOM faced enormous barriers in its operations. First, by 2009 AMISOM had had limited impact in Somalia as its deputy force commander was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009, bringing AMISOM fatalities by then to 60. Initial budgetary constraints were haunting AMISOM. Western interest had waned; only did the EU Council, on 23rd April 2007, and with encouragement from the US, amended its joint action on AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to include a military support element to assist AMISOM (Vines, 2011:279). Second, though the number of fatalities is difficult to arrive by, partly because TCCs were unwilling to release actual figures of battle- and operation-related deaths ((Bruton and Williams, 2014), “AMISOM became one of the world’s most dangerous peace operations. Measured by the number of fatalities per peacekeeper deployed, AMISOM is probably the most deadly peace operation ever conducted in Africa according to Williams, (2015) quoted by Sebastiano Rwengabo (2016)3 : Williams estimates that more than 4,000 troops died. In 2013, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, in a press conference, estimated up to 3,000 AMISOM soldiers killed, but the UN withdrew this number the following day4.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), a reasonably reputed source, estimates 13,384 battle-related fatalities involving all parties to Somali’s conflict (Melander, 2015) quoted by Sebastiano. The Armed Conflict Event and Location Data Project (ACLED) recorded 3,485 AMISOM-related fatalities between 2007 and 2014 (see Raleigh, et al., 2010). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that between 1st January 2009 and 31st December 2013, AMISOM suffered 1,039 fatalities: 200 in 2009; 300 in 2010, 94 in 2011; 384 in 2012; 261 in 2013, and 69 in 2014, bringing the total to about 1,108 (Williams, 2015)5. Even though it is still hard to estimate the exact number of battle-related deaths, it is evident to say that most of these deaths occurred because AMISOM was more than an ordinary peacekeeping operation: it has an extended mandate, and engages in counter- insurgency and counter-terrorism operations6. The aim was to restore state structures and minimum control for the Somali state. This showed “renewed determination of the IGAD countries to take steps required to effectively address the situation”, including “the promotion

3 Sebastiano Rwangabo (2016): AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308898703 4 UN (2013, 9 May). ‘Press Conference by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson at United Nations Headquarters’, DSG/SM/668. New York: UN (online http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/dsgsm668.doc.htm, accessed 11 Nov. 2015) 5 Ibid 6 Bruton, B.E. and P.D. Williams (2014). Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013. Report 14-5. Florida: The JSOU Press. 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

of a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia, the persistence and escalation of which constitute a serious impediment to Africa’s efforts to promote peace, security and integration, as well as a serious threat to international peace and security”. Adding to these fatalities, Uganda and have suffered al-Shabaab terrorist counter- attacks. These terrorist attacks targeted civilians and socio-economic infrastructure, which may not be counted alongside AMISOM-related losses. Besides, AMISOM estimates, which remain undisclosed as all sources rely on estimates7 exclude Ethiopian and Kenyan losses suffered during these countries’ unilateral interventions in Somalia. Therefore, to say that AMISOM has been a successful operation in no way implies scot-free fighting in a troubled landscape. Through persistence, inclusiveness, and use of integrated approach–mechanisms AMISOM covered ground that previous fragmented interventions failed to trample upon. This was made possible basing on the ministry of defence of Uganda at the Security Council in 2012, Honorable Chrispus Kiyonga stated, “In the next few weeks, Burundi will deploy its additional 1,000 troops to Somalia. The delay has been due to the time required to obtain equipment and other facilitation for those troops. The required logistics for Uganda to deploy the final 1,700 troops are being finalized by the Government of the United States and by March these forces will be in Somalia. Kenya and Djibouti have together undertaken to deploy into AMISOM a total of over 5,000 troops in order to beef up AMISOM to over 17,000 troops. And so now we have more troops but also Al Shabaab is being attacked on multi- fronts; in Mogadishu, on the border with Kenya and from the border with Ethiopia”

All efforts made in Somalia by these forces have had side effects in their homelands and governments have failed to control different terror attacks. The example is Uganda and Kenya,... Al Shabaab’s overall leader Mohamed Abdi Godane had warned Uganda and Burundi earlier in July of a possible attack. Hansen said that it had now proved that such warnings were more than sabre-rattling and that the Kampala bombings caught the region napping. The leader of Islamist Al-Shabab Mujahidin Movement, Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, has said the blasts they carried out in Kampala, Uganda, are only the beginning and vowed to revenge against anybody who harms the Somali people. All these declarations show that all the efforts that are being put together by these countries are undermined by the Al- Shabaab8.

The AMISOM’s challenges9.

7 Ibid 8 Africa Research Bulletin 2010: Political Social and Cultural Series Volume 47 Number 7 July 1st–31st 9 Paul D. Williams: Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM’s Seven Strategic Challenges,

Journal of international Peacekeeping (2013), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

Even though some successes had been visible, the AMISOM has been faced with many challenges in the fights against al-Shabaab. First of all, there was the widespread pessimism about embarking on the mission in the first place. This pessimism was evident across many member states of the African Union and beyond. Second, the AU mission was widely seen as providing cover for the imminent backlash of Ethiopian forces from Mogadishu. Thirdly, the fact that Mogadishu was an active warzone at the time meant that very few countries were willing to come forward and champion the mission despite its authorization by the AU and endorsement by the UN Security Council. Indeed, only Uganda stepped forward until December 2007 when Burundi also committed troops. The multifaceted nature of the AMISOM mission was another challenge. Indeed, in some senses the mission was so fragmented that it is more accurate to think of it as separate AMISOMs (in the plural) than one single, coherent operation. The challenge of internal coordination and coherence also had several dimensions. The first was the geographical separation of some of the key mission components.

The relatively disengaged stance of AMISOM’s political leadership contributed to the failure. The fact that AMISOM’s head of mission was based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 not only sent an unhelpful political signal to both locals in Somalia and the outside world, but it left several AMISOM force commanders in the difficult position of having to act as the principal political representative of the mission in Mogadishu. The coordination between AMISOM’s military, police and civilian components was another problem. This was not a major issue in the early years of the mission because the dire security situation on the ground in Mogadishu meant that it was inappropriate to deploy significant numbers of police officers and other civilian personnel.

AMISOM’s mandate had made it crucial that the mission work closely and effectively with the authorities in Somalia. It is an established element of counterinsurgency doctrine that the efforts of external forces are highly unlikely to succeed without a legitimate and effective local partner. Between March 2007 and September 2012, AMISOM’s local partner in its campaign against al-Shabaab was the TFG, which came in two versions. Both versions were far from being effective local partners for AMISOM to work with.

Ugandan cases The president Museveni has made a lot of speeches warning all the armed groups and terrorists to back down but the country had continued to be battle field to insurrectional groups. The attacks in Kampala may have been aimed specifically at the African Union which was due to hold its annual meeting in Kampala. Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, condemned the attack ‘‘in the strongest possible terms’’. ‘‘The attacks prove that terrorists can hit anywhere, including Africa’’, he said. Lamamra said that the body’s annual meeting of heads of state would go ahead in Kampala as planned. In Washington, Barack Obama, the US President, condemned the bombings. A spokesman quoted him as saying the attacks were ‘‘deplorable and cowardly’’. Mike Hammer, spokesman for the National Security Council, said in a statement that the US was ‘‘ready to 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

provide any assistance requested by the Ugandan government’’. US officials added that they were in contact with the US Embassy in Kampala and in touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding requests for assistance from Uganda’s government. The following day Somalia’s hard-line Islamist al Shabaab had claimed responsibility for a death toll that had climbed to 76. It later increased to 82. Political analysts say the organisation had scored a double whammy domestically sending a strong message to Ugandan troops in Mogadishu while also propelling themselves into the elite club of Al Qaeda franchises with regional scope.

Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the bombings in Kampala must serve as a wake-up call for the East African Community (EAC), the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and, ultimately, the AU. First, al Shabaab has now made it quite clear that it is capable of exporting terror. It has made it abundantly clear that its threats to attack neighbouring states as well as those within its reach must not be treated as empty ranting. After the bombing that occurred in Kampala, President Yoweri Museveni issued a press statement saying of the attackers, “We shall look for them wherever they are and get them.10” Did this statement have positive impacts? At the AU summit in Kampala, president Museveni continued and said the fight against al Shabaab must be stepped up. Dozens of people were killed on July 11th in two bomb attacks in Uganda’s capital, Kampala, which al Shabaab said it carried out. Leaders at the summit condemned al Shabaab rebels and observed a two-minute silence for the victims of the bomb attacks. AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping called the attacks ‘‘despicable’’.

African leaders gathered in Kampala had therefore tight security and a heavy military presence agreed to reinforce the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia to counter al Shabaab militants.11 Did these decisions work? Basing on the cases of insecurity that occurred particularly in Uganda, a report on the root causes of the northern conflict that provides possible solutions and reasons why current efforts to solve this conflict have failed. Calls on the government, rebels, local community and international community to be committed to end human rights abuses. Attributes the sustained conflict in northern Uganda to government’s use of violence against opponents, indiscipline of the army, previous support of LRA by Sudan in retaliation to Uganda’s support to Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and declaration of LRA as terrorists by the U.S. All negotiations have failed because of lack of trust in Museveni, issuing of ultimatum by Museveni for rebels to surrender during peace talks of 1994, continued in fighting by LRA, and failure by the Carter Center to involve LRA and SPLA in peace talks between Sudan and Uganda. Humanitarianism has focused much on abductions at the expense of the welfare of suffering civilians living in “protected camps.” Civil society peace efforts have not succeeded because of failure to bring government and the LRA into meaningful dialogue but the Amnesty Act is in place and functional. There exists lack of trust between

10 Rodney Muhumuza et al 2013, cited by The Open Society Foundation(2013) Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Ugand, The world cup bombing and beyond, Open Society Foundations 224 West 57th Street New York, New York 10019 USA www.opensocietyfoundations.org, 11 Africa Research Bulletin Political Social and Cultural Series: Volume 47 Number 7 July 1st–31st 2010 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

both government and the LRA, and government and the Acholi political community. People are suffering and questioning the hidden motive of both government and LRA in this war.12 Steps taken to end the war in northern Uganda have brought more misery to civilians: Forcing civilians to vacate their homes for camps in 48 hours, bombing villages, following the LRA in Sudan, and Sudan’s cutting of food aid to the LRA, have made the steps more ruthless to civilians in Uganda and Sudan.13

In this regards, all decisions taken by the presidents was worsening the matter. An open letter by Human Rights Watch to President Museveni regarding executed people and detention without trial by the newly formed Anti Terrorism Task Force and other state organs, who at times violate human rights. Requests the President to take action against human rights violation by state agents.14

Conclusion The presidential rhetoric can be considered as the yelling of dogs that bark without biting. A lot of effort is focused on arrestations of supposed perpetrator of terrorism in Uganda. This is in reference to many terror attacks that are being committed in countries like Uganda, Kenya,...despite of the declarations made by officials of different countries that aim at eliminating terrorism. In Uganda, three explosive devices were detonated on July 11th at the Ethiopian Village Restaurant in the popular Kabalagala area of the capital, Kampala, and at the Kyadondo Rugby Club. In both places hundreds of revellers were watching the World Cup final match. In Kenya, hotels are being attacked and many people were killed. These attacks are the revenge against the success of the AMISOM in Somalia. In the fight against terrorism, the efforts of governments should be joint with the internationals’ and make sure that counterterrorism struggles abide by the rule of law so that to avoid the human rights abuse that may occur.

12 Okello Lucima. 2002. “Protracted Conflict: Elusive Peace Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda.” Accord. 47(1): http://www. Org/accord/uganda/accord11/index. shtml. 13 Jemera Rone. 2002. “Uganda: Army and Rebels Step up Attacks on Civilians.” Human Rights News. http://hrw. org/press/2002/10/uganda1029. htm. 14 Jemera Rone. 2003. “Uganda: Unacknowledged Detention of 14 Persons and Reported Executions of 4 of Them.” Human Rights News. http://www. hrw. Org/press/2003/10/uganda100203-ltr. htm.

4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4) June 26-28, 2019 – Montréal

References 1. Africa Research Bulletin 2010: Political Social and Cultural Series Volume 47 Number 7 July 1st–31st 2. AU. (2014). Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), Addis Ababa: AU 3. Bruton, B.E. and P.D. Williams (2014). Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013. Report 14-5. Florida: The JSOU Press. 4. Jemera Rone. 2002. “Uganda: Army and Rebels Step up Attacks on Civilians.” Human Rights News. http://hrw. Org/press/2002/10/uganda1029. htm. 5. Jemera Rone. 2003. “Uganda: Unacknowledged Detention of 14 Persons and Reported Executions of 4 of Them.” Human Rights News. http://www. hrw. Org/press/2003/10/uganda100203-ltr. htm. 6. Okello Lucima. 2002. “Protracted Conflict: Elusive Peace Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda.” Accord. 47(1): http://www. Org/accord/uganda/accord11/index. shtml. 7. Paul D. Williams: Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM’s Seven Strategic Challenges, Journal of international Peacekeeping (2013), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. 8. Rodney Muhumuza et al 2013, cited by The Open Society Foundation(2013) Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Ugand, The world cup bombing and beyond, Open Society Foundations 224 West 57th Street New York, New York 10019 USA www.opensocietyfoundations.org, 9. Roland Marchal, March 2011: The rise of a Jihadi movement in a country at war: Harakat al -shabaab al mujaheddin in Somalia. Senior Research Fellow at CNRS SciencesPo Paris. 10. Sebastiano Rwangabo (2016): AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308898703 11. UN (2013, 9 May). ‘Press Conference by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson at United Nations Headquarters’, DSG/SM/668. New York: UN (online http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/dsgsm668.doc.htm, accessed 11 Nov. 2015).