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Title Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java(<Special Issue>Oei Tiong Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java(<Special Issue>Oei Tiong Title Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia) Author(s) Onghokham Citation 東南アジア研究 (1989), 27(2): 156-176 Issue Date 1989-09 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56364 Right Type Departmental Bulletin Paper Textversion publisher Kyoto University Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No.2, September 1989 Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java ONGHOKHAM* In Indonesia, a legend often grows around a man of great success, and this is certainly true I Introduction in the case of Oei Tiong Ham. Therefore one There are not many writings on Indonesian should not always accept everything that has business. Even the writings on Indonesian been written about him at its face value. For Chinese have been mostly on their politics, example, his daughter Oei Hui Lan's descrip­ despite the often-stated importance of their tion of her father's elaborate morning toilet role in the economy. Indonesia today con­ and gargantuan breakfast reminds us more of siders economic development as its main aim, a mandarin than a businessman [Koo 1943: and has been relying more and more on the 34-35], for the typical picture of a Java-Chinese private initiative of its citizens in achieving businessman is that he did everything fast, this aim. It is in this context that it might be though in his days life was indeed much useful to draw attention to the rise of Oei slower than today. Oei Tiong Ham's father, Tiong Ham Concern in the prewar period. Oei Tjie Sien, might also have had some share Engaged in international trading, sugar mill­ in this legend-making. A typical new im­ ing, banking, shipping, and some other trade­ migrant from China was poor and illiterate, related activities, it was the first modem but Oei Tjie Sien, who was the first of the fam­ business conglomerate in Southeast Asia. ily to come to Java, might have been an excep­ The founder of the Concern, Oei Tiong Ham, tion. However, Oei Hui Lan's story of the was an exception among the Chinese who ran aura of light around him during sleep [Koo small businesses relying on family members. 1943: 6] was probably not true, for it was Oei Tiong Ham was not what L. Williams probably borrowed from Javanese society in calls a mere business manager [Williams which such a story has old and deep roots 1952], or even a simple bearer of risk, but a [Koo 1943: 7]. Even today Oei Tiong Ham leader in economic development as well as a is still talked about in Indonesia. He is said to modernizer of business in the region. His have been a persuasive and sweet-talking achievements contradicted the prewar colo­ diplomat, somewhat of a financial raider, and nial order and J.H. Boeke's dualistic theory a charmer of women. Unfortunately, there is [Boeke 1931]. Ironically, it was the passing no way of knowing today how much of it is a of that order which caused the decline of Oei myth and how much of it was reality. Tiong Ham Concern. Oei Tiong Ham's life and career can be * Faculty of Letters, University of Indonesia, Jakarta understood better if we know the social and Indonesia. economic environment of his period. But 156 ONGHOKHAM: Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java since we cannot discuss every aspect of it, we money. The Dutch founder of Batavia, J.P. would like to narrow our discussion to what Coen, who was Governor General of the col­ had direct bearings on his life and career, ony from 1919 to 1923, thought of the Chinese namely: the formation of the Chinese, in the city as an essential economic asset. especially peranakan society in Java; the rise The Chinese formed a majority in Batavia's of capital in this society; and Dutch colonial population, living as artisans, traders, contrac­ policy which shaped these developments. tors, and coolies. And in the 18th century, And then we want to focus our attention on they began operating sugar mills in the en­ Semarang, where Oei Tiong Ham grew up, virons of the city. They were its middle class and view his business expansion against the as well as its proletariat. The traders were business and social background of the city. intermediaries between the Dutch and the indigenous people as well as between city and hinterland [Blusse 1986: 78-79]. II Peranakan Society under Dutch In early colonial days, the Dutch tried to Colonial Policy populate Batavia with free burghers, by en­ Although the Chinese began coming to couraging immigration from their country. Southeast Asia a long time ago (probably as But this failed because the VOC did not really far back as the dawn of history), the structure want to develop a city of free burghers from of the Chinese community in Indonesia today the fear that such a city would threaten its started to develop only after the advent of trade monopoly and its authoritarian political Dutch colonialism in the region. In 1619, the structure [Taylor 1983]. Ultimately, the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC preferred forming an economic partner­ or Dutch East India Company) made Batavia ship with the Chinese, and this became a its headquarters for its trading operations in permanent aspect of the Dutch colonial order. Asia, and Java, where Batavia was located, Early Batavia was already what J .5. Fur­ became the cradle of Dutch colonialism in the nivall later called a pluralistic society [Fur­ Indonesian archipelago [Masselman 1963]. nivall 1939]. Each group tended to have an Colonization of the Philippines, however, independent social life and was administered started earlier than that of Java, but compared by its own headman. In Jakarta today, the with the Dutch, the Spaniards who colonized pattern of residence developed in early the Philippines were less commercially Batavia is still reflected in such locational oriented and less efficient in exploiting their names as Kampung Cina, Kampung Bali, colony. Because of this, they had less need Kampung Melayu, and Kampung Arab. Un­ for Chinese labor. At the end of the Spanish til 1740, however, the Chinese seemed to have period, there were about 40,000 Chinese there been able to live anywhere in the town. They [Purcell 1980: 496], but around the same were, however, managed by their own time, there were 300,000 Chinese in Java headmen-the so called officers, such as [Purcell 1980: 386]. Like the Dutch, they kapitan, lieutenant and quartermaster. The came to the Indonesian archipelago to earn officers were appointed by the Dutch and usu- 157 ally selected on the basis of wealth-the source Dutch and the Chinese seemed to have been of respect and influence in merchant com­ restored within one or two years, even sooner munities· like that of the Chinese. Later, in Batavia, but one permanent effect of the when the local Chinese developed a sense of 1740 massacre was that the Chinese were solidarity among themselves as peranakan from then on assigned to their own residential and established themselves as a group quarters, called Chinese kamp [de Haan different from the newly arrived Chinese 1935: 376-395], and were forbidden to live (singkeh/totok), Chinese officers were ap­ elsewhere. The quarters were called Chinese pointed only from them. ghettos, or Chinatown, and this residential pat­ The existence of the Chinese officer system tern led to a zoning system. In Dutch it was did not mean that the VOC did not intervene called wijkenstelsel, which together with the in Chinese community affairs. In 1655, the passenstelsel, which required a pass for the Dutch established the Council of Chinese planning to travel outside, restricted Boedelmeesters (Trustees), consisting of both their freedom of movement. However, it was Dutchmen and Chinese, to administer the in­ not until 1830 that these restrictions were heritance of the Chinese who died without rigorously enforced by Dutch officials [Rush issue or without children who had come of 1977: 95-96]. age. The fund the trustees came to ad­ Even before 1740, the Dutch tended to keep minister was used to build hospitals and or­ the various ethnic groups they ruled separate phanages. The Dutch and the Chinese also from each other. In the beginning, this had to jointly deal with some other problems tendency was derived more from religious con­ such as sanitation and debtor-creditor rela­ siderations than from racial ones. This is not tions involving both. And also, from early too difficult to understand if we remember the days, the Chinese could take advantage of the fact that the Dutch came from the Europe of Dutch commercial law which gave protection the 17th century, when religious intolerance to their property. Being the headquarters of was at its zenith. The term "peranakan," for the VOC, Batavia enjoyed the best legal pro­ example, reflected the Dutch religious bias. tection, so many Chinese preferred to stay Until the early 19th century, the term was there [Blusse 1986: 85]. used to refer to the Chinese who became From the founding of Batavia in 1619 to the Moslems, or the shaven Chinese-the Chinese end of the VOC in 1800, the relations between who shaved off their pigtails when they the Dutch and the Chinese seemed generally became Moslems. Their number seems to good, but in 1740 there occurred a massacre have been quite large. The VOC segregated of Chinese in Batavia. This was followed by them from the non-Moslem Chinese and ap­ the so-called Olanda-Cina (Hollanders­ pointed their own officers. The position of Chinese) war, which in tum led to a war of suc­ major in the Moslem Chinese community in cession among the Javanese princes, dividing Batavia was, however, abolished in 1827 them into the pro-Chinese and pro-Dutch when they became indistinguishable from the groups.
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