UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AFRICA: IN SEARCH FOR AN AFRICAN VOICE 6 and 7 November 2006

Edited by Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha

Seminar Series Sponsored by: UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AFRICA IN SEARCH FOR AN AFRICAN VOICE

Edited by Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha

6 and 7 November 2006 The vision of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is one of a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable develop- ment, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. As an applied policy research institute with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the debate on human security in Africa the organisation supports policy formulation and decision making at every level towards the enhancement of human security for all in Africa. The Institute supports this vision and mission by undertaking applied research, training and capacity building; working collaboratively with others; facilitating and supporting policy formulation; monitoring trends and policy implementation; and collecting, interpreting and disseminating information.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this report are the responsibility of the participants in the workshop and not of the CPRD, its Board or Council of Advisors or of the ISS, its Advisory Council, the Trustees or any funder or sponsor of CPRD or the ISS.

© Institute for Security Studies, 2007

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the ISS.

ISBN-10: 1-920114-14-9 ISBN-13: 978-1-920114-14-9

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Caption: Taken in Soweto, South Africa on 30 October 2002. A member of a Muslim community in Soweto prays in front of a mosque which was severely damaged during a spate of bombings across Soweto. Contents

About the authors ...... iii

Foreword ...... vii

Panel 1: The African understanding of terrorism

Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa ...... 3 Gani Yoroms

The history and root causes of terrorism in Africa ...... 15 Sam Makinda

Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it ...... 23 Anneli Botha

Panel 2: Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa on leadership, governance and democracy ...... 45 Abdel Aziz Shady

The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights ...... 51 The experiences of east african countries George Kegoro

The price of counter-terrorism in Africa ...... 59 Fool’s gold or genuine gold? Donovan Chau

Africa’s role in America’s ‘war on terrorism’ ...... 67 Some political implications Alamin Mazrui

Panel 3: Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Engaging religious communities and building partnerships ...... 77 Cedrick Mayson

Building partnerships with the United States in combating terrorism ...... 81 Mike Hurley

The role of the United Nations in providing technical assistance in Africa...... 85 Anton du Plessis

Building regional partnerships...... 93 Perspectives from the IGAD region Richard Barno Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

Panel 4: Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Detection and prevention of terrorist threats ...... 103 Boinett Wilson

The arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects ...... 107 Edwin Okello

Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa ...... 111 Defending terrorism suspects Mbugua Mureithi

Judging terrorism cases ...... 117 Paul Mugamba

Panel 5: In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

Terrorism, media and the search for an African voice ...... 123 Salim Lone

In search of a counter-terrorism strategy ...... 127 The role of civil society Felicity Harrison

Human rights, terrorism and the interests of a secure society ...... 131 Jody Kollapen

Role of the international community ...... 135 Kurt Schillinger

List of participants ...... 139

ii About the authors

Gani Yoroms Afrikaans University that focused on the historical development Dr Gani Yoroms is currently a senior research fellow and director of terrorism, religious extremism and PAGAD (People Against of the Department of Defence and Security Studies of the African Gangsterism and Drugs). She has a specifi c interest in the un- Centre for Strategic Research and Training at the National War derlying causes of terrorism, including the stages in the develop- College, Nigeria. He has served as a Fellow of SSRC-Mac-Arthur ment of terrorism, terrorism in Africa, and the implementation of at the famous Watson Institute of International Studies, Brown effective counter-terrorism strategies. University, Rhode Island, US. Dr Yoroms has attended and par- ticipated in local and international conferences, including collo- Abd El-Aziz M Shady quia organised by the Peace Studies Programs of the Haverford, Professor Abd El-Aziz Shady is an associate professor and director Bryn Marr and Swarthmore Colleges, Pennsylvania, US. He was of the Program for Terrorism Studies and Research at the Faculty instrumental in working with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in of Economics and Political Sciences at the University of Cairo in the establishment of the West African Network on Security and Egypt. Since 1987, Professor Shady has taught at a number of in- Democratic Governance (WANSED), an organisation that brings stitutions, including Leiden University in the Netherlands, Tanta together research institutions and civil societies in West Africa University, Fayoum University, October Six University, and the to work on security sector reform in the sub-region. He has Institute of International Trade and Management in Egypt. While served as a member of various panels, including the Committee at Leiden University, he completed his master’s degree (in 1996) for the Formulation of Peace Support Operation Doctrine for the in Islamic Studies. As a Fulbright scholar at the Department Nigerian Army, which has eventually been adopted as a docu- of Political Science, Siena College, New York, US, Professor ment for the Nigeria military. Dr Yoroms has published widely in Shady taught a course on Middle Eastern politics and women local and international journals and books. and politics. His current research interests include religion and democratisation in the Arab world, Palestinian democracy and Samuel M Makinda national struggle, Christian perceptions of Islam in the US, and Professor Samuel Makinda is Professor of Security Studies and the absence of the nation-state and terrorism in the Middle East. International Relations at Murdoch University, Perth, Australia, where he heads the Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism George Kegoro Programme and the discipline of Politics and International George Kegoro graduated in law from the University of Nairobi, Studies. Professor Makinda is a member of the Australian Foreign Kenya, in 1991. He has worked for the government of Kenya as Minister’s National Consultative Committee for International a state counsel and served as secretary to the Law Society of Security Issues and is also on the Council for Security Kenya until early last year. He also served as the secretary to the Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c, a track-two diplomacy frame- Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair that was es- work. He previously worked with the Foreign Affairs Section tablished by the Kenya government in 2003. He currently serves of the Parliamentary Research Service at the Australian Federal as country researcher for Kenya for the Anti-Money Laundering Parliament in Canberra, where he advised MPs, senators, par- and Organised Crime Programme of the ISS. George Kegoro was liamentary committees and ministers. Professor Makinda is a involved in the search for justice in US courts for the victims of former editor of the Daily Nation and a political correspondent the Nairobi bombing of the US embassy in1998. Those proceed- of The Weekly Review in Nairobi. He has published extensively. ings are still pending in the US. He has also been involved in the critical review of Kenyan counter-terrorism legislation and Anneli Botha co-ordinated a committee of the Law Society that produced an Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute alternative draft than that published by government. He currently for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria. After completing an works as a consultant on governance and reforms. honours degree in International Politics, she joined the South African Police Service, Crime Intelligence, in 1993 where she Alamin Mazrui focused on, inter alia, terrorism and religious extremism. In Alamin Mazrui is Professor of African American and African 1999 she obtained an MA (Political Studies) degree from Rand Studies at Ohio State University and visiting professor in the

iii Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

Department of Africana Studies at Rutgers University. He holds and director of the counterterrorism policy investigation. In the a doctorate degree in linguistics from Stanford University with course of the investigation into the September 11 attacks on the specialisation in the political sociology of language. He has US, the team he headed interviewed more than 150 offi cials taught in universities in Kenya and Nigeria and has served as and reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of sensitive docu- a consultant to non-governmental organisations in Africa on ments. On 9/11 Michael Hurley volunteered to work in the CIA’s subjects such as language and urbanisation, and language and Counterterrorist Center and to deploy to Afghanistan. He served the law. Until recently he wwas a member of the board of three tours in Afghanistan post-9/11, leading Agency employees directors of the Kenya Human Rights Commission and of the and Special Forces in southeastern Afghanistan. He was one international advisory board of Human Rights Watch. He has of the Agency’s lead coordinators on the ground of Operation a special interest in human rights and civil liberties and has Anaconda, the largest battle against al-Qaeda in the campaign written policy reports on these subjects. Professor Mazrui is in Afghanistan. From 1998 to 1999, and again in 2000, he was a published Swahili poet and playwright and has written and detailed to the National Security Council, where he was director edited numerous articles in political sociology, education, lit- for the Balkans, and advised the national security advisor and erature and linguistics. the president on Balkans policy. Over the past decade he has been a leader in US interventions in troubled areas: Kosovo Donovan C Chau (1999–2000); Bosnia (1995–1996); and Haiti (during the US Dr Donovan Chau is assigned to the Policy, Intelligence, and intervention, 1994–1995). Michael Hurley has held a range of Analysis Division at Applied Marine Technology, Inc (AMTI). He management positions at CIA headquarters and served mul- was hired as the area specialist responsible for supervising and tiple tours of duty in Western Europe. He speaks French and conducting research on terrorist threats in and emanating from Spanish fl uently. the continent of Africa. In this capacity, he was a lead author to the Department of Homeland Security’s universal adversary pro- Anton du Plessis gram and the national planning scenarios. He currently provides Anton du Plessis is a terrorism prevention expert in the Terrorism analytical red team support to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Prevention Branch of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Offi ce. Before joining AMTI, Dr Chau was a professional staff Crime (UNODC) in Vienna. His core functions include providing member on the Committee on Homeland Security, US House technical assistance to countries on the legal and related aspects of Representatives. While serving the US Congress, Dr Chau of counter-terrorism, including legislative drafting and training of conducted policy oversight as well as research and analysis on senior criminal justice offi cials, and political leadership on the border and transportation security issues. In addition, he worked universal legal framework against terrorism and its application. directly with the committee staff director to write, coordinate, Before the UNODC, Anton du Plessis was head of the Crime and and edit Committee Chairman Christopher Cox’s report Freedom Justice Programme at the ISS in South Africa. Anton is an admit- defended: implementing America’s strategy for homeland secu- ted advocate of the High Court of South Africa and worked as a rity. Dr Chau earned a Doctorate of Philosophy in Politics and prosecutor for the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South International Relations from the University of Reading in the UK. Africa. In 2002, he was appointed as a senior state advocate and He also earned a Master of Science in Defense and Strategic head of the NPA’s Sexual Offences Section. Anton has published Studies from Missouri State University and a Bachelor of Arts in and edited numerous publications, and has presented research Literature and Government from Claremont McKenna College in papers at several local and international conferences. In 2005, California. he was selected for the US’s Department of State International Experts Program on international terrorism and organised crime, Cedric Mayson and spent a month in the US working with anti-terrorism and Cedric Mayson worked for 20 years in the Methodist ministry organised crime units. He has been a member of several edito- before joining the staff of the Christian Institute in South Africa. rial committees and advisory councils and boards. He holds the He was detained, banned, charged with high treason, and in degrees BIuris, LLB and LLM (with specialisation in criminal law the eighties was sent into exile in the UK. On returning to South and human rights. Africa in 1992, he worked fi rst for the South African Council of Churches, then the South African chapter of the inter-faith World Richard Barno Conference of Religion and Peace, and for the past ten years has Richard Barno is a senior fi eld researcher at the IGAD Capacity been national coordinator of the ANC Commission for Religious Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) in Addis Ababa, Affairs. He has written and broadcast extensively in the fi eld of Ethiopia. In the period 1997-2001 he was an advocate of the religion and politics and has and pioneered inter-faith television High Court of Kenya, followed by a period (2001 – June 2006) work on the SABC. at the Ministry of State at the Offi ce of the President of Kenya. In 1997 he received a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University Michael C Hurley of Nairobi, followed by a postgraduate diploma, in 1999, from Michael Hurley, currently a special advisor to the Coordinator the Kenya School of Law. His current research includes terrorism for Counterterrorism, has 22 years’ experience as a CIA offi cer. trends in the Horn of Africa and border control and management He served on the 9/11 Commission’s staff as a senior counsel within the IGAD countries. iv About the Authors

Wilson Ayabei Chemno Boinett Paul Kahaibale Mugamba Brigadier Boinett is currently the executive director of Regional Mr Justice Kahaibale Mugamba studied law at Makerere and International Security Consulting (RISC) and director of University in Uganda from 1972 to 1975. After graduation with the Credit Reference Bureau. He has an impressive military a Bachelor of Laws degree he joined the Law Development background that includes: General staff offi cer and a fi eld Centre. In 1976 he graduated from the centre with a Diploma offi cer of the Kenyan army; military assistant to the President in Legal Practice. He served in the Department of Public and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Kenya; gen- Prosecutions as a state attorney from 1976 to 1979, when he was eral staff offi cer in charge of training and operations, Kenya promoted to senior state attorney. In 1981 he resigned from the Army Headquarters; Chief of Military Intelligence (Ministry Uganda Public Service. Mr Justice Mugamba was employed as of Defence) of the Kenyan contingent to the UN joint verifi - a staff training offi cer in the Legal Department at the National cation team to Mozambique; Brigade commander; Director Institute of Public Administration, offi ce of the Prime Minister, of Intelligence, Kenya (head of the Directorate of Security Lusaka, Zambia, from 1982 to 1987. On his return to Uganda Intelligence of Kenya) and Director General, National Security in 1987 he started a legal offi ce in Fort Portal known as P K Intelligence Service (NSIS), Kenya. Brigadier Boinett received Mugamba & Company Advocates. He was senior partner in that his BSc (Military Science), from American University, US in fi rm from 1987 until his elevation to the Bench of the High Court 2003 as well as certifi cates in intelligence and military sci- of Uganda in 2000. ence from Kenya, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. He also received international training in Strategy Salim Lone and National Security, NWC (US); Information Resource Salim Lone is a member of the Media Council of Kenya and a Management (US); and Intelligence and Security (UK) columnist for the Daily Nation. He is a commentator for the and (US). print and broadcast international media, including the Guardian and the BBC, and also speaks on themes involving relations be- Edwin Obuya Okello tween Muslims and the West, including the fl awed conceptions Edwin Okello is a state prosecutor at the Department of Public of terrorism. He was director of the News and Media Division Prosecutions, Attorney-General’s Chambers in Nairobi, Kenya. (1998-2003) during his 21-year career at the UN’s New York He is also a member of the Director of Public Prosecution’s headquarters. His last assignment was as spokesperson for the Law Reform Committee, whose duty is to review periodically UN mission in Iraq immediately after the US-led 2003 war and all criminal laws and advise the Attorney-General on amend- occupation. He retired from the UN after the 19 August 2003 ments for the proper working of the criminal justice system. He terrorist attack on its Baghdad headquarters. Salim Lone’s assign- is also a member of the Law Society of Kenya. Edwin Okello ments at the UN included being part of the Secretary-General’s attained a Bachelor of Arts (Economics) in 1992 from Agra Strategic Group on Iraq, and he was also a core member of the University, India, followed by a Bachelor of Laws (Criminology) UN’s Strategic Communications Group formulating policy and in 1996 from the same university. He attended a training course guidance for Mr Kofi Annan. He was appointed by Mr Annan as on preventing, interdicting and investigating of acts of terrorism the UN representative to the independent task force led by Mr in February 2005 at the Kenya School of Monetary Studies in Mark Malloch Brown to produce a UN blueprint for a commu- Nairobi, followed by a post-blast investigations course in March nication policy. Earlier, in 1994-1996, Secretary-General Boutros 2005 at the Louisiana Police State Academy, US. Boutros-Ghali named him to the International Advisory Board which oversaw the pioneering work undertaken by Ms Graça Mbubua Mureithi Machel on children and armed confl ict. He was editor of Africa Mbugua Mureithi is a legal consultant on human rights and Recovery and also a member of the UN Steering Committee on public interest law with several organizations, including the African Development between 1985 and 1993. Before joining Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the the UN in 1982, Salim Lone was the editor of a number of publi- Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Independent cations in Kenya, including the Sunday Post, Viva magazine and Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), People Against Torture (PAT), the African Perspectives. In 1981, he became the fi rst journalist to Release Political Prisoners Pressure Group (RPP), the Catholic be tried by the Kenya government for his professional work, and Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), the Law Society of Kenya in 1982 was forced to fl ee into exile to escape imminent arrest. (LSK), the Haki Jamii/Economic and Social Rights Centre and the When he returned to Kenya in 1986 on assurance of safety, he Kenya Society for the Mentally Handicapped (KSMH). Mbugua was arrested, mistreated and then deported, and his nationality Mureithi attained a LLB from the University of Nairobi, Kenya, in revoked. He returned to Kenya two years ago after the Moi re- June 1991, followed by a Diploma in Law from the Kenya School gime was voted out of power. of Law in February 1993. Admission to the Roll of Advocates of the High Court of Kenya was received in February 1993, fol- Felicity Harrison lowed by admission to the List of Certifi ed Public Secretaries of Felicity Harrison is a researcher for the Southern African Kenya in March 1995. Mbugua Mureithi has also written several Catholic Bishops’ Conference Parliamentary Liaison Offi ce papers, reports and research documents on issues relating to (CPLO) in Cape Town. The CPLO deals with issues of public the constitution. policy and relations with parliament and government. Her main

v Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

areas of work are in Justice and Constitutional Development, Kollapen was requested by President Mandela to be part of a Safety and Security, and Defence. She has worked on numerous panel entrusted with the task of interviewing and making rec- pieces of legislation, including the Protection of Constitutional ommendations on persons to be appointed to the Truth and Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, the Reconciliation Commission. His areas of interest include human Firearms Control Act, the National Conventional Arms Control rights within the administration of justice, equality and the ad- Act, and the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation vancement of socio-economic rights. He is at present chairper- of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Confl ict Bill. She son of the Equality Review Committee. He currently serves on holds an honours degree in International Relations and Human the boards of various national and international human rights Rights from the University of Natal, Durban. She served as a bodies, including the Legal Resources Centre and the Human board member for Amnesty International South Africa, as well Rights Foundations. He has spoken and participated in numer- as being the South African coordinator of the Military, Security ous workshops and conferences on human rights issues, both and Police Transfer Network. As part of her work, she has par- nationally and internationally, and written extensively on hu- ticipated in a number of NGO coalitions, as well as being an man rights issues and constitutionalism. advocacy advisor on the National Advocacy Advice Group for Gun Free South Africa, was on the Steering Committee of the Kurt Shillinger Coalition for Defence Alternatives, and is on the steering com- Kurt Shillinger is a Research Fellow on Security and Terrorism mittee of Women Waging Peace. in Africa. His research interests include Islam in Africa and the possibilities for external radicalisation; weak states and terrorist Jody Kollapen activity on the African continent; Africa’s role in global security Jody Kollapen is the chairperson of the South African Human and counter-terrorism; African music tradition; and the social Rights Commission (SAHRC), a constitutional body set up in dynamics of political transition. As an award-winning former terms of Chapter 9 of the South African constitution to protect journalist, he was deputy foreign editor of The Christian Science and promote human rights. He was appointed by President Monitor before covering Congress and presidential politics for Nelson Mandela on the recommendation of parliament and the paper for nine years. In 1997, he moved to South Africa to reappointed for second term by President Thabo Mbeki. He cover the African continent for The Boston Globe, reporting obtained the BProc and LLB degrees from the University of the from 18 countries during six years. He is former chairman of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg and practised law in Pretoria, the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of Southern Africa, South Africa, from 1981 to 1992 focusing on public interest law. and rounded out 17 years in journalism as managing editor of During this period, he represented a number of people pros- the SAIIA monthly online magazine eAfrica. Currently, he is ecuted in terms of apartheid laws. Some of the matters that he conducting case studies on the growth and character of Islam was involved in as a human rights lawyer included the Delmas in African states seen as most prone to external infl uence and Treason Trial, the Biko case and the case of the Sharpeville Six. liaising with policymakers on and off the African continent on All these cases sought to positively impact on the enforcement security, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. He is also con- of human rights in a hostile environment. He joined Lawyers ducting research into the impact of post-apartheid regional po- for Human Rights, a leading human rights NGO, in 1992 litical change on the music of Mozambique for a master’s degree and served as its national director from 1994 until 1995. Mr in ethnomusicology at the University of the Witwatersrand.

vi Foreword

This report of contains articulate and clear voices of participants However, as this report indicates, the seminar did not only of the November 2006 seminar on “Searching the African Voice meet the “ambitious, lofty and unrealistic” objectives but ex- in the Global Debate.” This is the fi rst in the series of semi- ceeded them beyond expectations. The quest to achieve the nars on the theme of “Understanding Terrorism in Africa.” The seminar objectives started with the welcoming remarks given by seminar drew together participants, from different parts of Africa the ISS Executive Director, Jakkie Cilliers, who recalled the need and from other countries outside the continent, who in two days for “the African voice” in the global debate on terrorism in view willingly and enthusiastically engaged in a very rich exchange of of the fact that Africa is the continent that is most affected by ideas, views and information on terrorism in Africa. terrorism. This seminar was a continuation of the process of understand- Samual Makinda’s presentation not only helped us to gain a ing terrorism in Africa that started in Dar-es-Salaam in March deeper understanding of the concepts related to terrorism but 2006 under the theme of “Towards Understanding Terrorism in also delved into details on its history, and analysis of its causes. Africa.” During this seminar, a concern was raised that despite the He also called on Africa to use its own resources to address ter- long history of terrorism in Africa, in particular domestic terror- rorism threats as it is enormously endowed with resources. He ism, the continent is largely excluded from the global debate. The also called for “knowledge construction” that would look at ex- participants pointed out that there is a need for an “African Voice” isting paradigms, analyse them and determine how they refl ect in the ongoing global debate as well as a clearer understanding African realities. of the threat and impact of terrorism in Africa. Some of the pres- Gani Yoroms defi nes and maps terrorist threats in while entations made in the Dar seminar were latter included in ASR Anneli Botha’s presentation gives an overview of Africa’s vulner- 15:3 that focused on terrorism in Africa. Besides being charged to abilities and abilities to prevent and combat terrorism. Presenting host more meetings to bring more understanding of terrorism in in a panel on the “impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa, ISS was also requested to steer the formation of a network Africa” Abdel-Aziz Shady shares his views on how leadership, of African researchers, scholars and analysts on issues related to governance and democracy are being affected by counter terror- terrorism. This network is now called African Research Network ism measures. Presenting on the same panel, George Kegoro’s on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (ARNTACT). paper dealt with how human rights are being affected, Donovan The seminar had the following objectives, which some re- Chau analysed the economic ramifi cations; and Alamin Mazrui’s ferred to as ambitious, lofty and unrealistic: paper dealt with how relations between communities, govern- ments and civil society are being affected. ■ Highlight the threat of terrorism on Africa’s human After critically reviewing the impacts of terrorism and coun- security; ter-terrorism measures on Africa, the seminar then focused ■ Assess the vulnerability and challenges to preventing and on how to build sound partnerships that would minimize side combating terrorism threats in Africa; effects. Mike Hurley’s paper deals with the Africa-US partner- ■ Analyse the impact of terrorism on Africa’s development; ship in combating terrorism, while Anton du Plessis’s papers ■ Review the existing partnerships for preventing and focuses on the role of the United Nations in providing technical combating terrorism in Africa, particularly the relations assistance in Africa. In the same panel, Richard Barno’s paper between citizens, civil society, governments and interna- highlights how IGAD is building regional partnerships, while tional partners; Cedric Mayson’s paper shows how religious communities can ■ Highlight the work of practitioners in preventing and be engaged in the partnership. combating terrorism in Africa The papers in the next panel highlighted the challenges of ■ Highlight contributions being made by various stakehold- preventing and combating terrorism in Africa. These papers are ers in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa; and refl ective of the practical and direct experiences of the practition- ■ Generate and propose ideas on preventing and combat- ers. Wilson Boinnet highlights the importance of detection and ing terrorism in Africa, and make recommendations of prevention of terrorist threats; Edwin Okello highlights the chal- more effective counter-terrorism approaches that refl ect lenges or arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects; Mbugua Africa’s human security interests. Mureithi highlights the importance of protecting human rights in

vii Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

terrorism cases; and Paul Mugamba emphasizes the benchmarks thank the US Embassy in Pretoria for its generous support that that must be met by all sides in presenting their cases. enabled us to bring most of the participants to South Africa. The papers presented in the fi nal panel dealt with the roles Other governments must also be thanked for promptly respond- that can be played by various stakeholders in the search of a ing to our requests to send representatives and to permit their comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Salim Lone, the offi cials to make presentations at this seminar. former UN Communications Director, makes recommendations There is no doubt that this report will immensely contribute on how the media can play a constructive role; Jodi Kollapen, to deeper understanding of terrorism in Africa by articulating the from the South African Human Rights Commission, highlights African voices in the global debate. It is hoped that the well- the role of human rights organizations; Felicity Harrison, from thought and deeply considered recommendations in this report the Catholic Parliamentary Offi ce, highlights the role of civil will be complemented by those from the seminars on “bridging society organizations; while Kurt Schillinger highlights the role the gaps,” “domestic terrorism in Africa,” and “assessing African of the international community. strategies in preventing and combating terrorism” to be held These reports are also a refl ection of the astute work of the in 2007. panel chairs who steered the presenters towards lively discus- The hosting of the seminar and production of this report sions and exchange of ideas, experiences and knowledge, would not have been possible without the assiduous support of and produced far-reaching recommendations on making the the ISS Executive Director, Jakkie Cilliers, the untiring efforts of African voice to be heard in the global debate on the “war my colleagues Anneli Botha and Charlene Harry of organizing on terrorism.” the superb seminar, and the professional support of the ISS pub- The ISS is very honoured to have been entrusted with the lications manager, Dorette de Jager. responsibilities of hosting this seminar. We heartily thank the We hope you fi nd the next reports on building bridges in Norwegian government for the generous support it has given us Africa, domestic terrorism in Africa and assessing CT strategies to run this project. Without this generous support, both fi nancial in Africa as insightful and informative as this report. and moral, we would not have been able to conduct in-depth research, monitor and track terrorism threats in Africa, dissemi- Wafula Okumu nate our research fi ndings through publications such the African Head: African Security Analysis Program Security Review (ASR) and hold these seminar series. I must also Institute for Security Studies

viii Panel 1 The African understanding of terrorism

Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa Gani Yoroms

The history and root causes of terrorism in africa Sam Makinda

Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it Anneli Botha

Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa Gani Yoroms

INTRODUCTION extent). In the process, most of the freedom fi ghters took to guerrilla and revolutionary struggle or warfare to gain freedom Within a decade of the entry of the world into the 21st century, or independence for their countries. Given this development, the euphoria of the new millennium was being shattered by should they be seen as terrorists? Second, Africa has a sizeable the rise and spread of terrorism across the globe. This affected Muslim population. If the perpetrators of terrorism claim they are ‘the end of history’ because it undermined the expectation of fi ghting the cause of Islam, could this population be held under liberal democracies that the collapse of the Berlin Wall presaged suspicion of being terrorists as well? Lastly, terrorism and terror- their great hegemonic power all over the world. However, this ist acts are asymmetrical. They do not follow the conventional is being questioned in greater dimension by the ‘axis of evil’. ways of fi ghting wars. Already, Africa has been criminalised as a Thus, the wave and expansion of terrorism post-11 September continent that is noted for human rights abuses by authoritarian 2001 have made it diffi cult to defi ne what terrorism is and and predatory regimes. In the course of the transition to democ- what its constituent variables are. The events of September 11, racy and security sector reform, the pressure to counter terrorism which involved the bombing of the World Trade Center and the has become signifi cant. Is it not possible that the African state Pentagon in the US, have blurred and complicated the meaning will further encroach on the abuse of human rights in the course and understanding of terrorism. Since then, vulnerability to ter- of countering terrorism? rorism has increased, evoking more fear, passion, emotion, hate, This paper does not claim to provide a master key that can frustration and confusion than ever before. The reality of terror- unlock the defi nition of terrorism, or disclose what constitutes ism becomes clearer, but why and how it happens is incompre- the threat of terrorism on the continent. It attempts to provide hensible. For the perpetrators of the September 11 event, it was a road map that may give a clearer route through the maze a major breakthrough which they had long sought, to redirect surrounding the theory and defi nition of terrorism in Africa. world attention to their cause and change the global perception Second, whatever yardstick of measuring terrorism is used, it of an ideal that is yet to be understood. As a result, the causes of will establish the context and growth of terrorism in Africa. The terrorism in Africa are obfuscated because: third section provides conjectures for mapping out the threats of terrorism in Africa. ■ Terrorism is equated with the liberation struggle. Often it has been stated that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fi ghter. How can we understand terror- EXPLAINING, THEORISING AND ism as an aspect of liberation struggle in Africa from this DEFINING TERRORISM perspective? ■ There is a tendency to see terrorism in the context of be- Even before the September 11 bombing, it was diffi cult to cap- ing Islamic only, because an increasing number of mod- ture a defi nition of terrorism. This has brought about a sensation- ern perpetrators of terrorism claim to be fi ghting the cause alisation of terrorism by victims and the media, the politicisation of Islam. This creates a serious problem for Africa in view of its meaning by the state (government) and the contextual of the large population of Muslims on the continent. confusion that intellectuals and experts have added to it. ■ The abuse of human rights in the course of countering ter- Historically, the concept of terrorism emanated from the rorism raises the question of how the African state (which period of the French Revolution in the 18th century when has already been criminalised) can cope with confronting Maximilien Robespierre, one of the leaders of the revolutionaries, terrorism without abusing citizens’ rights. was quoted as saying “Without virtue, terror is useless; without terror, virtue is powerless”. (The French word terreur means fear.) These issues are fundamental to understanding how to de- The Jacobins were pursuing a value-driven terror, superintended fi ne and map out the threat of terrorism in Africa. First, Africa by the people’s will against renegades and dissidents. Thus, the emerged as a continent in the international system through a act of terror by the state was seen as a positive and existentialist struggle against imperialism and colonialism before formal in- approach to creating a cohesive society for development. (The dependence was granted (except Liberia and Ethiopia to some use of terror predates the French Revolution, however.)

3 The African understanding of terrorism

However, fear is not likely to be banished from human soci- tutions. Rampaging local terrorists discovered that their threats ety because change and development have expanded its scope would be meaningful only if they were internationalised. For and dimension, as a result of the increasing unequal social rela- instance, the Middle East crisis became intense through threats tion to production. Fear can be generated from the top, where of terrorism because: the leadership uses it to command obedience and allegiance; and from the bottom, where the weak try to defend themselves The Palestinian ‘planners’ of operations noticed that no matter against the overwhelming infl uence of those who control power. how successful any operation against Israelis in the occupied The Roman Empire, the Russian tsars and the Ottoman Sultanate, territories was, a total news blackout was imposed by the Israeli among others, made use of coercion to intimidate others into military authorities, and censorship was rigid. Thus, although the submission in order to achieve or promote their political agen- operation may have been a success in military terms it was a total das. This practice was widely applied in pre-colonial Africa. For failure in the political sense because almost no-one inside the oc- instance in 1804, the Emir of Kontagwa (in present-day Nigeria) cupied territories or in the rest of the world heard about it.5 frequently sent army or security personnel to terrorise dwellers in rural areas. When these dwellers fl ed to urban centres, they Measures were then gradually put in place to drive home the were butchered or taken as slaves.2 position of the Palestinians at international level: Similarly, other forms of terrorism were carried out in pre- colonial African society. Men kidnapped young girls along bush ■ Hijacking airliners from European cities to friendly paths. The use of masks and voodoos to intimidate, harass and capitals instil fear in opponents was common. Sometimes supernatural ■ Holding hostages and threatening to kill them unless rea- powers were invoked to mesmerise and persecute people into sonable trade-offs were agreed submission through witchcraft and divination. In most cases, it ■ Carrying out suicide bombing of airlines through con- was the collective will of society to hunt down those believed to cealed weapons be witches or dissidents. Increasingly terrorism has been taken ■ Recruiting and training seemingly innocent individuals up by aggrieved individuals and groups who have realised that, and groups because of their small numbers, they are unable to confront the ■ Eliciting sympathy from others who became recruits and enemy in open battle, but a systematic long-term campaign of were trained to Perpetuate terror elsewhere in Africa, terror by a small force can be an effective political weapon to Asia, North America and Latin America. achieve their aims.3 Thus, for a number of reasons terrorism may be regarded as positive or negative. When the Jacobins began Penetrating the free and liberal Western world with seemingly in- the Reign of Terror, terrorism was rationalised as positive, but nocent groups under the pretext of seeking greener pastures. This gradually it has become negative, whether at the level of the allowed terrorists to exploit the circumstances and opportunities state, of groups or of individuals within the society. in the West. These apparent innocents were found in the educa- Terrorists are not psychopaths, but are people with deep con- tional systems, the military, and the social life of the West, learn- viction, loaded with intellectual reasoning, who want to make a ing the logic of capitalism as well as how to turn it against itself. practical demonstration of their ideals by taking to acts of terror in The burgeoning terrorist capability subsequently led to the order to meet their political, economic, cultural or religious beliefs. bombing attacks on September 11. The cooperation between Their ”actions are thought out and, if one accepts their particular Osama bin Laden and the US against the presence of the Soviet logic, often supremely reasonable”.4 Before the 1970s, individuals Union in Afghanistan was terminated by these events. According and groups of terrorists were not given serious attention at inter- to an African proverb, when two people deceive each other, national level; the focus was on state-sponsored terrorism. When they won’t quarrel. Indeed, at the time that the US and Osama the US promulgated the Export Administration Act of 1979, it bin Laden were deceiving each other, they had no basis for an- authorised the Secretary of State to determine which nations spon- tagonism. The US knew what it wanted, using Osama bin Laden sored terrorism. A number of countries were put on the list, such to fi ght the Soviets, while bin Laden wanted to use the relation- as Libya, Sudan, Somalia and South Africa (during the apartheid ship with the US to understand capitalist war strategy and learn era). Meanwhile terrorism was domesticated only in countries how to turn it against the US and the West at an appropriate where the causative phenomenon triggering its spread was ram- time. The end of the Cold War reconfi gured this relationship, pant, mostly in the Middle East, Spain, Japan, Ireland and Central when bin Laden turned against the ideological support that had America. However, terrorism became international when aircraft assisted him. This explanation should give us the background hijacking, assassinations and destruction or damage to a state, against which to analyse a theory of terrorism that seeks to ex- individuals and properties went beyond the territorial borders of plain domestic and international terrorism. a nation. In apartheid South Africa, cross-border assassinations of offi cials of liberation movements in neighbouring countries were carried out in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania. THEORISING ON TERRORISM In other words, international terrorism grew beyond the borders of states in the international system with rampant and The concept of terrorism has generated so much sentimentalism multiple threats of terror to international personalities and insti- that intellectual discourse on the subject is often suspect. As a

4 Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa

result, a theory of terrorism is diffi cult to capture scientifi cally. It rational choices, but also to decide how to fashion their social has been suggested that the gap could be fi lled by establishing a relations, based on their passion and values of how to fulfi l their typology of terrorism rather than a theory.6 expectations. Sartre justifi ed the use of violence by the weak and This typology is divided into three categories: revolutionary the oppressed as a means of demonstrating the social, moral, terrorism; sub-revolutionary terrorism; and establishment or and cultural courage to liberate themselves. His ideas infl uenced state terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism seeks to abolish an exist- the work of Frantz Fanon, who wrote The wretched of the earth ing political system and replace it with a new system of political as the testament of revolution in Africa. In it he noted that the governance. Revolutionary terrorist groups included the German mobilisation of the masses, when it arises out of a war of libera- Red Army Faction (the Baader-Meinhof Gang), the Basque tion, introduces into human consciousness the ideas of common Separatist Group, the Peruvian Sandero Luminoso (Shining Path), cause of a national identity, and of a collective history.7 and the Palestine Liberation Movement. Sub-revolutionary ter- The emphasis is on the responsibility of human beings in soci- rorism involves a group of terrorists that seek the reform of an ety, in spite of its imperfection. Thus, the state cannot be a threat existing structure to accommodate their interests, which have to the existence of the citizens that founded it. Therefore, the citi- been rendered marginal. The African National Congress (ANC) zens are entitled to question the state when their rights are threat- in South Africa was once said to be in this category. ened. Menaces that warrant existential terror require compelling The third category, establishment or state terrorism, consists threats such as physical dangers (pain, injury, death), economic of states that sponsor terror against their citizens or against for- threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to eign governments when their national interests are under threat. work or resources), infringement of rights (imprisonment, denial The purpose is to defend and protect values or interests that of normal civil liberties) and threats to position or status (demo- the state cherishes. These values can include the defence of a tion, public humiliation).8 In line with this, Marx and Engels stated regime that is currently in power or protection of the corporate in their seminal work The Communist manifesto that the history of existence of the state as an entity. humankind is one of class struggle, which was their main concern. This typology, though important, is too mechanical. It lacks But it is clear that all revolutionary struggles were fought because systematic correlation between categories. Each category stands the people were denied their right to exist as human beings. The alone without links to the others. This makes it diffi cult to criti- right to human dignity is primary, basic and intrinsic to human cally analyse the dynamics of global terrorism. To overcome this, nature. Human struggle attempts to compel the state to address it becomes necessary to fashion a framework of analysis that social imbalances and to ensure that obligations go together with should conceptually capture the essence and spirit of terrorism the rights and privileges of the citizenry. However, class strug- in local and global societies. As a social phenomenon driven by gle attempts to reorder the character of the state in such a way a pattern of behaviour that is judgmental on the part of those that citizens are availed of equal opportunities. Though the two who perpetrate it, terrorism, whatever the hypothesis, should be types of struggle are mutually exclusive, human struggle is based situated within the realm of free-fl oating theory, anchored on on the liberal philosophy of live and let live, while class struggle the dynamic process of the development of the concept within addresses the orientation of socialism. Nevertheless, both aim at the context of sentimentalism and ‘paranoidism’. This theory the common good of the society. These were the circumstances is determined by a tripod of social phenomena: existential- that led to the struggle for independence in Africa, Asia and Latin ism; disproportionalism or anarchism; and situational pressure. America. This means that the tactics may include acts of terror, The tripod is regulated by the key elements of the free-fl oating positively based on existentialism as they were not anarchical or theory of terrorism: the dynamism of the society, the sentimen- disproportionate in the course of their struggle, because they had talism invoked by groups in the society, and the manifestation focus, and their opponents knew covertly that they actually had that results from situational pressure created by the state. The genuine cause for their actions. The emphasis is on the struggle state as agent provocateur sets the tone for situational pressure, for human dignity, because most countries that struggled for inde- which subsequently generates reaction from groups in the soci- pendence have been freed, yet none of them can be said to be a ety. Failure to address issues that provoke reactions could open classless society. the fl oodgates to disproportionate terror. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, terrorism can be determined by any of the elements in the tripod. It may start from situational provocation DISPROPORTIONATE OR and thereafter begin to exhibit existential drive or disproportion- ANARCHIC TERRORISM ate character that may subsequently turn out to be terrorism. This type of terrorism is pursued by those who are psychologi- cally estranged from society. They believe that the world can EXISTENTIAL TERRORISM be reconstructed according to a religious worldview or political ideology with which they have indoctrinated their members. In The existential concept of terrorism is rooted in the writings of this case, religion, more than politics, is the opiate that drugs the Jean-Paul Sartre and earlier philosophers such as Nietzsche and people into a world of fantasy and inspires anarchistic acts of Heidegger. The element of philosophy that is applicable here terror. The perpetrators of this type of terrorism may have high argues that human beings have the ability not only to make intelligence quotients and be technically skilful, but they lack

5 The African understanding of terrorism

moral intelligence. This defi ciency creates the unbalanced think- being misrepresented, but also of some sort of fatwa that ing that allows them to instil fear and intimidation into society, might be declared. to steer the weak into being empathetic to their cause, and to compel society to follow their course of action. It gives the weak an opportunity to become recruits or agitators that put pressure SITUATIONAL PRESSURE on governments to meet the demands of the terrorists, that is, if the society were to be released from the tension and fears that The process toward existentialist or disproportional terror- disproportionate terrorists generate. ism begins with situational pressure: provocation by the state They use their knowledge and skills to learn war strategy and or by circumstances in the society. The way in which it shifts use it to enforce a technology of terror. Because they are not between disproportionalism and existentialism is determined fi ghting a war they can win, they target their primary enemies by the historical context of the contradiction in the society, the by using shock values. Such attacks create intimidation, harass- level of support among groups within the society, and the way ment and help sustain fear in the psyche of the general public. in which the perpetrators coordinate or decode reaction within Even the destruction of public property serves as a devastating the society. When a group of people are marginalised, they can measure to weaken their enemy. Prominent among shock value turn disproportionate and at worst bestial. In this case, the state targets are bus and rail stations, schools and offi ces, because in or any individual or group that triggers the process of contra- such places the public sense of security is easily disrupted or dif- diction becomes an agent provocateur. This can cause ripples fused. This forces a change of behaviour from both the primary in the society and make the aggrieved resort to the elementary and secondary targets to be predisposed towards conceding to manifestation of terrorism. A situational pressure posits that the their demands. tendency to resort to acts of terror is a human instinct. Whether Disproportionate or anarchic terror uses aggression that is as a state or individual, one may be prone to reacting tempera- not generally accepted by international norms. This is because mentally to an issue that angers one, in particular when justice everything about a terrorist is absorbed by a single exclusivist fails to redress injustice. Situational pressure is usually a tempo- interest, single thoughts and single passion to carry out a reign ral action taken in the hope that the aggressor may change its of terror.9 Anarchism is criminalised because it is fashioned on stance and provide ‘level playing fi elds’. When change is not a hate system, and attacks non-combatants and innocent by- effected, the aggrieved resort to jungle justice. This happens standers, destroys public facilities and endangers international when poverty becomes excruciating amid unequal distribution peace and security. It nurtures this hate system in the minds of of societal wealth. Likewise, when the state security apparatus innocent and ignorant people in the society. When the state is threatened by external aggression or internal disturbances, it mismanages its information system, innocent and ignorant is likely to covertly sponsor acts of terror. In other words, both people in the society turn their sympathies towards terrorists. groups and governing authority may be in a position to under- Even though it may be diffi cult for the terrorists to achieve their take and covertly sponsor terror when their interests and values aim, because they do not have specifi c environmentally driven are endangered. In Marxian scholarship, situational pressure values to establish an end state, they are often satisfi ed with may turn to revolutionary pressure and become an indicator for the sympathy they draw from the society. In spite of this, states revolution based on class contradiction. However, under situ- in the international system are easing themselves out of the ational pressure, confl icts are not necessarily provoked only by register of the axis of evil. It would therefore be diffi cult to see class distinction, but also by individual and group belief systems any state providing an enabling environment for disproportion- that are in peril. Belief systems cut across classes and groups ate terrorists. and neutralise class differentials. The aggrieved may not neces- However, once terror has been infl icted on the society, an- sarily be deprived, poor or discriminated against. Though they archists or disproportionate terrorists have achieved some aims, have equal and equivalent access to opportunities, they may such as: be psychologically and emotionally incomplete, insatiable and unfulfi lled when their belief system is in peril. ■ Creating awareness of their views among the people; they become recognised, for good or bad. They are then in an advantageous position because their ‘enemy’ is forced to REACHING A DEFINITION face the contradiction they have created and is put on the offensive. How then do we defi ne terrorism in the African context? In ■ Creating suspicion and building a hate system between spite of our efforts to construct a framework that would be fl ex- clashing interests and values; pluralism and exclusivism. ible enough to reach a defi nition, it remains diffi cult because ■ Shrinking the space of globalisation and global invest- the meaning of terrorism is becoming too ”highly pejorative, it ment across the world. is a badge which denotes a lack of legitimacy and morality”.10 ■ Putting society under siege and making minimal scholar- The appellation ‘terrorist’ is therefore always disputed, and at- ship and intellectual discourse diffi cult to achieve. When tempts to defi ne the concept invariably arouse debate, because a religion or a philosophy denies the cause of intellectual rival defi nitions may be employed to include the actions of discourse, it is diffi cult to engage in it for fear not only of certain parties, and exclude others, the proponents of each of

6 Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa

which will subjectively claim a legitimate basis for employing (B) A ppear to be or intended to violence in pursuit of their own political or religious cause or (i) Intimidate or coerce civilian population, aim.11 Thus, prior to September 11, the defi nition of terrorism (ii) To infl uence the of a government by mass intimida- was less controversial because the problem was how to identify tion or coercion or non-state actors and state actors that support such actions. Most (iii) To affect the conduct of a government by a mass de- pre-September 11 defi nitions focus on threats to sovereign states struction, assassination or kidnapping, and by non-state actors and on how to secure the state from threats (C) Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the of terror. Less attention was paid to the citizens and shock values US or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the US. in society. For instance, in its Convention for the Creation of International Criminal Court 1937, the League of Nations defi ned These defi nitions are not different from that of the European terrorism as ‘criminal acts directed against a state and intended Union, which in its document on the Framework Decision on to or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particu- Combating Terrorism 2002 defi nes terrorism as criminal offences lar persons, or a group of persons or the general public’.11 This which given their nature or context may seriously damage a defi nition was elaborated by the International Law Commission, country or an international organisation, with the aim of serious- which categorised those affected by terrorism according to level ly intimidating a population or unduly compelling a government of signifi cance: or international organisation to perform or seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or As any act that causes death or grievous bodily harm or loss of lib- social structure of a country or an international organisation. erty to a head of state, his representative, relatives, or any person These defi nitions are based on struggles or efforts by these holding public offi ce. Secondly, when acts calculated to destroy countries to capture the meaning of terrorism, based on this or damage public property or property devoted to a public pur- perception and understanding of international environment. pose. Thirdly, any act likely to imperial human lives through the However, many who opposed the US and its allies have refused creation of a public danger directed against persons who enjoy to accept their defi nitions. This has generated a lot of contro- international protection or manufacture, obtaining possession or versies which the UN and various regional organisations should supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substance resolve. As for Africa, the positions of the AU and the UN on with a view to the communism of a terrorist act.12 what constitutes terrorism are important. Since the bombing of cities in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the AU has embarked on However, September 11 evoked various dimensions of sensitivity defi ning and determining what terrorism is and what it is made to the concept of terrorism, because the threats of terrorism are of. The AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of as serious as nuclear threats. This is because interests and values Terrorism defi nes terrorism or terrorist acts in article 1(a)(i) as have changed. Indeed, there is now a shift away from defi ning meaning to: terrorism in favour of the state, but there has never been an ac- ceptable attempt to identify the ideology that triggers contempo- ■ intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any govern- rary terrorism. Nobody wants to offend the other, but everybody ment, body, institution, the general public or any segment wants an end to terrorism. Because everybody is deceiving the thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt others, we have conjectures, bits and pieces of ideas, feelings or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to and wishful thinking about what constitutes terrorism. Even in certain principles; or the US there is no single defi nition of the concept. ■ disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential The US National Security Strategy defi nes terrorism as “pre- service to the public or create a public emergency; or meditated politically motivated violence against innocents”. The ■ any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, US Department of Defence says terrorism is the “calculated use aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threats, con- of unlawful violence to inculcate fears, intended to coerce or spiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) generally political, religious, or ideological”. While on its part, (i)-(iii) the US National Counter Terrorism Centre says terrorism is a Though this defi nition has been accepted in Africa as compre- … Premeditated act perpetrated by a subnational or clandestine hensive enough, it has yet to capture the core content of vibra- agent, politically motivated, potentially including religious, tion that triggers terrorism. The AU is not the only organisation philosophical or culturally symbolic motivations, violent and in this dilemma since the UN has done no better. The UN, since perpetrated against noncombatant target.13 September 11, has adopted several resolutions and decisions in both the Security Council and the General Assembly on the act However in the wake of September 11, the USA Patriot Act of of terror. For instance, UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) declares 2002 defi ned terrorism as activities that14 that activities of terrorism involve “acts, methods and practices of terrorism which are contrary to the purposes and principles of (A) Involve acts dangerous to human life that are violation of the United Nations”. In particular UNSC Resolution 1566(2004) the criminal law of the US or of any state, that defi nes terrorism as:

7 The African understanding of terrorism

… any action, in addition to actions already specifi ed by the iv The objective of terrorism also varies and may include existing conventions ... intended to cause death or serious bod- the pursuit of political, ideological, social, religious and ily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of philosophical objectives. such acts, by it nature or text, is to intimidate a population, or compel a Government or an international organisation to do or Terrorism is easier to explain and analyse than defi ne. But there to abstain from doing any act.15 is no doubt that an operational defi nition is important. Thus, terrorism can be defi ned as any act that is consciously and intel- Indeed, the UN defi nition is also too mechanical, as it calls lectually undertaken with no moral justifi cation and is negatively on member states to endorse various international conventions intended to intimidate, harass and instil fear via shock values of and protocols and to increase cooperation and fully imple- the society in order to compel the primary targets to attend to ment the relevant international conventions and protocols. The their demands. This defi nition can be operationalised by using UN, like the AU, has established a research centre called the what Paul Johnson called the ‘deadly sins of terrorism’. These Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the implemen- sins form the origin of contemporary waves of terrorism in Africa tation of the resolution by all states and increase the capabil- and include the following aspects:18 ity of states to fi ght terrorism and enforce compliance on all member states. In all these defi nitional samples, the one that is i. Terrorism is a deliberate and cold-blooded glorifi cation outstanding and fascinating is that provided by the Convention of violence over all forms of political activity. Violence of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating is used, not as a necessary evil for self-defence, but as a International Terrorism. In article 1 it defi nes terrorism as desirable form of action. any act of violence or threat thereof, notwithstanding its mo- ii. It is a deliberate suppression of ethical instincts in man by tive, to carry out a criminal plan with the aim of terrorism to the use of intellectual pursuit of ideology to render mor- threaten, harm or imperil lives, honour, freedom, security or ally blunt the consciences of their recruits so that they rights, and public or private property to hazards or occupying can kill without empathy. or endangering a national resources or international facilities iii. Terrorists are averse to politics as the normal means by or threatening the stability and political unity or sovereignty of which communities resolve confl icts. Therefore, the use independent states. of violence is not a political weapon in extremis, but a Given the theoretical discourse and random survey of defi ni- substitute for the entire political process. tions, Makinda noted that no defi nition of terrorism can be fi xed iv. Terrorists actively and systematically spread ideology in time or geographical location as it can only be characterised which sympathetic totalitarian states and groups will al- by arbitrary use of violence; acts leading to the intimidation of ways support and defend. people, society, state or government; violation of international v. Terrorists are afraid of totalitarian states that are unsym- norms, rules and institutions.16 Though what Makinda has done pathetic to their ideology, because such states will always has given insight into the activities of terrorists, we still need to use extra-judicial torture, killings and condemnation explore the contextual variables in which terrorism operates. In against them. the light of this, Alex Schmid specifi ed four arenas of defi ning vi. Terrorists exploit the apparatus of freedom in liberal and understanding terrorism: academic; the state; the public; societies and thereby endanger it. As Waltz says, ‘states, and how the terrorists see themselves. Tom Imobighe attempted like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of to isolate the vital elements that could be incorporated into the their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be defi nition of terrorism. The elements he identifi ed included:17 accepted’.18

i The environment of terrorism: Terrorism takes place in an Under these circumstances fear is fundamental to the use of environment of confl ict and discord. As human beings violence. To terrorists, violence becomes an art rather than an strive for survival they make demands that are confl ictual; act of defence. Fear is spread beyond the act of violence and the response and reactions may result in physical harm. makes it impossible for the victim to react and fi ght back, and In the process, terrorism, though a despicable act, has necessary to struggle to survive. This is done by putting pressure become one of the instruments for mounting pressure on the authorities to give in to the demands of the terrorists or on society. submit themselves to the services of the terrorists. In the course ii The nature of action and response: Terrorism emerges of violence, fear is instilled in the minds of the people. However, when there is a failure or a reluctance to manage confl ict- there is a limit to supporting terrorism, if only the society could ual relationships productively. It is an extreme response be aware of it. In a situation where the process of instilling fear to the nature of action taken in the course of confl ictual is sustained for a longer period of time, the terrorists are likely relationship to achieve a purpose, which may be political, to lose their credibility because the society will eventually turn religious or economic. against them. Conversely, ‘when a state relies on prolonged or iii The target of terrorists is often indiscriminate, involving excessive use of violence against terrorists or insurgents, its own directly or remotely the principal actors, as well as ancil- legitimacy tends to be eroded while the terrorists’ credibility is lary interests of the principal actors. enhanced.’19

8 Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa

THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA ics when they were transported to Africa. In the process, Africa suffered from cultural fi xation as three types of social formations The context of terrorism in African can only be understood emerged: within the framework of the historical sociology or anthropology of relationship that emerged between Africa and the rest of the i) The indigenous African social structures that are trans- world. Africa’s entrance into the international system was not formed from pre-colonial indigenous institutions, which a voluntary one. It was forcefully nurtured by various types of in their transformed states operate within the new social- imperialism from the Western world and the Middle East. These cultural system and framework. The moral and social imperialisms fi rst adopted the terror of the slavery and the slave order which formerly encased the pre-colonial indig- trade in Africans. Since then, Africa has been confronted with enous institutions is broken down by the social forces of several worldviews or what Ali Mazrui called its ‘triple herit- colonialism. age’20 The consequence was the shrinking nature of the African ii) Social structures and constructs were almost literally worldview. The penetrating worldviews affected the nature and parcelled from metropolitan centres of the imperial West character of the African state in the international system. They to Asia and Africa and grafted onto the new colonial situ- came with cultural imperialisms that created embedded cleav- ation. They were imported models and form the core of ages where nationalism is incompatible with nationhood. There resultant migrated social structures. Brought wholesale seems to be no sense of nationhood in Africa because cultural from Europe and the Arab world, they acquired their own ties are dysfunctionally rooted in its three heritages, which, life-world and established their unique parameters of so- though overlapping, are mutually exclusive. This makes Africans cial existence. and the African state, already baptised into exclusivism, cau- iii) Emergent social structures. These were not indigenous tious and suspicious as they confront one another in contesting to Africa, but were not brought from outside. They were arenas such as politics, economics or religion. Because the cir- generated, born from the space and time span of coloni- cumstances of relationship were not mutually inclusive, the spirit alism. They have a logic of their own and their peculiar of tolerance tends to be criminalised in the process of contacts situation in colonialism and their variant of imperialism in public and private realm. This triggers the clash of heritage marks them out as distinct political and sociological or cultural civilisation that has been experienced in Africa. structures, sometimes of baffl ing complexity. The follow- According to Peter Ekeh,21 most of the colonial and imperial ing fi gure shows a multiplex of circles that demonstrates social structures were disembodied of their originality and eth- the crisis of values and culture in which Africa has found

Figure 1: Multiplex circles of social information or worldviews in Africa

European Social Structure

Arab/Islam Migrated European Migrated Social Structures in Africa Structure in Africa

Arab/Islamic Social Structure

Emergent Social Transformed African P-colonial African structures in Africa Indigenous Social Structure indigenous tradition/culture

9 The African understanding of terrorism

itself, and which feeds into terrorism and other confl icts lies that spread across the Moslem world. A vanguard of Moslem on the continent. faithful were encouraged to carry out marches in which they chanted the greatness of God against the satanic world. What These worldviews or triple heritage are European or Western started as an insignifi cant effort subsequently became a method imperialism and colonialism, the Arab/Islamic cultural establish- of reacting to any anti-Islamic phenomena across the world. It ment; and African tradition and culture. The clashes of values spread from Egypt to Palestine and the entire Moslem world as and civilisation form the basis for competition to dominate a slogan of protest. The emotion-laden march also served as a African space. Ronald Chilote notes that one of the reasons for call to carry out ‘jihad’ by miscreants in Nigeria when there is Portuguese colonial exploration in Africa was to thwart and ‘di- a religious misunderstanding. In Algeria such marches are often vert control of west African trade from Moslems to Portuguese crushed by the power of the state machinery before they esca- merchants and to fi nd Christian allies to overcome Islam’.22 This late into unmanageable confl ict. The Palestinians benefi ted from creates a disconnect between emerging social formations in this logic of reaction when they started with stone–throwing and Africa because children that grew up under this heritage carry later graduated to suicide bombing and plane hijacking, a proc- different orientations and mindsets of the society. For instance, ess that sends terror, anguish and agony to innocent people. under Western imperialism, pluralism and liberalism were the The indigenous African tradition and culture become shrunk basis for integrating Africa into its fold. On the other hand, Arab/ and has lost out or been integrated into the European or Islamic Islamic imperialism pushed for exclusivism and puritanical cul- culture. When an African Moslem dresses in over-cloth and tural values in the process of integrating Africa into the Islamic thinks Arabic and Islam, the touch of African culture is lost. world. Arab/Islamic cultural advocates believe they can correct When a westernised African puts on American or European suits the damage done by Western liberalism in Africa. In doing so, and copies Western morals, the African value is diffused. There they adopt a principle of caution and suspicion in their relation- is nothing to show that Africa has history. This could be what ship with non-Moslems, while exploiting opportunities to ensure might have spurred Hugh Trevor-Roper of Oxford University a defi nitive space for cultural expansion and practices within the to assert that Africa has no history of its own. He added that African space. This was what Jamal al-Din advocated in 1870 what is found in Africa is European (and of course Arabic) his- for Islamic revival and a return to salafi sm. The peak was when tory placed in Africa, and not an African history in its original Sayyid Qutb visited the US in 1948 as an Egyptian bureaucrat to embodiment26. These are the factors that triggered revolutions to learn about the running of the US public school system. Unlike liberate Africa from the clutches of imperialism. As a result, the Tocqueville,23 who was impressed with the liberal nature of the notion that one man’s terrorist is someone else’s freedom fi ghter US democracy, Qutb was shocked to see an immoral society is pejorative in Africa, because it equates terrorism with the lib- in which human beings had turned into beasts and women had eration struggle. The two cannot be compared. There must be a become sex objects, displaying sex symbols. He concluded that, delineation. Okwudiba Nnoli spelled this out clearly in a semi- ‘No one is more distant than the Americans from spirituality and nal paper in which he made important distinctions between the piety.’24 He became convinced that only two societies exist in aggressor and the victim, the predator and the prey, the exploiter the world: the Islamic world and the world of barbarians (Jahili) and the exploited. He pointed out that the use27 of terror by a and the former should strive for dominance over the latter. If state to suppress people in poverty, ignorance, disease, preju- the American life of freedom could degenerate into immorality dice, hate and exploitation must be distinguished from violence and bestiality, there was nothing worth learning, not even the used by liberation fi ghters to free people from those obstacles to school system that had become the roots of immorality. For human progress. Braganca and Wallerstein correctly noted that most Muslims, the Westernisation of Christianity has disembod- all national liberation movements in Africa started off by seeking ied it from its cultural content which they once acknowledged to achieve change peacefully through dialogue and persuasion. as an ally. Christianity is now vulnerable and cannot claim to When these means are foreclosed to them by those who held represent the Qu’ranic honour given to it. So Christians have power, revolution became the last resort.28 Thus, in Nnoli’s become barbaric, having forsaken the call of God upon them. words, there could be state terrorism, but not all non-state acts This made Qutb more determined to provide the intellectual and of terror could be branded as terrorism. In any case there should ideological hub for the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan be a classifi cation of what constitutes positive and negative ter- al-Banna in 1928. His writings, especially Ma’alamfi ‘I-Tariq ror. According to this position: (‘Signposts on the road’) became the source of radicalisation and mobilisation of the brotherhood and committed the move- Revolutionary violence is associated with political programme ment to absolute opposition to the Egyptian state.25 for fundamental transformation of a social order. It is defensive The Moslem Brotherhood was founded as a political um- in nature because it does not aim at attaining privileges or pro- brella to revive the Islamic tradition of the prophet. Meanwhile tection vested interests by one group at the expense of others. Al-Manar magazine, which was founded in 1897 and edited by Instead, it usually occurs in the form of resistance against obvi- Rashid Rida in Egypt, together with messages from the Moslem ous social evils such as exploitation, domination, and discrimi- Brotherhood, indoctrinated young Moslems, the poor as well as nation. It is goals are greater equality, justice, and freedom for the upper class, into seeing a world of difference between them- an increased number of the population. Therefore, it seeks the selves and the West. This gradually snowballed into political ral- safety and freedom of the individual and group from violence to

10 Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa

life, existence, and from the threat of such violence, fear, anxi- the hotel, when we go into a coffee bar, war is sitting down right ety, uncertainty, doubt, loss, want of care, and general, all forms next to each and every one of us.30 of dangers. 29 Meanwhile, with the end of liberation struggle, the Africa state In the light of this understanding, the Organization of Islamic has become an agent provocateur, creating situational pressure Conference (OIC) stated in article 2 of its Convention on that provokes acts of terror. Therefore, it is diffi cult for one to Terrorism that its parameter of terrorism does not include peo- accept any genuine reason for state-sponsored terror in Africa. ple’s struggles such as armed struggle against foreign occupa- Indeed, a state, acting under the guise of responsibility to pro- tion, external aggression, colonial hegemony and the struggle tect its citizens, may undertake an act of terror. However, state for self-determination. The demarcation between a terrorist responsibility begins to erode when mass discontent leads to organisation (and/or a terrorist-sponsoring state) and a liberation regime security overshadowing human security. Overtly and movement is determined in the course of and in the manner of covertly, the abuse of power, orchestrated by assassination and using an act of terror to achieve a positive or negative purpose. killing of the opponents of the ruling elite, makes it diffi cult for This can be determined by whether such an organisation isolates such a state to be accepted as a credible international personal- itself from the masses or by its action is found to be operating ity. The perpetration of crimes by the state makes it possible for in the greater interests of the majority. However, the problem is its citizens to look elsewhere for security. Africa is now faced to determine the percentage that constitutes majority support. If with situational pressure from the state and groups. The African an organisation is found to have isolated itself from the masses, state thrives on a factionalised neo-patrimonial system of gov- it is a negative terrorist organisation. Hence no one fi ghts for a ernance. It suffers from political decay because it lacks discipline cause or for a people without fi rst seeking the consent of the and is the hub of corruption, human rights abuse and exploita- majority of the people it intends to defend. If it operates not only tion of the masses. Resources are appropriated without equity. by seeking their consent but also by mobilising the people, it 31 Therefore, in the attempt to fi ght global terrorists who have may be termed a liberation struggle. Members of an organisation found haven in the criminalised and totalitarian state, the citizens may assume terrorist attributes or adopt terrorist tactics, but they will certainly be abused. In another development the failure of can be regarded as freedom fi ghters when the following charac- the state to meet the ever-increasing expectations of the masses teristics are apparent: will also create the basis for any provocation that might trigger confl ict, the consequences of which might be that an act of ter- i. Genuine support from the majority of the population for ror is not deemed out of place. So, from the top the state can whom they are fi ghting perpetrate terror, while from the bottom the citizens can take ii. Maintaining a code of conduct to ensure that the civil to acts of terror or acts related to terror, especially where the population that it is defending are not attacked, even in environment is characterised by: random attacks iii. Wearing recognisable items of identity to distinguish ■ poverty and disease themselves from their opponents in the course of the ■ corruption and poor governance struggle. This could be in their use of combat gear, sym- ■ diversity, insecurity and confl ict bols and language. ■ wealth misappropriation and socio-economic inequality iv. Attacking mainly military targets with weapons and main- ■ illiteracy and de-educationalisation of society taining a particular base as their point of control. ■ environmental degradation and industrial pollution. v. Commanding international concern, empathy and sup- port, especially from the UN and regional organisations These terror-generating phenomena, based on disproportion- in the form of substantial resolutions ate terror, could persist in any society. On this platform there vi. Having a coherent ideology or principles from which the is mounting fear that Africa is becoming a potential area of fi ghters and the people can draw inspiration and concern, penetration by al-Qaeda. The increasing signifi cance of religion even from their enemies. as a philosophy or ideology for perpetrating a reign of terror sets the tone for the defi nitional controversy and the diffi culty Organisations that manifest anarchical disproportionalism of in countering the phenomenon of terrorism. The attacks and terror hardly meet these criteria. They do not have any recognis- bombings of Kenyan and Tanzanian cities by al-Qaeda in 1998 able badges of identity and carry out indiscriminate operations. and other fortresses that are maintained by similar organisations Though they employ guerrilla tactics, which is an attribute of a in Africa were prelude to this position. In addition, al-Qaeda and liberation struggle, what counts most against them is that they related organisations made infl ammatory remarks that they were remain faceless and are a danger to society. Cardinal Renato defending Islam. According to some of these comments, ‘Jihad Martino lamented about this menace: in God’s will means killing the infi del in the name of God and raising the banner of his name. And we do not want to make We have entered the fourth world war ... I believe we are in the this great jihad only words ... jihad is done in the will of God midst of another world war ... and it involves absolutely every only if you fi ght the infi del with the sword until he submits to one because we do not know what will happen when we leave Islam’.’31 As for Hamas, it foreclosed dialogue in its charter, say-

11 The African understanding of terrorism

ing that there was no solution to the Palestinian question, except generates. All religious organisations abhor violence, but no reli- through violence. gion will ignore violence if it is a means of safeguarding it from In the contemporary period, this means that the changing extinction. Those that don’t take to this course are either weak- course of terrorism from political, social, ideological and economic ened by the circumstances of their action or die naturally. Thus to religious is critical to the spread of terrorism. The relationship violence, however it is accepted by a religion, gives religion an between religion and violence will make it increasingly diffi cult to impetus to defi ne and establish itself. There is no acceptable defi - counter terrorism. Religion touches on the soul of human beings nition of terrorism by most countries in Africa either in specifi c or and is deeply embedded in the consciousness of the perpetra- generic terms because of the passion that religion unleashes on tors. Therefore, the position of al-Qaeda or any other religious their thinking and on their intellectual psyche. Though most coun- organisation that thrives on terror in defence of its faith should be tries have merely consented to generic explanations and variants put in proper context. Al-Qaeda is a recent terror phenomenon, of defi nitions provided by the UN and AU, most have failed to how does it represent Muslim umma? Or how are its views rep- legislate on terrorism in their countries. The specifi c defi nition of resentative of Islamic practice and the Qu’ran, the holy book of the concept in various countries has yet to be accepted because Moslems? The answers to these questions are important because the contradictions in these countries are counter-balanced by contradictions have been established in African society as a result clashes in their worldview or the triple heritage that they have of this. First, because the terrorists set to destroy Western values found themselves with. In Kenya, for instance, the parliament is which are presumably and mistakenly taken to be Christian val- yet to promulgate legislation on Terrorism because a section of ues, an uninformed Christian tends to believe that Christianity is the country is in disagreement with what has been proposed in under threat from the Moslem world. Second, an African Moslem the bill. In Nigeria, the Bill on terrorism is suffering from parlia- might also show empathy and become a recruit to the cause of mentary bureaucracy, possibly because of its incomprehensible Islam, without knowing that it is in the interests of al-Qaeda and nature, given the deeply divided cleavages in the Nigerian society. associated terrorists. The Abrahamic religions have their roots in Thus except for South Africa, Ethiopia, Algeria and a few others, one source, but unfortunately they remain the most confl ict–prone most countries still have to take a fi rm stand on terrorism. The religions all over the world. Of the three, Islam and the Qu’ran are penetrated worldviews have deepened the cleavages. It becomes the most liberal in term of exerting pluralism, yet in practice Islam diffi cult to defi ne terrorism because every individual and group in has become the most exclusivist religion; and some of those who the society is already converted to a specifi c view, position and have misunderstood its tenets have taken to the path of violence. religious belief. While Christianity preaches tolerance, it is the most vexed in terms As a result, there is mounting fear that Africa will become of practising pluralism. Judaism, though built on the practice of a battleground of terror, as terrorists are shifting base to the pluralism of the faith rather than race, is now racially concentrated, continent because of abundant resources to fund operations, using its rights to the occupied territories in the Middle East to over- vulnerable populations for recruitment and enormous space for shadow the tenets of the faith. This development set up the confu- training. The untapped oil resources that the West is likely to sion that led to the spread of religious terror to Africa. Through rely on in the Gulf of Guinea might be used to frustrate Western this confusion, most militants claim to use religion as propaganda interest in Africa. A sizeable gullible population is waiting to be machinery to achieve their terrorist aims. This is because most of recruited and trained to fi ght the war in situ. As David Radcliffe those who carry out act of terrorism belong to a particular faith noted, ‘Africa is attractive to terrorism because it offers space and claim to be fi ghting the cause of that religion. Though, con- – both actual and virtual – and countries with disenfranchised, trary to the tenets of these religions, it is always assumed that there frustrated populaces ripe for recruitment.’ 33 religious acts are synonymous with terrorism. This in itself creates the danger of understanding social construct in Africa; as it further makes it diffi cult to confront terrorism, especially when religious MAPPING THREATS OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA leaders accept the militants’ ideas. As Saighal noted: Africa is now threatened by terrorism, whether the understanding ... Moslem clergy allied to radical Islamists continue to push their of the concept is clear or not. But from the operational defi nition countries into medieval practices. In the process, they pose a of the concept in this paper, the process towards mapping out challenge to communal harmony and perpetuate the backward- threats of terrorism must be issue-specifi c, situationally contextu- ness of their community. The products of such backwardness be- alised and historically determined. We must interrogate the logic come the generation next of frenzied communists, who would be and dynamics that necessitate the drive towards terrorism. What is happy to link up with Islamist networks to undermine the security the role of the African state in the perpetuation of confl ict-driven of their own country as well as others that have sizeable Moslem terrorism? It is on these grounds that one can defi ne and map out populations. The clash of civilisation is being deliberately pro- how terrorism is eating deep into the psyche of the Africans. voked by Islamists in many parts of the world. The support base Most African states are poor at managing differences, because for which the militants arise is large. It is growing by the day. 32 the managers themselves live in fear of the people and tend to build up regime security rather than human security. Most African Indeed, Africa is a multi-religious continent. The issue of religion states are still rogue states, in spite of the rapid wave of transition is very sensitive in Africa because of the emotion and passion it to democracy on the continent. By its actions, the state in Africa

12 Defi ning and mapping threats of terrorism in Africa

is an agent provocateur in the reign of terror. In fact, democracy that undermines human rights would strengthen terrorism, rather in Africa provides the legal cover and serves as social engineer- than address the fundamental issues that bring about the phe- ing for corruption to thrive. For this to happen, the elite need to nomenon. Therefore, the international power politics that make create fear by securitising the process of state-society relations. In it diffi cult to accommodate an African perspective in the con- the course of the beautifi cation of securocracy, human security is struction of a counter-terrorism regime for the continent might undermined and the mass of the people are driven into the hands make Africa indifferent and thus see the fi ght against terrorism as of terrorists as recruits or take up disproportionate/anarchic be- a Western concern rather than a global issue. haviour and actions that could be prone to terrorism. The state in When society or a people are already converted to a position Africa has isolated African experts and civil society groups in the or worldview that is engrained in their memory, it is diffi cult to war against terrorism. There is a need to widen the entry of anti- provide alternative or superior views, especially when they touch terrorist stakeholders, because when it comes to terrorism, no one on religion. For instance, when a tenet of a religion is quoted has a monopoly of knowledge. Linked to this is the use of state se- out of context to support an act of terror, it becomes diffi cult to curity by those who hold power to fi ght their political opponents, change that worldview. Sometimes this is compounded by reli- thereby blurring the meaning of terrorism. Therefore, the wrong gious clerics who deliberately use clichés and indoctrinate the approach to counter-terrorism and insurgency has pushed local young to be resentful of others simply because they are of dif- militant groups to identify themselves with the ideals of terrorism. ferent faith. The inability to imbue a spirit of tolerance engineers In fact, they use the concept freely to frighten those in authority. the spread of terror, especially militant Islamic movements. Meanwhile, the African state is not true to itself as it has been These militant groups have found fertile ground in Africa unable to enact legislation to counter terrorism because of its vast landscape, which allows the free fl ow of Identity issue is important in understanding the dynamics of immigrants, arms and crimes along the lines of terrorism and terrorism and terrorist activism in Africa. This is fundamental to encourages its spread. The existence of common cultural ties, the fear and hate it triggers, the support it receives, and the des- especially among countries in North and West Africa, tend to peration with which it is carried out. The triple heritage in Africa enhance or encourage this. In addition, Africa’s proximity to the tends to create mutually separate and exclusivist identity rather Arabian Peninsula, to failed states such as Somalia and to totali- than mutually reinforcing identity and cultural values. Individuals tarian states such as Sudan makes it possible for al-Qaeda mili- and groups appeal and evoke emotion and appeals to exclusiv- tants to shift bases on this axis. A degraded environment such as ist interests and values to achieve what they want. Fortunately the Niger Delta, desertifi cation and pollution and the HIV/Aids Africa has the space for various interests to contest their positions pandemic also provide grounds for terrorism to thrive.35 and views which invariably are detrimental to the stability of the African state. Thus poverty, whether in relative or real terms, is fundamental to the factors that give rise to terrorism. Africa will CONCLUSION continue to be a breeding ground for terrorism, corruption and underdevelopment as long as poverty exists, particularly when In conclusion, this paper has attempted to provide conjectures the issue of development and the millennium development goals on the defi nition and threats of terrorism in Africa. However, it (MDGs) are not given serious attention by states that want to foster is not my position to determine the challenges and to resolve partnership in countering terrorism. The ruling elite in Africa have the contradictions created by terrorism on the continent. also failed to implement the MGDs in order to alleviate or reduce Nevertheless, it is important to note that terrorism will remain poverty. Thus, poverty is a weapon of the weak that are ready to a threat on the continent as long as bad governance, poverty, be recruited; either because they are poor or because they have underdevelopment, and abuse of power and human rights assimilated the ideological stance of terrorists. continue to exist. Also, it is important for the African state to Counter-terrorism should not be seen as a reaction to terror- provide a synergy between these penetrating worldviews is ism, but as a process towards undermining the conditions that such a way that they are mutually reinforcing, rather separate give rise to terrorism. Thus, an extreme counter-terrorism regime or exclusive.

NOTES

1 Agatha N T Eguavoen, Culture, religion and terrorism, 5 Okello, op cit, p 6. 8 Barry Buzan, State, people and fear, New York, Harvest in T A Imobighe and A N T Eguavoen (eds), Terrorism 6 O B C Nwolise, Geopolitical Terrorism as an Instrument Wheatsheaf, 1991. See chapters 1 & 2. and counter-terrorism: An African perspective, Ibadan, of Political Destabilisation in Plural Multiparty State: Case 9 Christopher Hermon, Terrorism today, Frank Cass, London, Heinemann Educational Books 2006, p 25. Study of Nigeria ‘s Political Scene 1979-2005, Paper deliv- 2000. 2 Okello Oculi, New international terrorism and African ered at the Capacity building workshop for senior Offi cers 10 (accessed Sep- Security Lecture at the National War College, Abuja, 23 of National Security and Civil Defence Corps on the Theme tember 2006). October 2003, p 3. Re-appraising National Security Dynamics and Democratic 11 Clair de Than and Edwin Shorts, International criminal law 3 Cited in Okello, op cit, p 4. Stability, Abuja, 14-16 February 2006.p 12; See also The and human rights, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2004, 4 Patrick I Chuke, 2006, The US unilateralism and the war New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed, Vol 11, pp 649-689. p 233. against terror, in Imobighe and Eguavoen (eds), op cit, 7 Frantz Fanon, The wretched of the earth, Grove Press, 12 Ibid. p 107. New York, 1983. 13 Sunday G Ehindaro, ‘Combating Terrorism in Nigeria:

13 The African understanding of terrorism

Police perspective’ Paper presented at a Two-day 20 Ali Mazrui, 1980, Triple Heritage, BBC/Nigerian Television East, in Imobighe and Eguavoen (eds), op cit. workshop for defence offi cers, Defence Headquarters, Authority 26 John E Philips, What’s New About African History?, Scorpion Mess, Abuja, 12-13 October 2005. 21 Peter P Ekeh, Colonialism and social structure, University History News Network, George Mason University, 5 June 14 See Uche O Okeke, 2005, Global terrorism: Nigerian per- of Ibadan Inaugural Lecture 1980, Ibadan University Press, 2006, . spective, paper presented at a two day defence offi cers 1983, pp 11-12. It must be pointed out that long before 27 Okwudiba Nnoli NJIA workshop, Defence Headquarters, Scorpion Mess, Abuja, Samuel Huntington came out with his seminal work Clash 28 Aquino De Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, The 12-13 October 2005, p 2. of civilizations, Peter Ekeh had written about this in Africa. African liberation readers. Vol 2: The National Liberation 15 United Nations, A more secure world: Our shared re- In 1975 Ekeh published a celebrated thesis Two publics Movements, Zed Press, London, 1982. sponsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, in Africa on the clash of civilisations in Africa. This was 29 Cited in O B C Nwolise, Geopolitical Terrorism as an Challenges and Change, United Nations, New York, 2005 followed in the 1980s with a seminal work by Ali Mazrui, Instrument of Political Destabilisation in Plural Multiparty . African triple heritage. State: Case Study of Nigeria ‘s Political Scene 1979-2005, 16 Samuel M Makinda, Global governance and terrorism, 22 Ronald H Chilote, Amilcar Cabral’s revolutionary theory Paper delivered at the Capacity building workshop for sen- Global change 15(1), February 2003, p 49. and practice, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colo, 1991, p 24. ior Offi cers of National Security and Civil Defence Corps 17 Alex P Schmid, 1998, The response as a defi nition 23 Wikipedia, Alexis de Tocqueville, (accessed 29 October 2006) and Democratic Stability, Abuja, 14-16 February 2006. terrorism, Frank Cass, London as well as Imobighe and 24 Amir Taheri, Holy terror: Inside the world of Islamic 30 Cited in Okeke, op cit, p 2. Eguavoen (eds.), Terrorism and counter terrorism: An terrorism, Sphere, London, 2000, p 11. 31 Peter L Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know, Free Press, African Perspective, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational 25 International Crisis Group, Islamism in North Africa 1: New York, 2006, p 35. Books, Nigeria, 2006 pp 12-13. The legacies of history, S Asani, Pluralism, intolerance, and the Quoran, The 19 Joseph Macmillan, Apocalyptic terrorism: The case of pre- 20 April 2004, p 9; See also Istifanus S Zabadi, Terrorism American Scholar, 71(1), 2002. ventive actions, Strategic Forum, 212, 2004. and counter–terrorisms: Lessons from Asia and the Middle 33 The Mail&Guardian Online, 23 October 2006 ;15:44

14 History and root causes of terrorism in Africa Samuel M Makinda

INTRODUCTION or Algeria could have impacts on Africa, the Arab countries and the Islamic world. The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, it explains briefl y why it is diffi cult to fi nd a universally acceptable defi nition of terrorism. Second, it describes how history is crucial to any explanation WHAT IS TERRORISM? and understanding of terrorism in Africa. Third, it discusses how and why socio-economic factors, lack of social justice, porous Many people use the word ‘terrorism’ frequently, but they do borders and poor governance mechanisms and structures have not all refer to the same thing. Indeed, there is no universally triggered , and could still trigger, disaffection that could lead to accepted defi nition of terrorism.1 In simple terms, one can say terrorism in some parts of the continent. Fourth, it suggests three that terrorism is a technique of warfare that is as old as human ways of responding to the threats of terrorism in Africa, bear- society. Over the years, the word ‘terrorism’ has been used and ing in mind the primary responsibility to protect the people and abused by policy-makers and analysts. Those who seek to del- preserve their values, norms and institutions. egitimise the goals or tactics of their opponents often label them Terrorism, in its various incarnations, has plagued Africa for ‘terrorist’. Hence the claim that one person’s terrorist is another many decades. It has manifested itself in various forms, depend- person’s freedom fi ghter. ing on time and space. For this reason, the history of terrorism in To appreciate the diffi culty of defi ning terrorism, one needs Africa should not be seen as a single progression from one point to look at the following exchange between Ned Walker, then or level to another. It is variegated and nuanced. Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, and Congressman root causes of terrorism in African states should not be assumed Lee Hamilton, then chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe to be identical or straightforward. For example, the causes of ter- and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the rorism in Algeria in the 1950s/60s, when Algerian nationalists US House of Representatives:2 were fi ghting the French colonial authorities for independence, vary immensely from the causes of terrorism in the same country Hamilton: Well, how do you defi ne terrorism, do you defi ne it in the 1990s, when some Muslim groups took up arms after the in terms of non-combatance? 1992 general elections were annulled. Even if we were to focus Walker: The State Department defi nition, which is included in on the 1950s or the 1990s, the causes of instability and insur- the terrorism report annually, defi nes it in terms of politically rections in various parts of Africa differ. For example, the causes motivated attacks on non-combatant targets. of an insurrection such as the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s Hamilton: So an attack on a military unit in Israel will not be were not similar to those that underpinned the Algerian resis- terrorism? tance during the same period. Similarly, the causes of the civil Walker: It does not necessarily mean that it would not have a war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) very major impact on whatever we were proposing to do in the 1990s differ from the circumstances that caused Muslim with the PLO. militants to take up arms in Egypt during the same period. Hamilton: I understand that, but it would not be terrorism. While it is misleading to assume that the history of terrorism Walker: An attack on a military target. Not according to the in Africa is a smooth progression, it is possible to make certain defi nition. Now wait a minute; that is not quite correct. You generalisations about history and terrorism, not the history of know, attacks can be made on military targets which clearly terrorism, in Africa. Moreover, while it is tempting to separate are terrorism. It depends on the individual circumstances. the occurrences of terrorism in Africa from those in the Middle Hamilton: Now wait a minute. I thought that you just gave me East, this separation is unsustainable given that several African the State Department defi nition. countries also belong to the Arab League and the Islamic Walker: Non-combatant is the terminology, not military or Conference Organisation. Indeed, a former Egyptian leader, civilian. Gamal Abdel Nasser, stated that Egypt belonged to three circles: Hamilton: All right. So any attack on a non-combatant could be Islamic, Arab and African. Applying Nasser’s logic, one could terrorism? argue that terrorist attacks in countries such as Egypt, Morocco Walker: That is right.

15 The African understanding of terrorism

Hamilton: And a non-combatant could include military? not. Even those who recollect what they witnessed often select Walker: Of course. some facts and ignore others. So, historical analysis is, to some Hamilton: It certainly would include civilian, right? degree, a selective endeavour. Second, the historians and oth- Walker: Right. ers who seek data from archives or from interviews with those Hamilton: But an attack on a military unit would not be who witnessed the past make prior assumptions about what terrorism? they want to look for. In so doing, they subject the past to re- Walker: It depends on the circumstances. interpretations of prior interpretations, which, in turn, makes it Hamilton: And what are those circumstances? diffi cult to produce value-free history. Indeed, by sifting through Walker: I do not think it will be productive to get into a de- historical records, historians re-interpret the past. However, not scription of the various terms and conditions under which all interpretations are equally valid. To be valid, an interpretation we are going to defi ne an act by the PLO as terrorism. needs to be predicated on the prevailing global norms, rules and The above exchange suggests that the meaning of institutions, and, at the same time, ought to comply with existing terrorism cannot be fi xed in time or space. Even govern- methodological and epistemological assumptions. ments have problems formulating a working defi nition. For An interpretation of past terrorist activities in Africa is likely example, the Australian government’s 2004 white paper on to reveal at least four waves or categories of terrorism: the pre-in- terrorism declares that “even the United Nations has been” dependence nationalist movements; the post-independence civil unable “to achieve consensus” on the issue, thereby com- war problems; the transplantation of the Israeli-Palestinian issue pelling individual states “to develop their own defi nitions for to the continent; and the emergence of the al-Qaeda network, the purposes of enacting legislation to counter the threat”.3 with its headquarters in an African country (Sudan) in the 1990s. Al-Qaeda-supported terrorism is the most dangerous form of Some of the activities that have been canvassed under this term political violence to come out of Africa. These four waves are include assassinations, kidnappings and bombings.4 The mean- interrelated. For example, the nationalist phase was implicated ing of terrorism is historically contingent, and the activities it in the civil war stage. Similarly, the transplantation of the Israeli- describes may stem from political, religious, social, cultural, Palestinian issue to the continent had a bearing on the creation economic, or environmental factors. Even global norms such as of the infrastructure that the al-Qaeda network later exploited. the right to self-determination have given rise to terrorism. Nationalism, the liberation struggle and other wars of inde- Terrorist organisations differ widely in their goals, strategies pendence in some parts of Africa involved political violence. and tactics. For example, the goals and tactics of the Lord’s African leaders and their supporters encouraged revolutionary Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, which has been in existence wars as an antidote to the institutionalised violence of colo- since the mid-1980s, are quite different from those of al-Qaeda’s nial authorities or white minority regimes. However, whether this supporters who destroyed the American diplomatic missions in revolutionary violence could be termed terrorism depends on Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. who is interpreting the history in question. Any study of the his- Different labels have been used in the past to describe what tory of African nationalism in South Africa, for example, would be is now called terrorism: insurgency, guerrilla war, revolution- nothing but a re-interpretation of the records of how those who ary war, and subversive war.5 In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorist controlled the apartheid regime understood their role in society groups gained media publicity through high-profi le kidnappings, (an interpretation) and how the African nationalists viewed their assassinations and aircraft hijacking. This emphasised that ter- roles as liberators (another interpretation). Was Nelson Mandela rorism involves the indiscriminate or arbitrary use of violence. of the early 1960s a terrorist or a legitimate fi ghter struggling for Terrorists may also seek to intimidate a people, society, state the liberation of the black majority? Based on the rules that existed or government so that they give in to their demands. Indeed, a at the time, it is plausible to argue that he was a terrorist. He was thread that runs through the entire tapestry of terrorism is the among those who sought to use violent means to bring an end to terrorists’ lack of responsibility towards the innocent people that the system of government that obtained in South Africa, albeit a die as a result of their actions. Without taking responsibility to- governance system that was universally condemned. wards fellow human beings, terrorists ensure their actions have However, if one looks at Mandela’s role from the point little chance of being justifi ed on ethical grounds. of view of a people’s right to self-determination, which is en- shrined in international law, he was a legitimate fi ghter seeking to improve the political, economic and social conditions of his HISTORY AND TERRORISM people.6 If one searched the news reports in the South African newspapers at the time, one would perhaps not fi nd any report While history is an important source of data and information that interpreted his activities in terms of international law or the about the past, it does not provide a value-free and accurate right to self-determination. This is why we need to recognise that picture of the entire past for several reasons. First, the past is in the majority of cases, history is basically a reinterpretation known only because some facts were recorded or can be re- of prior interpretations. Nevertheless, a re-examination of the membered by those who witnessed them. Those who record the Mandela case, through the lenses of the dominant global norms, facts do not record everything, so they must select. Selection rules and institutions, would suggest that the valid interpretation of facts involves interpretation of what is signifi cant and what is is one that portrays him as a legitimate liberator.

16 History and root causes of terrorism in Africa

What has been said about Nelson Mandela could be said of Israeli Defence Forces, making use of Kenyan facilities, launched other cases of nationalist resistance in Africa, including the Mau a daring rescue effort. By this time, Idi Amin had embraced the Mau insurgency in Kenya in the early 1950s, the Algerian war Palestinian cause by invoking Islamic solidarity, but he also sad- of liberation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Frelimo dled Eastern Africa with the baggage of transnational terrorism. resistance struggle against the Portuguese colonial authorities in The repercussions of the Entebbe episode worsened already Mozambique in the 1960s and 1970s. The African nationalist lib- strained relations between Kenya and Uganda. Even though eration movements throughout the continent had a broad base the Israeli rescue mission contributed to the weakening of the of support, as they were perceived as legitimate representatives Idi Amin regime, in December 1980, in revenge for the Israeli of the colonised people. Many of the leaders executed their ac- rescue, a Palestinian-linked terrorist group bombed the Norfolk tions in the name of the people that they represented. Owing to Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, killing several people. Moreover, the the nature of Pan-Africanism, most of them built cross-national hijacking of a Lufthansa fl ight to Mogadishu in October 1977 networks that utilised violence against colonial and white minor- by a Palestinian group highlighted the reality that Africa was ity regimes.7 As stated above, they were legitimate in the eyes of increasingly becoming involved in Middle Eastern-generated the colonised people. Their activities were variously described terrorism, over which it had no leverage. This was confi rmed by as insurgencies, guerrilla wars, civil wars or revolutionary wars Libyan complicity in the mid-fl ight bombing of a UTA airliner by the colonial or white minority regimes, but in view of the pre- over Niger in 1989 that killed 171 people. vailing norms, rules and institutions, international society would In the 1990s, African states started to be affected by the fourth regard them as legitimate.8 and most dangerous wave of terrorism emanating from Osama If nationalist forces constituted the fi rst wave of terrorist bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. For example, the Groupement forces in Africa, protagonists in African civil wars constituted the Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group, GIA), which was formed second wave. These included the Biafran secessionists in Nigeria in Algeria in December 1992, was inspired by al-Qaeda. Unlike in the 1960s, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which took up violence after Angola (Unita) in Angola from the 1970s to the 1990s, various the annulment of the 1992 Algerian general elections, the GIA political groups in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, Resistência saw itself as a Muslim force waging war against infi dels and Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in Mozambique in the 1980s, apostates. and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan from The African dimension of al-Qaeda is attested to by a the 1980s. Of the governments that were battling civil wars, the number of factors. First, one of the network’s leaders, Dr Ayman Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam was the only one al-Zawahiri, is an Egyptian and therefore an African. Most press that admitted it was using terror against its opponents: borrow- reports refer to al-Zawahiri as bin Laden’s deputy, but this ap- ing the Soviet language of the early 1920s, the Mengistu regime pears to stem from a misunderstanding. As Rohan Gunaratna claimed it was using ‘revolutionary red terror’ against ‘counter- argues, it was al-Zawahiri who transformed bin Laden “from a revolutionary white terror’. guerrilla into a terrorist”.9 In other words, it was an African who In much of Africa, there were major differences between turned bin Laden into the most feared person around the world the political violence of nationalist movements and of post-in- and helped to turn bin Laden’s ideas into reality. The second dependence organisations. While pre-independence nationalist African dimension of al-Qaeda is that in the mid-1990s Sudan, forces were regarded as legitimate liberators, the post-independ- an African state, not only hosted bin Laden, but also allowed ence guerrilla forces, many of which were supported by their him to establish al-Qaeda’s headquarters there. It was the leader own ethnic groups, did not enjoy the same level of legitimacy of Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF), Dr Hassan al-Turabi, among the African masses. Unlike the nationalist liberation who invited bin Laden to Sudan after he had fl ed Saudi Arabia movements which targeted Western or white minority regimes, to Pakistan.10 At the time, Turabi, who built up his Islamic fun- civil war meant that Africans targeted fellow Africans. Indeed, damentalist network in Sudan from the mid-1960s onwards, some of them were seen as traitors to the Pan-African ideal of was very close to Sudan’s military ruler, General Omar Hassan integration. However, some of the post-independence insurgents al-Beshir. From Sudan, the NIF and al-Qaeda hoped to destroy waged legitimate struggles to try to rid their countries of authori- the predominantly Christian SPLA and to spread fundamentalist tarian rulers. Islam to other parts of Africa. Indeed, since the 1990s, al-Qaeda Terrorism in Africa was not always restricted to continental supporters have carried out terrorist attacks in a number of coun- African issues. For example, from the 1970s, African states, some tries, including Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Tanzania.11 of which are members of the Arab League and the Organisation A brief interpretation of history shows that terrorism in Africa of the Islamic Conference, took sides on the Israeli-Palestinian manifested itself in four forms. First, it was restricted to African issue. It was not long before some of these countries served as issues, especially the liberation struggle. This form of political platforms for Palestinian hijacked airlines. The hijacking of a violence, which was directed at forces of foreign occupation, French Airbus from Athens to Kampala, Uganda, in 1976, for was justifi ed in terms of self-determination. Second, terrorism instance, marked the fi rst violent intrusion of the Arab-Israeli in Africa manifested itself in the form of civil wars in various confl ict in Eastern Africa. This appeared to refl ect a collaborative countries, including Angola, Congo, Rwanda and Sudan. In this effort between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine incarnation of terrorism, the struggle took the form of African and Idi Amin’s Uganda. The hijacking came to an end when the against African, and one ethnic group against another. Third,

17 The African understanding of terrorism

African governments embraced the Palestinian cause and trans- including Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, persuaded planted the Israeli-Palestinian problem to the continent. Fourth, African states to embrace the Palestinian cause in the 1970s. the emergence of al-Qaeda into a feared network was helped The main causes of the fourth wave of terrorism in Africa, by an African Muslim scholar and an African country. The si- which is associated with the al-Qaeda activities, partly stem from multaneous terrorist attacks on American diplomatic missions in inadequate security and governance institutions. The emergence Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998 by al-Qaeda support- of al-Zawahiri and his supporters in Cairo could be explained in ers could be interpreted as a culmination of the transplantation terms of the tensions that have existed for many years between of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict to Africa, but it was also the some religious groups and the Egyptian government. Beyond start of the most dangerous wave of terrorism in Africa to date. this, the existence of porous borders in much of Africa fosters an environment that is amenable to exploitation by extremist and criminal groups. Indeed, border security is so inadequate in CAUSES OF TERRORISM many African states that governments cannot keep out foreign- ers, including al-Qaeda elements. There is hardly any African Terrorism may be based on political, religious, social, cultural, country that has the capability to police its coastline, whether economic or environmental factors, but not all these factors it is on the Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea have been behind every terrorist attack in Africa. or Red Sea. In addition to a lack of adequate border security, The four waves of terrorism in Africa emanated from differ- African states rely on poorly trained and corrupt intelligence ent sources. For example, nationalist liberation movements were personnel. Without substantial capacity building in the areas of largely driven by the desire for self-determination. In this case, analysis, detection and prevention, African states will increas- the root cause was Western colonialism and its racial, disem- ingly fi nd it diffi cult to keep out al-Qaeda elements. powering and discriminating policies. The nationalists sought to Moreover, the extent of corruption in the civil services of end the humiliation to which colonialism had subjected them.12 many countries means that the governments of these countries In other words, the fi rst wave of terrorism was underpinned by cannot prevent foreigners from acquiring their passports. For ex- the need to empower African peoples politically, economically, ample, Eastern European mercenaries were able to infi ltrate the socially and culturally. Kwame Nkrumah described it as the res- highest levels of government in Kenya in early 2006 simply be- titution of the African personality.13 cause of their relations with the daughter of one senior politician The second wave of terrorism, which was associated with in the country. In other words, unless African states establish ef- various civil wars, was driven by a multiplicity of factors, such fective, transparent, accountable and responsible governments, as failure to deliver the political and economic benefi ts prom- they will continue to leave themselves open to exploitation by ised during the liberation struggle, dissatisfaction with colo- non-state actors, including terrorists. nial boundaries, and differences in ideology. For example, in Another factor that might create conditions that could make Ethiopia, the civil war was driven partly by the desire of Eritreans terrorism possible is the phenomenon of state failure or collapse. for self-determination, and partly by ideological struggles and There is no clinical defi nition of failed, failing, disrupted or col- power ambitions among other groups, such as the Tigrayans and lapsed states.15 However, policy-makers and commentators often Oromos. In other countries, such as Angola, Unita was in large use these terms interchangeably to refer to African and other part driven by ideological differences and personal ambitions. In developing countries that have experienced or may be experi- other parts of Africa, civil wars have been caused by corruption encing different levels of governance problems. in high places, the use of public institutions to benefi t only one Although there is recognition that international society has or two ethnic groups, the manipulation of technical services, a moral responsibility to help its poorer members, these terms including intelligence analyses, for selfi sh ends, and the lack of partly stem from the mistaken belief that all states, regardless of transparent, accountable and responsible governments. time and geographical location, are expected to exhibit similar These problems have bred discontent and, in some cases, characteristics. Commentators and policy-makers have frequently compelled people to take up arms to fi ght for justice and equal- referred to Somalia as a failed state, but if one looked carefully, ity. Indeed, political mismanagement and marginalisation of one would wonder whether Somalia is a failed state or simply a some ethnic groups has been one of the causes of civil wars society that never became a state. When did Somalia start to fail and instability in Africa. At the socio-economic level, one could as a state? During the colonial period, Italian Somalia and British point to misguided macro-economic policies, a lack of employ- Somaliland were governed as different entities and did not consti- ment opportunities, corruption in the awarding of government tute a single functioning state. When the two sides came together tenders and other economic benefi ts, worsening poverty and in 1960 following independence, the new Somali Democratic the economic marginalisation of some groups.14 Republic was not united, as various clans competed ferociously The third wave of terrorism in Africa, which was associated for power. These clans united temporarily whenever they wanted with the Israeli-Palestinian problem, was underpinned by the to pursue irredentist claims against Ethiopia and Kenya. perceived injustices in the Palestinian territories. The lack of Prior to Siad Barre’s military coup of 1969, Somalia was self-determination and social justice in the occupied Palestinian virtually ungovernable, with more than 60 political parties territories and the failure of the international community to im- representing different clans and vying for political power. As plement various United Nations Security Council resolutions, a dictator, Siad Barre established a one-party dictatorship and

18 History and root causes of terrorism in Africa

made no efforts to nurture state institutions. For several years governance and fundamental freedoms, and inconvenience the before Siad Barre was driven out of offi ce in 1991, Somalia’s citizens of democratic states. cabinet was divided and functioned like a federation of clans. The use of the traditional approach would have several ad- The national army was also divided along clan lines, with new vantages. First, it would demonstrate that governments have not army recruits going to the sectors controlled by their clansmen. panicked or been intimidated by the terrorists to inconvenience But whereas Somalia is currently going through anarchy, it can- their own citizens. Second, it would create an atmosphere for not be accurately described as a failed state, because it was not enhancing democratic governance and basic freedoms, while a unifi ed state with well-developed institutions that most states combating terrorism. In other words, the use of the traditional take for granted. approach would be consistent with efforts to enhance security: Nonetheless, the anarchy in Somalia, like that which has that is, the protection of people as well as the preservation of plagued other African countries such as the DRC, Liberia, Sierra their values, norms, rules and institutions. Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, potentially creates a haven for criminal The ‘institutional’ counter-terrorism option is based on the un- gangs, drug traffi ckers, pirates and terrorists.16 Therefore, there is derstanding that institutions can reduce the likelihood of terrorism a need for international society to intervene and help restore sta- in various ways. First, institutions constitute the identity and regu- bility where order has evaporated. However, the key to success late the behaviour of actors, including governments and terrorists. lies in asking the right questions, listening to the people affected, Without institutions, there would be no sense of order, security and delivering solutions that have meaning, not for the helpers, and justice. Second, to the extent that institutions also constitute but for those people being helped. Through such an approach, terrorism, the challenge is for policy makers to devise ways of international society can help failed, disrupted or collapsed promoting those institutions that promote human solidarity and states back to their foundations and thereby prevent terrorists encourage the ‘self’ to respect the ‘other’. Keohane argues that from exploiting them. one of the functions of institutions is to limit the use of large-scale violence and ‘to provide a guarantee against the worst forms of abuse … so that people can use their capabilities for productive RESPONDING TO TERRORISM purposes’.18 Disseminating and enhancing institutions that promote human solidarity can help remould the identities of would-be The key challenge for African states is to establish institutions terrorists and modify the behaviour that leads to terrorism. Such that address the root causes of terrorism, particularly the last efforts may include providing education, showing respect for cul- three waves of terrorism discussed above. The ideal situation is tural, ethnic and other differences, and supporting the struggle for for individual African states to develop the capacity to address self-determination and the promotion of democratic governance. terrorist threats effectively. However, given the lack of expertise Thus, the institutional approach would meet the ethical require- and institutional infrastructures in much of Africa, there is need ment of the ‘self’ assuming responsibility for the ‘other’. for collective action at bilateral, sub-regional, and regional lev- The ‘development and social justice options’ are the most els. National action is important, but it is insuffi cient to address appropriate in Africa. Development and poverty alleviation have the three waves of terrorism effectively. This section will not been part of the global normative structure since the 1940s. address the bilateral, sub-regional and regional mechanisms for However, the meaning of ‘development’ has evolved. After addressing terrorism. It simply focuses on the issues that need to World War II, it was associated with self-sustained economic be considered after sub-regional and regional mechanisms have growth and measured in GDP fi gures. Development also referred been established.17 to attempts to redistribute resources between countries. Since the There are many ways of tackling terrorism in Africa, but this 1980s, the term ‘development’ has come to refer to qualitative article looks at only three of them: the traditional, institutional and quantitative changes in a variety of areas: economic, envi- and developmental approaches. The ‘traditional’ counter-ter- ronmental, political, cultural, social and human. At fi rst, this ef- rorism approach relies on the use of intelligence agencies, the fort to expand beyond economic-oriented development included police and the judiciary. It does not address the root causes of provision of basic needs such as shelter, water, sanitation, educa- terrorism, as it offers only a band-aid solution. In the past, this tion and health, which are a part of social justice. Social justice approach was effective in containing terrorism in Germany, has been defi ned as ‘a morally justifi able distribution of material India, Italy, Britain, and other countries, but it did not involve or social rewards, notably wealth, income and social status’.19 The the erosion of civil liberties. Some scholars and policy makers expanded defi nition of development is refl ected in the UNDP’s might argue that in the aftermath of the events of September Human Development Report, which, since 1990, has listed ma- 2001, the traditional approach does not work. Those who ternal and infant mortality rates, access to health, education and would make this point would be ignoring the fact that the terror- safe water, as indicators of a country’s development. ist attacks of 11 September 2001 were possible partly because Development has further expanded to include human em- of the failure of US intelligence agencies to share information. powerment, especially increased participation by the people in Unfortunately, the US and other governments over-reacted and the management of their economic, political, cultural and social instituted far-reaching counter-terrorism measures even before affairs. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues, development ‘can the cause of 9/11 had been fully investigated. The legislative only succeed if it responds to the needs of the people, and if measures that have been undertaken undermine democratic it articulates these needs into a coherent policy framework’.20

19 The African understanding of terrorism

Development includes capacity building in its broadest sense, CONCLUSION thereby implying the introduction of new ideas, standards, in- stitutions, norms and techniques of overcoming obstacles to hu- Mapping the history of terrorism in Africa requires an understand- man progress. It also includes democratisation, an independent ing that the past does not reveal itself to researchers. It is the re- judiciary and an open, responsible and accountable government. searchers who employ various methods to try to understand what Thus, development provides the basis for security. they seek to uncover. In so doing, the researchers re-interpret the Moreover, development, poverty alleviation and social jus- past from archives and records, which are basically previous inter- tice can reduce the chances of terrorism by facilitating human pretations of phenomena. Only interpretations that are based on empowerment while at the same time eliminating the conditions the prevailing norms, rules and institutions, and are, at the same that produce political discontent. As Wolfensohn says: time, consistent with universally recognised methodological and epistemological assumptions are considered valid. This paper’s in- The international community has already acted strongly, by terpretation has included the African liberation struggles and civil confronting terrorism directly and increasing security. But those wars in the history of terrorism on the continent. actions by themselves are not enough. We will not create that If the political violence unleashed in the course of nationalist better and safer world with bombs or brigades alone.21 struggles constituted terrorism, the root causes of terrorism on … the continent must have included the oppressive and discriminat- We must recognise that while there is social injustice on a ing policies of the colonial and white minority regimes. In other global scale – both between states and within them; while the words, by describing African liberation fi ghters as terrorists, this fi ght against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the paper accuses Western powers and white minority regimes of world; while the link between progress in development and planting the seeds of terrorism. If the battles waged by civil war progress toward peace is not recognised – we may win a bat- protagonists constituted terrorism, the root causes of terrorism tle against terror but we will not conclude a war that will yield have included the authoritarian and misguided political and enduring peace.22 economic policies of the post-independence regimes. The latest wave of terrorism in Africa has been inspired by the Poverty per se does not cause terrorism, but it can combine with global al-Qaeda network which was founded by the Saudi-born other factors to ignite political violence. Wolfensohn says: ‘Poverty Osama bin Laden. While al-Qaeda may be regarded by many is our greatest long-term challenge … poverty which, while it does African leaders as a foreign or non-African entity, it was at one not necessarily lead to violence … can provide a breeding ground time headquartered in Sudan. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s foremost for the ideas and actions of those who promote confl ict and ter- ideologist, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was born and bred in Egypt, an ror.’23 Moreover, poverty, combined with the politics of identity, African state. In a sense, al-Qaeda has a strong African link. can fuel terror. People such as those who masterminded the ter- The best counter-terrorism approach for African states should rorist attacks of 11 September 2001 do not have to come from be based on political and economic empowerment, social poverty-stricken homes in order to identify with the poor. These justice, development, creative institutional designs and capac- terrorists might have been rich, but they defi ned their identities in ity building. These values would undermine the root causes of terms of the aspirations of those who had been denied justice in the terrorism, guarantee stability and security in the long term, and Middle East. Development, poverty alleviation and social justice enable Africans to take responsibility for the security of their fel- can help people redefi ne their identities and refocus their interests low Africans. In other words, a values-based counter-terrorism and energies, and, thereby, reduce the chances of terrorism. strategy would be ethically sound.

NOTES

1 Gus Martin, Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspec- Revolution in Guinea: An African people’s struggle, Stage 11 See William Rosenau, Al Qaida recruitment trends in tives and issues, 2nd ed,Sage, London, 2006), pp 33-74. See 1, London, 1973. Kenya and Tanzania, Studies in confl ict and terrorism, 28, also J M Lutz and B J Lutz, Global terrorism, Routledge, 6 For Nelson Mandela’s own perspective on this, see his pp 1-10. London, 2004, chapter 1; and J I Ross, Defi ning terrorism: Long walk to freedom, Little Brown, London, 1994. 12 For a perceptive analysis of the impact of colonialism on An international consensus, a critical appraisal after 9/11, 7 For a practitioner’s perspective on Pan-Africanism, see the black people, see, for example, Frantz Fanon, Black Encyclopedia of world terrorism, 1966-2002, Sharpe, New Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary path Panaf Books, skins, white masks, Grove Press, New York, 1967. York, 2003, pp 12-16. London, 1973. 13 See, for example, S M Makinda, The African personality: 2 Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Europe 8 On the link between liberation and revolutionary warfare, Is it relevant in Africa?’ Thought and Practice, 4(1), 1982, and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary war- pp 17-28. House of Representatives, 101st Congress, First Session, fare, Panaf Books, London, 1968. 14 See, for instance, J-F Bayart, S Ellis and B Hibou, The p 66. 9 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaida: Global network of ter- criminalization of the state in Africa James Currey, Oxford, 3 Australian government, Transnational terrorism: The threat ror, Hurst, London, 2002, p 26. 1999. to Australia, Canberra, 2004, p 3. 10 For a brief analysis of Sudan’s National Islamic Front 15 See, for example, I William Zartman (ed), Collapsed 4 See Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the liberal state, and its interest in a wider Islamic revolution, see Samuel states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate Macmillan, London, 1977, pp 47-68. M Makinda, Iran, Sudan and Islam, The World Today, authority,Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colo, 1995. 5 See, for instance, Che Guevara, Guerrilla warfare Pelican, 49(6), June 1993, pp 107-110. See also S M Makinda, 16 For a detailed analysis of Somalia’s problems and the po- 1966, chapter 1; Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary guerril- ‘Islamisation and politics in Sudan’, Australian Journal of tential for terrorists, see Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State col- la warfare, Penguin, 1974, chapter 1; and Amilcar Cabral, Political Science, 28(1), 1993, pp 118-134. lapse and the threat of terrorism, Adelphi Paper No 364,

20 History and root causes of terrorism in Africa

Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 18 R O Keohane, Governance in a partially globalized world, 21 J D Wolfensohn, A partnership for development and Strategic Studies, Oxford, 2004. American Political Science Review, 95(1), 2001, p 3. peace, (8 March 2002). ism, see Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha, African 2000, p 135. 22 Ibid. commitments to combating organised crime and terrorism, 20 B Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for development, United 23 Ibid. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004. Nations, New York, 1995, p 2.

21

Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it Anneli Botha

INTRODUCTION extensive nature of an act of terrorism, one can approach it from the conjecture that the illness had presented previously under a Security experts and researchers have traditionally studied the different manifestation, but had been misdiagnosed. Owing to a direct threat and impact of terrorism on a specifi c country, wrong or late diagnosis, the underlying reason was not identifi ed based on the number of incidents or the identity and activities and addressed. In treating terrorism merely as a symptom (the of groups associated with terrorism. This approach is considered primary focus is on arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators) reactive and event-driven and therefore has limited effectiveness without addressing the underlying cause, it will remain a threat in creating a better understanding of the nature of terrorism and to human security. One could therefore conclude that prevention the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring. In other words, is better than cure – through adopting a vulnerability assessment while this is a valid and practical approach, it does not identify approach. In the medical profession the latest approach is to and attempt to prevent the threat that terrorism has on human conduct genetic analyses to determine the likelihood of an illness security in the medium to long term. A critical challenge for re- before it presents itself, in the hope that it may be prevented or searchers, policy-makers, and law enforcement and intelligence detected earlier. Governments and the international community agencies is to identify emerging threats. need to be more ‘in harmony’ with their citizens. In addition to this reactive approach, a proactive preventa- In assessing vulnerability, certain indicators provide useful tive approach is suggested in the study of terrorism. First, what insights: makes a country vulnerable to terrorism? A preliminary study in- dicated that certain countries in Africa are not only more prone ■ Socio-economic conditions to be the targets of terrorism, their citizens may also become ■ Political conditions involved as agents of terrorism. The only way to identify factors ■ Security and strategic conditions that contribute to a country’s vulnerability is to study conditions ■ State response –strategies – the infl uence of counter-ter- in countries that have been the target of terrorism in Africa. In rorism measures is recognised as contributing to instabil- other words, to explain acts of terrorism requires uncovering the ity, and is an important element in conducting a vulner- causes that contributed to its manifestation. Broadly, these may ability assessment. be categorised as internal factors and external factors. Internal factors focus on domestic conditions that may prompt terrorist In essence, vulnerability assessments focus on the identifi cation activities, for example economic deprivation, political oppres- of all the factors – including safety and security hazards – that sion, government repression, and ethnic and religious persecu- could contribute to a state’s susceptibility to terrorism. The aim of tion. One has merely to consider the development and level of a vulnerability assessment is broader than a risk or threat analysis, impact that terror networks have achieved in the past ten years. and is not only to identify potential threats but to understand the At external level, vulnerability to terrorism is infl uenced inter likelihood of their occurring. The goal is therefore twofold: alia by the foreign policies of other countries, in particular the United States, as well as globalisation, especially the develop- ■ To identify threats, based on feasibility and indicators of ment of telecommunications, which has enabled same-minded potential exploitation, for example lax immigration and individuals to unite and conspire against common enemies. security laws; corruption; long porous borders with insuf- In this paper a paradigm shift is suggested in which terrorism fi cient border control units or instruments; and advanced is studied as a symptom and not merely a criminal act or an act infrastructure without effective security measures. These of war. To use a metaphor, a fever is regarded as a symptom of an threats are then categorised according to the likelihood illness and is not treated in isolation. If it were, the body would that they will be exploited. fi nd another way to manifest the illness. In addition, the sooner ■ To provide an informed assessment based on detecting, the illness can be diagnosed, the sooner it can be treated and the monitoring and predicting potential threats. greater the possibility of recovery. Terrorism should be studied as a manifestation that ‘something’ in society, domestic or interna- Despite the analytical use of indicators in understanding and tional, is ‘not in order’. Equally important, when one considers the identifying new threats and causes of terrorism, it is important

23 The African understanding of terrorism

to acknowledge that these analyses should not be considered an number of activities that should be categorized as acts of ter- exact science: Human nature and the inability to predict it play a rorism. Equally not all acts of violence can be categorized as decisive role. But it is still an important step towards understand- terrorism. This argument however reinforces the need to focus ing and therefore preventing terrorism, especially domestic and our attention on what the concept of terrorism means within state-inspired terrorism. Although it is beyond the focus of this the African context. paper to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment for a country, a number of indicators will be presented and explained Civil war and actions by governments against their own citizens through the use of examples. may be regarded as forms of terrorism: the same rules apply. When a group resorts to violence against its own government or a segment of society, it is regarded as terrorism, but when TERRORISM IN AFRICA governments or security forces have recourse to the same meth- ods (and even worse), this is done in the name of security and Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Africa, it is an protection of the regime. On numerous occasions, the suspicion emotional topic that means different things to different people that a village might be sympathetic towards the cause of ‘terrorist – hence the inability of academics, policy-makers and others to groups’ has led to indiscriminate bombing raids that have includ- create a single defi nition. Another possible reason is the chang- ed the use of cluster bombs against unarmed civilians. Should ing nature of and motivation for terrorism. In addition to interna- these incidents not be categorised as acts of terror? This remains tional and transnational threats, the primary source of terrorism an open question that is slowly attracting the attention of policy in Africa is domestic, since insurgents, guerrillas, organisations makers. The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recently and states before the attacks of 9/11 had adopted the tactic. stimulated debate with his defi nition of terrorism:”An action is Since neither the international community (United Nations) terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm nor scholars can decide on a single defi nition of terrorism, this to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating discussion will be structured in terms of a mutual agreement or a population or compelling a Government or an international or- understanding that targeting civilians or non-combatants cannot ganization to do or abstain from doing any act.”2 The deliberate be accepted. Therefore terrorism is referred to as ‘violent acts use of weapons to kill innocent people must be condemned and against a civilian population by state and non-state actors’. eradicated, for it is as unworthy and inhuman as it is repulsive, Boaz Ganor supports this approach:1 ”[T]errorism is the inten- like terrorism perpetrated in the past by oppressing states. But tional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against the right to resist cannot include the right to deliberately kill or civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.” Unlike other maim civilians.3 One might therefore argue that the defi nition of defi nitions, this one applies to governments and their agencies terrorism should be broadened beyond those that were adequate as well as non-governmental groups and individuals. One can to describe the concept in the 1960s and 1970s as threats to state probably include a number of the actions of insurgents, para- security. Terrorism in this analysis comprises two categories: militaries and other groups that resorted to terrorism as a tactic. In these confl icts or periods of instability, both sides often resort ■ Domestic terrorism: Domestic terrorism occurs when the to terror tactics to coerce populations into supporting their causes act of terrorism is confi ned to national boundaries and or equalling the ‘playing fi eld’. An act of terrorism in accordance does not include targets or agents from abroad. State ter- to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of rorism forms part of domestic terrorism when state actors Terrorism refer to “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws (police, the military, etc) have recourse to acts of terror of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integ- against own nationals. rity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, ■ International/transnational terrorism: International terror- any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage ism comprises of acts that are instigated by a state parties to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or with clear international consequences. These include cultural heritage”. Elements of an act of terrorism include: incidents where terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign targets, select victims or targets because of their ■ Intimidation – put in fear, force, coerce or induce govern- connections with a foreign country (for example diplo- ment, body, institution, the general public or segment to mats, executives), attack airliners on international fl ights, do or abstain from doing any act / adapt or abandon a par- or force aircraft to fl y to other countries. International ticular standpoint / to act according to certain principles; terrorism is broadly associated with the Cold War, when ■ Disruption – Any public Service / the delivery of an es- acts of terrorism were carried out by individuals or groups sential service / create a public emergency; and controlled by a sovereign state. ■ Create general insurrection in a state Cause feelings of insecurity within the public (segment) / Induce, cause or According to Anderson, transnational terrorism is “the use, or spread feelings of terror, fear or panic. threat of use, of anxiety – including, extra normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting Although disruption will defi nitely limit the possibility of for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when legitimate political dissent, the other two elements include a such action is intended to infl uence the attitudes and behavior

24 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

Figure 1: Terrorism in Africa: Historical Analysis

8,000

6,910 7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000 1,783 1,141 1,210 1,000 409 472 227 342 191 0 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005

Incidents Deaths Injuries

Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, that the individual or group can be utilised to the advantage of through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, through a foreign cause. Equally only a small number of individuals and its location, through the nature of its institutional or human vic- groups involved in domestic terrorism will remain active within tims, or through the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifi cations the borders of that particular country. Ideological infl uence, fi - transcend national boundaries”.4 In other words, in comparison nancial support, weaponry, safe haven and even targets attacked with international terrorism where state actors commit acts of seldom remain domestic. For example the LRA in Uganda terrorism, autonomous non-state actors, irrespective of support directed their attacks from Sudan and the DRC while al-Ittihad from sympathetic states, carry out acts of transnational terror- al-Islamiyya, although based in Somalia were implicated in a ism. Terrorism is transnational through the nationality or foreign number of attacks in Ethiopia. ties of its perpetrators, its location, victims, or the mechanics One could probably produce volumes on how we should of its resolution and its ramifi cations that transcend beyond defi ne terrorism. In an attempt to steer away from emotional national boundaries. arguments, it is rather suggested to focus on the act itself. A Although these areas of operation are separated and ad- useful test might be to exclude the organization suspected to dressed as independent threats to human security, this paper be responsible as well as the country in which the incident oc- will argue that for international/transnational groups to obtain a curred and only based on the nature and target of the incident foothold in a country, domestic pre-conditions need to exist so decide whether a particular incident could be categorized

Figure 2: International Terrorism in Africa: 1990-2002

60 55 53 53

50

40 33

30 25 21 20

10 10 11 11 10 6 5 3

0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

25 The African understanding of terrorism

Figure 3: Areas of concern

Renewed concern since 2004: ■ 7 Oct 04: Two car bombs detonated at the Taba Hilton Hotel and a beach bungalow south of Taba ■ 7 April 05: Suicide bomber detonated a device in Cairo’s main bazaar (Khan al-Khalili) ■ 30 April 05: Suicide bomber detonated a devive outside the Egyptian Museum in Cairo 50 incidents were recorded during 2006 ■ 30 April 05: Two women opened fi re on a tourist bus in Cairo ■ 31 Oct: Truck bomb attacks in Dergana & ■ 22 July 05: Approximately 60 people were killed in a series of attacks in Sharm as-Sheikh Reghaia the fi st use of truck bombs since 2003 ■ 19 Dec 05: A small device detonated in Giza, an area close to the Pyramids ■ GSPC aligned themselves openly with al-Qa’eda ■ 24 April 06: A number of explosive devices detonated in Dahab ■ 26 Apr 06: Two suicide bombers attacked international peacekeepers at Rafah

Growing number of attacks directed against peacekeepers and humanitarian agency representatives

25 attacks were recorded in Ethiopia for 2006: GSPC ■ 7 Mar: Three divices detonated throughout Addis ■ 15 Apr: Grenades were detonated in a bar and church in Jijiga ■ 12 May: 9 bombings in Addis Ababa ■ 27 May: 42 people were injured in three blasts directed against 2 cafes abd a hotel Bin Laden verbal threats ■ 31 Jul: Three explosive devices detonated in Dire Diwa against peacekeepers

LRA Bin Laden verbal threats against peacekeepers

■ 13 May: The HQ of ‘Concern’ was bombed in Marka (southern Somalia) 32 attacks were recorded in Nigeria during ■ 31 Aug: 9 people were injured in a grenade attack on a 2006 – predominately directed oil installations crowded market in Mogadishu and foreign employees (growing specialization) ■ 18 Sep: Two powerful bombs rocked Somalia’s ■ 9 Jul 06: A grenade was tossed into a parliament building in Baidoa - a suicide attacker crowed street. drove a car into the presidential convoy, directed at the ■ Between 30 Jul-6 Aug fi ve attacks were automobile that usually carries President Abdullahi Yusuf directed against bars & public places

Sporadic attacks

■ 1 Jan 06: Two high schools were petrol bombed ■ 21 Jan 06: Mbabane magistrate court was petrol bombed ■ 4 Feb 06: Two apartment buildings housing police offi cers were fi rebombed

as an act of terrorism. This strategy might be the only way than that of a foreigner. MIPT and the US Department of State one will be able to guard against emotional outbursts and recorded the results as shown in Figure 1. double standards. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism, the number of Since 1995, Africa has witnessed an increase in the number incidents can be broken down as shown in Figure 2. of terrorist attacks. Most of these stemmed from internal civil Between 1990 and 2003, 6 per cent of international acts unrest and spill-over from regional wars, as African rebel move- of terrorism were committed on African soil, making it the fi fth ments and opposition groups resorted to terrorism to further most targeted region after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia their political, social or economic objectives. However, despite and the Middle East. This trend will probably change, because growing international interest in the threat of terrorism, interna- terror groups and networks will search for more ‘suitable targets’ tional databases such as the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism as a result of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and (US Department of State) and the Memorial Institute for the the ‘war against terrorism’. African countries, as with the rest of Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) focus predominately on incidents the Third World, lack the resources to prevent acts of terrorism, with international consequences, therefore providing a distorted making them vulnerable targets. Although the primary targets picture of the threat and impact of terrorism in Africa. This even may be the US, Israel and certain Western countries, casualties fuelled the perception that the life of an African is worth less among African nationals present another reality: African countries

26 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

may not always agree with international policies, but they cannot to human life, stability and development. The following map isolate themselves from the growing threat of transnational terror- refl ects a few areas of concern as shown in Figure 3. ism. It is equally important to acknowledge that the primary threat comes in the form of domestic terrorism, as a result of domestic Modus operandi and target selection circumstances. Countries in Africa are therefore encouraged to ad- Although the use of explosives is often the preferred modus oper- dress these issues that not only impact on a country’s vulnerability andi, Africa refl ected also the use of fi rearms in acts of terrorism. to domestic terrorism, but have a positive infl uence on its vulner- In Africa, the number of incidents involving explosives and fi re- ability to transnational terrorism. Since the two are inter-related, in arms was similar from 1990 to 1999. The period 2000 – October addressing domestic circumstances, countries will make it diffi cult 2004 shows a different scenario, in which shooting incidents for domestic and transnational agents of terrorism to operate, to were the most frequent modus operandi, represented by 47 per justify the use of terror tactics and to recruit new followers to cent, compared with 31 per cent for explosives. This is explained their cause. This is part of a long-term strategy and requires the by the availability, fl ow of illegal fi rearms (as a result of a lack involvement of security forces and intelligence agencies within of control of fi rearms) inter- and intra-state warfare and instabil- the framework of a broader objective. ity. After the Cold War and the conclusion of civil wars in most Between 1990 and 2002 Africa recorded 6 177 casualties African countries, the continent was faced with extensive stock- from 296 acts of terrorism (according to MIPT), making it the piles of used and unused weapons. Virginia Gamba comments: continent with the second highest number of casualties, after Asia. This fi gure excludes the death of approximately 200 000 A massive quantity of small arms is circulating throughout people in Algeria and countless deaths in Uganda as result of the Africa, moving unchecked across porous borders. This is one Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), as well as deaths from acts of ter- of the legacies of the continent’s many confl icts. The origins of rorism in Egypt, Ethiopia, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, and Sierra the small arms build-up lie in the Cold War competition and Leone. Direct costs in terms of devastation to infrastructure as the struggles against colonialism and apartheid. Since 1970, well as indirect costs through the withdrawal of investment and more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa. In 1996 alone, tourism, one of Africa’s biggest industries, cannot be calculated. 14 of the 53 countries were affected by armed confl icts.5 More The highest number of casualties (5 379) was recorded in 1998, recently, as internal wars predominate, the infl ux of new weap- as a result of the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. It is also im- ons remains a preoccupation. But it is the illicit redistribution portant to acknowledge the increase in the number of attacks and fl ows of existing stocks from older confl icts which currently and their intensity, which is refl ected in the number of casual- raise the greatest concern.6 ties since 1998. Although the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania came as a surprise, danger signals were well defi ned, especially Stockpiles of weapons that were used and then circulated by in Tanzania, and could be traced back to the Gulf War in 1991. secondary and tertiary actors to other confl ict areas are one In addition to these incidents, African countries are con- of the primary concerns faced by governments. Most African fronted with domestic terrorism, with devastating consequences countries do not have the resources to implement adequate

Figure 4: Modus Operandi: 2005

Modus Operandi (Global): 2005 Modus Operandi in Africa: 2005 7% 7% 13% 34% 35%

46%

Modus Operandi in Africa: 2006 13%

Explosives 58% Firearms Kidnapping Knives 32% 55%

27 The African understanding of terrorism

Figure 5: Target Selection: 2005

Target Selection (Global): 2005 Target Selection Africa: 2005 10% 27% 26% 10%

16% 50% 14%

9% Target Selection Africa: 2006 4% 4% 18% 1% 44%

5% 29% Civilian Religious Security Forces 10% Commercial Infrastructure Humanitarian

Diplomatic Government 23%

measures of control over illegal weapons or to secure their bor- members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) were responsible ders. Notwithstanding the existing threat of fi rearms, the fi gure for a number of attacks on IDP camps. shows that the use of explosives in Africa has increased from 34 In addition to the immediate impact of this trend, the me- per cent in 2005 to 55 per cent in 2006, bringing it into line with dium- and long-term consequences cannot be estimated. international trends (58 per cent for 2005) see Figure 4. Considering that Africa urgently needs humanitarian assistance, Africa also presented an interesting target selection, differ- attacking these soft targets constitutes an attack against recon- ent from the situation in Europe and the Middle East. Although struction and development initiatives that in the medium to long civilian targets are preferred (75 per cent for 1990–1999, com- term would have contributed to stability. In acknowledging and pared with 64 per cent for 2000 – October 2004), commercial countering this threat, the Statute of the International Criminal targets represent 8 per cent of the attacks and are increasing. Court made it a war crime to deliberately direct attacks against Acts of terrorism against humanitarian agents (including UN personnel, installations, material, units and vehicles involved in representatives) doubled from 5 per cent (1990–1999) to 11 humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions.9 per cent (2000 – October 2004). Attacks on humanitarian rep- resentatives introduced a new trend, similar only to the target selection in Asia. Examples include the abduction of members INVOLVEMENT OF AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL of the International Rescue Committee in August 1999 by the AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM Joint Forces for Liberation of Liberia, who demanded fuel and other assistance in return for their release.7 In July 2001, gunmen The threat of Africa as an ‘agent’ or ‘facilitator’ of terrorism can in Mogadishu attacked a World Food Program convoy, killing six be divided into two categories: people and wounding several others. In March 2001, again in Somalia, extremists attacked a Médecins Sans Frontières medi- ■ State-initiated campaigns of terrorism against other states cal charity facility, killing 11 people, wounding 40, and taking or dissidents in other countries. Included in this category nine hostages. The hostages were later released.8 Despite the are states who knowingly facilitated, funded, provided threat to humanitarian agencies, in 2006 the number of attacks safety and other forms of support to individuals and or- on commercial targets increased. Like attacks on humanitar- ganizations associated with acts of terrorism in their ter- ian institutions, attacks directed at commercial agents have ror campaigns against other states; and far-reaching consequences in terms of development. Figure 5 ■ Non-state actors that include individuals and organisa- reveals a unique target selection in Africa compared with the tions who participate, facilitate, fund, provide safety and global trend. other forms of support in terror campaigns. It is not only external agencies that are being targeted. Attacks against internal displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps are As examples of state-initiated campaigns, the governments of also a matter of concern. Attacks directed against humanitarian Libya and Sudan were reputed to be the two most prominent efforts increased substantially in 2004. For example, in Uganda agents of terrorism within Africa. Currently fewer states have

28 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

been named as exporters of terrorism or state sponsors of terror- stantiate, though, because only fi gures are presented. For exam- ism than in the 1970s and 1980s. Although this trend developed ple, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly, approximately 2 800 gradually, the aftermath of 9/11 and US President George W Algerians were trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, making Bush’s ‘for or against’ speech led to an almost immediate decline Algeria the third biggest contributor of foot soldiers, after Saudi in the state as actor or facilitator of terrorism in an organised Arabia and Yemen.14 The Groupe Salafi ste pour la Prédication manner. Despite the declining trend of traditional international et le Combat (Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) state-sponsored terrorism, it is still a threat to be reckoned with, also openly aligned itself with al-Qaeda since 2003. In addition although in a different manifestation. State-inspired terrorism, in to the involvement of Algeria, Egyptian nationals constitute the which the state or its security forces act against its own subjects, third largest number of foreign fi ghters in Iraq, after Saudi Arabia is a direct threat to national and regional stability, directly (the and Syria. According to a high-ranking security offi cial in Iraq on loss of civilian lives in particular) as well as indirectly (refugees 10 November 2006, most of the foreign fi ghters who had been that often result in cross-border activities into neighbouring arrested in the previous four months were Egyptian nationals countries) that have a further destabilising effect. Within Africa (estimated at 150), followed by Syrians and Libyans (estimated at the situations in the Great Lakes region, Liberia and Sierra Leone 80).15 Other examples are Mohsen Khayber, aka Abdul Rahim or serve as examples. Abdul Majid Al-Libi, a Moroccan national who is wanted in con- nection with the Casablanca bombings in 2003, and has been The threat of non-state actors could best be described through linked to three simultaneous car bombings in Balad that killed the development of transnational terror networks (for example more than 100 people in September 2005. Khayber reputedly al-Qaeda) and incidents where individuals were responsible for moved to Syria in early 2004, where he helped channel foreign acts of terrorism in another country. Osama bin Laden, through militants from Morocco into Iraq.16 the al-Qaeda network, proved that it is possible to coordinate devastating acts of terrorism through a decentralised system. Despite the immediate impact on security in Iraq, it is feared that This global network tied Islamic groups together in a loose a trend might develop similar to the aftermath of the Afghanistan coalition of organisations and sympathetic individuals, includ- war against the Soviet Union that ended in 1989: Returning indi- ing fi nanciers and aid donors, government offi cials, former and viduals, infl uenced by a new philosophy and possessing combat possibly current military offi cers, guerrilla and militant groups, experience, ultimately led to the emergence of terrorist groups information technology specialists and operational commanders in all northern African countries in the early 1990s. all adhering to a broader philosophy. Kenya and Tanzania are examples of Osama’s reach into Africa. In contrast to northern Other examples include the infl uence of nationals of North and eastern Africa, Islamic extremism has found it more diffi cult African countries in the Madrid bombing. This was reconfi rmed to penetrate West Africa, despite poor socio-economic condi- with the implication of predominately Moroccan nationals, tions in those countries. However, Senegal, Gambia, Niger, particularly through the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Mauritania, Liberia, Chad and even Mali have experienced (MICG). Among those arrested was Jamal Zougam, a 30 year Islamist-motivated unrest. Traditionally al-Qaeda’s infl uence in old Moroccan who was accused of direct involvement in manu- West Africa has been associated predominately with the smug- facturing the 13 bombs that were placed on commuter trains. gling of precious stones used in the fi nancing of terrorism.10 Zougam, an alleged al-Qaeda member, knew Imadeddin Barakat Yarkas, alias Abou Dahdah, the head of the former al-Qaeda African and Asian nationals also established networks in Europe cell in Spain.17 In addition to its presence in Spain, the MICG and the Middle East, including Belgium, Switzerland, Turkey, had cells in Belgium, Britain, Canada, France and Italy. In the af- Bangladesh, Romania, Yemen and Syria.11 According to Rohan termath of the Madrid bombing, several links with London also Gunaratna,12 al-Qaeda has established links with a number of emerged. Zougam, for example, travelled to London on several Islamic political parties, terrorist groups and key individuals occasions to collect logistic help and false documents for the al- in central and southern Africa. The CIA managed to thwart Qaeda cell in Spain. Abu Qatada, a London-based radical cleric, the bombing of the US embassy in Kampala, Uganda, on 18 whom the Spanish authorities described as ‘al-Qaeda’s spiritual September 1998. The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania had been adviser in Europe’, is currently being held at Belmarsh top secu- planned since 1994, when al-Qaeda fi rst established a presence rity prison in southeast London under emergency terror legisla- in Nairobi and Mombasa. Because of his knowledge of civil engi- tion. The Spanish police suspect that the command structure of neering, bin Laden was approached to identify the entry path of al-Qaeda in Spain comes from the followers of Abu Qatada.18 the explosives van into the embassy. In addition to Southern and On 6 November 2006 a court in Milan further sentenced two Eastern Africa, Osama bin Laden planned to make inroads into Egyptian nationals for their involvement in the Madrid train central and Western Africa. Plans were set in motion for further bombings. Rabei Ousmane Sayed Ahmed, the accused master- attacks against US embassies to politicise and radicalise African mind, was sentenced to ten years in jail for being member of a Muslims in the hope of provoking anti-Muslim backlashes.13 terrorist organisation, and Yahya Mawad Mohamed Rajeh was sentenced to fi ve years in jail.19 Probably the most prominent ex- Algeria and Egypt are the best examples of ‘domestic’ terrorism ample of an African national’s involvement in transnational ter- being exported to a transnational network. This is diffi cult to sub- rorism is Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Jihad in Egypt,

29 The African understanding of terrorism

who reputedly was the intellectual and ideological leader of deaf ears. In allowing these individuals to establish themselves the International Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Al- in Western countries, they not only contributed to the instability Qaeda originated from this alliance, which was formed in 1998. to their countries of origin, but also facilitated the establishment of cell structures in Europe and the US that ultimately directed The transnational infl uence of Algerian armed groups became their attacks against their hosts. clear in the 1995 bombing campaign in Paris, France. Since South Africa was also implicated in a number of prominent then Algerian nationals have been implicated in a number of transnational terrorism cases. Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a acts of terrorism. For example, Said Arif (extradited from Syria Tanzanian national in Cape Town, was arrested after the August to France), also known as Slimane Chabani or Abderrahmane, 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Haroon Rashid Aswat originally from Oran, Algeria, had close relations with a cell lived in Mayfair, Johannesburg, for a while before he was arrest- in Frankfurt, Germany, of Algerians implicated in a foiled ed in Zambia. According to investigators, Haroon Rashid Aswat, plot to plant a bomb in the bustling French holiday market in aged 30, a British citizen, placed a number of calls to suspects Strasbourg on New Year’s Eve 2000. Arif escaped capture and of the bombings in London on 7 July 2005. These examples fl ed to Georgia, where he collaborated with al-Qaeda militants provided an additional trend: Foreigners used South Africa as who would later be arrested in France on suspicions of plotting a safe-haven or hideout. A possible explanation might be that a chemical attack against Russian interests. The network was certain communities in South Africa are traditionally open and dismantled in December 2002 with the arrests of nine suspects hospitable, but fears are growing that ‘outsiders’ with ulterior in the Paris suburbs of La Courneuve and Romainville.20 motives may abuse this hospitality. In April 2004 a Spanish judge charged four Algerian nation- als and members of the GSPC21 for belonging to al-Qaeda. The involvement of African nationals in transnational terrorism is The four worked in support of a French cell led by Merouane not limited to northern and eastern Africa. Two South Africans, Benahmed (arrested in December 2002) and received training Dr Firoz and Zubeir Ismail, were arrested after a long shoot-out in Afghanistan from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A mobile phone with Pakistani authorities in an alleged al-Qaeda safe house in detonator, similar to those used in the Bali nightclub and Madrid Pakistan in 2004, along with Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. Ghailani, train bombing attacks, was found in their possession.22 a Tanzanian national in US custody, was allegedly involved in On 24 February 2005, Italian security forces announced that the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings. The they had arrested Nadir Remli, the former head of the Armed two South Africans explained that they were hiking in Pakistan, Islamic Group (GIA) cell in London, at Rome airport. Remli al- an explanation that was not accepted by analysts because of though wanted by Algerian authoriries since 1992 was granted the conditions and the company of their arrest. After investiga- polictical refugee status by the United Kingdom. He was also tions in Pakistan were completed, these two individuals were one of the founders of the Algerian Community in Britain (ACB) transported back to South Africa – where they did not face Salvation Front (FIS). Along with Kamredinne Kherbane (the prosecution. leader of the Algerian ‘Afghans’), also a London resident. The In summary, Africa provides almost ideal recruitment condi- Algeria government accused Remli of having supplied money to tions, which might worsen as a result of increased resentment of the GIA since 1992 by setting up an account at an Arab bank US foreign policy in the Middle East. In addition to recruitment in London. Remli, with Mohamed Dnidni, was considered one with the object of being directly involved in planning and ex- of the main offi cials of the GIA cell in Britain for fi ve years. His ecuting terrorist operations in Africa or elsewhere, an increasing activities varied from collecting money to the creation of GIA’s number of Africans indirectly or in principle support the activi- publication Al-Ansar. Despite being on a list of terrorists close to ties of extremist groups. Although this situation can be managed, the al-Qaeda network, which was sent by the Algerian security countries should be very careful in their counter-terrorism strate- agencies to Interpol and the UN, the British authorities did not gies preventing they do not drive ordinary followers to extremism. act on the request for extradition.23

Two African nationals who were involved in transnational terror- VULNERABILITY INDICATORS ism were identifi ed in the bombings in London on 21 July 2005: Muktar Said Ibrahim, originally from Eritrea, attempted to deto- Socio-economic conditions nate a bomb on a doubledecker bus, and Yasin Hassan Omar, a It is often suggested that there is a direct link between extremist Ethiopian national (arrested in Italy), staged a failed attack on the ideas and appalling social conditions. The roots of extremism Underground system’s Northern Line. Both had moved to Britain grow in poverty and despondency. People become easy prey to in 1992 with their families as minors. This is the fi rst recorded devious individuals who will attempt to channel this frustration incident in which militants from East Africa played a direct role into religious fanaticism or political fascism. This perception be- in terror cells in Europe. In comparison, the role of nationals came the norm in understanding and analysing the reasons for from North African countries is well recorded.24 terrorism, especially in Africa, and in Third World countries. In most cases, countries in Africa warned European coun- To return to the role of poor socio-economic conditions as tries of the danger of hosting suspicious individuals and even motivation for acts of terrorism, a counter argument developed; requested their extradition before 9/11. Unfortunately this fell on that not all poor people get involved in terrorism.

30 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

The possibility that well-off people in poor countries with members of society could easily be indoctrinated and oppressive governments are drawn to terrorism must be studied, mobilised. leaving researchers and policy-makers to determine the role and ■ The illiteracy rate and unequal education and employment infl uence of poor socio-economic conditions in ‘driving’ people opportunities are further factors. to terrorism in current world politics. To return to the role of poor socio-economic conditions as motivation for acts of ter- Countries that cannot offer solutions to everyday socio-eco- rorism, poor economic performance increases pressure for eco- nomic conditions, not only introduce challenges to their ability nomic change, which in turn impacts on government reaction. to rule, they also open the door to external role-players. For In situations where increased economic disparities occur within, example, poor socio-economic conditions and governments’ or are limited to, identifi able ethnic and religious groups, might inability to address these conditions presented favourable condi- affect the political climate, raising questions of discrimination tions for charity organisations. Although not all charity organi- and separation. Generally support can be drawn from deterio- sations should be considered threats to national and regional rating socio-economic conditions. Therefore, the monitoring of stability, it is common knowledge that a number of Islamic relief socio-economic trends is an important element in identifying an organisations (NGOs) were used as fronts for groups associated emerging issue that might have political consequences. with acts of terrorism. Overtly these relief organisations gained importance through providing essential humanitarian services, It is however important to differentiate between instigators or including education, health, welfare and culture. While provid- planners and foot soldiers when analysing the role of socio- ing essential services individuals within these organizations economic conditions. Earlier research established that terrorists exploited these structures to establish and enhance their illegal representing the lower ranks came predominately from poor activities. However, it is equally important to warn against the countries. However, one cannot assume that only poor people perception that all charity organisations and their employees are or all poor people turn to terrorism. As well as a link between involved in suspected illegal activities. economic conditions and terrorism, domestic political conditions constitute another element. Lack of civil liberties, specifi cally Socio-economic conditions can also lead to the export of poten- human rights, political frustration, and religious ideology, in ad- tial extremist and terrorist groups. In Morocco, for example, un- dition to poor economic conditions, can be used to mobilise in- employment, poverty and social tensions resulted in hundreds of dividuals to become involved in terrorism. Guarding against the Moroccans immigrating to Europe, legally or illegally, where radi- assumption that socio-economic or political conditions ‘compel’ cal Islamic elements presented a threat to security. 25 For those in individuals or groups to acts of terrorism, the central argument is the ghettos in Spain or France conditions are poor, especially for that a combination of factors are part of the causes that manifest those who do not have the necessary documentation and therefore in acts of terrorism. On the African continent, countries are in- cannot apply for employment legally. Disillusionment and poverty creasingly confronted with socio-economic frustration. Through often fuel bitterness. Moroccan immigrants, responsible of the introducing a political or religious ideology, poor socio-econom- Madrid bombings for example used crime and criminal networks ic conditions could bring forward individuals that have nothing to fi nance the attacks as well as getting access to explosives used to lose, in other words replaceable foot soldiers. in the attacks. The Madrid bombings therefore presented an inter- A number of inter-related indicators are included in this esting scenario on the relationship between terrorism and crime. analysis: Islamic extremist elements consequently use these conditions to their advantage to recruit, fi nance and equip willing foot soldiers ■ Population growth: High population growth, especially that have nothing to lose. This trend might continue to develop in poor countries that already have high unemployment due to the decentralised nature of transnational terror cells. As a fi gures, can present an ideal recruitment ground for ex- result of international counter measures these cells are required to tremist and terrorist groups. Weak infrastructure, disen- be self-suffi cient and motivated by a common ideology. chantment and feelings of hopelessness make the youth particularly susceptible to recruitment. For example, Morocco’s dramatic population growth ultimately led to POLITICAL CONDITIONS the spread of extremism, both domestically and abroad. The fact that economic growth could not keep up with Governance, the relationship between those in government and the rise in population led to high unemployment among its citizens, is an essential element in understanding why people the youth. These conditions ultimately contributed to resort to political violence (that could include acts of terrorism). the fact that most of the 14 suicide bombers who were The World Bank defi nes governance as ‘the exercise of political responsible for the Casablanca bombings on 16 May 2003 authority and the use of institutional resources to manage soci- came from Sidi Moumem, an area categorised as a slum ety’s problems and affairs’. It identifi es six indicators to measure on the outskirts of Casablanca. the quality of governance:26 ■ Urbanisation: When urbanisation is associated with poor socio-economic conditions, including unemployment and ■ Participation and accountability refers to the extent that poor living conditions, large concentrations of disgruntled a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting

31 The African understanding of terrorism

Table 1 Characteristics of weak, failed and collapsed states27

Weak states Failed states Collapsed states

Weak states are inherently weak owing States are tense, deeply confl icted, dangerous Characteristics to geographical, physical or fundamental Extreme format of a failed state and contested by warring factions economic constraints

Offi cial power is often limited to the capital and one or more areas controlled by an Vacuum of authority fi lled by Despots do not recognise the role of political ethnic group. State failure can be measured warlords. Ethnic and clan affi liation Political power opposition. The latter are often considered by the geographical control of the offi cial becomes the norm. Warlords often ‘enemies’ and dealt with accordingly government. The status of warlords and non- reach international agreements state actors is on the increase, since the state is increasingly losing its legitimacy

Civil war stems from existing inter-communal Sense of anarchy despite control States harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic tensions. Government security forces face two of warlords. Crime might decrease, Level of confl ict or other inter-communal tensions that are or more insurgencies, a variety of civil unrest, although kidnappings for ransom becoming overtly violent but violence is directed predominately against might be common the state

Failed states cannot control their borders. Warlords gained control over Police forces are paralysed, leading to the regions and sub-regions through escalation of criminal violence. Smuggling High crime rates; high levels of corruption and their own security apparatuses. Law enforcement becomes common. Both rebel groups and the harassment of civil society Economic structures are built government target citizens. Warlords based on illegal fi rearm and narcotic on ethnic and clan solidarity often provide traffi cking security

Infrastructure is under the control Infrastructure is gradually destroyed. Literacy of warlords. Basic needs are Infrastructure Infrastructure networks are deteriorating rates are falling and mortality rates are on the provided for based on funds increase received from external benefi ciaries

their government, as well as freedom of expression and ■ Political freedom association. ■ Inter-state confl ict ■ Political stability and the absence of violence will de- crease the likelihood that the government will be destabi- Weak, failed and collapsed states lised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. A state can broadly be categorised as ‘stable’ when: ■ Government effectiveness includes the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree ■ A high degree of political continuity in a political system of its independence from political pressure, the quality of allows free political participation and dissent (within legal policy formulation and implementation, and the credibil- boundaries). ity of government’s commitment to its policies. ■ There are no signifi cant extra-constitutional threats to the ■ Regulatory quality refers to the ability of government to authority of the government. formulate and implement sound policies and regulations ■ There are no signifi cant external threats to the govern- that permit and promote private sector development. ment or any segment of its population. ■ The rule of law refers to the extent to which security forces have confi dence in and abide by rules provided by Unfortunately, only a limited number of states on the African the constitution and legislative framework. continent can be categorised as stable. The ‘state’, in the ■ Control of corruption refers to the extent to which public African context, differs dramatically from Western principles. power is exercised for private gain, including petty and Colonialism and its aftermath are often blamed for this develop- grand corruption. ment, since individuals were placed in power who had only their own interests at heart. Consequently, political power became Domestic political conditions directly infl uence vulnerability, es- synonymous with a monopoly of natural resources in particular. pecially to domestic terrorism. Domestic vulnerability, however, Gaining and keeping political power became the ultimate goal, cannot be isolated from international individuals and groups often at any cost, without recognising the responsibilities it im- that will again use domestic instability to their own advantage in plied. As a result, states in Africa fl uctuate between weak, failed order to advance and initiate acts of terrorism in other countries. and collapsed states with associated police violence and the use In this analysis reference will be made to: of terrorism as a tactic. Table 1 briefl y summarise the character- istics of weak, failed and collapsed states. ■ The state or the relationship between weak, failed and A battle for political control will infl uence democratic de- collapsed states and terrorism velopment and the relationship with the populace. As a result,

32 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

marginalisation and subsequent calls for self-determination Somalia moves from a collapsed state to a weak state. The might lead to the use of terrorism as the only viable tactic. As rise and success of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) might well as the threat of domestic terrorism, the ‘health’ of the state therefore be a reason for concern. Larger areas are being will contribute to its vulnerability to transnational terrorism: the liberated and brought under the control of the UIC. Somalia association between failed and collapsed states and the creation is therefore gradually moving from a collapsed state to a of safe havens comes to mind. In theory, the inability to control failed state. certain areas in the country, including border areas, can open the country to foreigners with ulterior motives. Although these Political freedom and the right to countries are seldom targeted by transnational terrorism, their express legitimate forms of dissent territories can be used to train potential terrorists, as well as act A number of countries in Africa have used the global war on as staging areas, especially into neighbouring countries. Somalia terror as an excuse to delay reforms and commit extensive hu- is probably the best-known example in Africa. In a recent report, man rights abuses. Through preventing democratic reforms, the International Crisis Group commented: as well as allowing growing divisions between those in power and ordinary citizens, it could be expected that the possibility What makes Somalia an object of special concern is its lack of of potential instability will increase. Muslim countries are par- a functioning central government, which renders the country ticularly vulnerable, since domestic legitimacy confl icts can be a ‘haven for terrorist groups’ [including] the absence of func- incorporated into a Jihadist worldview. Equally, when freedom tioning police, immigration, customs and intelligence agencies of expression and other civil liberties are protected, non-violent … Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, unpat- ways to express political and social frustration could prevent the rolled borders, and unregulated arms markets make it a useful growth of extremism. If this theory is correct, terrorist attacks platform for actions aimed at foreign interests elsewhere in the should increase under a repressive regime. But ironically, civil region.28 liberties are often the fi rst casualty in the fi ght against terrorism. Democratic governments are more lenient towards legiti- Although direct al-Qaeda involvement and presence in Somalia mate dissent than totalitarian or autocratic regimes, accepting is a topic for debate, the activities of domestic and semi-do- it as part of the political process. However, illegitimate dissent mestic groups such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya and other smaller is more likely in authoritarian countries, where governments splinter factions that follow the Jihadist ideology are a matter of generally limit legitimate opposition. Therefore dissent, and concern. Somalia was used as a transit point and short-term safe domestic terrorism as a form of illegitimate dissent, is more haven in both acts of transnational terrorism in the region: the likely to be directed against authoritarian regimes that repress US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 or restrict opposition and offi cial representation than against and the Mombasa attack in 2002. In these attacks, smuggling totalitarian dictatorships and democratic regimes. Although lib- networks were used to gain access to material. Areas close to eral democracies may not be vulnerable to domestic terrorism, borders proved particularly vulnerable, since they were used for they can be susceptible to transnational terrorism.30 Before 9/11, the movement of people. These areas are also more inclined to political freedom in democratic regimes enabled terror organisa- accept outsiders. Money played a very important role in being tions and individuals to recruit new members, propagate their accepted and accommodated. Equally, although corruption can ideals and activities, and organise and launch their operations be used to gain access to a country, it can hinder the free move- against target countries. Western Europe, in particular Britain, ment of external terrorist groups in a collapsed and failed state, was used by a number of groups which, despite being classifi ed since people need to pay for everything, in particular to obtain in other countries as terrorist groups, were able to raise funds access to other parts of the country, since all assets, including and publicise their activities. Enabling these groups to function airstrips, were under the control of warlords. Free movement in in their own countries, under the guise of freedom, made these open and uncontrollable country was therefore not a reality, thus countries vulnerable in the medium term to acts of terrorism, as explaining why suspected terrorists stayed in one area under the was experienced in France, Spain, and more recently Britain. protection of sympathetic warlords. According to Robert Rotberg, return to stability would imply Inter-state confl ict, marginalisation that vulnerability to terrorism would increase: and claims of self-determination Political frustration and dissent should not be regarded as … the implanting of terrorist cells and the free movement of the equivalents of terrorism. However, political and dissent- terrorists is always easier when a nation-state emerges from the ing groups apply methods to achieve self-determination that chaos of collapse and forms a weak central government. It and may include acts of terrorism. In other words, if individuals or its leaders become more rather than less susceptible to the blan- groups within the movement resort to violence, one may expect dishments and intimidations, and even to the arguments and terrorism-related tactics to form part of their broader strat- ideologies, of terror and terrorists.29 egy. Throughout history, terrorism-related tactics have proved valuable in ‘levelling the playing fi eld’ against the state with its In other words, according to this theory, the possibility that advanced capabilities. A number of factors contribute to margin- terrorists could become a more viable threat increases as alisation and subsequent calls for self-determination.

33 The African understanding of terrorism

Ethnic composition primarily by fear for loss of their language, culture, iden- According to Robertson, ethnicity refers to tity and safety. These fears were intensifi ed by feelings of marginalisation. … a sometimes rather complex combination of racial, cultural ■ In Egypt, government reaction against the Bedouin and historical characteristics by which societies are occasionally community in the Sinai in the aftermath of the Taba divided into separate, and probably hostile, political families … bombings in October 2004 contributed indirectly to the Ethnicity raises the whole socio-political question of national Sharm al-Sheikh bombings on 23 July 2005. Members identity, which is why ethnic politics are at their most virulent of the community complained that, in addition to mass and important in third world countries whose geographical defi - arrests, security offi cials humiliated their tribal leaders nition … [is] far from ethnic homogeneity. In third world coun- and women during counter-terrorist operations. Bedouin tries ethnic divisions may be absolutely central to the problems culture emphasises respect. Its members felt that by disre- of organizing a working political system.31 garding this element the fabric of their culture was being attacked. Community members also said that their coun- Diversity, especially if accompanied by geographic and eco- trymen dealt with them as second-rate citizens. Feelings nomic differentiation, can lead to mistrust, violence and acts of of marginalisation were evident before the bombings. terrorism. As with other forms of identity, ethnicity provides a Although Israel launched a number of studies to under- sense of belonging, which psychologists regard as essential to the stand the Bedouin culture, the Egyptian government did psychological development of a person. However, ethnocentric not show the same enthusiasm after re-integration with nationalism leads to a number of violent confl icts in the search Egypt in 1981. for self-determination. These confl icts are diffi cult to contain and ■ In the Great Lakes region, Angola and Namibia and other solve. The potential for future secessionist groups should be con- groups called on their right to self-determination. These sidered an urgent reality since ”the world is divided into 5,000 represent examples of ethnic insurgency, for insurgents distinct ethnic groups and only 9.1% of independent states are and the counter-insurgent regimes used violence against ethnically homogeneous”.32 civilians. Characteristics of these confl icts included: According to Charles Quaker-Dokubu: ■ Extreme cruelty towards the civilian population, which involved incidents of ethnic cleansing or genocide to Africa in the urge to create political unity [after colonialism] terrorise sectors of the population into fl eeing from neglected ethnic, regional and cultural diversities rather than their homes. recognising them as building blocks in the construction of a civil ■ The use of massacres and mass rape as weapons of society. The result has been often a façade of seeming unity at terror and the cost of many unsettled wounds and denied identities.33 ■ Total disregard for international humanitarian laws.

In other words, heterogenic countries often proved to be targets Religion of violence (including terrorism) that was motivated by the need Three concepts must be differentiated, namely fundamentalism, to redraw political boundaries in the interests of self-determina- extremism and terrorism. These concepts are not synonymous. tion. Feelings of marginalisation tend to exist in situations where In the Oxford dictionary ‘fundamentalism’ is described as ”the the group has a specifi c geographic location and the govern- strict maintenance of the ancient or fundamental doctrines of ment is not representative of it. Traditionally, these groups have any religion or ideology”, whereas ‘extremist’ refers to ”a person clearly defi ned political objectives, but their activities are limited who holds extreme political and religious views”.35 ‘Extreme’ to their direct areas of origin. Nationalist groups tend to be more comes from the Latin word extremus, meaning ‘the outermost’ capable of prolonged campaigns and mobilising sustainable sup- or ‘last’. In other words, an extremist could be described as ex- port than ideological groups. Acts of terrorism are often directed cessive in his or her views and actions; and as ”a person who against specifi c targets. Certain factors increase the possibility of advocates the use of force or violence; advocates supremacist ethnic confl ict:34 (an ideology, quality, state of being, or position of being superior to all others in something) causes based on race, ethnicity, reli- ■ The strength of the ethnic group’s identity and solidarity. gion, gender, or national origin; or otherwise engages to illegally ■ The ability of leadership to mobilise support, often based deprive individuals or groups or their civil rights”.36 Extremism on emotional appeals with a strong historical foundation. is therefore a way of thinking that goes beyond the boundaries ■ The level of support and access to fi nancial assistance, of moderation, followed by action that is viewed by the middle- weaponry and a safe haven inside the country, and also ground proponents and modernists as beyond that what could from members of the group who live in other countries. be categorised as reasonable. Although it is diffi cult to indicate precisely when funda- Within Africa a number of examples can be presented: mentalism fl ow over into extremism, fundamentalism may be classifi ed as a personal belief, whereas extremism based on fun- ■ In South Africa, the Boeremag, who were implicated damentalist ideals has recourse to external action, in particular in a number of bomb attacks in 2002, were motivated when fundamentalists intervene in the political process to ensure

34 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

that society is forced to conform to the behaviours their world- ■ Perceptions of themselves and the role of violence: view requires. In their minds, the belief that they are right justi- ‘Where secular terrorists regard violence either as a way fi es the use of violence to ‘enlighten’ others if necessary.37 It is as of instigating the correction of a fl aw in a system that is important to understand how extremist elements exploit domes- basically good or as a means to foment the creation of tic and often international conditions in order to turn moderate a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as believers away from the fundamental principles of their religion components of a system worth preserving but as ‘outsid- to extremism. First, they manipulate the misery suffered through ers’ seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. economic hardship and convert it into a semi-religious ideology. This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorist They then transform the ideology into a political agenda, and to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of present an armed subversion campaign as a primary means of terrorist operations than secular terrorists.’40 achieving it. The ultimate aim is often to impose their rule on the country through attacking the state, its representatives and Conditions in Africa proved favourable to the development of fun- interests. In other words, the campaign is motivated by political damentalist and extremist movements – within both Christianity aspirations. New converts are particularly vulnerable. Being new and Islam – that resorted to violence, including terrorism. to the religion, they do not always possess suffi cient knowledge Although a support base is needed for its activities to expand, to counter more extreme arguments and interpretations and are transnational terrorism represents a trend away from revolutionary often compelled to ‘prove’ their commitment, making them soft terrorism. With revolutionary terrorism, it was essential to have a targets for extremists. large support base to equip activists with the means of conducting Fundamentalism and extremism are more likely to represent its activities. This acted as a balance to its activities, and resulted people who perceive the need to fi ght a godless, secular cul- in target selection, so that its larger support base was not alienated ture, even if they (in the minds of fundamentalists and extrem- – this consisted mostly of residents of the country being targeted ists) have departed from their own religious principles. For ex- – therefore the target selection was mostly discriminate. ample, the 9/11 hijackers adapted to a secular Western lifestyle and aimed to deceive the ‘enemy’ under the principle of takfi r. Christian extremism: On a domestic level, the LRA in Uganda In fact, what extremists everywhere have in common is the could be used as an example of Christian principles being used ability to adapt and manipulate their messages to suit the cir- to justify acts of terrorism and violence against unarmed civil- cumstances. In other words, they see themselves as the guard- ians. Additionally traditional beliefs played a signifi cant role. The ians of the truth, usually to the exclusion of the interpretations LRA grew out of an earlier rebel militia called the Holy Spirit of others. Although all religions (formally identifi ed as well as Movement. A peasant woman, Alice Lakwena, who claimed to sects) and their religious texts are open to interpretation, this channel spirits, founded the movement. In 1986, she gathered makes them vulnerable to ‘misinterpretation’ by individuals soldiers from the Acholi tribe in northern Uganda for what and groups that need acceptance or justifi cation for their often she declared to be a war against evil. According to the LRA, violent actions. the greatest evil in the country was that ethnic southerners in Acts of religious terrorism are often committed in the belief Kampala ran the government. Religion was therefore manipu- that they are sanctioned to restore ‘good’, based on their own lated to justify violence and harness support for broader political principles of separating ‘good’ from ‘evil’. The manifestation of aspirations and was infl uenced by ethnic differences. After initial this phenomenon and its symbolism varies according to religion successes, Lakwena’s army was defeated, after which she fl ed and culture. Despite these variations, previous acts of terrorism to Kenya in late 1987 and took up residence in a refugee camp suggest that religiously motivated groups can be more lethal, (where she later died). In her absence, a former altar boy named especially since religion is used to legitimise the use of violence. Joseph Kony41 claimed to be the new medium for Lakwena. The Bruce Hoffman identifi ed the following ‘core characteristics of LRA’s ostensible aim is to rule Uganda according to the biblical religious terrorism’:38 Ten Commandments. Although strict principles were followed in the earlier period of the confl ict, which included the banning of ■ View on violence: ‘For the religious terrorist, violence is looting, rape and adultery, Kony later allowed his troops to loot, fi rst and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty exe- burn and murder in villages they attacked.42 The LRA seldom at- cuted in direct response to some theological demand and tacks a strategic target, preferring nocturnal hit-and-run raids on imperative’.39 This explains the recourse to indiscriminate rural communities. It is renowned for its brutality towards civil- killing in contrast with other forms of terrorism. ians and for the abduction of approximately 20 000 children.43 ■ Religious sanctioning of violence, therefore legitimising The LRA is made up largely of child abductees who have ma- the use of force: Victims targeted by religious terrorists tured over the years into hardened fi ghters, and are preventing are often portrayed as not being human (through name more recent recruits from leaving their ranks.44 calling, for example ‘infi dels’). ■ Absence of a ‘constituency: This ‘leads to a sanctioning of Islamic extremism: Similar to Christianity, Islam was used to almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended justify violence, predominately against ‘illegitimate’ Muslim category of targets: that is, anyone who is not a member leaders in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect’. Libya, according to the government, a number of organisations

35 The African understanding of terrorism

began to threaten stability in the country through al-Jama’ah al- supported by the younger generation. For example, a number Muqatilah al-Islamiyah, or the Libyan Islamic Group; al-Ikhwan of Ethiopian scholars received their religious training in Saudi al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brothers; Harakat al-Tajammu’ al- Arabia. On their return to Ethiopia, traditional Sufi interpretations Islami, the Islamic Alliance Movement; and Harakat al-Shuhada (the predominant form of Islam) were questioned, which led al-Libiyin, or the Islamic Martyrdom Movement. The threat to open violence, including the destruction of Sufi mosques.45 materialised in Tunisia in 1988, however, when a number of ex- Equally, a more militant version of Islam is spreading through the plosive devices were detonated in hotels and at the ruling party’s use of the Internet, which has proved a valuable resource not headquarters. After a period of calm, the country was again con- only for spreading radical ideals, but also for recruiting, com- fronted with terrorism when Islamic Army for the Liberation of municating with and training decentralised independent cell the Holy Sites claimed responsibility for a bombing at the Ghriba structures throughout the world. synagogue on the island of Djerba on 11 April 2002. Morocco in its turn was confronted with this phenomenon on 16 May 2003 Natural resources when 12 suicide bombers attacked fi ve targets in Casablanca, In addition to natural resources as a soft target, it also contributes an incident that left 41 people dead and more than 50 injured. to a country’s vulnerability to acts of terrorism (as a motivation). In The extent of devastation can hardly be compared with other other words, natural resources, in addition to marginalisation and countries in the sub-region if one focuses on Algeria. In a cam- claims for self-determination, have proved to be a source of insta- paign of terror the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation bility in which terrorism can also be used as part of its strategy. Front), Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army), Group Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) and Groupe Internal migration that leads to the displacement of an ethnic group Salafi ste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafi st Group can result in animosity and confl ict, especially over scarce natural for Preaching and Combat) claimed an estimated 150 000 lives resources. Land distribution has been identifi ed as a leading cause over the periods of confl ict. of confl ict in Africa, where contested rights to land and natural resources are signifi cant, particularly in the light of land scarcity.46 Egypt has also had its share of acts of terrorism, with the differ- For example, in Darfur, Sudan, which covers roughly one fi fth of ence that it had a longer historical development. Throughout the Sudanese territory, access to scarce natural resources, worsened by 20th century Egypt had been the birthplace of militant Islamist its mixed ethnic and religious composition, introduced a volatile ideologies. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in the 1920s, gen- domestic situation. With a mixed population of nomadic pastoral- erated similar organisations throughout the Middle East. Sayyid ists and sedentary farmers, similar to southern Sudan, the popula- Qutb provided the ideological framework for groups such as al- tion of Darfur complained of political and economic marginalisa- Qaeda and Islamic Jihad. Within transnational terrorism individ- tion. Confl ict over natural resources, particularly water, resulted in uals such as Ayman al-Zawahri and Mohamed Atta, (the suicide clashes, mainly between the settled communities and pastoralists. pilot of American Airlines fl ight 11 on 9/11) are well known. The confl ict has taken on a racial dynamic: farmers are mainly from the African Fur, Masalit and Zagawa peoples, whereas the Islamic extremists as part of a transnational jihad against infi - nomads are of Arab origin. Although not terrorism, these develop- dels or non-believers believe that God sanctions their actions, ments had devastating consequences for human security. thereby freeing them of any political or moral constraints. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are probably the best-known In Nigeria the ‘oil curse’ indirectly infl uenced recourse to examples of a transnational ideology of terrorism in which violence, including terrorism, against foreign oil companies. Islamic principles are used to justify the use of terrorism against For example, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Niger Delta non-believers. It is important to recognise the development of groups, including the Ijaw Youth Congress, the Movement for this phenomenon on a domestic level. Unlike the al-Qaeda the Survival of the Ogoni People and the Egbesu Boys, tried to network, most of these groups are not transnational, despite force the government to give a greater share of oil profi ts from links with similar movements in neighbouring countries. the Delta region to local communities. These groups gained Virtually all are the products of particular states or internal or recognition by occupying foreign oil company installations and regional confl icts. But they share goals such as Islamising their kidnapping, often for ransom. With the establishment of the state and society by advocating Sharia law as the partial or sole Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the basis of the legal system. However, the means vary greatly and extent and sophistication of attacks increased to the point that a are context specifi c. loss in oil revenue may lead to the disruption of basic services, which in itself can fuel instability and confl ict. Attacks are not Traditional moderate Muslim communities are also gradually limited to foreign oil workers. For example, on 19 April 2006, being confronted with more extreme external infl uences, often MEND detonated a car bomb at Bori Camp military base in Port leading to intra-religious friction between the traditional indige- Harcourt that resulted in the death of two people.47 Although nous interpretation preached by religious scholars who received not associated with al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda’s leadership referred to their religious training in the particular country (often supported Nigeria as a potential theatre to target the ‘Crusaders’ economic by the older generation) and the more extreme interpretations interests. The strategy is therefore to manipulate and transnation- from sheikhs that were educated in Middle Eastern countries and alise a domestic confl ict.

36 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

SECURITY AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS instability in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, a number of countries are exporting extremism, for example Wahhabism Geographic position and border control from Saudi Arabia and the teachings of scholars such as Sheikh Countries with long borders and/or coastlines are more vulnerable Abdul Majid al-Zindani from Yemen. Yemen is also an important to transnational organised crime and terrorism – both as target and country in arms smuggling from the Middle East to Africa. agent – than countries with borders that can be easily controlled and monitored. Most countries in Africa are concerned about: International political arena While the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and the confl ict in Iraq ■ Long porous borders and the lack of human and techno- remain unsolved, Muslims throughout the world are outraged, logical resources to monitor them and prevent the infl ux and individuals feel compelled to participate. Equally important, of illegal immigrants, transnational criminal elements as the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s well as suspected terrorists. enabled an international network of extremists, al-Qaeda, to be ■ Confl ict in a number of countries, especially Uganda, formed. Combat-hardened individuals returned to their countries Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, which has led to the forma- of origin (with or without the knowledge of authorities) motivat- tion of no-go areas in which borders are very diffi cult, if ed by a new worldview. Initially, Jihadists directed their attention not impossible, to monitor. to what they considered corrupt and illegitimate Muslim govern- ■ Lack in technological resources. In an ideal world, all bor- ments, ‘kept’ in power and supported by the West, in particular der posts are computerised and in constant contact with the US. The possibility that events in Iraq and Afghanistan could other border posts and head offi ce. In theory, the existence provoke another phase in the development of networks of of such a system would enable countries to share informa- brothers in arms should concern African governments. Although tion about suspected terrorists in order to apprehend sus- countries in northern Africa are more directly affected, since pects before entering the country. Most border posts in the Egyptian nationals constitute the third highest number of foreign region barely have the minimum requirements and are not fi ghters in Iraq and the GSPC in Algeria has openly aligned itself linked to national or regional counterparts. with al-Qaeda, individuals from other African countries are committed to answering the call. As a result of the confl icts in Consequently, the task of controlling borders is plagued with Afghanistan and Iraq, key members of al-Qaeda might favour practical diffi culties, which adds to a country’s vulnerability. conditions in Africa, especially East and Northern Africa, for set- Individuals associated with terrorism and criminal syndicates ting up bases to re-group and train potential Jihadists. can utilise this ‘advantage’ in infi ltrating and using the country as a safe haven for re-organising, planning and committing acts of These confl icts also have a direct impact on stability in a num- terrorism in the ‘host’ country. ber of African countries. For example, the smuggling of fi rearms The threat may be divided into two components: and explosives as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict af- fected stability not only in Palestine, but also in Egypt. Weapons ■ Formal ports of entry: Effectiveness in controlling formal smuggled with the assistance of the Bedouin community in the ports of entry needs constant assessment. Training in pro- Sinai Peninsula were used in the bombings in Taba, Sharm al- fi ling suspects, based on behaviour and new technology, Sheikh and Dahab. Figure 6 shows how tunnels are being used is an area that needs attention. to smuggle foreign currency, weapons, narcotics, alcohol, elec- ■ Informal or illegal forms of entry: Traditionally when the tronic items, and people from Egyptian Rafah to the Palestinian question of border control is raised, attention is diverted areas of the Gaza Strip. The average tunnel is approximately to strengthening formal ports of entry. Although borders 500 metres in length, and several metres deep. Tunnels are even are marked on maps, in practice, these borders are not equipped with wood panelling, electrical and communications clearly marked, making it almost impossible to monitor infrastructure, and elevators.48 Although the above items are the movement of individuals across borders. The use of smuggled primarily from Egypt to Palestine, individuals trained in illegal points of entry becomes greater when formal ports explosives could equally assist extremists in Egypt or direct their are monitored and guarded more effectively. A suspected attacks against Israel on Egyptian territory. The Sinai Peninsula terrorist will think twice entering a country legally if visitors and the Gaza Strip could therefore be used as safe havens for are screened, an international passport stop-list is opera- transnational terrorists. The impact that al-Qaeda associates tional, the forgery of passports is prevented, and corrup- might have on the region, if operatives from Sinai make their way tion is minimised. African countries must also focus more via the Negev to the West Bank’s Palestinian population centres, of their attention on the infl ux of illegal immigrants and is equally a source of concern for security forces. According to refugees. The screening of these individuals needs atten- security offi cials, militants linked to Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and tion. Only an integrated, regional approach to movement other international terror groups have set up bases in the Sinai control through information sharing will be effective. that are still functioning, using tunnels to get into Gaza. The probability for limiting their attacks only on Palestine, became Owing to their close proximity to the Middle East, African coun- unlikely when one of the groups that claimed responsibility for tries in the Gulf of Aden seem particularly vulnerable, following the Sharm al-Sheikh bombings called itself the ‘Abdullah Azzam

37 The African understanding of terrorism

Figure 6: An Illustration of the Rafah Weapon Smuggling Tunnels

Security Explosion to fence Tunnel IDF Posts uncover tunnels entrance

The Egyptian Philadelphi Road The Palestinian area of Rafah (Israel-Egypt Border) area of Rafah Air Shaft

Terrorists crawling Underground Weapons loaded with weapons metal barrier on wagon Tunnel Phone exit line Palestinian Rafah

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs50.

Brigades’, al-Qaeda, in Syria and Egypt. The group also claimed sophistication, which comes with a price tag. However, to pre- responsibility for the Taba bombings. vent counter-terrorism measures from contributing to terrorism, certain principles could be used as guidelines for an effective Al-Qaeda Organization in the Levant and Egypt also claimed counter-terrorism strategy: responsibility for the Sharm ash-Shaikh bombings in an Internet statement: ”This operation came as part of the response against ■ It is the responsibility of any democratically elected gov- the global evil powers which are spilling the blood of Muslims in ernment to uphold the rule of law and the constitution, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Chechnya. The mujahedeen ... which also serve as frameworks for its activities, includ- have dealt a devastating blow to the Crusaders and the Zionists ing the policy, strategy and tactics to prevent and combat and the infi del Egyptian regime in Sharm al-Sheikh.49‘ terrorism. The rule of law can generally be described as a legal-political regime under which the law restrains Around the world many people are increasingly feeling mar- the government by promoting certain liberties and cre- ginalised, primarily because of the adverse effects of rapid ating order and predictability regarding how a country globalisation. In addition to the consequences of globalization, functions. In the most basic sense, the rule of law is a participation in regional alliances, multinational agreements and system that attempts to protect the rights of citizens from other forms of international cooperation to prevent and combat arbitrary and abusive use of government power. The rule terrorism could also contribute to a country’s vulnerability. For of law also serves as an important assurance of social example, allies of the US, especially in its campaign against in- rights and government accountability.51 surgents in Iraq, became targets in attempts to intimidate their ■ All aspects of any government’s initiatives and instru- governments to withdraw their cooperation or involvement. ments should be democratically accountable. Obviously, the more involved a country becomes in international ■ Governments should not resort to indiscriminate repres- and regional counter-terrorism operations, the greater the pos- sion in attempts to deal with terrorism. sibility of becoming the target of these activities. ■ It is the responsibility of government and its security forces to do everything in its power, within the frame- State response to preventing and work of the law, to protect its citizens and those in its combating terrorism territory (including foreign nationals, representatives and State capacity to prevent and combat terrorism extends beyond institutions) and under its control (aircraft or ships under legislation to include an analysis of policy implementation. A the fl ag of that country) against terrorism. number of factors infl uence capacity. These include the per- ■ Capacity is a central requirement of any counter-terrorism ception of threat to that state: countries that have experienced strategy and any government must be politically com- domestic or transnational terrorism or countries that consider mitted to provide its security forces with what is needed themselves vulnerable will be better equipped than countries and to incorporate these initiatives in a holistic approach with a lower perception. Therefore, threat perception is linked to to preventing and combating terrorism. As part of this ap- political will. Counter-terrorism initiatives require will and also proach, a government must address the underlying causes

38 Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it

of terrorism to prevent individuals from resorting to terror- – Centralising police databases and opening them to ism and to isolate terrorists from a potential support base. non-police offi cials – Introducing tracking and monitoring systems Counter-terrorism centres/units ■ These measures (anti- as well as counter-terrorism) are All countries in Africa face resource constraints to the implemen- available to prevent and combat terrorism. Their propen- tation of an effective counter-terrorism policy. Counter-terrorism sity to contradict democratic principles is a concern that requires specialised structures and dedicated resources. In pro- is often raised among human rights organisations. tecting state institutions and society against terrorism, security ■ Crisis management measures focus on resolving and sta- forces normally implement a three-part strategy:52 bilising the situation after a terrorist attack, and involve disaster and emergency management, including: ■ Anti-terrorism measures that involve the use of strategies ■ Increasing the preparedness of healthcare profession- to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property als and authorities, and to terrorist acts. The primary objective is to prevent at- ■ Dealing with threats of weapons of mass destruction. tacks, but, if they should occur, to minimise the effects. The following measures are included in an anti-terrorism The aftermath of 9/11 again reminded the international com- strategy: munity to focus attention on their intelligence structures and to ■ Introduce legislation that specifi cally addresses terror- place renewed emphasis on inter- and intra-state cooperation. ism or amends existing legislation. Countries that had not experienced the impact of terrorism ■ Enhance the capabilities of security forces and intro- established counter-terrorism centres and units. Although names duce additional structures and measures to promote might vary, these structures, as part of proactive initiatives, fa- cooperation between the security services at local cilitated the exchange of information between units and depart- and national level, often made possible through coor- ments tasked with preventing direct threats (security agencies); dination centres. and between departments that are not directly responsible for ■ Introduce additional control measures over immi- preventing the establishment of terror support networks. These grants, asylum seekers and foreigners. departments often include immigration and customs (border ■ Enhance border and travel control measures. control), ministries of fi nance and the banking sector respon- ■ Monitor fi nancial transactions: sible for preventing the establishment of economic support – Increase supervision over fi nancial institutions. structures. Therefore, the primary objective is to conduct and – Establish access to fi nancial information. inform other roleplayers of counter-terrorism activities, including – Require banks and fi nancial institutions to verify intelligence gathering operations, collating and analysing terror- client information; monitor fi nancial transactions; ism-related information from all sources, and informing them of and report suspicious transactions. new trends and threats. Since terrorism cannot be addressed in – Freeze bank accounts suspected of being con- isolation, security and intelligence agencies focus their atten- nected to terrorism. tion on trans-national criminal activities that may be related to – Establish fi nancial intelligence units. terrorism, especially money laundering, traffi cking in narcotics ■ International cooperation: and illegal fi rearms, and the forgery of identity documents and – Enhance international, regional and sub-regional identity fraud. Countries not only honour their commitment to cooperation on terrorism. enhancing cooperation, they also acknowledge and focus their – Ratify and adopt conventions and protocols and in- attention on related trans-national criminal activities. Although corporate these instruments into national legislation. opportunistic in theory, implementing these measures in prac- – Enable cross-border cooperation, including mutual tice is another question. legal assistance and extradition. ■ Counter-terrorism measures include offensive strategies Despite the investment of governments in the training and equip- to prevent terrorism through the prior identifi cation of the ment of intelligence agencies, without the involvement of the threat and perpetrators. The primary objective of counter- public in the process the intelligence-gathering process will be terrorism is to neutralise the threat. incomplete and insuffi cient. Without community support and the ■ Enhanced intelligence measures (also a component of willingness of ordinary citizens to come forward with informa- anti-terrorism measures) include: tion, the best-quipped intelligence service that overemphasises – Eavesdropping on Internet, telephone and fax technological advances will be caught off-guard. Human intel- communications (legal with court surveillance or ligence (HUMINT) proved to be the missing component in the without the court’s oversight) prevention of 9/11. Although countries in Africa may not have – Enabling access to electronic records from banks, the technological capabilities, fi nancial resources or need to internet providers, etc, without informing suspect- invest in imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and sig- ed individuals natures intelligence (MASINT) it is always worthwhile investing – Detaining suspects for longer periods to acquire in HUMINT. Despite this requirement, one must remember that more information ordinary citizens may not be willing to provide security offi cials

39 Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

with information. A sense of responsibility in citizens and trust in intelligence units (FIUs) is central to this. FIUs require the security forces are essential to ensure community involvement in capacity to aggregate fi nancial information about suspect national security. Building trust requires a number of elements sources, where such information is normally dispersed among before communities become involved in security: a number of accounts and jurisdictions. Implementation entails the restructuring of conventional inter-agency relationships ■ Members of the community should be informed and vigi- within public sector agencies and between the public sector lant without being alarmed. and the private sector. In practical terms, this means better ■ Engagement with community members, starting with integration and cooperation between immigration authorities, selective discussions with business, ethnic, religious and customs authorities, the revenue-collecting authorities and the community members in an attempt to build trust, with the police. It also means that information from other departments aim to encourage community leaders to report suspicious should be accessible to the banking sector and the bureau de activities and individuals to security forces, is essential. change. Without this, transactions that should be regarded as ■ Members of security forces should consult community suspicious can easily slip through the net. Detecting suspicious members instead of engaging in a one-way communica- fi nancial transactions requires specifi c investigation skills and tion process that allows limited or no involvement for equipment. Although remarkable strides have been made since ordinary citizens to appreciate their ‘role’ in security. 9/11 with the assistance of the international community, much is ■ Through this process an ethos of personal and profes- still needed. In addition to the formal industry, Western observ- sional responsibility for own security will be created. ers do not always have sympathy with the need and function of informal economies throughout Africa. Despite the vulnerability Trust in security forces depends on the legitimacy of the govern- of this strategy, engagement with the public is urgently needed ment. Governments that are not considered legitimate use their to make people aware of the dangers and to consult them on security forces to ensure regime security and not human security. strategies to prevent the use of informal economies in the fi nanc- Members of the community therefore are reluctant to supply in- ing of terrorism. formation to the security forces. The actions of members of the security forces also infl uence trust: If the police are perceived Analysis of counter-terrorism legislation to be corrupt, individuals do not come forward with informa- Although it is not considered the primary initiative in preventing tion for fear of their lives. The actual or perceived involvement and combating terrorism on a national level, inadequate counter- of foreign security forces and intelligence agencies also affects terrorism legislation may make a country vulnerable as a target trust, especially if this decision is infl uenced by political interests or agent (for example safe haven) for terrorist activities. A bal- and not the interests of ordinary citizens. The ultimate goal is ance between the threat of domestic and international terrorism, to create an open and trusting relationship between individuals, culture, domestic circumstances and human rights should be the larger communities and security forces. determining factor in developing a national counter-terrorism The conduct of the security forces is central to this. For strategy. Although acknowledging the need to incorporate and example, after the US embassy bombing in August 1998 com- adhere to international and regional instruments, the primary munity members came forward with information that assisted aim of legislation should be to protect its citizens and not con- security forces to identify the perpetrators with relative ease. stitute a source of controversy, which contributes to instability. However, through targeting members of the Muslim community Since terrorism is a sensitive issue, governments are encouraged and because of the conduct of the security forces during inves- to engage with their populations to prevent misconceptions that tigations, members of the community, particularly the Muslim could be used by individuals and groups with ulterior motives community, began to lose trust in the police. Subsequently, they and to inform the public of the implications of the new legisla- began to call for the disbandment of the police Anti-Terrorism tion, their rights and responsibilities, thereby creating a ‘partner- Unit.53 In Algeria on the other hand, government recognised ship’ in preventing and combating terrorism. It is unfortunate that the importance of community support and involvement in its the interpretation and use of counter-terrorism legislation should campaign against terrorism. In addition to the formal structuring contribute to vulnerability, particularly in African countries that of the Patriots, government offi cials throughout the campaign have draconian legislations, often with the sole purpose of op- called for community responsibility and involvement. For exam- posing rival parties without respect for human rights. ple, in a television interview on 22 April 1997 Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia called on the people ”to be more aware, more mobilized and more vigilant in facing up to the terrorism that CONCLUSION has now been exposed as targeting Algeria, the people, the state and their property’. 54 Africa is an important theatre of war in combating terrorism, owing to ideal conditions. But terrorism is not high on the list Establishment of fi nancial intelligence units of priorities of most countries, as a result of a low threat percep- To honour international requirements as stipulated under UN tion. A possible reason is that terrorism is not a new threat to Resolution 1373, countries in Africa must prevent and combat human security, but developed as a valuable strategy throughout the fi nancing of terrorism. The establishment of fi nancial history. It is essential to recognise the relationship between do-

40 Chapter 1: Introduction and background

mestic and transnational terrorism and to address them with the into areas of opportunities. When those in government realise same resolve. that they should serve the best interests of its population and Domestic and transnational terrorism are threats to stability not their own interests, they follow a policy of inclusion and not and security throughout the world, but not the only threats. In exclusion;when policy makers and those responsible for execut- this paper a holistic approach is suggested in which terrorism ing these policies understand that all actions have consequences. is understood and studied as a tactic or the result of broader It is hoped that the strategic value of a strategy to prevent and causes and issues. The primary focus must be to address the combat terrorism will receive thought, while assessing whether underlying causes of discontent. The war on terrorism could the counter-terrorism strategy will ultimately contribute to the therefore also be a war on poverty, ignorance, political exclusion terrorism or make it diffi cult for terrorists to justify their actions and marginalisation, on inequality and on oppression as some and recruit new members. Regular consultations with all sec- of the underlying causes of terrorism. Victory over terrorism will tions of society will ultimately create a climate of cooperation only be achieved if these areas of vulnerability are transformed and this in turn will contribute to stability.

NOTES

1 J Barker, The no-nonsense guide to terrorism, New News, 20 April 2004. 43 G Muleme, Army: At least 30 rebels killed in northern Internationalist Publications, London, pp 23-24. 23 Italy arrests British passport holder, former Algerian Uganda, Associated Press, 7 April 2003. 2 K Annan, A global strategy for fi ghting terrorism: Keynote Islamist leader, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 24 February 44 Selva, op cit. address to the closing plenary of the International Summit 2005. 45 David H Shinn, Ethiopia: Governance and terrorism, in on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005, 24 M Champion and G R Simpson, UK terror cell’s link to Robert I Rotberg (ed), Battling terrorism in the Horn of Madrid, (1 April 2005). 2005. Press, Washington, DC, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 3 Annan, op cit. 25 M Binyon, Morocco in grip of radical Islam, The Times, 30 2005, p 97. 4 Sean K Anderson, ‘Warnings versus alarms: Terrorist threat June 2004. 46 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Great analysis applied to the Iranian state-run media’, Studies of 26 The World Bank, A decade of measuring the quality Lakes: Land reform cited as key to issue in confl ict man- Confl ict & Terrorism, 21 (1998): 282. of governance: Governance Matters 2006 Worldwide agement, 14 October 2004. 5 UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council, Governance Indicators, The International Bank of 47 Power and Interest News Report, Intelligence Brief: April 2000. Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC, MEND escalates instability in Nigeria, 27 April 2006, 6 V Gamba, Small arms foster social turmoil: Illegal traffi ck- 2006, pp 2-4. . Recovery, 12(1), August 1998, p 24. states: Causes and indicators, in Robert I Rotberg (ed), State 48 Israel’s peace agreement with Egypt granted Israel security 7 A Toweh, Liberia rebels release at last two hostages, failure and state weakness in a time of terror, [Brookings control over a strip of land running 70 metres east of the Reuters News, 14 August 1999. Institute Press] Washington, DC, 2003, pp 2-10. Philadelphi Road. The Rafah smuggling tunnels: A histori- 8 United States Department of State, 2001. Patterns of 28 International Crisis Group, Counter-terrorism in Somalia: cal background, IDF Spokesperson’s Offi ce, 12 October Global Terrorism: 2000. Losing hearts and minds? Africa Report, 95, 11 July 2005, 2003; Background material: Rafah weapon smug- 9 Refugees victims of terrorism, not its perpetrators, High pp 1, 7. gling tunnels. IDF Spokesperson’s Offi ce, 10 October Commissioner tells Third Committee, as refugee debate 29 Ibid, p 3. 2003; The Rafah terror tunnels: An underground city opens – Part 2, M2 Presswire, 20 November 2001. 30 P Wilkinson, Political terrorism, Macmillan, London, 1974, of weaponry, IDF Spokesperson’s Offi ce, 11 February 10 For a few dollars more: How al-Qaeda moved into the p 109. 2003; David Frankfurter, Gaza’s underground econo- diamond trade, Global Witness, April 2003, pp 2 & 40. 31 Ibid, pp 111-112. my, FrontPageMagzine.Com, 9 June 2004; Margaret 11 Egypt: Interior Minister announces release of around 1,000 32 H Solomon and S Matthews, Transforming ethnic con- Dudkevitch, Background: Tunnels keep Gaza terrorists Islamic militants, BBC Monitoring Newsfi le, 3 September fl icts, in Politics of identity and exclusion in Africa: From awash in arms, Jerusalem Post, 16 May 2004; Arnon 2003. violent confrontation to peaceful cooperation, University Regular, Background / profi ts drive smuggling in Rafah,’ 12 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global network of of Pretoria, Seminar Report, 25-26 July 2001, p 138. Ha’aretz, 19 May 2004; Amos Harel, IDF plans to build terror, Berkley Books, New York, pp 212-213. 33 C Quaker-Dokubu, A Nigerian case study, in ibid, p 43. trench along Philadelphi Road, Ha’aretz, 28 April 2004, 13 Ibid. 34 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state . 14 Gilles,Tremlett, Terror thrives in Algeria’s climate of bloody response, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p 46. 49 Al-Qaeda group claims Egypt blasts as tentacles spread, confl ict, The Guardian, 17 January 2003. 35 C Soanes, The Oxford compact English dictionary, 2nd ed, Agence France Presse, 23 July 2005. 15 Almost half gunmen detained in last four months in Iraq Oxford University Press, 2000, pp 446; 387. 50 Weapon Smuggling Tunnels in Rafah: Operation Rainbow, said Egyptian, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10 November 36 United States Army, Lesson Number 8 – Task: Identify ex- 17 May 2004, . ings, Reuters News, 1 November 2005. ration%20of%20Others-NGB/IDENTIFY%20EXTREMIS 51 H Yu and A Guernsey, What is the rule of law? Center 17 C Wright, Intelligence chiefs set to assess Al-Qaeda’s M%20AND%20EXTREMIST%20ORG.DOC> (7 March for International Finance and Development, University reach in Europe, Agence France Presse, 22 March 2004. 2005). of Iowa, . say police; War on terror, The Times, 12 April 2004. must be wrong, http://pe.net/~bidstrup/religion.htm. 52 P Fluri and A B Johnsson, Parliamentary oversight of the 19 Egyptian linked to Madrid train bombings jailed for 10 38 B Hoffman, Inside terrorism, Columbia University Press, security sector: Principles, mechanisms and practices – years in Italy, Agence France Presse, 6 November 2006. New York, 1998, pp 94-95. handbook for parliamentarians, No 5, Inter-Parliamentary 20 Algerian man extradited to France for alleged terror ties, 39 Ibid. Union / Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Dow Jones International News, 17 June 2004. 40 Ibid. Armed Forces, Geneva, 2003 pp 111-112. 21 Spain charges four Algerians who could have made 41 Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army rebellion, Reuters News, 53 Muslims’ fury on anti-terror police, The Nation, 30 ‘home-made napalm’, Agence France Presse, 20 April 22 October 2004. September 2006. 2004. 42 M Selva, The mystic and his brutal army of child soldiers, 54 PM Ouyahia says killings designed to disrupt parliamen- 22 Spain charges four Algerians with al Qaeda ties, Reuters The Independent, 30 July 2004. tary poll, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 24 April 1997.

41

Panel 2 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in africa on leadership, governance and democracy Abdel Aziz Shady

The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights: The experiences of East African countries George Kegoro

The price of counter-terrorism in Africa: Fool’s gold or genuine gold? Donovan Chau

Africa’s role in america’s ‘war on terrorism’: Some political implications Alamin Mazrui

The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa on leadership, governance and democracy Abd El-Aziz M Shady

INTRODUCTION physical force to protect them against any internal or external threat. Enforcing law and order is also an exclusive function of Defi ning terrorism has not been an easy task, for both politicians government. While performing these functions, there must not and scholars. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has been calling be any competing actors against the government. upon international organisations and governments to organise Social contract theorists (Thomas Hobbes; John Locke) justi- an international conference to defi ne terrorism, but his call has fi ed the legitimacy of the state by focusing on the individual’s not yet been answered. It seems that consensus among govern- need to live in an organised, civilised and secure environment. ments and scholars on terrorism has not been reached yet. We These liberal political thinkers felt the need for a secure life can attribute this to differences in ideology, the scientifi c para- through creating an entity in which the individuals would give up digm, and national interests among governments and scholars. all (Thomas Hobbes) or some (John Locke) of their natural rights These differences have led to a confusing phenomenon, namely to protect their physical existence. Any violence against the gov- regarding terrorism and national resistance as one thing. ernment within this constitutional liberal state will be considered National resistance against occupation is yet another terrorism, provided the government does not violate the contract. phenomenon. In the case of military occupation, there is no Should this happen, citizens are entitled to change their govern- independent sovereign, central or federal, authority that could ment by peaceful means, but also through the use of force. monopolise the use of force. There is a competing state-actor The liberal theory was the answer to certain challenges in that is using force not only to control the occupied land, but also Western European societies (Britain and France) in the past. to oppress the inhabitants and to deprive them a basic human Confl ict between the royalists and the parliamentarians neces- right, which is self-determination. Resisting the powers of this sitated the development of such a theory. Constitutional liber- occupying force has been considered a national duty by most alism did not emerge in Europe until the end of the Industrial political thinkers. For instance, Patrick Henry, one of the found- Revolution, however. Democracy was considered the most ing fathers of the United States, said in his famous address: “Give dangerous form of government by both Socrates and Plato. But me liberty or give me death!” In international law, resisting the after the Industrial Revolution, the tenet emerged of ‘no taxation occupying military by using force is legitimate, provided that it without representation’, and within this context the government does not include civilian targets in the occupying state. was empowered to have a monopoly over the use of force. Occupying states and their allies usually brand national resist- Colonial powers imposed the nation-state model on African ance movements terrorist. This is one reason explaining the absence peoples. After independence, nation-states became the normal of consensus in the UN towards the nature of terrorism. Each nation political entity in Africa. But were they constitutional liberal na- has the right to gain sovereignty and to have an independent state. tion-states? The borders of most of these states did not refl ect Morally speaking, depriving some nations from this right legitimises the existing social forces. Many tribes were divided among these these nations’ usage of force against the occupying military forces in nation-states. Consensus was not at the basis of the legitimacy the occupied lands. This is the essence of liberalism. Unfortunately, of many nation-states in Africa. To this day, only a small number in the eighteen and the nineteen centuries, some liberal superpow- of these states have managed to develop sound and stable con- ers were guilty of the sins of colonialism and occupation. stitutions. Ethnic tension has continued to threaten the existence Consequently, there has been a gap between constitutional of many nation-states. Regional as well as international actors liberalism as an ideal type of political ideology on one hand and intervened in decision-making systems. In many states, sover- the international politics of the states that translated this ideology eignty has become an obsolete concept. Neo-colonialism and into concrete political systems on the other. This gap encourages globalisation have undermined the capabilities of these states. A us to question the scientifi c and moral validity of using the liberal large percentage of African states have failed or collapsed. defi nition of terrorism and liberal measures of the impact of ter- rorism on leadership, governance and democracy. It seems that A defi nition of terrorism liberal defi nitions of these concepts and impacts might not fi t. Within this framework, what could be the defi nition of terrorism According to the classic social contract theories, government in a developing sovereign state? Could it be the same defi nition is empowered by its citizens, through the constitution, to use within developed constitutional liberal nation-states? Some

45 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

international scholars of criminal law do not care about these three phenomena. The above contextual difference between contextual differences. Professor Chereif Bassiouni regards ter- constitutional liberal nation-states and colonial nation-states rorism as the use of force against civilians by non-state actors, may complicate the nature of this analysis. regardless of the context in which this force is being used.1 Although colonial nation-states passed through a wave of But ignoring this contextual factor misleads and confuses democratisation and liberalisation due to foreign pressure and analysts. Monopolising the use of force by the central govern- conditionality during the 1980s, the absence of a governance ment is the result of consensus among all the members within infrastructure in constitutional liberal nation-states necessitated this state. In the absence of consensus, it will be impossible for changes in leadership and democracy in Africa. Governance did the dominant government to have this mandate: some forces will not exist at that time. But the use of force to destabilise the system deny the government the right to monopolise the use of force. that is in charge of the allocation of political values commenced To sum up this point: one has to be careful in defi ning terror- as a result of this wave of democratisation and liberalisation. The ism and measuring its impact according to the liberal model. If leaders at that time used ethnic militia instead of the regular gov- we do that, we shall not consider ethnic terrorism an authentic ernmental army to terrorise their ethnic competitors in elections. African form of terrorism. Ethnic terrorism takes place within a dif- ferent context. In Africa, social contract has not been the basis of Leadership, governance and democracy the existing nation state. Central government’s legitimacy has been Now, we need to assess the impact of new international and questioned by competing ethnic groups. Any violence against this African forms of terrorism on leadership, governance and central government has been justifi ed on the basis of the absence democracy. of liberal constitutional consensus. Colonial nationalism had been Democracy is about elections and the rotation of power. the basis of both the legitimacy and the identity of African nation- Governance is about transparency, accountability, the rule of states. The colonial powers drew the borders of these states. law, the just distribution of values, tolerance and the empower- The Organisation of African Unity, and currently the African ment of citizens. Leadership is about effective guidance through Union, closed discussions on the issue of African nation-states’ using resources rationally, charismatically or traditionally. borders and urged its members to consider these borders sa- Although these three phenomena are interrelated and mutu- cred. These borders must be a given regardless of their social ally reinforced, the existence of one of them will not automati- and political legitimacy. The failure of many nation-states to cally lead to the existence and functioning of the other two. The create harmony between these borders and their national identi- type of leadership that emerges in a democratic system and that ties should not lead us to consider these colonial nation-states is keen to apply the rules of governance will be totally differ- illegitimate political entities. This type of nation-state is currently ent from the types of leadership that emerge in other forms of admitted to the UN and recognised by international super pow- political systems. Democratic transformation works smoothly ers. We cannot ignore it. It suffers from terrorism. Still, we have in an environment that has already developed a good govern- to differentiate between the constitutional liberal model of a na- ance infrastructure, while components of a democratic system tion-state, which is a product of Western political development, can sometimes work in an environment that does not have good and the colonial model of a nation-state, which is the product of governance. Africa’s colonial legacy. In order to understand these challenges and trends, this paper In both cases, terrorism is the use of violence and force to is divided into three parts. The fi rst deals with the impact of ter- destroy the existing system that is responsible for the authori- rorism and counter-terrorism on leadership and the second with tative allocation of values by non-state actors within an inde- their impact on governance. The third part explains how democ- pendent sovereign nation-state. This kind of terrorism could take racy has been infl uenced by terrorism and counter-terrorism. various forms. The reasons behind the use of force may differ in these two contexts, therefore we have to take the contextual dif- ference into consideration when explaining and understanding PART 1: IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND terrorism, but not when defi ning it. COUNTER-TERRORISM ON LEADERSHIP

Counter-terrorism According to Max Weber, there are three types of leadership: Counter-terrorism has been a complicated process and included charismatic, traditional and rational-legal (bureaucratic). many national, regional and international actors using political, Charismatic leadership – it is popularly believed – endows legal, cultural, military and social tools. Counter-terrorism has the leader with extraordinary imagined skills and values which also gone through many stages. Here, one has to say that the US enables him or her to overcome any kind of crisis. Contextual, has been playing an important role in counter-terrorism since 11 personal and cultural factors facilitate the development of this September 2001. The strategic signifi cance of Africa in the US’s type of leadership. Crises can be testing moments in the de- counter-terrorism strategy has also increased. velopment of charisma. After the bombings in Oklahoma City Our main argument is that while terrorism challenges mod- (1995) and at the World Trade Center (1993), US President Bill ern forms of leadership, governance and democracy in Northern Clinton provided psychological security for Americans with his African states and in Africa in general, counter-terrorism leads to charisma. In contrast, George W Bush has not managed to do so the emergence of new trends and new debates concerning these after the September 11 attacks.

46 The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa on leadership, governance and democracy

Traditional leadership, which depends in its guiding role on his able bodyguards. Terrorists used force against intellectual primordial affi nities, is the second type. These primordial affi ni- leaders in Egypt as well. Farag Foda, a secular liberal journalist ties include tribal and religious components. Tribal and religious and strong opponent of terrorism, was assassinated in the early leaders are respected neither because they have formal authori- 1990s. Egyptian Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouze was attacked tative tools nor because of their personal characteristics. by a terrorist but survived. Charismatic and traditional leaders may both have a negative In Algeria, developments in the early 1990s led to the spillo- impact on institutional developments because the loyalty and al- ver of terrorism and threatened the ability of government leaders legiance of citizens are focused on persons, not institutions. The to monopolise the use of force. President Mohammed Boudiaf existence of strong institutions balances the negative impact of was assassinated, and many enlightened journalists lost their these types on the development of a rational model of leader- lives because of their outspoken anti-terrorist leanings. ship. Sometimes, charismatic leadership can be a transitional In Somalia, the confl ict between transitional governmental development towards rational institution building. leaders and Islamic fundamentalist leaders is threatening to In cases where charismatic leaders are serious about institu- destabilise the entire Horn of East Africa and creates a safe ideo- tion building, the loyalty and allegiance of the citizens could be logical haven for terrorist leaders that is similar to the one on the shifted towards institutions. Selfi sh charismatic and traditional border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. leaders do not secure a continuous institution-building process In Nigeria, national leaders have been confronting increas- and may be a destructive catalyst in the process of institution ing ethnic tensions between Muslims in the north and Christians building in developing nation-states. in the south. Religious violence has become a threat to national Rational-legal or bureaucratic leadership is the third type. integration in Nigeria. This type of leader depends on his or her professional and insti- tutional skills in leading and guiding their polities. They are keen Impact of counter-terrorism to use and obey the legal and the constitutional instruments that If this has been the impact of terrorism on leadership, what are dominant in the system. This type of leader never makes use could have been the impact of counter-terrorism on leadership of the existing primordial affi nities in the nation. They usually in Africa? emerge in developed nation-states. The essence of counter-terrorism is to restore the sovereign Since independence, African nation-states have experienced nation-state’s monopoly over the use of physical force by elimi- all these types of leadership. Nasser in Egypt, Nkrumah in Ghana, nating any other claimants to the right of the legitimate use of Ghadafi in Libya and Mandela in South Africa are examples of force, inside or outside the sovereign nation-state that is not charismatic leaders. Tribal leaders have been playing an impor- under occupation. Accordingly, the relative political and popular tant role in African politics. Modernisation in Africa could not weight of rational-legal leadership is expected to be empowered minimise the infl uence of charismatic and traditional leaders. while the relative political and popular weight of both traditional and charismatic leadership are expected to be weakened. The Impact of terrorism rational model of leadership is in favour of strengthening the Terrorism eroded all possibilities for the development of rational- power of central institutional authority vis-àvis other competing legal leadership in Africa. In North Africa, rational models of ethnic or local groups while traditional and charismatic leaders leadership have been increasing challenges. Rational leaders’ are in favour of strengthening the powers of themselves and abilities to convince their citizens that the war on terrorism is fair their tribes. Has this been the general trend in the world and and just have been constrained.Terrorist organisations and groups particularly in Africa? accused rational leaders of violating religious codes of legitimacy. In the US, George W Bush won his fi rst presidential term by According to these terrorist ideological blueprints, these leaders a narrow majority. He was not looked upon as a potential strong are infi dels and may destroy the purity of religious beliefs. So, president. After 11 September 2001, his popularity increased terrorist organisations and their leaders have been using religious dramatically. A new conservative and religious discourse con- discourse to delegitimise the existing rational models. trolled Bush’s ideology and language. The relative weight of Unfortunately, various factors that emerged in North liberal leadership in the US declined. Africa helped terrorists to distort the images of rational leaders. A link was created within this conservative discourse be- Corruption, illiteracy and economic problems have all contributed tween Islam and terrorism. Anti-Islam discourse gained currency to the weakening of these rational models. The failure of political among neoconservatives as well as religious leaders in Europe institutions to absorb the increasing demands for political par- and the US. Differences between radical Islam and moderate ticipation from the educated young generation left these rational enlightened Islam have been rarely highlighted. The occupa- models without any tools to fi ght these terrorist organisations. tion of Afghanistan and Iraq provoked anti-American senti- Terrorism challenged the capacity of rational leaders to monopo- ments among Muslims and Arabs all over the globe. Support lise the use of force, and this put these leaders in a dilemma. of the American administration for the Israeli concept of war Should they rely on their law-enforcing tools or use other tools? on terrorism in Palestine and Lebanon increased anti-American In Egypt, President Mubarak was exposed to more than sentiments among Muslims in Latin America, Asia, Africa and one assassination attempt, the most dangerous of them during the Middle East. Now, President Ahmadi Nijad of Iran, Sheikh his visit to Ethiopia 1996. He managed to survive because of Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and President Hugo

47 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

Chavez of Venezuela are the ideal types of leaders in the opin- wards the south and north by redistributing both political and ion of radicals in North Africa. economic values. Arab rational leaders in North Africa suffered a dilemma. Counter-terrorism did challenge the prevailing types of lead- They wanted to participate in the war on terror, but did not ership. A new collective type of leadership emerged in which share the American/Israeli concept of terrorism. North African traditional and rational types co-operated. A reconciliatory public opinion was evidently against the American/Israeli con- approach was used in addition to the military one to provide cept. If these leaders were to join the American war on terror, effective guidance by mobilising more social capital to counter they needed to distance themselves from the American/Israeli terrorism. Rational leaders found it hard to fully support the US concept. They became selective in their approach towards the war on terror, so they chose to use American resources without US war on terror. necessarily accepting the American/Israeli concept of terrorism. Their selective approach faced another challenge during The American strategy in the fi ght against terrorism includes the latest stage of the war on terror, namely the ethical dimen- political, economic and social components. Building leadership sion of the war on terror. The scandalous policies of the US in through civic education is an important part of this. In Africa, civic Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, which violated basic human education is a necessity. It is the fi rst step towards building citizen- rights, complicated the relationship between Arab leaders’ se- ship. Both citizenship and enlightened leadership are necessary to lective approach towards the American war on terror on the one counter terrorism. In Africa, terrorism starts at local level and there- hand and North African public opinion on the other. This was fore local leadership is of vital importance as well. Enlightened lo- not confi ned to North Africa. Leaders in all African nation-states cal leadership can be a pre-emptive tool against terrorism. that have Muslim populations faced this dilemma. The Egyptian approach to counter-terrorism is older than the other approaches. A new type of leadership emerged in Egypt. A PART 2: IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND coalition among secular liberal leaders, whether in the govern- COUNTER-TERRORISM ON GOVERNANCE ment or in the opposition and moderate Islamic leaders repre- sented by Al-Azhar, Dar El-Ifta and other independent Islamic According to the UN subcommittee in charge of protecting and thinkers, mobilised a lot of human resources and social capital empowering human rights, it is not logical to fi ght terrorism by de- against terrorists. priving people of their human rights. Respecting human rights and The media was used effectively to fi ght terrorism. Mubarak enforcing the law will lead to peace and order within any society. empowered the governmental Islamic establishments to reform Absence of good governance may lead to terrorism. A lack the religious discourse in Egypt and to deal with the accusation of citizenship, which means legal and constitutional equality of terrorist groups against him. (According to the Egyptian con- among all members of the internal community, could prepare stitution; governments should observe certain religious codes. the individual for terrorism. In African nation-states, this has Terrorist groups accused Mubarak’s regime of not observing these been the case since independence. So it was not surprising that codes.) The president attended Islamic ceremonies himself and Africa developed many ideological safe havens for terrorism. made speeches elaborating the moderate understanding of Islam. Somalia, Nigeria and many North Africa states were unable to After 1997, a dialogue between the government and the im- develop legal and constitutional equality among their citizens. prisoned leaders of the violent Islamic groups had good results. There have been many built-in discriminatory mechanisms These leaders denounced the use of violence against the state against certain social and political groups. Those groups that are and tourists and issued an initiative to advise their followers out- discriminated against will feel alienated and marginalised -the side prison to stop using violence against the state. fi rst psychological requirements for terrorism. The increasing rate of unemployment in the 1990s and early A second important element in governance is the rule of law 2000s due to privatisation, the marginalisation of certain social and its enforcement. Its absence is a facilitator for terrorism and forces (the Bedouins in Sinai) and the Israeli policies in Palestine crime. Wherever there is a lack of criminal justice and law en- and Lebanon have led to a new wave of terrorism in Egypt. forcement institutions are weak and corrupt, one could expect In Algeria, a change in leadership brought in President Abdul terrorism. In these cases, justice will be defi ned as serving the Aziz Butafl iqa, who developed a new approach towards ter- interests of strong segments of the society. Weak segments will rorism. He followed a reconciliatory approach and declared a feel helpless and hopeless. They will not have any interest in the peaceful initiative to end terrorism, and even jointed the Trans- security and stability of society. One basic requirement of good Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative. This change of heart has not governance is a trust in law enforcement. Its absence will facili- disturbed Algerian-French relations. In the meantime, tribal lead- tate terrorism and organised crime. In some cases, democracy ers in the south of Algeria, which has not been included in the can exist in a society where there is no rule of law and no trust development plan of the state, provide a safe haven for the vio- in law enforcement agencies. lent Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat, which aims to over- In both North and sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of an effec- throw the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. tive rule of law and absence of trust in law enforcement agencies In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni managed to conclude have been classic features of nation-states since independence. a peace agreement with the Lord’s Resistance Army. In Nigeria, In some African countries, registration as a voter has to be done General Olusegun Obasanjo balanced the state’s approach to- at a police station. Citizens are unwilling to register because they

48 The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa on leadership, governance and democracy

may be insulted inside police stations. In case somebody has a Some analysts think that the process of state weakening, traffi c accident, he or she is reluctant to involve the police be- failure and collapse is not a one-way street and that a particu- cause of this lack of trust. This explains why police offi cers have lar state may be restored from a failure stage to a weak stage. been the target of terrorist attacks in many African states. Liberia and Lebanon are a clear evidence of this. The role of Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa have led to differ- international intervention is vital. ent impacts concerning governance. In North Africa, anti-ter- To conclude this part – both terrorism and counter-terror- rorism legislations should empower law enforcement agencies ism infl uence governance in Africa. Measuring this infl uence is with new mandates and new recourses. According to the Arab not easy. But one can say that in some cases the war on terror League’s political reform initiative in 2004 that was declared in empowered governance, while in other cases, more efforts have Tunisia, building transparent and accountable political processes to be made to create good governance. But a balance between and institutions should be a cornerstone in the Arab counter-ter- security and liberty must be struck. rorism strategy. The Alexandria political reform initiative adopted by Arab intellectuals in Egypt in 2005 considered good govern- ance a strategic asset in the fi ght against terrorism. PART: 3 THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND Although Egypt extended its emergency law for another two COUNTER-TERRORISM ON DEMOCRACY years, starting in April 2006, anti-terrorism legislation is being debated as an alternative. Teaching human rights in Egyptian A democratically elected government is an important tool in law enforcement agencies started many years ago. Some civil the fi ght against terrorism. Those who suffer economically in a society organisations have been monitoring presidential and par- democratic system can fi nd avenues to express their grievances. liamentary elections since 2005. They have registered violations The absence of democracy deprives disadvantaged groups from of electoral laws by the ruling National Democratic parties and these peaceful means and encourages them to use violence to oppositional forces as well. change their miserable conditions. Egyptian/American relations experienced some setbacks due One should not ignore the fact that the level of violence in to the intervention in Egyptian internal affairs of US congress- a democratic system such as the US is very high. John Kennedy men. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice postponed a visit to and Martin Luther King Jr were assassinated in a democratic so- Cairo because of what she described as an unjust court verdict ciety. Both the September 11 terrorist attacks and 2005 London against a presidential candidate who forged documents when he explosions took place in democratic societies. Yitzhak Rabin established his political party. On another occasion she praised was assassinated in a democratic system. Egyptian political reforms in a speech at the American University In 2003, 60 per cent of African states were classifi ed as free in Cairo. or partly free. Morocco was the only North African state to be According to a Freedom House report, Morocco occupied a included in this classifi cation. better position in 2005, not only in transparency but also in fi - Terrorism in Africa has not stopped. In 2005, Egypt had a nancial accountability. In Algeria, President Butafl iqa received US major constitutional reform and two elections, Presidential assistants to reform law enforcement agencies. In Libya, President (September 2006) and Parliamentary (October 2006). In the Qadhafi ’s son has become an agent of the good governance de- same year, Egypt suffered from more than fi ve terrorist attacks, bate. Seif El-islam AL-Qadhafi has been playing an effective role according to the last report issued by the US Department of in igniting hot debates on reforming the existing system. State. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has just gone According to the 2004 Human Development Report, North through democratic elections (November 2006) but ethnic ter- African states suffered so much from corruption in 2003 that rorism may continue. they ranked very low on the accountability scale. As for political So what is the story? It can be summarised as follows: stability, in 2002 Arab North African states occupied position Democracy is necessary to prevent terrorism, but it is not suf- number 6, before sub-Saharan African states and following Asian fi cient. Power-sharing may be a solution to ethnic terrorism. This countries. Regarding effective government in 2002 Arab North was the case in South Africa. But this case must be studied care- African states occupied number 6, after Latin American states fully in order to learn some lessons. and before sub-Saharan African countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, counter-terrorism strategies continue what globalisation has started, namely the collapse and failure of CONCLUSION states. Sudan is a strong case in point – peace between the north and south is fragile. Darfur is another fl ashpoint in Sudan, where Terrorism has both national and international roots. Leadership, ethnic terrorism has led to international intervention. The peace governance and democracy are necessary in the fi ght against agreement in Burundi may not spell the end of ethnic terrorism. terrorism, but they are not suffi cient.

NOTE

1 M Chereif Bassiouni, International legal approaches to combat terrorism, a public lecture presented at the Program on Terrorism’s Researches and Studies, Cairo University, March 2006.

49

The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights The experiences of East African countries George Kegoro

INTRODUCTION terrorism measures and therefore what would need to be done by individual countries to comply with the resolution. Among Counter-terrorism activities in Africa received a higher prior- other information, each country was required to indicate ity than they previously commanded following the attack of whether there existed any law making terrorism a serious September 11 in the United States of America. As a result of the offence in its territory and also whether there was in place, requirements of United Nations Resolution 1373, African coun- a law preventing the use of its territory as a safe haven for tries have attempted, with mixed outcomes, to enact counter- terrorists. Countries were also required to indicate whether terrorism legislation. Irrespective of the fate of these attempts, there were in place any laws that would prevent the use of African countries, when faced with the threat of terrorism within their fi nancial systems for conveying funding that may be their territories, have had to respond to the threat using available used to support terrorism and, in this regard, to indicate the legislative and administrative arrangements. arrangements in place for freezing accounts and assets at This presentation gives a bird’s eye view of the attempts banks and fi nancial institutions. Further, they were required of African countries to enact counter-terrorism legislation in to indicate what measures were in place to offer assistance to response to Resolution 1373 and reviews the effects of counter- other countries in the fi ght against terrorism. terrorism measures on the observance of human rights on the All African countries have fi led reports with the committee in continent. The interest is in counter-terrorism ‘measures’ as response to the request for information.1 Based on the informa- opposed to counter-terrorism ‘legislation’ on human rights. The tion that they have provided to the committee, African countries reason is that some countries without counter-terrorism leg- fall into four clusters, when considering the progress they have islation have nevertheless been the scene of counter-terrorism made in enacting legislation that implements the measures re- measures. Counter-terrorism legislation has come to be viewed quired by Resolution 1373. In the fi rst group are countries that with a measure of apprehension and as containing an inherent have enacted counter-terrorism legislation which substantially threat to the enjoyment of human rights. If so, countries that do introduces the measures required by the resolution. The follow- not have counter-terrorism legislation in place should arguably ing countries fall in this category: have a better human rights record than those that have enacted counter-terrorism legislation. The presentation will look at the ■ Uganda impact on human rights of such measures in countries that do ■ Tanzania not have counter-terrorism legislation but have nevertheless had ■ Mauritius to deal with the threat of terrorism. ■ The Gambia ■ South Africa ■ Mauritius THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1373 BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES In the second group are countries which assert that even before the events of September 11 and the subsequent Resolution 1373, When adopting Resolution 1373, the Security Council of the their national systems already had in place the measures that UN established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, a 15-member were the subject of Resolution 1373. Therefore, these countries, committee of the Assembly, to monitor the implementation by having already put in place such arrangements had no obliga- member countries of the resolution. The committee has empha- tions to discharge under the resolution. This group are all the sised that it is not a sanction organ of the UN and that its sole countries north of the Sahara. They include: purpose is to provide technical assistance to those countries that need it in order to comply with the resolution. ■ Egypt Soon after the adoption of the resolution, the committee, ■ Tunisia pursuant to paragraph 6 of the resolution, sent to each ■ Libya member country a request for information that would enable ■ Algeria the committee to determine the status of existing counter- ■ Morocco

51 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

The reports fi led with the counter-terrorism committee by the Only a small number of African countries have had terrorist ex- countries in this group reveal the sense of disappointment they periences of their own. The countries north of the Sahara have, be- harbour against the global community for ignoring terrorism, tween them, been the subject of numerous terrorist attacks, before which for long years they had to cope with on their own, before and after September 11. Evidently, they have had a home-grown the events of September 11. For example, Algeria reported to need to enact counter-terrorism legislation. Without exception, all the committee that it had “long suffered the ravages of terrorism the countries north of the Sahara had comprehensive counter-ter- often in the face of an indifferent and occasional complaisance rorism legislation in place even before Resolution 1373. [sic] on the part of certain sectors of the international commu- In sub-Saharan Africa, few of the countries have experienced nity”.2 Egypt reported that it was one of the fi rst states to deal terrorist attacks: Kenya and Tanzania are two of them. The claims with terrorism through legislation, long before September 11. by Togo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo that they The third groups of countries are those that have taken have also been the subject of terrorist attacks are less universally formal steps to enact counter-terrorism legislation but the steps recognised.3 It is likely that without a home-grown terrorist expe- were not met with success. Kenya and Namibia are the only rience, the bulk of African countries have had no domestic com- countries in this category. Kenya published the Suppression of pulsion to enact counter-terrorism legislation. Faced with more Terrorism Bill in 2003. The bill was the subject of signifi cant pressing national problems such as famine, disease and poverty, opposition by members of the Islamic community and human these countries are likely to rank counter-terrorism rather lowly rights groups, who felt that it promoted religious and ethnic in the list of national priorities. prejudice against Muslims. It was further claimed that the meas- The failure to enact counter-terrorism legislation in the bulk ures were disproportionate compared to the threat they were of African countries seems wholly explicable by the percep- targeted against and, moreover, the defi nition of terrorism as tion that these countries have no need of their own for such provided in the bill was vague and incapable of certainty. The legislation. Faced with diplomatic and donor pressure to do so, provisions of the bill that proposed to make it an offence for one they have approached the task of complying with Resolution to wear items of clothing that were associated with terrorists was 1373 rather perfunctorily. The country reports submitted to the construed as a direct attack on the Muslim way of life includ- Counter-Terrorism Committee by countries falling in this cat- ing traditional Islamic modes of dress. The provisions in the bill egory fully support this assertion. which proposed to impose on an accused person the duty to provide exculpatory evidence once the prosecution had estab- lished a certain threshold of evidence that tended to suggest ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTER- the guilt of the person, were construed as reversing the burden TERRORISM MEASURES of proof in criminal cases which, under Kenya’s constitution, is always the onus of the prosecution. In the end, the government East African countries chosen for this study withdrew the bill when it became clear that it would not receive For this presentation, the three East African neighbouring coun- the approval of the National Assembly. Namibia, on the other tries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have been selected to dem- hand, has reported that its legislation is in preparation and that onstrate the effects of counter-terrorism measures on the protec- consultations aimed at improving the drafts have been going tion of human rights. This choice is deliberate for several rea- on. Although the impression has been created that Namibia will sons. First, Kenya and Tanzania have been the subject of terrorist soon enact such legislation, a period in excess of four years has attacks on their soil and there is therefore domestic experience elapsed without any tangible achievements based on the various regarding terrorism. Second, Uganda and Tanzania are some of undertakings made to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. the few African countries that have managed to enact specifi c The fourth category, which encompasses the balance of the counter-terrorism legislation. The existence of such legislation countries on the African continent, are those countries which provides an ideal basis for reviewing the effects of counter-ter- acknowledge that they do not have in place legislation that rorism measures on human rights in those countries. Third, all meets with the requirements of Resolution 1373 but which, at three countries have had a measure of counter-terrorism activity the same time, have not taken formal steps to enact such legisla- whether or not this is based on specifi c counter-terrorism legisla- tion. Internally, this group is not homogenous. There are varying tion. Fourth, Kenya, which has no counter-terrorism legislation reasons why these countries have not enacted formal counter- in place, has nevertheless had a robust counter-terrorism pro- terrorist legislation. The majority of them consider that the crimi- gramme. Looked at this as a whole, the East African territories nal codes in force in their territories, although only of a general provide a good case study on the effects of counter-terrorism nature, can be extended to cover acts of terrorism. Zimbabwe, measures, Kenya serving as a kind of control in the study. for example, has reported that existing legislation, although not specifi cally designed with a view to countering terrorism, Terrorist attacks in East Africa substantially meets the requirements of the resolution. Others, On 7 August 1998 suicide bombers targeting the US embassy in like Equatorial Guinea, have reported that they do not have the Nairobi killed more than 200 people and injured more than 5 000 resources necessary to enact counter-terrorism legislation. These others, some of them very seriously. A simultaneous attack which resources would seem to be both fi nancial and technical such as targeted the US embassy in Dar es Salaam killed eight people and drafting skills. injured several others. In November 2002, another terrorist attack

52 The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights

took place in Kenya, on a coastal holiday resort at Kikambala of effects. First, uncertainty as to the exact defi nition of terrorism near Mombasa, owned and frequented by Israeli nationals. At leads to diffi culties in classifying conduct as terrorism and makes least 12 people died as a result of the attack and several others it possible for a subjective classifi cation of what may be innocent were injured. On the same day an abortive attempt was made conduct as terrorism. Second, the actions of law enforcement in Mombasa to bring down an Israeli jetliner using a rocket-pro- authorities in the name of counter-terrorism have been the subject pelled grenade. The grenade, however, missed the target. of grave concern from a human rights point of view. These two issues are discussed fully below. Case studies that are demonstra- Responses to the attacks tive of the problems are provided at the end of the discussion. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania had developed specifi c counter- terrorism legislation when the 1998 terrorist attacks happened. Problems of a defi nition of terrorism In Tanzania, one person was arraigned before court as a result One of the central problems in the implementation of the UN of the attack on the US embassy. Khalijan Mohammed was Resolution and the enforcement of counter-terrorism measures charged with murder, contrary to the provisions of the country’s is the diffi culty in achieving a universally acceptable defi nition penal code, in the absence of a more specifi c counter-terrorism of what constitutes terrorism. Flowing from this, it is also diffi cult offence. He was eventually acquitted for lack of evidence at the to defi ne, for example, a terrorist act, a terrorist organisation end of 2004. No case has ever been presented in a Kenyan court and the assets of a terrorist entity. The UN Resolution does not as a result of the Nairobi bombing. The Kikambala bombings, defi ne terrorism and it is for the member states to arrive at their however, led to a fl urry of law enforcement activities which are own defi nitions. The criticism here is that individual states could the subject of the study in this report. and may have defi ned terrorism in subjective terms with a view Uganda enacted its Anti-Terrorism Act in 2003 and Tanzania to suppressing dissidents, minorities or foreigners. enacted the Suppression of Terrorism Act in the same year. As Uganda has based some of its strong action on the Anti-ter- indicated, Kenya’s attempts to enact counter-terrorism legislation rorism Act enacted in 2002. The lack of counter-terrorism leg- of its own have not been successful. The main features of the islation has not inhibited Kenya’s government in the execution Ugandan and Tanzanian legislation include a defi nition of the of a sometimes robust counter-terrorism policy. An offi cial of offence of terrorism, which the statutes then criminalise, provi- the Uganda Human Rights Commission has remarked that the sions empowering the designation by a minister and without a defi nition of terrorism in Uganda’s legislation is “extremely wide judicial hearing of organisations as terrorist organisations, provi- to the extent that other criminal conduct that can be adequately sions on the procedures for the investigation of acts of terrorism dealt with by other legislation may fall within the defi nition of which include the denial of bail for terrorist suspects, and the terrorism”. The problems of defi nition are inherent in the deci- power to arrest without a warrant and for the confi scation of as- sion to declare the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an enigmatic sets and instrumentalities of terrorism. group of bandits fi ghting for the last two decades to overthrow Although Kenya has so far not enacted counter-terrorism the government of Uganda, a terrorist organisation. This may be legislation, it has carried out, among others, the following acts in viewed as trivialising the fi ght against terrorism. The organisa- enforcement of counter-terrorism measures: tion had been in existence for a long time without the govern- ment taking any steps to apply counter-terrorism measures to ■ Kenya has established a specialised anti-terrorism unit it. Further, the arrest of an opposition presidential challenger within the police force. on charges of terrorism, discussed below, is at the heart of the ■ In January 2004, Kenya established the National Counter- problem of an acceptable defi nition of terrorism. Terrorism Centre under the auspices of the National Tanzania, on the other hand, has counter-terrorism legisla- Security and Intelligence Service, which is Kenya’s formal tion in its books but has failed to invoke such legislation in cir- security intelligence organ. The centre is required to pro- cumstances where it is carrying out counter-terrorism measures, vide timely and factual intelligence to assist in the fi ght choosing to rely on administrative action or more traditional against terrorism. legislation instead. For example, the expulsion of offi cials of a ■ Security measures have been strengthened at airport, gov- Muslim charity on suspicion of terrorism was done outside the ernment installation, foreign embassies situated in Kenya framework of the counter-terrorism legislation. Further, the as- and other places considered to be vulnerable to terrorism. sets of the charity were distributed other than in the accordance ■ Kenya is an actual member of the Intergovernmental with the legislation. Authority on Development (IGAD),part of whose agenda is the fi ght against terrorism. Derogation from fundamental rights Some measures contained in typical counter-terrorism statutes have been viewed as having the effect of rolling back the protec- EFFECTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM tion of fundamental rights which provided under international MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS legal instruments. Examples include provisions which require that persons charged with terrorism offences be denied bail; In this section, we look at the effects of counter-terrorism meas- provisions which permit the detention of suspects for long pe- ures on the observance of human rights. There are two main types riods before they are charged in court; provisions which give

53 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

law enforcement offi cials unchecked investigative powers; and ism measures on human rights in Kenya. The report observed provisions which unfairly lessen the onus of proof that isordinar- that the crackdown on terrorism in Kenya had extensive impact ily required to be discharged by the prosecution in a criminal on the human rights situation in the country. The report echoed case. Further, the fi ght against terrorism has provided scope for the fi ndings by the Law Society of Kenya that authorities had the expansion of the death penalty. failed to act in compliance with international human rights law The case of Dr Kiiza Besigye and 22 others, considered and standards set by Kenyan law in the investigations following below, illustrates several failures of due process, including an the bombing in Kikambala. The issues of concern pointed out administrative refusal to release the defendants who had already in the report included a disturbing level of secrecy surround- been granted bail by the court, the arraignment of civilians be- ing the arrests and detention. Further, the report claimed that fore a military court which has signifi cantly reduced safeguards the authorities had held several persons in incommunicado in as to fair trail (for example, trials before the court martial are detention, had subjected suspects to detention without charge, not open to the public and the court is presided over by a non- torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment and had legally trained person) and the concurrent trial of the defendants carried out harassment of family members and relatives of those before two courts of law. These circumstances can never be suspected of terrorism. viewed as being consistent with a fair trial. Amnesty International claimed that interviewees had com- The Law Society of Kenya, reviewing offi cial action against plained of having been interrogated by foreign security agents. terrorism in the wake of the Kikambala terrorist attack in 2002, The presence and role of such agents in Kenya was not acknowl- concluded that “the government has … committed grave and edged by Kenyan authorities. serious human rights abuses in the name of fi ghting terror”.4 The In Uganda, there has been heightened military activity in the report claimed that the government had carried out harassment northern part of the country where the LRA has been active. and intimidation of sections of the population, particularly those It is claimed that Ugandan security forces have been involved it perceived to have leanings towards al-Qaeda owing to reli- in grave human rights abuses in the process of warfare against gious, cultural or linguistic ties to the Arab world. Citing as its the LRA. Atrocities carried out by elements in the army in- source the Muslim Lawyers Trust, the report set out a number clude the rape of civilians, torture, detention without trial and of serious human rights abuses that had been carried out by extrajudicial killings. government forces and justifi ed as counter-terrorism measures. These measures include: Case Study 1: Bandit organisation labelled terrorist organisation7 ■ Arbitrary and unwarranted arrests of individuals The Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act, 2003, provides for a schedule ■ Lengthy periods of detention of suspects at undisclosed in which the minister responsible is empowered to publish the locations in police cells without explanation as to reasons names of organisations considered to be terrorist organisations. for their confi nement Following the enactment of the legislation, the following were ■ Suspects being held incommunicado and denied all rights declared to be terrorist organisations: to legal representation ■ Unlawful coercion being applied on suspects and their ■ The Lord’s Resistance Army family members by way of harassment, arbitrary searches ■ The Lord’s Resistance Movement and periodic arrests of the family members, who are de- ■ Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and tained in similar circumstances as the principal suspects ■ Al-Qa’eda ■ Lengthy and harsh interrogation of suspects without their being advised of their rights or allowed access to lawyers It took the government of Uganda 19 years to declare the LRA a or concerned family members terrorist organisation. This declaration is controversial, however; ■ Threats of torture and deportation by way of intimidation some people may consider the LRA a bandit organisation and to unknown countries, regardless of whether the suspect not a terrorist organisation. is a Kenyan citizen or not ■ Permitting foreign security agents, particularly Israel and Case Study 2: Arrest of opposition American offi cers, to interrogate Kenyan suspects in a leader on terrorism charges8 manner and style inconsistent with that provided for In November 2005 Kizza Besigye, the leading opponent in the under Kenyan laws, the laws of the foreign offi cers’ coun- then forthcoming presidential elections, was arrested together tries, and international law. with 22 others and charged simultaneously before an ordinary ■ Charging suspects with frivolous ‘holding’ charges such as civilian court (the High Court) and the General Court Martial, harbouring aliens and being unlawfully present in Kenya, a military court, with terrorism and treason. As Besigye and the which is aimed at intimidation, prolonged detention and 22 others were all civilians, the decision to arraign them before a harassment5 court martial was diffi cult to justify. Further, jurisdiction for the trial of the offences related to ter- An investigation by Amnesty International6 on the crackdown rorism is, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, vested in the High Court, against terrorism led to a report on the effects of counter-terror- and not the court martial. On 16th November, a successful

54 The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights

application for bail was made on behalf of the defendants, but ity, the Tanzanian government did not invoke the Prevention of they were all re-arrested within the High Court precincts where Terrorism Act which had been enacted in 2002. the bail had been granted. The following day the defendants were arraigned before the Court Martial on a charge of terror- Case Study 4: Arbitrary detention ism, under the Anti-Terrorism Act. of relatives of suspects11 During the application for bail before the High Court, the A feature of the aftermath of the Kikambala terrorist attack has court premises were invaded by uniformed members of the Joint been the arbitrary detention of relatives of suspects. Anti-Terrorism Task Force Urban Hit Squad in an attempt to in- The confusion several detainees experienced during the ini- fl uence the bail application. tial states of detention and interrogation could have been made The Uganda Law Society therefore fi led a petition before the worse because of language diffi culties. Several interviewees Constitutional Court, seeking a number of declarations, includ- reported that they could not understand why they were being ing that: kept in custody, why they were interrogated, or even the charges being put to them. Amnesty International is also concerned that ■ The invasion of the court premises by security agents the alleged violations of pre-trial rights of detainees may have connected with the fi ght against terrorism contravened been exacerbated by the fact that interrogations were often con- the right to a free and fair hearing before an impartial ducted in a language the detainees could not fully understand. court, as guaranteed by the constitution of Uganda ■ That the concurrent proceedings in the High Court and the Case Study 5: Deportation of refugee General Court Martial against the defendants were illegal on charges of terrorism12 ■ That Section 119 (1) (g) and (h) of the Uganda Peoples Abdel Mohamed Al-Dahas is a 57 year old Iraqi national, a Defence Forces Act No 7/05, which subjected civilians pilot by profession. Al-Dahas was recognised as a refugee to military law and discipline, was inconsistent with the by the offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for constitution of Uganda Refugees (UNHCR) in Nairobi. He was held in police custody at ■ That the trial of the defendants before the General Court Kileleshwa police station, in Nairobi, from 8 October 2001 until Martial for the offence of terrorism, an offence whose trial February 2005 without any explanation being given regarding is the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court, is contrary his detention. Al-Dahas was handed into the custody of UNHCR to the constitution of Uganda on 28 February 2005. According to information gathered by Amnesty International, The High Court upheld the Law Society’s petition that the ex- Al-Dahas fl ed Iraq in 1996, fearing for his life, and was subse- istence of concurrent criminal proceedings in the High Court quently forced to move onwards between various countries, and the General Court Martial contravened the right to a fair including Yemen, in search of protection. He reached Nairobi hearing before an inadequate and impartial tribunal. The court, on 13 December 1999, where he attempted to apply for refugee however, did not satisfactorily answer all the questions raised in status with the UNHCR offi ce. In the process of making arrange- the petition. ments to leave, Al-Dahas was arrested and taken to Gigiri police Although Besigye was thereafter released on bail, the 22 station on 24 April 2001. He was brought to court on 18 May with whom he was charged before the Court Martial were not 2001, where he was found guilty of being in Kenya illegally and released, despite a High Court order granting them bail and sentenced to four months imprisonment or to a fi ne of Kshs 8 despite the fi nding that Court Martial had no jurisdiction to 000 (approximately US$105). The court also ordered his de- try them. portation to Iraq. He paid the fi ne and was taken back to Gigiri Whereas the fi rst case study demonstrates the use of coun- police station pending deportation. ter-terrorism legislation to controversially target local political While in custody, Al-Dahas managed to contact UNHCR of- dissidents, the second illustrates the use of such legislation to fi cers who wrote to the Immigration Department of Kenya on crack down on what may well be legitimate political competi- 13 September 2001, requesting them not to proceed with the tion The lack of clarity in the defi nition of the term ‘terrorism‘ deportation as Al-Dahas’s case was being examined. On 14 in legislation passed to fi ght terrorism contributes to situations September 2001, UNHCR sent another letter to the Immigration where legitimate political activity is branded as terrorism. Department confi rming that Al-Dahas has been granted refugee status and requesting the Kenyan authorities to release him into Case Study 3: Closure of Islamic charity10 UNHCR protection. On 6 October 2001, in contravention of the The Tanzanian branch of a Saudi charitable organisation, al- fundamental principle of non-defi lement and its obligations un- Harama in Islamic foundation shut down its offi ces after two der the 1951 Refugee Convention, Kenya deported Al-Dahas to of its offi cials were deported for using fraudulent documents to the United Arab Emirates, from where he was to be sent to Iraq. obtain Tanzanian citizenship. There were claims that the charity However, on informing the authorities at his transit point of his which the offi cials were in charge of had been implicated in a fear to return to Iraq because of serious threat to his life, he was plot to carry out terrorist attacks in Zanzibar. The assets of the brought back to Kenya on 8 October 2001. Upon his arrival in charity were distributed among several organisations. In carrying Kenya, he was taken straight to Kileleshwa police station, where out the expulsions and the distribution of the assets of the char- he was held until 28 February 2005.

55 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

Al Dahas challenged his detention and in a judgment deliv- Whether or not they have enacted counter-terrorism legisla- ered on 15 December 2003, the judge said the following: tion, a number of African countries have had to grapple with the threat of terrorism or deal with actual terrorist attacks. Where I take judicial notice of the following notorious facts. That on legislation exists, some of their responses have been, or are 07.08.98 the American Embassy in Nairobi was bombed and claimed to have been, based on such legislation. Uganda, for damaged … That many innocent Kenyans died and others were example, has carried out some of its counter-terrorism measures maimed for life. That on or about 28.11.02 the Paradise Hotel at on the basis of its counter-terrorism legislation. Some countries Kikambala near Mombasa was bombed and fl attened. That the which have enacted counter-terrorism legislation have, in re- media reported that about 15 people died and 80 others injured sponse to the threat of terrorism or to an actual terrorist attack, and that most of the victims were again Kenyans. not relied on such legislation. Tanzania provides a good exam- ple of a country that has pursued its counter-terrorism measures The judge made reference in this context to the fact that Al outside the framework of existing legislative. This raises question Dahas is a “foreign pilot bomber engineer and trained military as to the necessity of such legislation in the fi rst place. But there personnel” though the judgment establishes no link between the are also countries which, having no counter-terrorism legislation events referred to above and Al-Dahas. Al-Dahas came to Kenya in place, have had to deal with the threat of terrorism or actual on 13 December 1999 and was already in custody at the time of terrorist attack staged within their territories. Such countries have the Kikambala bombing. had to rely on general legislation in dealing with the terrorist at- tack, or have resorted to extra-legal means. Case Study 6: Deportation of Italian doctor13 As the foregoing shows, Kenya has had an active counter-ter- In July 2003 an Italian doctor was deported from Tanzania rorism scene even without specifi c counter-terrorism legislation. for raising a false claim about a terrorist attack in Zanzibar. The assumption that the enactment of counter-terrorism legisla- Dr Marico Mariana, who was the Honorary Consul of Italy in tion will of necessity reduce the threat of terrorism is severely Zanzibar, was asked to leave within 90 days because he had undermined by situations where such legislation exists but is not tipped off foreign embassies in Tanzania about the presence of invoked. The threat to human rights which is associated with the terrorists in Zanzibar. This report, which the Tanzanian govern- enactment of counter-terrorism legislation can be shown to exist ment considered to be false, had spread alarm and affected tour- even in those countries which have not enacted counter terror- ism on the island. ism legislation but have had to regard to what they consider to be terrorist attacks. The foregoing realities indicate that it is simplistic Case Study 7: Arrest of Muslim religious leader14 to assume that countries that have in place specifi c counter-ter- In October 2004, a Muslim leader, Sheikh Khamis Khalifa, was rorism legislation are worse off from a human rights point of view arrested and interrogated for alleged links with al-Qaeda. It was that those that do not. Further, the quality of counter-terrorism claimed that Khalifa was in communication with the al-Qaeda legislation becomes irrelevant if, as in the case of Tanzania, coun- leadership and that he had been implicated in international ter- ter-terrorism action is implemented outside the framework of such rorist investigations. legislation. From these realities, it is clear that the debate in Africa In the end, however, he was cleared of the allegations and his should centre, fi rst, on whether all the countries have in place arrest was viewed by some as one example of prejudice based effective counter-terrorism legislation, and second, and more pro- on religious or ethnic origin. found, that all action against terrorism on the continent should be carried out only on the basis of a written law, however oppressive the law may be. Action undertaken outside the law will remain GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION diffi cult to account for and may give law enforcement authorities more leeway for carrying out human rights abuses than even the The debate on counter-terrorism legislation in pursuance of the most draconian legislation ever could. Discussing the handling of UN resolution now questions the necessity for such legislation terrorism cases in Uganda, Simon Kinobe remarked: in the fi rst place. Arguments have been advanced that legisla- tion alone cannot be the basis for a successful counter-terrorism [T]he reality on the ground in Uganda is that, notwithstanding strategy in Africa and that, more needs to be done to address the the existence of the elaborate legislation, government has pur- underlying causes of terrorism, the existence of which counter- sued military and political options for the suppression or oth- terrorism legislation appears to be in denial. Questions have also erwise solving terrorism perpetrated by local terrorist organiza- been raised about the threat that counter-terrorism measures tions – the Lord’s Resistance Army. As a result, there are hardly portend for the enjoyment of human rights, especially in a con- any criminal prosecutions of cases of terrorism. The perpetrators tinent in which even before the advent of strong counter-terror- of terrorism who survive the battles in the fi eld are not taken ism measures, had not enjoyed a strong tradition of respect for to court for prosecution under the Act, they are either handled such rights. It is feared that counter-terrorism measures may be under the amnesty law or illegally dealt with by the military. used in Africa as a smokescreen for human rights abuses and to This has led to an enormous violation of the fundamental rights, stifl e legitimate political competition. As the case of Dr Besigye contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Uganda (1995), shows, this fear is not without justifi cation. along with supporting legislation. Fortunately, cases of such vio-

56 The effects of counter-terrorism measures on human rights

lation are coming into the limelight and the power of the military rights abuse and the connection with the fi ght against terrorism. courts has been challenged. Any corrective efforts must take into account these realities. Any insistence in form, which has been one of the hallmarks in the The situation in Uganda as portrayed in the foregoing discussion opposition to counter-terrorism legislation, appears not to have demonstrates the diffi culties in the African continent as to human reckoned with this reality.

NOTES

1 The information about the status of compliance by African 6 Amnesty International, Kenya, The impact of ‘anti-ter- 9 Ibid. countries with Resolution 1373 of 2001 is derived from rorism’ operations on human rights (Al Index AFR 10 Ibid. the offi cial website of the United Nations, http://www. 32/002/2005), March 2005. 11 See Amnesty International, op cit. un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/1373DocsEng. 7 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (Kenya Section), 12 See Amnesty International, op cit. htm (accessed between 15 and 30 November 2006). ICJ Imminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism 13 See ICJ, op cit. 2 Ibid. and Human Rights (The Report of the submissions to the 14 Ibid. 3 Ibid. ICJ Panel at the East Africa Regional Hearings held on 15 Ibid. 4 Law Society of Kenya, Annual Human Rights Report, 27 and 28th February 2006), edited by Harvey Agumba, 2003, Law Society of Kenya, Nairobi, p 4. Nairobi, 2006. 5 Ibid, p 5. 8 Ibid.

57

The price of counter-terrorism in Africa Fool’s gold or genuine gold? Donovan C Chau1

INTRODUCTION Training individuals in the business of countering terror- ism and providing them with the equipment and technology The purpose of this paper is to fi nd answers to the questions: necessary to prevent the use of violence against civilians are (a) How much does an effective counter-terrorism strategy for the readily identifi able aspects of the cost of counter-terrorism. African countries cost, and (b) Is paying for counter-terrorism Training may involve education, seminars, and exercises, while measures worth the cost. In other words, is counter-terrorism equipment and technology may involve anything from basic law spending ‘fool’s gold’ or ‘genuine gold’. enforcement gear to costly infrastructure and software programs. The paper attempts to provide answers by examining the Political will, while not quantifi able, is another crucial aspect of cost of counter-terrorism in Kenya, Ghana, and Botswana. It the price of counter-terrorism. It entails leadership, sacrifi ces, as concludes with policy recommendations for African nations and well as the wherewithal to remain steadfast in diffi cult times. the counter-terrorism community as a whole. How does one measure the cost of counter-terrorism related to people and machines? Foreign countries’ budget speeches and documents are useful, when available. Examining the cost DEFINITIONS of counter-terrorism assistance to African nations is also a useful indicator of the price of counter-terrorism and the cost of an ef- Before we can discuss the costs and funds associated with fective counter-terrorism strategy. countering terrorism, we must agree on what terrorism and The US funds various programmes to help foreign countries counter-terrorism are. To date, the international commu- counter terrorism, also in Africa. These programmes are wide- nity has not reached consensus on a defi nition of terrorism; spread and information is readily available. The Antiterrorism thus, logically, there is also no agreement on what it takes to Assistance Program (ATA), for example, was established in counter terrorism. 1983 in response to the bombing of US Marine barracks in For the sake of argument, we turn to the US defi nition which Beirut. ATA includes the provision of training, equipment, and states that terrorism “means premeditated, politically motivated advice to enhance anti-terrorism skills and capabilities, estab- violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-na- lish security relationships, and share anti-terrorism techniques. tional groups or clandestine agents”.2 The critical elements of this Between 1999 and 2005, the US provided US$589.9 million for defi nition of terrorism (and those that are generally agreed upon) ATA worldwide.3 are violence, non-combatants (or civilians), and groups or indi- Another US initiative is the Terrorist Interdiction Program viduals. Countering terrorism, then, should be aimed primarily (TIP), which was established in 2000. TIP assists foreign coun- at preventing groups or individuals from using violence against tries by providing a centralised country database of cross-border civilians. (Nuances could be added to this understanding of travellers (the Personal Identifi cation Secure Comparison and countering terrorism, but they are not necessary here.) Counter- Evaluation System, or PISCES), assessing a country’s needs for terrorism, at its core, seeks to address groups or individuals and PISCES, and training local offi cials. Through TIP, foreign coun- the violence they may use, and involves protecting civilians from tries gain watchlisting capabilities, helping to identify suspect the groups or individuals who use violence. persons attempting to pass through air, land, or maritime ports The cost of counter-terrorism – the cost of implementing of entry. Between 2000 and 2005, the US provided US$38.25 a counter-terrorism strategy – is as elusive as a defi nition of million for TIP worldwide.4 terrorism. Other countries provide foreign counter-terrorism as- sistance as well. For example, the United Kingdom’s Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) has a counter-terrorism programme THE COST OF COUNTER-TERRORISM that focuses on the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Between 2003 In general terms, the price of counter-terrorism may be broken and 2005, the British government provided 9.4 million (approxi- down into three parts, two quantifi able and one not. These are mately US$16.1 million) worldwide “to support sustainable CT humans, machines, and political will. [counter-terrorism] relationships with key countries to develop

59 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

their long-term counter-terrorism capacity”.5 Owing in large part linchpin of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Providing to its historical legacy on the continent, France also has counter- them with training and equipment is one of the more costly ar- terrorism programmes in Africa. Italy, Germany, the European eas of an effective strategy. Nevertheless, more than a country’s Union, and – to a lesser extent – Japan and Switzerland provide military, police and other law enforcement entities are the direct some counter-terrorism aid to African countries as well. Several link to the people, and they perform vital intelligence missions other countries provide standard law enforcement assistance to (if they are not already the sole domestic intelligence agency the continent. Nevertheless, very few countries provide extensive within a country).7 Police and law enforcement entities must be programmes aimed at countering terrorism, and, with the excep- supported by laws and legislation dealing with countering terror- tion of the US and the UK, even fewer provide information on ism, another necessary interior control. Curtailing local support foreign counter-terrorism assistance that is in the public domain. to all aspects of terrorism, including the use of deterrence in the form of punishment, provides police and law enforcement enti- ties with the legal powers to counter terrorism. People must be TRINITY OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER- trained in laws and legislation, however, the cost of this interior TERRORISM MEASURES control is primarily one of political will. Related to laws and leg- islation are courts and the ability to prosecute alleged terrorism Despite the diffi culty in assessing the cost of counter-terrorism, suspects. This interior control, like laws and legislation, provide the tenets of an effective counter-terrorism strategy involve police and law enforcement entities with the incentives to coun- what may be termed ‘overall controls’, ‘interior controls’, and ter terrorism effectively. The costs of courts and prosecution are ‘exterior controls’.6 Overall controls for an effective counter- human, but establishment of these courts depends primarily on terrorism strategy are government functions and processes that political will.8 affect all aspects of national security, whether counter-terrorism The third key area for an effective counter-terrorism strategy related or not. Interior controls are the processes and measures is exterior controls. Security at a country’s points of entry is a government needs to maintain security within a country, while vital for countering terrorism. Agencies that deal with guarding exterior controls are measures used to manage the entry and exit a country’s borders, such as customs and immigration, require of people and goods across and between international borders. funding to train individuals and to purchase the necessary Focusing on the prevention of terrorism, an effective strategy equipment and technology to track potential terrorists entering keeps counter-terrorism within the perspective of a country’s or exiting the country. Like intelligence and police, the entities primary interests, its available resources, its threat environment, that are responsible for security at points of entry comprise a and the likelihood of terrorist attacks. vital element in any nation’s counter-terrorism strategy. Security Overall controls comprise intelligence collection and analy- between points of entry is equally important; however, its sig- sis, information sharing, and public communications. The single, nifi cance is largely a function of a country’s geography. The most crucial component of an effective counter-terrorism strat- cost associated with this external control involves training and egy is intelligence collection and analysis. For countries with equipping individuals responsible for maintaining the integrity of few international interests, this means domestic intelligence. a country’s borders – in many but not all African countries, this Domestic intelligence collection and analysis involves training is the military. individuals as well as providing them with the tools they need From this broad discussion, the following trinity emerges that to perform their jobs effectively; the cost involves people and represents identifi able governmental entities needed for an effec- machines. Directly related to overall control is information shar- tive counter-terrorism strategy: intelligence, police, and border ing. Agencies within a government must share counter-terrorism guards (including land, air, and maritime points of entry).9 While information effectively to prevent terrorist acts. While there are the other tenets of an effective counter-terrorism strategy are costs associated with training individuals in the correct proce- necessary, these three measures are vital. And as they are mostly dures and building the necessary infrastructure for them to share discernable in the budgets of foreign governments, one is able to information, the price of information sharing is primarily one of analyse them for the purposes of this paper. Note also that this political will. Public communications is another overall control trinity of measures applies regardless of the form of government.10 for an effective counter-terrorism strategy. This means commu- nicating clearly and directly to the country’s people about the terrorist enemies of the country. If the people can be made to COUNTRIES STUDIED understand the government’s stance, then an effective counter- terrorism policy can endure. Like information sharing, the costs We may now turn to our three case studies – Kenya, Ghana, and associated with public communications are less about training Botswana. These three countries were chosen because they: (a) individuals and purchasing the right equipment and more about have counter-terrorism policies; (b) are located in similar geopo- political will. litical environments; (c) have similar total reported government Several interior controls are needed for a country to pos- expenditures (between US$3.5 and US$4 billion annually); (d) sess an effective counter-terrorism strategy. First and foremost have expended funds on and received assistance for counter-ter- are the police and other law enforcement entities of a country. rorism; and (e) have counter-terrorism-related budget expendi- Like intelligence collection and analysis, police agencies are the tures that are accessible in the public domain.11

60 The price of counter-terrorism in Africa

Avoiding normative or subjective analyses, each case study inspectors to better oversee and maintain security procedures begins by examining the measures necessary for an effective and planning.15 counter-terrorism strategy in each country – intelligence, police, The National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) was estab- and border guards. To determine the amount spent on coun- lished in 1998 to be the primary civilian intelligence organisa- ter-terrorism, an overview of the geopolitical environment for tion. Located within the Ministry of Provincial Administration these countries is required. In each examination, we also need and National Security, the NSIS was established from the Police to determine which agencies within each government possess Special Branch (Security Intelligence Service). US Federal Bureau authority over the three essential functions of counter-terrorism. of Investigation (FBI) agents along with other consultants helped From this, we may determine the expenditure of the relevant train NSIS personnel. In February 2003, an Anti-Terrorism Unit counter-terrorism entities and, fi nally, discuss the cost of an ef- consisting of offi cers from all security agencies was established fective counter-terrorism strategy. within the OOP. In 2004, Kenya opened a National Counter- Terrorism Centre to improve security throughout the Horn of Cost of counter-terrorism in Kenya Africa by coordinating information. Kenya, a multiparty republic headed by a president, has expe- It was reported that Kenya received US$10 million for its rienced incidents of terrorist attacks in the past – from the 1998 Anti-Terror Police Unit and US$40 million to upgrade airport and bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi to the 2002 attacks sea port security from the US.16 Located in the OOP, the Anti- against an Israeli civilian airliner and an Israeli-owned hotel in Terror Police Unit oversees the prevention and suppression of Mombasa. Its demographic make-up and proximity to Somalia terrorist fi nancing. The unit is composed of intelligence person- makes Kenya vulnerable to future attacks. Moreover, Kenya’s nel dealing with various aspects of fi nancial forensics required geographic proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian to trace proceeds channelled for terrorist activities. The US also Peninsula makes her a convenient transit point for individuals provided US$175,000 for Export Control and Related Border and groups affi liated with Islamic extremist groups. Security Assistance (EXBS) from 2005 to 2006.17 Similarly, be- As the country’s primary counter-terrorism entity, the Kenyan tween 1999 and 2003, Kenya received US$12.28 million for ATA police force is based in administrative centres and divided into a from the US.18 The US will also provide approximately US$10 number of separate operational units across the country. Located million through the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative within the Ministry of Provincial Administration and National (EACTI) for an in-country anti-terrorism training programme for Security under the Offi ce of the President (OOP), operational Kenya.19 In coordination with Kenya’s Commissioner of National police units include an air wing, port police for patrol of har- Police, Director of Public Prosecutions, and others senior Kenyan bours on the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria, and a Criminal offi cials, the US Department of State has used some of these Investigation Department (CID) intelligence division. In 2003, a EACTI funds to devise a nine-week training course that has been Tourism Police Unit was established with a contingent of 450 delivered to a hand-picked group of investigators, prosecutors, offi cers; it has certain functions to reduce concerns about the immigration offi cials, and counter-terrorism analysts focusing on threat to foreign tourists from terrorism, especially in Coast interagency collaboration, as well as command and control.20 Province. The Kenyan Customs Department and Kenyan Wildlife The UK has provided counter-terrorism assistance for mul- Service are paramilitary security forces with police functions as tiple projects in Kenya as well. Projects have included aviation well.12 The Kenyan Wildlife Service is located within the Ministry security and border security management; assistance on anti- of Tourism and Wildlife. money laundering and counter-terrorist fi nancing legislation; po- The Police General Services Unit (GSU) is a mobile autono- lice reform and leadership support; training in investigative skills mous paramilitary force for internal security with approximately for the Kenyan police; and improving tourism security. The UK 5,000 personnel. Since 2003, the GSU has had certain counter- also provided crisis management training as well as assistance terrorism functions, including patrolling around Kenya’s inter- to arms and explosive search dogs. The UK expended 711,722 national airports. The GSU and the Kenyan army are deployed (approximately US$1.2 million) in Kenya in 2004/05.21 to guard Kenya’s borders. Border entry points are manned While the US and the UK have devoted substantial re- by immigration offi cials and reinforced by security agencies, sources to assist Kenya improve its counter-terrorism capabilities including the Administration Police. The Ministry of Provincial (over US$72 million since 1999), Kenya itself has expended Administration and National Security has overall responsibility a signifi cant amount on counter-terrorism. Table 1 illustrates for Kenya’s boundaries. Kenya’s recent expenditure on ministries with counter-terrorism With support from the US TIP, Kenya has embarked on authorities. computerisation of its immigration department and all points Only a portion of the expenditure within the OOP, of entry and border posts. Between 2000 and 2003, Kenya re- Department of Defence, and Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife ceived US$900 000 for TIP.13 In 1999, the US helped launch an is related to the trinity of effective counter-terrorism measures. ‘emergency security training’ programme aimed at establishing If an average of 50 per cent of this expenditure were counter- a Kenyan coast guard.14 Kenya also received civil aviation se- terrorism related, then Kenya’s expenditure on police functions, curity assistance from the US Federal Aviation Administration intelligence, and border guards – including NSIS expenditure (FAA) and the US Transportation Security Administration – would amount to roughly 10 per cent of the government’s total (TSA). This security assistance included training managers and expenditure.

61 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

Table 1: Kenya’s ministerial expenditures related to counter-terrorism, cumulative by quarter in Kenyan shillings (million) (percentage of total)

2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter Ministries ending 31/12/04 ending 31/03/05 ending 30/06/05 ending 30/09/05 ending 31/12/05

Offi ce of the President 15 250 13,8% 23 954 13,9% 30 109 11,4% 9 248 14,8% 15 544 12,4%

Department of Defence 11 082 10,0% 11 082 6,4% 21 066 8,0% 5 717 9,1% 10 921 8,7%

National Security Intelligence Services 1 985 1,8% 2 999 1,7% 4 189 1,6% 1 288 2,1% 2 545 2,0%

Tourism and Wildlife 479 0,4% 1 251 0,7% 2 511 0,9% 339 0,5% 1 133 0,9%

Total of all ministries 110 805 172 342 264 843 62 671 125 690

Source: Ministry of Finance Quarterly Budget Reviews, May 2005 – April 2006.

It is important to take into account costs not normally associ- In October 2001 Ghana established a Counter-Terrorism ated with these measures. For example, in 2005/06, the Kenyan Operations Unit under the National Security Council. The government allocated Kshs1,5 billion for police reforms – Kshs750 unit was mandated to conduct counter-terrorism intelligence million of which for police housing.22 A fair approximation of gathering and operations. Also known as the counter-terrorism Kenya’s counter-terrorism expenditure would therefore be some- intelligence centre, the unit is composed of personnel drawn where between 6 and 9 per cent of total government expenditure. from various security and intelligence agencies.25 In 2004, the How does it compare to the other countries reviewed? We Vetting Crime Intelligence Analysis Unit was ‘revitalised’ to lead now look across the continent. the course of intelligence gathering and management.26 In 2006, it was reported that the CID would renew its crime investiga- Price of counter-terrorism in Ghana tion process and establish crime intelligence units for proactive Like Kenya, Ghana’s demographic make-up may be a cause for policing in regional, divisional, and district headquarters. In future concern. Ghana – a constitutional republic – is located to addition, the Immigration Service would embark on the expan- the immediate south of the Sahel region – where past incidents of sion of intelligence operations with improved fraud detection terrorism have occurred. In addition, Ghana’s proximity to region- facilities, modernisation and computerisation of border con- al confl icts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, southern Guinea, and Côte trol and immigration business process, and training of staff in d’Ivoire (or what has been collectively termed the Mano River information technology.27 confl ict23) creates a challenging transnational threat environment. Ghana has received international support, much of it from The Ghana police service is the prominent counter-terror- the US, for the installation of a computerised system at the na- ism entity and falls under the jurisdiction of an eight-member tional airport, Kotoka International Airport, and along the coun- police council. In 2005, the Ghana police service was estimated try’s borders. Under TIP, the US provided Ghana with PISCES, at more than 20,000 personnel.24 Other police-related entities and between 2000 and 2003 Ghana received US$200,000 for in the Ministry of Interior include the Criminal Investigations this programme.28 Ghana’s NCB has also received assistance Department (CID), Narcotics Control Board (NCB), Immigration from the UK, assisting in the expansion of its force from about Service, and Customs and Excise Service. The latter two man 60 to 200 offi cers.29 Similarly, the US will provide training in ad- border checkpoints. The Customs and Excise Service also op- vanced investigative techniques as well as airport and sea port erates as part of the police service, while the NCB maintains a interdiction to the NCB. US funding for these measures is a por- permanent presence at airports and sea ports. tion of US$500 000 to be devoted to several regions of Africa.30 The Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) is responsible for Thus, US and UK counter-terrorism assistance to Ghana since state security and answers directly to the president. Intelligence 2000 has amounted to more than US$1 million. agencies include the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the Defence Ghana’s counter-terrorism expenditure on intelligence, Intelligence, as well as External and Internal Intelligence. police, and border guards are localised in two ministries, the

Table 2: Functional classifi cation of Ghana’s government expenditure related to counter-terrorism, in billions of cedi (percentage of total)

Ministries 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Ministry of Defence 166 2,2 % 287 2,3% 293 2,3% 462 2,4% 507 1,9%

Ministry of the Interior 206 2,7% 285 2,3% 376 2,9% 548 2,9% 677 2,5%

Total of all ministries 7 525 12 451 12 753 19 053 26 584

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Offi ce of the Controller and Accountant General.31

62 The price of counter-terrorism in Africa

Ministries of Defence and of the Interior. Table 2 illustrates the The border with Zimbabwe is of particular concern because government’s recent expenditure on counter-terrorism. of the infl ux of economic migrants and the threat of foot and Only a portion of the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure may mouth disease. Botswana police with BDF support are active in be said to apply to the trinity of counter-terrorism measures. If this area and a four-metre-high electrical fence was erected to we estimate that half of the Ministry of Defence’s expenditure protect the frontier. and 90 per cent of the Ministry of the Interior’s expenditure Botswana has received a modest amount of counter-terrorism is related to counter-terrorism, then Ghana spends on aver- assistance. Between 1999 and 2003, it received US$321,000 from age some 3.5 per cent of its total government expenditure on the US through ATA.34 In 2005/06, the British High Commission counter-terrorism. funded the acquisition of police intelligence software and spon- How does this compare to the fi nal country studied, sored media training for police. The moderate amount of assistance Botswana in southern Africa? may be attributed, in part, to year-on-year increases in Botswana’s defence and police budgets, as well as its perceived threat envi- Price of counter-terrorism in Botswana ronment.35 Table 3 illustrates Botswana’s counter-terrorism expen- Botswana, a multiparty parliamentary republic, does not have a ditures as they pertain to the trinity of counter-terrorism measures. potentially dangerous demographic make-up. However, its close While nearly all the expenditure on Public Order and Safety proximity to ‘militant Islamic formations’ in southern Africa (in may be said to be related to counter-terrorism, in all likelihood Mozambique and South Africa, in particular) is cause for con- only a portion of defence expenditure is related to it. If some 50 cern.32 Furthermore, the potential spillover effects of regional in- per cent of Botswana’s defence expenditure is allocated to the stability – especially in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – makes trinity, about 9.6 per cent of the country’s total government ex- transnational threats such as terrorism a real and signifi cant issue. penditure goes to counter-terrorism. Like other countries, much of The Botswana Police Department is controlled by the Botswana’s expenditure goes to physical infrastructure. For exam- Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, who ple, in 2005/06 Botswana allocated P100 million and in 2006/07, also heads the Ministry of the State President. The Ministry of P181.1 million to police facilities.37 It these are taken into account the State President is also responsible for the Botswana Defence an estimated 9 per cent of Botswana’s total government expendi- Force (BDF) and intelligence service. The police service is di- ture goes to the police, intelligence, and border guards. vided into three regional divisions (North, South Central, and South) and comprises eight branches: General Duties, Criminal Investigation Department, Special Support Group, Special CONCLUSION Branch, Traffi c, Telecommunications and Transport, Police College, and Departmental Management. Another small armed To summarise, the annual percentage of total government ex- force, the Anti-Poaching Unit (APU), was established by the penditure on counter-terrorism, or the cost of counter-terrorism, Department of Wildlife and National Parks, which is within the in these three countries as follows: Ministry of the Environment, Wildlife and Tourism. The APU’s mission is to counter the activity of poachers, particularly those ■ Kenya – between 6 and 9 per cent targeting elephants for their ivory; however, its role as a law en- ■ Ghana – 3-4 per cent forcement agency gives it some counter-terrorism functions. ■ Botswana – roughly 9 per cent The Botswana Police’s Security Intelligence Service branch (SIS) is responsible for investigating terrorist activities within the This means that these three African countries spend some country. SIS maintains relations with other intelligence serv- US$230-270 million on counter-terrorism annually. ices to identify people associated with the threat of terrorism Kenya and Botswana’s counter-terrorism expenditure is on within the country and outside its borders.33 Personnel from the the higher end, Ghana’s on the lower. Expenditure roughly re- Department of Customs and Excise in the Ministry of Finance and fl ects the terrorist threat each country faces, as well as the coun- Development Planning are responsible for Botswana’s borders, try’s resources, which suggests that these African countries are in cooperation with paramilitary units of the BDF. Established allocating an appropriate amount of funds to counter-terrorism. in 1994, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime is Although equipment and technology absorb much of the money another law enforcement agency with border security functions. allocated to counter-terrorism, they are not necessarily effective

Table 3: Functional classifi cation of Botswana’s government expenditures related to counter-terrorism, in millions of pula (percentage of total)

2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005

Public Order and Safety 686 5,9% 629 4,6% 773 4,9% 850 5,2% 944 5,0%

Defence 998 8,7% 1 305 9,5% 1 451 9,2% 1 596 9,8% 1 772 7,6%

Total government expenditure 11 536 13 671 15 710 16 275 18 720

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and IMF staff estimates.36

63 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

measures. The cost associated with the human aspects of coun- ing terrorism, how much they are spending, and what the similari- ter-terrorism – training and educating police, intelligence, and ties and differences are among them.38 Thus, a nongovernmental border guards – are often overlooked. The cost of an effective organisation could create a counter-terrorism inventory equivalent counter-terrorism strategy is therefore dependent on a country’s to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, threat environment as well as its national priorities. It amounts to the “authoritative annual inventory of the world’s armed forces”.39 between 4 and 9 per cent of the total expenditure. Such a global, authoritative counter-terrorism inventory would This paper concludes with three policy recommendations for contribute to understanding the cost of counter-terrorism and African countries, one recommendation for the counter-terror- would do much to enhance foreign counter-terrorism strategies. ism community, and two observations. The inventory would also assist with the diffi cult issue of transpar- ency for many governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ■ First, African countries should focus their counter-terror- Finally, attaining high-quality police, credible intelligence, ism strategies on the trinity of essential counter-terrorism and effective border guards affords numerous benefi ts to African measures – police, intelligence, and border guards. To societies – and society as a whole. An effective counter-terrorism reach an appropriate level of spending, African countries strategy, for example, would not only curtail the potential for ter- should base funding on their respective threat environ- rorism, but would also stem the tide of transnational organised ments, which is ascertained through credible intelligence crime. Moreover, the consequences of an effective counter-terror- and the likelihood of terrorist activity. ism strategy – safety and security – would enable private sector ■ Second, African countries should seek counter-terrorism investment and economic growth which, in turn, would contrib- assistance from foreign countries while at the same time ute to the betterment of society. Also, funding the trinity of coun- developing their own counter-terrorism measures. This ter-terrorism measures would enhance overall human security. does not mean catering to foreign interests, but rather So, what is the true cost of an effective counter-terrorism establishing basic laws, effective police, credible intel- strategy? In essence, it is the price of achieving good governance ligence, and capable border guards. in areas such as intelligence collection and analysis, information- ■ Third, Africa countries should maximise existing counter- sharing, high-quality law enforcement, legislative and judicial terrorism capabilities among the police, intelligence, and competence, and international border controls. Is paying for an border guards. Effective counter-terrorism measures do effective counter-terrorism strategy fool’s gold or genuine gold? not require the creation of new capabilities. Many coun- If money is spent on the prescribed areas of good governance tries have embarked on maximising existing capabilities, and this is accompanied by suffi cient political will, then it is and they should be commended and further supported. worthwhile. However, if money is spent on ad hoc ‘counter-ter- rorism only’ functions and capabilities, then it is a waste. Thus, As for the counter-terrorism community in general, it would be effective counter-terrorism spending is genuine gold; counter- benefi cial to study how foreign countries are organised for counter- terrorism spending, narrowly construed, is fool’s gold.

NOTES

1 The author wishes to thank Andrew Black of Applied “Intelligence is King,” “Unity of Effort,” “No Sanctuaries 12 Notably, the Kenya Wildlife Service was reportedly Marine Technology, Inc, Garry Hindle of the Royal United and No Support,” and “Undercut the Irregular Enemy trained by the British Special Air Service. Federal Research Services Institute, Anneli Botha of the Institute for Security Politically.” C S Gray, Irregular enemies and the essence Division, Country profi le: Kenya, March 2005, Library of Studies, and a former US counter-terrorism offi cial for of strategy: Can the American way of war adapt?, Strategic Congress, Washington, DC, p 21. their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 13 United States General Accounting Offi ce, op cit, p 44. paper. The analysis and conclusions drawn represent the PA, March 2006, pp 20-28. 14 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Central Africa, author’s opinion alone, and he bears responsibility for any 7 In countries where the military performs police functions, Executive Summary, 27 April 2006, errors or omissions. I group these entities alongside ‘police and other law en- (26 August 2006). No cost information available. 2 Offi ce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US forcement entities’. 15 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Patterns of global Department of State, Country reports on terrorism 2005, 8 I do not intend to downplay the cost of developing and terrorism, Kenya: 2005 overview, (29 3 United States General Accounting Offi ce, Department States, the United Nations, as well as other countries and August 2006). No cost information available. of State: Non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and organisations have spent signifi cant sums of money seek- 16 Federal Research Division, op cit, p 22. related programs follow legal authority, but some activities ing to help African countries build and sustain these sys- 17 EXBS encompasses the following: developing the legal need reassessment, GAO-04-521, Washington, DC, April tems. However, political will is crucial to this money being framework and regulatory infrastructure to establish ef- 2004, p 37. well spent. fective controls over weapons and other strategic trade, 4 Ibid, p 43. 9 I use the term ‘border guards’ to include personnel such as in particular transit and transshipment goods; bolstering 5 Foreign & Commonwealth Offi ce, Global opportunities customs and immigration offi cials as well as those who are customs enforcement; and providing front-line inspec- fund: Counter terrorism programme, (13 September 10 A country does not necessarily need to be ‘democratic’ to tion and training. US Department of State, Congressional 2006). possess these measures for an effective counter-terrorism budget justifi cation fi scal year 2007, Washington, DC, 13 6 The following tenets are based in part on Colin Gray’s the- strategy. February 2006, pp 134, 136. ory of countering irregular warfare (insurgency and terror- 11 Because I did not possess audit authority in any of the 18 United States General Accounting Offi ce, op cit, p 40. ism), which includes the following: “Protect the People,” three countries, I relied on open-source information. 19 Kenya was provided US$3.484 million in fi scal year 2005,

64 The price of counter-terrorism in Africa

an estimated US$3.168 million in fi scal year 2006, and 25 Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations, 35 As reported by Western sources, Botswana’s defence will receive approximately US$2.938 million in fi scal Report of the Republic of Ghana to the Counter-Terrorism budget increased from US$233 million in 2002/2003 year 2007. US Department of State, op cit, p 159. A total Committee, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 to US$334 million in 2004/2005; Botswana’s police of US$35 million was reportedly allocated to Kenya in (2001) of 28 September 2001, S/2002/708/Add.1, 25 budget, from US$98 million in 2002/2003 to US$123 EACTI. J Carson, Kenya: the struggle against terrorism, in R September 2002, p 5. million in 2004/2005. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment Rotbert, Battling terrorism in the horn of Africa, Brookings 26 K Baah-Wiredu, The budget statement and economic – Southern Africa, Defence budget, Botswana, 1 August Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2005, p 189. policy of the government of Ghana for the 2005 fi nancial 2006, (26 August 2006). 20 W P Pope, Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries: The role of se- year, Republic of Ghana, 24 February 2005, p 203. 36 Data from International Monetary Fund, Botswana: curity assistance, Testimony before the House International 27 K Baah-Wiredu, The budget statement and economic Statistical appendix, IMF country report no 06/65, Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International policy of the government of Ghana for the 2006 fi nancial February 2006, p 19. Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, 10 year, Republic of Ghana, pp 273-274. 37 B Gaolathe, Budget speech 2005, Republic of Botswana, March 2005, (15 August 2006). 29 R Reeve, The Bight of Benin traffi cking axis, Jane’s 2006, Republic of Botswana, 6 February 2006, p 26. 21 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Intelligence Review, 1 November 2005, (26 August 2006). these lines is United States General Accounting Offi ce, October 2005, p 21. 30 US Department of State, op cit, p 81. Combating terrorism: How fi ve foreign countries are 22 D Mwiraria, Budget speech for fi scal year 2005/2006, 31 Date from International Monetary Fund, Ghana: statistical organized to combat terrorism, GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Republic of Kenya, 8 June 2005, pp 21-22. Other reforms appendix, IMF country report no 05/286, August 2005, Washington, DC, April 2000. This work, however, lacks included improving capacity for crime prevention, inves- p 27. expenditure information and focuses on Western democ- tigation, and prosecution as well as additional community 32 D Fleming, Africa – Islamic militancy in southern Africa, racies only (Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the policing in urban areas. Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, 1 November 2004, United Kingdom). A more recent work, also focused sole- 23 R Reeve, Ghana key to G8 engagement with ECOWAS (26 August 2006). ly on Western democracies, is P Chalk and W Rosenau, security, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7 September 2005, 33 Permanent Mission of Botswana to the United Nations, Confronting the enemy within: Security intelligence, the (26 August 2006). Report by the government of Botswana pursuant to police, and counterterrorism in four democracies, RAND, 24 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – West Africa, Security Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), S/2004/131, 20 Santa Monica, Calif, 2004. and foreign forces, Ghana, 4 August 2005, (26 August 2006). 34 United States General Accounting Offi ce, op cit, 39. (25 August 2006).

65

Africa’s role in America’s ‘war on terrorism’ Some political implications Alamin M Mazrui

INTRODUCTION We know, of course, that the US has not always advanced the cause of democracy in Africa. In spite of the disturbing The September 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New record of violation of human rights and civil liberties, the early York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, was the critical years of African independence were characterised by a series event that gave birth to the American Patriot Act, intended to be of uncontroversial American initiatives which avoided imple- the primary legal weapon against terrorism in the United States. mentational concerns in favour of documentation. Indeed, the That tragic attack was also the source of American pressure US even seemed willing to fl irt with a certain degree of relativist on other countries of the world to construct specifi c regional interpretation of rights and democracy. Refl ecting this political alliances that would support the American-led war against ter- mood, for example, Smith Hempstone – a seasoned US diplo- rorism (especially from the Muslim ‘Other’).1 In Africa, these mat – once claimed: alliances have included the US’s East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative – intended to improve police and judicial anti-terrorist Western democracy is not going to work in Africa. Nor is gov- capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea and erning going to revert to a tribal framework. A new synthesis is Ethiopia – and the 2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) – a programme in the making and something new in political organization is designed to assist Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad protect about to emerge, an ‘Afrocratic’ system which utilizes the form their borders better and combat terrorism within the region. In but not the substance of democracy and draws much of its inspi- 2005 the Pan-Sahel Initiative was replaced by the Trans-Sahara ration from indigenous institutions. This implies limited freedom Counterterrorism Initiative, which affects nine countries (the of speech, irregular and semi-free elections, a one-party system original PSI countries plus Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria and rule of a popular dictator.2 and Tunisia). In the meantime, following the blueprint of its own Patriot Hempstone was in fact indirectly counselling Western nations Act, the US has pushed for the enactment of country-specifi c not to expect much from Africa in the area of human rights and anti-terrorism legislation in one African country after another. democracy, since its circumstances do not parallel those of the While all these laws – in the US and Africa – have been pro- West and the needs and aspirations of its peoples and nations jected as instrumental measures in the protection of democracy do not support the evolution of such a political culture.3 And it and liberty, I argue in this essay that their actual effect in Africa is a telling sign of the time that Hempstone contextualised these may be quite the reverse. The measures may be eroding rather remarks in what he saw as the growing infl uence of Russia and than consolidating the foundations for sustainable democracy on ‘Red China’ in Africa and the continent’s vulnerability to that the continent. infl uence due to its economic needs.4 The position of the US, in other words, was directly tied to the Cold War – the fear that too aggressive a push of a demo- AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND cratic and human rights agenda in its international relations may DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA alienate allies and render them pawns of the Soviet Union. The anti-communist thrust of American policy thus allowed the US The evidence so far seems to suggest that anti-terrorism meas- to tolerate and, often, support regimes with the ugliest record of ures as practised in the US itself may have weakened America’s democratic and human rights abuses as long as those regimes global image as a defender of human rights and promoter of were pro-American.5 As a result, there were several African dic- democracy globally. The decay in America’s own democracy tators whose political survival drew partly from the complicity precipitated by the Patriot Act has made it easier for Africa’s and/or direct support of the American government. own dictators to justify tyranny. And the anti-terrorism measures In the 1990s, during the so-called struggle for the second forced upon African governments by the US may further under- liberation in Africa, America became more ‘uncompromisingly’ mine the trend towards democratisation and pluralism in Africa, universalist in its advocacy of democratic change in the world. especially because of the fragility that continues to accompany This coincided with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the end these processes. of the Cold War, the period that Francis Fukuyama described as

67 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

the “end of history”, supposedly leading to the global triumph of America became less effective as an advocate of democracy Western-style liberal democracy. This is not to overlook the fact elsewhere in the world – except, perhaps, through the undemo- that to the US, “human rights have only an instrumental function cratic methods of gunboat diplomacy. America is again under in the political culture, serving as a weapon against adversaries the sway of World War and Cold War politics. Indeed, George and a device to mobilize the domestic public behind the banner W Bush has compared America’s war on terrorism to the war of our nobility, as we courageously denounce the real or alleged against fascists during the Second World War – during which it abuses of offi cial enemies”.6 After all, in spite of itself, the US was deemed legitimate to intern Americans of Japanese origin, was among the Western governments which acquiesced with for example – and communists during the Cold War – charac- a military coup in Algeria to pre-empt the possible formation terised by MaCarthyst policies internally and support for pro- of government by an Islamicist party in a democratic election.7 American tyrants in its foreign relations.11 The US government was also hostile to the victory of Hamas in Until 11 September 2001, phenomena like detention without Palestine, even though the electoral process itself was reported to trial and secrecy about who disappeared behind bars were seen have been open, fair and democratic. On the other hand, the US to be characteristics of ‘underdeveloped’ postcolonial societies. has been totally silent on and maintains a strong bilateral relation- Lack of access to lawyers, inadequate information to families ship with Saudi Arabia, one of the most undemocratic societies in about the detainees, lack of information to the detainees about the world today. Nonetheless, it is still true that the post-Cold War what they are being detained for – all these were pre-eminently period was marked by relatively strong American support for the tendencies of political underdevelopment. Harsh custody condi- institutionalisation of democracy and human rights in Africa and tions have sometimes been part of such detention without trial. elsewhere – all as part of its neo-liberal agenda. Sweeps of non-nationals in East Africa – accusing them of crimes This development in America’s international relations is of violence or drug traffi cking – and sometimes deporting them clearly demonstrated by Warren Christopher, then US Secretary without due process, this too was often a periodic manifestation of State, in his address to the delegates of the 1993 Vienna World of underdevelopment. 12 Conference on Human Rights. “I speak to you,” he said to the Since 11 September 2001, such manifestations of political delegates in the plenary, underdevelopment have unfolded in the US. Hundreds of people were held secretly in detention without trial, the majority being … as the representative of a nation ‘conceived in liberty’ … of the Islamic faith. Commenting on this new wave of detentions Over the course of two centuries Americans have found that ad- in the US, Barbara Crossette reported that, “What is new is that vancing democratic values and human rights serves our deepest the detentions are shrouded in secrecy: for the fi rst time, the values as well as our practical interests … And to those who say United States – like countries whose human rights policies it had that democracy is a Western contrivance, I say … [w]e cannot long criticized – is withholding the names of the detainees” in let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression.8 spite of a court ruling that they be released.13 Until the 29 June 2006 Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, the Bush administra- And the same Smith Hempstone, who saw only an African-style tion was employing military tribunals to try terrorist suspects of democracy and human rights culture emerging out of Africa, foreign origin without the consent of Congress, using a system of could now claim that courts-martial that allowed convictions based on evidence not seen by the accused. On 6 September 2006, George Bush fi - … it is profoundly racist to suggest that democracy is impossible nally admitted publicly that the CIA had been holding suspected in Africa. It will be diffi cult and messy. The process is likely to terrorists in secret prisons and that it used “enhanced interroga- be a protracted one. But we owe it to ourselves as much as to tion techniques” – in other words offi cially sanctioned torture Africans to support the pro-democracy forces in their struggle. – to extract information from them.14 Furthermore, the detain- The support of human rights and expansion of democracy will ees rounded up after September 11 and held in secret, many always be a component of US diplomacy …9 of whom were tried for deportation in closed hearings, were predominantly Muslim, now projected as the ultimate religious Hempstone here envisions the possibility for democratic devel- ‘Other’.15 The FBI has been accorded powers to survey mosques opment in spite of his expressed conviction that the requisite and other places of worship, just as library activities and borrow- conditions for democracy as set out by Carol Lancaster – that is, ing patterns of those of us in the American academy are being “widespread literacy, a high per capita level of income, a size- constantly monitored. Some Muslim educational institutions in able middle class, a vibrant and organized civil society, strong America were raided and their equipment seized without due public institutions independent of one another, nationally based process. Racial and religious profi ling in the US has taken a new political parties with differentiated programs and a political cul- ugly turn. ture of tolerance, debate and compromise” – are largely if not With this political decline, the US essentially lost its moral entirely absent in contemporary Africa.10 And so the US became standing as an advocate of democracy and human rights in a great ally of a wide range of oppositional movements in Africa Africa. Even before the enactment of country-specifi c anti- in their struggle for democratic, plural and more open societies. terrorism legislation in many of the African nations, a Human But because the aftermath of 11 September 2001 led to a Rights Watch report pointed out that some country leaders were decline in the US’s record on human rights and civil liberties, taking advantage of the anti-terrorism campaign to suppress dis-

68 Africa’s role in America’s ‘war on terrorism’

sent and abuse human rights. In the period following September Kenya in their itineraries. But once Kenya became an ally of 11, the report said, “the world was focused on efforts to bring the US in the anti-terrorism campaign, especially in the im- those responsible for the attacks to justice, and to prevent ad- mediate aftermath of the 7 August 1998 bombing of the US ditional terrorist attacks. However, many countries around the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, “signifi cant members globe attempted to take advantage of this struggle to intensify of senior American offi cials traveled to Nairobi, President Moi their own crackdowns on political opponents, separatists and re- even received a long-desired invitation to the White House … ligious groups … In other places, leaders exploited the situation Tanzania also experienced an increase in high-level American to advance unnecessarily restrictive or punitive policies against attention.”22 refugees, asylum-seekers, and other foreigners.”16 This apparent In the process, the Kenyan government acceded to American decline in America’s political maturity was re-shaping concep- instructions to seize the assets of and deregister a Saudi-spon- tions of democracy in Africa, a link that was made explicit by sored NGO, the Al-Haramain Foundation,23 and some four other Eritrea’s ambassador to the US. In defending his government’s Muslim NGOs (Mercy Relief International, Help African People, decision to arrest some journalists, the Ambassador pointed to the Islamic Relief Organization, and Ibrahim bin Abdul Aziz al post-9/11 developments in the US to argue that detention with- Ibrahim Foundation). This action was taken without due process out charge or trial is not inconsistent with democracy.17 of law, resulting in major protests from the Muslim constituen- President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is said to have de- cies as well as members of the NGO community. The US also rived particular mileage from this decline of civil liberties in the changed its policy towards Sudan, turning it into an important US.18 Upon the arrest of six correspondents in Harare, Mugabe’s ally in the war against terrorism, in a way that neutralised “the spokesperson accused them of distorting and misrepresenting American domestic constituency that wanted stronger against facts in a way that assists terrorists who stand accused in courts the Sudan” for its crimes during the civil war and its continued of law, adding: “As for the correspondents, we would like them human rights abuses.24 Similarly, the US has turned a blind eye to know that we agree with US President Bush that anyone who to human rights violations in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, all fi nances, harbors or defends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We allies in its bid to combat terrorism. In a sense, then, the US has too will not make any difference between terrorists and their not only begun to ignore the undemocratic practices of some of friends and supporters.”19 Unwittingly, George Bush seems to its allies in Africa, it has sometimes encouraged them to violate have armed his own political adversaries in Africa with his anti- democratic processes, human rights or civil liberties, all in the terrorism talk and policies, which are now serving as a conven- interest of the American war on terrorism. ient pretext for internal repression. Yet, another example of this interplay between America’s anti-terrorism measures and Africa’s political record is that of AMERICAN STRATEGIES IN Mauritania. According to a report of the International Crisis THE AFRICA CONTEXT Group, a Brussels-based think-tank, “the government of Mauritanian President Maaoya Sid’Ahmed Ould Taya – a US ally In addition to the African implications of the American Patriot in West Africa who was deposed on August 3 [2005] in a blood- Act and other US anti-terrorist measures, the US pressure on less coup – used the threat of terrorism to justify human rights many African governments to enact new legislation against ter- abuses. Taya jailed and harassed dozens of opposition politi- rorism has posed newer threats to civil liberties in Africa just at cians, charging that they were connected to the Salafi st group,”20 a time when democratisation was gathering momentum in some an Islamist organisation in Algeria that seeks to overthrow the African states. Like the American Patriot Act, these legislative Algerian government. The Salafi sts are considered members of a initiatives in Africa have already been widely criticised for the terrorist organisation by the US government. danger they pose to human rights and civil liberties in terms of Apart from the weakening of its moral position on democ- their defi nition of terrorism and terrorist organisations, and the racy and human rights, America’s quest for political alliances in immense powers of arrest, detention and prosecution invested the so-called war against terrorism has also made it less critical in the security forces.25 And partly because of the vagueness of political abuses of its allies. As suggested earlier, throughout of their language, these legislative instruments can easily be the Cold War, the US supported all shades of African tyrants subject to political abuse. The Committee to Protect Journalists as long as they were avowed enemies of communism. In this has reported, for example, that in September 2002, the Director new war against “Islamic fascism” – as George Bush described of Information at the headquarters of the National Resistance it following the arrest of alleged terrorist plotters in Britain on 9 Movement (NRM) in Uganda, Ofwono Opondo, warned radio August 2006 – or against the Muslim world as some observers stations against airing interviews with the opposition leader, would have it21 – and even as the US was waging a war in Iraq Kizza Besigye, and threatened them with persecution under and Afghanistan (or against Hamas and Hezbollah through its the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002. The Act empowers the Cabinet protégé, Israel), it softened its position against certain African to designate an organisation as terrorist and, under this provi- dictators. Because of President Daniel arap Moi’s reluctance to sion, all ‘rebel’ groups are so designated. According to Opondo, speed up the pace of democratisation in Kenya, for example, Besigye had declared war on the government, and anyone who the US maintained a rather cool relationship with him, with helps “Besigye spread his propaganda … comes under suspicion senior American offi cials who visited Africa virtually ignoring of aiding terrorism, and the anti-terrorism law will apply”.26

69 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

African leaders once used the Cold War in opportunistic … the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, with intent ways to advance their own interests and agenda. They are now to advance a political, religious, ethnic, ideological or other using the war on terrorism – the new ‘crusade’ as George Bush such cause; and includes any unlawful use of violence or threat once termed it – towards the same ends, undermining in the of violence with intent to put the public or a section of the pub- process hard won democratic and human rights and threatening lic in fear. Africa’s newly established and still fragile democracies. Among the East African Counterterrorism Initiative coun- And police offi cers no longer have the kinds of draconian pow- tries, Kenya seems unique. On the one hand, it is the country ers they would have enjoyed under the initial bill. that receives the largest share of the funds allocated to this But the new bill continues to pose problems touching on American project27 – partly because it has repeatedly suffered concerns of human rights and civil liberties. For example, the consequences of previous anti-American and anti-Israel acts Kenya’s legal system has all along been operating on the prin- of terrorism that have taken place on Kenya soil. These included ciple that one is innocent until proven guilty. Under the Kenya the 1980 anti-Israel bombing of the Norfolk Hotel, the 1998 Anti-Terrorism Bill 2006 innocence is no longer assumed at the anti-American bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi outset: an arrested person may sometimes be required to prove – leaving a number of Kenyan dead that is almost proportional his/her innocence. A professor who criticizes America’s record to the American dead in the World Trade Center attacks – the of counter-terrorism in a public address, for example, may be 2002 anti-Israeli blast at the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, and charged, under section 11(3) of the Bill, with encouraging sup- the attempted downing of an Israeli aircraft in the same period, port for terrorist organisations, unless (s)he can satisfy the court in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. that (s)he had no cause to believe that the address would further On the other hand, Kenya is yet to pass its own anti-terrorism the beliefs or activities of a terrorist organisation. Because of bill into law. In this regard, the Kenya government has allowed these ‘loopholes’ the bill has been tabled for another round of the democratic process to take its own course, giving space for revisions. Kenyans to debate the bill in its various stages of revision. Like What is important here is that Kenya, albeit under intense several other anti-terrorism acts in neighbouring countries, for pressure from civil society, has allowed an open discussion of example, the fi rst version of Kenya’s proposed legislation, enti- the different versions of the bill and has been willing to revise tled The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, had a defi nition of terror- the document on the basis of the feedback from its citizens. ism that turned almost every crime of violence into terrorism. This record contrasts with that of Tanzania, where the govern- Terrorism was described as: ment is said to have passed anti-terrorist legislation with almost no debate in Parliament. In fact, the evidence in Tanzania … the use or threat of action which seems to show that Parliament was virtually gagged by the (1) involves serious violence against a person Executive Branch, which in turn was under great pressure from (2) involves serious damage to property the Americans. By being sensitive to the democratic process, (3) endangers the life of any person other than the person com- the Kenya government has helped allay Muslim fears that it is mitting the action … in league with the American government to profi le and target Muslims in the perceived American ‘war against Islam’. This defi nition can encompass a very wide range of crimes cur- On the other hand, in practice, Kenya has been acting as if rently covered under the country’s Penal Code, from robbery the more draconian version of its proposed anti-terrorism legisla- with violence to crimes of passion between lovers. tion was already in place as law. As we know, the security forces The bill also provided a description of people who would be of Africa have opened their doors to the US’s Federal Bureau of liable for arrest and prosecution by the police merely for arousing Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organisation. According to the the process, the Kenyan authorities have been so eager to please bill, a person who, in a public place (a) wears an item of clothing the Americans that they are tempted to repatriate their own or (b) wears, carries or displays an article, in such a way Kenyan citizens to the US on the slightest encouragement. The FBI is reported to have been involved in raiding the offi ces of the … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or sup- Mercy Relief Organisation as well as a number of mosques and porter of a declared terrorist organization shall be guilty of an Muslim homes in Nairobi, Mombasa and Lamu.28 In June 2005, offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a a senior Kenyan government offi cial reported that US and British fi ne not exceeding six months, or to a fi ne or both. intelligence agents were in the country tracking alleged members of two al-Qaeda-linked groups.29 This decline in sovereignty of A bearded Muslim in a kanzu or jalabiyya, therefore, could be ar- the Kenyan nation has led to increased tensions between the rested on a charge of suspicious conduct only because members state and the Muslim constituency. Can Kenyan Muslims trust of an organisation like al-Qaeda tend to dress in a similar fashion! their government to protect them against the excesses of what is Since then, Kenya’s proposed anti-terrorism legislation has seen to be a hostile foreign power? The gains the Kenyan govern- undergone major revisions. In the new bill, entitled Kenya Anti- ment is making in allaying the fears of its Muslim citizens in the Terrorism Bill 2006, intent, for example, has become central to political arena of law-making is being undermined by its secret the new defi nition of terrorism. Terrorism is now: collusion with America in actual security practice.

70 Africa’s role in America’s ‘war on terrorism’

Perhaps one of the greatest dangers of these anti-terrorist the detriment of American higher education. In the meantime, strategies is their potential to radicalise increasing numbers of students from the listed parts of the world who saw the US as a African Muslims. The opening up of the political space in African potential home for the acquisition of advanced skills that may be countries where Muslims are the preponderant majority (Niger, useful to Africa are now forced to look elsewhere in the pursuit Mali, Senegal, etc) has led to a certain liberal awakening towards of their academic ambitions. greater interrogation of literal readings of Islamic doctrines. This Within Africa itself, those likely to be affected most by the seems to have been particularly true among women who have new immigration measures – part of the package of both the begun to challenge patriarchal interpretations of Islam.30 But be- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative and the East African cause the American war on terrorism has made many Muslims Counterterrorism Initiative – are Africans themselves. African in Africa feel under attack, combined with the West’s post-Cold countries are seen as a broad expanse of poorly governed bor- War ‘demonisation’ of Islam,31 the imperative of unifi cation derlands which, because of their proximity to population centres (against a common adversary) may begin to supersede the quest in Europe, have become increasingly attractive to translational for internal reform. terrorists interested in exploring the region for recruits, logistics We should also bear in mind that a number of African and safe havens. There has thus been a push to limit the ‘po- countries that are part of the US’s East Africa Counterterrorism rousness’ of borders, a space which has long fostered regional Initiative have been experiencing internal confl icts of one kind exchange of peoples, goods and ideas. This development comes or another. Uganda is still dealing with the Lord’s Resistance at a time where there are renewed efforts to reactivate regional Army (LRA) in the north of the country. Ethiopia continues to experiments like the East African Community which are crucial face the challenge of the Oromo Liberation Front. The question to Africa’s economic development. The new immigration meas- of its union with Zanzibar, intertwined as it is with religious ures have the potential to affect regional cooperation and to (Islamic) considerations, continues to play havoc with Tanzania’s become a new source of stress in relations between and within political stability.32 These and other tensions and confl icts in African countries. the other EACI countries require political rather than militaristic There is also the impact of anti-terrorism measures on other solutions. Some regimes, however, have already attempted to inter-African relations. Of particular concern is the danger of use their anti-terrorism legislations to respond to these instances Ethiopia becoming America’s Trojan horse for penetrating and of internal descent, many making quite legitimate claims. controlling Somalia. As we well know, in its bid to prevent an According to a report of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Islamist government from taking over power in Somalia, the US for example, Uganda used its anti-terrorism law to shut a radio has been supporting a coalition of warlords. At the same time, it station for more than a month on account of its coverage of the has been working closely with the Ethiopian government, which LRA rebellion.33 seemed prepared to play the same role that Pakistan did in Afghanistan. Ethiopia is widely seen as “the only regional power Anti-terrorism and transnational relations capable of militarily containing the [Union of] Islamic Courts [in Central to the anti-terrorist initiatives globally has been the issue Somalia]”.34 It seems poised to invade Somalia if it gets the green of immigration. With regard to the US in particular, it is people light from the US. At one time, Ethiopia and Somalia were pawns of South Asian, Middle Eastern, and to some extent, African in the Cold War designs of the US and the Soviet Union. They origin who are being affected most by new immigration policies now may become pawns in the new war between the US and and measures. Immediately after September 11, 2001 twenty- the al-Qaeda movement. Increased tensions between the two fi ve countries were classifi ed by the US State Department as op- countries may lead both to further political underdevelopment, erational fi elds for al-Qaeda and a potential breeding ground for with obvious implications on internal relations between the state terrorists. These included Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, and the citizenry. Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, There is also the problem of the border dispute between Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. How is the American war on terrorism likely Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and to impact on this confl ict? At the moment, both countries are co- Yemen. The range included several African countries (especially operating with the US, but this cooperation is “also linked to the from North Africa and the Horn). What is obvious is that the two countries’ desire to gain favor with the US on their festering twenty-fi ve nations were overwhelmingly Muslim. The number border demarcation disagreement”.35 Given the reported levels of visas to the US accorded to nationals of these countries went of violation of civil and human rights in both countries, there is down dramatically. an opportunity here for the US not only to facilitate a resolution These immigration restrictions have had a particularly adverse of the confl ict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also to infl uence effect on the demographics of American universities. Graduate internal change towards greater political openness. But if the programmes in the sciences in the US had long depended heav- US chooses to focus too narrowly on its own counter-terrorism ily on high-quality students from other parts of the world to as- agenda, the cooperation it enjoys with, and therefore the support sist American professors in their teaching and research projects. it provides to each of the two countries, may harm the cause of But the American Department of Homeland Security has now those struggling for a more democratic and plural order. severely constrained the ability of American institutions to re- The impact of anti-terrorism measures on state-citizen re- cruit the best from the international pool of students, often to lationships may also be indirect – based, for example, on their

71 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

impact on the economy. Economic pressures have a tendency in some African countries, affecting state-citizen relationships in to strain state-citizen relationships. Africans living in the US, new ways. Europe and the Middle East have complained that the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the US have affected the fl ow of their remittances to Africa which have been a crucial source of CONCLUSION survival and investment for many families. Countries like Kenya which rely so extensively on the tourist economy have been ad- It is clear then that America’s counter-terrorism strategies in versely affected. In the meantime, as part of its response to the Africa have multiple implications, at both the political and war on terrorism, the US passed a Farm Bill intended to subsidise economic levels, whose overall effect on state-citizen relation- American farmers in a way that hurts African trade in agricultural ships may be to the detriment of the cause of democracy on the commodities. US government offi cials and independent observ- continent. In spite of George Bush’s repeated claims that the ers are reported to have said that: war on terrorism is a war to save democracy and freedom – for sections of the American public, of course – the strategies that … the big subsidies doled out to US farmers will contribute to have been put in place in the USA and in Africa pose the danger global overproduction of wheat, cotton and other basic crops. of weakening rather than strengthening the development of a And that, in turn, will drive down world commodity prices, mak- democratic culture in many African nations. And if the outcome ing it more diffi cult for small, unsubsidized Third World farmers of these anti-terrorism strategies is declining democratic and hu- to compete. African nations will be particularly hard hit because man rights culture, some of the most affected (in some African agriculture plays such a big role in their economies – accounting countries) will be women and the youth: For these are among for more than 50% of the gross domestic products of some.36 the social groups that took advantage of the opening up of the political space to inscribe their own claims and gain greater rep- With the growing ‘feminization of poverty’, women will bear resentation in the national arena. the brunt of this economic downslide precipitated by the ‘war It is also important that Africa assesses the issue of transna- on terrorism’. By putting new stresses on African nations, these tional terrorism in terms of its own security interests. Kenya, for and other similar economic developments have the potential of example, has been a target of repeated anti-American and anti- creating new social conditions that could undermine the demo- Israeli attacks partly because of the perception that it has main- cratic future of the continent. After all, the ability of the state to tained a special relationship with the USA and Israel, nations that work towards the economic and social welfare of its citizens is have had oppressive legacies to one degree or another. Under an important contributor to the sustainability of democracy. the circumstances, the introduction of American-engineered An equally important economic factor relates to the possible anti-terrorist legislation can heighten rather that diminish the underlying motives of America’s counter-terrorism agenda in danger of terrorism in Kenya. Let us remember that both Spain, Africa. There have been compelling suggestions that America’s in the 11 March 2004 bombings against the commuter train in war on terrorism in Africa is part of a broader design to control Madrid, and Britain, in the 7 July 2005 bombings in London tar- Africa’s oil resources, especially in West Africa, seen as the last geted at the public transport system, became targets of terrorism frontier of energy reserves in the world. This linkage between partly because the two agreed to be part of a military coalition American oil interests and the Trans-Saharan Conterterrorism of the willing headed by the US. The push for anti-terrorist legis- Initiative (TCI), in particular, is clearly articulated by Daniel lation world-wide and for a counter-terrorism convention is part Volman, the director of the African Security Research Project in of an attempt to forge a political coalition of the willing (which, Washington, DC.37 Bill Fletcher, former director of Trans-Africa no doubt, has military consequences). The danger of belonging Forum, is also of the opinion that, “More than anything else, the to such a coalition is that Africa may be transformed from an in- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative refl ects the [American] direct target of terrorism (aimed at the US and Israel) to a direct desire to secure major African oil reserves …”38 In places like target (aimed at its own people and institutions). Nigeria, the American oil company Shell was part of the problem The possibility that Africa’s participation in America’s politi- that led to the emergence of the Ogoni movement for liberation cal coalition of the willing makes Africa more vulnerable to ter- in the southern part of the country, eventually leading to the ex- rorist attacks puts great responsibility on African governments. ecution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and several of his colleagues and the They must not only train and equip their own security agencies death of many others since then. Indeed, the military skills and better for the task, but they must also provide the kind of police techniques that are being imparted under the TCI arrangement oversight that can eliminate the notoriously high levels of police are said to be precisely those employed in “the suppression impunity against their own citizens. If unrestrained, the anti-ter- of ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife”,39 the kinds of volatile rorist measures will only serve as additional avenues for police situations that prevail in oil-producing TCI countries like Nigeria corruption, violence and misconduct against innocent civilians. and Algeria. Indeed, Nigeria has already been actively sharing Finally, we all appreciate the wisdom in the saying that ’power information with the US about Muslim radicals in Nigeria.40 The corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. We are yet to oil-related agenda of America’s counterterrorism activities in appreciate the reverse formula: that ‘powerlessness too corrupts, Africa, then, may be a source of new politico-economic tensions and absolute powerlessness corrupts absolutely’. State and state- sponsored terrorism is an aspect of the corruption that power

72 Africa’s role in America’s ‘war on terrorism’

generates: it has been used repeatedly by the US to punish those Non-state terrorism, on the other hand, is an aspect of the nations and organisations that are unwilling to tow the American corruption fostered by powerlessness, a powerlessness that has line. Some of America’s acts of terrorism have been quite direct. risen to new proportions under the neo-liberal order. As Joseph The US is reported to have used cluster bombs in its attack on Kechichian has put it, Benghazi, Libya, in 1988. The US terrorist bombing of Sudan’s Al- Shifa pharmaceutical plant in August 1998 is said to have been Terrorism, broadly defi ned, is a form of political warfare by more devastating to Sudan – in both actual and silent death toll disenfranchised groups. What most terrorist organizations seem and on the socio-economic well-being of the society at large to want are rights which they are denied in the existing politi- – than the September 11, 2001 bombings were to the US.41 The cal order. By defi nition, such a quest indicates an awareness of illegal US invasion of Iraq has also entailed numerous acts of ter- power politics in the international system. It is precisely the rorism that have been reported by human rights organisations. lack of legitimacy that leads disenfranchised groups to the use Apart from direct state terrorism, there has been state-sup- of political violence in articulating their grievances. Thus, the ported terrorism by private movements. We know that the US ultimate purpose is not to destroy ‘civilization’ or democratic subsidised Jonas Savimbi’s Unita, which was not known to be values but to participate as legitimate participants in the inter- fastidious about its methods of struggle. It continued to have a national system.42 love affair with the apartheid regime in South Africa even at its moments of great ruthlessness. It armed Osama bin Laden (the That powerlessness in its absolute desperation, in other words, is leader of al-Qaeda) and the Taliban in Afghanistan in their strug- a fertile ground for non-state terrorism. gle against the Soviet Union: these were the same forces that Rather than simply accede to American pressures in the im- later turned their terrorist rage against the US. The US has been plementation of one anti-terrorism strategy or another, therefore, a bulwark behind Israeli terrorism against Palestinians. Israeli African governments need to develop their own understanding reprisal raids are often a case of counter-terrorism – though of the forces and circumstances that may attract sections of their equally insensitive to civilian lives and often more brutal and own populations to al-Qaeda or to engage in suicidal acts of ter- destructive in effect (as the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon rorism. In addition, Africa should seek to position itself in the clearly demonstrates). The fi rst Gulf War against Iraq started on forefront of the growing forces calling for a new world order that a note of liberation of Kuwait, but it soon turned into a terror- will be respectful of diversity and different models of politico- ist orgy. More recently, the US has been supporting warlords in economic development, and that will seek to eliminate the state Somalia in its bid to pre-empt the establishment of an Islamist of powerlessness and desperation in some regions of the world regime. Some of these warlords have openly employed terrorist that have been an important catalyst of the transnational terror- methods. Certainly, there is no reason to exclude all these forms ism we are witnessing today, much of which is a reaction to the of state-sponsored terrorism, be they direct or indirect, from extraordinary subordination of world opinion and memory to moral scrutiny. American power.

NOTES

1 It is possible to argue that the militaristic form that 12 See Ali A Mazrui, Islam between globalization and coun- 16 Human Rights Watch, Current Events to the rise of neo-conservatism in the country and the per- 13 Barbara Crossette, In the secret detentions club, New York (29 July 2006). See also The Washington Post, 18 January sistence of the old military industrial complex in a post- Times, 11 August 2002. 2002, p 12. cold war context of ‘globalisation’. 14 Some of these techniques, like ‘waterboarding’ in which a 17 Ibid. The same report of Human Rights Watch shows how 2 Smith Hempstone, Africa: Angry young giant, Praeger, prisoner is made to believe he or she is drowning, are pro- the idea of ‘enemy combatant’ that the Bush administra- New York, 1961, p 640. hibited by the UN Convention Against Torture and Other tion used to justify trials of certain arrested individuals by 3 Ibid, pp 640-641. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment military tribunals has also been invoked by the government 4 Ibid, p 637. to which the US is a signatory. On 14 September 2006, of Liberia against four of its journalists who were arrested 5 See Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman, The Bush visited Congress to lobby for congressional approval in June 2002 – Hassan Bility, Ansumana Kamara, Abubakar Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South to continue with this programme. The Bush “administra- Kamara and Blama Kamara – claiming that an “illegal End Press, Boston, 1979. tion no longer conceals what it wants. It wants authori- combatant may not only a person who carries arms, but 6 Noam Chomsky, Deterring democracy, Hill and Wang, zation for the CIA to hide detainees in overseas prisons collaborates in ways and means to assist one side or the New York, 1991, p 130. where even the International Committee of the Red Cross other” (see Bility faces military court, (2 August 2006). ASEAN and human rights management in post-Cold War those detainees with abusive practices that in the past 18 See Mugabe mocks Blair, Bush from Malaysia, Southeast Asia, in James T H Tang (ed), Human rights and have included induced hypothermia and ‘waterboarding,’ Mail&Guardian (South Africa), 5 August 2002. international relations in the Asia Pacifi c, 1995, p 168. or simulated drowning. And it wants the right to try such 19 Quoted by Rotimi Sankore, September 11 and its impli- 8 Quoted in Michael Collins, The Second Coming of the detainees, and perhaps sentence them to death, on the cations for Africa. Pambazuka News (a weekly electronic Magi: The case of the two world conferences, Callaloo, basis of evidence that the defendants cannot see and that newsletter for social justice in Africa), 12 September 17, 1994, p 530. may be extracted during those abusive interrogation ses- 2002. Also see Human Rights Watch at (6 University of the South Press, Sewanee, Tenn, 1997, p 327. 15 September 2006). August 2006). 10 Ibid, pp 326-327. 15 See The war on civil liberties, Washington Post, 10 20 Quoted by Jason Motlagh, The Trans Saharan Counter- 11 See report in New York Post, 1 September 2006, p 9. September 2002. Terrorism Initiative: US takes terror fi ght to Africa’s ‘Wild

73 Impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa

West’, San Francisco Chronicle, 30 December 2005. 26 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the press in Obasanjo had to rush to Kano to contain the tensions be- 21 John E Woods, a professor of Middle Eastern history at the 2002, (5 fore they spilled over into sectarian riots all over Nigeria. University of Chicago, reminds us that “[a]lmost imme- August 2006). 33 Committee to Protect Journalists, op cit. diately after the collapse of Communism, Islam emerged 27 Shinn, op cit, p 41. 34 Gregory Alonso Pirio and Gregorian Hrach, Nigeria: as the new evil force” in the imagination of the American 28 Judith Achieng, Ruling on Muslim charities averts a major Outside view – Marshall Plan for Africa? Daily Champion government (New York Times, 28 August 1995). strike, 18 September 1998, (3 August 2006). 35 Shinn, op cit, p 42. the Horn, Foreign Service Journal, September 2004, p 37. 29 Michael B Kraft, Africa: Connecting the dots, 19 June 36 Warren Vieth, US exports misery to Africa with Farm Bill, 23 Ibid, p 39. 2005, (12 August 37 Daniel Volman, The scramble for African oil, New African, 25 According to Judge S B Bossa and Titus Mulindwa the 2006). July 2006, pp 18-21. defi nition of terrorism in Uganda’s Anti-Terrorism Act 30 See, for example, the brilliant study by Ousseina D Alidou, 38 Bill Fletcher, Bush counterterrorism initiative in Africa? 2002 “around which the legislation is constructed is so Engaging modernity: Muslim women and the politics of FinalCall.comNews, 10 August 2006, (12 August involved in an illegal strike or those engaged in civil Madison, 2005. 2006). disobedience” (The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (Uganda): 31 Woods, op cit. 39 Volman, op cit, p 18. Concerns and implications, Paper presented to the 32 There is some anxiety that September 11 and its aftermath 40 USA government report at (21 August 2005). broad that it “could be used to criminalize the actions of stration by Nigerian Muslims in Kano against the American 41 Noam Chomsky, 9-11, Seven Seas, New York, 2001, pp a wide range of people” (Barbara Slaughter, South Africa: war in Afghanistan provoked stone throwing by Nigerian 45-49. ANC government pushes through draconian anti-terror- Christians, which fl ared up into communal riots. Churches 42 Joseph Kechichian, Terrorism and the search for power, ism legislation, 9 November 2001, (27 July killed (see Sarah Coleman, Nigeria religious riots, World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, London, 2006). Press Review, 8(12), December 2001). President Olusegun 1988, p 56.

74 Panel 3 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Engaging religious communities and building partnerships Cedrick Mayson

Building partnerships with the united states in combating terrorism Mike Hurley

The role of the United Nations in providing technical assistance in Africa Anton Du Plessis

Building regional partnerships: Perspectives from the IGAD region Richard Barno

Engaging religious communities and building partnerships Cedric Mayson

Thirty years ago I was detained as a terrorist by the apart- Can we seriously expect that Africa and other countries of the heid Security Police. It was my fi rst sojourn at John Vorster developing world can deal with their under development by de- Square, though not the last! I worked with Dr Beyers Naudé pending on a private sector that is driven by the profi t motive? and others in the Christian Institute (CI), with its liberation The reality demands that there must be a political will to transfer theology. The CI was considered a major infl uence behind the resources from the rich to the poor globally. student uprising of Soweto in June 1976, and the countrywide demonstrations that followed: marching, stoning, burning, at- The media, no longer led by editors concerned to mediate truth, tacking beer-halls, municipal offi ces and police stations, and but controlled by owners and managers who are committed punctuating every protest meeting with raised fi sts and shouts primarily to the promotion and profi t of Western globalisa- of ‘Amandla!’.1 Of course, we thought that the apartheid tion, show only marginal concern for moving from liberation regime was terrorist: shooting, beating, detaining, enforc- to transformation. They seek commercialism not compassion, ing curfews and pass laws, racist, sexist, undemocratic, and competition not cooperation, and blunt vision. The media seem theologically heretical. currently preoccupied in ensuring that the successor to President There is a terrorism from the top, and a terrorism from Thabo Mbeki is someone who can be manipulated by the pres- the bottom. Both have happened throughout history. The sures of the West, because during that term, Middle Eastern oil Inquisition, priest-holes, the persecution of Galileo, slavery, will begin to run out. Peterloo, the Indian Mutiny, Amritsar, Nazism, Stalinism, But the focus of this paper is on religion. McCarthyism, Thatcher, Reagan, Idi Amin and P W Botha have Religious institutions in Africa are rooted in imported colo- all fouled the pages of history with terror, hunger and blood. nial religions. We have liberated ourselves from colonial politics, Terrorism from the top invariably instigates terror from the and are seeking freedom in the global world of colonial eco- bottom; all terrorism fl ourishes in the foetid heat of right-wing nomics, but it has not occurred to many that we need to liberate religious fundamentalism; and history asserts that terrorism ourselves from colonial religions. Those religious organisations, never wins: from top or bottom it always collapses, and new constantly entangled in politics and economics, have been in- life emerges. volved in wars and terrorism throughout history, and in our own Terrorism from the top arises in four areas: national imperial- lifetime. The spiritual life of the rest of the world – particularly ism promotes major acts of violence and oppression to promote the West – offers little guidance or hope for Africa. We do not its own power and prestige; the dictatorial control of capital aspire to emulate the colonial religions that have been an integral promotes corruption and oppression to feed its own profi t; the part of terrorism from the top, and major barriers to the libera- media are controlled to impose views and attitudes upon readers tion and transformation of human society. Their founders did not and viewers to undermine democratic humanity through fear and intend it that way, nor did many sincere followers: but facts are propaganda; and the dictatorship of right-wing fundamentalist facts. The educational, medical and theological insights of colo- forms of heretical faith, from colonial religions to modern sects, nialism have been a subsidiary factor in the political, economic is used to demonise minds and consciences to support evil in the and cultural oppression that has terrorised millions as part of the name of good. imported religious package. Top-down terrorism in Africa, as seen by people who do not Some are grouped as ‘mainline’ religions, three of which possess land, guns, money, media outlets or religious institutions claim their descent from Abraham: Jews, Christians and may also be examined in these four categories. Muslims. Hinduism has a greater antiquity, and links to Victoria Brittain, in a recent article, showed how ‘selective Buddhism, Jainism, and Zoroastrianism. Further East we fi nd and systematic political assassination against liberation move- the great religions of Lao-tse, Confucius and Japan. All of them ments’ has fi gured in the war of attrition waged by Western and contain subdivisions. Most of them (though not all) believe imperialist powers, and robbed Africa and the Middle East of they have a hot-line to the Divine, and a prime duty to convert some of their great leaders.2 others. For the past century, there have been efforts to unite Aziz Pahad, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Christian scene by ecumenism, and the inter-faith scene by wrote:3 global organisations, but with limited success. There has been

77 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

a general failure to lead the world to peace and prosperity by For some time now, our offi ce has been monitoring the either ecumenical or inter-faith initiatives. Some fi nd comfort conservative religious teachings of the current US regime, not by coming together to deplore and escape the world, like pa- as they appear in the media, but on the websites of the liber- tients in a hospital waiting-room, but this brings no healing. ated US spiritual opposition: the ‘real America’. They reveal a Many religions oppose one another, having no vision of spir- horrifi c anti-Christian, inhuman, right-wing fundamentalism itual unity in religious diversity; and many who do talk simply promoting the imperialist, capitalist dictatorship, enforced by seek chumminess, while continuing to pursue their separate military might, a top-down terrorism masquerading as God’s development of religious apartheid. agent to bring about the apocalyptic return of Christ to destroy Some fi nd solace when religions confer with uplifting voices the enemies of the US. on needy issues, but governments, corporations, the media, and The full extent of right-wing fundamentalist terrorism is ex- the general public show no sign of resisting the inroads of terror- posed by the current Middle East situation. This is frequently ism or attaining spiritual maturity. This has been the tragic failure presented as a clash of civilisations, a religious confl ict be- of bodies such the World Council of Churches, the All-Africa tween godly Christianity and Judaism and the wickedness of Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches, Islam. This is a totally false right-wing fundamentalist carica- and the National Religious Leaders’ Forum in South Africa, and ture, invented to support the top-down terrorist quest for oil. of global inter-faith bodies. They think in terms of promoting The spiritual message to the human community from these religious institutions, instead of advancing the spiritual power of three great Abrahamic religions is not one of confl ict, but of secular communities. The vision of their heads does not reach human love and solidarity. If Moses, Amos and Isaiah could their hearts or their hands. sit down together with Jesus of Nazareth and the Prophet In all these religions, especially the variety of Christianities Mohammed, there would be total agreement among them on practised by the main colonising nations, there has been the priorities for peace and prosperity of the human commu- a deliberate separation between the spiritual and secular nity on earth today. spheres. The emphasis has not been placed on the growth of What we see in the Middle East is the clash of right-wing fun- spiritual qualities within the human community, but on the de- damentalist distortions invented to promote or defend political velopment of religious institutions with their divisive structures, and economic objectives, in which all sides resort to violence priesthoods, rituals, theologies, and traditions. The reluctance infested with terrorist justifi cation. Top-down terrorism brings us of religions to embrace the developments of science, educa- to the brink of devastating world war for the sake of rolling out tion, politics, economics and international communications a barrel of oil. The Middle East may seem far away, but it is of in recent centuries has often produced terrifying tension and great concern to us. Because Africa comes next. confl ict, which have had two main results: agnosticism and There is a different approach. A few years ago, four South religious fundamentalism. Africans visited the remains of an ancient synagogue in Many countries have experienced an agnosticism that pro- Capernaum. Two were Christians and two Muslims; one black, vokes a major rejection of religion. Some attribute this to what one white, and two coloured; one is now an archbishop in they call ‘secularisation’, but is more accurately described as Johannesburg, one is a South African ambassador in the Middle a reaction to a false spirituality. Millions have rejected religion East, one an adviser in the President’s Offi ce in Pretoria, and because it has refused to tackle the realities of modern life. The the other was me. We spent a week or more visiting people in inborn needs of the human spirit, both individual and collective, Palestine and Israel, and that day we stood in the synagogue are not nourished by the imposition of religious rules and tradi- where two thousand years ago Jesus of Nazareth had said to the tions. Deserted by relevant spiritual and moral strength, many religious leaders of his day: people have succumbed to un-spiritual political or economic directives, and become easy prey for terrorism. You disregard God’s word to follow your own teaching. These The reaction to agnosticism has been a right-wing, and usu- people, says God, honour me with their words, but their heart is ally heretical, religious fundamentalism. These forms of religion really far away from me. They teach man-made commandments place high emphasis on emotional fulfi lment, feelings of a as though they were God’s rules. personal relationship with the Divine, and individual concerns about wealth, health and death. They may practise charity, but There, in the synagogue in Capernaum, he proclaimed that the not justice. They focus on the prospects for individuals in heav- good news of the word and ways of God were at odds with the en, not on the spiritual growth and transformation of the human traditions of the religious leaders of his day. He saw religion as a community on earth. Right-wing fundamentalism nurtures a site of struggle, and they crucifi ed him as a terrorist. selective ideology that owes more to superstition than theology, Religion in Africa has long been a site of struggle. Apartheid and instructs people to leave political and economic matters was born in the church, and so was the African National to the direction of political and economic leaders. Such beliefs Congress (ANC). There have been fi gures of confl ict from John are meat and drink, garnished with every succulent self-centred Colenso to Beyers Naudé, from Nehemiah Tile to Stephen Biko, condiment, to both top-down and bottom-up terrorism. There’s from Sheik Yussuf of Macassar onwards, from Seth Mokitimi to nothing like an emotional fear of death to terrorise people into Ivan Abrahams of the Methodist Church, who coined the phrase losing faith in life. that ‘we must brew our theology in African pots’. The CI, the

78 Engaging religious communities and building partnerships

Kairos Document, contextual theology, and the massive inter- African Hinduism, and the wider concept of politics, business, faith funerals of the 1980s were all sites of struggle. education, culture and the media that the ANC and other ‘secu- It was during his 25 years of struggle against the terrorism of lar’ bodies are currently seeking. At the heart is that Africa is the top in South Africa that the great Hindu fi gure of Mahatma seeking what the world needs: to rediscover humanity in terms Gandhi changed from an establishment British lawyer to the of compassion, cooperation and vision. Satyagraha Mahatma. Islam experienced a major struggle by This is the area that President Mandela recognised when he the Call of Islam Organisation to establish its credentials, until encouraged South Africans to recover the reconstruction and the President of the Muslim Judicial Council said to the Call: development programme of the soul. President Thabo Mbeki, you were correct. Similar strife rocked the Jewish Community echoing this thought in the recent Mandela Foundation Lecture, over the Jews for Justice movement. The leaders of the Dutch said:5 Reformed Church and other Afrikaans bodies who had opposed liberation and greatly feared the arrival of the democratic gov- Because of the infancy of our brand new society, we have the ernment came to the ANC last year and said: ‘We were wrong: possibility to act in ways that would, for the foreseeable future, you were correct. How can we help?’ infuse the values of Ubuntu into our very being as a people. The struggle of top-down terrorism continues. We are strongly aware of the dangers threatening us: the pressure of out- It is out of this non-racial analysis in Africa that reconciliation has side military might, the global dictatorship undermining Africa’s come. This is why South Africa had a Truth and Reconciliation economics, the blind conservatism of many religious leaders, the Commission instead of a Nuremberg Trial. It is the source of our massive growth of right-wing fundamentalism, and the insidious rejection of terrorism from both the top and the bottom. It is infi ltration by US groups of so many parts of African society, why Africans feel uncomfortable when they have been brought all of which are preparing a fertile soil for terrorism throughout or bought into the US, British, French and Belgian colonial ter- the continent. rorist syndrome, because we know the world will not work in But there is another vital factor. the colonial terrorist way. The great secret of Africa, its hidden weapon of mass re- Chief Albert Luthuli once wrote: construction, is erroneously called Traditional African Religion. It has existed from time immemorial, but was neither a western Somewhere ahead there beckons a civilisation which will take nor an eastern type of religion: it had no churches or tem- its place in God’s history with other great human syntheses: ples, no priests or scriptures, no institutions. It was a way of Chinese, Egyptian, Jewish, European. It will not necessarily be life, a deeply spiritual secularity, focused on ubuntu. It is the all black: but it will be African. African experience of the primal spirituality of all human soci- ety, appearing in all the primal communities: Inuit, indigenous Africa is now re-defi ning itself as African. It is rediscovering American, Maori and Siberian. It has largely been civilised out humanity, but not as an off-shoot of Western globalisation. It is of the main religions of the world as they sought to separate experiencing a post-Western appreciation that no longer divides, the secular from the spiritual, and replaced society with indi- but brings secular and spirit together, and seeks the spiritual uni- viduals, but it is still there in the root make-up of all human ty in our religious diversity. It is no longer dependent on colonial beings. The major presence of primal human spirituality is in religious institutions, but can be supported by them. Africa, and this is the alternative to the terrorism of the north Africa has an approach to living and community that invali- and west. dates terrorism. Many in Western civilisation have ‘lost the plot’ In a recent publication, African Christian theologies in trans- for humanity. But when Bush and his cronies have bankrupted formation,4 Siqibo Dwane quotes the South African Ethiopian the US, when the Blair lies and protests have passed into history, Episcopal Church: ‘There is a common ground in which the African when terrorism from the top and the bottom has demonstrated heritage meets and interacts creatively with Christian Tradition.’ its irrelevance and inability, the world will be listening to Africa, Molefe Tsele says: ‘We must raise afresh the question of what where the human community started 150 000 years ago. Africa it means to be an African church.’ has come of age, and many vital organisations need to reassess Tinyiko Sam Maluleke writes that African Christianity is not and readjust to the new dynamics. The answer to terrorism will textbook Christianity, nor is it a rehash of traditional religion. not be found by pursuing the prescriptions of the West, but from the new theology, politics and economics struggling to emerge I am suggesting that in African Christianity, we have a new reli- in our continent. There is always something new out of Africa. gion – new in relation to pre-colonial African religion, and new When I was detained thirty years ago, we were on our in relation to colonial Christianity. What we need to do is to honeymoon. We married in Cape Town, and were driving back begin looking at this new religion in its own terms and not con- to Johannesburg when the Security Police intervened. They stantly judge it against either conventional Christian doctrine, or brought us back in separate police cars, all through the night, conventional African Religion. to start the days and nights of interrogation, the deprivation of food and sleep and clothes, the denigration of all we believed This vision is far wider than the context of a Christian discussion. in, the seemingly all-powerful imposition of top-down terrorism. It includes a new view of African Islam, African Judaism and In the struggle, we had no power, no money, no arms, no media,

79 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

no infl uence, and most of us had no vote. The Security Branch But when I came out of detention and went home, we made tried to make us think there was no future but terror, no end to a baby. For there is new life and promise, hope and liberation, oppression, no prospect of liberation. the transformation to a new world, in Africa.

NOTES

1 ‘Power!’ October 2005. 5 Thabo Mbeki address to Nelson Mandela Foundation, 29 2 http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/37899. 4 ‘African Christian theologies in transformation’, edited by July 2006. 3 Paper entitled ‘Building a global progressive movement’, 6 Ernst Conradie, EFSA, 2004.

80 Building partnerships with the United States in combating terrorism Michael C Hurley

The organisers of this conference have asked me to outline US border security, law enforcement capacity, and prosecutorial counter-terrorist policies in Africa. Our response to terrorism capacity of our partners in the region. Through the Safe Skies for in Africa has been a steady process of building partnerships Africa Program, we have enhanced airport security and safety, with African institutions, including both states and regional or- working with the East African Community. We have trained ganisations. We fully realise that terrorism cannot be defeated fi nancial investigators and provided technical assistance to the by American efforts alone. Just as in the past confrontations with East and South Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. Nazi fascism or Soviet totalitarianism, our success will depend We have not neglected the development side, addressing the on the strength of our partners and our partnerships. From the economic and social injustices that terrorists attempt to exploit. onset, I want to stress that we regard this struggle not as a reli- The primary mission of our Combined Joint Task Force, based gious one. In fact, we see Muslims as perhaps the most impor- in Djibouti, has been not to hunt and kill terrorists, but to re- tant partners in countering the indiscriminately violent ideology build clinics and schools, provide medical and dental care, and of terrorism. For let us remember that al-Qaeda seeks to murder to help provide clean, safe water to marginalised communities. not only non-Muslims, but all Muslims who do not ascribe to We have focused our development assistance in the region to their narrow political vision for world domination. target marginalised Muslim populations, expanding access We can no longer assume that every state can control and to education, especially to women. We have undertaken an direct threats emerging from its territory, nor can we assume unprecedented programme of cultural outreach to Muslim com- that weak and poorly governed states are merely a burden on munities along the Swahili Coast and are currently working to their people or simply an international humanitarian concern. establish American presence posts in Zanzibar and Mombasa Technology is eliminating the distance that once clearly separated to demonstrate our long-term commitment to engagement with us across land and sea. Safe havens in cyberspace and the ability the Muslim population of the East Coast. Within Somalia, many to transfer funds, materiel and people depend on existing regional development efforts are limited by security concerns, but we underground networks (such as those that exist for narcotics traf- are doing whatever possible to advance civil society, peaceful fi cking, piracy or human traffi cking). Most terrorist safe havens sit confl ict resolution and education. astride national borders, in places like the Sulu Sea, the Northwest We recognise that these efforts have to be sustained and that Frontier — and the Sahel. Terrorists use national borders to their they will require substantial resources. These efforts also have to advantage. Denying terrorists a safe haven therefore demands a be driven by our experts in the fi eld, in consultation with part- regional response. For this reason building regional partnerships ner governments and regional organisations, not bureaucrats in is the cornerstone of any enduring counter-terrorism strategy. The Washington. That is why we inaugurated a new effort this May, US seeks full partners, bilaterally and regionally, to engage the bringing our regional ambassadors together in Nairobi for a strate- enemy with all the instruments of statecraft. gic meeting to plan new ways to improve co-operation against the terrorist threat. We recognise that rapidly changing conditions in Somalia represent a threat to regional stability. Somalia cannot be EAST AFRICA a terrorist safe haven, a territory in which al-Qaeda is allowed to plan terrorist attacks. The questions of terrorism and governance Africa is confronted with two main terrorist threats, both linked go hand in hand in Somalia. We can’t defeat terrorism in Somalia to al-Qaeda – one in the East and the other in the West. In the without proper governance and Somalia will not be properly gov- East, the remnants of the al-Qaeda cell that bombed Nairobi and erned until the terrorists are no longer allowed to operate there. Dar es Salaam in 1998, and Mombasa in 2002, is still active and dangerous. We have worked closely with governments in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Comoros and Yemen to counter WEST AFRICA this threat, and we have largely succeeded in preventing further attacks over the past four years. We have spent some US$100 Meanwhile, in West Africa, the US and nine partner coun- million in the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, begun tries in the Mahgreb and Sahel established the Trans-Sahara in 2003, to bolster the military capabilities, maritime security, Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005 to defeat terror-

81 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

ist organisations and their ability to gain recruits in this region. GSPC remains under signifi cant pressure and continues to suffer TSCTP expands our effort beyond security and military coun- losses in combat. Most recently, Malian Tuaregs have attacked ter-terrorism capabilities. Given that this threat resembles an GSPC cells in northern Mali, killing leaders and fi ghters. insurgency, we must develop a counterinsurgency strategy that These activities are an excellent example of what we incorporates all the tools of governance: to attack the enemy, can achieve by working together to thwart the expansion of deny safe haven, and address the socio-economic-political Islamic extremists. needs of populations. Offensive tactical counter-terrorism suc- In conclusion I offer the following summary of the broader, cess buys us time and space to build the far more enduring, more enduring aspects of the TSCTP framework, that should in- constructive programmes that society needs. The isolation and clude the following principles: “consultation, justice, and equality ultimate destruction of terrorist networks is only the fi rst step. in its drive to achieve good governance, widen political participa- We must offer much more in the second step. We must offer tion, establish the rule of law, protect human rights, apply social a better vision. We must replace an ideology of hatred with justice, transparency, and accountability, fi ght corruption, and an ideology of hope. This is also a key part of this partnership. build civil society institutions”. Those are words from the Mecca Good governance programmes would strive, in particular, to Declaration, signed by the leaders of the Organisation of Islamic provide adequate levels of US support for good governance and States in December 2005. This guidance will serve us well. economic development in the Sahel to strengthen abilities to manage terrorist threats. Public diplomacy programmes will allow us to expand out- SOUTH AFRICA reach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal, and seek to develop regional and local programming While our efforts are focused on East Africa and West Africa, embracing this vast and diverse region. We will emphasise we don’t overlook other regions in Africa that are threatened by preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed terrorism and instability. Fortunately, South Africa enjoys a large in African Muslim communities and countering the develop- degree of political stability and its professional security forces ment of violent extremism, particularly in at-risk youth and in enhances its capability to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. rural populations. South Africa’s neighbours are benefi ciaries of the stability this Practically, this implies that our most important task in the provides. New, strong legislation clearly defi nes and specifi - war on terrorism is not the ‘destructive’ task of eradicating en- cally criminalises terrorist activities. The South African Financial emy networks, but the ‘constructive’ task of building legitimacy, Intelligence Centre, established in 2003, inhibits the abilities of good governance, trust, prosperity, tolerance, and the rule of terrorist supporters to launder money through South Africa’s law. Systems that are characterised by an absence of political sophisticated fi nancial systems. choice, transparent governance, economic opportunities and personal freedoms can become incubators for extremism. We need to fi nd ways to encourage and nurture good gov- TERRORIST FINANCE ernance. A society lacking in good governance destroys hope, individuals sometimes feel they are justifi ed to lash out in rage I’d like to conclude with a few general words about terrorist and frustration at those they believe are responsible for their fi nance. The international community must step up efforts to plight. disrupt the cash fl ows used by terrorists to recruit, travel, com- We were able to provide modest funding in 2005 and 2006, municate, train, and execute attacks. The strategic goal is to but 2007 will see the fi rst robustly funded activities. TSCTP make it harder, riskier, and more costly for terrorists and those anticipates receiving programmed funding in excess of US$100 associated with them to conspire and act. We have several mul- million per year through 2013. With the co-operation of our tilateral tools at our disposal. nine partners and these funds, we hope to increase counter-ter- One tool is the co-ordination of intelligence gathering. This rorism capacity and also address developmental challenges in job is not only the responsibility of intelligence or law enforce- this region. ment agencies. Banks, securities fi rms, money exchanges and in- In co-operation with our partners, we have achieved some surance companies have important roles in reporting suspicious notable successes against terrorist groups operating in this region, transactions to their country’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). namely the Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat (French: FIUs may exchange information under appropriate circumstanc- Groupe Salafi ste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) and es. Like South Africa, more than 80 countries have introduced the Nigerian Taliban. GSPC leader Abderrezak al-Para was cap- new terrorist-related legislation, and over 100 have established tured in Chad in 2003 and his terrorist cell was destroyed. He FIUs. was handed over to Algerian authorities. Nigerian security forces Another vital tool is the public identifi cation, or ‘designation’, were successful in destroying a signifi cant part of the Nigerian of individuals and organisations that support terrorism, through Taliban in 2003. The GSPC attacked Mauritania in June 2005, national announcements and international listing by the United but subsequent joint operations between Mauritania, Algeria and Nations. The designation procedure is strengthened by serious Mali overran GSPC logistic sites, capturing truckloads of mate- sanctions. These include the freezing of assets to choke off the rial. Despite its recently publicised affi liation with al-Qaeda, the terrorists’ immediate access to cash and also to provide avenues

82 Building partnerships with the United States in combating terrorism

for intelligence-gathering back to the source of the funding: ac- The terrorists have demonstrated again and again that their complices in the terrorist network, front companies, non-profi t target list does not know any boundaries of geography, reli- organisations, and side channels used to transfer or smuggle cash. gion or decency. Their attacks are indiscriminate, and African These UN sanctions alone have yielded quantifi able results. civilians, including Muslims, have been among the hardest hit Since 2001, the UN estimates that almost 60 countries have submit- groups. We share a common vulnerability and the threat we face ted names to the UN sanctions list, and 312 individuals and entities is a joint one. We have to answer that threat together with politi- have been subjected to sanctions. US Treasury reports indicate that cal will, and strong partnerships, strengthening existing regional over 1 600 terrorist-related accounts and transactions have been institutions. People of all religious faiths have to stand united blocked around the world, and more than 170 countries and juris- against the common threat that terrorism poses to our lives and dictions have issued freezing orders consistent with applicable UN freedoms. In the United States, we will remain committed to Security Council Resolutions on US$150 million in assets. partnership with Africa in defeating this extremely violent, yet The tools exist. What is required is the political will of govern- narrow and constrained ideology. ments to wield these tools aggressively, effectively and effi ciently.

83

The role of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime in building counter-terrorism capacity in Africa Anton du Plessis1

Terrorism is a global menace. It calls for a united, global re- pacity-building and technical assistance initiatives stumble, and sponse. To defeat it, all nations must take counsel together, and offers suggestions based on the experience of UNODC/TPB on act in unison. That is why we have the United Nations – former how to address these challenges. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, September 2001 This article argues that the UN cannot effectively build, or in- spire the effective building of, counter-terrorism capacity simply by expressing collective and united international political will, as INTRODUCTION it does through the General Assembly (or arguably by adopting Chapter VII Security Council resolutions). Without strategic part- Terrorism poses one of the major international security threats to ners – states, international organisations, regional organisations, mankind. Unfortunately, Africa has not been spared its devastat- and civil society – the UN can achieve very little. And without ing consequences; in fact it has been one of the hardest-hit con- taking into account the political, economic and development tinents, by both domestic and international forms of terrorism. realities of the regions, sub-regions, and states while trying to Terrorist motivations, fi nancing and support mechanisms, meth- help them build their counter-terrorism capacities, the UN risks ods of attack, and choice of target are constantly evolving, thus creating a reputation for itself as an insensitive body with ge- adding to the complexity of an effective strategy to counter it. It neric, imprecise mandates and tendencies. To be effective, the has all too often been highlighted that a global and concerted UN needs to provide tailored, sustainable training and technical response to this threat should be the priority of all nations. assistance activities to the right people, at the right time, sup- By its very nature, the United Nations should be at the ported by thorough and accessible follow-up, and underpinned forefront of this international effort. The organisation’s role by candid evaluation. in countering terrorism is necessarily extensive: its mandate and expertise mean that it is involved in almost every aspect of counter-terrorism, from broad-based prevention strategies, THE UN’S GLOBAL COUNTER- social and development projects, military responses and law TERRORISM PROGRAMME enforcement mechanisms to the development and maintenance of international criminal justice norms and standards. As a The UN started working on the development of a multifaceted transnational phenomenon that is not restricted by borders or, and rigorous international response to terrorism well before the as is happening today, national politics, international terrorism tragic and seminal events of 11 September 2001 (commonly can most effectively be countered at normative level through referred to as 9/11). The fi rst defi ning moments for the interna- a body with the multilateral tools and global mandate that the tional community were the hijackings of several transnational UN possesses. airliners in the early 1970s, the assault on the Olympic Games in A comprehensive discussion of all aspects of the UN’s Munich, Germany, in 1972, and the kidnapping of Ministers of counter-terrorism programme would fi ll many volumes, and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in falls beyond the scope of this analysis. Rather, the aim of this Vienna, Austria, in 1975. In the following decades, the increasing article is modest: it focuses on only one aspect of the UN’s prevalence and severity of terrorist attacks further strengthened counter-terrorism programme: its role in building state capac- international resolve to respond to this growing threat. ity and delivering technical assistance and training on the legal The UN’s counter-terrorism efforts span more than three and related aspects of counter-terrorism. More specifi cally, it decades,2 involving the General Assembly, the Security Council, provides a short overview of the international legal regime that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and UN special- has developed to respond to terrorism and discusses the role of ised agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and (IAEA), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and its Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in supporting national and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The fi ve-yearly regional action to develop legal regimes and associated criminal UN congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment justice capacity in conformity with this framework. It goes on of Offenders have also been particularly important, starting with to highlight some of the main challenges over which many ca- the 1970 Kyoto Congress, which focused on airline hijackings.3

85 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

The universal legal framework against terrorism inhospitable to terrorists (and those who fi nance and support The most important contribution of the UN to counter-terrorism them) by denying them safe havens. over the past four decades has been the gradual establishment However, despite a notable increase in the levels of ratifi ca- of a common legal framework consisting of more than a dozen tion and implementation of these instruments in recent years, conventions (meaning multilateral treaties) and protocols (mean- much work remains to be done to achieve the ultimate aim of ing agreements supplementary to conventions) that cover almost having a seamless international legal framework that can deny every conceivable kind of terrorist act,4 including: safe haven to terrorists (see table 1 for a summary of interna- tional ratifi cation levels of all conventions and protocols). ■ Acts of aircraft hijacking ■ Acts of aviation sabotage Resolution 1373: The Security Council ■ Unlawful acts of violence at airports fl exes its counter-terrorism muscles ■ Unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation On 11 September 2001, a shiver ran down the spine of the inter- ■ Unlawful acts against the safety of fi xed platforms located national community as it witnessed a new and previously unim- on the continental shelf aginable type of terrorist attack that resulted in large-scale loss ■ Crime against internationally protected persons (such as of life and destruction of property. This event sparked immedi- kidnapping of diplomats) ate, unprecedented and unifi ed international action and political ■ Acts of unlawful taking and possession of nuclear material cohesion against terrorism, epitomised by the rapid adoption of ■ Acts of hostage taking Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)7 just two weeks after ■ Acts of terrorist bombings the 9/11 attack.8 And while this attack did not mark the begin- ■ Acts of support and funding of terrorist organisations ning of the international response to terrorism, it certainly galva- ■ Nuclear terrorism by non-state actors nised global counter-terrorism action and commitment. Resolution 1373 heralded a new and relatively controversial These instruments offer the legal infrastructure to address serious quasi-legislative role for the UN Security Council; it imposed crimes committed by terrorists. They are based on the premise legally binding obligations on states to undertake wide-ranging that perpetrators of terrorist crimes should be brought to trial by legal reforms and introduced several new counter-terrorism their national governments, or should be extradited to a country measures, focusing heavily on prevention through the target- willing to bring them to trial.5 The simple principle of aut dedere, ing of persons and entities that support and fi nance terrorism. aut judicare (‘extradite or prosecute’) is meant to make the world Resolution 1373 effectively fast-tracked key provisions of the Financing of Terrorism Convention of 1999, with the overall aim Table 1: Number of member states that are parties to the 13 of combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols6 Adopted on 28 September 2001, Resolution 1373 required every country to freeze the fi nancial assets of terrorists and their Mid- Oct- 2000 2006 supporters, deny them travel or safe haven, prevent terrorist re- cruitment and weapons supply, and co-operate with other coun- 1 Tokyo Convention (1963) 169 182 tries in information sharing and criminal prosecution. Member 2 Hague Convention (1970) 171 182 states were also called upon to sign and ratify the international UN conventions and protocols against terrorism. In addition, 3 Montreal Convention (1971) 174 185 they were to afford one another ‘the greatest measure of assist- 4 International Protected Persons Convention (1973) 102 162 ance’ in investigating terrorist acts. And unlike previous Security 5 Hostage Convention (1979) 89 153 Council resolutions on terrorism, 1373 is not time bound or limited in application to a specifi c group or territory. It is an 6 Nuclear Material Convention (1980) 64 117 open-ended and far-reaching resolution that imposes extensive 6a Amendment to the Nuclear Material Convention (2005) n/a 3 counter-terrorism legal obligations on all UN member states.9

7 Airports Protocol (1988) 99 158 Resolution 1373 also created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),10 which was fashioned as a committee of the 8 Maritime Navigation Convention (1988) 39 135 whole, consisting of all fi fteen members of the Security Council. 8a Protocol to the Maritime Nuclear Material Convention (2005) n/a 0 It received priority attention within the UN and was described by Kofi Annan as the ‘centre of global efforts to fi ght terrorism’.11 9 Fixed Platform Protocol (1988) 35 124 The primary function of the CTC has been to strengthen the 9a Protocol to the Fixed Platform Protocol (2005) n/a 0 counter-terrorism capacity of UN member states. Its mission,

10 Plastic Explosives Convention (1991) 56 125 wrote one observer, is to ”raise the average level of government performance against terrorism across the globe”.12 The commit- 11 Terrorist Bombing Convention (1997) 8 146 tee has served as a ‘switchboard’, helping to facilitate the provi- 12 Terrorist Financing Convention (1999) 0 153 sion of technical assistance to countries needing assistance in implementing counter-terrorism mandates. It has also attempted 13 Nuclear Terrorism Convention (2005) n/a 2 to coordinate the counter-terrorism efforts of a wide range of

86 The role of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime in building counter-terrorism capacity in Africa

international, regional, and sub-regional organisations inside and Resolution 154017 was passed on 28 April 2004 in the imme- outside the UN system. diate aftermath of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s confession to sharing To reinforce the committee’s efforts towards more effective nuclear technology with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. The UN collaboration and state capacity building, it established the Security Council adopted the non-proliferation resolution in Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTC/ which it decided that all states shall refrain from supporting by CTED), which became fully operational late in 2005. Through any means non-state actors that attempt to acquire, use or trans- the Executive Directorate’s on-site visits to capitals and dialogue fer nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery with states and relevant international, regional and sub-regional systems. Unanimously adopting the resolution under Chapter organisations, the committee has moved beyond its original fo- VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council decided cus on written reports, and improved its ability to monitor and also that all states would establish domestic controls to prevent assess what actions states are actually taking to combat terror- the proliferation of such weapons and means of delivery, in ism. The Executive Directorate also enhances the committee’s particular for terrorist purposes, including appropriate controls capacity to identify and prioritise the technical assistance needs over related materials, and legislative measures. The resolution of member states. also established a committee to monitor state implementation of its provisions for domestic controls to prevent the proliferation Other Security Council resolutions of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of pertaining to terrorism delivery. This resolution was adopted Resolution 1373 came on the back of, and was followed up by, Like the 13 universal conventions and protocols, these reso- several other Chapter VII UN resolutions, including 1267, 1456, lutions deal with, and respond to, specifi c types of terrorist acts. 1540, and 1566. However, the difference between these resolutions and the uni- Resolution 1267 was passed on 15 October 1999 to oversee versal legal instruments is that essentially the instruments, in the the implementation of sanctions (including freezing of assets, form of conventions or protocols, are international agreements arms embargo and travel ban) on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan developed by the General Assembly and, as such, are only bind- for its support of Osama bin Laden after the simultaneous bomb- ing on state parties that have signed and ratifi ed (or acceded ings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, to) them. Tanzania, in 1998, which killed 257 people and wounded over Most Security Council resolutions, like 1373, have been 4,000. The 1267 sanctions regime received added impetus, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are therefore however, after 9/11, owing to the involvement of al-Qaeda and legally binding on all member states. UN Security Council resolu- the Taliban in the planning and execution of the attacks. Since tions, while developing and adding to international law through then, it has been modifi ed and strengthened by Resolutions the executive arm of the UN, intensify an existing legal framework 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005). against terrorism agreed upon by its main deliberative body, the Resolution 145613 was passed on 20 January 2003. Its op- General Assembly, which represents all UN member states. erative paragraph 6 declares that ”[s]tates must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obliga- The UN global counter-terrorism strategy tions under international law, and should adopt such measures Another important counter-terrorism development in recent years in accordance with international law, in particular international has been the eventual elaboration of the UN Global Counter- human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law”.14 Resolution Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by the General Assembly 1456 – often regarded by many human rights NGOs as a fl ag- on 8 September 2006. The strategy18 – in the form of a resolution ship resolution for safeguarding human rights in the fi ght against and an annexed plan of action – is a unique global instrument terrorism – reminds states that ‘terrorism can only be defeated, that aims to enhance national, regional and international efforts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and inter- to counter terrorism. This is the fi rst time that all member states national law, by a sustained comprehensive approach involving have agreed to a common strategic approach to fi ghting terror- the active participation and collaboration of all States, interna- ism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unac- tional and regional organisations, and by redoubled efforts at the ceptable in all its forms and manifestation, but also resolving to national level’. take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and Resolution 156615 was passed in October 2004, following the combat it. Those include a wide array of measures, ranging from school massacre at Beslan in North Ossetia. This Russian-drafted strengthening state capacity to counter terrorist threats to better resolution urged greater cooperation in the fi ght against terrorism co-ordinating UN system’s counter-terrorism activities. and established a working group to consider additional counter- An additional positive aspect of the strategy is its focus on terrorism measures. These new resolutions demonstrated the broader terrorism prevention aspects, including addressing Security Council’s resolve in countering terrorism, but they also underlying contributing and motivating factors that lead to ter- created potential overlap with the mission of the CTC and gener- rorism. That the strategy was negotiated under the auspices of ated uncertainty about how the new bodies would work together. the General Assembly is also of positive signifi cance, especially Unfortunately, implementation of this resolution has been lax. The from an African perspective, where the General Assembly gen- working group established by the resolution has not met regularly, erally carries more legitimacy than the Security Council, owing and little progress is foreseen in the near future.16 to its broader representational base.

87 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

The adoption of the strategy fulfi ls the commitment made provision of technical assistance to states that would enhance their by world leaders at the 2005 September summit and builds capacities to implement their counter-terrorism obligations.21 on many of the elements proposed by the Secretary General in his 2 May 2006 report, entitled Uniting against Terrorism: The UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.19 The UN’s key provider of counter-terrorism technical assistance The need to enhance criminal justice While the CTC’s main function is to monitor the implementation responses to terrorism of Resolution 1373 and to facilitate technical assistance where Unfortunately, despite the pre-existing legal framework that pro- required, it is not a technical assistance provider. TPB’s specifi cally vides for an international criminal justice response to terrorism, mandated function is to deliver technical assistance to requesting the global response since 11 September has been heavily rooted countries, making TPB one of the CTC’s main executing partners in in the military coercive paradigm. It has depended more on implementing the criminal justice response to terrorism, and one of military might and fl exing of law enforcement and intelligence the UN’s key providers of counter-terrorism technical assistance.22 agencies’ muscles than international cooperation and criminal The technical assistance activities of TPB are undertaken in justice principles. This reality is borne out by the relative paucity full compliance with the decisions and policy guidance of the of successful counter-terrorism criminal prosecutions over the Security Council’s CTC. There is full complementarity between past few years. While there might be instances when a military the normative, policy, monitoring and facilitation functions of response to terrorism could be both necessary and effective, the CTC and the technical assistance provision/delivery func- generally speaking, an international criminal justice response of- tions of UNODC/TPB. The technical assistance activities of TPB fers more potentially appropriate remedies, including an estab- are also closely coordinated and carried out jointly with other lished legal framework and recognised international cooperation international and regional organisations, with a view to combin- mechanisms. ing UNODC expertise with the competencies of other actors on special thematic or geographical areas. UNODC/TPB’s role in strengthening the The recently adopted UN Global Counter-Terrorism international legal regime against terrorism Strategy also calls on TPB to expand its technical assist- The UNODC is a specialised entity that forms part of the UN ance activities to support member states in developing their Secretariat.20 Based in Vienna, the UNODC has a broad man- legal regimes in full conformity with universal legal frame- date covering various aspects of crime, crime prevention, and work against terrorism, including human rights and rule of combating the illicit traffi cking of drugs. In recent years, this law principles.23 mandate has expanded beyond its two original areas of work, TPB follows a specifi c tried and tested methodology in de- drugs and crime, to include terrorism. livering its technical assistance activity. This fi ve-step approach The UNODC’s terrorism-related mandate is limited to pro- includes the following elements:\ viding technical assistance to member states on the legal and related aspects of counter-terrorism, and is carried out by its ■ Analysing national legislation related to counter-terrorism TPB. The branch’s main activities include: activities ■ Identifying the specifi c legislative gaps and needs of the ■ Promoting the ratifi cation and implementation of the uni- requesting country versal counter-terrorism legal conventions and protocols ■ Assisting in drafting national laws to implement the in- ■ Analysing national legislation and regional/sub-regional struments relating to terrorism counter-terrorism conventions and providing advice on ■ Recommending administrative and regulatory measures effective implementation and application of the laws necessary for the implementation of national legislation ■ Assisting, where required, with legislative drafting of ■ Training of criminal justice offi cials in the implementation counter-terrorism legislation of new laws and international criminal justice coopera- ■ Training criminal justice offi cials on the implementation tion, including extradition and mutual legal assistance. and practical application of the new laws ■ Organising regional and sub-regional workshops on counter-terrorism CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DELIVERY AND CAPACITY The Counter-Terrorism Committee: BUILDING TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL The UN’s lead counter-terrorism normative, LEGAL REGIME AGAINST TERRORISM policy and monitoring entity The CTC was set up to be at the centre of the global fi ght against Since the launch of TPB’s Global Project in 2003, the branch terrorism. Established by the Security Council, it is at the core has provided technical assistance and training to more than 336 of the UN’s efforts to improve the coherence and effi ciency of countries, including over 45 in Africa. This section of the paper technical assistance delivery. Resolution 1373 mandates the com- draws on this extensive technical assistance experience and mittee not only to monitor compliance, but also to facilitate the briefl y highlights some of the key challenges to effective capac-

88 The role of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime in building counter-terrorism capacity in Africa

ity building and technical assistance delivery. And while these joint initiatives have been established to address this concern,26 and other challenges might present themselves in several regions much still needs to be done to achieve effective collaboration. of the world, some are particularly relevant to Africa. This imperative applies equally to a handful of counter-terror- ism agencies, which, for the most part, are trying to achieve the Lack of political support for international same objectives in relation to the strengthening of legal capac- counter-terrorism efforts ity to counter-terrorism. A shrinking pot of international donor This lack of support in certain parts of Africa24 is often easy to funding for these crucial initiatives brings home the importance comprehend: many parts of continent are wracked by poverty, of streamlining efforts and improving information exchange in unemployment, pandemic diseases, drought and crippling hun- order to avoid duplication of efforts and wasting of resources. ger. These political and practical realities necessarily require Improving the effi ciency and coordination of counter-terror- the prioritisation of these pressing issues over counter-terrorism ism technical assistance initiatives would enhance the image of obligations and related measures. Moreover, a genuine lack of international organisations in Africa, which in some cases are national resources, expertise and manpower to address serious perceived as being over-burdened by bureaucratic process, mired localised challenges can severely hamper any national counter- in political imperatives, and guilty of unnecessary duplication. terrorism efforts, especially when these measures require the allocation of already scarce resources and manpower. Even the Flash-in-the-pan capacity building best-intentioned African leader would be hesitant to shift the Effective and sustainable counter-terrorism capacity building focus to counter-terrorism under these circumstances. and technical assistance requires more than simply conducting In addition, many African countries do not regard terrorism a one-off training workshop for a group of randomly selected as a major threat to their security; nor do they see the need to government offi cials. While this may be the fastest and easiest legislate for a specifi c type of terrorism that does not impact way for technical assistance delivery agencies to complete their directly on their country – a point often raised by landlocked donor deliverable lists, it seldom achieves the desired long-term countries in relation to the various maritime conventions and results. The inadequacy of this ‘training-on-the-run’ approach is protocols.25 This approach, however, is short-sighted, especially exacerbated when coupled with limited follow-up and support if one considers the transnational/cross-border nature of inter- activities in the months and years following the training. national terrorism (where planning and preparation of attacks Rather, sustainable capacity building requires a more coher- committed in foreign countries often takes place in a different ent and strategic approach that provides in-depth and substantive country). Moreover, a country may be confronted with situations training to the right offi cials, practitioners and policy makers. In in which its nationals are killed or injured on board a ship or tandem with this training should be a steady dissemination of use- fi xed platform, or whose nationals commit an offence under ful and accessible training tools and handbooks, backstopped by the conventions or protocols, or suspected offenders are found effective follow-up and reinforced by ongoing support services. within its territory. These instruments cover all these situations, and the legal procedures provided by them could avoid post- Insuffi cient prioritisation of countries attack friction between states. Ratifi cation and implementation most in need of technical assistance of these instruments is called for in Security Council Resolution The unfortunate reality is that the countries most in need of techni- 1373, without regard to whether a state possesses a seacoast or cal assistance and training to develop their counter-terrorism abili- not. Effective international cooperation against terrorism requires ties are often not reached by technical assistance providers. There widespread compliance with the international legal regime. are several possible reasons for this, including lack of access (often Moreover, a mixture of history and politics has cast counter- owing to travel and security related reasons) to these countries, lack terrorism and its associated measures as a potentially contentious of diplomatic channels and personal contacts to facilitate the plan- issue for many African countries. During the period of African ning of technical assistance activities, lack of political will of the colonialism and later decolonisation, the concept of legitimate country to request counter-terrorism assistance, and the political in- wars of national liberalisation necessarily further complicated stability in the country that makes planning of the missions diffi cult. the already multifarious international and regional debate sur- However, as is increasingly the case, terrorists and inter- rounding terrorism. A legacy of the complexities surrounding national criminals often exploit these inaccessible and poorly this debate means that some African countries are more hesitant governed countries because of their perceived reputation as safe to engage in the international counter-terrorism effort. Linked to havens where they can fi nd refuge from justice. Strengthening this concern, some African countries are concerned that interna- the counter-terrorism capacity of these countries should there- tional and regional counter-terrorism initiatives might undermine fore be an international priority. the already fragile security situation in their country or region.

Inadequate exchange of information OVERCOMING THESE CHALLENGES: between technical assistance providers LESSONS FROM THE FIELD Lack of information exchange, joint mission planning, and proper collaboration can be a major challenge for international and re- In short, to achieve effective and sustainable capacity building, gional technical assistance providers and agencies. While various counter-terrorism agencies and international organisations need

89 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

to deliver targeted technical assistance and training to the right local sustainable capacity – an essential component of any long- people, in the right countries, upon request, all the while en- term strategic success. suring that they have the political support from the right people – political leadership and policy makers. Tailor technical assistance and training Regions and countries require specifi c tailoring of approaches initiatives to meet Africa needs and priorities: in order to address the divergent political and practical realities Avoid building castles in the sand they face. And while Africa should never be viewed as a homog- Technical assistance and training initiatives should target the right enous landmass, based on TPB’s experience on that continent, people at the right time, and should be pitched at the appropri- certain general observations and suggestions can be made re- ate level. For instance, it serves little or no purpose to conduct garding the capacity-building challenges highlighted above. a four-day specialised training workshop on complicated legal aspects of counter-terrorism and international cooperation for Build strategic and sustainable junior, under-resourced prosecutors in post-confl ict or severely partnerships at all levels underdeveloped countries. In reality, these prosecutors might To enhance the effectiveness of its technical assistance, TPB still be battling to come to grips with very basic criminal justice develops operational partnerships with international, regional and prosecutorial concepts, and would be better off attending and sub-regional organisations in support of existing bilateral a training workshop on how to draft murder, robbery and rape arrangements for technical assistance. The advantages of this charge sheets and indictments. approach are clear: at international level, partnerships enable Identifying real capacity, resource and expertise gaps is technical assistance providers to share information on planned therefore an essential component of any successful technical activities and explore the potential for joint collaboration. This assistance and capacity building initiative. It requires proper promotes better use of resources, enhanced complementarity planning and precise scoping assessments of recipient countries of mandates and expertise to provide broad-based and holistic and the identifi cation of reliable country-level focal points. initiatives, and avoids unnecessary duplication of work.27 Where required, the UNODC (through other relevant parts of At regional and sub-regional levels, partnerships ensure that the organisation, for instance the Criminal Justice Reform Unit29) the political, economic and development dynamics and sensi- should provide, or attempt to facilitate, more broad-based train- tivities germane to the regions are properly understood and ef- ing for criminal justice offi cials to strengthen basic rule of law fectively incorporated into technical assistance activities. These structures and practices. This would lay the required skills foun- practical realities will clearly differ markedly from region to re- dation on which to build additional specialised criminal justice gion and country to country, but they are important factors that and counter-terrorism expertise. must inform the eventual implementation of the UN’s technical assistance and training initiatives on the continent. Ensure proper follow-up and evaluation of The partnership organisations also bring invaluable local recipient country progress and implementation expertise and experience with them, thereby enhancing the The euphoria of a successful training workshop dissipates quickly overall quality and relevance of the technical assistance activi- when criminal justice offi cials and policy makers are left to try to ties. Regionally, the African Union, whose foremost objectives implement and apply the legally binding, yet often complicated, include the promotion of collective security and common values provisions of the universal counter-terrorism legal framework in Africa, and whose membership covers all nations on the con- that they were so enthusiastically trained on a couple of weeks tinent, has an indispensable role to play in building counter-ter- or months before. Moreover, regional or national training work- rorism capacity in Africa. Partnership and collaboration with the shops can usually cater for only a select number of relevant offi - AU on counter-terrorism is therefore essential for the long-term cials, leaving many others wondering what the euphoria was all success of any African initiative.28 about in the fi rst place. Hit-and-run training workshops, while At sub-regional level, TPB has developed a collaborative attractive at fi rst blush, do not always address the real needs of partnership in East Africa with the Intergovernmental Authority recipient countries. on Development (IGAD). In Southern Africa, the branch has In many cases, thorough follow-up support and evaluation signed a working agreement and is implementing project ac- of recipient country progress is often as important as the initial tivities with the Southern African Development Community training. Follow-up support can be provided in several ways, in- (SADC). In Western Africa, the Economic Community of West cluding telephonically, by e-mail, via video-conference (which, African States (ECOWAS) has joined forces with TPB, as has contrary to initial bad press, has become a viable option, thanks the Economic Community of Central African States in Central to recent technological advances), through a regularly updated Africa (ECCAS). website containing online training manuals, tools and implemen- These partnerships are becoming increasingly central to tation kits and, where required, additional regional, sub-regional TPB’s success in delivering technical assistance in Africa. This or in-country training workshops. Practically, this requires the approach adds political legitimacy, local knowledge and exper- establishment and maintenance of a good relationship with re- tise, not to mention valuable logistical support to many of TPB’s gional, sub-regional and national focal points. counter-terrorism initiatives. They also facilitate knowledge Another useful tool to promote effective follow-up is the elab- transfer while substantively contributing to the development of oration of workshop outcome documents. The training provider

90 The role of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime in building counter-terrorism capacity in Africa

can facilitate the drafting of the outcome documents. However, debate and negotiation to achieve some level of global con- care should be taken to ensure that countries accept full owner- sensus and joint commitment to fi ghting terrorism in its various ship of their commitments contained in the document. manifestations. And while the threat of terrorism is likely to fur- At regional or sub-regional levels, these outcome docu- ther morph and grow, international counter-terrorism measures ments assist in setting benchmarks from which member states will have no option but to keep pace. agree to progress by taking certain steps to properly implement However, we cannot uncouple the development of this in- the universal legal framework against terrorism. The outcome ternational counter-terrorism regime from the simultaneous need document should be reviewed at the next annual training work- to enhance the regional, sub-regional and national capacity to shop, thereby creating a system of internal peer review within implement and properly apply these laws and measures in prac- the region/sub-region. Participating states are often loath to tice. Under-developed and post-confl ict countries often need return to the next workshop without complying with the mu- additional assistance to keep up with international counter-ter- tually agreed commitments contained in the previous year’s rorism standards and norms. Ironically, it is often these states outcome document. that do not receive appropriate capacity building assistance. The At national level, the workshop outcome document is an double irony lies in the fact that these states (especially weak effective tool to measure the country’s progress against the and failing ones) are often victims of terrorist attacks themselves, counter-terrorism commitments it undertook to implement at the or provide fertile soil for terrorists and their supporters to plan workshop. Without taking on any monitoring functions,30 TPB and perpetrate attacks against other countries with relative im- has managed to use this approach to keep track of countries’ punity. This further highlights the need to refocus international progress in developing their legal regimes against terrorism in priorities and approaches to counter-terrorism capacity building. line with their own commitments and requests for assistance, Africa, like many other regions of the world, is replete with all the while helping TPB to identify remaining gaps and further examples of states that urgently require assistance to strengthen training requirements. their counter-terrorism legal regimes to bring them into line with international obligations, and establish laws and effective criminal justice structures that are able to deal with terrorists and the threats CONCLUSION they pose and, where required, bring them to justice. The UN cannot build this capacity alone. Partnerships – at all functional The universal legal regime against terrorism provides the norma- levels – must be constructed with clearly identifi ed aims and goals. tive framework that should guide the development of counter- Longer-term and sustainable capacity building should never be terrorism legal measures across the globe. The 13 conventions sacrifi ced at the altar of expediency. Building effective counter- and protocols, supported and strengthened by various Security terrorism capacity in Africa requires commitment and political Council resolutions and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism support at all levels: international technical assistance providers, Strategy, represent over four decades of intensive international donors, and importantly, the recipient countries themselves.

NOTES

1 The author would like to thank Fionn Herriott and Georgia Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Karasiotou, TPB consultants, for their valuable assistance against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971); Convention Shelf (1988). in preparing this paper. The views expressed in this paper on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 5 All but two of the universal conventions and protocols es- are those of the author alone and do not necessarily re- Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic tablish criminal offences and require state parties to crimi- fl ect the position of the United Nations Secretariat. Agents (1973); International Convention against the Taking nalize specifi cally defi ned crimes. The 1963 Convention 2 Until the 1990s, terrorism was dealt with almost entirely of Hostages (1979); Convention on the Physical Protection on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board by the General Assembly, which approached the issue as of Nuclear Material (1979); Protocol for the Suppression of Aircraft, while clearly aimed at aircraft hijackings, simply a general international phenomenon rather that one relat- Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International requires a state party to establish jurisdiction over of- ing to specifi c events or confl icts. The Security Council Civil Aviation (1988), Supplementary to the Convention fences defi ned in the convention. The Convention on the began to take the issue seriously in the 1990s in response for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection to specifi c terrorist acts. Civil Aviation; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful requires its parties to take measures to prohibit and pre- 3 These congresses have approved model treaties on extra- Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); vent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives. dition, mutual assistance in criminal matters, transfer of Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 6 Data from the UN Offi ce of Legal Affairs; updates by the proceedings in criminal matters, and transfer of supervi- Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf Terrorism Prevention Branch (20/10/2006). sion of offenders conditionally sentenced or conditionally (1988); Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 7 United Nations Security Council, Security Council released. They focus on international cooperation and for the Purpose of Identifi cation (1991); International Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373, New York, 28 practical technical assistance for strengthening the rule of Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings September 2001. law, action against transnational and organised crime, the (1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the 8 A good example of this expression of international soli- role of criminal law in the protection of the environment, Financing of Terrorism (1999); International Convention darity against terrorism can be found in the now famous criminal justice and police systems, and crime prevention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005); September 12 headlines of the French newspaper Le strategies as related to crime in urban areas and juvenile Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection Monde that read, “We are all Americans now”. and violent criminality. of Nuclear Material (2005); Protocol of 2005 to the 9 Resolution 1373 was passed under Chapter VII of the 4 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against UN Charter, which permits the Security Council to take Committed on Board Aircraft (1963); Convention for the Safety of Maritime Navigation; Protocol of 2005 to legally binding decisions under article 25 directing mem- the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against ber states to impose economic sanctions or to use force

91 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

to maintain international peace. Because of the serious Justice (CCPCJ) provide the relevant mandate to UNODC 24 It should be pointed out that this is not applicable to the consequences of such action, the permanent members in its specifi c focus areas of drugs, crime and terrorism. entire continent. There are many African countries that do of the council have not hesitated to use their veto power 21 The Committee’s Executive Directorate (CTED) advises support and strengthen international counter-terrorism to obstruct action of this kind where there interests have the committee on technical aspects of states’ reports, in- efforts. been involved. cluding criminal, fi nancial, customs, immigration and ex- 25 A commonly sighted reason by landlocked countries for 10 The CTC website is available online at (14 November 2006). sues; and illegal arms traffi cking. After analysing the state’s ventions/protocols is that the country does not have oil 11 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001) on the basis of drilling or other fi xed platforms on the continental shelf at Ministerial level meeting of the UN Security Council. its reports and other available information, the commit- and do not have a signifi cant commercial fl eet under See United Nations Security Council, High-level meeting tee sends a letter requesting further information on issues their fl ag. of the Security Council: Combating terrorism,’ S/PV4688, raised in connection with the reports and on other matters 26 UNODC/TPB works in partnership with the New York, 20 January 2003. considered relevant to implementation of the resolution. Commonwealth Secretariat, Organisation International de 12 Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the States are requested to respond in a further report within Francofonie, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Counter-Terrorism Committee: The cornerstone of the three months. League of Arab States, Inter-governmental Authority on United Nations contribution to the fi ght against terrorism, 22 Since January 2003 TPB has supported 123 countries ei- Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development in Cyrille Fijnaut, Jan Wouters, and Frederik Naert (eds), ther directly or indirectly – through bilateral missions or Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Legal instruments in the fi ght against international terror- regional workshops – in ratifying and implementing the West African States (ECOWAS). ism, Brill Academic Publishers, 2004, pp 603, 606. universal legal instruments against terrorism: 87 coun- 27 TPB has developed operational partnerships with several 13 (28 November some 144 technical assistance missions to countries, as sations with counter-terrorism mandates and expertise, 2006). well as video conferences and visits of national offi cials including the Commonwealth Secretariat, Interpol, and 14 Emphasis added. to UNODC/TPB.79 countries provided with legislative ILAC, including its member organisation, the International 15 Adopted 8 October 2004 (28 November 2006). ism legislation in progress, and another 11 have already with the AU, and is currently working closely with the 16 Victor D Comras, The United Nations and the fi ght against passed new anti-terrorism legislation. Approximately AU’s Peace and Security Council on various counter-ter- terrorism and nonproliferation, statement, Committee on 3,300 national criminal justice offi cials have been provid- rorism initiatives. International Relations, US House of Representatives, ed with specialised substantive briefi ng on legal regime 29 The unit contributes towards the mandate of UNODC by Washington, DC, 17 March 2005, p 4. against terrorism. TPB has developed, or is in the process assisting developing countries, countries emerging from 17 (28 November aimed at assisting countries in strengthening their legal building the capacity of their justice systems to operate 2006) regimes against terrorism. more effectively within the framework of the rule of law 18 (28 November 2006). A/res/60/288, Adopted 8 September, 2006. Available women and children. 19 (28 November 2006). at: (28 November 2006).

92 Africa’s responses to the terrorism threat Perspectives from the IGAD region Richard Barno

INTRODUCTION loose or direct connections with other terrorists in other regions of the world (whether such connections be tangible or merely The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) com- inspirational) and where the theatre of operations transcend prises the countries Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, many borders. Sudan and Uganda, all squarely within the Horn of Africa. It It should be clear that the classifi cations are not mutually covers largely semi-arid and arid region that stretches over 5.2 exclusive.5 (The controversial concept of state terrorism is not million square kilometres.1 The Horn of Africa is considered discussed in this paper.) one of the regions most vulnerable to terrorism, together with the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This is largely a Western Djibouti perception2 which is based not only on the socio-economic Djibouti is wary of its territory being exploited by transiting and cultural outlook of the region, but also on actual terrorist or translocating international terrorists, especially from or to incidences in the region. The perception is not confi ned to the the Middle East. It is wary of individuals or cells linked to the West, however – IGAD countries acknowledge the seriousness phenomenon known as al-Qaeda, not least because of the exist- of the threat of terrorism in the region, as well as its above-aver- ence of major Western military bases in Djibouti city. Djibouti is age vulnerability.3 The existence of an acknowledged failed state conscious too of the fact that strict foreign exchange regulations and of other states that meet the least stringent criteria for weak in neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia make the liberal foreign states, together with the proximity of the region to the Middle exchange environment in Djibouti attractive to businessmen and East, explains this view. Terrorism has manifested itself different- terrorism fi nanciers in touch with lawless Somalia, though this ly in the various countries of IGAD and is thus conceptualised burden may have lessened considerably with increased regula- differently in each state. tions and stability in the autonomous region of Somaliland. For many years, Djibouti was aware of the passive presence in the country of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI). This presence has di- MANIFESTATIONS OF TERRORISM minished in the recent past as the organisation has evolved or IN THE REGION disintegrated.6

Conceptions of terrorism, as stated, are infl uenced by their mani- Ethiopia festations in the various countries. Mapping out the perceptions4 The AIAI accepted responsibility for atrocities against Ethiopian indicates a region that is fraught with terrorism in all its mani- citizens in the 1990s. In 1996, a bomb explosion ripped through festations. There are insurgent terrorist groups, jihadist extremist a market killing innocent civilians in an act claimed by AIAI. In groups, nationalist groups and elements of international terrorism, 1997, two explosions at two hotels in the city of Addis Ababa but none of these are being exclusively or universally classifi ed. killed a number of people, an act again attributed to the AIAI. The fi eld of classifi cation of terrorism is a minefi eld and it is An attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak not the intention of the author to enter into it. It shall suffi ce for in June 1995 in Addis Ababa introduced Ethiopia to the exploits the purpose of this paper that jihadist extremist groups be con- of religious extremist groups and international terrorists, whose sidered as those that, from what can be gleaned, have a religious presence is now believed to be positive in Somalia. Ethiopia motivation for engaging in terrorism, the motivation being the feels exposed to international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda protection and propagation of Islam. It does include groups that and what is considered its local surrogate by AIAI. use religion to cement and drive a political agenda. The attempted assassination in July 1996 of the Ethiopian ‘Nationalist terrorists’ are those that commit terrorist acts Transport Minister, Dr Abdulmajid Hussein, was claimed by the aimed at a nationalistic goal, whether or not they exploit reli- AIAI. In the recent past, part insurgent, part nationalist groups gion in the process. The term ‘nationalist’ will be confi ned to have been designated as terrorist groups by Ethiopia. Chief those whose theatre of operations is largely within one country, among these are the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the even if they undertake repeated incursions into neighbouring Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Police blamed a seri- countries. ‘International terrorist’ would refer to those who have ous of explosions in Addis Ababa in March 2006 and the kid-

93 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

napping of Red Cross workers in September 2006 on insurgent children, women and even policemen by unidentifi ed elements terrorist groups. whose tactics are clearly those that would be described as ter- rorist – planned, indiscriminate and against defenceless civilians. Uganda In the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden lived in the Riyadh district Uganda has had to contend with terrorist atrocities committed of Khartoum, Sudan, in an arrangement that was meant to keep by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic him out of his home country, Saudi Arabia, with the full knowl- Forces (ADF), which both were responsible for more than 48 edge of Saudi Arabia.13 His presence in Khartoum later became a bomb blasts in Kampala City and the direct deaths of over 5 source of embarrassment for Sudan and the region when Sudan 000 people across the country.7 The two started off as insurgent was labelled a supporter of terrorism and when associates of groups employing conventional guerrilla tactics but turned bru- Osama bin Laden, chief among them Wadi el Hagi,14 went on to tal, committing serious atrocities. Both groups are considered establish the East African al-Qaeda cell that resulted in the 1998 terrorist in Uganda and are listed as terrorist groups by the US.8 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.15 In the last couple of years, the threat posed by the ADF had been extinguished largely by military force, but the LRA threat Eritrea continued. Recent peace moves between the Ugandan govern- Eritrea has stated that it does not support international terror- ment and the LRA show the transient nature of terrorism desig- ism.16 However, it offers tacit recognition and support to the nation and may yet succeed. Counter-terrorism analysts suggest OLF,17 which it does not consider to have terrorist links or to be a possibility of a split within the LRA which would result in one terrorist, despite their designation as such by Ethiopia. Within the faction continuing with the war. Also, there are recent police Horn of Africa, Eritrea is the only country reported to have given reports suggesting the re-birth of the ADF.9 some measure of support to Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an organisation some of whose members are suspected Kenya by the US government of supporting terrorism.18 Kenya has thrice been the victim of international terrorism. In the 1980 Norfolk Hotel attack, the 1998 US Embassy bombing Somalia and 2002 Paradise Hotel attack, the targets were largely Western Somalia has been without a functioning government since the facilities and the perpetrators largely foreign terrorist groups. The fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991. Since then, 14 at- 1998 and 2002 attacks were linked to al-Qaeda while the 1980 tempts have been made to create governments, the latest being attack was blamed on the continuing Israeli-Palestinian con- an IGAD-fronted attempt that resulted in the formation of the fl ict. This attack was blamed by the Kenyan government on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The ability of the TFG Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, an accusation the to consolidate its governance have been hampered largely by group denied. Abdullah Ocalan, the then leader of the Kurdistan a lack of international support and initially by hostile warlords Workers Party (PKK), was arrested in Kenya in 1999. Kenya has based in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. The warlords were also experienced one AIAI attack,10 in 2003, which resulted replaced by a more united and purposeful UIC, which has a in the death of one person. Incursions by OLF insurgents into myriad of reasons including appeal to religion and nationalism to Kenya have led to the deaths of many pastoralists in what is of- bring all of central and southern Somalia under its control. The fi cially referred to as ‘banditry’.11 The reluctance to refer to the group has caused excitement in the rest of Somalia by offering OLF as a terrorist organisation could be a result of desire to limit the possibility of a united Somalia. However, the UIC has raised the use of the word ‘terrorism’ or simply a lack of serious study concerns in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia over its close links of the OLF, with counter-OLF efforts being lumped with other with people linked to the AIAI and the power wielded by Al- criminal management. Shabaab, a militant jihadist group within the UIC. The concerns have not been lessened by the denial by the UIC leadership of Sudan the existence of an al-Qaeda cell in Mogadishu, an issue taken Sudan is a large and culturally diverse country. Perhaps, for this as a fact by counter-terrorism practitioners in the region and by reason, terrorism has manifested itself it here in many forms. In the US government.19 Since the beginning of the rise of the UIC February 1994, a religious extremist attacked a mosque killing 19 in Mogadishu, more concerns have been raised because of the persons in what would fi t the bill for religious extremist terrorism. reported presence of Ethiopian OLF and ONLF insurgents, to- In 1997, Takfi r wal-Hijra, a religious extremist group, attacked in- gether with Arab fi ghters, within Mogadishu.20 Indeed, the pres- habitants of Kambo Asahara, but were repulsed by security forces. ence of foreign fi ghters is given as the reason for the wearing of In 2000, the same group attacked a mosque killing 24. Aircraft full-face slit-eyed veils by UIC fi ghters. There may also be the hijackings is one of the most frequent manifestations of terrorism desire to emulate the Mujahideen of Afghanistan. In May 2005, in Sudan with an Ethiopian airliner being hijacked in 1995 and an explosion in a stadium in Mogadishu targeted the TFG prime 2001, a Sudanese airliner in 1994 and 1996, and a Libyan airliner minister, while in September 2006, the TFG president narrowly in August 2004. In 1997, an internationally wanted terrorist, Carlos escaped death and 11 people died when an explosion occurred the Jackal, was arrested in Sudan and extradited to France. as he was leaving a session of the TFG parliament in Baidoa. The events in Darfur, northwestern Sudan, paint a whole The perpetrators of the attacks, condemned by the TFG govern- new picture. In 2005 alone, monitors12 noted over 100 killings of ment as terrorists, have not been identifi ed despite the reported

94 Africa’s responses to the terrorism threat

arrest of some of the perpetrators. Somalia is thus a source of from the UN to provide security, transport and escort services. international, insurgent, nationalist and Islamic extremist terror- Unlike warlord militia, they were disciplined. The UN contracts ism, both to itself and the region. were an added source of revenue. The civil war itself was double wedged for the AIAI. Credible Al-Ittihad al-Islamia21 reports appear to suggest that at fi rst, the AIAI leadership tried to Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) – loosely translated as striving in the avoid taking sides in the war. Inevitably, clan loyalties overcame way of Islam – is a UN-designated terrorist organisation22 that has religious differences and the AIAI found itself in battle, often rout- or has had a presence in fi ve of the seven countries in the IGAD ed by clan-based militias. Returnees from Afghanistan preached region. It is reported to have links to al-Qaeda,23 to have given the message of jihad to achieve religious and political aims and support to al-Qaeda cell members, to have engaged in insurgent even though the message was initially resisted, the necessity of activities, to have been involved in indiscriminate bombings of survival forced the AIAI leadership to resort to war. Among the civilians, and to have provided social services to the people of leaders that emerged from this period of war was Sheikh Hassan Somalia after the collapse of the Siad Barre government, thus Dahir Aweys, at one time the military commander. providing, in one, all the manifestations and complexities of the The militant AIAI did not fare very well. It was routed out face of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. A study of the AIAI is of Kismayo by the Hawiye clan-based United Somali Congress thus a study of terrorism in the Horn. (USC) militia of General Hussein Aideed and forced to Gedo The origin of the AIAI cannot be dissociated from the po- and Bossasso. In Bossasso, after a short-lived alliance with the litical awareness that grew in the Muslim world in the period Majeerten Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) where after the World War II and the fi rst years of post-independent it established its rule over Bossasso (March 1991 to June 1992), Africa, more notably the infl uence of an Egyptian movement, they were routed from Bossasso and forced to fl ee to Las Qoray the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood). Before the AIAI, there were and disintegrated later with some members going as refugees to organisations that espoused the ideology later made famous in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. In Gedo, after the brief establishment Somalia by the AIAI, including Wahhabism. In 1984, Al-Jama’a of an Islamic administration, it had to contend with the Ethiopian- al-Islamiyya merged with Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islaamiya (the backed Marehan Somali National Front (SNF) militia and later, in Muslim Youth Organisation) to form al-Ittihad al-Islamia. It ap- 1996, with direct Ethiopia military power in Luuq and Buulo Hawa pears that, initially, the AIAI was more of an umbrella organi- towns. The Ethiopian military response was a result of AIAI in- sation for politico-Islamic groups whose point of commonality volvement in the ongoing insurgency in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. was their aim at establishing an Islamic state and the creation of By the beginning of 1997, AIAI as a militant force was visible only greater Somalia and that other groups may in fact have joined in the Ogaden, where it had resorted to terrorist actions. Most of in the merger. Al-Gama’a and Nahdat were simply the largest of its membership had melted into their respective clans. During the the groups that did join the organisation. Indeed, even though entire period, AIAI did not lose its salafi st inclination. Sheikh Ali Warsame of the Muslim Youth Organisation was re- The end of AIAI militancy has led to speculation about its ported as the leader of the AIAI, the organisation did not seem to activities. It has been contended that AIAI simply retreated to its have a clear leadership structure with a clear chain of command. massive economic ventures, especially in Kenya and Djibouti, It appeared highly decentralised. Among its corporate members while others contend that it is a dead organisation. In autono- was al-Takfi r who, though within the AIAI, was so secluded as to mous Somaliland – where AIAI would have had natural support be independent. based on the fact that the fi rst AIAI leader, Sheikh Ali Warsame, The AIAI grew in the period 1984 to 1991, taking in mainly is an Issaq Somalilander – a number of terrorist attacks since the disadvantaged and penetrating all spheres of society. It soon 2003 have been blamed on AIAI. These include the killings of started engaging in business, especially commercial activities in Swiss, Italian and British aid workers at different times in 2003 small towns and cities. As it grew, the AIAI spread its wahhabist and the killing of a Kenyan aid worker in 2004. ideology.24 The ranks of the AIAI were increased by products The existence of a large number of former AIAI activists in of academic scholarships to Saudi Arabia and Egypt who, while the UIC has led to speculation that the UIC may be the new front on scholarships abroad, became exposed and indoctrinated in for AIAI. Just like AIAI, the UIC adopts a corporate structure. Its the ideology of the AIAI. Towards the end of the Barre regime, core leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (head of consultative and with the regime distracted by confl icts in the northwestern council of the courts), Sheikh Hassan Turki (Shura council mem- part of the country and elsewhere, the AIAI attracted more con- ber), Sheikh Abdi Ayrow (head of Al Shabaab, the core military verts by its fi erce criticisms of scientifi c socialism and traditional wing of the UIC) and Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Said ‘Inda adde’ shaafi sm in sermons after evening prayers. Its preaching was (head of security for the UIC) were all key members of the AIAI. punctuated with calls to adopt Sharia law to bring sustainable Indeed, comparing the leadership of the UIC and AIAI is tell- law and order. ing, as one of the few leaders of the AIAI missing in the ICU The collapse of the Siad Barre regime allowed the fi nancially leadership is Sheikh Ali Warsame, the AIAI founder.25 He was stable, nationalist and highly organised AIAI to supplant govern- in late September reported to have travelled from Somaliland to ment structures. The AIAI took over businesses, set up schools, Mogadishu and joined the UIC Shura.26 established Islamic courts and even enlisted its own ‘army’. AIAI and al-Qaeda have always had ties, though the ties may Indeed, the AIAI militia was disciplined and won major contracts have been of an individual and not a corporate nature. Aden

95 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Ayrow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys are reported to have campaign to Addis Ababa or, indeed, elsewhere in the region. established ties with the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan.27 This is already evident. In mid-September 2006, eight police- Counter-terrorism offi cials insist that al-Qaeda operatives in- men were injured in Kenya when they intercepted what they volved in the 1998 and 2002 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania are suspected to be an assassination mission against a senior TFG sheltered by AIAI/UIC elements in Mogadishu. It is contended fi gure based in Kenya.33 that terrorists involved in the 2002 attacks were trained in AIAI- protected safe houses while weapons were transported overland Kenya and by sea using AIAI couriers for the 1998 and 2002 attacks.28 Kenya is wary of the very same Somali-based international terror- In the current order in Mogadishu, the al-Qaeda protectors are ist groups responsible for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. The groups likely to be the al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is mentioned because may have set up infrastructure within the country and it is plausi- of its clear wahhabist inclination and because Aden Ayrow, its ble that they could have local sympathisers and supporters.34 As commander, is a former Afghanistan Mujahideen, like some of stated, the two attacks have strong connections with AIAI and the al-Qaeda cell members. Sheikh Dahir Hussein is reported their continued stay in safety in Somalia is of security concern to have offered patronage to the al-Shabaab29 and to enjoy to Kenya. The reports linking OLF to the ICU in Mogadishu will greater power as a result of that. The UIC has consistently re- concern Kenya because of the frequent incursions of the OLF fused to discuss the issue of these terrorists, insisting that they into districts of northern Kenya and the plausible existence of are not in Somalia, and if they were, they would be subject to sympathizers of OLF in these districts. Islamist law.30 The status of AIAI today is as clear as mud. As the differ- Sudan ing contentions continue, the Horn of Africa states of Ethiopia, Sudan has to contend with the crisis in Darfur. Darfur has given Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia (to include specifi cally autonomous rise to all manner of extremists who may be responsible for hu- Somaliland), having felt the impact of AIAI in its various manifes- man rights violations therein. The reaction of the West to the tations, keenly watch Somalia. crisis in Darfur has attracted religious extremists from West and North Africa, further exacerbating the situation. The perception that Western countries are using Darfur to destabilise another ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT31 Muslim country, coupled with rallying statements from Osama bin Laden, can only increase the number of religious extremists IGAD countries, as previously stated, all perceive terrorism a heading towards Darfur from other parts of the world. The other serious security issue. great threat to Sudan is, ironically, from the peace agreements. Sudan recently concluded peace agreements in southern and Djibouti eastern Sudan. There is great apprehension that in the long term, The existence of the largest Western military base in the Horn, ‘spoilers’ from both sides may instigate terrorist attacks to un- which is hosting America, French and German troops, makes dermine the peace agreements. Such apprehensions and Darfur Djibouti an attractive target for international terrorists. The un- describe the terrorist threat in Sudan. equivocal support that Djibouti32 has given to the war against in- ternational terrorism has marked it as a Western ally in the Horn. Uganda Djibouti is thus vulnerable to international terrorism, originating Uganda will be hosting the Commonwealth heads of state and either from 15 kilometres across the red sea in the Middle East governments meeting in Kampala in 2007.35 Such a high-profi le or across the porous border with Somalia. meeting is a ‘not to miss’ opportunity for extremist groups and should thus defi ne the threat to Uganda until after the meeting. Ethiopia Further, reports of a resurgence of the ADF and the possibility Ethiopia is threatened by two groups of Somali-based terrorists. of a split within the LRA following the peace talks suggest that The fi rst includes insurgent groups like OLF and ONLF which ADF and LRA insurgent terrorism may yet continue. Another are now reportedly based in Somalia. The other threat emanates issue for Uganda is the possibility of peace keeping in Somalia. from international terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, hosted and Uganda has offered troops for duty under IGAD in Somalia to protected in Mogadishu. The perception that Ethiopia is pro- support transitional federal institutions. The presence of for- Western increases the chances of attacks against Ethiopian tar- eign troops in Somalia is opposed by the UIC. The possibility gets or the large Western community in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia of extremist factions causing attacks in Uganda to discourage also faces insurgent activity from OLF and ONLF members Uganda either before or after deployment of troops is a consid- based in the country, as evidenced by the explosions in Addis eration for Uganda. Ababa in March 2006. Ethiopia’s keen interest in stability in Somalia has increased the perception that it is the strongest backer within IGAD of the RETURNEES TFG in Somalia. Anti-TFG groups have been involved in two assassination attempts against the TFG president and prime min- The history of terrorism in the IGAD region is replete with the ister. It is not inconceivable that such groups would extend their role played by returnees. The AIAI was made militant by return-

96 Africa’s responses to the terrorism threat

ees from the Afghanistan war against the Soviets and returnees Djibouti. Sudan has had its terrorism law reviewed by the UN from Islamic ideological schools in Saudia Arabia and Egypt.36 Offi ce of Drugs and Crime, and is considering the recommenda- In Kenya, the terrorist cell responsible for the 1998 and 2002 tions made.46 Uganda, too, considers its Anti-Terrorism Act of attacks has its history in ex-Afghanistan returnees recruited into 2002 too focused on domestic terrorism and reckons that the Kenya by associates of Osama bin Laden, himself a product of same may not suffi ce for international terrorism.47 Afghanistan.37 The Janjaweed, blamed for most of the atrocities Djibouti has an Anti-Money Laundering Act48 to criminalise in Darfur, were trained and armed in Libya as part of the Libyan fi nancing of terrorism. In Sudan, a similar law was enacted in ideology of a Pan Arabic Army. After training, the Janjaweed December 200349 and with it was confi rmed the earlier crea- returned home, and in the resulting confl ict of resources, used tion (in August 2002) of the Banking Financial Information Unit. their training to devastating effect.38 Sudan took another legislative step by amending the Passport Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US, the Middle Eastern and Immigration Act 1993 to give the immigration minister pow- country has become the rallying cry for international terrorists. ers to deport undesirable foreigners.50 One of the most effective foreign ‘fi ghters’ in Iraq who eventu- A major handicap which was recognised early by the govern- ally got crowned as the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al- ments of the region was the lack of co-ordination among the dif- Zarqawi, was Jordanian by birth.39 The current head of al-Qaeda ferent government agencies in countering terrorism. Administrative in Iraq is Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian.40 efforts thus saw the creation of co-ordinating bodies. The internationalisation of the Iraq insurgency – not least In Djibouti, one day after the passing of UN Security because of the media suaveness of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – has Council Resolution 1373 of 2001, a presidential decree created not spared the region. Reports indicate that 25 per cent of the a high-powered National Counter Terrorism Committee NCTC), foreign insurgents arrested in Iraq are from the Horn of Africa.41 chaired by the Minister of Justice and with membership compris- That would suggest that the foreign insurgents from the IGAD re- ing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry gion constitute roughly a quarter of all foreign insurgents in Iraq. of Finance, the Central Bank Governor, the Chief of Security Of course, it could also mean that the insurgents from IGAD are and the Head of the Army.51 Divided into three committees the most incompetent, and are easily arrested. Be as it may, there concerned with legislation, security and terrorist fi nancing, are (IGAD) insurgents from the Horn in Iraq. They have received the committee provides policy and administrative guidance for indoctrination and training, and have established international the country’s counter-terrorism efforts. Djibouti also intends to networks. The exposure that Afghanistan provided to the ageing create a National Security Monitoring Agency (NSMA) to give leadership of the terrorist world in the Horn has received a new technical advice to the NCTC.52 boost in Iraq. Ultimately, these graduates will return. Whatever In Ethiopia, counter-terrorism falls under the general guid- happens to Iraq – whether it gets stable, whether it disintegrates, ance of the Council of Ministers, which is advised by technical whether it becomes a US police state – the IGAD insurgents will experts in a co-ordinating body composed of experts from come back. History has shown that once they return, they will the National Bank of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of employ their skills locally. And that is a source of fear for the Revenue (customs), Ministry of Infrastructure (aviation security), entire Horn of Africa region. Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Federal Affairs (Police and The assissination attempt of the TFG president in Baidoa, Intelligence). The National Intelligence and Security Service is Somalia, in the assassination attempt in September 2006 and the the lead agency concerned with implementation of counter- fact that Arabic is now the lingua franca within the UIC lead- terrorism efforts, combining intelligence collection, border and ership suggest both negative and positive Middle Eastern infl u- migration control and investigations. ences. Whether this heralds the era of returnees, time will tell. In Sudan, the co-ordinating agency is the National Counter All that is clear is that the region is threatened and vulnerable to Terrorism Coordinating Committee (NCTCC). It has the Ministry terrorist attacks of all forms. of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry, Department of Defence, National Intelligence and Security Service, and Bank of Sudan as members and acts as the national focal point against ter- COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES42 rorism, operationalising state efforts against terrorism, co-ordi- nating such efforts and preparing reports to the UN Counter The reality of terrorism in the Horn of Africa has elicited a largely Terrorism Committee. The NCTCC reports to the National state institutional response. The responses have either been leg- Security Council, which provides the policy environment for islative or administrative, and all have been largely reactive. all security issues. Countries in the Horn have enacted counter-terrorism legisla- The Republic of Uganda created a highly operational co-or- tion and legislation to curb the fi nancing of terrorism. Sudan and dinating body and named it the Joint Anti Terrorism (JAT)53 task Uganda have sui generis counter-terrorism legislation.43 In Kenya force under the leadership of Military Intelligence. Its members and Ethiopia, draft counter-terrorism laws are being considered are the Police Criminal Investigation Department, Police Special for debate in parliament.44 Djibouti and Eritrea have counter- Branch, Internal Security Organisation and External Security terrorism legislation in their respective penal codes. Djibouti Organisation. does not consider the penal code provisions on terrorism45ade- In February 2004, the National Counter Terrorism Centre quate and is reviewing the code. The reviews do not end with (NCTC) was created in Kenya as a co-ordinating agency in

97 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

counter-terrorism efforts. It has within its membership the A UNIQUE REGIONAL APPROACH Police, Military, Intelligence, and Customs, as well as govern- ment administrators, the offi ce of the Attorney General, and IGAD was formed in 1986 as IGADD (drought and desertifi ca- Immigration. The committee reports to the National Security tion) and has at its core a commitment to preserve peace, secu- Advisory Council (NSAC), a ministerial committee that provides rity and stability through regional efforts.56 Following the adop- policy guidelines on security matters. tion in July 1999 of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Administrative guidelines have been issued to provide more Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the protection against terrorism, touching on anything from terrorism IGAD summit in Khartoum in January 2002 discussed the need fi nances to border control. for a regional response to the threat of terrorism at the request In 2003, the Central Bank of Kenya issued prudential regula- of Sudan. The meeting was followed by a conference on the tions to all fi nancial institutions, requiring the institutions inter prevention and combating of terrorism in Addis Ababa in June alia to adopt prudent ‘know your customer’ measures.54 Kenya 2003 and a draft implementation plan to counter terrorism in created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 2003 as a specialised the IGAD region. The implementation plan was approved in unit for investigating terrorism cases. October 2003 at an IGAD summit meeting held in Kampala, Uganda created joint security deployments at border points un- Uganda. The plan provided, among other things, for IGAD der the leadership of the Police to ensure proper co-ordination at member states to undertake a number of measures, including border points and also established an inter-ministerial refugee eli- the establishment of a regional approach to counter terrorism, gibility committee to vet refugees. In 2002, the Bank of Uganda is- countering terrorism fi nancing, enhancing countering of illegal sued guidelines to fi nancial institutions against money laundering. border movements, enhancing sharing information, and enhanc- Sudan has created counter-terrorism units at the Ministry of ing the protection of human rights. Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence and Subsequent to the plan, IGAD and the Institute of Security Security Service, and the Bank of Sudan; all members of the Studies (ISS) conducted a vulnerability assessment of terrorism in NCTCC. In 2001, order No 33 was issued by the Ministry of the IGAD region, This was completed in November 2003 and the Interior, Sudan, concerning the control of aliens, requiring the recommendations from the study were discussed and amended at registration of all aliens at hotels and the registration of all alien a second IGAD conference on the prevention and combating of employees, among other things. terrorism in the IGAD region which was held in Kenya in October In August 2006, Ethiopia was in the process of creating a 2004. That meeting defi ned the project components as follows: Financial Intelligence Unit under the National Bank of Ethiopia. Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti have employed ■ Enhancement of judicial measures PISCES, an electronic border management database system, at ■ Optimising inter-departmental co-operation major border points and hope to implement the system at all ■ Improved border control border points. Djibouti, in a unique attempt to address the root ■ Training, information sharing and best practice causes of terrorism, intends to create an information and public ■ Enhancement of strategic co-operation awareness website.55 It further converted its Rapid Response Force into a counter-terrorism force. Eritrea has had its ministry In March 2005, the IGAD Council of Ministers approved the of transport issue an airport security manual. IGAD counter-terrorism programme (which emanated from A major element of counter-terrorism is international co- the implementation plan and vulnerability study). ICPAT was operation. Djibouti has established a close relationship with the launched in June 2006 during the fi rst steering committee meet- countries that have bases in the country – mainly the US and ing of the programme in Addis Ababa, where the programme the French. It has an extradition treaty with France, Yemen and is based. Ethiopia and is signatory to the Rome Statute which created the International Criminal Court. Ethiopia and Eritrea have estab- ■ Enhancement of judicial measures: This component aims lished information-sharing channels with Interpol and the Eastern at supporting IGAD countries to identify, ratify and do- Africa Police Chiefs’ Conference (EAPCCO) and are involved in mesticate international counter-terrorism conventions and the IGAD counter-terrorism initiative. Sudan has extradited a international counter-terrorism requirements. It should sub- wanted terrorist to France without having an extradition treaty sequently support and enable IGAD countries to build the and has tried many other terrorists. Kenya and Uganda are also capacity of its judicial personnel, including investigators, members of EAPCCO and Interpol. All the countries in the Horn judges and prosecutors, to handle counter-terrorism cases. of Africa have, together with other countries, signed up for a Under this component, a review of extradition agreements regional fusion centre, an information-sharing clearing house for between IGAD countries will be conducted and encour- terrorism and transnational crime. aged. The ambit of counter-terrorism legislation includes The efforts of the region show a determination to fi ght the laws relating to terrorism, money laundering, organised scourge. This determination has seen the creation by IGAD of crime, corruption, drugs, and arms traffi cking. a regional counter-terrorism programme, the IGAD Capacity ■ Optimising interdepartmental co-operation: This aims at Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT), which is based the proper use of counter-terrorism resources by identify- in Addis Ababa. ing the current national actors in counter-terrorism and

98 Africa’s responses to the terrorism threat

gauging their perception of their role and their relationship Challenges and co-ordination with other actors. Ultimately, it should The above achievements have not come without challenges. lead to information sharing and co-ordination among dif- The biggest challenge is the failure to obtain the participa- ferent actors in a national set-up and the establishment tion of the state of Eritrea. This is probably due to the hosting of national anti-terrorism co-ordination units where these of the programme in Ethiopia and the current tensions that exist do not exist. The long-term goal is to have the co-ordina- between the two countries The situation will hopefully be ad- tion units be focal points for regional co-ordination. dressed by having meetings outside Addis Ababa. ■ Improved border control: The component aims at improv- Another challenge is the fact that the region has various secu- ing border management. It thus seeks an assessment of rity considerations. There has been a low prioritisation of terror- border control practices followed by proposals of improve- ism in some countries, resulting in a lack of resource allocation ments, the support of such improvements, and improved by member countries to programme activities. So far, all activi- inter-departmental co-operation at border points. It seeks ties have been carried out at the expense of the programme, and to inculcate regional thinking in border management as a such expenditure is neither sustainable nor desirable. long-term goal. The programme envisages co-operation between and among ■ Training, information sharing and best practice: This aims regional states. However, the level of mistrust in the region at developing and managing a uniform, generic, compre- means that this is at best a mirage. The mistrust results from a hensive counter-terrorism course of action for the region. low level of interaction among the states bureaucracies, as well ICPAT is in the process of developing a manual with the as past or current political differences, and manifests itself in support of the Commonwealth Secretariat and EAPCCO. the high level of skepticism encountered in the implementation The component will see the provision the training and of of the programme. Most bureaucrats, while not dismissing the terrorism lectures to countries upon request and the con- programme, have adopted a wait and see attitude. vening of meetings at which best practices and standards The political and security realities of the region also present in all aspects of counter-terrorism will be shared. challenges. In Somalia, no programme activities can be carried ■ Enhancement of strategic co-operation: This is about pro- out because of a lack of governmental institutions to work with. gramme management. Overall management of the pro- In Somaliland, where there are governmental institutions to work gramme means initiating strategic relationships with coun- with, programme activities cannot be undertaken as Somaliland ter-terrorism and other bodies involved, for example the is not recognised as an entity by IGAD. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), UN Offi ce on Drugs and Crime CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS (UNODC), International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). It in- The IGAD region is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, the terror- cludes liaison with donors, the ISS, the IGAD secretariat ism manifesting itself in various forms. Though many countries and all member countries. Liaison with all country and have taken individual state-centred measures to counter terror- regional players involved in counter-terrorism is necessary ism, ICPAT, with all its challenges, provides a unique regional to ensure that efforts are not duplicated. This component approach to countering terrorism. The success of the ICPAT envisages support for the IGAD secretariat on terrorism programme may well herald the beginning of a new approach issues, including the preparation of a terrorism vulnerabil- in countering terrorism in Africa, a movement from national ity report for the IGAD Council of Ministers. state-centred approaches to inclusive regional partnerships involving regional bodies, research institutions, international IGAD, recognising the limitations it faced in implementing the partners and the states, all working together. This may well be programme and cognisant of the research capabilities of the the solution to counter-terrorism initiatives in countries and ISS, entered into an agreement with the ISS for the performance regions where the competition for limited state resources is of the programme. The ISS would help to implement the pro- high and manpower resources low and where other security gramme, through its administrative and research capabilities. considerations are considered a high priority by states. It must The programme is all about enhancing the capacity of be stated that ICPAT-like initiatives do not seek to replace member countries of IGAD. For example, in its six months of the state in counter-terrorism efforts, or to undermine it, but existence, legal research has been done in Uganda, Ethiopia and rather to complement state efforts. ICPAT cannot exist outside Djibouti, while border assessments are being done in Kenya, state institutions. Ethiopia and Sudan.

NOTES

1 IGAD strategy, IGAD Secretariat, October 2003, p 1. 3 The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in the IGAD IGAD Terrorism Report),p 2. 2 See US Department of State, Country reports on terrorism, region, Report of the IGAD Conference held on 24-27 4 The perceptions are based on country reports made to . June 2003 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, IGAD Secretariat ( IGAD quoted in IGAD Terrorism report, op cit, the coun-

99 Building partnerships for preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

try reports made to UNCTC pursuant to Resolution 1373, 21 See A Duele Sii’arag, The birth and rise of AIAI in the 37 See 34, op cit. and open sources. Somali inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa, 13 38 See Oliver Read, Sudan’s Janjaweed militia, Online 5 See Annette Hübschle, The T-word: Conceptualising ter- November 2003, . sifi cations of terrorism. 2005; author’s interview with counter-terrorism offi cials 39 See . Some insist that AIAI adopted several names to evade cap- 22 See 20, op cit. 40 Ibid. ture specially as a result of sustained Ethiopian onslaught 23 Some insist the links are not corporate AIAI to al-Qaeda, 41 Dow Jones International News, Several terror plots thwart- and it is therefore active while yet others insist that its ral- but individual between some AIAI cell members and the ed in Horn of Africa: US Gen, 24 November 2003, quoted lying cry, Somalia irredentism, is no longer attractive to a al-Qaeda leadership. in Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the IGAD region: Threats and survivalist Somalia. 24 Without getting mired in details, ‘wahhabism’ in this countermeasures, ISS. 7 See IGAD Terrorism Report, op cit, p 12. paper refers to the Islamic religious thought that requires 42 Based on country reports to UNCTC, op cit, and on con- 8 See US Department of State, op cit. Muslims to live like the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) and tacts with regional counter-terrorism offi cials. 9 See New Vision reports, 18 September 2006. the early followers. 43 Sudan’s Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, Uganda’s Anti- 10 The perpetrator was a graduate of AIAI training camps. 25 The AIAI leadership included Sheikh Ali Warsame – spir- Terrorism Act of 2000. See Kenya’s experience with terrorism, NSIS publication, itual leader, Sheikh Hassan Aweys – military head, Sheikh 44 Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006, Ethiopia’s draft Anti- 2004. Hassan Turki – senior fi eld military commander, Sheikh Terrorism Proclamation of 2006. 11 See Daily Nation, 19 July 2005 – one of the few reports Yusuf Mohamed Said – head religious courts and Aden 45 Articles 167 to 171 of the Penal Code. that refer to such incidences as terrorism. Ayrow – militia commander. 46 See Government of Sudan, 4th report to the United 12 US Department of State, 2005 country reports, April 26 “ Somalia: Al itihad offi cials reach Mogadishu, Somaliland Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) dated 15 2006. issues warning, 30 September 2006, . dated 20 October 2003, op cit. 15 Ibid. 27 Interview with regional counter-terrorism offi cials. 48 Act No 196/AN/02/4eme L on Money Laundering, 16 See Eritrea’s sole report to the UN Counter-Terrorism 28 Ibid. Confi scation and International Cooperation with Respect Committee pursuant to Resolution 1373 of 2001 on 24 May 29 Ibid. to Proceeds of Name. 2002, . 30 Sheikh Hassan Aweys described the terrorist as being 49 Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2003. 17 The OLF has an offi ce in Asmara and the OLF and Eritrean non-existent. See Islamists condemn the UN pullout of 50 See Government of Sudan report to the UNCTC dated 27 People’s Liberation Front have a history dating back to the Somalia, Report in Somalinet News, 12 October 2006, December 2001, op cit. Eritrean struggle for self-determination. . 51 Presidential Decree 2001/0193/PRE of 3 October 2001. 18 A UN report accused the state of Eritrea of support to the 31 Based on open discussions with counter-terrorism offi cials See Republic of Djibouti report to the UNCTC, 27 Union of Islamic Courts. See the report of the monitoring in the region. December 2001, op cit. group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 32 US Country reports 2005, op cit. 52 Djibouti report to UNCTC, 27 December 2001, op cit. 1587(2005), 4 October 2005. 33 See Police investigating terrorism link in attack, Daily 53 See 48. 19 Sheikh Dahir Aweys, the leader of the Shura of the UIC, Nation, 25 September 2006. 54 See Kenya’s report to UNCTC, 12 March 2003, op cit. appears on the UN’s list of terrorists, 35 See www.thecommonwealth.org/document/147565/ 56 Article 18A, Confl ict resolution, of the agreement estab- 20 See Somalia soccer shooting arrests,BBC reports, 6 July chogm_2005_fi nal communiqu.htm. lishing IGAD, . 36 See 22, op cit. lishing_IGAD.pdf>.

100 Panel 4 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Detection and prevention of terrorist threats Boinett Wilson

The arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects Edwin Okello

Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in africa: Defending terrorism suspects Mbugua Mureithi

Judging terrorism cases Paul Mugamba

Detection and prevention of terrorist threats Boinett Wilson

We have slain a dragon ... but we live now in a jungle fi lled with DETECTION bewildering variety of poisonous snakes … – James Wooley, ex- director, CIA The perpetrators of this crime are usually organised in cell struc- tures of between three and fi ve people. One indicator that an operative is a terrorist is a relationship with other known terrorist INTRODUCTION organisations, individuals, or theatres of operations (for example Afghanistan, the Middle East, Pakistan and Somalia). Terrorism is as old as time, and its attacks on the innocent, Though operationally independent and small in size, inter- rich and powerful have a long and bloody history. The mod- national terrorists are well networked and engage in highly so- ern-day notion that it is a new phenomenon is therefore phisticated preparations that are thorough and time consuming. misplaced. The idea that terrorism is somehow not a legiti- These preparations normally go through ten phases: mate weapon for ‘furthering policy by violent means’ is quite ■ simply wrong. Recruitment – usually of committed cadres ■ Terrorism as it is understood today means an act of violence Training – military, intelligence and indoctrination ■ aimed at a target audience to obtain some political advantage. Selection of target – elaborate study of facilities, persons, The phrase ‘armed propaganda’ is fairly accurate. Terror at- etc, for the attack. (The US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam took over fi ve years to case, including tacks are not intended to destroy an enemy’s capacity to wage drawings and dry runs) war, but to communicate a clear threat, whether in pursuit ■ Planning – appreciation of a grievance or to warn off enemies. The aim is always to ■ Finances – setting up legitimate investments and/or fraud frighten, and at the same time to send a message to three key ■ Logistics – communications, escape routes, false docu- constituencies: the enemy; the domestic population and for- ments, cover stories/businesses eign audiences. ■ Transportation – bombers and their equipment Unlike normal warfare, advertising the message is as impor- ■ Security – crucial in all phases but vital on D-Day tant for modern terrorists as the violence itself. In short, terror- ■ Execution – the attack ism is now recognised as just another part of mankind’s brutal ■ Propaganda – coded warning for attack; pre-attack mes- spectrum of confl ict resolution, and a very cost-effective one, sage; claiming responsibility or blaming rival groups for the determined terrorist.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION DEFINITION Perhaps if Adam had had a little more intelligence about what You are damned if you defi ne, and you are doomed if you don’t Eve and the snake were up to, we [humans] might not be in the (Anonymous) mess we are in today. Intelligence collection is a requisite to any actions a country Efforts to defi ne terrorism have consumed a great deal of or organ could take to try to eliminate the threat posed by any ink. The semantic quagmire has been deepened not only by terrorist or group. The strategy is collection, analysis, renditions indiscriminate application of the term, but also by politically or disruptions, and arrest (covert action). This covert action of inspired efforts not to apply it. The United Nations continues to penetration requires the selection and training of offi cers who debate a defi nition of international terrorism. But many govern- will be deployed in the target area (language, religion, equip- ments simply recognise terrorism when they see it and do what ment, education, etc). they must. Any uncertainty about whether a given incident The need for technical surveillance cannot be over-empha- constitutes terrorism is not the result of a lack of defi nition, but sised. Detection of terrorists requires good intelligence, thorough is due to incomplete information – the fog of war. analysis and effective surveillance.

103 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

Currently and in the near future terrorism exhibits or will and marginalisation. The bottom line is to deny the enabling exhibit certain new characteristics that impact on intelligence environment. collection: The world government or community of nations must trans- form itself and re-defi ne its role in the face of the paradigm shift. ■ The loose networking of the cells/organisations across the Global conditions favour terrorism primarily because the world world offers logistical and other support. Cells are likely is at war with itself. These wars are creating millions of dispos- to become smaller and self-sustaining fi nancially, but will sessed, along with small-arms proliferation, and from these resort to other cells for other support. The link with other spring crime, corruption, plagues and terrorism, among others. cells, as with cells today, will be by individual connec- Real-world strategists and leaders need to refocus on the charac- tions, made (unlike today’s ex-Afghan comradeship) over ter of human beings. They must invest more in humanity. emergent media such as the Internet. The new cells are At country level, a national security strategy must be crafted, likely to be fl exible and transient, making them diffi cult to based on common sense. This dynamic strategy must take into penetrate, predict or pre-empt. consideration the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats ■ Some existing terrorist organisations have deep roots in of the country, and prepare a balanced budget (making trade-offs). and connections with their communities. These connec- When the morale of the country is high and sustained, the tions will disappear. The new groups will be at one with citizens experience the ‘feel good/feel secure’ attitude that the community and totally indistinguishable from it. The democratic government has created a much-needed ‘virtual boy next door is likely to be the terrorist. The attacks in intelligence community’. This national intelligence network of all London on 7 July 2005 already indicated this trend. patriotic citizens must harness the full potential of state and non- ■ The emergence of highly educated ‘secular’ and technologi- state actors. But since the national morale of any state is never cally knowledgeable operatives. The profi le of the operative constant, owing to the character and nature of power and its as a ‘religious fundamentalist’ illiterate is disappearing. The infl uence, then African countries must ensure that certain things new operative is likely to have a degree in complex sci- are done correctly: ences such as engineering, medicine and computer science and be competent in new communication technologies. ■ Improve political direction / policy leadership / ■ The motivation for the new terrorist is likely to con- commitment. tinue to be a confl ict of cultures (as enunciated in Samuel ■ Increase public awareness and ownership Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’). Pan-Arabic/Islamic ■ Set up partnerships with regional/international actors issues will continue to be prime motivators. Copycat ■ Deal with the centre of gravity inside the terrorist cells: motivation by other groups with socio-economic issues the bombers and command centre will arise. Think of groups such as the Movement for ■ Establish joint operation teams for doctrine, strategy and the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria. executions The suicide statement of Mohamed Sidique, one of the ■ Design and establish a shared databank of all known ter- London bombers, is telling. He explained that there is a rorist groups/players war between Islam and the West. ■ Deny the operatives money by sharing information of ■ Recognised or public leadership of terrorist organisations money-laundering schemes. Strengthen the laws is likely to be merely inspirational and ideological. This ■ Improve the character of the gatekeepers to minimise cor- is already the case. Osama bin Laden or his replacement ruption at its weakest links will be purely inspirational, and acts will be done in his ■ Intelligence organs of the state need to share information name without his input. Even today, Osama’s leadership more with other stakeholders (states, media, etc) to pub- is more ‘chairman than chief executive’. lish and enlighten, and thus disrupt the attacks ■ The quest for weapons of mass destruction, be they bio- ■ Nation-states must refrain from being drawn into unjust logical, chemical, radiological or nuclear (CBRN), is likely wars and improve on governance to increase. The new cadre of highly educated operatives ■ Professional intelligence units need to be specifi c, and will play a big role in this. They will seek to mount high target terrorists’ identities, their strategies, motivating fac- profi le attacks, probably using CBRN weapons. tors, plans, weapons and intentions ■ World wealth needs to be distributed equitably between the north and the south PREVENTION (DISTRUPTION) ■ Government response to attacks by terrorists needs to be well managed to avoid a backlash A defi nition of terrorism is hopeless … terrorism is just violence that you do not like – Professor Rubenstein, George Mason University, Virginia BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM

To prevent a terrorist from succeeding in his or her mission is Africa must respond effectively to the growing prevalence of to fi ght the ‘axis of evil’: poverty, diseases, ignorance, injustices terrorist attacks, with minimum cost to its fi ckle economies and

104 Detection and prevention of terrorist threats

young democracies. This calls for standards and best practices ■ Regional cooperation in counter-terrorism activities must evolved by African societies and the rest of the world. be enhanced and cooperation among security agencies sustained. The African Union Convention on Prevention ■ Terrorism is a special crime that requires a special law, and Combating Terrorism provides standards according different from the general penal code. Therefore African to which African nations should formulate their counter- governments should strive to enact relevant legislations to terrorism efforts. Regional bodies got together and for- tackle this crime. Meanwhile, strict application of crimi- mulated standards and best practices. One such standard nal law; the arrest and prosecution of people engaged or was formulated in Nanyuki, Kenya, in 2004 at the fi rst abetting terrorist activities should be entrenched. Regional Counter Terrorism Conference. ■ Enhancing diplomacy among African countries is vital. ■ There is a need to operationalise focal points charged Diplomacy supports other instruments in numerous ways. with counter-terrorism activities. Lack of funds and po- The negotiation of treaties on extradition and mutual legal litical will has hampered the role of these focal points. If assistance for example assists the application of criminal made operational, they should develop an early warning law by facilitating the transfer of fugitive terrorists or sus- system against terrorism in their regions. pects. Discouraging other African countries from allowing ■ ‘Know your enemy’ is an accepted maxim in warfare. The suspect groups to operate on their territories narrows the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies intelligence task of monitoring them. should continue their aggressive efforts to identify terror- ■ Counter-terrorism efforts should be geared towards win- ists and their organisations, map their command, control ning the minds of passive sympathisers of terrorism. The and support infrastructure, and share such intelligence notion that counter-terrorism is a ‘clash of civilisations’ broadly to thwart their schemes. should be expunged from our societies. ■ Terrorism is an intelligence war. For effective counter- terrorism measures we need to enhance communication CONCLUSION technologies. At the same time, Africa should develop and maintain reliable data to effectively fi ght the threat. The war on terror is never-ending. Terror will forever be with us, ■ Financial support has been a principal part of sponsoring because there will be the unjust gap between the rich and the terrorism. It is important for African governments to crimi- poor and the great divide between image judgement and reality nalise the fi nancing of terrorism in all its manifestations or until perhaps the end of time. But humanity must strive to live the collection of funds for criminal activities and freeze in peace terrorism notwithstanding, therefore, all nations have funds known to be allocated for terrorist purposes. a duty to detect and prevent terrorism. The moral here is to op- ■ The sharing of intelligence and coordination of covert pose terrorism but not use it. actions against terrorist groups is vital in combating the menace.

105

The arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects Edwin Okello

INTRODUCTION Investigations revealed that the mastermind of the twin at- tacks in Mombasa had entered the country, probably through Since the early 1980s, Kenya has been the victim of a number Somalia, and set out to integrate himself with the community of terrorist attacks. The most prominent were the attack in of a remote Island in the coastal part of Kenya called Siyu. He 1998 on the US embassy in Nairobi; the November 2002 at- presented himself as a preacher and taught at the madrassa tack in which the terrorists targeted the Israeli-owned Paradise at the local mosque. He even set up a local soccer club that Hotel at Kikambala, Kilifi District; and the attempt to shoot he called the al-Qaeda football club. Eventually, in December down an Israeli airliner at Moi International Airport, Mombasa. 2002, he married the sister of the other suspect, who introduced Investigations revealed that these attacks had been carried out him to the Siyu community. He managed to recruit a few people by the terrorist al-Qaeda organisation. in Mombasa, believed to be al-Qaeda sympathisers, who aided him mostly in the acquisition of the bomb vehicle and leasing of safe houses. PROSECUTION OF TERRORISM In the case of the suspect who was to bomb the new US AND RELATED CRIMES embassy, al-Qaeda literature was found in his house, with a photograph of himself and a portrait of Osama bin Laden lami- Of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Kenya, it was only in the nated together. attacks of 2002 that the suspects were prosecuted locally. The Problems faced during the prosecution of the case suspects in the 1998 bombing of the US embassy were arrested and taken to the US, where they were charged and convicted. ■ Fear and intimidation of witnesses: Fear was evident in Two prosecutions arose from the 2002 attacks, one in the High some witnesses. A few witnesses initially refused to tes- Court and the other in the Chief Magistrate’s Court. Both prose- tify in the presence of the accused persons. When the cutions have been concluded and the suspects acquitted. A ‘post prosecution prevailed upon them to do so, they were mortem’ analysis of those prosecutions graphically demonstrates not helpful in court, and could not identify the accused, the problems and hurdles encountered in the prosecution of ter- although that they had been so sure about this early in rorism and related crimes, not just in Kenya, but worldwide. the pre-trial conference. ■ There was also fear of possible reprisals if witnesses gave High Court CR Case No 91/03: evidence against the accused persons. At times witnesses R v Aboud Rogo & Three Others would travel to Nairobi from Mombasa in the same bus The four accused in this case were charged with causing the as relatives of the accused and reported that there had deaths of the 15 people who perished in the bombing of the been pressure not to testify against their own. Paradise Hotel, Kikambala, on 22 November 2002. Of the 15 ■ Lack of anti- terrorism legislation: Faced with a terrorist deceased, three were Israelis and the rest Kenyans. Scores of offence, but without the requisite legislation, we had to people were injured, some seriously and with permanent disfi g- charge the perpetrators with the offences of murder and urement. The hotel is owned by an Israeli, and the guests were conspiracy to commit felonies under our penal laws. Israelis. At the time of the explosion, 08:00, over 200 Israeli ■ Lack of judicial awareness: During the trial of this case, tourists were checking into the hotel. it was evident that this was a new phenomenon in our country, which still had to be grasped and understood. Arrest There was an apparent lack of awareness on the The breakthrough for the police came when one of the suspects part of the judiciary that was bent on treating the case was arrested on 1 August 2003. In his pocket was a mobile tel- as an ordinary murder trial, ignoring the prosecution’s ephone number. Using this number, the police, with the assist- contention from the beginning of the case that it was no ance of mobile cell phone service providers, analyzed the call ordinary murder trial. This was evident when the defence data and were then able to arrest the other suspects and identify objected to any mention of the word ‘terrorist’ and the the main suspect, who is still at large. court sustained the objection.

107 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

■ Accused masquerading as law-abiding members of the sion of light anti-tank missile launchers, which had been recov- community: In the eyes of their communities, the accused ered from the house that he had leased in an estate in Mombasa. were good people. There was a preacher, a councillor, a Four of the missile launchers were armed, and there was one business man, a madrasa owner and a village elder. The live grenade and 177 rounds of AK-47 ammunition. Intelligence suspects infi ltrated the community and entrenched them- reports indicated that the probable targets were ships docking selves until they became trusted by the community be- at the port of Mombasa. The trial lasted seven months and the fore they struck. Witnesses then became uncooperative. accused was convicted and jailed for eight years. One of the suspects, who is still at large and believed to have been the mastermind behind the two attacks, had Chief Magistrate’s Court Nairobi, Cr Case No 2787/03: even started a football club in Siyu village and fronted as R Vs Kubwa Mohammed Seif & Two Others a preacher. In this case the three accused were charged on four counts of ■ Failure to get expert witnesses from Israel and absence of conspiracy under the penal code: conspiracy to bomb the US a mutual legal assistance scheme: The prosecution, de- Embassy in 1998; to bomb the current US Embassy at Gigiri; to spite concerted efforts to get the Israelis who took sam- bomb the Paradise Hotel at Kikambala; and to shoot down an ples from the house where the bomb was constructed, Israeli airliner in November 2002, an attack that was planned to was unable to get these witnesses, who would have happen at the same time as the bombing of the Paradise Hotel. shown the court the house and would have testifi ed to As in the murder case, analysis of the communication data the technical aspects of the bomb. from the cell phone service providers led to the arrest of the ac- ■ Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2003: The abolition of cused, and investigations revealed that they had played host to confessions to the police: There was a detailed confession the suspected mastermind Abdi Karim, alias Fazul, who is still from one of the accused persons in this case, from the time at large. that the plot was hatched to the execution, naming those in- Problems experienced in prosecuting this case are similar to volved and the role he personally played in the whole plot. those in the murder trial. There was again a detailed confession The Criminal Law Amendments Act of 2003 did away with from one of the accused on how they had planned to bomb confessions made to police offi cers. We therefore could not the American Embassy. It could not be admitted in evidence produce this confession in court. Had such a confession not because of the 2003 amendment to the Evidence Act, which been outlawed, we are positive that there would have been abolished confession to police offi cers. suffi cient evidence to convict the accused. Another problem concerned a witness who demanded to be relocated, and be provided with a new identity after giving The accused were all acquitted when the court ruled that they evidence. We were not able to do this, and the witness did not had no case to answer. One glaring contradiction is apparent in testify. But progress has been made as the Bill on witness protec- the High Court ruling. This was the fi nding of the court: tion is pending before the Kenyan parliament. This will go a long way towards eliminating fear in witnesses. The evidence gathered showed that the accused belonged to At the close of the prosecution’s case, the accused were a terrorist gang called AL QUAIDA, which was involved in the placed on their defence, but were acquitted at the end of the preparation and plans and had common intention to attack Israel trial. The magistrate in his judgment of 27 June 2005 found that interests in Kenya. The evidence adduced by the prosecution the essential ingredient of conspiracy, that is, an agreement or show that the accused were involved in the renting of houses the meeting of minds, was not proved. Lack of anti-terrorism in Mombasa, where it was alleged the bomb which was used to legislation and the abolition of police confessions can partly be attack the hotel was assembled in one of the houses. blamed for the acquittals. One of the suspects gave a detailed confession, led the po- In the next paragraph the judge fi nds that: lice to the Internet and extracted the coded messages/communi- cation with his handler, and even decoded these to the police. There is no evidence direct or circumstantial which connects The prosecution tried to have these admitted as documentary the accused to the AL QUAIDA network and their involvement evidence, but the court rejected this after objection from the de- in the preparation, planning, and the bombing of Paradise Hotel, fence counsels. The prosecution then moved to the High Court which resulted in the killing of 12 Kenyans and 3 Israelis. for revision of the court order rejecting the production of the e-mails. We tried to exploit an apparent ‘oversight’. When parlia- The judge also ruled that since the accused had not been ar- ment outlawed confessions to police offi cers by amending and rested or found at the scene of bombing, they could not be guilty deleting the provisions of the Evidence Act dealing with confes- of murder, because the guilty ones were the suicide bombers sions, it did not delete section 29, which still recognised con- who perished in the attack. He therefore stated that the doctrine fessions to police offi cers above the rank of assistant inspector. of common intention did not apply, although the accused had Unfortunately, the High Court did not deal with the issues raised rented the house where the bomb was assembled. in our submissions and dismissed the application for revision as After the acquittal of the accused, one of the suspects, Omar premature, because the lawyer had not issued a fi nal order. That Said Omar, was re-arrested and charged with being in posses- reasoning we did not understand.

108 The arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects

It would have been easier to prosecute under specifi c leg- ■ Presumption of innocence / burden and standard of proof: islation on terrorism, because this would have created distinct The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. offences, defi ned their ingredients and prescribed penalties. In The burden to do so is on the prosecution, and the stand- addition, such legislation would address some of the problems ard of proof must be beyond all reasonable doubt, and identifi ed above and domesticate the major international and never shifts to the accused. In short, during a trial, the regional conventions and protocols against terrorism. The need defence need not tender any evidence and all it needs for this legislation cannot be overemphasised. do is create a doubt by discrediting prosecution evidence Lack of trained manpower, of modern equipment (a forensic through cross-examination. laboratory, etc), and of fi nancial resources are major hurdles in ■ Pre-trial disclosure: The law requires the prosecutor to the prosecution of terrorism and related cases. There is, there- disclose to the defence, in advance of the trial, all the fore, need for specialised training for investigators, prosecutors evidence in his or her possession, including what may and judicial offi cers. Adequate resource allocation for law en- be favourable to the accused. No corresponding duty is forcement is indispensable. placed on the accused. There is also need to take a fresh look into the working rela- ■ Previous convictions: In our legal system, the prosecution tion between the investigators and the prosecutors. The archaic cannot make any reference to the accused person’s previ- jurisprudence that prohibits prosecutors from becoming involved ous conviction(s) and criminal records till the sentencing in investigations should be done away with. It is important to stage. In Britain, from which we have borrowed most of involve the prosecutors at an early stage and periodically the our jurisprudence, the law has been changed to allow the investigations, so that they may give guidance and point out in prosecution to refer to the accused past criminal records good time any gaps in the investigations that need to be taken even in the opening statement and in the closing argu- care of for a successful prosecution. Moreover, there is need for ments before judgment. a multi-disciplinary integrated approach to investigations. It is es- ■ Sentencing: The prosecutor is not permitted to plead for sential that investigating teams should bring together experts from a harsher sentence. The accused on the other hand is al- various disciplines, for example forensic science, banking and lowed to mitigate for a lenient sentence. fi nance, information technology, investigation and prosecution. ■ Appeals: The Attorney General can appeal against an There is also an urgent need to strengthen our mutual legal acquittal in a subordinate court only on a point of law assistance and cooperation with other countries in the preven- and not a point of fact. The accused on the other hand tion, investigation and prosecution of terrorism and other related can appeal on both. In trials before the High Court, the cases. Mutual legal assistance and international cooperation Attorney General cannot appeal against an acquittal and legislation are long overdue. may only certify issues of law to the Court of Appeal, where it will be determined whether they are of serious public interest. Even then, the determination of the Court THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS, of Appeal is merely declaratory of the law and cannot PROTECTION AND OTHER PROCEDURAL, overturn an acquittal. EVIDENTIARY AND ETHICAL BURDENS From this analysis, it is clear that our laws, both constitutional ■ Period of detention: The constitution allows a suspect to and statutory, give too much emphasis to the rights of the sus- be held in custody before charge for 14 days for capital pect or the accused. The prosecution is overburdened by the offences and 48 hours for other offences. This period constitutional, procedural, evidentiary and ethical burdens that is hardly enough to complete investigations in complex are placed upon it. terrorism and related cases that invariably would rely on Our laws to a large extent seem to subordinate the rights of forensic evidence. the public and the community to those of an individual. We as ■ The accused right to silence and against self-incrimina- prosecutors, are always reminded of our professional and ethical tion: An accused has the right not to say anything, before duty as ‘ministers of justice’. We are always told that our pur- or even during the trial, and no reference can be made to pose is not to achieve a conviction, but ‘to do justice’. There this in arguments or even in the court judgment. There is no corresponding duty or obligation on the defence, yet we may be need to reconsider this right, especially in such operate under an adversarial system, as opposed to an inquisi- serious crimes as terrorism. Britain has changed its law torial system. The adversarial system, we are told, provides for and the courts can now take into evidence that the ac- ‘equality of arms’. But where is the equality? In short, to expect cused failed to say anything when confronted with an a prosecutor to achieve a conviction in effect is requiring him or accusation during the investigations and arrest. her to perform magic.

109

Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa Defending terrorism suspects Mbugua Mureithi

The requirement of ‘due process’ is not a fair-weather or timid PRE-TRIAL CHALLENGES assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens ... Representing The foremost casualties in ‘the war against terrorism’ are the a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and internationally recognised due process rights of suspects, which more particularly, between the individual and government, ‘due are contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of Rights (ICCPR)2 and elaborated in the UN Body of Principles decisions, and stout confi dence of the democratic faith which for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention we profess – Justice Black, US Supreme Court, 1951.1 or Imprisonment (henceforth Body of Principles)3 and regional human rights instruments. The rights are also, in varying detail, contained in the constitutions and laws of African countries. INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, the Twin Towers of the World Trade CHARATERISTISTICS OF THE CHALLENGES Center in Manhattan, New York, and the complex of the Pentagon in Washington, DC, were ‘bombed’ by suspected Extensive arbitrary arrests terrorists, using improvised commercial aircraft for the purpose. The world over, investigations of terror offences are shrouded in These brutal attacks killed nearly 4 000 people of various na- secrecy. tionalities, the majority (nearly 3 000) being Americans. Secret investigations are then, in most cases, followed by ex- Led by President George W Bush, the US administration react- tensive arbitrary arrests and detentions. Yet, under Articles 9(1) ed to the attacks by declaring ‘a global war against terror’: what has and (2) of the ICCPR, come to be called ‘the long war’ or ‘a new kind of war’. President Bush quickly followed the declaration by calling upon US friends Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one and allies to join the US in ‘the war’ with the memorable comment shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall that ‘you are either with us or against us’. No doubt, most African be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in ac- countries expressly or tacitly joined ‘the war’ on the US side. cordance with such procedure as are established by law [and] With the declaration of ‘war on terror’, the US administration (2) Anyone arrested or detained shall be informed, at the time invented a new paradigm and lexicon for dealing with the heinous of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly in- offences that centre on terrorism. Combating terrorism and dealing formed of any charges against him. with terrorism suspects, according to the US administration, is no longer regarded as a criminal law enforcement effort, but as part Article 6 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ of ‘the war’ effort. And even then, the US administration has been Rights echoes this right. adamant in its refusal to recognise the suspects in its custody in the It is elaborated in the Body of Principles and enacted in na- Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility and to apply well-established tional constitutions.4 international humanitarian law regarding prisoners of war. Instead, However, in investigations concerning terror suspects, these it has coined a new status for the suspects, albeit unknown in in- international standards are honoured more in the breach than in ternational law, of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ and used this to compliance. justify taking exceptional measures against them. For example, after two suicide bombers drove a car bomb Following the American example, countries around the into the Paradise Hotel, Kikambala, near Mombasa, Kenya, on 28 world seem to have ‘accepted’ that exceptional treatment and November 2002, killing 12 Kenyans and three Israelis, more than disregard of the due process rights of terrorism suspects are fair- 18 alleged suspects were arrested. Only seven of the suspects game in ‘the war’. were subsequently charged, two of them being father and son.5 It is in this context that this paper seeks to analyse the chal- As defence counsel received instructions to defend the sus- lenges of defending terrorism suspects, both in the pre-trial and pects, it transpired, and was indeed evident, that most of the during the trial stages. adult relatives of the suspects had been rounded up for inter-

111 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

rogation and it was therefore very diffi cult to obtain coherent family and shall be given adequate opportunity to communicate instructions from the young members of the families who were with the outside world, subject only to reasonable conditions frantically instructing lawyers. and restrictions as specifi ed by law or lawful regulations. When defence counsel fi nally got in touch with the suspects, who had been arrested and subsequently released without For days after the arrest of the Kikambala suspects, their relatives charge, they informed counsel that they had not been told the were unable to establish where they were. And when defence specifi c reason/s for arrest or of any crimes that they had or counsel fi nally managed to locate the detainees, they told har- might have been committed. They further informed counsel that rowing stories of being transferred to numerous undisclosed de- interrogations generally centred on their relationship with per- tention facilities and police stations. In some cases, it was only sons whose names were given to them by the interrogators. after fi ling for habeas corpus that the police disclosed where the It is apparent that the objective of the initial arrest of per- suspects were being held. ceived terror suspects is primarily for gathering evidence and Incommunicado detentions, at present, are a fl agrant viola- intelligence, and not for apprehending suspects against whom tion of Article 4 of the ICCPR. This article identifi es certain rights there exists reasonable cause for arrest. And whereas it is rec- as non-derogable even ‘in time of public emergency which ognised that governments need to investigate potential terrorist threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is links, and that this may require certain information to be with- offi cially proclaimed’. In 2001, the Human Rights Committee is- held while investigations are in progress, it is imperative that sued an authoritative analysis of Article 4 of the ICCPR in which such investigations and the treatment of all suspects must com- the committee also considered a number of additional covenant ply fully with international human rights standards, including the rights as effectively non-derogable beyond those explicitly pro- right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest. vided in Article 4, which, according to the committee, include the prohibition of abductions and unacknowledged detentions.8 Unauthorised prolonged pre-trial detention Article 9(3) of the ICCPR provides that: Denial of the right to counsel Principle 17(1) of the Body of Principles provides that, (3) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other offi cer authorized by A detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within legal counsel. He shall be informed of his right by the compe- a reasonable time or to release ... tent authority promptly after arrest and shall be provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it. Again this right is elaborated in the Body of Principles6and en- acted in national constitutions. For example, Section 72 (3)(b) of And principle 1 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers9 the Kenyan constitution provides that: provides that,

(3) A person who is arrested or detained upon reasonable suspi- All persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer cion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal of their choice to protect and establish their rights and to defend offence, and who is not released, shall be brought before a court them in all stages of criminal proceedings. as soon as is reasonably practicable, and where he is not brought before a court within twenty-four hours of his arrest or from the Principle 7 states that access to a lawyer must be granted commencement of his detention, or within fourteen days of his ar- ‘promptly’ and principle 8 states that, rest or detention where he is arrested or detained upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed or about to commit an offence ... all arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided punishable by death, the burden of proving that the person ar- with adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by rested or detained has been brought before a court as soon as is and to communicate and consult with a lawyer, without delay, reasonably practicable shall rest upon any person alleging that the interception or censorship and full confi dentiality. provisions of this subsection have been complied with. Although the right is not expressly provided for in the ICCPR, the But despite this provision, all the suspects who were arrested Human Rights Committee has stressed that “all persons arrested after the Kikambala bombings were held in police stations for must have immediate access to counsel”.10 more than one month before they were either released without When defence lawyers fi nally got to meet the Kikambala charge or arraigned in court.7 suspects, the suspects informed them that they had not been advised of their right to counsel during their initial period in cus- Incommunicado pre-trial detention tody. The lawyers were also informed that those who had sought Principle 19 of the Body of Principles provides that: to have counsel were fl atly informed by the interrogators that they had no such right. A detained or imprisoned person shall have the right to be vis- In the South African case of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, the ited by and to correspond with, in particular, members of his investigators admitted to having advised the suspect’s friend,

112 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

a Mr Dalvie, against engaging counsel for him. When Dalvie or a public authority may not be invoked as a justifi cation of asked the investigators whether it would help to get Mohamed torture. a lawyer they told him that “it would be a waste of money, be- cause Mohamed had admitted entering the country with a false The absolute prohibition of torture had fi rst found expression in document”.11 Articles 4 and 7 of the ICCPR in 1966.14 The denial of the right to counsel for terrorism suspects Torture is also an offence under international law15 and the seems to be standard practice globally. In the US, the practice laws of most countries, including Kenya.16 is legally institutionalised at Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility, Indeed, CAT gives extra-territorial jurisdiction to member where the detention regulations do not allow detainees to have states to punish for the crime of torture.17 access to counsel of their choice, but only to counsel appointed If there is any area of shared international norms that exhibits by the US Military. In other parts of the world, such as Kenya the change of paradigm in counter-terrorism measures, it is the and South Africa, the right is obliterated or regarded as a privi- question of treatment of suspects vis-à-vis the prohibition of tor- lege to be dished out at the discretion of the investigators. ture. As it is today, the paradigm of war seems to justify torture In both the Kikambala case in Kenya and the Khalfan Khamis of suspects as ‘a lesser evil.’ The US administration has already Mohamed case in South Africa, the failure to explain to the sus- sanctioned the use of ‘alternative interrogation techniques’ that pects the right to counsel and the absence of counsel in the ini- clearly amount to torture,18 and secret detentions/renditions that tial detention and interrogation were compounded by the pres- amount to the international crime of enforced disappearance.19 ence of foreign interrogators. In the Kikambala case, the suspects The practical challenge posed to defence lawyers by the were interrogated by a combined force of Kenyan, American and infl iction of torture on terrorism suspects is that of lack of con- Israeli investigators, while Khalfan Khamis Mohamed was inter- fi dence and trust in the lawyers and the legal/criminal justice rogated by South African and American offi cers. generally. For example, when defence lawyers fi nally met the It is also evident that, in both cases, the foreign interrogators Kikambala suspects, they were already traumatised by the pro- threatened the suspects with forced ‘extradition’. longed incommunicado detention and the psychological torture As a result of the denial of the right to contact counsel, de- infl icted on them, to the point that initially they could not believe fence lawyers experience a lot of diffi culty in establishing where that the defence lawyers were not part of the interrogation team. suspects are held. Lawyers have to conduct lengthy physical searches and inquiries in numerous police stations. In the Challenges during trial Kikambala case, lawyers had to shuttle between Mombasa and All accused persons are entitled to all necessary rights and Nairobi, 500 kilometres apart, to fi nd out where the suspects means to an effective defence. These include the right to be were being held and to have access to them. tried by a competent independent court/tribunal established The Kenya police and the foreign interrogators carried out by law, the right to assistance by effective counsel of choice secret interrogations, although the right to counsel is guaranteed at all stages of proceedings, the right to be presumed innocent by the constitution of the Republic of Kenya.12 And although the until proven guilty, the prompt notifi cation of charges; the right constitution does not specifi cally provide for the right to counsel to ‘equality of arms’, the right to adequate time and facilities to before arraignment in court, traditionally the police have allowed prepare the defence; the right of the accused to be present; the suspects to have access to lawyers in regular offences. right to challenge and to present evidence; and the right not be Although none of the suspects ‘confessed’ to the crime, there compelled to testify against oneself or confess guilt. The right is a real danger of such suspects making self-incriminating state- to an effective defence also requires the exclusion of evidence ments while in such detention, contrary to the internationally obtained through torture. guaranteed right against self-incrimination. It is also submitted Defence counsel will face challenges of actualisation of the here that deliberate refusal of access to lawyers is invariably a various components of the right to effective defence, depending precursor to torture being meted out to suspects by their jailors. on the country. For example, whereas defence counsel in the US will face challenges regarding the competence of tribunals, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or the right to assistance by effective counsel of choice, and the degrading treatment or punishment right of accused to be present during trial,20 in Kenya, challenges Torture is absolutely prohibited under international law and during trial are manifested mainly in the right of presumption of by the constitutions and laws of most countries.13 Article 2 of innocence, the right to ‘equality of arms’, and the negative public the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or perception of defence counsel in such cases. Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) provides that: On the presumption of innocence 2(1) Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administra- Everyone has an internationally recognised right to be presumed tive, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any innocent, and treated as innocent, unless and until he or she is territory under its jurisdiction. (2) No exceptional circumstances convicted according to law in the course of proceedings that whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal meet internationally prescribed requirements of fairness.21 The political stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked presumption of innocence lasts until the charge against the de- as a justifi cation of torture. (3) An order from a superior offi cer fendant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

113 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

The right to presumption of innocence also requires that trial explosives, the necessity for disclosure of these materials to the offi cers refrain from prejudging any case. And the prohibition defence is even greater. Yet, the investigation and prosecution against prejudging extends to the conduct of public offi cials. authorities are usually restrictive in availing to the defence copies The authorities have also a duty to prevent the media or other of documentary evidence to be used during the trial and accord- powerful social groups from infl uencing the outcome of a case ing the defence the adequate opportunity to examine exhibits. or pronouncing on its merit. In the Kikambala case, defence counsel in Kenya was denied Despite the recognition of the right of the presumption of in- access to the suspect’s personal documents and ballistic reports nocence in the constitutions of most countries,22 the trial of ter- prior to the trial. This was done in fl agrant violation of the deci- rorism suspects is invariably attended by overwhelming media, sion of the High Court of Kenya, which had authoritatively inter- political and other forms of publicity that essentially pre-judge preted section 77(2)(a) and (e) of the Constitution of Kenya25 as the suspect’s guilt, thereby affecting the broader right of the ac- the basis of the right of an accused to pre-trial disclosure of all cused to a fair trial. materials in the hands of the prosecution intended to be used against him or her. In George Ngodhe Juma & 2 Others v The On the right to ‘equality of arms’ Attorney General, the High Court stated of the section: The right of a suspect to ‘equality of arms’ comes into play from the moment of arrest. Upon arrest, every person is entitled to be Therefore, in our considered Judgment, the provisions of the informed that he or she is a suspect, to be informed of his or her Constitution of Kenya under consideration can have life and rights, including the right to remain silent without such silence practical meaning only if accused persons are provided with being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence, copies of statements made to the police by persons who will or to have counsel of one’s choice, and to have free legal assistance may be called to testify as witnesses for the prosecution as well if unable to pay for it, and not to be questioned in the absence of as copies of exhibits which are to be offered in evidence for the one’s counsel. Indeed, even the rules of procedure and evidence prosecution. This is not a novel idea ... This is only a recognition of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia of the accused’s elementary right to a fair trial which depends and Rwanda and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal upon the observance by the prosecution, no less than the court, Court make clear that these rights apply even to persons sus- of the rules of natural justice. No authority is needed for such a pected of the most heinous crimes: genocide, crimes against proposition. On the broad basis of this right, an accused person humanity and war crimes.23 is plainly entitled, subject to statutory limitations on disclosure The right to ‘equality of arms’ also entails the full disclosure by and public interest immunity, to be supplied in advance with the state of the case against the accused and the right to challenge copies of statements to the police by persons to be called as wit- and present evidence. Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR provides that nesses for the prosecution, and those who prepare and conduct any criminal defendant must be allowed, “in full equality”, to be prosecutions owe a duty to the court to ensure that all relevant able to “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him evidence of help is either led by them or made available to the and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his accused reasonably early. behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him”. In an open and democratic society based on freedom and Commenting on this right to due process, the US Supreme equality, with the Rule of Law as its ultimate defender, such as Court in 1959 stated: ours, the package constituting the right to a fair trial contains in it the right to pre-trial disclosure of material statements and Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our exhibits. In an open and democratic society of our type, courts jurisprudence. One of these is that where government action cannot give approval to trials by ambush, and in criminal litiga- seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the tion the courts cannot adopt a practice under which an accused action depends on fact fi ndings, the evidence used to prove the person will be ambushed. Subject to the rights of every person Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he entrenched in the Constitution of Kenya, including the presump- has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is impor- tion of innocence until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, tant in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more impor- the fundamental right to a fair hearing by its nature requires that tant where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals there be equality between the contestants in litigation. There whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjur- can be no true equality if the legal process allows one party to ers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, withhold material information from his adversary, without a just prejudice, or jealously. We have formalized these protections in cause or peculiar circumstances to the case.26 the requirements of confrontation and cross examination. They have ancient roots. They fi nd expression in the Sixth Amendment Restriction in examination of exhibits effectively denies suspects which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to effective defence and ‘equality of arms’ during trial. the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’. This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion.24 Negative public perception of counsel As it is, the ordinary person in the street has never been able Since terrorism offences invariably involve the use of alleged to distinguish the professional role of defence counsel in a false travel and identity documents and the use of fi rearms and regular criminal trial. Often the role of counsel is interpreted as

114 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

sympathy or support for the criminal suspect. This perception An African voice in dealing with terrorism and counter-terror- is sharpened when counsel is defending terrorism suspects and ism measures ought therefore, to be one that appeals and stands extends beyond the ordinary person in the street to professional for the observance and implementation, in good faith, of the colleagues, friends and even family. nationally and internationally agreed standards concerning the subject, that is, that whereas governments have a right and duty to bring to justice anyone responsible for crimes of terrorism, CONCLUSION that acts of terrorism must be severely punished, nonetheless, there is a higher imperative that governments do so in accord- A search for an African voice in the terrorism and counter-terror- ance with national and international laws in strict conformity ism discourse must entail a re-engineering of the current US-led with the internationally agreed human rights and humanitarian ‘global war’ paradigm to a criminal justice law enforcement ef- law standards. fort. Countering the menace of terrorism through criminal justice An African voice must therefore keep in mind United Nations measures that uphold the due process, the rule of law, human Security Council Resolution 1456 (of 2003), which stated: rights and democracy is the only legally acceptable approach in international law. States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism Accepting the ‘global war’ paradigm with its attendant comply with all their obligations under international law, and justifi cation for exceptional measures and disregard of rights should adopt such measures in accordance with international of due process of suspects serves only to increase the list of law, in particular, international human rights, refugee, and hu- perceived injustices committed against those who carry out or manitarian law. sponsor acts of terrorism or those in whose ‘behalf’ terror is unleashed. The warning sounded by the Constitutional Court The African voice will also be futile unless there is insistence of South Africa in the case of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is fully on the US administration, as the world leader in combating ter- instructive to all African countries. The court warned of the rorism, to use the words of Amnesty International, “to match its seriousness of the state breaking the law in the name of fi ghting deeds to the words of its own National Strategy for Combating against crime: Terrorism (of 2003 and 2006)”, which state that:

South Africa is a young democracy still fi nding its way to The choice is really about what kind of world we want to live full compliance with the values and ideals enshrined in the in. In waging this war, therefore, we will be equally resolute Constitution. It is therefore important that the state leads by ex- in maintaining our commitment to our ultimate objective. The ample. This principle cannot be put better than in the celebrated defeat of terror is a worthy cause and necessary goal in its own words of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead et al v United States: ‘In a right. But ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader government of laws, existence of government will be imperiled purpose. We strive to build an international order where more if it fails to observe the rule of law scrupulously ... Government countries and people are integrated into a world consistent with is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the interests and values we share with our partners – values such the whole people by example ... If the government becomes a as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties.... law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man We understand that a world in which these values are embraced to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.’27 The warning as standards, not as exceptions, will be the best antidote to was given in a distant era but remains as cogent as ever. Indeed, the spread of terrorism. This is the world we must build today for us in this country, it has a particular relevance: we saw in ... The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the the past what happens when the state bends the law to its own advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective ends and now, in the new era of constitutionality, we may be democracy ... Effective democracies honor and uphold basic tempted to use questionable measures in the war against crime. human rights ... Effective democracies also limit the reach of The lesson becomes particularly important when dealing with government ...This is the battle of ideas. those who aim to destroy the system of government through law by means of organized violence. The legitimacy of the constitu- This then, is the challenge in the search of an African voice in tional order is undermined rather than reinforced when the state the counter-terrorism discourse viewed from the prism of coun- acts unlawfully.28 sel defending terrorism suspects. We rest our case!

NOTES

1 Anti Fascist Committee v McGrath, 341 US 123 (1951). liberty save as may be authorized by law … (2) A person 6 Principle 11. 2 Especially Article 9. who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as 7 See Amnesty International (Kenya) Report of 23 March 3 General Assembly Resoulution 43/173 of December reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands, 2005 entitled The impact of ‘anti-terrorism’ operations on 1998. See in particular Principles 10-19. of the reasons for his arrest or detention.” human rights. 4 For example, Section 72(1) of the Kenyan constitution pro- 5 These were Kubwa Mohammed Seif and Mohammed 8 General Comment 29, States of emergency (Article 4), UN vides that: “No person shall be deprived of his personal Kubwa. Doc: CCPR/C/2/21/Rev1/Add11, 31 August 2001.

115 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

9 Adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of whereby detainees are forced to stand, handcuffed and ticle 6(2)(d) of Additional Protocol II. Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, on with their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the fl oor for more 22 For example, section 77(2)(a) of the Constitution of Kenya 27 August – 7 September 1990. than 40 hours. The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand provides that: “Every person who is charged with a crimi- 10 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees. Throughout the entire nal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is Georgia, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add74, 9, April 1997, para- time in the cell prisoner is doused with cold water. Water proved or has pleaded guilty.” graph 28. Boarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, 23 ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence Section 1, Rule 11 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed & Another vs President of the feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is 42(2) ICTR: Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Part 4, RSA & Six Others, CCT 17/01, p 8. wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over Section 1, Rule 42. And Part 5, Section 1, Rule 63 (3) 12 Section 77(2)(d) provides that: “Every person who is him. Unavoidably, the gag refl ex kicks in and a terrifying Rome Statute of the ICC: Part 5. Article 55(2) states that charged with a criminal offence … shall be permitted to fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the any suspect has the right: “(a) To be informed, prior to defend himself before the court in person or by a legal treatment to a halt. Amnesty International , 18 September being questioned, that there are grounds to believe that he representative of his own choice.” 2006, United States of America, Justice at last or more of or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 13 Articles 7 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of the Convention the same? Detentions and trials after Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Court; (b) To remain silent, without such silence being a Against Torture, Article 5 of the African Charter on Human p 14. consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence; and Peoples’ Rights, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for 19 Article 2 of the draft UN Convention on Enforced (c) To have legal assistance of the person’s choice ...; and the Treatment of Prisoners, and the Body of Principles. Disappearance provides that: “For the purpose of this (d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the 14 Article 4 (2) provides that: “No derogation from article Convention, enforced disappearance is considered to be the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.” ... 7 ... may be made under this provision.” And article 7 arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation 24 Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474 (1959). provides that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to of liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons 25 The section reads: “77 (2)Every person who is charged cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ...” or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support with a criminal offence – (a) shall be given adequate time 15 Article 4 of CAT provides that: “(1) Each State Party shall or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to ac- and facilities for the preparation of his defence. (e) shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its crimi- knowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his legal nal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which representative the witnesses called by the prosecution torture and to an act by any person which constitutes place such a person outside the protection of the law.” before the court and to obtain the attendance and carry complicity or participation in torture. (2) Each State Party 20 These are the main challenges faced by defence counsel out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf shall make these offenses punishable by appropriate pen- defending Guatanamo Bay detainees before the military before the court on the same conditions as those applying alties which take into account their grave nature.” commissions. to witnesses called by the prosecution.” 16 Section 13A of the Police Act (Chapter 84 of the Laws of 21 Article 11 of the Universal Declaration, article 14(2) of the 26 High Court of Kenya (at Nairobi), Miscellaneous Kenya). ICCPR, article 7(1)(b) of the African Charter, article 8(2) Application No 345 of 2001, pp 12-13 (unreported). 17 Article 5. of the American Convention, article 6(2) of the European 27 277 US 438, 485 (1928). 18 Which includes slapping, grabbing and long-time standing Convention, article 75((4)(d) of Additional Protocol 1, ar- 28 Ibid, p 24.

116 Judging terrorism cases Paul Mugamba

It is my intention in this presentation to relate the current epoch be considered in the light of the apt acknowledgement by Lord of terrorism and its effect on the international community with Denning of the relationship between community apprehension special reference on its impact on the dispensation of justice, and punishment. He stated: the realm of courts. Because of my origins, I shall refer to the Ugandan experience wherever relevant and cite conventional The punishment infl icted for grave crimes should adequately re- wisdom where applicable. I must confess, however, that I have fl ect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. not found Ugandan court cases on terrorism to be cited in It is a mistake to consider the objects of the punishment as being this paper.1 deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else … The The prescription as to what might constitute fertile ground for ultimate justifi cation of any punishment is not that it is a deter- a terrorist, terrorists or terrorism might lie with social scientists, rent, but that it is emphatic denunciation by the community.3 but from my vantage point I readily agree with the Telematic Journal of Clinical Criminology,2 which in 2004 stated that Perhaps, I should add here that in Uganda where an offence shortage of fi nancial and technical resources, areas of instability attracts capital punishment, such offence will be triable by the and prolonged violence, corruption, weak judicial and fi nancial High Court. The preamble to Act 14 of 2002 gives an insight into regulatory systems, porous borders and unregulated coastlines what the law is about: enable persons and illicit goods easy ingress and egress. It is no An Act to suppress acts of terrorism, to provide for the longer a secret that vices such as money laundering, drug traf- punishment of persons who plan, instigate, support, fi nance or fi cking and even traffi cking in human cargo feed into each other execute acts of terrorism; to prescribe terrorist organisation and with terrorism. The perpetrators of one are the perpetrators of to provide for the punishment of persons who are members of the other, or they operate hand in glove. or who profess in public to be members of, or who convene or Prior to the universal recognition that terrorism is a scourge attend meetings of, or who support or fi nance or facilitate the that knows no borders and that calls for sustained and sophisti- activities of terrorist organizations; to provide for investigation cated global cooperation to combat, Uganda, like many other of acts of terrorism and obtaining information in respect of such states in the world, made do with a basic sanction. Section 26 acts including the authorizing of the interception of the corre- (6) of the Penal Code Act read: spondence of and the surveillance of persons suspected to be planning or to be involved in acts of terrorism, and to provide for In this section ‘terrorism’ means the use of violence or a threat other connected matters. of the use of violence with intent to promote or achieve political Act 14 of 2002 contains a host of instances in which a person ends in an unlawful manner and includes the use of violence will be culpable under the law. It also details measures that will or a threat of the use of violence calculated to put the public in be taken by way of detection. Related provisions contained in such fear as may cause discontent against the Government. the Act need not detain us, since most states today have similar provisions. I need hardly reiterate that the guiding principle in In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA, the enactment of Act 14 of 2002 in Uganda and contemporary but probably against the background of a series of bombings enactments elsewhere is the protection of society against the in Kampala in 1998 that were attributed to urban terrorists, an adventures of individuals or groups of individuals bent on dis- elaborate statute to combat terrorism was enacted in Uganda in ruption of the social order. Democracy and the rule of law in early 2002. It was the Anti-Terrorism Act, Act 14 of 2002. Such a particular are being targeted. I fi nd it tempting to recall the wit procedure should surprise no one if the words of Edmund Burke of that eminent English judge, Lord Bowen (1835–1894), who are recalled. It was him who said the only thing necessary for noted: the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. Act 14 of 2002 seeks to cover all matters relating to modern-day terrorism and The rain it raineth on the just provides for a death penalty upon conviction. The penal code And also on the unjust fella: provision on the other hand provided for life imprisonment as But chiefl y on the just, because the maximum penalty upon conviction for terrorism. This should The unjust steals the just’s umbrella.4

117 Challenges of preventing and combating terrorism in Africa

It is therefore incumbent upon democratic societies to pre- As should be evident, the rights apply to persons who are arrested, pare and protect themselves effectively against terrorism. Yet detained, accused, convicted as well as sentenced. Which of the in the process, human rights should be safeguarded as far as rights is or are invoked by the individual concerned depends on possible. Let it be lost on no one that terrorism challenges both the circumstances. In the rare event that any of the above standards democracy and human rights. While terrorism subsists, states are not contained in the municipal laws of a state, ready advantage might be tempted to take draconian measures to combat the should be taken of relevant international law.5 I should add for scourge. The measures might be seemingly or actually repressive. emphasis that the law to combat terrorism, wherever possible and The jewel in the crown of a democratic society will have been practicable, should not be seen to interfere with freedoms such as lost if such society is seen to derogate from the fl agship values those of speech, expression and, association, and where extradi- expected of it. So to speak, the baby will in the process have tion is in issue due process should always be followed. been thrown out with the bath water. Sadly, the result might be a Whereas the state ensures the security of the general com- totalitarian society born and nurtured in an endeavour to combat munity against harm from terrorism, individual rights also call for terrorism. Those rights we so readily espouse in our constitutions attention. Needless to say, individual rights are inclusive of the and take so much for granted, along with those underwritten rights of the terrorist him- or herself. In a democratic society, hu- by international law and conventions we so readily embrace, man rights must not be divorced from the day-to-day functioning would be casualties. Needless to say, disaffection would result. of society. In the circumstances, who other than courts of law and Disaffection would play right into the hands of the terrorist. What judges in particular are better qualifi ed as the custodians and en- a small premium for the terrorist to pay to achieve his ends? surers of the ideal? A court of law will be in a position to arrive at In enacting laws to guide them, states will therefore do well a ‘dicey’ verdict between what is necessary for the defence of a to put in place some safeguards. There will be need for govern- democratic society and what is vital to guarantee individual rights. ments to account for acts done in the name of combating ter- Underlying the justice of the decision is the impartiality of rorism wherever possible. The starting point would be the law the court. H R Hahlo and E Kahn observe: itself. The law should be clear about what terrorism comprises and who a terrorist is. Security personnel engaged in the en- It is against ‘natural justice’ that judgment should be given forcement of the law through surveillance, detection, arrest and against an accused person in a criminal trial … without allowing detention should be ascertained to avoid uncalled-for harass- him to present his side of the case to a bench prepared to listen ment of individuals. Names of detainees, if any, and places of … [A]ccused persons should never be left with the impression detention should be gazetted. These ideals should complement that they have had anything but a fair trial. They should never be the standards of a fair trial that a person should normally expect given cause for feeling that the presiding judicial offi cer adopted as an entitlement, such as: anything but a calm, impartial attitude towards issues which he is called upon to decide.6 ■ Equality before the law ■ A fair and public hearing In similar vein I recall the words of Viscount Hewart, Lord Chief ■ Hearing by an impartial, competent and independent Justice of England, who noted: tribunal ■ Presumption of innocence until proved guilty It is not merely of some importance, but it is of fundamental ■ Prompt and detailed information of the charge importance that justice should not only be done, but should ■ Adequate time and facility for preparation of defence manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. ■ Speedy trial ■ To choose and be represented by a legal counsel I hasten to add that where any court of law has fallen short of this ■ To have free legal representation when the defendant expectation, such event has been an exception rather than a rule does not have the means and the interests of justice so to the otherwise illustrious record. There is a caveat, however, in require the reality that the majority of rights are not absolute and, as is of- ■ To have the free assistance of an interpreter in court ten said, where the rights of one individual end, those of another ■ Not to testify during proceedings and not to provide self- begin. Consequently, it is incumbent on the court to examine the incriminating evidence threat in situ alongside the likely repression of individual rights ■ Not to be charged for something that was not a crime proportionately. For the record, I must be emphatic that torture when the offence was committed and inhuman degrading treatment can by no means be justifi able, ■ To benefi t from the lesser of the penalties where there is however trying the situation might be. Courts of law are relied a change in the penalty between the time of conviction upon to ensure strict compliance with basic human rights. and sentencing With this in mind I fi nd fortifi cation in the words of Justice ■ The right to habeas corpus Aharon Barak, former president of the Supreme Court of Israel, ■ The right to adduce and challenge evidence who is cited as saying: ■ The right to apply for bail ■ Not to be subjected to double-jeopardy We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with ■ The right to appeal and review [the harsh] reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all

118 Judging terrorism cases

means are acceptable to it, and not all practices are open to it. Democratic societies the world over have to preserve their Although democracy must often fi ght with one hand tied behind cherished heritage, which includes the rule of law as well as [its] back, it nevertheless has the upper hand. Preserving the human rights. All means, including the necessary law, have to rule of law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes be put in place, as they indeed are, to combat present or future an important component in its understanding of security. At the terrorism. There is a need to balance anti-terrorism law and end of the day they strengthen its spirit and strength and allow it measures with individual rights in the process, and courts are to overcome its diffi culties.7 well placed, besides the brief of hearing the specifi c cases, to stand as reliable trustees of the various rights. This is a balancing Need I add more? act and the challenge of judging terrorism cases.

NOTES

1 While there have been several rebel groups in Uganda, 1986, p 112. customs, religions and traditions on the right to a fair trial none of the members have so far been treated strictly as 4 Quoted in Walter Sichel, Sands of time, 1923. in Africa, a paper by Prof C R M Dlamini SC, Rector and terrorists. This should be chiefl y because those of them 5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Vice Chancellor, University of Zululand. that have been captured or have surrendered have ben- Convention on Civil and Political Rights, The African 7 Quoted from the address of Luzius Wildhaber, president efi ted from an amnesty law. Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. of the European Court of Human Rights, delivered to the 2 At . 6 H R Hahlo and E Kahn, The South African legal system 10th International Judicial Conference in Strasbourg from 3 Lord Denning LJ, The changing law, Sweet & Maxwell, and its background, 1968, p 48, quoted in The effects of 23 to 24 May 2002.

119

Panel 5 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

Terrorism, media and the search for an African voice Salim Lone

In search of a counter-terrorism strategy: The role of civil society Felicity Harrison

Human rights, terrorism and the interests of a secure society Jody Kollapen

Role of the international community Kurt Schillinger

Terrorism, media and the search for an African voice Salim Lone

The free press is one of humanity’s greatest achievements. John What gets most attention in the media are therefore confl icts Milton’s essay, Aeropagetica, in the 17th century, fi red the fi rst involving Muslims and the West in which accusations of ter- shot for freedom of expression, and determined struggles and rorism are made, rather than confl icts which might actually be sacrifi ces by writers and journalists since then have enlarged the much bloodier or potentially more destructive, such as the wars freedoms the media operates under. The free press now enjoys in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (an astonishing 4,5 universal support and a high level of credibility in democratic million people killed between 1994 and 2006) and northern societies, its position anchored in constitutional guarantees. Uganda (100,000 dead and 2 million people moved into ‘pro- It would not be an exaggeration to say that the media has tective’ camps), as well as North Korea’s nuclear programme. now become the single most powerful force, cultural factors In covering terrorism, therefore, the media is actually covering apart, in shaping opinion and action. Even more important, it issues that lie at the heart of world peace. is frequently central to determining national and international When you combine these two facts – the power of the agendas – or what we more generally refer to as ‘priorities’ – that media and the huge amount of coverage that terrorism receives most people and even governments feel must be addressed. The – one would imagine that there would be an ongoing analysis media has even been called the sixth permanent member of the of the media’s role infl uence on the issue of terrorism – whether UN Security Council, the most powerful of all global institutions. through the perceptions it creates of terrorism, or any direct Given this centrality, billions of dollars are spent every year by stimulus it might advertently or otherwise provide for acts of ter- governments, political parties and others in attempts to infl uence rorism or counter-terrorism. Unfortunately, that is not the case. media coverage to win popular support for their point of view. I must commend the Institute for Security Studies for includ- But a key problem for us here is the heavy dependence ing the role of the media in this seminar on terrorism. Indeed, I of African media on Western news sources -which of course would urge the Institute to consider initiating a scholarly study write from their own perspective – for coverage of most major on the multiplicity of links between terrorism and the media, international events, news events and, indeed, even events in especially as these relate to the theme of the current conference, neighbouring countries. This is a dangerous dependence, since the search for an African voice on the subject of terrorism. But if it means that Africa’s people are sometimes led by their own it does so, it must also examine the link between terrorism and media to form opinions on issues central to their self-interest wars of aggression, because these wars are responsible for pro- by the views of foreign media, without any serious vetting by ducing for tens of thousands of new terrorists, many more than African editors and journalists. And so Africans lack what in this existed before those terrible attacks on the World Trade Center. seminar’s parlance we would call an ‘African media voice’ on Terrorism, in all its complexities, is a vital issue for us to issues that might once have been seen as ‘foreign’, but which in debate in Africa, because while it was seemingly affecting pri- our globalised world are compellingly national as well. marily the Middle East, we have seen it come home in Somalia. I One of these issues is terrorism. The most widely covered am afraid that the toppling of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), story in the world media today is terrorism and its offshoots, a new grouping which had won over control of almost all of given the phenomenon’s intense repercussions on world peace. southern Somalia) will return Somalia to its earlier lawlessness, Most of the major confl icts and hot spots in the world have in which newly created Muslim extremists can fl ourish. As in terrorism, or at least allegations of terrorism, at the core: Iraq, Iraq, an illegal war of aggression by Ethiopia was portrayed as Afghanistan, Palestine, Iran, Syria, Somalia, to name a few. a drive to curb Islamic terrorism, while the real Ethiopian – and These confl icts have not only regional but also intense inter- American – aim was to impose a client regime in Somalia, national repercussions, and they seemingly pit Muslims against which lies at the heart of the strategic and newly oil-rich Horn the rest of the world. They have caused a schism in which of Africa, just miles across from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and moderates on both sides of the divide are slowly being driven overlooks the daily passage of large numbers of oil tankers and towards less tolerant views of the other. A clash that was tak- warships through the Red Sea. ing place at the extremities of two civilisations (Islam and the This is not to imply that the UIC is composed of angels. West) is now beginning to ensnare larger numbers of adherents Some of its members have a history of terror, but their collective on both sides. pool of terrorist acts is dwarfed by the terrorism of the warlords

123 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

that the US has been supporting in a blatant violation of the UN to topple the UIC, which controlled virtually all of southern arms embargo. The US has every right to be concerned about Somalia. terror. But the best antidote to terrorism in Somalia is stability, To understand the role of the media in the question of ter- which the UIC had provided. rorism in Africa, it is important to remember that accusations of Let me take a stab at the media dimension of the issue by terrorism to justify supposedly corrective action are not a new going to two recent headlines on the front pages of Kenya’s two phenomenon of our times. Even as recently as the 1980s, the US largest newspapers, the Daily Nation and the Standard. The sto- and the UK condemned South Africa’s anti-apartheid fi ghters, ries concerned the UIC. included Nelson Mandela, as terrorists. It was a terrible accusa- On 4 November 2006 the Standard carried a banner head- tion, but its impact was relatively limited; the terror label was line: ‘Terror alert’. The subhead indicated that Somali suicide used essentially to explain to domestic US and UK populations fi ghters associated with the UIC would strike within ‘days or why the governments were supporting the apartheid regime in hours’. Next to the headline was a photograph of a Muslim what they called a ‘constructive engagement’ to bring about woman in a hijab with a bomb strapped to her body. change. In Kenya also, our freedom fi ghters used methods that That story caused intense alarm among Kenyans and among are conventionally defi ned as terrorist and were condemned for the 6,000 leaders and senior offi cials from the around the world these tactics by the West. who were in Nairobi for historic climate change talks. Alarm However, the colonisers infl icted terror on an incomparably aside, that story added to the conviction that Islam is a violent greater scale, killing hundreds of thousands in Africa and uproot- religion and that Islamists pose a real danger to peace and must ing whole communities from their homelands, as well as alienat- be crushed. Muslims in turn, were furious that once again their ing their resources and decimating their cultures. The crimes of religion and the UIC were being maligned by a scare story the colonisers and their modern equivalents never were and still – which was not backed by a single fact. are not acknowledged by them to be terrorism. The story about the terror scare had originated on a US In any event, many in the West did not buy into that argu- government website, but as the paper itself reported later, the ment, and in Africa and most developing and socialist worlds, US government had not informed Kenya about this plot, even few believed it. The UN repeatedly resisted Western attempts though the huge environmental conference was taking place to classify as terrorism the violence used by freedom fi ghters to there in Nairobi. Clearly, had this been a remotely credible plot, counter the much greater force employed by the colonisers. the US government would have alerted the Kenyan government Even as they condemned terrorism, a number of Western and provided details. Be that as it may, someone had alerted the countries had no diffi culty in supporting genuine terrorists Standard to the warning on the US website. within the Unita and Renamo rebel movements in Angola and Not much later, ‘Secret Somalia letters ordered attacks in Mozambique in order to achieve their goals. US support for ter- region’ blared a frontpage headline in the Sunday Nation. The rorists in Latin America was even greater, with the US military story went on to describe in detail a campaign of assassinations training military and paramilitary units as well rebels such as the and massing of Somali fi ghters at the borders with Kenya and Contras in Central America to carry out execrable acts. State ter- Ethiopia. Later in the story, the newspaper acknowledged that it rorism was condemned also, except when practised by Western could not establish the letters’ authenticity. As it turned out, the allies, where it was supported. newspaper itself reported two days later that the supposed UIC In our post-9/11 world, the practice of using the terrorist letters were most likely a hoax, after it emerged that the letters label to condemn opponents has been revived with a venge- were distributed by Ethiopia, 15,000 of whose troops were il- ance – and to infi nitely greater effect. The most compelling legally in Somalia with US support in order to topple the UIC. example is of course Iraq, which in 2003 was invaded by the US I offer these startling examples from Kenya, which has one of on grounds that it had links with terrorist groups who could be Africa’s most sophisticated media, as yet another reaffi rmation of given the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Saddam Hussein the critical role the media is known to play in moulding people’s possessed. A more democratic and peaceful Iraqi regime would perceptions about the key issues of our times. No wonder, cer- be installed in the interest of global peace and security, the tain parties went to a lot of trouble to get these two completely world was told. Because fear of terrorism in the US in particular unfounded stories covered in the media in order to portray the is intense, Americans overwhelmingly supported that war. UIC as a terrorist force, because that would turn Kenyan opinion Saddam Hussein’s government we now know conclusively against them – as indeed it did among many. had neither terror links nor WMD; the US Congress itself has The splash treatment given to these stories was of course established that. But using those arguments, an illegal war of contrary to all professional media tenets, and also extremely aggression was portrayed as a drive to curb Islamic terrorism, irresponsible. Both stories caused alarm, anger and division while the real US aim was of course to gain a direct foothold in among Kenyan communities, and fury among Muslims, who a key strategic and oil-rich region by imposing a client regime in felt that they had been tarred with the worst possible crime one Iraq, the Middle East’s second most important country. can commit at the moment. Wars are being launched or threat- ened nowadays against countries or regimes even suspected of In looking at our own media’s role in covering and forming opin- committing terrorism or harbouring terrorists, as in Iraq, and ions on terrorism, one of the fi rst elements is the extraordinary Somalia, which the Ethiopian army invaded (with US support) dependence of the African media on Western news sources,

124 Terrorism, media and the search for an African voice

given the fact that the African media on the whole is the least This dependence on Western media has a long history but developed in the world. In addition, most educated Africans has become particularly problematic for Africa since 9/11, be- listen to or view international broadcasts originating in the West, cause Western media coverage now is less independent than it and access Western news sources on the Internet. used to be on war and peace issues facing their nations. Their Let me give an example of such dependence, again from the media coverage increasingly refl ects the strategic agenda of the Kenyan media. An early December headline read ‘US pushes West as defi ned by their own governments. The net result, there- Somalia peace plan at UN’. The text explained that the US was fore, is that public consciousness on international issues amongst planning a UN Security Council resolution that would authorise Africans is being shaped not merely by Western media perspec- countries in the Horn of Africa region to send in a force which tives but by the strategic interests of Western governments. would ‘protect’ Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government from To give one simple example: Ken Bacon, who had recently the UIC, which the US accuses of harbouring terrorists. The retired as Pentagon spokesman, reported on a US network that resolution also indicated that the regional force would ‘restore the new US army policy of ‘embedding’ journalists had severely peace and stability’. The text of the story was taken verbatim distorted the Iraq war’s TV coverage, which of course all of us in from a Reuter’s dispatch. Africa watched. “You could not have hired actors to do as good Now, a few facts on the background to this story, since it is a job as the press has done for the Pentagon.” It had been vital emblematic of the grossly inaccurate and irresponsible reporting for the Bush administration to show the war having been won that our media habitually falls prey to by reproducing western without too much bloodshed in order to retain the support of media reports without assessing their objectivity, even when the the US public, and they were on the whole obliged by the me- reports concern a close neighbour. The UIC had in 2006, brought dia, whose coverage of bloody battles was completely sanitised, southern Somalia its fi rst respite from 16 years of utter lawlessness, as implied in Ken Bacon’s comments. terror and piracy at the hands of marauding warlords who in 1993 The most obvious example of how Western media coverage had driven out UN peacekeepers by killing 18 American soldiers affects us, directly or via our own media, is prioritising terrorism in a battle memorialised in Black Hawk Down. The UN had kept to the exclusion or diminution of many others that affect Africa away from the Somali crisis since then, except for the imposition and are responsible for much of the instability of the current of a complete arms embargo on Somalia. world. Chinese Professor Li Xiguang recently pointed out that The new stability in Somalia had been brought about by the “with daily [Western] media bombarding and repetition of the UIC, not through violence, but by rallying people against the same topic, the same agenda, the same key words, the same warlords and establishing law and order through applying Sharia images, the anti-terrorism message and ideology has been ac- law, which Somalis have traditionally practised, and by provid- cepted as the mainstream journalistic discourse … making the ing social services to a population long deprived of them. These American problems global problems.” developments had been reported prominently by all major The converse of that is that what the Western media does not Western news organisations. In a world not so comprehensively cover on the international scene gets scant coverage on ours as dominated by the US, the success of the UIC would have been well. Amongst these are the wars of aggression and occupations hailed as a model for peace that other poor, war-torn regions which have killed hundreds of thousands of people and destabi- could emulate. lised countries and entire regions. As for the UN, deciding that the regional force would support Much of the current world terror is being practised by the transitional government against the Islamists was bizarre, Muslim groups and the media is right to report it as such. This since this government was created outside Somalia, essentially terrorism is increasingly being attributed in Western media, and by US allies Ethiopia and Kenya, and is composed primarily of therefore African media, to an inherent violence in the religion of former warlords, one of whom is actually its president, Abdulahi Islam. That is a legitimately debatable subject. But the problem Yusuf. The government was so weak, divided and unviable that is that the political, as opposed to the religious, dimension of it had been unable to move beyond the small western town of the struggles in which this terrorism is being employed, is being Baidoa and fi nally was forced to turn for protection to archen- altogether ignored or underplayed by the media. emy Ethiopia’s troops, which of course completely destroyed the The media’s double standards are infuriating as well. Strong government’s domestic credibility. language, such as words like ‘barbaric’ or ‘inhuman’ are used The Ethiopian troops were in Somalia in a blatant violation for actions such as beheadings by Muslim terrorists, or the des- of the earlier UN arms embargo. As was the US: it had begun ecration by Iraqi crowds of dead bodies or even the killings of funnelling arms and dollar-fi lled suitcases through ‘contractors’ innocent civilians. Such language is fully merited. to the anti-Islamic warlords when the Islamists began to emerge However, similar phraseology is not used when commenting as a leadership force. (The US, of course, determines which UN on the death of half a million Iraqi children through UN sanc- resolutions need to be observed and which ignored.) tions imposed at US behest, or when 2 000-pound bombs rain Despite all the known US machinations to get a new UN down on civilian areas or when the city of Fallujah is blockaded resolution which supported warlords and would lead to war and water and electricity – including to hospitals -are cut off. – as we now know it did – and undermine the fi rst stability in Terrorists have in fact killed infi nitely fewer people than have Somalia for 16 years, our Kenyan newspaper ran the story ‘US died as a result of illegal wars of aggression and occupations, pushes Somalia peace plan at UN’ straight out of Reuters. by a margin of a hundred or more, and yet the world is much

125 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

more afraid of terrorism because that is how the media reports ates terrorists on its own. How many of us have seen condemna- on these matters. tion of such attitudes? While it is mainly news coverage rather than opinion pieces Because we publish so much of Western reporting uncriti- that have the greatest impact on forming opinion, let me quote cally, the net result is that a demonisation of Islam is emerging, two brief astonishing examples of the media double standards even in Africa. My articles criticising Western policies towards the from opinion pieces. One is from New York Times last year, Muslim world are greeted even in Kenya by vituperation, such where renowned columnist Thomas Friedman wrote an article as that Mecca should be bombed by nuclear weapons. This has titled ‘Let Iraq have the right kind of civil war’. It stated in its enormous implications for Africa. No other continent has as many opening paragraph that “we have to have an election in Iraq so mixed Christian and Muslim societies as does Africa. Divisions we can have a proper civil war”. He goes on to say “the civil war are slowly cementing which could wreak havoc on some of we want is a democratically-elected Iraqi government against our mixed-religion societies. In addition, the reportage even in the Ba’athist and Islamist militants”.1 Western media itself, now easily accessible by satellite and the Closer home was an Economist editorial on Darfur and Sudan Internet, has enormous resonance for both Muslims and non- titled ‘Must intervention be legal?’ The answer was provided: Muslims in African countries. It is therefore vital that the media “Armed intervention in Darfur may – or may not – fl out the law. deals sensitively carefully with the issue of terrorism, so that we So what?” It went on to argue that armed intervention in Darfur tackle it in a way that will defeat rather than exacerbate it. need not be “as drastic an assault as some legal sticklers fear”. One way to begin is for our media to defi ne terrorism in ways However, it also proposed “another possible tack … to persuade that refl ect Africa’s national and continental experiences. Chad, across whose borders tens of thousands of Sudanese refu- Terrorism is not the only reason that Africa needs stronger gees are streaming, to initiate an intervention in Darfur under its media. We are often dependent on Western news media to learn right to self-defense. This would obviate the need for a Security about events happening in neighbouring countries. Our conscious- Council vote.” ness, cultures, expectations and aspirations are being moulded to How easy it is for the media of the powerful to encourage a far greater extent than in other regions by the whole spectrum of devastating wars against weak nations! Can we imagine what Western media. That media is very dynamic and there is absolutely would become of mainstream Muslim journalists who urged no reason that we should not take from it and learn from it, but we Iraqis to launch attacks inside the US for its occupation of their are altogether too dependent on it. A pan-African effort needs to country? Such media content infl ames Muslim passions and cre- begin immediately to help our media become more self-reliant.

NOTE

1 Thomas Friedman, Let Iraq have the right kind of civil war, IHT, 7 January 2005.

126 In search of a counter-terrorism strategy The role of civil society1 Felicity Harrison

Peace is not the absence of confl ict, but the presence of justice.2 who opposed military action on the grounds that it would create further hostility towards the US and generate further instability. At international level, there were those who opined that unless INTRODUCTION unjust economic and social conditions were addressed, military action and revenge would merely perpetuate the situation.3 Our concepts of terrorism and peace, like so many issues in the This highlights the need to understand what motivates some political realm, are contested. The terms themselves have under- people to take extreme actions. To effectively counter the threat gone changes in how they are perceived and defi ned, especially of terrorism in Africa, and indeed in the rest of the world, it is since the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. important to take preventative steps to ensure that those who Understanding the roles and responsibilities of the state and may be vulnerable and marginalised have their needs met and civil society, as well as dealing with the root causes of terrorism, that these vulnerabilities are not exploited. is central to countering the threat of terrorism and creating the Counter-terrorism strategies must include some of the tradi- conditions for a stable, peaceful society. tional responses (that is, having a legal and policing framework This paper looks at the role of civil society and how it relates that will be able to respond to threats as they arise), but in addi- to counter-terrorism strategies. It then examines what civil soci- tion to this, good governance, development and human security ety can do, and looks at the examples of the Firearms Control must be seen as part of the solution to the problem.4 Act and counter-terrorism legislation in South Africa.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM It is important to note that civil society is not a homogenous In many instances, current strategies repeat the same methods group – it is a disparate group of organisations, working in differ- that have been employed in the past (and failed), and yet, there ent arenas with different agendas, some of which may compete is an expectation that the results will be different. Given that and confl ict with one another. In this discussion, however, civil the threat of terrorist attacks is increasing and not decreasing, I society will be classed as a group in society as distinct from gov- would suggest that a shift in focus and strategy is necessary. ernment and state institutions. Rather than use old paradigms that focus on power, force, When assessing the role of civil society in counter-terrorism and state-centric solutions, we will be required to shift our strategies, it is essential fi rst to look at its normative role. understanding of the problem. Counter-terrorist strategies must Catholic social teaching,5 in common with classical social include the creation of a just and stable socio-economic order, contract theory, opines that the governed confer on the gover- and the cooperation and assistance of civil society is imperative nors the authority to do certain things in return for certain social to achieve this end. goods. Thus, the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of The discourse of the early 1990s centred on a shift from the force within a bounded territory and in return, the citizens can bipolar Cold War international system to a ‘new world order’ expect to be protected. The state also has a duty to maintain with the United States as the sole superpower. While there was the political order, ensuring the rule of law and upholding the undoubtedly a change in the international system, much has principles upon which the state is founded.6 Civil society has a stayed the same – the state-centric, realist approach with its right,7 but perhaps more importantly a duty, to participate in the emphasis on the use of force by state institutions to combat the political life of the community. threat of non-state actors is one of them. One only has to look If the government is representing the electorate and the at the approach taken by the Bush administration to the military citizenry, then it is important that civil society should know what interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to see this. their representatives are doing in their name, what policies are Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center, there being formulated and what legislation is being passed. were calls for the US not to adopt a military response to the at- In a society based on constitutional principles, it is important tacks. These included families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks that the most vulnerable and marginalised should be given a

127 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

voice in democratic processes.8 This is not only because of the nomic life of their communities – if this is done, the likelihood of pragmatic spin-off (that is, that the conditions under which ter- their vulnerability and marginalisation becoming the sources of rorism fl ourishes are those in which people feel disenfranchised dissatisfaction and extremism is reduced.13 The history of Africa and disempowered), but more importantly because it promotes has shown how the lack of a strong civil society and, indeed, human dignity and a culture of human rights. the deliberate weakening of civil society by those in power, can It is not the sole responsibility of government to ensure that have disastrous results. such a society is created. For a just and equitable society to be Second, participation in the body politic needs to be encour- established, there must be a partnership between the governors aged. Civil society is an important partner with government. and the governed, between the state and civil society. While it is incumbent on the state to provide some social goods, This is an important part of the social contract that is frequent- it is not up to government to provide all of them – civil society ly overlooked or ignored. States are all too often blamed for not has a responsibility to ensure that it partners with government to living up to their responsibilities as the providers of public goods. create the societies we want to live in. While there is often merit in the criticism, it can shift the focus The duties of civil society extend to the legislative sphere away from the responsibilities of people and society in creating a where it has an enormous role to play in the formulation of leg- just social order. In searching for counter-terrorism strategies, it is islation and policy. If all voices are to be heard and no one is to important to recognise the role that civil society can and ought to be left behind in terms of development, then it is up to civil soci- play in creating the conditions for a just society. ety to articulate the needs of its constituencies and communities when policy and legislation are being formulated. It is easy for people to participate in elections and then ab- RELATING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY dicate responsibility to their elected public offi cials, taking an TO COUNTER-TERRORISM interest in things political only when the next election comes around. This, however, undermines the very essence of democ- Poverty, underdevelopment and marginalisation are breeding racy. Civil society needs to monitor and be active in the creation grounds for exploitation by extremist groups.9 Until people who of the policies and legislation. face such challenges are given space to articulate their needs Politicians are, by their very nature, susceptible to public and concerns, and opportunities to improve their situation, all opinion and public pressure. It is thus important that civil society the police and security in the world are not going to bring lasting should express opinions and put pressure on politicians to create solutions to the problem of terrorism. a legal and social framework that is in the best interests of the From an ethical/moral perspective,10 it is always important to whole community. recognise human dignity and ensure that the common good of But this is not the full extent of civil society involvement. all is pursued.11 From a constitutional legal perspective, it is im- All the best legislation in the world is meaningless unless it is perative that the rule of law and the principles of human rights, implemented and monitored. This is a much neglected area which are the foundation of the political and social order, are – usually not through lack of interest, but rather lack of funding respected. From the pragmatic/utilitarian perspective it is in the and resources. best interests of those who govern to ensure that people are not If people have rights that are not realised, and their margin- pushed to a point where they feel the need to use indiscriminate alisation and vulnerability continue to be a feature of their lives, violence to be heard. they may very well lose faith in the political and justice sys- tems14 and thereby become prone to taking more radical actions in order to make their presence felt and their message heard. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN Meaningful participation is key to ensuring that people do not COUNTER-TERRORISM become disaffected. Third, civil society has an important educative role. Often Civil society organisations are usually very good at telling to half truths and rumours are taken as gospel. Civil society or- governments what they ought to be doing. Civil society, how- ganisations are key to ensuring that misperceptions are corrected ever, is not a passive element in society and there are a number – especially when they relate to emotive issues such as religion, of important ways in which civil society needs to contribute to culture, language and identity. the creation of partnerships with the state in the pursuit of the Fourth, it is important for civil society to monitor what common good. government is doing at international level. It is of very little First, there is the need to assist in building a strong civil so- use to ensure that the domestic environment is taken care of, ciety. A vibrant, active civil society is vital to monitor what is if foreign policy perpetuates instability or the conditions under going on at policy and government level. It is also important that which terrorism develops in other parts of the world. So, for civil society organisations should be able to create places where example, it is imperative for civil society to monitor something the vulnerable and the marginalised are able to articulate their like arms exports – who is receiving them and what the possible needs and to give these a voice.12 consequences of such acquisitions are likely to be. It is just as It is vital that a space is created in which people are given important to ensure that trade policies are just and do not harm the opportunity to participate in the social, political and eco- the development of other states.15

128 In search of a counter-terrorism strategy

THE FIREARMS CONTROL ACT LEGISLATION DEALING WITH TERRORISM

In South Africa, the Firearms Control Act (Act 60 of 2000) is Even before the attack on the World Trade Center, the South increasingly being seen as a good example of public participa- African government had identifi ed terrorism as an issue that tion in the policy- and legislation-making process.16 Government required special attention17 and had proposed legislation to deal consulted with the public from the start – both with groups with what it perceived as threats. who are in favour of strong gun-control and those who are not. From the government’s perspective, intelligence received Policy-makers realised that they would need to mediate their and the bombings that occurred in Cape Town in early 2000 way through competing and often confl icting views of interest indicated a threat of ‘urban terror’ being waged by groups in the groups. Because of this, they would have to ensure that all par- Western Cape.18 The Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, Joe ties were consulted and felt included in the process. Without this Matthews, argued that there was a need for more legislation in buy-in (and hence compliance) would be compromised, thereby this area, since the democratic government had repealed the possibly undermining the legislation. draconian apartheid laws, leaving a lacuna that needed to be Additionally, it would be essential to ensure that all stake- fi lled. He believed that the existing legislation would not impose holders, not just those with the wherewithal to make submis- the kinds of sentences that were commensurate with the serious- sions, would be given an opportunity to articulate their needs ness of the crime. and views. Having come from a past in which the law was used to sup- Public consultations started in 1997 with a commission of press legitimate forms of dissent, civil society groups argued that enquiry and continued through the legislation-making process. if there was to be legislation dealing with terrorism, it must have In 2000, when the bill was before parliament, the Portfolio a much narrower, more concise defi nition than that which was Committee for Safety and Security held extensive hearings. being proposed.19 Groups from around the country came before the committee. Opposition to the proposed legislation came from many These included advocacy groups as well as people from com- quarters in civil society. The proposed legislation was so broad munities and community-based organisations. Even after the that there was a danger that everything from bombing a building formal hearing process had been completed, the committee to acts of civil disobedience would be defi ned as an act of ter- chairperson welcomed the views of organisations on the com- rorism.20 Following the attacks on the World Trade Center, these mittee’s deliberations. concerns intensifi ed. From church groups to trade unions and When the bill was fi nalised, government continued consulta- the media, civil society expressed grave concern at the possible tion with interested groups during the writing and fi nalisation of consequences of enacting the legislation. the regulations. Public participation was encouraged throughout Given the country’s past, dealing with the issue of terrorism the process to amend the principal act. Groups were consulted was always going to be diffi cult. It was made more so because during the drafting stage of the amendment bill and the parlia- the government had to balance its international obligations21 mentary committee again held two days of hearings. with a growing tide of domestic dissent. The consequences of Civil society groups realised, however, that their involve- being seen to bow to international pressure – and encroach- ment could not be confi ned to the legislative process. With ing on hard-won civil liberties – were enormous. On the other this in mind, groups such as GunFree South Africa embarked hand, given the volatile international situation, not enacting on education campaigns to inform communities about the anti-terrorism legislation would have been a foreign policy new law, as well as to work with government departments and disaster. the police. The government thus embarked on an extensive media While the legislation is not a panacea for problems relat- campaign and held four days of hearings on the bill. In addition, ing to fi rearms and violent crime, it is a signifi cant step in the they spent a remarkable amount of time deliberating on the bill, right direction. The approach of government to involve various only voting on it fi ve months later, in November 2003.22 There stakeholders in the process has been crucial to the success of was a high level of responsiveness of the Parliamentary Portfolio the implementation of the legislation. Had all stakeholders not Committee for Safety and Security to the concerns of the public. felt included in the process, or believed that they were being Policy-makers realised that it was vital that civil organisations unfairly targeted and their views or needs not being taken should feel that their concerns were being recognised and there into account, they may not have felt the need to comply with was a process in which these could be voiced. If this did not the legislation. happen, there was serious concern that compliance with the This is not to say that this legislation is uncontested (and in legislation would be a problem, leading to greater civil instabil- some circles, it is still controversial). What the experience illus- ity – which was the exact opposite of what the law was trying trates, however, is the signifi cance of civil society’s participation to promote. in the legislation-making process. Not only that, but the partner- In this instance, the law-makers followed a process that ac- ships and relationships that have developed between civil soci- commodated the concerns and the fears of civil society. While ety and the state go beyond the creation of public policy and there was still some concern about the law when it was eventu- law and have expanded to many areas that go beyond dealing ally passed, by and large civil society organisations felt that their with fi rearms. voice had been heard and some of their fears allayed.

129 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

In the end, the process of interaction and the fact that politi- The role of civil society is to actively participate in the crea- cal system has the space to allow the voice of civil society to be tion of conditions in which the marginalised and the vulnerable heard proved to be of enormous importance. In dealing with ter- have a voice; to partner with government in creating a better rorism, the government recognised that it was essential to ensure society; and to help to create a just and secure environment. that the concerns of those opposing the legislation were taken To effectively counter the growth and spread of terrorism, we seriously and that there was an opportunity to engage on the must address its root causes. issues at hand and enter into a dialogue. Rather than intervening in violent confl icts after they have erupted and then engaging in post-confl ict peace-building, it is more humane and more effi cient to prevent such violence in the CONCLUSION fi rst place by addressing its roots.23 In doing this, it is the right and the responsibility of civil Terrorism is the result of the failure of society to ensure that the society to partner with the state to ensure that a just society is voice and needs of all are articulated and met. It is not the sole created. This may be a long-term counter-terrorism strategy, but responsibility of governments to ‘fi x’ the problem. it is an option that we seriously need to explore.

NOTES

1 Paper presented at the Institute for Security Studies and a duty to participate in society, seeking together the the Republic, Seminar, Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for common good of all, from Byron, op cit. (a) that is committed — an African ’Voice’, Johannesburg, 6–7 November 2006. 13 It is important that civil society organisations do not fall (i) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideo- 2 The National Council of Churches’ reaction and response into the trap of being one elitist group talking to another logical purpose, objective or cause, and to the Vietnam War, 1965-1972, http://repository.upenn. on behalf of the vulnerable and the marginalised. The (ii) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidat- edu/dissertations/AAI9712930/. principles of participation and subsidiary, if properly ap- ing the public, or a segment of the public, with 3 September 11th families for a peaceful tomorrow, www. plied, should prevent this from occurring. regard to its security, including its economic se- peacefultomorrows.org/ and Archbishop Renato 14 Although South Africa has one of the most progressive curity, or compelling a person, a government or a Martino, Unjust status quo will continue to fuel con- constitutions in the world and some very comprehensive domestic or an international organization to do or fl icts, 16 October 2001, http://disarmament.un.org/ pieces of legislation, implementation and monitoring to refrain from doing any act, whether the person, Library.nsf/6d6dbf92b8a6807685256bd40071ce25/ continues to be a problem. For example, the Domestic government or organization is inside or outside 59d152f0b6cf56ba85256bd5004f5cd2/$FILE/fcpv9.pdf; Violence Act provides many legal protections and yet the the Republic, and Zenit, Indiscriminate reprisals won’t defeat terrorism, incidence of domestic violence remains one of the highest (b) that — Vatican aide warns, 23 October 2001, www.katolsk.no/ in the world. (i) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person nyheter/2001/10/24-2006.htm. 15 This was recognised during the deliberations on the by the use of violence, 4 It has been argued that African governments lack the po- National Conventional Arms Control Act (section 15 (ii) endangers a person’s life, litical will to deal with transnational terrorism. However, if of Act 41 of 2002), when the parliamentary Portfolio (iii) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the we take the ‘root causes’ approach, dealing with develop- Committee for Defence and civil society both strongly public or any segment of the public, mental problems, focusing on good governance and pro- objected to the exclusion of human rights considerations (iv) causes substantial property damage, whether to viding education are the key tools in a counter-terrorism from the criteria to be considered when exporting arms. public or private property, if causing such damage strategy. It is a response to transnational terrorism and a The human rights criteria were reinstated and are now part is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred counter-terrorism strategy; it just is not the traditional re- of the act. Included in the criteria is the need to consider to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (iii), or sponse to the problem. developmental impact of the sale of arms as well as the (v) causes serious interference with or serious dis- 5 The term ‘Catholic Social Teaching’ refers to the body of human rights and security implications to the state that ruption of an essential service, facility or system, offi cial teachings of the Catholic Church concerned with arms are to be sold to, as well as to the region. whether public or private, including, but not human life in society in all of its dimensions — cultural, 16 Adele Kirsten, Leading by example: The role of civil limited to: an information system; or a telecom- social, economic, political and environment, www.seton- society and MPs in strengthening national gun laws in munications system; or a fi nancial system; or a hill.edu/o/index.cfm?PID=37&T1=4&T2=0&T3=0. South Africa, Presentation at roundtable discussion at the system used for the delivery of essential govern- 6 Gaudium et Spes, 74, www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Offi ce,19 October 2006. ment services; or a system used for, or by, an es- councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_ 17 The South African Law Commission Project 105 sential public utility; or a system used for, or by, a 19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. (Discussion Document 92) on Anti-Terrorism is available transport system, other than as a result of lawful 7 Catechism of the Catholic Church 1914 quoting Gauduim on www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm. It was released for advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work et Spes, 31(3), www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P6L. comment in September 2000. that does not involve an activity that is intended to HTM#$22U. 18 Notes on the Human Rights Commission Seminar, Human result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of 8 Catechism of the Catholic Church 2445, www.vatican. Rights, Crime and Urban Terror, 6 November 2000, subparagraphs (i) to (iii), va/archive/ENG0015/__P8F.HTM. Athlone. but, for greater certainty, does not include conventional 9 Archbishop Renato Martino, op cit. 19 Irvin Kinnis’ presentation on behalf of the Centre for military action in accordance with customary interna- 10 This ethical/moral perspective is based on the principles Confl ict Resolution at the Human Rights Commission tional law or conventional international law. in Catholic Social Teaching, but are not confi ned to this Seminar, op cit. Such concerns were shared by interna- 21 See pp 2 and 3 of the act for a full list of international and tradition and the same ideas can be found in human rights tional human rights organisations, as seen in Amnesty regional treaties, www.polity.co.za/pdf/protectioncon- theories. International’s submission on the Anti-Terrorism Bill (B12- demact33.pdf. 11 William J Byron, SJ, Ten building blocks of Catholic 2003), 30 April 2003. 22 Parliamentary Monitoring Group minutes, www.pmg.org. Social Teaching, quoted on www.setonhill.edu/o/index. 20 The defi nition as contained in the 2000 version of the za/minutes.php?q=2&comid=22. cfm?PID=37&T1=4&T2=0&T3=0. Anti-Terrorism Bill (www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm) 23 Archbishop Renato Martino, op cit. 12 The Principle of Participation is that people have a right was as follows: a “terrorist act” means an act, in or outside

130 Human rights, terrorism and the interests of a secure society Jody Kollapen

INTRODUCTION when there is a community of nations which have a different understanding of sovereignty and where national states see sov- The post-September 11 era has certainly seen the world being en- ereignty not in absolute terms but with a realistic understanding gaged in an intense debate about the place and emphasis of human of their interconnectedness and dependency on one another. rights in a world described as being under attack or under siege, The International Criminal court, the Constitutive Act of the where the security of individuals, nations and, indeed, the interna- African Union3 (the notion of legitimising interference in the affairs tional order is under threat. In many quarters, the fault lines in the of a member state by the AU under limited and defi ned circum- discussion have been stark – in that you either support measures stances), the Protocol for the Establishment of the African Court on to enhance human security (relegating human rights concerns) or Human and People’s Rights (where national jurisdiction may well you display a fi delity to human rights norms and standards (at the yield to the jurisdiction of a regional court), all bear testimony to expense of human security). Of course, the underlying assumption this understanding and approach and illustrates a signifi cant agree- - and a wholly incorrect one, I may add - in such an analysis is that ment on common human rights norms, principles and standards. it proceeds from the basis that the pursuit of national security and While we may debate the proposition that human rights the advancement of human rights are separate discourses that exist norms are grounded in Western experience, even within the uni- in opposition to one another. I will attempt to show the inextrica- versality of the values they articulate, there is room for it to be ble link between the two and thereby argue that we do not have applied with regard to differences that exist culturally and oth- the luxury of choice in the matter. Advancing human rights does erwise. While the United Nations, which adopted the Universal advance human security and in addition thereto, the human rights Declaration in 1948, could hardly be said to be representative framework does provide an adequate and substantial response of the people of the world (which statement is still valid today), when human security is under threat. I imagine that few would argue that the values and principles (including their interpretation) that underpin the human rights movement are not shared in some form or the other by the vari- HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS ous peoples, cultures, civilisations, religions and political systems of the world – thereby making them truly universal. Taking its cue from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 However enlightened the standards that are set and which (the International Bill of Rights), the past 58 years or so has seen are evidenced in the international instruments, this does not al- a phenomenal development in the doctrine of human rights. ways translate into reality on the ground, and the position of the Premised on both the recognition of the dignity and the citizen of the world remains precarious. Notwithstanding the equal worth of all members of the human family, as well as the eloquent commitments to a better life, a just and caring world committed pursuit for the attainment of social progress and bet- and an environment that enables the full development of the ter standards of life (which includes the freedom from fear and individual and society, strife, confl ict, inequality, poverty and the freedom from want), the Universal Declaration articulates human suffering remain the defi ning features of our time. The both values and rights that seek to advance the development of security and the freedom that we regard as our birthright remain the individual, sets parameters for the exercise of state power elusive for many millions of people that cover the globe. and sets a framework for the development of relations between The Report of the Commission on Human Security reminds us states. There is thus a declaration, treaty, convention, or a set that more than 800,000 people a year lose their lives to violence of principles that covers virtually every facet of human activity and that about 2.8 billion people suffer from poverty, ill health, il- – women’s rights, children’s rights, migrant’s rights, refugee’s literacy and other maladies.4 We also witness the exacerbation in rights, the criminal justice system, etc - all of which have been the disparities between the rich and the poor and the attainment the subject of comprehensive attention by the international hu- of social justice seems increasingly beyond our reach. man rights system. Put briefl y, there is no shortage of charters, It is these factors that result in the vulnerability of individuals declarations or treaties canvassing human rights.2 and nations and the challenge facing us is to advance human We have also seen how the commitment to human rights security as a means to achieving secure societies. standards and the respect for international law can only happen In the said Report of the Commission they argue, and I quote:

131 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

Human Security means protecting vital freedoms. It means pro- we respond to such threats. I will not attempt to focus specifi - tecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, cally on the wide range of threats to human security I have pre- building on their strength’s and aspirations. It also means cre- viously alluded to, but will seek to confi ne my remarks to the ating systems that give people the building blocks for survival, threats that undermine the security of the state and its people dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types that are political or ideological in nature. In saying this, however, of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and free- I should make it clear that I am not in any manner suggesting dom to take action on one’s own behalf. To do this, it offers two that one type of threat is more formidable than the other. general strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection In this regard and simply by way of illustrating the point, shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to President Mbeki, in a recent address to the General Assembly, develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically reminded the world that the greatest threat to human security address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop came, not from terrorism, but rather from poverty and inequal- their potential and become full participants in decision making. ity,5 In the same vein, a recent United Nations Development Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing and both Project Report on the state of democracy in Latin America found are required in most situations. that democracy was under threat, not from terrorism, but from a failure to deliver on the promises of social reform, the deliv- This wider, expansive and holistic notion of human security is ery of services and the eradication of poverty and inequality.6 important because it seeks to understand and accept the inter- Indeed, democracy is in trouble across the world wherever the connectedness between the security of the state and the security dividends that it has promised do not materialise. Under such of people and does not see them existing in silos. In addition, it is circumstances, a return to authoritarian rule or the allure of new clear that the pursuit of human security is related to the advance movements become attractive to citizens – this represents a suf- of human rights – the human rights’ regime provides a normative fi ciently signifi cant threat to human security and to democracy framework to advance the protection of vital freedoms, to secure and yet, we are still to see the kind of concerted and coordinated the individual from the threat of hunger and the threat of fear. international action necessary to deal with these root causes. Whether it has been done so successfully is another matter One of the dilemmas of our time is how the state that faces altogether and without going into the issue in any detail, detrac- a threat to its security should respond. One must at the outset tors argue that for all its impressive and noble language, the accept that the kind of threats the modern state faces are far international human rights’ system failed to prevent the genocide from conventional. They may at the one level emanate from or- in Rwanda, failed to prevent the suffering in Darfur and failed to ganised and identifi able structures and sources but increasingly bridge the gap in a deeply stratifi ed world. I imagine a credible their form, their expression and their manifestation have become response to that criticism would be that failing is not the be found increasingly unpredictable, their targets considerably wider, their in the norms and standards but rather in the absence of the neces- impact visibly more brutal, and their resources and co-ordina- sary political will that can convert paper rights and commitments tion at the national and international level highly sophisticated. to real and meaningful action as well as the deeply faulty and When such threat exists, then understandably public pres- imbalanced architecture that characterises international relations. sure is brought to bear on the authorities to take all the necessary An important question we must ask is whether human rights measures to protect the security of the state and its citizens. It is interventions are guided and motivated by a genuine concern under these circumstances that the contestation around human for human rights principles or indeed whether power, the need rights’ norms and standards become fi erce. Indeed, the events of to exercise global infl uence and the desire to covert and control the past few years have served to illustrate both the sombre re- strategic resources lie at the heart of many debates around hu- sponsibility that states face in protecting the interests of their citi- man rights. Do we live in a world where ‘might is right’, or is zens but also, on the other hand, the kind of dangers that attach to there still place to fi ght for principled positions? such actions when they are not measured, analyzed and weighted Reverting, however, to the specifi c issues arising out of the which at the broader level illustrates the negative impact it may protection strategy I have alluded to, human security is con- have on the advancement of human rights and human security. stantly under threat and a range of protection interventions have At the outset, let me say that in general, subject to one or two become necessary. Sometimes, those threats emanate from specifi c exceptions, human rights are not absolute. They are capa- natural forces, sometimes those threats emanate from the fault ble of being limited under defi ned circumstances and it is impor- lines in the society such as prejudice, hatred and intolerance, tant for human rights’ proponents to accept the legitimacy of the at other times they emanate from the failure of democracies to doctrine of the limitation of rights as an integral part of the system deliver the dividends they promised such as the eradication of of human rights. The notion that you may have to limit a right in poverty, the bridging of inequalities’, sometimes they emanate order to protect another right or a competing and legitimate inter- from criminal elements while at other times they emanate from est is clearly accepted in international law and South African law coercive movements that seek to undermine the security of the has also in both the formulation of the Constitution as well as in state and its people in order to impose a new political, social or the dictum of our courts accepted such a proposition. ideological order. The diffi cult issue is the approach to be taken when All of these threats to human security represent a threat to rights are to be limited. In a publication ‘Human Rights and democracy and the litmus test of our democracies will be how Human Security’ Bertrand Ramcharan (former Deputy High

132 Human rights, terrorism and the interests of a secure society

Commissioner of Human Rights),7 put the matter succinctly as Western culture and civilization, which is under threat, is the follows: pre-eminent culture. Under these circumstances the ideals that underpin our com- Democracies face a unique challenge in maintaining the se- mon humanity, that shape our common approach to seeking curity of the State. Put very simply, that challenge is to secure to craft a better world, become severely compromised and we democracy against both its internal and external enemies, with- rapidly risk embracing the notion that might is right. Indeed, the out destroying democracy in the process. A government must very essence of the international order, namely, a community of meet both the requirements of security and the requirements of nations working together, is threatened. democracy. We must never forget that the fundamental purpose In saying this, I am acutely mindful that the kinds of threats of the former is to secure the latter. modern democracies face require a kind of tough and at times uncompromising approach. What I will argue is that even such While the balance that is referred to above ensures a fi delity to an approach must and can happen within a framework that pro- the security of the citizen and the dictates of democracy, the re- tects the fundamental values and rights on which we build our ality has been somewhat different. In many instances, states un- democracies. This does not suggest a slavish, an impractical loy- der threat have simply used the optimal measures available in an alty to human rights norms and standards - what it does require attempt to achieve security. Whether they have had the desired however, is a conscious and deliberate application of the mind effect is another matter and there is a strong argument that the to strike a necessary balance in advancing national security on use of such measures indiscriminately and simply has the effect the one hand while remaining loyal to the human rights’ norms of galvanising undemocratic movements in itself (by its arbitrary and standards that, despite their considerable shortcomings in nature and the prejudice, it causes innocent individuals, create practice, still remain a signifi cant beacon in a world increasingly the recruits for tomorrow’s terrorist, thus undermining the very gone mad. purpose of the measures). The indefi nite detention of hundreds, without reasons or ac- cess to the courts or due process in the US, Guantanamo Bay as STRIKING THE BALANCE well as in Iraq, serves as an example of how a rigid and dispro- portionate response to a security threat may very well have quite Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro- the opposite effect. The notion of Americans liberating Iraq is vides that: diffi cult to reconcile with images of civilian deaths in bombing forays and prisoners facing sexual abuse. ■ Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the Therein lies the real threat to the course of human rights and free and full development of his personality is possible. the interest of democracy – the lack of balance, the absence of ■ In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall a considered weighing up of the issues and a tendency to de- be subject only to such limitations as are determined by monise those who oppose our attitude. This results in a no holds law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition bared approach in which we ultimately become so blinded by and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of our belief in the justness of our cause that any means used to ad- meting the just requirements of morality, public order and vance it, justifi es the end and the kind of excesses we see then the general welfare in a democratic society. are an inevitable consequence of such an approach. Moreover, those who question what we do is either branded The provisions of Section 36 of the Bill of Rights in the South unpatriotic or soft on an international level and becomes even African Constitution9 articulate the approach to be adopted more compromised. Principle easily yields to expediency – many when rights are to be the subject of limitation. states who displayed negative human rights records and a scant What one can glean from Section 36 is that, fi rstly and regard for democracy have overnight made the astounding tran- signifi cantly, the onus is on the party that seeks to limit a right sition from dictator to democrat simply because they signed up to make out a case for limitation. In addition, it must be dem- in the war on terror. onstrated that the limitation is reasonable and justifi able in an Mary Robinson, the former High Commissioner for Human open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality Rights, speaking at an International Bar Association meeting in and freedom. A series of considerations are then listed, which Chicago, recently refl ected on the misuse of language saying include, an assessment of the importance of the right, the pur- that this has led to “Orwellian euphemism” so that “coercive pose of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and interrogation is used instead of torture, cruel and inhuman the purpose (the necessary causal connection as well as matters treatment; kidnapping becomes extraordinary rendition”.8 We of proportionality) and importantly, an examination of whether have also heard the language of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. the need to preserve Western values and morals in the context To properly understand why the need to interrogate any of the war on terror. Language cannot disguise human rights proposed limitation so vigorously, is to understand that in a de- abuses and we should be careful that we do not exacerbate mocracy, its citizens, whom it is to hold and exercise on their the fault lines that already exist by somehow suggesting that behalf and for their benefi t, hand power to government. By its very nature, these powers are formidable and thus a necessary

133 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

condition of the grant is that they be exercised for the purpose this manner but also provided examples and instances that dem- given and for the common good. The constitution, one may say, onstrate that it is possible. spells out the terms of that social contract and thus, when the For the human rights activists amongst us let us, be both state seeks to act outside of those terms or seeks to vary those principled and practical and the words of David Kennedy writ- terms or when it thinks its actions will entail a limitation of those ing in the Harvard Human Rights Journal: terms, it is proper and appropriate for it to make out a proper case to justify such conduct. That in essence is what the limita- Of course the best human rights’ practioners are already stra- tion clause is about – it is part of the system of checks, balances, tegic and practical in thinking about their work. But it is often accountability and transparency. tempting to set pragmatic concerns aside, to treat human rights Some South African experiences in dealing with such matters. as an object of devotion rather than calculation. With regard to legislation, South Africa has passed acts such as the Interception and Monitoring Act,10 which allows for the For those who represent government and the agencies responsible monitoring of communications on condition that prior approval for our safety and security the guidance of our Chief Justice in the for such monitoring has been obtained from a judge and the matter of The State vs Khalifan Mohamed and other, quoting Mr Promotion of Access to Information Act,11 in terms of which one Justice Brandeis who in 1928 said is of relevance, and I quote: is entitled to access information from both public and private bodies but with certain exceptions thereby, inculcating a system [I]in a government of laws, existence of government will be im- of checks and balances. perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously … Government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example … If the government becomes CONCLUSION a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. We live in diffi cult and indeed trying times. The threats we face and the horror of those threats may compel us to react with an- The Chief Justice went on to remind us that while that warning ger, perhaps driven by our fear. That is understandable and quite was given in a distant era, it remains cogent as ever. human. Yet, as the custodians of our democracies we surely need to remind ourselves that the sacrifi ces and the struggles we Indeed for us in this country, it has a particular relevance; we fought for was in order that we could live by the standards and saw in the past what happens when the State bends the law to norms that displayed our common humanity and our desire to its own ends and now, even in the era of constitutionality, we advance those very values that defi ne who we are. Of course, may be tempted to use questionable measures in the war against we must resist the attack on our democratic way of life from crime. The lesson becomes particularly important when deal- wherever it comes but in resisting, we must use the means and ing with those who aim to destroy the system of government the methods that distinguish us fundamentally from those who through law by means of organized violence. The legitimacy seek to undermine us, because we are different. I hope that I of the constitutional order is undermined rather than reinforced have demonstrated just not the reasons why we should act in when the State acts unlawfully.

NOTES

1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 force 2 September 1990). 7 Bertrand G Ramcharan, Human rights and human security, December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)) 3 Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/ Martinus Nijhoff, 2002. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ad- LEG/23.15, entered into force 26 May 2001. 8 Address by Mary Robinson,former High Commissioner opted 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 4 Commission on Human Security, Human security now, for Human Rights, on the ‘Rule of law: Striking a balance 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); International Covenant New York, 2003. in an era of terrorism, at the International Rule of Law on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 5 Address of the president of South Africa and the current Symposium: A Plan for Action, organised by the American December 1966 UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), entry into chairperson of the G77 and China, Thabo Mbeki, at the Bar Association, Chicago, 16 September 2006. force 3 January 1976); Convention on the Elimination of 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 9 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,108 All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 September 2006, New York. of 1996 (RSA). December 1979 UNGA Res 34/180, entry into force 3 6 United Nations Development Programme, Democracy in 10 Act 77 of 1995. September 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child Latin America: Towards a citizens’ democracy, New York, 11 Act 2 of 2000. (adopted 20 November 1989 UNGA Res 44/25, entry into 2004.

134 Rules of engagement The international community and counter-terrorism in Africa Kurt Shillinger

Easily was a man made an infi del, but hardly might he be con- Islam appears to be deepening among Muslim communities verted to another faith across the continent. – T E Lawrence This paper makes no attempt to analyse the effi cacy of spe- cifi c counter-terrorism initiatives. It poses, rather, a conceptual During the fi rst fi ve weeks of 2007, fi ve distinct policy meas- question: First, Is the international community succeeding tacti- ures underscored Africa’s rising profi le in US efforts to counter cally but failing strategically to buttress Africa against transna- trans-national terrorism. Washington provided technical advice tional terrorism? Put differently: How might social and cultural to Ethiopian troops in what was essentially a proxy war to oust norms inform more effective engagement? an Islamist guerrilla faction expanding its control of southern Somalia. When that was successfully accomplished, the US helped install a transitional federal government in Mogadishu, THREE LESSONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY the Somali capital, and simultaneously bombed discrete loca- tions in the country where it suspected al-Qaeda operatives More than three decades ago, Clifford Geertz noted the erosion were hiding. Meanwhile, back in New York, Washington for- of disciplinary boundaries brought on by the convergence of di- mally proposed the addition of two South African Muslims to verse sciences in the study of ‘the forming nations and tottering the United Nations list of individuals and groups funding or oth- states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America’.1 Scholars working in erwise aiding al-Qaeda, the terrorist network founded by Osama distinct fi elds, he observed, were coming to the hard conclusion bin Laden. Finally, in the clearest recognition of Africa’s growing that ‘theirs is not only a special science, but a special science strategic signifi cance, the Bush administration announced in which cannot even function without a great deal of help from early February the creation of a US African Command to coor- other special sciences previously despised’.2 This was more true dinate and unify all US military responses in Africa, including in regard to the political and international relations sciences than countering terrorism. any other. Their terrain increasing imposed upon, and was in Identifying what the international community can do in turn imposed upon, by archaeologists, historians, anthropolo- response to real or potential terror-related activity in Africa is gists, sociologists, and economists. What Geertz was marking not particularly diffi cult. The counter-terrorism toolbox is well was the culmination of a critical turn in the humanities away stocked. The standard inventory includes joint surveillance, from pre-war structural, isolationist studies to the more integrat- government cooperation and/or coercion, manhunts, military ed inter-disciplinary approach required to adequately interrogate training exercises, extradition, extraordinary rendition, anti- newly independent former colonies. money laundering initiatives, fi nancial and technical assistance But the old walls of the academy fall hard, and in the aftermath to boost security at ports, borders and banks, funding to build of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United intelligence capacity through the African Union, support for aca- States, seemed to be resurrected by political practitioners oper- demic research, and so on. ating in what they themselves affectionately denigrate as policy Recognising what the international community should ‘stove pipes.’ The US-led military adventures into the culturally do to counter terrorism in Africa, however, is a trickier ques- complex societies of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, like Somalia tion. All of the measures listed above have been employed before them, where strangely – inexplicably – dominated by po- in Africa during the last fi ve years in the US-led ‘global war litical scientists, international relations theorists, and development on terror’. Some have yielded immediate effects, while others experts who scorned ‘the touchy feely anthropological stuff’3 have contributed to growing the capacity of states and regional while at the same time admitting admiration for those who could structures to respond to specifi c problems. Despite such piece- ably navigate seemingly unfathomable tribal structures. Those meal successes, however, two trends indicate that the overall faltering interventions, however, have lately restored the necessity response to trans-national terrorism in Africa is failing. First, the for embracing the social sciences in shaping foreign relations,4 so increasing international attention on Africa suggests that terror- that we may now draw with a straight face three critical politi- related activity is increasing and becoming more diversifi ed; cal lessons in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency from the and second, the perception that the US is waging a war against ‘softer’ academic disciplines – in this case, anthropology.

135 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

Lesson One: The nature of cultural knowledge for recrimination and criminality yielded to a unifi ed pursuit of In the early 1970s, Paul Berliner, then a doctoral student at ethical justice and morality. Wesleyan Connecticut, sought to uncover the apparent rela- The discomfi ting proximity of the ‘I-you’ encounter’, Zulaika tionship between the social structure of the Shona and struc- notes, shifts the basis of the solution from ‘further tabooing the ture of the particular form of mbira – or ‘thumb piano’ – they faces of the violent subjects’ to ‘personally confronting them as favoured. He felt certain that this connection, if it existed, held revelatory mirrors that can refl ect the dilemmas of ethics and deep cultural insights into the people and their society. On politics’. He observes: several occasions, he sought the wisdom of one particular vil- lage elder who was widely venerated as the authority on the [S]eeing literally and fi guratively the face of the faceless activist instrument. At fi rst, the old man denied any metaphoric rela- may become, rather than a contaminating taboo proscribed in tionship between the mbira keys and Shona society. Berliner the name of science, a condition necessary for understanding earnestly persisted. Years passed. At each meeting, a crowd of that inferno of action. In those meetings, the face rescued us villagers would gather to watch, the old man would admit a from allegory and representation.9 partial explanation of the keys, and the young foreigner would draw diagrams that made no apparent sense. To make matters Lesson Three: Information fl ow worse, each new explanation differed from the previous one. and human social networks By the time Berliner made his fi nal visit to the village, he was On 11 October 2005, the Offi ce of the Director of National desperate. His dissertation was due and this was his last oppor- Intelligence in Washington released a translation of a letter be- tunity to sort out the riddle. He implored the old man, listened lieved to be written by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian deputy intently, drew more diagrams, scratched his head, and implored of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, again. After three rounds of this, Berliner heaved a frustrated the then-alleged leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, congratulating the sigh and reached for the off switch on his tape recorder. Then latter on the successful Sunni insurgency against US forces but the old man cracked a wry smile. ‘Well,’ he said, turning to issuing a cautionary note: the watching villagers, ‘it seems to me that this young man is Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace serious after all. I suppose I can tell him the truth now.’ After who love and support you will never fi nd palatable – also – are three trips to Zimbabwe over four years and ‘many rigorous the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn’t be de- tests’ from the mbira master, Berliner got his prize – ‘a totally ceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their consistent and precise set of classifi cations’.5 description of you as the shaykh of the slaughters, etc. They do More importantly, Berliner gained an insight, as he put it, not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter into ‘the nature of knowledge as privileged information’.6 of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favour and blessing of God … I say to you: that we are in a battle, and Lesson Two: The corrective lens of direct encounter that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefi eld In 1979, at the height of Franco’s repression, Joseba Zulaika of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the was invited to return to his home village of Itziar in northern hearts and minds of our Umma.10 Spain to join Basque separatist movement ETA. As an anthro- In an interview with The New Yorker, David Kilcullen pologist, Zulaika had little interest in becoming a practitioner of summed up that passage succinctly: Zawahiri was ‘basically say- violence, but the invitation provided an irresistible ethnographic ing to Zarqawi, “Justify your attacks on the basis of how they challenge: interrogating the phenomenon of terrorism from the support our information strategy.”’11 Kilcullen, an Australian re- inside. Itziar was a small village then, with just 1,000 people, serve lieutenant colonel who was until recently on secondment and had been struck by six political murders in the fi ve years be- to the US State Department as chief strategist in the offi ce of the tween 1975 and 1980. At the end of his fi eldwork, Zulaika held coordinator for counter-terrorism, holds a doctorate in anthro- a town meeting at the villagers request to discuss his fi ndings. pology with a focus on counter-insurgency, which he defi nes The audience included former ETA members who now opposed as ‘a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability violence and sympathisers who, having never engaged in the to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.’12 struggle directly, nonetheless supported its ways, means and ob- Kilcullen’s thesis is this: Insurgents and counter-insurgents are in jectives. The debate that ensued, Zulaika notes, ‘was not about direct competition for the mass base, and this struggle is won or a reifi ed and tabooed abstraction but a face-to-face encounter lost through the operation of social networks. Information is the with the pronouns “I” and “you” on the line, exploring questions essential weapon. As he told The New Yorker, ‘People don’t get and responsibilities over events that had taken place in our own pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by village’.7 Through this exercise, the anthropologist noted, ‘ethno- their social networks’ – friends, family, and colleagues. Islamism, graphic perspectivism was at least able to carve out a communal in this light, is not about regulating or imposing Islamic behav- space in which people with irreconcilable conceptions could iour through the state, but rather infl uencing and driving social talk to each other without turning one other into monsters’.8 The behaviour with Islam. It’s not about adherence to the faith; it’s effects were noteworthy. The intimate encounter of family and about the cohering of community around specifi c objectives. neighbours undermined the collective representations each side Here’s where the US-led global war on terror goes wrong. made of the other across the divide of violence, while the search Rather than superimposing bin Laden’s espoused objectives on

136 Rules of engagement

each local faction articulating Islam-based politics, there is a that ‘[t]he art of strategy … consists not simply of concentrat- need for what Kilcullen calls a ‘Disaggregation strategy’: ‘You ing our own forces but of causing the enemy to disperse his’.18 don’t play to the enemy’s global information strategy of making Thomas Ricks, meanwhile, observes that ‘[s]trategy, correctly it all one fi ght. You say, “Actually, there are sixty different groups formulated, shapes tactics. But tactics uninformed by strategy, or in sixty different countries who all have different objectives. misinformed by an incorrect strategy, are like a car without a Let’s not talk about bin Laden’s objectives – let’s talk about your steering wheel: It may get somewhere, but probably not where objectives. How do we solve that problem?”’13 its driver wants it to go.’19 Taken together, these defi nitions prompt a series of relevant questions: What kind of war is ‘the global war on terror?’ Put dif- TACTICS VS STRATEGY ferently, what kind of war are the US and its allies fi ghting? How does the West defi ne itself in this fi ght, the foe and the nature of Because the post-9/11 struggle against transnational terrorism the war it is waging? Does the response match the threat? Which has been cast as war, it is instructive to classify counter-terrorism one motivates policy: perception of risk or actuality of threat? measures as tactics. Tactics, at their best, refl ect strategy, and How should the range of objectives be prioritised? Finally, how here is where a critical problem arises: The tactics employed by does it end? The widening range of tactics characterising the the US to counter terrorism in Africa suggest not one coherent West’s counter-terrorism engagement – and, indeed, the evolv- strategy, but several. The Bush administration’s September 2006 ing nature of the enemy – suggests that these questions have not National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism notes that ‘protect- been fully resolved. ing and defending the homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our fi rst and most solemn obligation’. It also states that the objective is ‘to meet the evolving threat’ THE ‘OTHERING’ OF THE GWOT – a generic objective that the document breaks down into sev- eral sub-categories: advance democracy, prevent attacks, deny The thorniest of these questions is the one relating to identifi ca- weapons of mass destruction to ‘rogue states and their terrorist tion: How does the West defi ne itself and its foe? The answer allies’, prevent terrorists from using states as bases, and build is central to the problem of strategy. It is a loaded question. institutions ‘to carry the fi ght forward’.14 The global war on terrorism, like colonialism and indeed every It is undoubtedly true that 9/11 forced a response in real episode of conquest – whether foreign or domestic – in direct time, requiring the simultaneous development of strategy and confrontation with the problem of representation. As James execution of tactics. Over time, however, it is not clear that the Clifford and George Marcus note: ‘It has become clear that relationship between the two, and more importantly the clari- every version of an “other,” wherever found, is also the construc- fi cation of the former as the governing policy, has been sorted tion of a “self”… Cultural poesis – and politics – is the constant out. Nor has it been demonstrated that the means implied by reconstitution of selves and others through specifi c exclusions, the policy approaches enumerated above have, in fact, met ‘the conventions, and discursive practices.’20 evolving threat’. Arguably, to the contrary, they are driving that In every one of his annual State of the Union addresses since evolution. If ‘protecting and defending the homeland’ involves 9/11, President George W Bush has employed the term ‘the advancing democracy abroad, the latter has in turn undermined terrorists’. It has become a stock representation, as in ‘we must the objective of denying weapons of mass destruction to ‘rogue prevent the terrorists’ (2002), ‘We have the terrorists on the run’ states and their terrorist allies’. The invasion of Iraq, for example, (2003) or ‘The terrorists continue to plot against America and the has impelled Iran to develop its nuclear capability and also arm civilised world’ (2004).21 In a speech before the Reserve Offi cers its Lebanese client Hezbollah with even greater determination. Association in Washington on 29 September2006, the president Preventing the use of states as terrorism bases has required meas- used the term 19 times. ures that have undermined the aim of advancing democracy, as Who are ‘the terrorists’, and how does that refl exively defi ne is the case in Somalia. Almost all of the above objectives, mean- the West? In this context, perpetrator and victim seems a too- while, have deepened the perception among Muslims around simple explanation. Representation, Marcus argues elsewhere, the world that the US – and the West by extension – is waging not only defi nes the discourse, but the one representing in rela- a war against Islam – a trend that is opening more spaces, such tion to his subject.22 The term ‘the terrorists’ is all-encompassing as Africa, to various terror-related uses ranging from recruitment and enabling. It is defacing, delegitimising, dehumanising. In the to logistical support. A ‘cardinal problem of strategy’, writes current context, it categorises all Islamists into one ideologically Martin van Creveld, ‘whether in war or in football or in chess, united threat, where distinctions of grievances or social condi- is the question as to which objectives one’s strength should be tions become devalued and unimportant. Furthermore, ‘the directed against, and in what order.’15 terrorists’ implies an opposite: the barbarian vs the civilised, the The great military thinker Carl von Clauswitz noted that de- savage vs the refi ned, the immoral, unethical and fanatical vs the fi ning the kind of war to be waged ‘is the fi rst of all strategic moral, ethical and principled. questions and the most comprehensive’.16 Van Creveld similarly Imposed against the three lessons of anthropology and the points out that ‘strategy signifi ed everything that took place in discussion on strategy entertained above, the two-way identi- war before and after the physical clash’.17 He further notes fi cation implied in the term ‘the terrorists’ has profound policy

137 In search of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

implications. It eliminates the possibility of the ‘I-you’ discourse global news networks, email and the internet aid the spread of explored by Zulaika and therefore obviates a refl exive consid- ideas, opportunities and, indeed, grievances. eration of ethics and responsibility. It discards the importance of In other words, the benefi ts of globalisation are also liabilities, cultivating trust implied by both Berliner and Kilcullen. It places and if there is any one problem to be managed through the in- counter-terrorism strategy on a Manichean construct where the ternational community’s engagement with Africa in countering battle between good and evil is open-ended and the one-sided- terrorism, this is where it lies. Multi-pronged initiatives comprising ness of the evil provides unrestrained license. counter-terrorism training to military units, intelligence sharing, and technology to enhance safeguards at ports and banks are important. So, too, is getting balance right between security and CONCLUSION development measures. These, however, do little to address – and, indeed, can exacerbate – the most destabilising and immeasurable Concerns about how Africa fi ts into the global trans-national ter- factor of all: perception. As Berliner and Kilcullen suggest, trust is rorism equation run in several directions, ranging from the prob- essential to the transaction of knowledge, and this is not easily lems and challenges of weak governance and failing states to the built. Transnational terrorism creates competition for the establish- movement of people and money on and off the continent to the ment of mutual interests. This is the essence of the policy doc- shifting social dynamics of Africa’s many and diverse Muslim trine of ‘hearts and minds’. As Kilcullen notes: ‘“Hearts” means communities. Western and African offi cials talk positively and persuading people their best interests are served by your success; resolutely about growing cooperation and a joint commitment “Minds” means convincing them that you can protect them, and to breaking this global scourge. The policy bumper stickers read that resisting you is pointless.’23 Critical to both objectives is an ‘Holisticism’ and ‘Hearts and Minds’. The many and diverse understanding of local problems, social structures, and cultural counter-terrorism initiatives spreading across the continent have norms. Not the dehumanising, homogenising approach of ‘the value and merit. The vulnerabilities are obvious. Porous borders terrorists,’ but humanising, differentiating, refl exive interaction. enable the unmonitored fl ow of people, money, guns and other Touchy feely? So what if it is? Africa is a patch quilt of 53 nations smuggled goods. Points of global interconnectivity – such as embracing thousands of ethnicities with distinct social structures. South Africa, with its strong telecommunications, fi nancial and The globalisation of images combined with the emerging articu- physical infrastructure, or Egypt and Algeria, with their proximity lation of local aspirations is increasingly shaping perceptions in and cultural ties to the Middle East and Europe – link Africa in Africa against the West. The building of what Kilcullen calls ‘trust each direction to the rest of the world. Poor governance renders networks’ at the local level, achieved through the patient under- natural resources vulnerable to illegal extraction and state re- standing of local norms and response to local conditions, will de- sources – like passports – to easy abuse. Omnipresent, 24-hour termine in whose favour those perceptions and grievances shift.

NOTES

1 Clifford Geertz, Politics past, politics future: Some notes Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (eds), Violence The Free Press, 1991, p 114. on the uses of anthropology in the understanding of new in war and peace: An anthology, Malden and Oxford: 16 Quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American military states,’ in The interpretation of cultures, New York: Basic Blackwell, 2005, p 417. adventure in Iraq, London: Penguin Books, 2006, p 184. Books, 1973, p 327. 8 Ibid. 17 Ibid, p 96. 2 Geertz, op cit, p 328. 9 Ibid, p 418. 18 Ibid, p 121. 3 As described to the author by one NATO development 10 Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, ODNI news release 19 Ricks, op cit, p 184. adviser based in Kabul in an interview on 14 July 2006. 2-05, 11 October 2005. 20 James Clifford and George E Marcus, Introduction, in 4 See, for example, George Packer’s excellent article 11 Quoted in Packer, op cit. James Clifford and George E Marcus (eds), Writing culture, ‘Knowing the enemy’ in The New Yorker, 18 December 12 David Kilcullen, Twenty-eight articles: Fundamentals of Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, pp 23-24. 2006. company-level counterinsurgency, Journal of Strategic 21 These speeches can be accessed on the website www. 5 Paul Berliner, The soul of mbira: Music and traditions of Studies, 1, March 2006. whitehouse.gov. the Shona people of Zimbabwe, Chicago and London: 13 Packer, op cit. 22 George E Marcus, Ethnography through thick and thin, University of Chicago Press, 1993, p 7. 14 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, Washington: Princeton University Press, 1998, p 197. 6 Ibid. The US Government, September 2006, p 1. 23 Kilcullen, op cit. 7 Joseba Zulaika, The anthropologist as terrorist, in Nancy 15 Martin van Creveld, The transformation of war, New York:

138 List of participants

Surname Name Title Institution Country

Barno Richard Mr ICPAT / ISS Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Bellamy Pamela Ms Embassy of the United States of America Pretoria, South Africa

Benali Belaid Mr Embassy of Algeria Pretoria, South Africa

Bencheikh Mourad Amb Embassy of Algeria Pretoria, South Africa

Berkouk M’hano Prof Human Security Research Program, University of Algiers Algiers, Algeria

Botha Anneli Ms African Security Analysis Program, ISS Pretoria, South Africa

Butler William Mr Australian High Commission Pretoria, South Africa

Chau Donovan Dr AMTI Washington, D.C., United States of America

Cilliers Jakkie Dr Executive Director, ISS Pretoria, South Africa de Jager Johan Mr Defence Institute Pretoria, South Africa

Defouad Habib Amb Morocco Embassy Pretoria, South Africa

Du Plessis Anton Mr UNODC Vienna, Austria

Du Toit Rina Ms Embassy of the United States of America Pretoria, South Africa

El-Aassar Amr Abd El-Fattah Brig-Genl Egypt Police Cairo, Egypt

Gastrow Peter Mr Director ISS Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa

Guyo Mohammed Mr ISS Nairobi Nairobi, Kenya

Harrison Felicity Ms Catholic Parliamentary Offi ce Cape Town, South Africa

Harry Charlene Ms African Security Analysis Program, ISS Pretoria, South Africa

Hurley Mike Mr United States of America Washington, D.C., United States of America

Janse van Rensburg Gerhard Lt Col South African National Defence Force Pretoria, South Africa

Jhazbhay Iqbal Mr University of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa

Kegoro George Mr Kenya Law Commission Nairobi, Kenya

Koenig Mary Ellen Ms Embassy of the United States of America Pretoria, South Africa

Lambert Jane Ms Australian High Commission Pretoria, South Africa

Letam Wiwa Wugate Col Nigeria Defence Force Abuja, Nigeria

Lone Salim Mr Former UN spokesperson Nairobi, Kenya

Louw Antoinette Ms Crime & Justice Program, ISS Pretoria, South Africa

Mahmoudi Moez Mr Embassy of Tunisia Pretoria, South Africa

Makinda Sam Prof Murdoch University, Western Australia Perth, Australia

Manthripragad Ranganath Mr US Dept of Justice, Resident Legal Advisor Nairobi, Kenya

Matiiri Ayub Guantai Lt Col National Counter Terrorism Centre Nairobi, Kenya

139 Understanding terrorism in Africa: In search for an African voice

Surname Name Title Institution Country

Mayson Cedrick Mr African National Congress Johannesburg, South Africa

McNaught David Mr UK High Commission Pretoria, South Africa

Mlowola Valentine Mr Tanzania Police Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania

Mugamba Paul Justice High Court of Uganda Kampala, Uganda

Mureithi Mbugua Mr Defense Lawyer, Kenya Nairobi, Kenya

Nwanna Dozie Min Nigerian High Commission Pretoria, South Africa

Okello Edwin Mr State Prosecutor, Kenya Nairobi, Kenya

Okumu Wafula Dr Head African Security Analysis Program, ISS Pretoria, South Africa

Ras J M Prof University of Zululand Durban, South Africa

Roux J.J Lt Col Defence Intelligence Pretoria, South Africa

Saidane Noorzad Mr General Direction of Tunisian Security Tunis, Tunisia

Schillinger Kurt Mr South Africa Institute for International Affairs Johannesburg, South Africa

Schlachter Mark Mr Embassy of the United States of America Pretoria, South Africa

Shady Abdel Aziz Dr University of Cairo Cairo, Egypt

Shirodkar Justin Dr British High Commission Pretoria, South Africa

Simelane Shadrack Mr SARPCCO Harare, Zimbabwe

Strømø Jon Erik Mr Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Norway Oslo, Norway

Tanziani Ombretta Ms Embassy of the United States of America Pretoria, South Africa

Triabelsi Nejib Mr General Direction of Tunisian Security Tunis, Tunisia

Van Wyngaard Carl Mr South African Police Service Pretoria, South Africa

Voges Nina Ms Defence Intelligence Pretoria, South Africa

Wawi Letam Wugate Col Nigerian War College Abuja, Nigeria

Welch John Adv National Prosecution Authority of South Africa Pretoria, South Africa

Wilson Boinett Brig RISC Nairobi, Kenya

Ziphelele Mhlongo Not provided Not provided

140 UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AFRICA: IN SEARCH FOR AN AFRICAN VOICE 6 and 7 November 2006

Edited by Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha

Seminar Series Sponsored by: