STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 157

PRO-SELF ORIENTATION AND PREFERENCE FOR DECEITFUL STRATEGIES: SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION, DISPOSITIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNISM

Maria SAKALAKI, Penelope SOTIRIOU

Department of Psychology, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences 136, Siggrou Avenue, 17671- Athens, Greece E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore some dispositional and behavioral correlates of economic unfairness. In particular, this paper aims to explore: a) if opportunistic attitudes as measured by an economic opportunism scale are positively correlated to pro-self dispositions like narcissism, psychopathy and pro-self social value orientation, b) the degree to which opportunis- tic attitudes correlate with non-cooperative behavior towards unknown partners in a sequential game. Confirming our hypotheses, a first study (n = 125) showed that, opportunistic attitudes are negatively correlated with pro-social and positively correlated with pro-self social value orienta- tion, as well as with narcissism and primary psychopathy. A second study (n = 77) showed that opportunistic attitudes are negatively correlated to cooperative economic behavior in a game situation. These findings highlight the affinities between preference for non-cooperative eco- nomic strategies and both pro-self social value orientation and self-focusing dispositional vari- ables, as well as self-interest seeking behavior in a game situation.

Key words: opportunism, defecting economic behavior, social value orientation, narcissism, psychopathy

porary type of opportunism, which depends INTRODUCTION on situational factors like affective prefer- ences or aversions for certain persons or Studying economic cooperation is a chal- groups under specific social and situational lenging topic for social psychological re- conditions and a durable type of opportun- search. Actually, economic practices are so- ism, which stands from the internalization of cial practices that are immersed within a so- social and cultural norms and values. This cially constructed symbolic, political and study focuses on the second type of oppor- cultural environment (Bourdieu, 2000). Yet, tunism and explores to what extent pro-self at the same time, the economic field favors dispositional and social value orientation rather anonymous and impersonal ex- variables are correlated with economic un- changes, between individuals that are not fairness. acquaintances and therefore partly solicits Unfair economic strategies are a matter of individual dispositions. Thus, Ghoshal and great concern to contemporary societies. Moran (1996) distinguish between opportu- The 2008 world economic crisis, partly nistic attitudes that refer to a precarious, tem- caused by the opportunistic economic be- 158 STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 havior of several financial economic agents, partners’ actions (De Cremer, Van Lange, underline the importance, for social sciences, 2001; see also Van Lange et al., 1997). Per- to further explore the conditions that favor sonality researchers also underline the im- or inhibit opportunistic propensity. Accord- portance of interpersonal dispositions re- ing to Williamson (1985, p. 47), who thor- garding cooperation. For example, the main oughly theorized and popularized this con- variable of the Big Five that refers to inter- cept, opportunism is “self-interest seeking personal dispositions, Agreeableness, has with guile. This includes but is scarcely lim- been shown to be a factor of cooperative- ited to more blatant forms such as lying, steal- ness (Beersma et al., 2003; Koole et al., 2001; ing, and cheating”, as well as subtle forms of Ross, Rausch, Canada, 2003; Sakalaki, deceit. A common feature of Machiavel- Foussiani, 2012) while defectors have a pref- lianism and opportunism, integrated by erence for precarious, less tight relationships Williamson (1985) into his definition of op- to others (Sakalaki, Fousiani, 2008). This portunism, is that they both rely on deceit specificity suggests the affinity between and manipulation of others. Although there opportunists and individualists, about whom is a positive association between these two Kim (1994) suggests that their relations with strategies based on the manipulation of in- others are also precarious since they are de- formation (Sakalaki, Richardson, Thépaut, termined by conflicting motivations: They 2007), they are not identical: Machiavellian- simultaneously consider that maintaining ism can be regarded as a sociopolitical strat- their relations has a high cost but after all egy of defection, while opportunism is an they must safeguard their social relations in economic strategy of defection, operating in order to achieve their goals. This affinity more anonymous contexts and in economic between opportunism and individualism can transactions, wherein transparency and com- possibly explain the positive correlation munication are often lessened and the other found between these two constructs agent is not necessarily a social partner. (Sakalaki, Kazi, Karamanoli, 2007). Therefore, opportunism mainly concerns The present study focuses on the relation- societies in which the economy has come to ships between opportunistic economic atti- dominate over politics, religion, cultural tudes and a) several pro-self dispositional norms and values. In order to make further characteristics, namely narcissistic and anti- progress in the comprehension of economic social tendencies and pro-self social value defection, this study aims to explore some orientation (SVO), b) self-interest seeking, dispositional and behavioral specificities of defecting economic behavior in a game situ- individuals scoring high in opportunism. ation. Actually, the preference of opportun- The role of interpersonal dispositions in ists for the extrinsic life aspirations of wealth, cooperativeness has been studied by re- fame and image (Sotiriou, 2010) as well as for searchers inspired by the integrative model precarious, loose social bonds, suggest a of social value orientation (Van Lange, 1999, narcissistic orientation. Additionally, guile, 2000) who showed that pro-socials are more cheating and lying being, as presumed by cooperative than pro-selfs, because they feel Williamson (1985), the main behavioral in- more responsible as regards the group’s in- gredients of opportunism, a correlation is terests and more likely to reciprocate their expected between opportunism and psycho- STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 159 pathic tendencies, since psychopathy more pressing opportunistic behavior (e.g., than narcissism includes traits and behav- “When you apply for health insurance, it’s iors like duplicity and lying. It can be also not wrong to keep quiet about some health expected that opportunistic attitudes should problems so as to keep the premium down”; correlate with a pro-self social value orienta- “When you sell a used car, you are not tion as well as with an unfair and self-inter- obliged to tell the potential buyer about the est seeking economic behavior towards a car’s defects”) or non-opportunistic behav- trusting partner in a sequential game. ior (e.g., “Advertisements that only show the Given the above theoretical rational, the product’s good side and keep quiet about hypotheses are as follows: its drawbacks are dishonest”; “If someone H1: Opportunistic attitudes should be posi- gives his word in a financial deal, he can’t tively correlated to narcissism, psychopathy break it. Giving your word is like signing a and pro-self social value orientation. (Study contract”). The total score for the 20 items 1 investigates the first hypothesis.) (reversing the direction of scoring for the H2: Opportunistic attitudes should be non-opportunistic items) provides a score negatively correlated to cooperative eco- of opportunism, with higher scores indicat- nomic behavior towards an unknown but ing greater opportunism. The psychometric trusting partner in a $10 Trust Game, thus properties of this scale are satisfactory. A suggesting that opportunistic propensity previous study showed a Cronbach’s alpha and self interest-seeking, unfair economic of .82, and a separate small pilot study of the behavior are affected by and can predict each EOS, carried out on 43 students aged 18 to other. (Study 2 investigates the second hy- 25 years, gave a test-retest correlation (over pothesis.) an interval of one week) of r = .81, p < .001 (Sakalaki, Fousiani, 2012). STUDY 1 Narcissism was measured using a version of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory Participants (NPI; Raskin, Hall, 1979 translated into Greek. For the translation see Coccossis, Data were obtained by a questionnaire in- Vaslamatzis, Anagnostopoulos, Markidis, vestigation conducted in Athens, Greece. 1998). NPI consists of 40 items presented in The participants were 125 undergraduates, a forced choice dichotomous format, with 18-23 years old (mean age = 19.42). 83% of high scores indicating strong narcissistic participants were women and 17% men. tendencies. A total score (range: 0-40) on the NPI is calculated by summing only the nar- Instruments cissistic choice. The Greek version of NPI seems to be a valid tool for the measurement Participants completed the latest version of narcissism construct (Cronbach’s alpha of Sakalaki’s Economic Opportunism Scale = .85; Coccossis et al., 1998). (EOS; Sakalaki, Fousiani, 2012). This scale Respondents also completed a 27-item includes 20 items rated on a seven-point scale version of Levenson Self-Report Psychop- ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 athy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, (strongly agree) and offers statements ex- Fitzpatrick, 1995) as proposed by Lynam, 160 STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2

Whiteside and Jones (1999). LSRP is de- signed to assess characteristics associated RESULTS with primary and secondary psychopathy in the general population. Participants rated on All measures’ reliabilities were found to be a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly dis- satisfactory. Cronbach’s alpha was .74 for agree) to 7 (strongly agree) and the total the economic opportunism scale, .74 for the score for each scale (reversing the direction narcissistic personality inventory, .84 for the of scoring for the non-psychopathic items) primary and .47 for the secondary psychop- provided a score of primary and secondary athy1, and .90 for the individualistic, .93 for psychopathy, with higher scores indicating the prosocial and .95 for the competitive ori- greater psychopathy. Reliability estimates entation respectively. In the present study, were .85 for the total scale and ranged from out of a total number of 125 participants, 41 .82 to .83 for the primary psychopathy scale (25.8%) were identified as pro-socials and 84 and from .63 to .69 for the secondary psych- (52.8%) as pro-selfs. Means, standard de- opathy scale (Brinkley et al., 2001; Levenson viations and results of the Pearson Correla- et al., 1995). tion Analysis among all study variables can Finally, participants completed a version be found in Table 1. of a Nine-Item Decomposed Games Measure of Social Value Orientation (Van Lange et al., 1997; Van Lange, Kuhlman, 1994) trans- lated into Greek. This measure of social value orientation has generally revealed good in- 1 The lower alpha for the secondary psychop- ternal consistency and is not related to mea- athy scale is quite consistent with previous studies of this measure (e.g., Hicklin,Widiger, 2005; Lynam sures of social desirability or indices of mood et al., 1999; Miller, Lynam, Widiger, Leukefeld, (Kulhman, Camac, Cunha, 1986). 2001; Ross, Lutz, Bailley, 2004).

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between EOS, social value orienta- tion and personality variables Standard Mean Variable Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 (M) (SD) 1. Economic 3.44 .663 1.000 Opportunism 2. Pro-self - - .314** 1.000 Orientation 3. Pro-social - - -.288** -1.000** 1.000 Orientation 4. Narcissism 15.10 4.560 .310** .106 -.168* 1.000 5. Primary 2.63 .812 .686** .158* -.238** .394** 1.000 Psychopathy 6. Secondary 3.90 .787 .113 .032 .098 .082 .138 1.000 Psychopathy * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 161

chopathy into Model 2 resulted in an addi- Correlations of the EOS with Social Value tional 37.6% of the variance being ex-

Orientation, Narcissism and Psychopathy plained (F1, 124 = 110.967, p < .001), emerging as a strong predictor of economic opportun- The results confirmed the first hypothesis ism (β = .667, p < .001). The inclusion of sec- showing a positive correlation of economic ondary psychopathy and social value orien- opportunism with pro-self social value ori- tation into Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively entation (r = .314, p < .01, n = 125) and a did not result in any statistically significant negative correlation with pro-social orienta- variance. Confirming the findings presented tion (r = -.288, p < .01, n = 125). The results in the precedent sections, tendencies toward also showed a positive correlation between primary psychopathy and, to a less degree, economic opportunism and narcissism (r = to narcissism seem to predict opportunistic .310, p < .01, n = 125) as well as primary psy- propensity fairly well (see Table 2). chopathy (r = .686, p < .01, n = 125), but no correlation with secondary psychopathy. STUDY 2

Regression Analysis Participants

A hierarchical multiple regression analy- Data were obtained by a questionnaire in- sis was employed in order to test the rela- vestigation conducted in Athens, Greece. tions of narcissism, primary and secondary The participants were 77 undergraduates, psychopathy and social value orientation aged 18-25 years old (mean age = 20.47). 61% with economic opportunism. Results showed of participants were women and 39% men. that in Model 1, which included only narcis- sism, narcissism accounted for 9% of the Experimental Design and Procedure variance (F1, 157 = 16.692, p < .001), emerging as a predictor of economic opportunism (β = At the beginning of a university course, .310, p < .001). The inclusion of primary psy- respondents completed the Economic Op-

Table 2. Personality and social value orientation effects on economic opportunism Unstandardized Model b Standard Error b Regression Coefficients (Constant) 1.812 .212 Narcissism .132 .265 .033* Primary Psychology .513 .048 .628*** Secondary Psychology .004 .051 .008 Competitive Orientation .024 .011 .128 Individualistic Orientation .027 .014 .119 Cooperative Orientation .022 .011 .124 Note: R2 = .09; ΔR2 = .376. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

162 STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 portunism Scale, as described above, and gether. In other words, he gives you the they continued with their course. After com- chance to play either movement 3 or move- pleting the course, they were asked to take ment 4. How will you play for each of these part voluntarily in an experiment that would three sets?” Participants did not know at this be conducted and to complete a version of point that they would not be playing any the $10 Trust Game, a truncated version of additional sets with this partner, and they the extensive-form game devised by Berg, had no way of estimating the trustworthi- Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), translated ness or other traits of a partner whom they into Greek. The $10 Trust Game is a sequen- could not see. The dollar payoff was adapted tial game presenting the following rules: to Greek currency (Euro) in the description Player 1 has to choose either movement 1 of the game. At the end of the experiment (distrust) avoiding interaction and ending participants were told that the payoff was the game with both players receiving $10, fictitious. or movement 2 (trust), a more rewarding but riskier movement, since it gives Player 2 a RESULTS chance to move. Player 2 can now choose between two moves. Movement 3 is recip- Economic Opportunism Scale’s reliability rocation of trust and cooperation, and in was found to be satisfactory, as Cronbach’s this case Player 1 gains $15 and Player 2 alpha was .82. The dependent measure in gains $25. However, by choosing movement the experiment was cooperative behavior. 4, that is non-reciprocation of trust and This was measured by the number of times defection, Player 2 takes a payoff of $40 that the participant adopted the coopera- and leaves Player 1 with nothing. This tive Movement 3 when playing as Player 2 game is appropriate for measuring coopera- in the $10 Trust Game. The score of the tion, since according to Guunthorsdottir, dependent variable was thus from 0 to 3, McCabe, and Smith (2002), who also used with a higher score indicating greater co- it for this purpose, movements 3 and 4 by operativeness. Player 2 indicate cooperation and defection, Confirming our second hypothesis, the respectively, towards a partner who has al- results showed that opportunistic propen- ready adopted a trusting behavior. Thus, a sity was rather strongly negatively correlated positive correlation of the EOS with defect- with fair, cooperative behavior in the $10 ing behavior in this game could suggest Trust Game (Pearson’s correlation coefficient that opportunistic propensity can predict r = -.471, p < .01, n = 77). unfair economic behavior in a game situa- tion. Movements 1 and 2, which according CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION to the same authors relate to trust rather than cooperation, were not taken into con- The purpose of this study was to explore sideration in this study. the relationships between opportunistic at- Participants first read the rules of the game. titudes and pro-self social value orientation, The instructions were as follows: “Your part- self-focusing, narcissistic and antisocial dis- ner, who is in another class, chooses move- positions and self-interest seeking, non-co- ment 2 for three sets that you will play to- operative behavior in a game situation. STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2 163

Confirming our first hypothesis, the find- sented as hostile, hazardous and controlling, ings showed that opportunistic attitudes are by means of manipulating strategies instead positively correlated to narcissism and to of effort, work, competence and persever- pro-self social value orientation and nega- ance. Therefore, it can be argued that oppor- tively correlated to pro-social social value tunism results from a conflictual combina- orientation. However, the variable having tion between: a) a pro-self (selfish, self-in- the strongest positive correlation with op- terest seeking, narcissistic, anti-social), portunistic attitudes is primary psychopathy rather individualistic and materialistic orien- which explains 37.6% of the total variance tation, a preference for precarious and loose of opportunistic propensity, emerging as social alliances, all characteristics that are the main personality dimension subjacent specific to individualistic cultures (Kim; to economic defection, a finding that un- 1994) and b) a deficit of integration of sev- derlines that an antisocial orientation is eral dominant values and norms of individu- even more susceptible than a narcissistic alistic societies like autonomy and internal- or an individualistic one to correlate with ity. A best integration of these norms could opportunistic propensity. Confirming our probably permit to satisfy the individualistic second hypothesis, Study 2 showed that aims and goals specific to these pro-self ori- opportunistic propensity is negatively cor- entated individuals, by means of more fair related with cooperative economic behav- and legitimate strategies. ior towards trusting, unknown partners in a Future studies should explore to what ex- game situation, thus underlying the inter- tent the relationships between stable oppor- dependence between opportunistic atti- tunistic propensity and opportunistic behav- tudes and non-cooperative, unfair economic ior vary in function of social-psychological, behavior. cultural and situational contexts. For example, A synthesis of these findings with those it would be interesting to study the joint ef- of previous studies highlights a specific pro- fect on fair versus unfair economic behavior file of economic defectors. They have a pro- of a social-psychological variable like the in- self social value orientation, as well as nar- group versus out-group status of partner cissistic and antisocial characteristics of per- compared to more internalized variables, sonality. Low Agreeableness (Sakalaki, such as opportunistic propensity, in order Fousiani, 2012), individualism (Sakalaki, Kazi, to test if situational and social variables, when Karamanoli, 2007) and precariousness of available, prime on attitudes and stable dis- social relationships suggest that relatedness positions. The above findings suggest that and social embeddedness are rather poor. the attribution of opportunism to human na- Finally, opportunists’ external economic ture in general seems to be inadequate and locus of control (Sakalaki, Kanellaki, highlight the greater affinity of economic Richardson, 2009), extrinsic life goals defection and unfairness with a pro-self ori- (Sotiriou, 2010) and extrinsic motivations entation and with narcissistic dispositions (Sakalaki, Fousiani, 2012) suggest that we that are more frequent in individualistic cul- are dealing with a less integrated and less tures. autonomous organization striving to achieve extrinsic goals within an environment repre- Received January 15, 2012 164 STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA, 54, 2012, 2

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ORIENTÁCIA NA SELF A UPREDNOSTŇOVANIE KLAMLIVÝCH STRATÉGIÍ: ORIENTÁCIA NA SPOLOČENSKÚ HODNOTU, DISPOZIČNÉ A BEHAVIORÁLNE KORELÁTY EKONOMICKÉHO OPORTUNIZMU

M. S a k a l a k i, P. S o t i r i o u

Súhrn: Cieľom bolo preskúmať dispozičné a behaviorálne koreláty ekonomickej nečestnosti. Ide predovšetkým o výskum toho: a) či oportunistický prístup meraný škálou ekonomického oportunizmu pozitívne koreluje s narcizmom, psychopatiou a hodnotovou orientáciou na seba, b) do akej miery koreluje oportunistický prístup s nekooperatívnym správaním voči neznámym partnerom v sekvenčnej hre. Výskum potvrdil naše hypotézy: prvá štúdia (n = 125) zistila negatívnu koreláciu oportunistického prístupu k prosociálnej hodnotovej orientácii a pozitívnu koreláciu s hodnotovou orientáciou na seba a tiež s narcizmom a primárnou psychopatiou. Druhá štúdia (n = 77) ukázala, že oportunistický prístup negatívne koreluje s kooperatívnym ekonomickým správaním v hrovej situácii. Dané zistenia vyzdvihujú úzky vzťah medzi preferenciou nekooperatívnych ekonomických stratégií, hodnotovou orientáciou zameranou na seba a tiež na správanie v hrovej situácii, ktoré je orientované na vlastné záujmy.