Clement J. Zablocki Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 10/29/1965 Administrative Information
Creator: Clement J. Zablocki Interviewer: Ronald J. Grele Date of Interview: October 29, 1965 Place of Interview: Washington, D.C. Length: 50 pp.
Biographical Note Zablocki, Clement J.; Representative from Wisconsin (1949-1983). Zablocki discusses John F. Kennedy’s [JFK] time while in the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as his involvement in JFK’s presidential campaign and Wisconsin primary (1960). He also discusses his own relationship with, and support for, JFK, as well as JFK’s personality, among other issues.
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Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed August 17, 1967, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish.
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Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.
Suggested Citation Clement J. Zablocki, recorded interview by Ronald J. Grele, October 29, 1965, (page number), John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.
GENERAL SERVICES AIMINISTRATION NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE Gi:f't of Personal Statement By Clement J. Zablocki
to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library
In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Propertf and Adminis trative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 u.s.c. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Clement J. Zabloc~ihereina:f'ter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. The gi:f't of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all 11terary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.
2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material · for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable. 4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the fore going shall be kept intact permanently in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.
Signed
Date , I Accepted I!- ,. chivist of the United States Date ~ 111 t;~l
GSA DC 67 19341 Clement J. Zablocki
Table of Contents
Page Topic 1, 34, 46 Zablocki’s initial knowledge and impressions of John F. Kennedy [JFK] during his time with Congress and the Senate 2, 37 Legislation 5 1956 Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Illinois 6 Zablocki’s role in campaigning for Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire, 1957 7, 10, 31 Zablocki’s involvement in JFK’s presidential campaign, 1960 14, 46 Wisconsin primary, 1960 20 Zablocki’s role in JFK’s Wisconsin primary 13, 17, 23 Religion in JFK’s presidential campaign, 1960 27, 35 1960 Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles, California 32 Zablocki’s involvement with the appointment of Postmaster General John A. Gronouski 34, 45 JFK’s personality 37 Trade with Poland 39 Compensating Philippine war claims 47 Zablocki’s trip to Vietnam in 1963 and President Ngo Dinh Diem’s assassination Oral History Interview
with
Clement J. Zablocki
October 29, 1965 Washington, D.C.
By Ronald J. Grele
For the John F. Kennedy Library
GRELE: Congressman Zablocki, do you recall when you first met John F. Kennedy?
ZABLOCKI: I first met John F. Kennedy when he was elected to Congress as a Representative from the state of Massachusetts.
GRELE: What were your impressions of him at that time?
ZABLOCKI: At the time that he was in Congress, he was not very active in legislation. He didn’t make many speeches on the floor
[-1-]
of Congress nor did he make a truly great impression on his colleagues. I should add, however, that on meeting him and on having an opportunity to associate with him, one could immediately detect latent possibilities.
GRELE: Did you ever confer with him on any piece of legislation or on anything else when he was in the House? ZABLOCKI: Not so much in the House. But in the Senate he and I were co-sponsors of legislation to amend the Battle Act, relating to trade with Communist countries. As a matter of fact, during his campaign in the Presidential Primary in the spring of 1960, President Kennedy would facetiously remark to the legislation as either the Zablocki-Kennedy Bill or the Kennedy-Zablocki Bill, depending on which state he was in at the time.
[-2-]
GRELE: What were your impressions of his work when you worked with him?
ZABLOCKI: He was very diligent; he was also extremely thorough and meticulous in his approach. That is probably why, as a member of the House of Representatives, he had been less active and more conservative in his views.
GRELE: Do you feel that he was more conservative in his views when he was in the House than when he was in the Senate?
ZABLOCKI: Oh, yes. This is not too unusual since as a member of Congress one tends to have more parochial views; the district you represent is closest to you. For example, one piece of legislation in which I was particularly interested was the Great Lakes Waterway. Because of the shipping industry on the Atlantic coast -- in Boston and other areas -- the then Congressman
[-3-]
Kennedy opposed that legislation. When he became Senator he still could have held these views to a degree. However, as a Senator from the state of Massachusetts he was courageous in this respect and supported the Great Lakes Waterway.
GRELE: Did you have any contacts with him outside of legislation -- personal contacts, social contacts?
ZABLOCKI: Not too many. For one thing, I was a bit older than President Kennedy. While he was single, I think he maintained a closer liaison with old friends from Harvard then he did with members of the House -- even from his own state delegation. Again, this is quite normal; a young Congressman becomes acquainted first with members of his own state delegation and the region and then, of course, the members of the committee to which he is assigned. Then only after some years does he become more acquainted with and fraternize
[-4-] with members from other areas of the country.
GRELE: Did you attend the 1956 Democratic National Convention in Chicago?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, I did. I left the Democratic National Convention in Chicago almost assured that President Kennedy -- then candidate for Vice President -- was going to receive the nod. We thought it was assured. As a matter of fact I felt so confident about it that I left early in order to keep a prior commitment in my own district in Milwaukee. When I heard the bad news on the car radio I almost turned back because I realized what a terrific setback this would represent to him -- particularly since so many of us were so positive that he would be selected.
GRELE: Was he your choice?
ZABLOCKI: Indeed he was. And I think that had the Democratic presidential candidate at the
[-5-]
time, Mr. Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson], selected him, his chances would have been enhanced. I think that was one of the political blunders Mr. Stevenson made.
GREELE: How did the Wisconsin delegation vote on the vice presidency?
ZABLOCKI: As you know, the delegates to a Convention don’t really choose the running mate. It’s the decision of the candidate for President. But the Wisconsin delegation, I might say again, in that Convention had supported Kefauver [Estes Kefauver] earlier -- for President, that is.
GRELE: That’s right. They went committed to Kefauver, didn’t they? Do you recall Senator Kennedy’s trip to Wisconsin in 1957 to campaign for Senator Proxmire [William Proxmire]?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, I do. As a matter of fact, I was also a candidate for the vacancy created
[-6-]
by the death of Senator McCarthy [Joseph McCarthy.] After I was defeated by Mr. Proxmire in the spring primary I went on to campaign for him in the final election. It was in that connection that I traveled throughout the state with Senator Kennedy in a joint effort to elect Mr. Proxmire. I take great delight in recalling that even as early as 1957 I had the pleasure of introducing Senator Kennedy as a future President of the United States. While campaigning at plant gates, for example, I would introduce Bill Proxmire as the candidate for Senator from the state of Wisconsin and Kennedy as a future President of the United States.
GRELE: At the time, I believe, that was a very important election because the Senate was split almost evenly or just one…
ZABLOCKI: Yes, almost evenly with one vote differential.
[-7-]
It was therefore extremely important to have that additional vote in the Senate. When Senator Proxmire defeated the Republican candidate, former Governor Kohler [Walter J. Kohler, Jr.], it was a great victory for the Democratic party because it added one vote to the very, very close margin. Senator-elect Proxmire overnight became a national figure because, Senator Joe McCarthy, and two, he had increased the Democratic margin. He was greeted, as I recall at the National Airport by a great number of senators, among them, of course, was the future President of the United States, President Kennedy.
GRELE: Did the then Senator Kennedy ever say anything to you about being such a good loser in the primary to go out and campaign for Senator Proxmire afterward?
[-8-]
ZABLOCKI: Yes. He was amazed at the fact that I would campaign for the successful candidate to the extent that I did. I traveled in the Fox River Valley and went to the districts where I could be of some help to Senator Proxmire and stayed away from the districts where I would be a detriment to him. Senator Kennedy was somewhat taken with the fact that I tried to be such a plus and “minus” asset and he mentioned it. I recall it was a very cold winter and he came in from Washington without a topcoat -- or at least not a topcoat of any weight which would shield him from the cold winds. I had what we call an overcoat, which is the proper attire for Wisconsin winters. One day he mentioned the fact and said, “Is this the attire you must wear to survive an election? It’s either that or pneumonia,
[-9-] and you don’t get to see the final votes tallied.” Later, when he was a candidate in the Wisconsin Presidential Preferential Primary, he again remarked that he ought to get a coat. I said that if he were just a bit shorter, or I were a bit taller, he could use mine. He also remarked that in his visits to the state for the campaign he didn’t think there was even anything but snow in Wisconsin. Both in the Proxmire campaign and in his own, he always caught us at our wintry worst.
GRELE: At that time in 1957, did he discuss his future plans with you?
ZABLOCKI: Not directly. While traveling together, however, and in reply to my comment that I deeply regretted the fact that he was not selected as a running mate in ‘56, and that we hoped he would be selected as the vice presidential candidate in 1960,
[-10-] he said, “Well, the thing to do is always shoot your sights even higher than settle for something less.” To me this indicated that even at that time he was hopeful that some day he could -- as he so well did -- fulfill a role in our government at the highest level.
GRELE: At one time in 1962, he referred to you as his campaign manager in Wisconsin. This, I believe, was an obvious reference to the 1960 primary. How did this relationship begin?
ZABLOCKI: Well, the relationship began, really, in 1959 when I asked and invited then Senator Kennedy to give the principal address at the Pulaski Day Dinner. I was the recipient of the Man of the Year award of the local Pulaski organization. When I introduced him, I introduced him as the next President of the United States. He then, of course,
[-11-] said he would have to scrap everything he had about Pulaski and devote all of the speech to Zablocki in order to reciprocate. Some people said he did just that. But that was the very first time that he had been exposed to a large group of Democrats who were of predominantly Polish-American ancestry, and who, as was later confirmed, solidly supported him in his campaign in Wisconsin and elsewhere in the country. But the ‘58 dinner was then, of course, followed by several visits to the state. At one point the question of selecting a campaign chairman for the state of Wisconsin came up and I was asked if I would accept the position. I said I thought it would be preferable if the state were divided roughly in half -- an eastern section and a western section. I, as chairman of his campaign committee, could do him some good in the
[-12-] eastern sector of the state, particularly in the southeastern sector of the state. But, to the west were all the Norwegians, Scandinavians, and other brethren who had difficulty even reading my name much less remembering it. Because of the fact that President Kennedy was Catholic, and I happened to be Catholic, I thought it was preferable that, if he could get a Scandinavian chap to head the committee, I would stand by in the wings and assist in whatever way I could. I wanted him to win. It so happened that I was named honorary chairman, and Ivan Nestigen, the mayor of Madison, (Madison, as you know, is the state capital of Wisconsin) was the chairman and coordinator of the Kennedy for President campaign in Wisconsin. I believe that having made the choice of Nestigen was most helpful. I might say that the President again
[-13-] expressed surprise, and at the same time was grateful, that I would step aside; that my only interest was that he get as many votes as possible; and that I wasn’t seeking any titles for myself or any gain or aggrandizement, but that I wanted his candidacy to be as successful as possible. He had, nevertheless, referred to me after that as his campaign manager in Wisconsin although in truth I was behind the campaign manager in Wisconsin.
GRELE: Did he ever seek your advice as to whether or not he should enter the Wisconsin primary?
ZABLOCKI: Yes. I remember rather vividly some discussion we had on that question. He called me to his office in the Senate Office Building one day. There was a difference of opinion among his advisors because it was going to be close. After all, he would be faced with a very, very
[-14-] serious contender, Senator Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey], who was from the neighboring state of Minnesota and who was quite popular in Wisconsin. Since Wisconsin had Republicans in both of its Senate seats prior to Senator Proxmire’s election, we sort of adopted Senator Humphrey as the “Democratic Senator for the state of Wisconsin.” Consequently, he enjoyed quite a following. The President wondered whether he should chance running in the Wisconsin primary -- one of the earliest in the country along with Minnesota and Pennsylvania. Only one state in the East, New Hampshire, has a primary earlier than Wisconsin. But it’s a pivotal, crucial state and to lose a primary so early could count him out of the race. I assured him that, if the effort was worth it all, he ought to take the toughest things first, go into the Wisconsin primary and thereby
[-16-] face one of the most formidable contenders for the presidential nomination. After some further deliberation, he did decide to do just that. I’m not saying that I was the deciding factor of this going into the state, but I did say to him, “If courage is necessary, you have got to show it early.” And courage is necessary in a presidential race. One way to demonstrate that courage is to move fast and win primaries in several of the states before anyone else. When you do that you’re running ahead -- not catching up. This, I think, was the political mistake which Mr. Stevenson made. He refused to enter any state primaries. Candidates for the presidential nomination who fight for Convention votes and support through the primaries always have an advantage.
GRELE: Do you recall offhand which of then Senator Kennedy’s staff agreed with you about
[-16-]
Wisconsin and which members of the staff disagreed?
ZABLOCKI: This is something that I often admired about President Kennedy; he didn’t get a group together to pit on against the other. He sought counsel and advice from an individual and made his decisions separately. It appeared that his closest advisor agreed with the idea that he enter the primary -- Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen.] Although some said he was counseling him against it, I gathered from my conversations that Sorensen agreed that the race should be made in the Wisconsin primary and that a showdown must be had. The same thing held true later in West Virginia. It was a difficult primary in Wisconsin because the religious issue did come in and in a very nasty way. Nevertheless, the President conducted a magnificent campaign. I saw
[-17-] him really ruffled or angered only once or twice.
GRELE: During the primary?
ZABLOCKI: You have to understand that such a campaign generates a great deal of pressure: a change in plane schedules, trying to be in too many places at the same time, arrangements fall through, and so on. Put a couple of these end to end and you can see how the pressure can build up - particularly when the stakes are as high as they are in a presidential race. I do recall one incident in West Allis, which is a suburb of Milwaukee. We had arranged to have him stop at the city hall to meet the mayor and some of the common councilmen. Not all of them, of course, were Democrats. One of the campaign coordinators took the stop off the trip. I happened to be at the city hall with some
[-18-] of the President’s campaign workers, and the caravan didn’t arrive. We were told later that that stop was omitted. Somebody decided instead that he stop at a shopping center in a new development in another part of the county. I went over to meet him because we were continuing on for the rest of the evening to another location in the state. But upon arriving there, the President asked where I had been. I said that I had been waiting where the itinerary indicated that he would be at a certain hour -- at the city of West Allis. And he said, “Well, who changed this?” He got gruff, and he turned down the line and, surprisingly, he decided, “Well, if they’re still there, we’re going to make it.” And he crossed town again to make that stop, even though it was several hours late. That was one time that I noticed him become a little
[-19-] cross with some of the people who were working with him.
GRELE: What were your functions during the ‘60 primary? Where did you travel with him? What did you do?
ZABLOCKI: Primarily, my functions were to see that he would carry the Fourth District of Wisconsin. If he carried the Fourth District of Wisconsin, or the greater metropolitan area of Milwaukee, he would carry the state. Except for short trips to Green Bay, Manitowoc, Madison, Racine and Kenosha, (all in the eastern part of Wisconsin,) I centralized my efforts in the Fourth Congressional District. My job was to make sure that the Fourth District, which by the way has the largest percentage of Democratic votes in the state, would be in the Kennedy column rather than the Humphrey column. Happily,
[-20-]
I was successful. Even to this day, Mr. Humphrey says, “Clem, if I just had gotten you before Jack did I might have won the ‘60 primary.” Upon arriving in Washington after the primary, then Senator Humphrey was asked by the press what happened in Wisconsin. He said, “I didn’t have Zablocki, where the Democratic votes are.” I had been frank with Senator Humphrey. I said, “Hubert, I think you’re a great fellow. You’re our Democratic senator by adoption. It is therefore with great reluctance that I have to tell you that because I was with Senator Kennedy for the vice presidency in ‘56, and, since I really wasn’t sure you were a candidate when I was asked to help him again in Wisconsin in 1960, I have decided to support him once more.”
[-22-]
GRELE: I have heard that the Fourth District was really the only district in Wisconsin where the established political structure worked for John Kennedy. The others were either neutral or for Humphrey, I’ve heard.
ZABLOCKI: Well, in the Fifth District there was a split within the Democratic party organization -- that is, the officers, ward chairmen, regional chairmen, state senators, and elected officials. For example, my colleague, Congressman Reuss [Henry S. Reuss], was neutral, leaning just a little bit to Humphrey, but not openly. He was neutral, openly.
GRELE: He had his own race then, didn’t he?
ZABLOCKI: We all did.
GRELE: Wasn’t he running for mayor in the primary?
ZABLOCKI: He ran for mayor in the primary, yes. But he also had a race in the fall for reelection to Congress. In the Fourth
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District if the organization would not be for Kennedy, they’d have to be against Zablocki. They were for Kennedy.
GRELE: The Fourth District, I believe, is a district heavily Polish Catholic in population.
ZABLOCKI: That’s not quite true. The census would indicate that it’s heavily but not predominately -- nor near the majority -- Catholic. In terms of nationality background I would say it would probably be Germans, Polish, Irish, Italian, and French.
GRELE: Did this present any particular problem in the ‘60 primary? I know that John Kennedy and some of his advisors wanted to keep the religious issue out of the primary as much as possible…
ZABLOCKI: Yes. They very effectively did keep it out until some of the very nasty biased campaign literature against his Catholicism
[-23-]
got into circulation. That, of course, was probably a blessing in disguise because it sure riled up all the Catholics -- German, Polish, Irish, or Italian. To the credit of Senator Humphrey, he had never associated himself with any such hate effort. I know he wouldn’t have anything to do with something like that. But it was some bigoted group or individual that was responsible for this literature being disseminated; that did bring in the religious issue. It helped not only in the Catholic areas, but I think it helped in the non-Catholic areas as well. In other words, it hurt Humphrey as much as it helped Kennedy because many Catholics were now motivated to really campaign for Kennedy, although they were lukewarm before or maybe even neutral or disinterested. What these people said to themselves was
[-24-]
“Well, if they’re going to campaign on a religious basis, we’re for Kennedy.” On the other hand, those who might have been tempted to vote against Kennedy because of his religion were ashamed of what happened and, therefore, gave him a sympathy vote.
GRELE: Did you notice some John Kennedy making any particular appeal to the Germans, the Irish, the Poles?
ZABLOCKI: Yes. He was very capable in that respect. When he was in a more solidly Polish area, he would attempt to say a few words in Polish.
GRELE: How was his Polish?
ZABLOCKI: His Polish was not as good as Jacqueline’s [Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy] but it was good enough to make it plain that he cared and tried. As I recall, we had one rally in Serb Hall where we just had them jam packed.
[-26-]
Several people fainted because the place was so crowded. I guess every fire relation and police ordinance in the city was violated, but it was violated for a good purpose as far as I was concerned. The President was late and when he did arrive he insisted on coming through the front entrance and going right through the mass of people rather than being ushered in through the side entrance where he would just go onto the platform. There he certainly gave, as did Jacqueline, excellent appeal and brought in a few words of Polish to the delight of those that were Polish as well as those who were not. He also would campaign very effectively before a German group, speaking a few words in German. This was very effective when he was President of the United States -- in Berlin for example. In my opinion, he developed
[-26-] this knack for reaching to the people and bringing them up to his level or bringing himself to their level by a few words in their own vernacular.
GRELE: Did you attend the 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, I did. GRELE: As a delegate?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, as a delegate.
GRELE: The Wisconsin delegation, as I understand it, was bitterly split.
ZABLOCKI: Yes, they were split because the delegates from the western half of the state were not pro-Kennedy. Although Kennedy had the majority of the delegates, they were either still for Humphrey, or those who left Humphrey were for Stevenson. They did everything possible to try to stop Kennedy at any cost. It’s remarkable, though how after he became President, the ranks
[-28-] closed and President Kennedy was warmly acclaimed by all of the factions. There always are factions in the Democratic Party. That’s probably what makes the Democratic Party interesting; they continually have differences among themselves. There were problems in the Wisconsin delegation. I didn’t endear myself to some of the delegates when I urged that the delegation support Kennedy on the first roll, or they wouldn’t have a chance to vote for a President at all; and it so happened.
GRELE: If Wisconsin had cast all of its votes for John Kennedy, would he have gone over with Wisconsin? He went over with Wyoming on the first ballot.
ZABLOCKI: He went over with Wyoming.
GRELE: Yes, but if all of the Wisconsin votes had gone to Kennedy…
ZABLOCKI: He would have had it. Wisconsin could
[-28-]
have had the honor of nominating the President -- the candidate for President.
GRELE: Do you recall Governor Nelson’s [Gaylord Nelson] position during this time?
ZABLOCKI: Governor Nelson’s position, as I recall, at the time was one of leaning toward Stevenson.
GRELE: Were you at all involved in the continuing split in the Wisconsin party after John Kennedy’s election? We know that there was a split between people who backed Pat Lucey [Patrick J. Lucey] or people who backed Governor Nelson in certain appointments. Were you at all involved in any of this?
ZABLOCKI: I became involved only to the extent that there were factions within the Fourth Congressional District. I tried to use my good office to persuade them that it was not in their interests nor in the
[-29-] interests of the Party to have this bickering continue. It was really never resolved; and I don’t think there ever will be any complete unanimity of views in the Democratic Party in Wisconsin because it’s just that kind of animal up there. We’ve always had problems because the big Democratic vote comes from the metropolitan area of Milwaukee. Milwaukee is looked upon by not only the Democrats but the populace as a whole in Wisconsin as a state by itself. In other words, they’re fearful that Milwaukee will dominate not only various government activities but party activities as well. Therefore, you’ll find there is what is commonly referred to as the “Madison Group,” representative of those who are generally anti-Milwaukee. On the other hand, the people in Milwaukee are just as unrealistic in some ways --
[-30-] lacking in understanding of the people from the Madison area or the out-state area.
GRELE: Did John Kennedy or anyone connected with him ever make any attempts to mediate in Wisconsin at all?
ZABLOCKI: I am not in a position to say. However, I believe that Bob Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] exerted some effort in trying to get the groups together; but I’m sure that whenever President Kennedy had any dealings with Wisconsin people he didn’t do it on the basis of one faction or another.
GRELE: Did you work for John Kennedy during the campaign? Did you travel for him, make speeches for him, send out literature for him?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, in the southeastern part of the state and into the Fox River Valley in the eastern part of the state. I had a
[-31-]
campaign of my own after that. The main effort therefore was one of getting out the tremendous vote in the Fourth District which would be helpful in the final.
GRELE: Did he come to campaign with you in Wisconsin? ZABLOCKI: After the Wisconsin Presidential Preferential Primary, he had so many other commitments and obligations that, as far as coming in to campaign in my district, it was unnecessary for him to do so.
GRELE: In the formation of the new administration were you consulted on any appointments?
ZABLOCKI: No, other than a few brief comments or suggestions I made to either Bobby Kennedy or President Kennedy regarding appointments that directly involved Wisconsin.
GRELE: Were you consulted on the appointment of Postmaster General Gronouski [John A. Gronouski]?
ZABLOCKI: After Postmaster General Day [J. Edward Day]
[-32-]
had resigned, yes.
GRELE: What was your verdict on Mr. Gronouski? Did you urge his appointment?
ZABLOCKI: Yes, I certainly did recommend Mr. Gronouski’s appointment. As a matter of fact I went so far as to suggest that it would be extremely helpful to all concerned, particularly to President Kennedy, if he would announce that appointment as soon as possible. To that I added that if it were possible in some way for me to make that announcement I would be most grateful and extremely pleased. Happily, that’s just the way it turned out. When President Kennedy reached a final decision on Mr. Gronouski the White House called and informed me that I could preempt the customary White House announcement with my own - in other words, to “leak” it. The audience to which the news was first revealed therefore was the Polish-American
[-33-]
Veterans Convention meeting in Milwaukee. From there it passed like wildfire throughout the state. It should be absolutely clear, however, that I did all this with White House approval.
GRELE: Do you recall any meetings that you had with John Kennedy prior to his election that would give us some indication of his personality? Do you recall any anecdotes? ZABLOCKI: He had a keen sense of humor the very first time I met him even though he was, as I said, rather quiet and reserved as a member of the House of Representatives -- now, in retrospect, undoubtedly due to the back injury and the great pain he suffered as a result. He had lost a terrific number of days in the House as well as later in the Senate because of hospitalization. Nevertheless he had an automatic, glistening smile; he was also a great kidder. He loved to pull
[-35-] a few puns, and he didn’t mind being kidded himself. If you got one across on him; he enjoyed getting it as much as he did handing it out. In the days just before assuming the presidency, naturally after the Convention, there wasn’t time enough, and I really didn’t get to see him. As I say, I’ve always been more or less in the background. I didn’t get into the so-called “inner circle.” I always felt that if they really wanted me to come in, they would invite me. In other words, I didn’t want to put in my two cents’ worth unless asked. For example, at the Convention when he was nominated with all the fanfare, he was coming down the aisle at one point amid this screaming throng. I happened to be along the other side of the rope -- not on the preferred side of the rope, but the other side of the rope. I
[-35-] shall never forget this because with the great number of people there, I wouldn’t expect him to single me out or spot me, an insignificant individual among the masses. However, as he came down the stairs he walked directly by me and said, “Why Clem, what are you doing on that side of the rope? You should be with us up here.” All the newspaper people wanted to know who the devil I was. This was one of these little things that was so typical of President Kennedy -- that he would always remember the little fellow. I know that night after receiving the nomination for the Presidency of the United States -- even though I had been one of his earliest, supporters certainly in the Midwest -- he had no reason to remember me or to take time out to come up to see me.
GRELE: Moving on to the presidential years and
[-36-]
some of the legislation of those years in which you were involved, did you ever discuss with the President the Foreign Aid proviso that you offered in 1961, I believe, limiting exports to the United States to 10 per cent from nations receiving from nations receiving Foreign Aid for development?
ZABLOCKI: Yes; and I also discussed with him to the proposal in which he had been so interested to amend the Battle Act and thereby give the President discretionary authority in dealing with Communist countries where it would be in our national interest. Also, I had discussion with him on trade with Poland and the sale of our PL 480 surplus commodities to Poland.
GRELE: What did he feel on this issue? This could be turned into a very touchy issue domestically -- trade with Poland. How did he feel on this issue?
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ZABLOCKI: His feeling was -- as has been expressed very adequately and succinctly in all of his utterances and in his requests for authorization to sell our surplus commodities to Poland -- that is, that it would be unconscionable for our country to permit wheat or other cereals to rot or to go to waste while there are people in the world starving. Further, he had emphasized that it was the regime of Poland that was Communist and not the Polish people. As a matter of fact at least 95% of Poles are non-Communist. As President Kennedy so ably analyzed the situation, helping the Poles would actually accomplish two aims. First, it would give the Polish people continued hope in their fight against Communist domination. Secondly, the very fact that a Communist regime had to buy from a so-called capitalistic country disproved the alleged and often touted
[-38-] efficiency of such a Communist system. Therefore, it was for psychological reasons as well as humanitarian reasons that he sought to obtain the authority, and Congres wisely gave it to him.
GRELE: Who would you say were his chief opponents on issues like this?
ZABLOCKI: The “neo-isolationists” -- the usual crown that’s against everything. That is, those who believe in the “America Fortress” idea -- that we are self-sufficient, that we need no allies; those who were opposed to foreign aid even to friendly countries much less neutral countries or enemy countries. It was those of the usual isolationist attitudes and beliefs that opposed it.
GRELE: Do you recall offhand his reasons for supporting your proviso on the Foreign Aid Bill in 1961?
ZABLOCKI: My reasons were his reasons. The reason
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I introduced it was because of his interest.
GRELE: You introduced the legislation in 1962 which compensated the Philippines for their war claims. Did you ever confer with the President on this legislation?
ZABLOCKI: Yes. As a matter of fact, not only with the President but also with the State Department. In 1959 when President Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] was President, there was an intention to bolster the economy of the Philippines -- to loan, grant, give, really, to the Philippine government a hundred million dollars to bolster the economy so they would keep their head above water. There were some in the Department of State that felt that repaying the balance of the Philippine war damage claims would be doing two things with one stroke. One, helping the economy of the Philippines, and two, repaying an obligation that was not a legal one, but
[-40-] certainly a moral one, to which President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt], President Truman [Harry S. Truman], and then President Eisenhower had obligated us. At the time the legislation was introduced there were differences of opinion in the executive branch. I was of the opinion that we ought to pay the claims directly to the claimants rather than to the Garcia government. It was estimated at the time at one hundred twenty million dollars as it happened, the bill provided later seventy-three million dollars -- actually, the amount paid to claimants was nearer sixty-five million dollars. The last claims were paid in December of ‘64 -- the last claim that could be made. I maintained that paying it directly to the claimants would, one, satisfy the claimants. There was some evidence that the Philippine government, if given the so-called
[-41-] opportunity to pay the claimants, would not carry out that responsibility. I know from testimony and from statements of Philippine officials -- as a matter of fact, the Ambassador to the United States from the Philippines -- that it would be preferable to pay it as it was originally intended in the original act of 1946. THat is, to pay it to the claimants directly. Particularly when there was some flak later about irregularities, which the subcommittee knew nothing about, as far as the lobbyist for the Philippine war damage claim bill…
GRELE: Mr. O’Donnell [J.P. O’DOnnell.]
ZABLOCKI: Mr. O’Donnell. I had advised the President that, when I worked for the legislation, I did it with the highest motives. O’Donnell had nothing to do with my motivation or that of Dr. Judd [Walter H. Judd] or of my subcommittee. As a matter of fact, he was
[-42-] a nuisance. But we felt that this was an obligation that we had to the Philippine people. His efforts proved an irritant, and as a result we had dissident groups in the Philippines which were harming our American-Philippine relations. It was our position that the balance should be paid under the formula agreed upon earlier -- that is directly to the claimants. Of course, the President concurred and signed the bill.
GRELE: Do you recall who you worked with in the State Department, and who offered alternative methods in the State Department?
ZABLOCKI: No. That I don’t know. There was never any testimony on this although the Senate report might offer some indication. Senator Fulbright [J. William Fulbright] wanted to pay the lump sum to the Philippine government. We were told that the Garcia government would
[-43-] just use it for its own political gain, and we’d still have the dissident groups and the irritants who would not have been paid. There was some difference of views between the executive branch, that is, the Treasury and the Secretary of State -- or somebody within the Department of State. The testimony we had received from Under Secretary of State at the time, Mr. Averell Harriman, when he appeared before the House and the Senate, supported the method of payment to which the House agreed.
GRELE: Back to Wisconsin, now. In 1962-1963 did you notice any evidence of “backlash” that would have affected President Kennedy had he run in 1964?
ZABLOCKI: No. I did not. As a matter of fact, I believe that the polls indicated -- I mean the Gallup Polls -- that President Kennedy was gaining in popularity and respect. I’m
[-44-] positive that had he lived, he would have easily won election nationwide and, certainly, the support of the voters in the state of Wisconsin.
GRELE: Is there anything we’ve missed?
ZABLOCKI: No. I must say I’ve always had most cordial and friendly contacts and relations with President Kennedy. In the few incidents that I recall he was always very thoughtful. One that comes to mind just offhand is when the plaque for the former President of Poland, Ignatz Paderewski, was dedicated in Arlington Cemetery. At the ceremony he said, “They should put the short fellows up front.’ He said I should have been nearer the podium where all the action was taking place so that I would have been in the focus of the cameras. Later, when I was walking back to my car he drove by in the presidential
[-46-] limousine. Suddenly his car stopped and he lowered the window and opened the door. He said, “Why don’t you come along? You’re not walking back to the Capitol?” I said, “No, Mr. President. Thank you very much, I’ve got my own car and a very safe driver -- myself.” He laughed and said, “Well, if I were at the wheel, you’d also have a safe driver.” This was reference to the time when he would pick me up on occasion -- one or two that I remember -- during the primary campaign. We’d leave on a Friday night to go to Wisconsin. He picked me up here in front of the House Office Building. With him at the wheel and without the freeways we have now we got to the airport almost as fast if not quicker. I said, “Senator, I’m not sure whether my insurance has run out, but, if we’re going to drive together again I’m going to double it.”
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He said he’s never had an accident yet, and I said, “I hope you never do.” He was a very, very human sort of person. The one time that I was disturbed is when I went to Vietnam in 1963. That was just two weeks before President Diem [Ngo Dinh Diem] was assassinated. I went there with the head of the study mission from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific. We returned, and the President called me to the White House and said, “Well, Clem, I hope you don’t build up Diem too much.” I said, “Well, Mr. President, I’m sure my subcommittee will write in the report only what they feel is proper, and what they have observed, and what they feel is in our national interest. I am, as are other members of Congress, concerned that there are some forces here in Washington, as well
[-47-] as in Saigon, who are working to remove Diem, and all indications are that there is no one in Vietnam who can replace him and do as well. Oh, you’ll have some of these newspaper people condemning him and saying that he’s totalitarian in his tactics, but we could find no evidence that here was any wrong-doing, and I do hope that we will continue to support him.” The President said he had been getting reports which indicated that Diem was losing control of the country and was no longer able to keep his position as President. I said, “As long as we will support him, he will remain. As soon as we pulled the rug out from under him, he’s through.” Unfortunately, we did pull that rug out from under President Diem and he was deposed and assassinated on November 1. But I never could get the courage to go back to President Kennedy
[-48-] to again refer to our conversation. Then, to our sad recollection, on November 22, he, himself was assassinated in Dallas. Now, I often regret that I didn’t discuss this matter with him again. I know I would have been able to go to see him just by picking up the phone. This isn’t to say that I was right; but it is to say that there are still several unanswered questions about the Diem government: our role in it, and what he, President Kennedy, really thought about it. Knowing how badly he felt with President Diem was assassinated, I just couldn’t get the courage to go up to see him because I didn’t want to cause him any additional grief. I do know from other sources, however, that he felt badly about it. I therefore saw no reason to see him at that time although I did hope to do so someday.
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Tragically, I never got a chance. This was the only piece of unfinished business between President Kennedy and myself.
GRELE: Thank you very much, Congressman.
[THE END]
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