Strategic Empathy the Afghanistan Intervention Shows Why the U.S
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New America Foundation Strategic Empathy The Afghanistan intervention shows why the U.S. must empathize with its adversaries. Matt Waldman, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University April 2014 As the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, it leaves mistakes were made. To name but a few, the U.S. backed violence and uncertainty in its wake. The election of a new power-holders widely seen by Afghans as abusive and Afghan president gives some grounds for optimism and unjust, which undermined the Afghan government’s could improve the fraught relationship between legitimacy and generated powerful grievances; coalition Afghanistan and the U.S. But no Afghan election since the forces caused too many civilian casualties; aid was often 2001 intervention has brought about a diminution in wasteful or ineffective, and swung from being insufficient, violence – and the conflict shows no signs of abating. The in the early 2000s, to excessive, thereby fueling corruption; Taliban is powerful, tenacious and increasingly deadly. and there was no effective U.S. political strategy for Civilian casualties are rising and the fighting forces some Afghanistan or the region.* 10,000 Afghans from their homes every month.1 The linchpin of the U.S. exit strategy, Afghan national security But the most egregious error of the United States was to forces, have critical capability gaps and are suffering huge pursue a strategy founded on a misreading of its enemy. As losses of up to 400 a month due to escalating insurgent former Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledges, the attacks.2 The Afghan government is corrupt and anemic, United States was “profoundly ignorant about our reconstruction is faltering and the region continues to be adversaries and about the situation on the ground…. our unstable. knowledge and our intelligence were woefully inadequate.”5 It was assumed the Taliban posed such a threat to the West Over the past twelve years, the United States has spent that it had to be defeated. This was mistaken on two counts: $650 billion dollars in Afghanistan and lost over 2,000 the threat posed by the Taliban was minimal and their lives.3 Close to 20,000 U.S. service members have been defeat was improbable. During the 2000s, from an wounded.4 Democratic institutions have been established operational standpoint, U.S. knowledge of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and there has been progress in human improved. In fact, officials were deluged with information rights, infrastructure and services, such as health and education. But how did such vast and sustained * Matt Waldman is a Research Fellow in the Belfer Center investments not deliver a more favorable outcome? for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy Conditions were undoubtedly challenging, but most School of Government and an Associate Fellow at Chatham observers – and indeed U.S. officials – agree that major House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs). about what insurgents were doing; they knew less about outside Afghanistan, nor is there evidence that it seeks to who they really were. In essence, most U.S. officials were do so. Conversely, there are few Afghans in al Qaida’s unable to “get inside their minds.” leadership, which is based in Pakistan; in fact, there are as many German nationals on the UN’s al Qaida sanctions list What was missing in U.S. policy-making was empathy: as there are Afghans.8 For years, senior U.S. officials have imagining or simulating another’s experience and said there are fewer than 100 al Qaida operatives in perspective, in order to better understand them. Empathy, Afghanistan and they pose no real threat.9 More in this sense, is rational and cognitive. Is a tool for importantly, Taliban leaders understand what provoked the understanding the way another person thinks, feels or U.S. intervention in 2001, that forced them from power, perceives. It enables us to comprehend another’s mindset, and they have repeated both publicly and privately that they driving emotions or outlook, without requiring us to share will not allow other groups to use Afghan soil to launch the other’s thoughts, feelings and perceptions, or, indeed, attacks against other countries. Most Taliban leaders want approve of them. An empathic approach involves the safety, recognition and influence – and know that any assimilation of diverse information, including social, relationship with al Qaida would threaten that. historical and psychological details, and a conscious effort to see the world through that person’s eyes. Thus, it serves the first demand of strategy: know your enemy. Crucially, An empathic approach involves the empathy can help leaders anticipate how enemies and assimilation of diverse information, including perceived allies are likely to act and react, and help avoid strategic errors. As the theorist Robert Jervis has said: “The social, historical, and psychological details, ability to see the world and oneself as others do is never and a conscious effort to see the world easy and failures of empathy explain a number of foreign policy disasters."6 Indeed, the intervention in Afghanistan through that person’s eyes. Thus, it serves the was marked by an absence of this kind of understanding, first demand of strategy: know your enemy. especially as regards the Taliban and Pakistan’s military, which are considered below. Paradoxically, towards the end of the 2000s, U.S. officials Misjudging the enemy mistakenly believed the vast majority of Taliban foot- soldiers were fighting for money, which led to coalition Given the Taliban’s role in sheltering al Qaida prior to 9/11, “reintegration” efforts to lure them away from the it is hardly surprising that many U.S. officials saw the insurgency through employment and educational Taliban as a threat – but it was a mistake to conflate the two incentives. Unsurprisingly, these efforts made little groups. The Taliban did not invite Osama bin Laden to discernable impact on the strength of the Taliban. Afghanistan, and its relationship with the terrorist group Thousands of Talibs have been killed or injured since 2001, was strained, influenced by Pakistan and highly dependent and while securing a source of income is a factor in on personal relations between the group’s respective explaining their motivations, it cannot explain why so many leaders. Today, there are undoubtedly extremists within the were willing to risk their lives. Taliban, which is comprised of various networks and sub- groups, but links to al Qaida are limited and borne out of In reality, the Taliban cannot be simply categorized as expediency.7 The Taliban does not subscribe to al Qaida’s either fanatical or mercenary. The movement encompasses global jihadi ideology. It has never conducted an attack a wide range of individuals, with multiple and varying new america foundation page 2 motivations, who have coalesced around core notions of nothing is more likely to rouse men to fight than perceived what they see as resistance to invasion, defense of Islam foreign aggression and an acute sense of injustice. and action against injustice perpetrated by those in power. An empathic perspective can throw light on these factors. An empathic approach points to other factors that have Simply put, a small but significant number of Afghans influenced Afghans’ decisions to fight and which are mistakenly perceived U.S. forces as invaders who apparent in field research.12 For those who were threatened their safety and their country’s sovereignty, unemployed and destitute, the insurgency offered status, a religion or way of life. This perception was formed over sense of purpose and an “honorable” way for them to feed years of coalition airstrikes, ground assaults or night raids, their families; while for those educated in hard-line which caused large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries. madrassas, the jihad was a religious duty. Many have been Between 2007 and 2010 alone, the coalition and Afghan drawn into the insurgency through ties to a particular forces caused 2,500 civilian deaths, including hundreds of group of fighters, known as a Mahaz, typically led by a women and girls.10 Yet, the perpetrators, whether NATO prominent Taliban figure, or through the efforts of a forces or their Afghan allies, were seen as having impunity, community, tribe or faction to resist government predation and redress was seen as piecemeal and inadequate. Too or gain the upper hand in a local conflict or feud. Some are often, operations destroyed or damaged property, and motivated by personal ambition or criminal opportunism; house searches or even routine encounters were seen as others are driven by grievances, such as the persecution of aggressive and intrusive. It is therefore not surprising that Talibs after the 2001 intervention; and many have merely some Afghans came to disbelieve U.S. leaders when they sought to protect themselves and their families by siding said they sought to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan with those whom they expect to win. – even Afghan political leaders share this distrust. Nor is it surprising that Afghans who lost family members, friends Recognizing these factors does not in any way amount or neighbors joined the insurgency out of anger, for either to endorsing or justifying the Taliban insurgency. It retribution or to resist perceived aggressors. In this way, the is understanding, not approval. Who, in their right mind, U.S. presence galvanized resistance. could approve of the Taliban’s indiscriminate roadside and suicide attacks, or their systematic killing of civilians who The perception of U.S. aggression, which was evident from support the Afghan government? But knowledge of Taliban this author’s interactions with Taliban fighters and motivations is the kind of information that is crucial for commanders between 2009 and 2012, is easier to decision-makers.