Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory
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University of Cincinnati Law Review Volume 84 Issue 1 Article 5 April 2018 Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory Jeffrey M. Lipshaw Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr Recommended Citation Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory, 84 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2018) Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Lipshaw: Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory LEXICAL OPPORTUNISM AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT THEORY* Jeffrey M Lipshaw Abstract This essay is a reflection on the gap between the real- life practice of contract law and some of the academic theory that tries to explain it. I describe "lexical opportunism," an aspect of contract practice having three elements. First, the parties must have reduced a complex business arrangement to contractual text, portions of which text are as devoid of thoughtful drafting or close negotiation as the boilerplate in a consumer contract. Second, an adversary cleverly develops a legal theory based upon a colorable interpretationof that text. Third, this interpretation creates a potential for staggeringliability beyond all common sense. A multi-billion lawsuit, recently settled, serves as an example, and triggers my discussion of (a) what it means to engage in theoretical assessment in contract law; (b) how the justification of contract law by way of inhibiting economic opportunism is based on the simplest examples, rather than the kind of contract discourse found in any real-world contract worth spending millions to litigate; and (c) how normative theory based on upholding the moral sanctity of promise keeping evaporates when the parties disagree about the meaning of their promises. I argue that both economic and moral theories about contract law fail to account for issues in the use of language and depend on the naive adoption of the correspondence theory of truth. The nature of language permits opportunism, and the only check on it is the desire, * Or, Why Litigation Over a Failed Merger with $7 Billion Turning on Interpretation of Twenty-One Words of BoilerplateAffirms My Skepticism About Economic and Moral Theories of ContractLaw. ** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. A.B., University of Michigan, 1975; J.D. Stanford University, 1979. 1 am grateful to Dennis Patterson, Rob Kar, Pat Shin, Victor Goldberg, Jeff Harrison, and participants at the 10th International Contracts Conference at the William S. Boyd School of Law at UNLV for helpful comments. 217 Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018 1 University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84 from whatever motivation, not to be opportunistic. I conclude with what I hope are some constructive thoughts about the appropriate use of theory in lawyering, and thereby mitigate my skepticism whether any single theory or discipline is capable of meaningful explanation or prediction about lexical opportunism. 'We should be pragmatic about theory It is a tool, rather than a glimpse of ultimate truth, and the criterion of a tool is its utility '4 I. INTRODUCTION This is a reflection on the gap between the real-life practice of contract law and the academic theory that tries to explain it. As someone who used to do mergers and acquisitions as a lawyer and corporate executive, I occasionally get a call to comment on pending litigation. I also happen to be an academic theorist who has written about contract theory, and a teacher who guides first-year law students through the standard fare of casebook law. These interludes in which I leave the ivory tower and revisit contract disputes in the real world cause me to shake my head sadly, as they generally confirm my intuition that trying to connect before-the-fact contracting intentions and behaviors with colorable after-the-fact interpretation disputes misses the point. My skepticism about academic theories of contract law most recently flared up in connection with an eight-year-old dispute, the result of a contested public company takeover, between Johnson & Johnson, the frustrated suitor, and medical device maker Guidant Corporation, now a subsidiary of the winning bidder, Boston Scientific Corporation. The contract issues are straightforward despite having arisen out of the documentation of a deal worth more than $20 billion. I will tell the story of the case and explain the context of relatively standard M&A contract practice. Then I will reflect on the implications of the case for 1. Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, J. INST. & THEORET. ECON. 73, 77 (1993). 2. The case culminated in a bench trial before Judge Richard J. Sullivan of United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in late November 2014. The parties submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 16, 2015. The record reflects that the parties settled and the case was dismissed with prejudice on March 30, 2015. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Civil Docket for Case No. 1:06-cv-07685-RJS, https:/ecf'nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/ DktRpt.pl?108224015220512-L_1_0-1. See also Press Release, Boston Scientific, Boston Scientific Announces Agreement With Johnson & Johnson to Resolve Guidant Litigation (Feb. 17, 2015), http://news.bostonscientific.com/2015-02-17-Boston-Scientific- https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss1/5 2 Lipshaw: Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory 2016] LEXICAL OPPORTUNISM the prevailing economic and moral theories justifying state intervention in the enforcement of private agreements, at least when we put aside the abstractions and get down to cases. With the disclaimer that I had no stake in the outcome of the case and no particular sympathy for Boston Scientific's uncomfortable situation, digging into J&J's claim caused me to have flashbacks to my most frustrating experiences as a general counsel: contending with a phenomenon I am here calling "lexical opportunism," an aspect of contract practice having three elements. First, the parties must have reduced a complex business arrangement to contractual text, portions of which text are as devoid of thoughtful drafting or close negotiation as the boilerplate in a consumer contract. Second, an adversary cleverly develops a legal theory based upon a colorable interpretation of that text. Third, this interpretation creates a potential for staggering liability beyond all common sense.3 I have long harbored two bugaboos about contract theory, at least when thinking about the complex deals I did versus the "Dick and Jane" 4 contracts that are the necessary fodder for broad theory. The first is the fantasy that contract law actually does much to limit opportunism except in the arid laboratories where law professors conduct their thought-experiments. The second is the illusion of mutual consent against which to measure the putative opportunism or the moral force of the promise as a rational process in either contract formation or interpretation. 5 Most business agreements worth litigating over were, at Announces-Agreement-With-Johnson-Johnson-To-Resolve-Guidant-Litigation. None of that matters to me because the mere fact that this litigation occurred, rather than how it might have concluded, is what interests me. 3. It is a fair question whether I ever authorized the very kind of lexically opportunistic lawsuits I am criticizing here. When I was representing a client as advocate in a contract claim, I did the best I could with the language I had, but I always thought that being credible was important. As the chief lawyer for several businesses, I heeded the teaching of one of my mentors to the effect that once you get around to litigating a contract case, it doesn't matter who the plaintiff or defendant is;there's only a "****er" and a "****ee" and your job as a lawyer is to make sure it's clear your client is the latter and the other side is the former. In other words, I will simply say that I put the burden on anyone trying to make a lawyer's case for us also to demonstrate that we would be able to show we were the ",****ee."1 4. I am indebted to Victor Goldberg for the phrase "Dick and Jane" contracts. 5. My particular b~e noire on this topic is the contract law professoriate's fascination with Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375. Raffles was the famous case in which the parties referred in the contract to a ship named Peerless traveling from India to Liverpool. Amazingly, there were two ships named Peerless, one departing Bombay in October and the other in December. The parties claimed to have been referring subjectively to the different ships. The court held no contract to have been formed. What I find astounding is that we have not been able to find another more modem case in 150 years. I do not teach it anymore, because it strikes me as the casebook equivalent of basing an entire unit of a medical school anatomy course on Joseph Merrick, also known as the "Elephant Man." Mirror Online referred to Merrick as "the best known 'human curiosity' in history," and that is how I feel about the good ships Peerless. Bodyshocked: Elephant Man Joseph Merrick and other Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018 3 University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol.