Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No.2, September 1989

Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of

Introduction

YOSHIHARA Kunio*

Oei Tiong Ham Concern was a sugar-based Tiong Ham started tapioca production by set­ conglomerate in the Netherlands Indies (or In­ ting up a plantation and a flour mill. In addi­ donesia in the postwar period), founded by a tion, he went into property development and peranakan Chinese named Oei Tiong Ham management (mainly to provide housing for (1866-1924). N.V. Handel Maatschappij the workers on the plantations).!) was a sugar-centered international A plantation in Java was quite different trading company, and N.V. Algemeene from what we usually know of as a plantation. Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der Oei Tiong For example, Oei Tiong Ham Concern did not Ham Suikerfabrieken was a sugar production own the land it used to grow sugar cane. company which operated five sugar planta­ Agricultural land belonged to indigenous tions and mills in Java. From sugar, Oei peasants, and no corporation was allowed to Tiong Ham diversified into other products. buy it. Thus, it had to be leased from Kian Gwan became over time a general peasants. Furthermore, no manual labor trading company with offices abroad. In the could be brought from outside. It had to early 1930s, it had Kian Gwan Western Agency, come from the peasants in the area where the Ltd., in London, Kian Gwan (Malaya), plantation was located. A corporation could Ltd., in and Kian Gwan Company, invest in land improvement and infrastruc­ India, Ltd., which covered British India and ture, and organize and manage agricultural China, with offices in Calcutta, Bombay, production on the land it leased. So, in this Karachi, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Amoy. respect, it was not a sub-contract system, but And to facilitate trading as well as to expand it differed from a typical plantation-an ex­ business interests, the warehousing company panse of contiguous land over which the N.V. Midden Java Veem, the regional ship­ owner had complete control. ping company N.V. Heap Eng Moh Steamship In the prewar period, Oei Tiong Ham Con- Co., and the bank N.V. Bank Vereeniging Oei Tiong Ham were set up. Furthermore, in 1) For an overview of Oei Tiong Ham Concern in the early 1930s, see "The Story of Krebet," Krebet, Malang in , where a sugar [], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan, plantation and a sugar mill were operated, Oei 1932 and "The Oei Tiong Ham Concern: A Short Survey of its Development and Progress," * S' JJ¥:~t:5l::, The Center for Southeast Asian [Semarang], Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan, Studies, Kyoto University 1934.

137 cern was the first as well as largest Chinese­ later).2l owned business empire in the region we call The trading company Kian Gwan was today the ASEAN. It started growing rap­ founded by Oei Tiong Ham's father, Oei Tjie idly in the 1890s, and had become a diversified Sien (1835-1900), an immigrant from Tong-an business group by the early 1910s. In the in Ch'uanchou District, Fukien Province. prewar period, Thailand was the backwater of Unlike most of the Chinese who came to Southeast Asia, and it was not until the 1930s Southeast Asia in the 19th century, Tjie Sien that a modern business conglomerate began seems to have had a basic Chinese classical appearing there in its embryo form (for exam­ education in his youth. For some reason, he ple, the Wang Lee group). In the Philippines, became involved in the Taiping Rebellion, a modem business appeared earlier than in and had to flee the country. Around 1858 he Thailand, but it was confined largely to a came to Semarang in , where he single industry (for example, China Banking started petty trading. His granddaughter, Corporation), and no modem business con­ Oei Hui Lan, describes his position at this glomerate appeared there in the prewar stage as follows: period. In British Malaya, since it became an important supply source for the West and the With his small hoardings he purchased Chinese were given a great deal of freedom in cheap porcelain saucers and bowls which he the economy, as in the Netherlands East In­ peddled from door to door in baskets hung dies, modem business conglomerates ap­ from a bamboo yoke. He bargained dog­ peared relatively early, but none equaled the gedly, haggled shrewdly over each copper size of Oei Tiong Ham Concern. The coin, then re-invested infinitesimal profits in business fortunes of such successful tin more bowls and saucers and small packets miners as Eu Tong Sen and Loke Yew were of rice. Slowly, painstakingly, Tjie Sien more limited in size as well in scope, and also managed to save [Koo 1943: 6]. they were short-lived. The Ho Hong group built by Lim Peng Siang in the 1910s was the Semarang was a good place for a Chinese to most diversified group in Malaya at that time, settle. It being the major harbor for Central but it could not have been larger than Oei Java, such native produce as sugar and gam­ Tiong Ham Concern (which, after all, man­ bir were brought there to be shipped outside, aged five sugar plantations and owned five sugar and Chinese wares and other foreign products mills, among others), and, since it started to passed through there for distribution in the decline after the First World War, its life was city and its hinterland. In fact, at the time Tjie short. Tan Kah Kee's business empire, Sien arrived, Semarang was the largest com­ which reached its peak a little later than the mercial city in all Java. Batavia did not have Ho Hong group, was also limited in scope and, much hinterland trade, and in the case of as in the case of the Ho Hong group, short­ Surabaya, it was after the advent of corporate lived (it began facing financial trouble in the 2) For further discussion on Chinese capitalism in this late 1920s and went bankrupt several years period, see [Yoshihara 1988: Ch. ill].

138 YOSHIHARA K.: Introduction capitalism and the age of steamships that it claims, but it is difficult to take what they say became the premier city of Java [Dnghokham at face value since they may be unconsciously 1989: 160]. exaggerating the modernness of Kian Gwan In the mid-19th century, when Tjie Sien at that time, projecting into it the modern em­ arrived in Semarang, the production of export bryo of what later came to be known as Dei crops was still under the government-super­ Tiong Ham Concern. Undoubtedly, vised culture system. Thus, despite its premier however, with Kian Gwan, Dei Tjie Sien position in trading, Semarang did not have became a wholesale trader (a considerable im­ such vitality as it would enjoy in the late 19th provement of his fortune from a peddler), and century. It was with the passage of the in the next few decades, with hard work and Agrarian Law in 1870 that Dutch private business acumen, he made it a respectable capital began pouring into Java to set up plan­ trading company. tations and processing facilities (sugar planta­ It is most natural to think that Kian Gwan tions and mills in particular). As a result of formed the basis for Dei Tiong Ham's such large inflow of capital from the business career. In fact, Tjoa Soe Tjong and Netherlands, the commercial landscape of Liem Thian Joe expect us to believe that [Tjoa Java (as well as Sumatra later on) went 1963: 604-605; Coppel 1989: 184]. But Liem through a dramatic transformation. In par­ Tjwan Ling and Dei Hui Lan, though they do ticular, Central and East Java emerged as the not deny this interpretation, tell us, in pass­ major center of sugar production in the ing, a legend which can throw a different light world. As the port of Central Java, on it. This is about a retired German consul Semarang began experiencing a rapid in­ who decided to spend the rest of his life in crease in business activities, especially in Java. He leased a house from Tjie Sien and sugar and sugar-related trading, in the 1870s. came to know his son, Dei Tiong Ham, who Dei Tjie Sien was well prepared to take ad­ often visited him to collect rent. The German· vantage of this expansion [Liem 1979: 8-18]. subsequently became quite impressed with After several years of hard work, he set up the his ability, and offered a substantial sum of trading company Kian Gwan in 1863. At this money (Dei Hui Lan says it was 300,000 stage, it may have been an ordinary trading guilders, whereas Liem Tjwan Ling says it company, but Tjoa Soe Tjong and Liem was 300,000 dollars) for Dei Tiong Ham to Tjwan Ling tend to give us the impression start a business. Dei Tiong Ham used this that at that time, Kian Gwan was already a money to buy sugar mills in the 1890s [Koo large, modern company. Liem Tjwan Ling 1943: 12; Liem 1979: 48]. says that Dei Tjie Sien had saved three million This may be regarded as sheer legend, but guilders by that time [Liem 1979: 10], Dei Tiong Ham may have first gone into whereas Tjoa Soe Tjong says that it was formed business on his own, become fairly successful as a limited liability company and managed in this way, and taken over his father's by an outsider named Ang Tai Lion [Tjoa business, Kian Gwan. His life philosophy and 1963: 604]. There is no data to refute these method of business seem to have been quite

139 different from those of his father. Tjie Sien him chafe with impatience. Increasing fric­ was proud of being a traditional Chinese. He tion seemed unavoidable unless Tiong Ham spoke Chinese at home, wore a Chinese dress launched out on his own [Koo 1943: 11]. and a pigtail, and ate Chinese () food. And he insisted on having his family In the mid-1890s, when Oei Tiong Ham was follow a Chinese life style [Liem 1979: 17­ still in his mid-twenties, which was several 18]. In contrast, Oei Tiong Ham was more years before his father died, he began buying modem-oriented. On the difference between sugar mills. If he became independent them, his daughter Hui Lan makes the follow­ because of his differences with his father and ing observation: thus without his help, how did he amass such a large sum of money as. needed to buy five He [Oei Tiong Ham] was out of sympathy sugar mills at that time? He may have been an with the narrow, conventional Chinese of extraordinarily clever trader and made a for­ Semarang [to this group Dei Tjie Sien tune in a short time, but it may be more belonged] and wanted to be entirely in­ reasonable to think that he had a financial dependent. Though it was impossible to backer, such as the former German consul as break his racial ties, he adopted as many oc­ told in the legend. cidental ideas as possible both in his private This legend becomes more credible as we life and in his business affairs [Koo 1943: start questioning how Oei Tiong Ham came to 32-33]. know the Western method of business. He went to a Chinese school, and did not speak He had loathed his queue, found it both Dutch. Liem Tjwan Ling says that Oei Tiong incongruous and embarrassing, but was Ham understood some Dutch since he signed forced to keep it as long as Grandfather Tjie letters in. Dutch without getting them Sien was alive. Once Papa's hair was cut in translated. But Oei Hui Lan says that "he European style he sprayed his head each never succeeded in learning a word of Dutch" morning with Pinaud's hair lotion ... [Koo 1943: 33], and this is confirmed by Oei [Koo 1943: 34]. Tjong Ie [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989: 191]. About signing letters, if they were ordinary This difference in life philosophy between letters, Oei Tiong Ham may have trusted his father and son must have caused conflicts be­ subordinates, and thus, it could not be taken tween them in doing business together, and as evidence of his understanding of the Dutch may have eventually resulted in his son's in­ language. dependence. Oei Hui Lan states the problem If he did not understand Dutch, how did he as follows: talk to Dutchmen? There is no question that he did talk with some Dutchmen on intimate He [Tiong Ham] was soon plunged into terms. Although Oei Tjong Ie denies this further conflict with his father, whose nar­ [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 191], his half- . row, old Chinese business methods made sister Hui Lan tells us about Sijthof, the

140 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction

Dutch Resident of Semarang, who became an bid. Under this system, for about ten years intimate friend of Oei Tiong Ham's. Unlike starting in the early 1890s, Oei Tiong Ham in British Malaya, where few British officials became a major license holder in Central and spoke Malay and Chinese businessmen had to East Java (in Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakar­ know English if they wanted to talk with ta, and Surabaya), and seemed to have made a them, many Dutch officials and businessmen profit of about 18 million guilders [Coppel spoke Malay well, and could talk to Chinese 1989: 185; Liem 1979: 31-32]. Tjoa Soe Tjong who learned the language. Although it may argues that Oei Tiong Ham and some other not have been on intimate terms, Oei Tiong Chinese traders at that time used profits from Ham must have discussed in Malay com­ opium trading for business modernization plicated legal problems with his Dutch [Tjoa 1963: 604]. lawyer, Baron van Heeckren [Koo 1943: 50]. A Chinese business usually remained small, When Oei Tiong Ham was still struggling, being family owned and family managed, but contacts with Dutchmen must have been diffi­ Oei Tiong Ham was an exception. To under­ cult. The two contacts cited above came stand what made him different from a typical after he became a successful businessman. Chinese businessman, we should first note So, a person like the former German consul some of his personal attributes. As Liem becomes important in understanding his early Tjwan Ling points out, he was a bright person years. He was retired and had a lot of free and a hard worker [Liem 1979: 28-29]. When time; he was educated enough to tell about the he was studying in a Chinese school in West and its way of business (to act as a Ger­ Semarang, he was the best student among his man consul, he must have had some educa­ classmates. After he started working, he tion); and since he decided to retire in Java, he rarely left his office before his employees, and must have spoken Malay. When Oei Tiong at home, he usually went to bed after mid­ Ham went to collect rent, he may have spent a night. Also, he was probably a very energetic lot of time with him discussing various mat­ person. A glimpse of this is given in the ters in Malay, and paid a number of purely following description of his appetite by his social visits in addition. daughter Oei Hui Lan: Another thing to note about Oei Tiong Ham's early years is the fact that he made a Catering for my father was a difficult task, substantial sum of money as an opium as he was an enormous eater... he started trader. Until around 1904, when the system off [his breakfast] with a few mangoes or was abolished and the government-operated papayas, followed by a bowl of steaming opium regie took over, the Dutch colonial porridge and climaxed with six fried eggs government divided Java into various districts and several slices of liver garnished with and made opium trading in each district the lavish curls of bacon, all washed down with monopoly of its license holder. The license bowls of tea. To compose his nerves after was granted on an open-bidding basis to a this exertion father smoked two fat black trustworthy Chinese who offered the highest cigars [Koo 1943: 33].

141 Of course, there were possibly many bright, largely on their supervision and business energetic persons at that time, so this was strategy. hardly a sufficient condition for business suc­ About a typical Chinese businessman, Tjoa cess. We should, however, keep in mind Soe Tjong says: "Conservatism, nepotism, some of the innate personal attributes which and a limited knowledge of modem finance had bearing on his success. and organization were his weaknesses" [Tjoa What made Oei Tiong Ham different from 1963: 605]. Even if the last problem was an ordinary successful businessman was his solved with the spread of education, the first business method. He built his business very two problems remained as barriers to Chinese much like an empire builder in the West, by business modernization, especially in the late building up professional management and 19th century and the early 20th century when diversifying into related fields. There were Oei Tiong Ham was building his empire. other businessmen, like Lim Peng Siang, who From the viewpoint of the typical Chinese created a conglomerate in Malaya at about the who were accused of nepotism and conser­ same time (though a little later and not as vatism, modem business techniques such as diversified as Oei Tiong Ham Concern), but delegation of authority were too risky, for by what made him really unique among the suc­ trusting outsiders, for example, they were cessful Chinese businessmen at that time was more likely to be cheated than rewarded. the creation of professional management. In Although this was true in general, Oei Tiong his case, it was the recruitment not only of Ham's innovation was to recognize that there competent Chinese from outside the family were some competent Europeans and Chinese (for example, he employed many profes­ outside the family who could be trusted, iden­ sionals, e.g. engineers who graduated from tify those people and use them in his universities in the Netherlands), but also of a business. He must have made some mistakes number of Dutch professionals (engineers and in judgment and suffered from their conse­ managers). In the late 1930s, at the Krebet quences, but he made more right judgments factory alone, several Europeans were work­ and from this, reaped large profits, clearly ing, and at the other four sugar mills, at least much larger than the losses he suffered from all managers were Dutchmen [Interview: Oei misjudgments. Tjong Ie 1989: 195]. Certainly, there were It is interesting to ask how he could identify some Chinese companies which employed one competent, trustworthy people, but there is or two Westerners, but there was none which no light shed on this in past writings. What systematically employed so many Western has simply been done is to attribute it to his in­ professionals as Oei Tiong Ham Concern nate or acquired skill by stating that "[he] had did. Basically, Oei Tiong Ham needed them a knack for finding right people" [Interview: to make up for the lack of skills and know-how Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 191] or that "he had a which the Chinese had not yet mastered. He remarkable flair for choosing brilliant up-and­ delegated authority to these professionals coming associates" [Koo 1943: 57]. But we (Dutch as well as Chinese), and concentrated can be more specific about the contents of the 142 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction skill. Since in hiring or promoting someone, tsu, companies. Itwas becomingmore impor­ it is not certain whether he will ultimately tant for a top Japanese manager to act as the turn out to be trustworthy, decision has to be coordinator of a management team, which made with some uncertainty, and some people tried to gather as much relevant information may have the skill to reduce it, one which they as possible (if necessary, from abroad) and have acquired over time in interpersonal rela­ base their decision on rational calculation. At tionships. Explaining how such a skill is ac­ the same time, Western business methods quired or how it has been acquired is not sim­ were studied to improve on the incentive ple. But another aspect of finding the "right system which would best motivate the people" is identifying the functions of a post employees. But in the Concern, after Oei to be filled and looking into the qualifications Tiong Ham's death, the non-university of a person to be appointed to the post, and graduates like Tan Tek Peng tried to this can be more easily explained. For exam­ dominate the university graduates by em­ ple, Oei Tiong Ham did not appoint a univer­ phasizing "intuition" in doing business and sity graduate to the top post of the trading com­ downgrading the importance of up-to-date in­ pany Kian Gwan, because he thought that a formation in decision making. Oei Tjong "daring gambler" would fit it better than a Tjay, who took over Kian Gwan from his half university graduate who probably lost the brother Tjong Hauw in the early 1950s, gambling instinct in the process of rational blames Tan Tek Peng partly for the organiza­ education [Tjoa 1963: 606]. This view was tional mess he inherited. Tjong Tjay replaced formed probably through his experience in Tan Tek Peng with university-educated sugar trading, the major activity of Kian Tjoa Soe Tjong [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay Gwan, which was quite speculative due to 1989: 226]. wide price fluctuations. A little before he left Oei Tiong Ham was well aware that Chinese for Singapore, Oei Tiong Ham promoted a businesses often suffered from the succession pookkeeper without university education problem. One major problem was that in the (Tan Tek Peng) to the top post of Kian Gwan Chinese family, all sons could claim a roughly tLiem 1979: 192]. equal share (this was unlike primogeniture

! Entrusting management to people like Tan practiced in prewar Japan), and often decided ffek Peng had some drawbacks. Tan Tek to split up the business founded by their ~eng may have been a "daring gambler" and father instead of running it together. ~een good at earning profits for Kian Gwan. Sometimes, the father created as many lBut he did not probably understand, or if he businesses as the number of sons, instead of understood, did not attach enough importance concentrating on the expansion of his main

, to the need for building a rational business business, in order to make sure that the organization. In Japan, for example, at the transfer of ownership would go smoothly after time Tan Tek Peng was promoted, university his death or retirement. Oei Tiong Ham graduates were becoming dominant among wanted to make sure that this would not hap­ the top managers of major, especially zaiba- pen.

143 A more difficult problem was to whom was still in the mother's womb at the time of ownership should be transferred. As a his death). For some reason he decided to let typical Chinese, he did not want his daughters all of them inherit his business, thus naming to inherit it. He had 13 sons and 13 nine heirs altogether. They were one son daughters, so half of his children were left from the third wife, four sons from the fifth out.3) In the case of an unincorporated firm, wife, and another four sons from the seventh which was the typical case at that time, this (or second from the last) wife. could be decided within the family, but in the This decision may not have been final, and case of such a large company as Oei Tiong he may have wanted to change it as his Ham Concern, to disinherit the daughters was younger sons got older and worked in his a problem since it could come under the Dutch business. He probably wanted to weed out civil law, which was more egalitarian than the those he judged incompetent, as he had done Chinese adat law and gave the right of in­ earlier. But unfortunately, he died suddenly heritance to daughters. Originally, such fam­ of a heart attack in 1924 at the age of 57. So, ily matters as inheritance were settled within this remained as an unfinished job [Interview: the Chinese community, but when a serious Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 217]. dispute arose concerning large inheritance, it In the beginning, the succession problem was often taken to a Dutch court and settled did not seem to be too serious. Only two sons there [Onghokham 1989: 161]. So, even if (Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong Hauw) had Oei Tiong Ham decided to disinherit his reached majority and participated in manage­ daughters or any sons, this could be challenged ment. Of course, there must have been some in court. This seems to have been a major friction between the two. But before it got reason why he finally left for Singapore where worse, ostensively for health reason, Oei under the Anglo-Saxon law, it was possible to Tjong Swan decided to pull out (he sold his disinherit some children [Interview: Oei share to the other brothers) and left the Tjong Tjay 1989: 224]. Netherlands East Indies for Europe. This The next thing to do was to decide whether made it possible for Oei Tjong Hauw to he should choose all his sons as his heirs or become a dominating figure in the family. only some of them. Apparently, he could try As a whole, Oei Tjong Hauw managed Oei some sons in business, especially those who Tiong Ham Concern fairly well. Under his had left school by the early 1920s when he management, Kian Gwan extended its interna­ went to Singapore. Among them, appar­ tional as well as national network, and Oei ently, all but Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong Tiong Ham Concern went into new areas, Hauw were judged to be incompetent, and such as rubber processing in Sumatra, which were disinherited from his business. Then was to become the mainstay of Kian Gwan In­ the remaining question was what to do with donesia in the postwar period, when sugar the younger sons who had not been tried (one ceased to be a viable export commodity under

3) For a list of his wives and children with birth dates, the socialistic government of Sukarno. Oei see the following appendix. Tiong Hauw, however, probably because of

144 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction his limited education (he was educated in view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 207]. As a result, Semarang and never went to college), did not discipline weakened, the line of authority got seem to understand well that success in blurred, and the exercise of strong leadership modern business depends on organizational became difficult. This is regarded as one ma­ development and efficiency. For example, jor reason for the decline of Oei Tiong Ham unlike the pyramid structure of a Japanese Concern in the postwar period [Interview: Oei zaibatsu, there was no holding company for Tjong Ie 1989: Section 15]. Oei Tjong the group. With the power he wielded in the Hauw's sudden death in 1950 (due to a heart 1930s, he could have set up a holding com­ attack) added to the problem. After this, pany and put all major operating companies there was no overall organizational control: under it if he had wanted to. Then, he could the branches the brothers controlled became have pooled the profits of those companies in­ their own "fiefs" [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay to the holding company and use these to pay 1989: 258]. dividends to the family shareholders to keep Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that a Japanese off incompetent brothers from the company zaibatsu avoided the succession problem [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: 260]. because it recruited its successor from outside But he did not set up a holding company, the family [Tjoa 1963: 607], but this is not and no dividends were ever paid during his true. He seems to have mistaken the manag­ tenure. Then in the late 1930s, as the younger ing director for the successor of a Japanese brothers reached majority, problems began zaibatsu. The main reason for its long life cropping up, because even if some of them did was the separation of management from not want to get involved in business, since ownership. In the case of the Mitsui zaibatsu there were no dividends to their shares, the in Japan's modern period, the owner family only way to assure a steady income was to rarely interfered in management; they left it participate in management. Eventually, all to its professional managers. This practice brothers who received inheritance par­ was established in the process of evolution ticipated in management (the last brother who over the preceding few centuries, as a matter joined the company was Oei Tjong Tjay, the of necessity to perpetuate the family last son of Oei Tiong Ham's, who joined the business. For a young conglomerate like Oei company in December 1948), and as was usu­ Tiong Ham Concern, this sort of tradition ally the case, some sons turned out to be could not be expected, but Oei Tiong Ham at incompetent, in particular the three full least could have restricted the participation of brothers of Oei Tjong Hauw. When they his heirs in management to one, or at most a started exercising their rights, problems few, by making the rest of his heirs rentiers became serious, but not much could be done and strengthening the professional manage­ since they had an equal share as the more com­ ment. The strength of a Japanese zaibatsu petent brothers. For example, if they wanted lay in the independence its professional something badly, even if it was not a viable management enjoyed. business proposition, they could have it [Inter- The ownership structure created problems

145 and hindered the smooth development of Oei Dutch colonialism. Tiong Ham Concern, but a change in business Under this setting, Oei Tiong Ham Concern climate in the postwar period was possibly a declined, but it was not destined to disap­ more tragic thing for its history. Unlike in pear. Although smaller in size, it could have the other former colonies in the ASEAN survived the Sukarno period and expanded region, independence did not come smoothly again in the New Order period, which revived in . It had to be fought for, and the capitalism and has created a number of new political leadership which came to power after business conglomerates. Oei Tjong Ie argues independence rejected most of the economic that one important reason for the end of its institutions which the Dutch had created dur­ life was a lack of strong leadership in the Oei ing the colonial period. It is true that this family after the death of Oei Tjong Hauw in anti-colonial reaction was moderate in the 1950 [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 199, beginning, but it accelerated over time as 211]. According to him, the best candidate to Sukarno gained more power. succeed Tjong Hauw would have been himself, The most serious change for Oei Tiong but he was bypassed and the youngest brother, Ham Concern was government interference in Tjong Tjay, was selected. But, Tjong Ie the economy. Tjoa Soe Tjong argues that argues, Tjong Tjay was too young at that time this started as early as the 1930s (soon after (he was around 27), and having lived most of the Great Depression began) [Tjoa 1963: 651], his life abroad, he did not know the Indone­ but at that time, it was to regulate production sian language and had difficulties in adjusting and distribution to overcome the problems to the rough and tumble of postwar Indone­ created by the Depression and was not in­ sian politics. He was simply the wrong per­ tended to be long-lasting. That is, it was in­ son to head Indonesian operation at that time, tended to save capitalism, not to destroy it. In and let it be taken over more and more by pro­ the postwar period, however, the nature of fessional managers like Tjoa Soe Tjong government interference changed. Initially, whose loyalty to the family did not seem too it was used to change the ownership structure strong [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 211]. of capitalism as well as superimpose socialism All this is refuted by Tjong Tjay [Interview: (government ownership) on capitalism, but Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: 227]. Although he was later when the government became more inexperienced in the beginning, he sought disillusioned with capitalism (especially after advice from his nephew Oei Ing Swie (Tjong 1955 when the Ali Sastroamidjojo govern­ Hauw's eldest son) as well as from Tjoa Soe ment was formed), it was used more and more Tjong. He acted as president director or to replace capitalism with socialism. Under chairman of the board of directors of Kian this setting, any capitalist institution had to Gwan Indonesia, but in decision making, he suffer; Oei Tiong Ham Concern had to suffer always consulted with Ing Swie and Tjoa Soe more, being the symbol of success of the Tjong, and if there was a difference of opin­ Chinese which the Indonesian government ion, he accepted a decision if the other two thought of as something of a collaborator of supported it. Tjong Tjay argues that Tjoa

146 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction

Soe Tjong was a loyal as well as capable since there were no Oei shareholders left, manager and that Tjong Ie is not objective management was entrusted to Tjoa Soe since Tjoa Soe Tjong objected to the way Tjong. This is possibly a sore point for Oei Tjong Ie wanted to manage Kian Gwan In­ Tjong Ie. He argues that if he had been al­ donesia: his way was to use Indonesia as a lowed to head Kian Gwan Indonesia, he could smuggling base for his Singapore operation. have developed close ties with the military Tjong Tjay did not stand idle, either, when and depended on them for protection [Inter­ the business environment was changing in In­ view: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: 206]. His brother donesia. Tjong Ie argues that since Tjong Tjong Tjay agrees that he was a super-contact Tjay could not speak Bahasa Indonesia, he man and that he could have found a patron could not develop close contacts with the among the military leaders [Interview: Oei military which, according to Tjong Ie, control­ Tjong Tjay 1989: 240]. Ifhe had, confiscation led Indonesia [Interview: Oei Tjong Ie 1989: might have been avoided. 202]. But Tjong Tjay argues that in the 1950s, The history of Oei Tiong Ham Concern ended it was politicians who controlled the govern­ abruptly on July 10, 1961, about two years ment, and that having close ties with the before it was scheduled to celebrate its centen­ military was not as important as his brother nial. On that date, deciding on the suit filed argues [Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay 1989: by the government, Pengadilan Ekonomi (the 229]. Tjong Tjay approached Partai Sosialis court for economic crimes) in Semarang Indonesia (PSI) and developed close contacts issued a confiscation order [Tjoa 1963: 677]. with its leaders, such as Professor Sumitro The Indonesian government and the Oei fam­ Djojohadikusumo. In a way, Oei Tiong Ham ily entered into the first legal battle in the Concern became the financier of PSI. At the Netherlands on a blocked reserve fund held same time, Tjong Tjay developed close ties by Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam. The fund with the moderate faction of Partai Nasional was originally deposited with the Javasche Indonesia (PNI). Unfortunately, the political Bank, but after the bank was nationalized and situation changed quickly in the 1950s, and renamed Bank Indonesia, it became a deposit once powerful persons were out not only of with Bank Indonesia. The Oei family asked the government but also of the country (for ex­ Bank Indonesia in Amsterdam to release the ample, Professor Sumitro). In the late 1950s, fund, but the bank refused, so they sued the politics became too radical for capitalists like bank in the Netherlands. They won the case Tjong Tjay, and there were no political and got the reserve fund back [Interview: Oei leaders who were powerful enough to protect Tjong Tjay 1989: 248], but the government his business. seems to have felt sore about it. Oei Tjong Ie At this point, as his brother Tjong Ie feels that the suit in Semarang was the Indone­ argues, he should have stayed in Indonesia sian government's retaliation for it.4) and developed close ties with the military. Many Indonesian Chinese feel that the chief But by 1958 he had become fed up with In­ donesia and left for the Netherlands. And 4) Letter from Oei Tjong Ie (December 21, 1987).

147 tormentor of the Dei family was the public pro­ the Amsterdam office cut down its operation secutor Gunawan. It is said that being a fer­ drastically, whereas the Singapore office vent nationalist, he hated the Chinese, in par­ declined gradually over time and today re­ ticular, Dei Tiong Ham Concern as the sym­ mains only as a small engineering firm; Kian bol of Chinese success. From the Indonesian Gwan (Malaya) no longer exists. It is only the nationalist viewpoint, however, he was an in­ Bangkok office which did well in the post-con­ corruptible nationalist whom Dei Tiong Ham fiscation period [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989: Concern could not bribe, and took action Section 13]. against it since it had violated law. It is not To those who are familiar with successful clear which view is correct, but he was clearly Chinese business families in Southeast Asia in the product of Indonesian nationalism which the prewar period and in the early postwar had a streak of anti-Chineseness at that time. period, the Dei family seems a little odd. A But it is wrong to think that he acted alone. typical successful Chinese family at that time As Dei Tjong Tjay argues, the confiscation of was very Chinese-oriented: the members his company was a result of the political spoke Chinese and retained a great deal of change in the socialist direction which started Chinese culture. If they spoke English or in the mid-1950s. From the direction in another Western language, they spoke it as which the country was moving, Tjong Tjay the second language. In the case of the Dei argues, confiscation was a matter of time. family, the first generation (Dei Tjie Sien) was What surprised him a little was that it came very Chinese, and the second generation (Dei sooner than expected. And he does not think Tiong Ham) was still Chinese though his any particular person masterminded the con­ Chineseness was not as much as his father's, fiscation, but if a single person should be but the third generation Deis had little named, it must be President Sukamo himself Chineseness left. Even Dei Tjong Hauw, since he was at the vanguard of the political who headed the family for about 25 years change at that time [Interview: Dei Tjong since the mid-1920s, did not have a good Tjay 1989: 249]. Mer all, he cleared a legal command of a ; he went barrier by issuing a law which acted against to a Dutch-medium school in Semarang and the legal defense launched by the Dei family seemed to have conducted business largely in [Interview: Dei Tjong Tjay 1989: 251-252]. Dutch and Malay (to be more exact, pasar The Indonesian government could not Malay). His half-brother Tjong Tjay, who touch Dei Tiong Ham Concern's subsidiaries took over after his death, spoke neither and assets abroad. The offices in Singapore, Chinese nor Indonesian well. The brothers Amsterdam, New York, and Bangkok re­ talked to each other in Dutch. In many ways, mained, but they were seriously affected by the the third generation Oeis were Dutch­ confiscation, because their activities centered oriented. Yet, they were not only accepted in around the trade with Indonesia. Without the Chinese community but also regarded as ties with Indonesia, it was difficult to sur­ its leader [Interview: Dei Tjong Ie 1989: Sec­ vive. The New York office soon closed, and tion 13].

148 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction

The so-called peranakan Chinese in In­ on the surface, since they retained (or were donesia, to which the third generation Oeis forced to retain) Chinese names, hair and belong, was a different breed of Chinese in dress styles, and some other characteristics. Southeast Asia. In the other countries in the This group constituted the peranakan region, except a small group of baba Chinese Chinese, in contrast with the China-born, in Malacca, the people who were regarded as Chinese-speaking "singkeh." In the 19th cen­ Chinese usually spoke Chinese. Those who tury, it was from this peranakan group that did not were quickly absorbed into indigenous the business elites of the Chinese community, society and were not regarded as Chinese called cahang atas, came. For example, the anymore. In Thailand, for example, where tax and revenue farmers and Chinese there was a constant influx of Chinese from officers (such as major and lieutenant) who southern China over a long period of time, a were chosen from the cahang atas group large number of their descendants seemed to were predominantly peranakan Chinese have been "lost" to Thai society. In the [Onghokham 1989: 163]. Philippines, too, the assimilation process went There was no strong reason for the Oei fam­ on; the more recently assimilated Chinese ily to remain culturally Chinese. The were called mestizos and as Filipinos, peranakan Chinese they dealt with usually spearheaded economic and social changes in spoke Malay, and their major product, sugar, the country [Wickberg 1964]. had a stronger linkage with the West than However, this sort of assimilation did not with the Chinese (its market was there and take place in Indonesia. The Dutch kept the machines necessary for its production came Chinese separate from the indigenous popula­ from there also). And to carry on a modem tion by restricting their freedom of residence business conglomerate, there were more ad­ and traveling. As in other Southeast Asian vantages in being Dutch-oriented than countries, since Chinese women did not come Chinese-oriented. For example, to handle its in a large number until the late 19th century, legal problems, Dutch-trained and Dutch­ the Chinese usually took indigenous women speaking lawyers provided better services as their wives, and their children grew up (and protection), and for trade finance, Dutch under the cultural influence of indigenous (and possibly to some extent British) banks mothers. But because of the Dutch policy to had more money to lend and offered a wider keep the Chinese separate from the in­ range of services. And the colonial digenous population, they remained a cultur­ bureaucracy which they had to deal with fre­ ally separate group. But they were not Chinese quently, despite its manifestly laissez faire in the sense that the term is usually policy, was Dutch-speaking. If the Chinese understood. Instead of Chinese, they usually language skill was really needed, people who spoke Malay (some even spoke Dutch in addi­ spoke Chinese could be hired. But the areas tion in the late 19th century), and absorbed a where it was necessary were quite limited number of indigenous customs. But they (such as the distribution of imported con­ were more Chinese than indigenous, at least sumer goods to retailers).

149 Today, it is not unusual for a large Chinese petitive environment, but there is no need to businessman in Southeast Asia not to speak do this in a relatively early stage of develop­ Chinese. Such a Chinese businessman is ment since accumulated profits and borrow­ usually non-Chinese educated and more ings from financial institutions can easily familiar with Western business techniques (he make up for the capital which can be raised in has gone to either an English-medium school the stock market. However, family manage­ or local language-medium school, and may ment is often a poor substitute for profes­ have even studied in the West). His Chinese sional management. And thus, for a con­ cultural base is weak and, in some cases, siderable period of time, professional manage­ dubious, but we consider him Chinese ment is a by far more important parameter because carrying a or being the defining business modernization than public son or grandson of a Chinese immigrant, he is ownership. What Oei Tiong Ham did was regarded as an outsider by the indigenous not full-scale but intermediate modernization; society and has developed some Chinese given the historical circumstances, in­ identity. The third generation Oeis are this termediate modernization was the only choice type of Chinese who became more prevalent left and the surest way to full-scale moderniza­ among the successful Chinese in the postwar tion. It should be remembered that in period. Japanese modernization, the zaibatsu did not The Oei family was a precursor of the go beyond intermediate modernization until Chinese business community in another way. the postwar period. By building a large business based on delega­ Oei Tiong Ham was a business pioneer in tion of authority and professional manage­ still another way. It is often thought that ment, Oei Tiong Ham shattered the Chinese capital is commercial and financial stereotype that the Chinese are tradition­ capital, or that since the Chinese do not want bound and cannot develop a modern business to invest in such long-term assets as industrial organization. Despite this·accomplishment, machinery, Chinese capital cannot become in­ however, critics may argue that he kept his dustrial capital. But this view is completely business family owned and in this respect, he wrong. In Southeast Asia today, there are was not fully modern-at least, he was more many Chinese-owned big factories (for exam­ traditional than some of the Chinese pie, Liem Sioe Liong's Indocement in businessmen today who actively use the stock Cibinong, Indonesia, which is the biggest ce­ market for raising capital. But one should ment complex in Asia) and high-story note that among the large companies (like buildings (for example, OUB Centre in Japanese zaibatsu) in prewar Asia, a family­ Singapore, which is the tallest building in owned company was the norm and that a fam­ Asia). And that view was proven wrong by ily-owned company was often better run than Oei Tiong Ham almost a century ago when he a public company. A family-owned company began investing in sugar mills. Given an en­ may have to become eventually a public com­ vironment in which long-term calculation is pany if it wants to continue to grow in the com- possible, the Chinese are willing to invest in

150 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction long-term assets, and thus, Chinese capital nand Braudel would argue, "the subset of a can be converted into industrial capital. If this greater set" [Braudel 1979: 458-461]. One is not done, it is because the Chinese feel in­ crucial component of the greater set is the at­ secure in their countries of residence and titude of the government toward business; since they have to take capital with them especially how much freedom the government when they have to leave, they want to keep gives to business and how political power is their capital in liquid form. regulated when it is exercised over business. To get into the manufacturing industry, one In Dutch Java, the Chinese were major problem the Chinese faced was modern discriminated against in many ways (e.g. technology. But this turned out not so they were not allowed to travel freely or serious a barrier as generally thought. It is reside in the place of their choice), but Chi­ true that in order to establish modern industry nese discrimination became less of a problem and spearhead technological progress on a cor­ from the late 19th century [Onghokham 1989: porate level, there has to be a well developed 173], as the colonial government created the technological environment supported by institutional order in which Dutch private learned institutions, but it is not terribly difficult capital could play a major role in develop­ to master mature technologies. In the case of ment. Oei Tiong Ham and many other Oei Tiong Ham Concern, a number of Dutch Chinese benefited from this legal-institutional engineers were used, but as some Chinese order. came back with engineering degrees from the Unfortunately, after independence, the Netherlands, they began taking over technical colonial economic order was rejected in posts from the Dutch (for example, Yap Kie Indonesia. This was also bound to happen in Ling, who replaced two Dutch engineers in the Philippines and Malaya, but in Indonesia, the headquarters in Semarang in the 1930s since the people had to fight for in­ [Liem 1979: 218]). Lower levels of dependence, rejection of the colonial order technical skill had been handled by the came sooner and in a more drastic way than in Chinese staff much earlier (for example, the the Philippines and Malaya where there were skill to work on an engine was probably first no political upheavals in the transition to in­ mastered on a steamship and transferred later dependence. What replaced the colonial to factories such as sugar mills [Interview: Oei economic order of Indonesia was eventually a Tjong Ie 1989: 195]). In a way, Oei Tiong government-dominated, autarkic economy. Ham Concern was a pioneer in the replacement Foreign capital was regarded more and more of Western engineers with Chinese and the as an instrument for perpetuating colonialism introduction of new technologies, which became and finally nationalized by the government more common among the Chinese firms in (Dutch capital in 1957, British capital in 1963, later, especially postwar, years. and American capital in 1965). And also, The growth and decline of Oei Tiong Ham there was an anti-Chinese feeling as a reaction Concern make us acutely aware that to Dutch colonialism: Indonesian leaders businesses are, as the French historian Fer- tended to regard the Chinese as the collabora-

151 tors of the Dutch in the exploitation of their One may argue that government interven­ country. Government intervention in the tion is necessary to control Chinese economic economy was not bad by itself, but Indonesia, power and promote indigenous participation like many other newly independent countries, in the modem economy. We are well aware did not know how to rationally contain and that the Chinese are still a political and social regulate the exercise of government power in problem in Indonesia, but it should be realized the economy. Like a typical revolutionary il­ that economic development is a terribly diffi­ literate in economics, Sukarno, who emerged cult task. In the early postwar period, as a as the dominant leader of Indonesia in the sort of negative reaction to the prewar 1950s, rejected capitalism as a supporting in­ ideologies to perpetuate colonial rule, op­ stitution of colonialism and in the process of timistic views on the prospect for develop­ replacing it with socialism, destroyed the effi­ ment became dominant among the intellec­ ciency of the economy. It was under this tuals in both developed and developing coun­ anti-Chinese and anti-capitalistic setting that tries, but after a few decades of in­ Oei Tiong Ham Concern declined. dependence, economic development (in the What made the situation worse was con­ sense that the masses, being liberated from siderable skepticism about economic poverty, enjoy a decent standard of living) is liberalism and support for extensive govern­ still a distant hope. Optimism still remains ment interference among the intellectuals strong, but if the past records and prevailing who had been influenced by socialist and economic situation are objectively reassessed, liberal political ideologies in the West. This one would get struck with the enormity of the intellectual atmosphere still remains today development problem. The Chinese problem and affects the role of government in the should be dealt with within this context. economy. But one has to realize that when The decline of Oei Tiong Ham Concern in government is not good government, exten­ the postwar period and its confiscation by the sive government interference can easily Sukarno government in 1961 were undoubt­ bankrupt the economy. It may be emotion­ edly painful events for the Oei family as ally difficult to accept the possibility that one's well as for the people who worked for the com­ own government is not good, but if it is not pany. At the same time, they were tragic good, it is better to face up to the reality. To events for the Indonesian economy as a judge whether a particular government is whole. In that period, all rationally run good or not and whether it will improve in per­ businesses suffered, being subjected formance in the near future may not be easy, to the abuse of governmental power. But but in Indonesia, judging from past records this was tolerated because the intellectual and the miserable standard of living today, climate at that time was such that something government performance is far from satisfac­ was intrinsically wrong with the economic tory, and the economy seems to considerably liberalism of the colonial period. Fortunately improve if economic liberalism was restored (from the economic viewpoint), Sukarno was as the dominant economic ideology. ousted from power in 1965, and a new political

152 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction order was established. As a result, the view of economic slowdown in recent years in economy has improved in the past two decades, the country, now is a good time to reflect on but a legacy of government intervention the virtue of the old economic liberalism still remains strong. which brought about the rise of such an In­ What a developing country like Indonesia donesian business empire as Oei Tiong Ham has to do is to restore the old liberal economic Concern. If it is restored, we may be able to ideology which regards private initiative as witness the rise of dynamic capitalism which the primary force of economic development. once spearheaded economic development in Certainly, economic development (as just the country and will undoubtedly do so again defined above) cannot be brought about in a in the future. short time, but a great deal can be done to im­ prove the economic situation. For example, References since the gap in wages between Japan and In­ donesia, which is over 40 times,5) can generate Braudel, Fernand. 1979. Civilization and Capitalism: 15 th-18 th Century. Vol. n: The Wheel of Com­ export, Indonesia can export a number of pro­ merce. New York: Harper and Row. ducts soon and still more in the near future as Coppel, Charles. 1989. Liem Thian Joe's Unpublished more capital is accumulated and more ex­ History of Kian Gwan. Tonan Ajia Kenkyu [Southeast Asian Studies] 27(2): 177-187. perience.is gained. This increase in exports Interview: Oei Tjong Ie. 1989. Tonan Ajia Kenkyu will enable Indonesia to reduce the gap in [Southeast Asian Studies] 27(2): 188-220. Interview: Oei Tjong Tjay. 1989. Tonan Ajia Kenkyu wages and income with Japan and raise its liv­ [Southeast Asian Studies] 27(2): 221-265. ing standard. Of course, Indonesia can direct Koo, Hui-lan (Madame ). 1943. An exports to other countries (especially high­ Autobiography as Told to Mary Van Rensselaer Thayer. New York: Dial Press. income countries). What is important is to Liem Tjwan Ling. 1979. Oei Tjong Ham: Raja Gula. realize that trade can act as the engine of Surabaya: privately printed. Onghokham.1989. Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java. growth. But for this to come about, the Tonan Ajia Kenkyu [Southeast Asian Studies] economic system of the country has to 27(2): 156-176. Tjoa Soe Tjong. 1963. O.T.H.C.-100 Jaar: Een restrain and regulate the exercise of govern­ Stukje Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesia. ment power in the economy and encourage Economische Statische Berichten. June 26, July 10, private initiative. This is essentially what the and July 17. Wickberg, Edgar. 1964. The Chinese Mestizo in old liberal economic ideology preached. Philippine History. Journal of Southeast Asian There is nothing wrong with an old ideology. History, March. Yoshihara, Kunio. 1988. The Rise ofErsatz Capitalism In fact, new ones caused a fiasco and brought in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University economic misery to postwar Indonesia. In Press.

5) According to the most recent issue of Asiaweek available at the time of this writing Gune 3, 1988), Indonesia's per capita GDP is $500, while Japan's is $22,825.

153 Appendix: The Oei Family

I. Oei Djing Poe (1789-1877) wife: Tjan Moay Nio (1792-1857) sons 1. Oei King Tjien 2. Oei King Tauw 3. Oei Wie Sian 4. Oei Sien Tjo 5. Oei Ing Soen 6. Oei Tjie Sien

:IT. Oei Tjie Sien (1835-1900) wife: Tjan Bien Nio (1839-1896) sons 1. Oei Tiong Tjhian (left in China) 2. Oei Tiong Ham 3. Dei Tiong Bing 4. Dei Tiong An (stillborn?)

m. Oei Tiong Ham (1866-1924) wife children

a) Goei Bing Nio 1. Oei Tjong Lan (f) (1886- ?) 2. Dei Hui Lan (f) (1889- ) b) The Khiam Nio 1. Oei Djoe Nio (f) (1903- ?) c) The Tjik Nio 1. Dei Tjong Tee (m) (1895- ?) 2. Dei Hwan Nio (f) (1897- ?) 3. Oei Tjong Swan (m) (1899- ?) 4. Dei Den Nio (f) (1900- ?) 5. Oei Tjong Yoe (m) (1903- ?) 6. Dei Tjong Tiong (m) (1904- ?) 7. Dei Liang Nio (f) (1906- ?) 8. Dei Tjong Liam (m) (1906- ?) 9. Oei Siok Kiong Nio (f) (1910- ?) d) Ong Tjiang Tjoe Nio 1. Dei Siok Kiong Nio (f) (1907- ?) 2. Dei Bien Nio (f) (1913- ?) e) Ong Mie Hoa Nio 1. Oei Tjong Hauw (m) (1904-1950) 2. Dei Swat Nio (f) (1908- ?) 3. Oei Tjong Tjiat (m) (1909-1957) 4. Oei Tjong Yan (m) (1912- ?) 5. Dei Tjong Ik (m) (1916- ) f) Njoo Swat Ting Nio 1. Dei Siok Ing Nio (f) (1915- ?) g) Ho Kiem Hoa Nio 1. Dei Tjong Ie (m) (1918- ) 2. Dei Twan Nio (f) (1920- ) 3. Dei Tjong Bo (m) (1922- ) 4. Dei Tjong Hiong (m) (1923- ) 5. Oei Tjong Tjay (m) (1924- ) h) Tan Sien Nio 1. Dei Siang Nio (f) (?- ?)

154 YOSHlHARA K.: Introduction

N. Oei Tjong Tee (ill-c-l) children: 1. Oei Ping Yan (f) 2. Oei Leodi (f) Oei Tjong Swan (ill -c-3) children: 1. Oei Ing Tjhing (m) 2. Oei Ing Hing (m) 3. Oei Ing Bian (m) 4. Oei Ing Wan (m) Oei Tjong Liam (ill-c-8) children: 1. Oei Ing Siang (m) 2. Oei Ing Ie (m) Oei Tjong Hauw (ill-e-l) wife: Be Hien Nio children: 1. Oei Ing Swie (m) 2. Oei Ing Lhie (m) 3. Oei Ing Gie (m) Oei Tjong Tjiat (ill -e-3) wife: B. Betuwe Oei Tjong Ik (ill-e-5) wife: L.A. Livain children: 1. Oei Ing King (m) 2. Oei Ing Tjiang (m) 3. Oei Ing Tjee (m) 4. Oei Lian Hwa (f) Oei Tjong Ie (ill-g-l) wife: M.S. Mathysen children: 1. Oei Ing Tjien (m) 2. Oei Ing Kiang (m) Oei Tjong Hiong (ill -g-4) wife: Oei Tien Nio children: 1. Oei Ing Tjong (m) 2. Oei Siok Tien (f) 3. Oei Siok Ing (f) Oei Tjong Tjay (ill-g-5) wife: M.L. Blanc children: 1. Oei Siok Lian (f)

155