Journal of Supply Chain Management 2020, (), 1–15 © 2019 The Authors. Journal of Supply Chain Management published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

REINVIGORATING THE STUDY OF OPPORTUNISM IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

FABRICE LUMINEAU Purdue University

NUNO OLIVEIRA Tilburg University

Opportunism is a core issue in supply chain management. However, assumption-omitted testing and a focus on general opportunism as opposed to specific forms of opportunism have stubbornly limited our understanding of this construct. Grounded in a review of empirical studies of opportunism, we identify empirical challenges that perpetuate concep- tual limitations in the study of opportunism in supply chains. Hence, we provide suggestions about research designs and data sources that support an agenda that steers research to refine and develop the theory about opportunism. Our call for a reinvigoration of the study of opportunism supports rigor—by discussing research design and data sources—and rele- vance—by identifying topics for future supply chain research.

Keywords: bibliometric analysis; opportunism; supply chain management; transac- tion costs

Opportunism is pivotal in supply chain manage- increasing attention in recent debates (Foss & Weber, ment (SCM) research (Handley, de Jong, & Benton, 2016a, 2016b; Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016) and 2019; Kaufmann, Wagner, & Carter, 2017; Morgan, empirical studies (Eapen & Krishnan, 2019; Mellewigt, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007). In spite of all the research Hoetker, & Lutkewitte,€ 2018; Villena & Craighead, on opportunism, we have a limited understanding of 2017). this construct. This limitation is rooted in two short- In this study, we argue for the empirical testing of comings: the dearth of testing of the opportunism opportunism and its forms as a path to reconcile assumption and, if tested, the focus on opportunism diverging perspectives concerning its realism. By real- in general as opposed to specific opportunism forms. ism, we mean the extent to which assumed oppor- Hence, we discuss three empirical challenges—the tunism is grounded in empirical evidence and reflects not-out-there problem, the informant’s cost–benefit how individuals behave in practice. Further under- problem, and social desirability—that call for the use standing of the opportunism assumption is important of a wider set of research designs and data sources. for several reasons. First, a better understanding of Moreover, we propose a research agenda for testing this assumption is a first step in addressing long-last- the assumption of opportunism and the study of a ing criticisms regarding the detrimental managerial variety of opportunism forms in supply chains. implications of opportunism by uncovering how and The assumption of opportunism is controversial. On under which conditions it manifests. Second, and per- the one hand, opportunism is a cornerstone of trans- haps more importantly, unrealistic assumptions are action cost economics (TCE), which is one of the likely to generate incorrect theories because the same leading perspectives in SCM (e.g., Grover & Malhotra, prediction may be generated by different mechanisms. 2003; Wever, Wognum, Trienekens, & Omta, 2012). Empirical evidence would support a better under- On the other hand, some scholars have challenged standing of the appropriateness of opportunism as a the assumption of opportunism as being less than representation of human behavior in supply chains. realistic (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Noorderhaven, Our study provides the groundwork for studying the 1996) and “bad for practice” (Ghoshal & Moran, forms, processes, and contingency factors of 1996). This controversy has continued to attract opportunism.

Xxxx 2020 This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any med- 1 ium, provided the original work is properly cited. Journal of Supply Chain Management

We make two main contributions: to identify the realistic for a wide range of economic exchange rela- main challenges faced by researchers who have stud- tionships, instead viewing such relationships as being ied opportunism and to identify research opportuni- infused with trust rather than opportunism (e.g., ties linking the study of opportunism forms to core Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Hesterly & Zenger, 1993; issues in SCM. Our endeavor shows that reinvigorat- Madhok, 1996). This debate began in the 1980s ing the study of opportunism offers bountiful oppor- (Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven, 1985), thrived in tunities to extend theory about traditional issues (e.g., the 1990s (Donaldson, 1990; Griesinger, 1990), and outsourcing) as well as explore emerging issues (e.g., remains lively today (Foss & Weber, 2016a, 2016b; blockchains) in SCM. Lumineau & Verbeke, 2016). Critics usually argue that the assumption of oppor- OPPORTUNISM IN SUPPLY CHAIN tunism paints an under-socialized view of human MANAGEMENT motivation and that human behavior is not ade- quately represented by opportunism. Milgrom and Thesis: The Relevance of Opportunism Roberts (1992, p. 42) conclude that the image of the Transaction cost economics (TCE) is built on an individual in Williamson’s view is as an “extreme cari- assumption of opportunism in combination with cature.” Donaldson (1990) labels this perspective a bounded rationality (John, 1984; Williamson & regressive conception of the human being, and Hodg- Ouchi, 1981). Over the last four decades, researchers son (2004, p. 405) warns of the “possibly deleterious have widely used TCE to address core issues in SCM, practical consequences of a faulty governance analysis such as outsourcing (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2008; based on opportunism alone.” In turn, scholars have Handley, 2017), buyer–supplier disputes (Lumineau & advocated that “actors have to be assumed to be both Henderson, 2012), third-party logistics (Leuschner, opportunistic and not opportunistic” (Noorderhaven, Carter, Goldsby, & Rogers, 2014), manufacturing loca- 1995, p. 605) in what mainly represents a “switch to tion decisions (McIvor, 2013), and governance deci- a different model of human nature” (Noorderhaven, sions (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). 1996, p. 108). A central assumption in TCE is that the threat of opportunism is inherent in economic transactions. The Need for a Synthesis Opportunism refers to “self-interest seeking with guile. The controversy is fundamentally about a view of This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant human nature as opposed to the notion of oppor- forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating [...] More tunism as self-interest with guile. We regard the piv- generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete or otal issue in this debate as the realism of this distorted disclosure of information, especially to cal- behavioral assumption—that is, the extent to which culated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, this assumption reflects managers’ actual behaviors. or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). Tsang (2006, p. 1002) argues that “an unrealistic core According to the TCE literature, the problem of eco- assumption will lead to an unrealistic mechanistic nomic organization entails the planning of gover- explanation and thus a defective theory.” Better empir- nance structures that have the purpose and effect of ical testing of opportunism would aid researchers in economizing on bounded rationality while safeguard- their assessment of the extent to which, and when, ing transactions against the threat of opportunism. In this core behavioral assumption adheres to field evi- conjunction with the idea of bounded rationality, dence. An alternative approach, mainly in economics, opportunism is thus understood as a leading reason argues that it does not matter whether the assump- for the failure of markets and for the existence of tions of a theory are realistic so long as the theory firms. If individuals never engaged in opportunistic yields sufficiently accurate predictions (Friedman, behavior, then the market would suffice for the medi- 1953). However, we believe that behavioral assump- ation of all transactions, including those characterized tions should be submitted to empirical testing as this by uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity. Wil- is indeed a way to develop theory (Alvesson & Sand- liamson (1999, p. 1099) concludes that “to assume berg, 2011; Foss & Hallberg, 2014). the absence of opportunism will miss much of the The debate on the behavioral assumption of oppor- action [and] our understanding of economic organiza- tunism suffers from two shortcomings. First, “the his- tion would be needlessly impoverished as a conse- tory of empirical research since the publication of quence.” Williamson’s seminal book, Markets and Hierarchies,in 1975 has been dominated by assumption-omitted Antithesis: The Irrelevance of Opportunism testing” (Tsang, 2006, p. 1005), as studies seldom In contrast, many influential scholars have criticized gauge opportunistic behaviors in their empirical tests. the assumption of opportunism as being less than Accordingly, researchers have noted that “given its

2 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

theoretical centrality, it is surprising that the empirical found that opportunism research has mostly drawn literature is largely devoid of efforts to measure oppor- on surveys conducted in the U.S. and European con- tunism” (Macher & Richman, 2008, p. 40). texts and focused on conventional supply chain set- Second, the tendency has been to examine oppor- tings (Appendix S1). tunism in general (Mellewigt et al., 2018; Ro, Su, & Chen, 2016; Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010). However, a handful of studies have made inroads in the study EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY of specific forms of opportunism such as shirking and OF OPPORTUNISM poaching (Handley & Benton, 2012) and bluffing Our analysis of past articles’ methodology and limi- (Kaufmann et al., 2017). These empirical studies high- tations identified three empirical challenges: the not- light the relevance of examining the context of forms out-there problem, the informant’s cost–benefit prob- of opportunism. To echo Chen, Peng, and Saparito lem, and the social desirability problem. These empiri- (2002, p. 568), “to make further theoretical progress, cal challenges reflect distinct but interrelated issues at researchers must tackle the harder and more interest- different stages of the research process: ways to cap- ing issues of what kinds of individuals are likely to be ture opportunism and identify data sources, strategies opportunists, under what circumstances, and to what to motivate respondents, and approaches to minimize extent.” More broadly, “any effort to bridge this gap biases in the data on opportunism. Figure 1 presents [between TCE and SCM] is therefore welcome” (Zip- the empirical challenges during the research process. kin, 2012, p. 465). The stages are ideal types that support our discussion Thus, leveraging studies about theory assumptions of connections among methodological and conceptual (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Foss & Hallberg, 2014; issues for each empirical challenge. Table 1 summa- Miller & Tsang, 2011), we call for direct measures of rizes each empirical challenge. different forms of opportunism in order to theorize if and when forms of opportunism manifest in supply The Not-Out-There Problem chains. Doing so is a step forward toward reconcile Problem Scope. The not-out-there problem pertains conflicting views on opportunism. A synthesis requires to the elusive nature of opportunism. Opportunism is attending the methods used thus far in past research, a canonical example of a difficult-to-capture construct since theory and methods are interwoven (Van Maa- (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). For example, a buyer usually nen, Sørenson, & Mitchell, 2007). An analysis of the cannot know if she or he has been swindled by a sup- linkages between the methodological and conceptual plier until the transaction has actually been completed issues will provide practical guidance for subjecting (and sometimes not even then). Bluffing and decep- this core behavioral assumption to empirical tests tion behaviors illustrate specific forms of opportunism about core issues in SCM. that are often concealed to external observers (Rotten- burger & Kaufmann, 2019). Like other deceitful prac- tices or socially questionable behaviors such as EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF OPPORTUNISM bullying and corruption, opportunism is not “a phe- We reviewed the empirical studies of opportunism nomenon ‘out there’ that impinges upon organiza- in order to learn about factors contributing to the tional action, but a dark interior to be found within assumption-omitted testing and a focus on general organizational boundaries and practice” (Linstead, opportunism in the SCM literature. We conducted a Marechal, & Griffin, 2014, p. 166). Hence, our notion multistep search of top-tier journals in SCM and clo- of the not-out-there problem encompasses the diffi- sely related disciplines to identify the empirical studies culty of accessing opportunism and its different forms on opportunism. We developed a set of search words in supply chains. based on a comprehensive list of forms of oppor- Methodological Issues. The not-out-there problem tunism, such as lying and cheating. (The Appendix S1 complicates access to data in the study of oppor- details the review procedures and results.) In total, tunism in supply chains. It is plausible that certain our review of 83 empirical studies reveals the diffi- forms of opportunism are easier to capture than culty in understanding opportunism both in theory others. For example, blatant forms of opportunism and in practice. such as lying and stealing are more easily captured We discuss core issues about testing the oppor- than instances in which the supplier intentionally tunism assumption and elicit information about manipulates or withholds product information from opportunism forms. First, by analyzing the methods the buyer. The ease of capturing forms of oppor- and limitations sections of the 83 articles, we learned tunism may lead scholars to overestimate the role of that researchers encounter major empirical challenges some forms of opportunism and underestimate the testing the assumption of opportunism. Second, we role of others (Table 1).

Xxxx 2020 3 Journal of Supply Chain Management

FIGURE 1 Three Interrelated Challenges to the Study of Opportunism.

Challenge 1: Challenge 2: Challenge 3: The Not-Out-There The Informant’s Cost- The Social Desirability Problem Benefit Problem Problem

Traditionally Actual observed opportunism opportunism (i.e., the whole (i.e., a subset of the phenomenon) actual phenomenon)

Note: The three research problems broadly map onto how researchers typically progress from an idea to designing a study and analyzing data. The light-colored box on the left hand side represents the subcomponent of the phenomenon that is traditionally observed by researchers. As we move from left to right along the research process, the darker colored cells represent the components of the phenomenon of opportunism that researchers are actually able to observe after specific empirical challenges have been overcome. The darkest colored cells represent the entirety of the phenomenon of opportunism, which plausibly remains to be examined; however, empirical challenges have traditionally prevented scholars from completing this analysis

The major hurdle involves the biases that are evi- and departmental or organizational practices of dent in the available data on opportunistic behaviors. opportunism. An informant’s participation in oppor- Only extreme cases of opportunism become public. tunism studies is a function of his/her potential losses The not-out-there problem requires caution when ana- and benefits. lyzing potential differences between detected and Forms of opportunism are traditionally perpetrated (still) undetected cases of opportunism. Given the by an individual party or group toward a counterparty prevalence of research designs aimed at generalizabil- or group (e.g., consumers or investors). If the infor- ity, the not-out-there problem raises questions about mant is the perpetrator, she or he might be perceived the external validity of the empirical literature on as a traitor by her or his peers in the organization or opportunism. industry (reputational costs); dismissed (financial Conceptual Issues. The difficulty of capturing oppor- costs); or faced with social stigma, shame, or prosecu- tunism is a broad challenge in SCM research. Studies tion by industry regulators and law enforcement on opportunism seldom address the distinction authorities (reputational and financial costs). If the between the propensity to act opportunistically and informant is the victim, she or he might experience opportunistic behavior (Das & Rahman, 2002). Con- distress (emotional costs); dismissal (financial costs); ceptual studies of opportunism adhere to TCE regard- and loss of her or his peers’ trust and respect (reputa- ing the opportunism propensity; however, empirical tional costs). Some individuals may be driven by studies have often amalgamated attitudes and behav- altruistic or moral motives to contribute to the iors in their measures of self-interest seeking with research; some may simply be willing to share experi- guile. This amalgamation is problematic; it clouds the ences. However, the costs of managers’ participation inner processes linking attitudes and behaviors, and are usually higher than their benefits. the attitudes that prompt behaviors that are generally Methodological Issues. Surveys have prevailed in viewed as opportunistic. studies of opportunism, but high costs of informants have contributed to modest sample sizes, which weak- The Informant’s Cost–Benefit Problem ens the power of the analyses and the transferability Problem Scope. Managers may be reluctant to share of the findings across empirical settings (Luo, 2007a, information about, for example, individuals’ attitudes 2007b; Zhou & Xu, 2012).

4 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

TABLE 1 Empirical Challenges to the Study of Opportunism

Informant’s Cost–Benefit The Social Desirability Not-Out-There Problem Problem Problem Problem Scope Opportunism is elusive Respondents may be unwilling Opportunism is socially and often hidden, thus or unavailable to share undesirable such that making it difficult to information on opportunism individuals prefer to identify and capture. attitudes or behaviors due to answer the researcher’s potential costs (e.g., questions in such a reputation damage). manner that they will be Respondents may viewed favorably. overemphasize the risks compared to the benefits. Methodological Examples: Examples: Examples: Issues Data nonequivalence. Small sample size (particularly Socially desirable Nonobservation of relevant in survey research). responses (particularly opportunistic behavior. Single observation point in relevant in survey Sampling bias. time. research). One-sided data (no dyadic Respondents recognize analysis). opportunism items. Single informant. Information retrieval bias. Conceptual Examples: Examples: Examples: Issues Ambiguity between Scarcity of theory on dynamics Concealment of the opportunism propensity and temporal issues about drivers of opportunistic and actual opportunistic opportunism. attitudes. behavior. Overlooking of asymmetries Ambiguous linkage Current insights concern between parties. between attitudes and forms of opportunism behaviors in that are easy to capture opportunism research. empirically. Limited information about managers’ true assumptions and motives. Practical implications in Practical implications in SCM: Practical implications in SCM: For example, limited SCM: For example, incomplete information and advice about For example, incipient training of managers to specific organizational and advice on how managers identify and cope with industry contexts (e.g., fear of actually cope with guilt, severe, but understudied retaliation). shame, and blaming. forms of opportunism.

Each of the three challenges entails both methodological and conceptual issues, which, in turn, have practical implications for SCM.

The high costs facing informants might limit the set about the use of their data for academic research of research designs that are feasible for researchers despite confidentiality agreements. Confidentiality (Table 1). For instance, an in-depth analysis of oppor- concerns are exacerbated in dyadic studies involving tunism requires that researchers persuade firms to par- data collection from the potential perpetrator and vic- ticipate in what might be a lengthy research process tim (e.g., buyer and supplier). involving interviews, focus groups and analysis of sec- Conceptual Issues. A notable shortcoming relates to ondary data—as opposed to surveys that might be a the difficulty of engaging informants in analyses of one-off event and administrated online. Even when the dynamics of opportunism over a period of time managers agree to host a study about opportunism (e.g., during contract negotiations or for the duration (e.g., lying and cheating), they may remain concerned of a buyer–supplier agreement). Engaging respondents

Xxxx 2020 5 Journal of Supply Chain Management

over a period of time is necessary to advance theory Kumar, 2011; Jap, 2007). Here, the concern is not about shifts in opportunistic attitudes or the emer- about getting managers to share information but gence of specific forms of opportunism. The theory about whether the researcher accurately captures sensi- remains limited with regard to temporal aspects, such tive issues that underlie emotions and actions relating as the timing of partners’ opportunism and retalia- to opportunism. As Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorder- tion, the speed of the opportunism, or the intensity of haven (1997, p. 774) observe, the study of an individ- the opportunism over time. ual’s propensity for opportunism “requires touching Furthermore, the organizational and cultural con- causes rooted in people’s mind and heart.” The social texts might complicate the informant’s cost–benefit desirability problem presents a serious hurdle for problem. First, organizations differ in how much they researchers seeking to access the so-called black box of might incentivize their employees to report oppor- managers’ feelings and emotions surrounding different tunism. Some organizations may actively develop pro- opportunism forms. cedures for reporting opportunism while others may nurture a culture of secrecy. Second, the individual’s values plausibly alter the relationship between the RESEARCH DESIGNS AND DATA SOURCES: potential losses and expected benefits for respondents. RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES Overcoming the empirical challenges previously The Social Desirability Problem identified will require researchers taking advantage of Problem Scope. Deceitfulness and guile are at the a wide set of research designs and data sources. core of the opportunism construct (John, 1984; Wil- Table 2 provides an overview of the main advantages liamson, 1985). These attributes make opportunism and disadvantages of specific research designs and an “unflattering behavioral assumption” (Williamson, data sources to study opportunism. We discuss next 1995, p. 29). Managers seldom want to be perceived how leveraging these research designs and data as opportunistic. The social undesirability of oppor- sources could help toward further testing the assump- tunism prompts individuals to answer questions in a tion of opportunism as well as developing theory manner that improve others’ perceptions of them. about multiple opportunism forms in supply chains. In light of the dominance of the Western context in tests of opportunism, the social desirability problem Survey Design requires caution with regard to received wisdom. For Surveys have dominated past research on oppor- instance, collectivistic countries may react more tunism. Such a pattern makes possible an evaluation strongly to opportunistic behavior by a manager of the extent to which surveys overcome each of the because it may be perceived to affect the collective empirical challenges of studying opportunism (Table 2; identity of the firm (Chen et al., 2002; Handley & top row). As for the not-out-there problem, surveys are Angst, 2015). However, in a highly individualistic useful for capturing blunt and general forms of oppor- country, the same opportunistic behavior may be tunism, but nuanced forms of opportunism might be attributed only to the individual perpetrator. overlooked. Scholars tend to survey the most visible Methodological Issues. The “unflattering” nature of and more accessible manifestations of opportunism, opportunism exacerbates the threats to validity rooted thus falling prey to the “streetlight effect.” in the social desirability problem. In their review of Due to the sensitive nature and potential high costs the opportunism literature, Crosno and Dahlstrom of answering questions about opportunism, the ease (2008, p. 193) indeed observe that “given the nature of use of surveys minimizes the costs to the infor- of opportunism, these [self-] reports should yield mant. Particular attention needs to be given to extra lower levels of opportunism and weaker effect sizes.” guarantees of anonymity, confidentiality, and benefits This quote illustrates the challenges of developing to participants (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003, p. robust estimates based on survey data, which have 215). Rewards and gifts may increase the value of par- dominated the research on opportunism. The failure ticipation. However, ironically, opportunistic individu- to curb the social desirability problem contributes to als may choose to participate with the sole purpose of underestimating (when evaluating oneself) or overesti- receiving financial incentives or as revenge against the mating opportunism (when evaluating a counterpart), opportunistic party. thus also undermining the internal validity of empiri- We envisage opportunities to draw on tried and tested cal tests. survey design techniques to collect data on oppor- Conceptual Issues. The social desirability problem tunism. The unflattering nature of opportunism calls prevents SCM researchers from accurately and easily for the use of, for example, forced-choice items, ran- assessing the individual’s motivations that consciously domized response techniques, the self-administration or unconsciously drive opportunistic behavior (Das & of questionnaires, the selection and training of

6 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

TABLE 2 Comparison of Research Designs in the Study of Opportunism

The Not-Out-There The Informant’s Cost– The Social Desirability Problem Benefit Problem Problem Survey Design (+) Convenient way to (+) Low costs for (+) Existence of tried and (Dominant collect data about respondents (role of tested strategies to curb research opportunism from financial and nonfinancial social desirability biases in design in prior managers incentives) surveys, both in prevention studies) (À) Difficulty of accessing (À) A party’s survey about and detection representative samples opportunism might raise its (À) The “unflattering nature” (hampers external validity) partner’s suspicion of opportunism is a threat (À) Risk of observational (importance of anonymity to truthful responses biases and confidentiality) (À) Risk of bystander effect and cultural issues Laboratory (+) Use of vignettes to (+) Perpetrators and victims (+) Use of scenarios curbs Experiments elicit data on face low financial or social desirability opportunism reputation costs associated with questions (+) To manipulate variables (À) Costs and benefits vary about opportunism of interest (but not in organizational contexts (+) Opportunities to take accessible otherwise) (not captured in advantage of new (À) No organizational laboratory) technologies to minimize context to study social desirability opportunism (À) Social desirability may stem from the experimental setup and/or the experimenter Field (+) Observation of (+) Low costs to informants (+) Study manager’s reaction Experiments opportunism in context to participate in studies of to opportunism in situ (+) Study of managers’ opportunism (À) If individuals find out reactions to events (+) Use of multiple about the study, the (À) Difficult to persuade informants in their work likelihood of social firms to participate context during the study desirability is high of opportunism (À) High costs for the hosting organization (e.g., setting up the experiment) Case Studies (+) Rich account of specific (+) Opportunity to study the (+) Use of triangulation and and forms of opportunism formation of perceptions indirect questioning Ethnography (+) Informant might about partners’ (+) Use of covert research provide leads to cases opportunism techniques to tap into of opportunism or (À) High researcher sensitive questions relevant informants investment in gaining (À) High cost of training (À) Firm’s unwillingness to informant’s trust to answer interviewers to prevent cooperate with sensitive questions about respondent’s bias on researchers interested opportunism sensitive questions in opportunism (À) High costs for the (À) Rationalization of events hosting organization and by managers (unwillingness participants to admit a weakness)

We use (+) for illustrating an advantage and (À) is an illustration of a disadvantage. interviewers, or proxy subjects (Nederhof, 1984). The Tourangeau, 2008), and industry-specific social con- bystander effects, informants’ cultural sensibilities ventions (Kriauciunas, Parmigiani, & Rivera-Santos, (Christensen & Rosenthal, 1982; Kreuter, Presser, & 2011) are relevant when studying the extent to which

Xxxx 2020 7 Journal of Supply Chain Management

cultural and interpersonal factors underpin oppor- structure) and the experimenter (e.g., appearance, tunism in supply chains within and across industries. race) may trigger respondent’s social desirability The use of surveys will continue to support the test- biases. Such issues might be more relevant in studies ing of the assumption of opportunism. Surveys are a about individual’s reactions and feeling toward coun- prime research design to collect dyadic and longitudi- terparty’s opportunism. nal data, where SCM theory about multiparty pro- cesses and patterns of opportunism remains scant. Field Experiments The use of field experiments remains scarce in SCM Laboratory Experiments studies of opportunism (for exceptions, see Jap, 2003, Laboratory experiments are particularly promising to 2007). Building on the exemplary field experiments of address the not-out-there problem in two ways deceitful behaviors other than opportunism (Aven, 2015; (Table 2). First, one of their advantages is to enable Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, & Taylor, 2002), we argue that researchers to use scenarios to “generate” specific field experiments not only address the not-out-there forms of opportunism that are otherwise inaccessible problem but also capture the organizational and industry to study (Ro et al., 2016; Rottenburger & Kaufmann, contexts. Researchers can study managers’ reactions to a 2019). Scenarios are presented to participants as vign- specific event in their work context (Table 2). ettes that convey carefully scripted descriptions of the The informant’s costs associated with field experi- variables under study. For instance, future research ments vary. Managers tend to be reluctant to engage might use experiments to examine events that trigger in field experiments, perhaps because such experi- individual’s opportunism (Carter & Stevens, 2007; ments require tight coordination between the Seggie, Griffith, & Jap, 2013), such as shirking or researcher and the firm (e.g., setting up the treatment lying. Second, researchers may experimentally manip- and control groups). Researchers might also take ulate the main partner’s characteristics to test hypothe- advantage of industry events—such as changes in reg- ses about managers’ preferences for punishment—or ulations—to carry out a field experiment such that the lack thereof—in reaction to partners’ opportunism. informant’s costs are minimal (Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Future experimental research should start to isolate Wade, & Quinn, 2013). Another advantage is the explanatory mechanisms of opportunism between opportunity to study multiple individuals from the buyers and suppliers (Handley & Angst, 2015). same organization while in their work context, which We envisage opportunities to use experimental allows researchers the advantage of not relying on a research where the informant’s cost–benefit problem single informant only. is an issue (e.g., managers’ fear of retaliation, guilt, The control group and the experimental group are and embarrassment). If the study is about the perpe- often unaware that a study is being conducted; thus, trator of opportunism, respondents do not feel that social desirability concerns are reduced. For example, they will incur financial or reputational costs by dis- Jap (2007) uses 25 quasi-experiments to study how closing information about their firm. If the study is the buyer’s auction design (e.g., the number of bid- about the victim of opportunism, participants might ders and price visibility) affected the buyer–supplier find the laboratory setting a more comfortable place relationship. Her findings show how a higher number to answer questions, take part in role-playing or share of bidders increase the supplier’s suspicions of oppor- their experience. In addressing the informant’s cost– tunism toward the buyer. benefit problem, we advise researchers to be mindful that some costs (e.g., reputation) vary across indus- Case Studies and Ethnography tries and cultural contexts, which are hard to capture Case studies and ethnographic research typically in laboratory experiments. draw on extensive and detailed data sources to over- Experimental designs further address the social desir- come the not-out-there problem (Table 2). In their ability problem in the study of opportunism (Table 2). study of multiple cases of buyer–supplier relationships Future researchers can take advantage of psychophysi- in Brazil, Brito and Miguel (2017) learned from their ological (e.g., eye tracking) and neuroimaging tools interviewees how unexplained and apparently oppor- (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging), which tunistic behaviors (e.g., unwillingness to share infor- generally are less affected by the social desirability mation) were deemed disrespectful according to local problem, in studies of opportunism (Dimoka et al., cultural values. Qualitative research is particularly 2012). Future experimental research is thus particu- appropriate for capturing the “hearts and minds” of larly suitable to test the relationships among oppor- the perpetrators and victims (Nooteboom et al., tunism and the concepts (e.g., flexibility, power) that 1997). are central to the SCM literature in a controlled envi- If the researcher remains in the organization for a ronment. Scholars should keep in mind that labora- relatively long period, she or he may be perceived as tory designs (e.g., wording of instructions, task an insider and be privy to secrets about opportunistic

8 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

practices. Respondents’ psychological costs of sharing quality standards (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2017). Meet- information progressively decrease. A drawback is that ing minutes specifically address the not-out-there participating organizations incur the high costs associ- problem of opportunism instances. Thus, these docu- ated with extended periods of research and in-depth ments provide researchers an opportunity to advance analyses. Researchers must also think through issues research on how managers cope with the daily man- related to rapport and attachment to participants agement of supply chains. Furthermore, professional (Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, & Liamputtong, 2009). counseling records also provide rare access to the The ethnographic study of transparency by Bernstein emotions of victims of opportunism (Table 3). (2012) in a Chinese factory used covert techniques to Third Parties. An array of third parties, such as study how workers curb their efforts when they are auditing firms (Short, Toffel, & Hugill, 2016) and not supervised or observed. In opportunism studies, trade associations (Abernethy, Bouwens, & Kroos, we suggest that future observational studies might also 2017), manages large repositories of data on oppor- use covert techniques—which may entail some ele- tunism-related issues. For example, Lumineau and ment of deception (Roulet, Gill, Stenger, & Gill, Oxley (2012) accessed a law firm’s legal files concern- 2017)—to help them study opportunism unfolding in ing buyer–supplier disputes that included recorded the organizational context (e.g., during outsourcing behaviors linked to opportunism (e.g., misappropria- negotiations). Covert techniques mitigate the social tion of rents). Platforms generate data that were not desirability problem (Table 2). previously available to researchers interested in oppor- tunism. In-depth analyses enable researchers to cap- Widening the Set of Data Sources on ture modifications to supply chain activities and the Opportunism degree of cooperation, or lack therefore, of actors in Opportunities to study opportunism accrue from the supply chain. Nongovernmental organizations data sources that require minimal, if any, direct input such as Transparency International, the Construction from the informant. Table 3 shows the data sources Sector Transparency Initiative, and the Open Contract- that might be used to study opportunism. ing Partnership, also collect data on opportunism-re- Perpetrators. Organizational records, such as meet- lated practices in public tendering processes. ing minutes, emails, and transaction documents, pro- Generally, we are encouraged by such data-related vide a glimpse of practices concerning opportunism. developments, but the challenges ahead call on SCM By inspecting a firm’s documents, the researcher may researchers from different research traditions to join gain access to the operations of the perpetrators while efforts to empirically study opportunism in supply circumventing the social desirability problem chains. (Table 3). However, managers might report only the extreme cases of opportunism where legal action is perhaps required, thus leaving out mundane forms of FURTHER TOPICS FOR RESEARCH opportunism that might have a bearing on the rela- Taking advantage of our suggestions about the study tionships among supply chain members. of opportunism in supply chains, Table 4 summarizes Victims. We invite researchers to take advantage of an agenda for future research. This agenda fore- the opportunity to theorize the role of victims of grounds research about different opportunism forms opportunism. Records of transactions, management and the future of opportunism in supply chains. support systems, strategic documents, and internal communications (e.g., emails and memos) often pro- Shifting the Research Focus from General to vide candid views of a partner’s opportunism. In orga- Specific Opportunism Forms nizational behavior (Conway & Briner, 2002; Tuckey First, we argue that the likelihood of opportunism & Neall, 2014), the use of diaries has also proved use- remains a central issue in SCM (Table 4). Future test- ful for gathering data on other difficult-to-capture con- ing of the assumption of opportunism will address cepts, such as victims’ emotions in cases of bullying the little knowledge available about whether oppor- or employees’ perceived breach of the psychological tunism is null or extremely unlikely (thus supporting contracts by employers. Diary studies allow scholars the unrealism of the assumption), or its frequency to focus on opportunism-related issues in a single (thus supporting the realism of the assumption). organization or dyad; however, they are less feasible Moreover, future empirical studies of opportunism in examining extended supply chains. will provide an evidentiary basis about when oppor- Building projects provide a typical example in which tunism is unlikely versus frequent (thus supporting a the minutes of meetings among the client, contractors, contingency argument; see Kelly, Wagner, & Ramsay, and project managers provide detailed accounts of 2018 for an exception). instances in which managers may “cut corners” by Second, we submit that generative knowledge about willingly supplying materials below agreed-upon the unrealism versus realism of the opportunism

Xxxx 2020 9 Journal of Supply Chain Management

TABLE 3 Unobtrusive Data Sources

The Informant’s The Social Examples of Data The Not-Out-There Cost–Benefit Desirability Sources Problem Problem Problem Perpetrator • Internal memos, • For example, • For example, • For example, minutes, and confessions protection incentives transaction provide schemes of provided by documents insights into whistleblowers authorities • Confessions perpetrators’ reduce informant’s encourage and biographies opportunism costs through perpetrators • Whistleblowers practices in anonymity to answer an industry truthfully about their actions Victim • Strategy documents • For example, • For example, • For example, and internal counseling diaries and internal communication notes capture biographies documents • Suppliers’ audits feelings and yield low costs provide already • HR records, emotions of for the victims collected data counseling notes victims of about opportunism opportunism, thus limiting the social desirability problem Third party • Advisory firms • For example, • For example, neither • For example, • Transparency provides data the perpetrator low social International, on multiple nor the victim are desirability; Open Contracting forms of involved in data data from third Partnership opportunism collection parties often entails expert evidence (no self-reports)

assumption can be advanced by studying different form opportunism from weak-form opportunism by forms of opportunism in supply chains (Table 4). examining complaints voiced by firms in documents Conceptual studies have devised many opportunism exchanged with their business partners. Future types. For instance, Griesinger (1990) categorizes research will advance the SCM literature by identifying opportunistic behavior into three types (dishonesty, the salience in specific opportunism forms across sup- infidelity, and shirking), and Wathne and Heide ply chain settings. (2000) suggest four opportunism types (evasion, Third, we envisage opportunities to conduct empiri- adaptation refusal, violation, and forced renegotia- cal studies on processes by which specific oppor- tion). Building on these instructive conceptual discus- tunism forms manifest (Table 4). For instance, we still sions, we call on SCM researchers to carry out know little about the potentially different origins and systematic research about the multidimensionality of consequences of opportunism in outsourcing (e.g., the opportunism construct. Two studies in particular Handley, 2017) compared to third-party logistics (e.g., have made progress in testing opportunism types. Leuschner et al., 2014) or manufacturing location Handley and Benton (2012) developed their own decisions (McIvor, 2013). In addition, future research- scales to empirically distinguish manifestations of ers can distinguish the different stages of each SCM shirking and poaching in buyer–supplier relationships. arrangement as a way to explore the process of oppor- Lumineau and Quelin (2012) disentangled strong- tunism manifestation across stages from partner

10 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

TABLE 4 Further Topics for Research on Opportunism in Supply Chains

From General Opportunism to Turning the Attention to the Opportunism Forms Automation of Opportunism Likelihood The (un)realism of the opportunism The influence of new technologies for assumption in supply chains curbing or fostering opportunism What is the likelihood of opportunism? What is the likelihood of opportunism in To what extent is opportunism likely to automated transactions (e.g., smart hamper the function of supply chains? contracts)? To what extent does the use of blockchain technology affect the likelihood of opportunism in supply chains? Opportunism Opportunism forms in supply chains Technology-embedded opportunism Forms What are the main opportunism forms forms (e.g., dishonesty, shirking) in supply What opportunism forms are mitigated chains forms (e.g., dyads vs. networks)? by automating transactions across the Which opportunism forms do managers supply chain? recognize? Which opportunism forms develop with the design and use of blockchain technology in supply chains? Processes The processes that underlie the New technology’s implications for the antecedents and outcomes of processes that underlie the antecedents opportunism in supply chains and outcomes of opportunism How do specific opportunism forms occur Ex ante and ex post, who engages with in the design and operation of supply opportunism in automated transactions? chains? How can opportunism spread or be What are the different motivations to contained in large, automated systems engage with opportunism ex ante of transactions? vs. ex post? Contingency The conditions under which opportunism Conditions under which opportunism manifests in supply chains might become automated When do cultural factors curb or prompt When automated systems are the most opportunism forms? resilient to opportunism? Which industry features exacerbate Under which conditions can technology opportunism forms? actually enable opportunism in supply chains?

The gray cell indicates the enduring debate about the (un)realism of the opportunism assumption in supply chains; this debate provides the starting point for future research that examines different forms of opportunism, processes, and contingency factors as research (a) moves from the study of general opportunism to develop a granular understanding of multiple forms of oppor- tunism and (b) turns attention to the automation of opportunism in supply chains. selection, negotiation, implementation, and operation (e.g., North American versus Asian, or African versus under that agreement. We envisage plentiful opportu- European). The SCM literature has yet to empirically nities to study the temporal aspects (e.g., sequence examine the implications of the institutional context and pace) in explicating opportunism (Oliveira & —e.g., national culture, legal framework—for the Lumineau, 2019). manifestations of opportunism in supply chains Finally, we call for research that examines oppor- (Table 4). Such research would reveal the conditions tunism forms in order to research contingency factors under which the disruption of global supply chains about opportunism (Rindfleisch et al., 2010; for might occur due to specific opportunism forms, thus exceptions, see Handley & Angst, 2015; Handley & providing relevant insight to design global supply Benton, 2012). SCM stands to benefit from future chains that are resilient to opportunism across research on cross-cultural elements of opportunism national contexts.

Xxxx 2020 11 Journal of Supply Chain Management

The Automation of Opportunism in Supply Chains identify three major empirical challenges to the study The spread of automation in supply chains raises of opportunism: the not-out-there problem, the infor- novel questions about opportunism (Table 4). Data on mant’s cost–benefit problem, and the social desirabil- e-procurement, for instance, may be used to examine ity problem. Second, we showed that adopting new specific forms of opportunism in automated transac- and varied research designs and data sources are tions. Researchers are advised to examine the motiva- instrumental in the advancement of the theories of tions of those that produce the data, but we think that opportunism. Finally, we noted specific ways in which machine-enabled transactions provide SCM researchers to refine existing and develop new theories with with renewed opportunities to study opportunism. regard to opportunism in SCM. The reinvigoration of Opportunism has traditionally been associated with the study of the phenomenon of opportunism will a heavy reliance on third parties—such as banks, provide numerous opportunities for SCM researchers financial bookers, and auditing firms—and limited and practitioners. transparency among the parties. The removal of inter- mediaries and enhanced transparency support the common expectation that the automation of transac- tions will decrease, if not eliminate, concerns about REFERENCES opportunism (Roeck, Sternberg, & Hofmann, 2019; Abernethy, M. A., Bouwens, J., & Kroos, P. (2017). Organization identity and earnings manipulation. Saberi, Kouhizadeh, Sarkis, & Shen, 2019). Accounting, Organizations and Society, 58, 1–14. On the one hand, automatically executed transac- Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating tions decrease the margin for opportunistic behaviors research questions through problematization. by compelling the parties to perform according to an Academy of Management Review, 36, 247–271. established agreement. In blockchain-based technol- Aven, B. L. (2015). The paradox of corrupt networks: ogy, the electronic records are not only virtually An analysis of organizational crime at Enron. impossible to tamper with but are also easily traceable Organization Science, 26, 980–996. (Rauchs et al., 2018; Tucker & Catalini, 2018). In Bernstein, E. S. (2012). The transparency paradox: A turn, opportunistic behaviors are thought to be easily role for privacy in organizational learning and detectable, if not altogether preventable. operational control. Administrative Science Quar- – On the other hand, automation and blockchain tech- terly, 57, 181 216. Brito, R., & Miguel, P. (2017). Power, governance, nology are not a panacea to mitigate opportunism. and value in collaboration: Differences between Indeed, future researchers are advised to observe that buyer and supplier perspectives. Journal of Supply human actors continue to be involved at the interface Chain Management, 53, 61–87. between the digital and the physical world, which Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the inter- might give rise to opportunism that is embedded in play between contractual and relational gover- how new technologies operate (Table 4). Future nance: A qualitative and meta-analytic research on forms of opportunism, processes and con- investigation. Journal of Operations Management, tingency factors will benefit to turn attention to the 33, 15–42. design stage of automation in supply chains. It is also Carter, C. R., & Stevens, C. K. (2007). Electronic plausible that the sources of opportunism might differ reverse auction configuration and its impact on buyer price and supplier perceptions of oppor- between traditional supply chains and supply chains tunism: A laboratory experiment. Journal of Opera- that rely on more automation. In the latter, the threat tions Management, 25, 1035–1054. of opportunism is likely to concentrate on the stages of Chen, C., Peng, M., & Saparito, P. (2002). Individual- the supply chain where individuals are directly ism, collectivism, and opportunism: A cultural involved (e.g., when individuals design the system). perspective on transaction cost economics. Journal Therefore, concerns about opportunism between of Management, 28, 567–583. individuals might become less relevant (as automa- Christensen, D., & Rosenthal, R. (1982). Gender and tion supports secure transactions among strangers), nonverbal decoding skill as determinants of inter- while the sources of opportunism related to the sys- personal expectancy effects. Journal of Personality – tem itself will become critical. The design of automa- and Social Psychology, 42, 75 87. tion systems provides a fertile ground to research Conner, K. R., & Prahalad, C. K. (1996). A resource- based theory of the firm: Knowledge versus about opportunism in supply chains. opportunism. Organization Science, 7, 477–501. Conway, N., & Briner, R. B. (2002). A daily diary study of affective responses to psychological con- CONCLUSION tract breach and exceeded promises. Journal of We argued for further empirical tests of the behav- Organizational Behavior, 23, 287–302. ioral assumption of opportunism. First, we conducted Crosno, J. L., & Dahlstrom, R. (2008). A meta-analytic an extensive review of the empirical literature to review of opportunism in exchange relationships.

12 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36, management research: Theory and measurement. 191–201. Journal of Operations Management, 21, 457–473. Das, T. K., & Kumar, R. (2011). Regulatory focus and Handley, S. (2017). How governance misalignment opportunism in the alliance development process. and outsourcing capability impact performance. Journal of Management, 37, 682–708. Production and Operations Management, 26, 134– Das, T. K., & Rahman, N. (2002). Opportunism 155. dynamics in strategic alliances. Cooperative Strate- Handley, S. M., & Angst, C. M. (2015). The impact of gies and Alliances,1,89–118. culture on the relationship between governance Dickson-Swift, V., James, E. L., Kippen, S., & Liamput- and opportunism in outsourcing relationships. tong, P. (2009). Researching sensitive topics: Strategic Management Journal, 36, 1412–1434. Qualitative research as emotion work. Qualitative Handley, S., & Benton, W. (2012). The influence of Research,9,61–79. exchange hazards and power on opportunism in Dimoka, A., Banker, R. D., Benbasat, I., Davis, F. D., outsourcing relationships. Journal of Operations Dennis, A. R., Gefen, D., ... & Weber, B. (2012). Management, 30, 55–68. On the use of neurophysiological tools in IS Handley, S. M., de Jong, J., & Benton, W. C. (2019). research: Developing a research agenda for Neu- How service provider dependence perceptions roIS. MIS Quarterly, 36, 679–702. moderate the power-opportunism relationship Donaldson, L. (1990). The ethereal hand: Organiza- with professional services. Production and Opera- tional economics and management theory. Acad- tions Management, 28, 1692–1715. emy of Management Review, 15, 369–381. Hesterly, W. S., & Zenger, T. R. (1993). Crossroads— Eapen, A., & Krishnan, R. (2019). Transferring tacit The myth of a monolithic economics: Fundamen- know-how: Do opportunism-safeguards matter tal assumptions and the use of economic models for firm boundary decisions? Organization Science, in policy and strategy research. Organization 30, 715–734. Science, 4, 496–510. Ellram, L. M., Tate, W. L., & Billington, C. (2008). Hodgson, G. M. (2004). Opportunism is not the only Offshore outsourcing of professional services: A reason why firms exist: Why an explanatory transaction cost economics perspective. Journal of emphasis on opportunism may mislead manage- Operations Management, 26, 148–163. ment strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13, Foss, N. J., & Hallberg, N. L. (2014). How symmetri- 401–418. cal assumptions advance strategic management Jap, S. D. (2003). An exploratory study of the intro- research. Strategic Management Journal, 35, 903– duction of online reverse auctions. Journal of Mar- 913. keting, 67, 96–107. Foss, N. J., & Weber, L. (2016a). Moving opportunism Jap, S. D. (2007). The impact of online reverse auc- to the back seat: Bounded rationality, costly con- tion design on buyer-supplier relationships. Jour- flict, and hierarchical forms. Academy of Manage- nal of Marketing, 71, 146–159. ment Review, 41, 61–79. John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some Foss, N. J., & Weber, L. (2016b). Expand bounded antecedents of opportunism in a marketing chan- rationality, but don’t throw opportunism out of nel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21, 278–289. the car and under the bus: A reply to Lumineau Kaufmann, L., Wagner, C. M., & Carter, C. R. (2017). and Verbeke. Academy of Management Review, 41, Individual modes and patterns of rational and 741–744. intuitive decision-making by purchasing man- Friedman, M. (1953). The methodology of positive agers. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, economics. Essays in Positive Economics, 3, 145– 23, 82–93. 178. Kelly, S., Wagner, B., & Ramsay, J. (2018). Oppor- Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A tunism in buyer–supplier exchange: A critical critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of examination of the concept and its implications Management Review, 21, 13–47. for theory and practice. Production Planning & Godfrey, P. C., & Hill, C. W. (1995). The problem of Control, 29, 992–1009. unobservables in strategic management research. Kreuter, F., Presser, S., & Tourangeau, R. (2008). Strategic Management Journal, 16, 519–533. Social desirability bias in CATI, IVR, and web sur- Graffin, S. D., Bundy, J., Porac, J. F., Wade, J. B., & veys: The effects of mode and question sensitivity. Quinn, D. P. (2013). Falls from grace and the Public Opinion Quarterly, 72, 847–865. hazards of high status: The 2009 British MP Kriauciunas, A., Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. expense scandal and its impact on parliamentary (2011). Leaving our comfort zone: Integrating elites. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58, 313– established practices with unique adaptations to 345. conduct survey-based research in nontraditional Griesinger, D. W. (1990). The human side of eco- contexts. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 994– nomic organization. Academy of Management 1010. Review, 15, 478–499. Leuschner, R., Carter, C. R., Goldsby, T. J., & Rogers, Grover, V., & Malhotra, M. K. (2003). Transaction cost Z. S. (2014). Third-party logistics: A meta-analytic framework in operations and supply chain review and investigation of its impact on

Xxxx 2020 13 Journal of Supply Chain Management

performance. Journal of Supply Chain Management, in a field experiment. American Economic Review, 50, 21–43. 92, 850–873. Linstead, S., Marechal, G., & Griffin, R. W. (2014). Nederhof, A. J. (1984). Methods of coping with social Theorizing and researching the dark side of orga- desirability bias: A review. European Journal of nization. Organization Studies, 35, 165–188. Social Psychology, 15, 263–280. Lumineau, F., & Henderson, J. E. (2012). The influ- Noorderhaven, N. G. (1995). Strategic decision making. ence of relational experience and contractual gov- Wokingham, UK: Addison-Wesley. ernance on the negotiation strategy in buyer– Noorderhaven, N. G. (1996). Opportunism and trust supplier disputes. Journal of Operations Manage- in transaction cost economics. In J. Groenewegen ment, 30, 382–395. (Ed.), Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond (pp. Lumineau, F., & Oxley, J. E. (2012). Let’s work it out 105–128). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. (or we’ll see you in court): Litigation and private Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N. G. dispute resolution in vertical exchange relation- (1997). Effects of trust and governance on rela- ships. Organization Science, 23, 820–834. tional risk. Academy of Management Journal, 40, Lumineau, F., & Quelin, B. V. (2012). An empirical 308–338. investigation of interorganizational opportunism Oliveira, N., & Lumineau, F. (2017). How coordina- and contracting mechanisms. Strategic Organiza- tion trajectories influence the performance of tion, 10, 55–84. interorganizational project networks. Organization Lumineau, F., & Verbeke, A. (2016). Let’s give oppor- Science, 28, 1029–1060. tunism the proper back seat. Academy of Manage- Oliveira, N., & Lumineau, F. (2019). The dark side of ment Review, 41, 739–741. interorganizational relationships: An integrative Luo, Y. (2007a). An integrated anti-opportunism sys- review and research agenda. Journal of Manage- tem in international exchange. Journal of Interna- ment, 45, 231–261. tional Business Studies, 38, 855–877. Rauchs, M., Glidden, A., Gordon, B., Pieters, G., Reca- Luo, Y. (2007b). Are joint venture partners more natini, M., Rostand, F., ... & Zhang, B. (2018). opportunistic in a more volatile environment? Distributed ledger technology systems: A conceptual Strategic Management Journal, 28, 39–60. framework. Cambridge Centre for Alternative Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction Finance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University. cost economics: An assessment of empirical Rindfleisch, A., Antia, K., Bercovitz, J., Brown, J. R., research in the social sciences. Business and Poli- Joseph, C., Carson, S. J., ...& Wathne, K. H. (2010). tics, 10, 1–63. Transaction costs, opportunism, and governance: Madhok, A. (1996). Crossroads—the organization of Contextual considerations and future research economic activity: Transaction costs, firm capabili- opportunities. Marketing Letters, 21, 211–222. ties, and the nature of governance. Organization Ro, Y. K., Su, H. C., & Chen, Y. S. (2016). A tale of Science, 7, 577–590. two perspectives on an impending supply disrup- Maitland, I., Bryson, J., & Van de Ven, A. (1985). Soci- tion. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 52, 3– ologists, economists, and opportunism. Academy 20. of Management Review, 10, 59–65. Roeck, D., Sternberg, H., & Hofmann, E. (2019). Dis- McIvor, R. (2013). Understanding the manufacturing tributed ledger technology in supply chains: A location decision: the case for the transaction cost transaction cost perspective. International Journal of and capability perspectives. Journal of Supply Chain Production Research,1–18. https://doi.org/10. Management, 49, 23–26. 1080/00207543.2019.1657247. Mellewigt, T., Hoetker, G., & Lutkewitte,€ M. (2018). Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Avoiding high opportunism is easy, achieving low Specific investments in marketing relationships: opportunism is not: A QCA study on curbing Expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Mar- opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships. keting Research, 40, 210–224. Organization Science, 29, 1208–1228. Rottenburger, J. R., & Kaufmann, L. (2019). Picking Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. D. (1992). Economics, on the new kid: Firm newness and deception in organization and management. Englewood Cliff: buyer–supplier negotiations. Journal of Purchasing Prentice-Hall. and Supply Management, 100527. https://doi.org/ Miller, K. D., & Tsang, E. W. (2011). Testing manage- 10.1016/j.pursup.2019.01.001. ment theories: Critical realist philosophy and Roulet, T. J., Gill, M. J., Stenger, S., & Gill, D. J. research methods. Strategic Management Journal, (2017). Reconsidering the value of covert 32, 139–158. research: The role of ambiguous consent in partic- Morgan, N. A., Kaleka, A., & Gooner, R. A. (2007). ipant observation. Organizational Research Methods, Focal supplier opportunism in supermarket retai- 20, 487–517. ler category management. Journal of Operations Saberi, S., Kouhizadeh, M., Sarkis, J., & Shen, L. Management, 25, 512–527. (2019). Blockchain technology and its relation- Nagin, D. S., Rebitzer, J. B., Sanders, S., & Taylor, L. J. ships to sustainable supply chain management. (2002). Monitoring, motivation, and manage- International Journal of Production Research, 57, ment: The determinants of opportunistic behavior 2117–2135.

14 Volume 0, Number 0 Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism

Seggie, S. H., Griffith, D. A., & Jap, S. D. (2013). Pas- tives on Organization Design and Behavior (pp. sive and active opportunism in interorganiza- 347–370). New York: Wiley. tional exchange. Journal of Marketing, 77, 73–90. Zhou, K. Z., & Xu, D. (2012). How foreign firms cur- Short, J. L., Toffel, M. W., & Hugill, A. R. (2016). tail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed Monitoring global supply chains. Strategic Man- contracts, centralized control, and relational gov- agement Journal, 37, 1878–1897. ernance. Journal of International Business Studies, Tangpong, C., Hung, K. T., & Ro, Y. K. (2010). The 43, 677–692. interaction effect of relational norms and agent Zipkin, P. (2012). A reply to Williamson’s “Out- cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–sup- sourcing...”. Production and Operations Manage- plier relationships. Journal of Operations Manage- ment, 21, 465–469. ment, 28, 398–414. Tsang, E. W. (2006). Behavioral assumptions and the- ory development: The case of transaction cost eco- nomics. Strategic Management Journal, 27, 999– 1011. Tucker, C., & Catalini, C. (2018). What blockchain Fabrice Lumineau (Ph.D., HEC Paris) is an Associ- can’t do. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from ate Professor in Strategic Management at the Krannert https://hbr.org/2018/06/what-blockchain-cant-do School of Management, Purdue University (West Tuckey, M. R., & Neall, A. M. (2014). Workplace bul- lying erodes job and personal resources: Between- Lafayette, USA). He received his Ph.D. from HEC and within-person perspectives. Journal of Occupa- Paris. His research investigates interorganizational tional Health Psychology, 19, 413–424. partnerships, the interplay between contract and trust, Van Maanen, J., Sørenson, J., & Mitchell, T. R. (2007). and the “dark side” of collaboration. He has pub- The Interplay between theory and methods. Acad- lished in Academy of Management Journal, Academy of emy of Management Review, 32, 301–314. Management Annals, Journal of International Business Villena, V. H., & Craighead, C. W. (2017). On the Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Operations – same page? How asymmetric buyer supplier rela- Management, Organization Science, Organization Studies, tionships affect opportunism and performance. and Strategic Management Journal. He serves on the Production and Operations Management, 26, 491– editorial board of the Strategic Management Journal 508. and Strategic Organization. Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64, 36–51. Nuno Oliveira (Ph.D., The London School of Eco- Wever, M., Wognum, P. M., Trienekens, J. H., & nomics and Political Science) is assistant professor in Omta, S. W. F. (2012). Supply chain-wide conse- organization studies at Tilburg University (The Nether- quences of transaction risks and their contractual lands). He received his Ph.D. in Management from solutions: Towards an extended transaction cost The London School of Economics and Political economics framework. Journal of Supply Chain Science. He is interested in problems of organizing – Management, 48, 73 91. between organizations (e.g., adaptation and coordina- Williamson, O. E. (1985). Economics institutions of capi- tion) and in devising enhanced research methods to talism. New York: The Free Press. study these problems. His research has been pub- Williamson, O. E. (1995). Hierarchies, markets and power in the economy: An economic perspective. lished in Academy of Management Annals, Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change,4,21–49. Management and Organization Science. (Email: Williamson, O. E. (1999). Strategy research: Gover- [email protected]) nance and competence perspectives. Strategic Man- agement Journal, 20, 1087–1108. Williamson, O. E., & Ouchi, W. G. (1981). The mar- SUPPORTING INFORMATION kets and hierarchies and visible hand perspectives. Additional supporting information may be found in In A. H. Van de Ven & W. F. Joyce (Eds.), Perspec- the online version of this article:

Xxxx 2020 15