THE SWEDES ON THE DELAWARE 1638-1664 AMAN DUS JOHNSON, PH. D. THE SWEDES ON THE DELAWARE 1638-1664 AMANDUS JOHNSON, PH. D. THE SWEDES ON THE DELAWARE 1638-1664 BY AMANDUS JOHNSON, Ph. D. SECRETARY OF THE SWEDISH COLONIAL SOCIETY PHILADELPHIA THE SWEDISH COLONIAL SOCIETY 1915 COPYRIGHT, 1915 BY AMANDUS JOHNSON TO DR. J. G. ROSENGARTEN, SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, PHILANTHROPIST, MAN, WHOSE SYMPATHIES ARE LIMITED BY NEITHER RACE NOR RELIGION. Fort Christina (1654), section of Lindestram's plan of Christinehamn. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Fort Christina Gustavus Adolphus The Reading Room in the Royal Library Willem Usselinx Title-page of the Argonautica Gustaviana Axel Oxenstierna Letter of Peter Spiring Klas Fleming Fort Elfsborg near Gotbenborg New Amsterdam The Research-room in the Royal Library Landing Place of the Swedes Finnish Log-cabin Interior of the Finnish Cabin An Indian Family A Delaware Indian Woman The Budget of New Sweden Castle at Viborg The Ship Septer Tidö Palace Johan Printz Store-house Bill of Lading Sewant (wampum) Mora house Interior of the Mora house or Log-cabin Water-mill Indian Testimony Title-page of the Geographia Americae Swedish Log-cabin Store-houses from Finland Peter Stuyvesant Passport for Peter Lindeström Queen Christina PREFACE This volume has been prepared to meet the demands, made from time to time, for a popular edition of THE SWEDISH SETTLEMENTS ON THE DELAWARE. It is essentially an abridgment of the above-named work; yet in some particulars it is a new book. It is popular only in so far that foot notes and bibliographical references have been omitted: nowhere has the statement of fact been sacrificed to the embellishment of language. The book (which was begun last summer) has been written during the spare hours of "a very full schedule" and without the noble aid, inspiration and encouragement of the author's wife it could not have been finished for another season. The author also desires to thank the many scholars and others, here and abroad, who, in reviews and private letters, have encouraged the labor through favorable criticism of the earlier book. If this little volume is accorded the same reception by critics and readers as the large work, the labor in writing it has been well worth while. THE AUTHOR. Philadelphia, April, 1913. PART I. Introduction. Sweden Immediately Preceding and During the Occupation of the Delaware. Gustavus Adolphus. From a painting at Skokloster (H.) CHAPTER I. Political, Social, Religious and Other Conditions in Sweden, 1611-1660. I. The beginning of the seventeenth century marks a new era in Swedish history. The constructive statesmanship of the great Vasa (whose fruits were wasted by forty years of misrule) lived again in the famous Carl IX and in his more famous son, and during their reigns Sweden took first place among the powers of northern Europe. The first sixty years of the century was an epoch of war. When Gustavus Adolphus ascended the Swedish throne in 1611, the armies of his country were engaged against three nations, Denmark, Russia and Poland. The King was anxious to conclude peace with Denmark, but this was refused and hostilities continued. The enemy, however, had the advantage and was able to impose hard terms in 1613, when the two belligerents were finally tired of the useless and bitter warfare. The King could now send more troops to the aid of his generals in Russia, and in the summers of 1614 and 1615 he went in person to lead the operations there. In February, 1617, the Russian war also came to an end by the treaty of Stolbova, where peace negotiations had been in progress for nearly a year and a half. Through this treaty Sweden acquired the territories of Ingermanland and Kexholm ; and Gustavus Adolphus won two of his foremost objects,—Russia was pushed back from the Baltic, and a natural northern boundary for Finland was secured against the Cossack hordes. Poland, having lately renewed and firmly established the Catholic religion, was ruled by a King of the Vasa house, who had a legal right to the Swedish crown. She was the leading European power in the East and the standard-bearer of Catholicism against Turks and heretics, and hence a natural enemy of Sweden ; and finally she possessed territory and harbors, that had to be brought under Swedish control, if the dream of making the Baltic a Swedish inland sea should be realized by the statesmen at Stockholm. There were therefore various circumstances that might provoke hostilities ; but the immediate cause of the war was Sigismund's pretentions to the Swedish throne, and his continuous refusal to recognize Gustavus Adolphus as the lawful king of Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus therefore determined to attack the enemy in his own country, and in the summer of 1621 he set sail for Riga with a fleet of 148 warships and ten yachts, carrying about 14,000 selected soldiers on board, some being mercenaries from Scotland and Holland. The brilliant campaigns that followed under the King and his able generals arrested the attention of Protestant Europe, and many of the new faith called upon him to become their leader against the Catholics. He expressed his willingness to champion the Protestant cause, and presented a comprehensive plan of operations, while conducting diplomatic conferences with the representatives of England and Holland to the same purpose. But King Christian of Denmark, always jealous of his northern neighbor, also offered his services in the pending struggle and, as his conditions were more moderate and his demands on the allies less exacting than those of Gustavus Adolphus, he was chosen to be the Gideon of the Evangelical Union in its fierce combat with the Catholic League. The Swedish army and navy (both of which had been re-organized and largely increased) were therefore not yet to be used against the imperial forces. Gustavus Adolphus, hoping for more favorable times, went to finish his Polish war, and, after several victorious expeditions through which Sweden gained many advantages and extended her territory, a six years' truce was concluded at Alt-mark in 1629. [These campaigns, however, did more than bring about a truce and place several important cities under Swedish sovereignty; they prepared Gustavus Adolphus and his soldiers for the greater struggle about to begin, and furnished means for its prosecution.] King Christian, who in the meantime had lost his battles with the veteran Tilly, was forced to withdraw from the field. The time now seemed ripe for action. England and Holland were willing to submit to the plans of Gustavus Adolphus. The Protestant princes requested him to become "the defender of their heritage", and Richelieu advised him to take an active part in the contest. He negotiated with England, Holland and France, but with little result, as they gave evasive and indefinite answers. He was now fully determined, however, to enter the lists—it was a case of averting a future danger from his own kingdom—and in the autumn of 1629 he called a meeting of the council of state. This session became a turning point in modern history. It was decided that Sweden should take an active part in the Thirty Years' War. [The motives of Gustavus Adolphus for taking part in the Thirty Years' War are clearly stated in the minutes—they were religious, political and commercial. Cf. Fries, Svenska Kultubilder, p. 19 ff.] After large preparations Gustavus Adolphus set sail for Germany in June, 1630, with a picked army of about 13,000 men. He at once turned the tide of events. He rescued the Reformation and raised Sweden to a first class power in European politics, but his brilliant career was cut short on the memorable battlefield of Lützen in November, 1632. The government was now placed in the hands of "the five high officers of the kingdom", until Christina became of age, and the war went on. Success continued for a time to follow the Swedish forces, but the spell of invincibility deserted them at Nördlingen in 1634; and the two following years were dark and full of trials for the Swedish leaders, interrupted only by a few brilliant achievements of Johan Banér. Gradually, however, the sky brightened. Swedish statesmen like Oxenstierna and Brahe and Swedish generals like Bauer and Torstensson wrought success of what appeared to be disaster. Denmark had kept aloof from an active participation in the Thirty Years' War since 1629. She had seen the increasing influence and power of Sweden and her growing commercial interests and far reaching plans with envious eyes. Only one-third of the Swedish export and import trade, it was true, for the years 1637-1643 was carried on Swedish vessels ; but Swedish ships had been sent to other continents, the Swedish flag was waving over possessions in the New World, and indications were that the mastery of the Baltic would soon pass over to the power lying north of Öresund. King Christian IV endeavored to assert and sustain Danish supremacy in the Baltic and Danish jurisdiction in the Sound. A heavy toll (amounting to over $3,000,000 in 1639) was collected from vessels passing through the Strait, a large part of which was levied on Swedish merchandise. Besides, Swedish vessels were often confiscated, and the Danish king conducted a regular warfare in everything but in name against his neighbor. In the peace negotiations of Sweden, Denmark also played the false friend. But the opportunity for which Oxenstierna had been waiting was come. Denmark was to be attacked and the Swedish sword was to make an end of Danish interference. The Swedish navy, which had been greatly increased and splendidly equipped through Fleming's efforts, was put in readiness, troops were mobilized and other preparations were made, the real object of which was kept so secret that not even the Swedish representative at Copenhagen knew the intentions of his government.